2 Unix SMB/CIFS implementation.
4 Database Glue between Samba and the KDC
6 Copyright (C) Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org> 2005-2009
7 Copyright (C) Simo Sorce <idra@samba.org> 2010
9 This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
10 it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
11 the Free Software Foundation; either version 3 of the License, or
12 (at your option) any later version.
14 This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
15 but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
16 MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the
17 GNU General Public License for more details.
20 You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
21 along with this program. If not, see <http://www.gnu.org/licenses/>.
25 #include "libcli/security/security.h"
26 #include "auth/auth.h"
27 #include "auth/auth_sam.h"
28 #include "dsdb/samdb/samdb.h"
29 #include "dsdb/common/util.h"
30 #include "librpc/gen_ndr/ndr_drsblobs.h"
31 #include "param/param.h"
32 #include "../lib/crypto/md4.h"
33 #include "system/kerberos.h"
34 #include "auth/kerberos/kerberos.h"
36 #include "kdc/samba_kdc.h"
37 #include "kdc/db-glue.h"
39 #define SAMBA_KVNO_GET_KRBTGT(kvno) \
40 ((uint16_t)(((uint32_t)kvno) >> 16))
42 #define SAMBA_KVNO_AND_KRBTGT(kvno, krbtgt) \
43 ((krb5_kvno)((((uint32_t)kvno) & 0xFFFF) | \
44 ((((uint32_t)krbtgt) << 16) & 0xFFFF0000)))
46 enum samba_kdc_ent_type
47 { SAMBA_KDC_ENT_TYPE_CLIENT, SAMBA_KDC_ENT_TYPE_SERVER,
48 SAMBA_KDC_ENT_TYPE_KRBTGT, SAMBA_KDC_ENT_TYPE_TRUST, SAMBA_KDC_ENT_TYPE_ANY };
50 enum trust_direction {
52 INBOUND = LSA_TRUST_DIRECTION_INBOUND,
53 OUTBOUND = LSA_TRUST_DIRECTION_OUTBOUND
56 static const char *trust_attrs[] = {
61 "msDS-SupportedEncryptionTypes",
69 static time_t ldb_msg_find_krb5time_ldap_time(struct ldb_message *msg, const char *attr, time_t default_val)
75 gentime = ldb_msg_find_attr_as_string(msg, attr, NULL);
79 tmp = strptime(gentime, "%Y%m%d%H%M%SZ", &tm);
87 static HDBFlags uf2HDBFlags(krb5_context context, uint32_t userAccountControl, enum samba_kdc_ent_type ent_type)
89 HDBFlags flags = int2HDBFlags(0);
91 /* we don't allow kadmin deletes */
94 /* mark the principal as invalid to start with */
99 /* All accounts are servers, but this may be disabled again in the caller */
102 /* Account types - clear the invalid bit if it turns out to be valid */
103 if (userAccountControl & UF_NORMAL_ACCOUNT) {
104 if (ent_type == SAMBA_KDC_ENT_TYPE_CLIENT || ent_type == SAMBA_KDC_ENT_TYPE_ANY) {
110 if (userAccountControl & UF_INTERDOMAIN_TRUST_ACCOUNT) {
111 if (ent_type == SAMBA_KDC_ENT_TYPE_CLIENT || ent_type == SAMBA_KDC_ENT_TYPE_ANY) {
116 if (userAccountControl & UF_WORKSTATION_TRUST_ACCOUNT) {
117 if (ent_type == SAMBA_KDC_ENT_TYPE_CLIENT || ent_type == SAMBA_KDC_ENT_TYPE_ANY) {
122 if (userAccountControl & UF_SERVER_TRUST_ACCOUNT) {
123 if (ent_type == SAMBA_KDC_ENT_TYPE_CLIENT || ent_type == SAMBA_KDC_ENT_TYPE_ANY) {
129 /* Not permitted to act as a client if disabled */
130 if (userAccountControl & UF_ACCOUNTDISABLE) {
133 if (userAccountControl & UF_LOCKOUT) {
134 flags.locked_out = 1;
137 if (userAccountControl & UF_PASSWORD_NOTREQD) {
142 UF_PASSWORD_CANT_CHANGE and UF_ENCRYPTED_TEXT_PASSWORD_ALLOWED are irrelevent
144 if (userAccountControl & UF_TEMP_DUPLICATE_ACCOUNT) {
148 /* UF_DONT_EXPIRE_PASSWD and UF_USE_DES_KEY_ONLY handled in samba_kdc_message2entry() */
151 if (userAccountControl & UF_MNS_LOGON_ACCOUNT) {
155 if (userAccountControl & UF_SMARTCARD_REQUIRED) {
156 flags.require_hwauth = 1;
158 if (userAccountControl & UF_TRUSTED_FOR_DELEGATION) {
159 flags.ok_as_delegate = 1;
161 if (userAccountControl & UF_TRUSTED_TO_AUTHENTICATE_FOR_DELEGATION) {
163 * this is confusing...
165 * UF_TRUSTED_FOR_DELEGATION
170 * UF_TRUSTED_TO_AUTHENTICATE_FOR_DELEGATION
171 * => trusted_for_delegation
173 flags.trusted_for_delegation = 1;
175 if (!(userAccountControl & UF_NOT_DELEGATED)) {
176 flags.forwardable = 1;
180 if (userAccountControl & UF_DONT_REQUIRE_PREAUTH) {
181 flags.require_preauth = 0;
183 flags.require_preauth = 1;
189 static int samba_kdc_entry_destructor(struct samba_kdc_entry *p)
191 hdb_entry_ex *entry_ex = p->entry_ex;
192 free_hdb_entry(&entry_ex->entry);
196 static void samba_kdc_free_entry(krb5_context context, hdb_entry_ex *entry_ex)
198 /* this function is called only from hdb_free_entry().
199 * Make sure we neutralize the destructor or we will
200 * get a double free later when hdb_free_entry() will
201 * try to call free_hdb_entry() */
202 talloc_set_destructor(entry_ex->ctx, NULL);
204 /* now proceed to free the talloc part */
205 talloc_free(entry_ex->ctx);
208 static krb5_error_code samba_kdc_message2entry_keys(krb5_context context,
209 struct samba_kdc_db_context *kdc_db_ctx,
211 struct ldb_message *msg,
214 uint32_t userAccountControl,
215 enum samba_kdc_ent_type ent_type,
216 hdb_entry_ex *entry_ex)
218 krb5_error_code ret = 0;
219 enum ndr_err_code ndr_err;
220 struct samr_Password *hash;
221 const struct ldb_val *sc_val;
222 struct supplementalCredentialsBlob scb;
223 struct supplementalCredentialsPackage *scpk = NULL;
224 bool newer_keys = false;
225 struct package_PrimaryKerberosBlob _pkb;
226 struct package_PrimaryKerberosCtr3 *pkb3 = NULL;
227 struct package_PrimaryKerberosCtr4 *pkb4 = NULL;
229 uint16_t allocated_keys = 0;
230 int rodc_krbtgt_number = 0;
232 uint32_t supported_enctypes
233 = ldb_msg_find_attr_as_uint(msg,
234 "msDS-SupportedEncryptionTypes",
237 if (rid == DOMAIN_RID_KRBTGT || is_rodc) {
238 /* KDCs (and KDCs on RODCs) use AES */
239 supported_enctypes |= ENC_HMAC_SHA1_96_AES128 | ENC_HMAC_SHA1_96_AES256;
240 } else if (userAccountControl & (UF_PARTIAL_SECRETS_ACCOUNT|UF_SERVER_TRUST_ACCOUNT)) {
241 /* DCs and RODCs comptuer accounts use AES */
242 supported_enctypes |= ENC_HMAC_SHA1_96_AES128 | ENC_HMAC_SHA1_96_AES256;
243 } else if (ent_type == SAMBA_KDC_ENT_TYPE_CLIENT ||
244 (ent_type == SAMBA_KDC_ENT_TYPE_ANY)) {
245 /* for AS-REQ the client chooses the enc types it
246 * supports, and this will vary between computers a
249 * likewise for 'any' return as much as is supported,
250 * to export into a keytab */
251 supported_enctypes = ENC_ALL_TYPES;
254 /* If UF_USE_DES_KEY_ONLY has been set, then don't allow use of the newer enc types */
255 if (userAccountControl & UF_USE_DES_KEY_ONLY) {
256 supported_enctypes = ENC_CRC32|ENC_RSA_MD5;
258 /* Otherwise, add in the default enc types */
259 supported_enctypes |= ENC_CRC32 | ENC_RSA_MD5 | ENC_RC4_HMAC_MD5;
262 /* Is this the krbtgt or a RODC krbtgt */
264 rodc_krbtgt_number = ldb_msg_find_attr_as_int(msg, "msDS-SecondaryKrbTgtNumber", -1);
266 if (rodc_krbtgt_number == -1) {
271 entry_ex->entry.keys.val = NULL;
272 entry_ex->entry.keys.len = 0;
274 kvno = ldb_msg_find_attr_as_int(msg, "msDS-KeyVersionNumber", 0);
276 kvno = SAMBA_KVNO_AND_KRBTGT(kvno, rodc_krbtgt_number);
278 entry_ex->entry.kvno = kvno;
280 /* Get keys from the db */
282 hash = samdb_result_hash(mem_ctx, msg, "unicodePwd");
283 sc_val = ldb_msg_find_ldb_val(msg, "supplementalCredentials");
285 /* unicodePwd for enctype 0x17 (23) if present */
290 /* supplementalCredentials if present */
292 ndr_err = ndr_pull_struct_blob_all(sc_val, mem_ctx, &scb,
293 (ndr_pull_flags_fn_t)ndr_pull_supplementalCredentialsBlob);
294 if (!NDR_ERR_CODE_IS_SUCCESS(ndr_err)) {
295 dump_data(0, sc_val->data, sc_val->length);
300 if (scb.sub.signature != SUPPLEMENTAL_CREDENTIALS_SIGNATURE) {
301 NDR_PRINT_DEBUG(supplementalCredentialsBlob, &scb);
306 for (i=0; i < scb.sub.num_packages; i++) {
307 if (strcmp("Primary:Kerberos-Newer-Keys", scb.sub.packages[i].name) == 0) {
308 scpk = &scb.sub.packages[i];
309 if (!scpk->data || !scpk->data[0]) {
315 } else if (strcmp("Primary:Kerberos", scb.sub.packages[i].name) == 0) {
316 scpk = &scb.sub.packages[i];
317 if (!scpk->data || !scpk->data[0]) {
321 * we don't break here in hope to find
322 * a Kerberos-Newer-Keys package
328 * Primary:Kerberos-Newer-Keys or Primary:Kerberos element
329 * of supplementalCredentials
334 blob = strhex_to_data_blob(mem_ctx, scpk->data);
340 /* we cannot use ndr_pull_struct_blob_all() here, as w2k and w2k3 add padding bytes */
341 ndr_err = ndr_pull_struct_blob(&blob, mem_ctx, &_pkb,
342 (ndr_pull_flags_fn_t)ndr_pull_package_PrimaryKerberosBlob);
343 if (!NDR_ERR_CODE_IS_SUCCESS(ndr_err)) {
345 krb5_set_error_message(context, ret, "samba_kdc_message2entry_keys: could not parse package_PrimaryKerberosBlob");
346 krb5_warnx(context, "samba_kdc_message2entry_keys: could not parse package_PrimaryKerberosBlob");
350 if (newer_keys && _pkb.version != 4) {
352 krb5_set_error_message(context, ret, "samba_kdc_message2entry_keys: Primary:Kerberos-Newer-Keys not version 4");
353 krb5_warnx(context, "samba_kdc_message2entry_keys: Primary:Kerberos-Newer-Keys not version 4");
357 if (!newer_keys && _pkb.version != 3) {
359 krb5_set_error_message(context, ret, "samba_kdc_message2entry_keys: could not parse Primary:Kerberos not version 3");
360 krb5_warnx(context, "samba_kdc_message2entry_keys: could not parse Primary:Kerberos not version 3");
364 if (_pkb.version == 4) {
365 pkb4 = &_pkb.ctr.ctr4;
366 allocated_keys += pkb4->num_keys;
367 } else if (_pkb.version == 3) {
368 pkb3 = &_pkb.ctr.ctr3;
369 allocated_keys += pkb3->num_keys;
373 if (allocated_keys == 0) {
374 if (kdc_db_ctx->rodc) {
375 /* We are on an RODC, but don't have keys for this account. Signal this to the caller */
376 /* TODO: We need to call a generalised version of auth_sam_trigger_repl_secret from here */
377 return HDB_ERR_NOT_FOUND_HERE;
380 /* oh, no password. Apparently (comment in
381 * hdb-ldap.c) this violates the ASN.1, but this
382 * allows an entry with no keys (yet). */
386 /* allocate space to decode into */
387 entry_ex->entry.keys.len = 0;
388 entry_ex->entry.keys.val = calloc(allocated_keys, sizeof(Key));
389 if (entry_ex->entry.keys.val == NULL) {
394 if (hash && (supported_enctypes & ENC_RC4_HMAC_MD5)) {
398 key.salt = NULL; /* No salt for this enc type */
400 ret = smb_krb5_keyblock_init_contents(context,
401 ENCTYPE_ARCFOUR_HMAC,
409 entry_ex->entry.keys.val[entry_ex->entry.keys.len] = key;
410 entry_ex->entry.keys.len++;
414 for (i=0; i < pkb4->num_keys; i++) {
417 if (!pkb4->keys[i].value) continue;
419 if (!(kerberos_enctype_to_bitmap(pkb4->keys[i].keytype) & supported_enctypes)) {
426 if (pkb4->salt.string) {
429 salt = data_blob_string_const(pkb4->salt.string);
431 key.salt = calloc(1, sizeof(*key.salt));
432 if (key.salt == NULL) {
437 key.salt->type = KRB5_PW_SALT;
439 ret = krb5_copy_data_contents(&key.salt->salt,
449 /* TODO: maybe pass the iteration_count somehow... */
451 ret = smb_krb5_keyblock_init_contents(context,
452 pkb4->keys[i].keytype,
453 pkb4->keys[i].value->data,
454 pkb4->keys[i].value->length,
456 if (ret == KRB5_PROG_ETYPE_NOSUPP) {
457 DEBUG(2,("Unsupported keytype ignored - type %u\n",
458 pkb4->keys[i].keytype));
471 entry_ex->entry.keys.val[entry_ex->entry.keys.len] = key;
472 entry_ex->entry.keys.len++;
475 for (i=0; i < pkb3->num_keys; i++) {
478 if (!pkb3->keys[i].value) continue;
480 if (!(kerberos_enctype_to_bitmap(pkb3->keys[i].keytype) & supported_enctypes)) {
487 if (pkb3->salt.string) {
490 salt = data_blob_string_const(pkb3->salt.string);
492 key.salt = calloc(1, sizeof(*key.salt));
493 if (key.salt == NULL) {
498 key.salt->type = KRB5_PW_SALT;
500 ret = krb5_copy_data_contents(&key.salt->salt,
510 ret = smb_krb5_keyblock_init_contents(context,
511 pkb3->keys[i].keytype,
512 pkb3->keys[i].value->data,
513 pkb3->keys[i].value->length,
524 entry_ex->entry.keys.val[entry_ex->entry.keys.len] = key;
525 entry_ex->entry.keys.len++;
531 entry_ex->entry.keys.len = 0;
533 if (entry_ex->entry.keys.len == 0 && entry_ex->entry.keys.val) {
534 free(entry_ex->entry.keys.val);
535 entry_ex->entry.keys.val = NULL;
541 * Construct an hdb_entry from a directory entry.
543 static krb5_error_code samba_kdc_message2entry(krb5_context context,
544 struct samba_kdc_db_context *kdc_db_ctx,
545 TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx, krb5_const_principal principal,
546 enum samba_kdc_ent_type ent_type,
548 struct ldb_dn *realm_dn,
549 struct ldb_message *msg,
550 hdb_entry_ex *entry_ex)
552 struct loadparm_context *lp_ctx = kdc_db_ctx->lp_ctx;
553 uint32_t userAccountControl;
554 uint32_t msDS_User_Account_Control_Computed;
556 krb5_error_code ret = 0;
557 krb5_boolean is_computer = FALSE;
559 struct samba_kdc_entry *p;
564 bool is_rodc = false;
565 struct ldb_message_element *objectclasses;
566 struct ldb_val computer_val;
567 const char *samAccountName = ldb_msg_find_attr_as_string(msg, "samAccountName", NULL);
568 computer_val.data = discard_const_p(uint8_t,"computer");
569 computer_val.length = strlen((const char *)computer_val.data);
571 if (ldb_msg_find_element(msg, "msDS-SecondaryKrbTgtNumber")) {
575 if (!samAccountName) {
577 krb5_set_error_message(context, ret, "samba_kdc_message2entry: no samAccountName present");
581 objectclasses = ldb_msg_find_element(msg, "objectClass");
583 if (objectclasses && ldb_msg_find_val(objectclasses, &computer_val)) {
587 memset(entry_ex, 0, sizeof(*entry_ex));
589 p = talloc(mem_ctx, struct samba_kdc_entry);
595 p->kdc_db_ctx = kdc_db_ctx;
596 p->entry_ex = entry_ex;
597 p->realm_dn = talloc_reference(p, realm_dn);
603 talloc_set_destructor(p, samba_kdc_entry_destructor);
605 /* make sure we do not have bogus data in there */
606 memset(&entry_ex->entry, 0, sizeof(hdb_entry));
609 entry_ex->free_entry = samba_kdc_free_entry;
611 userAccountControl = ldb_msg_find_attr_as_uint(msg, "userAccountControl", 0);
613 msDS_User_Account_Control_Computed
614 = ldb_msg_find_attr_as_uint(msg,
615 "msDS-User-Account-Control-Computed",
619 * This brings in the lockout flag, block the account if not
620 * found. We need the weird UF_ACCOUNTDISABLE check because
621 * we do not want to fail open if the value is not returned,
622 * but 0 is a valid value (all OK)
624 if (msDS_User_Account_Control_Computed == UF_ACCOUNTDISABLE) {
626 krb5_set_error_message(context, ret, "samba_kdc_message2entry: "
627 "no msDS-User-Account-Control-Computed present");
630 userAccountControl |= msDS_User_Account_Control_Computed;
634 * If we are set to canonicalize, we get back the fixed UPPER
635 * case realm, and the real username (ie matching LDAP
638 * Otherwise, if we are set to enterprise, we
639 * get back the whole principal as-sent
641 * Finally, if we are not set to canonicalize, we get back the
642 * fixed UPPER case realm, but the as-sent username
645 entry_ex->entry.principal = malloc(sizeof(*(entry_ex->entry.principal)));
646 if (ent_type == SAMBA_KDC_ENT_TYPE_KRBTGT) {
647 if (flags & (HDB_F_CANON)) {
649 * When requested to do so, ensure that the
650 * both realm values in the principal are set
651 * to the upper case, canonical realm
653 ret = smb_krb5_make_principal(context, &entry_ex->entry.principal,
654 lpcfg_realm(lp_ctx), "krbtgt",
655 lpcfg_realm(lp_ctx), NULL);
657 krb5_clear_error_message(context);
660 krb5_principal_set_type(context, entry_ex->entry.principal, KRB5_NT_SRV_INST);
662 ret = krb5_copy_principal(context, principal, &entry_ex->entry.principal);
664 krb5_clear_error_message(context);
668 * this appears to be required regardless of
669 * the canonicalize flag from the client
671 ret = smb_krb5_principal_set_realm(context, entry_ex->entry.principal, lpcfg_realm(lp_ctx));
673 krb5_clear_error_message(context);
678 } else if (ent_type == SAMBA_KDC_ENT_TYPE_ANY && principal == NULL) {
679 ret = smb_krb5_make_principal(context, &entry_ex->entry.principal, lpcfg_realm(lp_ctx), samAccountName, NULL);
681 krb5_clear_error_message(context);
684 } else if (flags & HDB_F_CANON && flags & HDB_F_FOR_AS_REQ) {
686 * HDB_F_CANON maps from the canonicalize flag in the
687 * packet, and has a different meaning between AS-REQ
688 * and TGS-REQ. We only change the principal in the AS-REQ case
690 ret = smb_krb5_make_principal(context, &entry_ex->entry.principal, lpcfg_realm(lp_ctx), samAccountName, NULL);
692 krb5_clear_error_message(context);
696 ret = krb5_copy_principal(context, principal, &entry_ex->entry.principal);
698 krb5_clear_error_message(context);
702 if (smb_krb5_principal_get_type(context, principal) != KRB5_NT_ENTERPRISE_PRINCIPAL) {
703 /* While we have copied the client principal, tests
704 * show that Win2k3 returns the 'corrected' realm, not
705 * the client-specified realm. This code attempts to
706 * replace the client principal's realm with the one
707 * we determine from our records */
709 /* this has to be with malloc() */
710 ret = smb_krb5_principal_set_realm(context, entry_ex->entry.principal, lpcfg_realm(lp_ctx));
712 krb5_clear_error_message(context);
718 /* First try and figure out the flags based on the userAccountControl */
719 entry_ex->entry.flags = uf2HDBFlags(context, userAccountControl, ent_type);
721 /* Windows 2008 seems to enforce this (very sensible) rule by
722 * default - don't allow offline attacks on a user's password
723 * by asking for a ticket to them as a service (encrypted with
724 * their probably patheticly insecure password) */
726 if (entry_ex->entry.flags.server
727 && lpcfg_parm_bool(lp_ctx, NULL, "kdc", "require spn for service", true)) {
728 if (!is_computer && !ldb_msg_find_attr_as_string(msg, "servicePrincipalName", NULL)) {
729 entry_ex->entry.flags.server = 0;
733 * To give the correct type of error to the client, we must
734 * not just return the entry without .server set, we must
735 * pretend the principal does not exist. Otherwise we may
736 * return ERR_POLICY instead of
737 * KRB5KDC_ERR_S_PRINCIPAL_UNKNOWN
739 if (ent_type == SAMBA_KDC_ENT_TYPE_SERVER && entry_ex->entry.flags.server == 0) {
740 ret = HDB_ERR_NOENTRY;
741 krb5_set_error_message(context, ret, "samba_kdc_message2entry: no servicePrincipalName present for this server, refusing with no-such-entry");
744 if (flags & HDB_F_ADMIN_DATA) {
745 /* These (created_by, modified_by) parts of the entry are not relevant for Samba4's use
746 * of the Heimdal KDC. They are stored in a the traditional
747 * DB for audit purposes, and still form part of the structure
750 /* use 'whenCreated' */
751 entry_ex->entry.created_by.time = ldb_msg_find_krb5time_ldap_time(msg, "whenCreated", 0);
752 /* use 'kadmin' for now (needed by mit_samba) */
754 ret = smb_krb5_make_principal(context,
755 &entry_ex->entry.created_by.principal,
756 lpcfg_realm(lp_ctx), "kadmin", NULL);
758 krb5_clear_error_message(context);
762 entry_ex->entry.modified_by = (Event *) malloc(sizeof(Event));
763 if (entry_ex->entry.modified_by == NULL) {
765 krb5_set_error_message(context, ret, "malloc: out of memory");
769 /* use 'whenChanged' */
770 entry_ex->entry.modified_by->time = ldb_msg_find_krb5time_ldap_time(msg, "whenChanged", 0);
771 /* use 'kadmin' for now (needed by mit_samba) */
772 ret = smb_krb5_make_principal(context,
773 &entry_ex->entry.modified_by->principal,
774 lpcfg_realm(lp_ctx), "kadmin", NULL);
776 krb5_clear_error_message(context);
782 /* The lack of password controls etc applies to krbtgt by
783 * virtue of being that particular RID */
784 status = dom_sid_split_rid(NULL, samdb_result_dom_sid(mem_ctx, msg, "objectSid"), NULL, &rid);
786 if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(status)) {
791 if (rid == DOMAIN_RID_KRBTGT) {
794 entry_ex->entry.valid_end = NULL;
795 entry_ex->entry.pw_end = NULL;
797 entry_ex->entry.flags.invalid = 0;
798 entry_ex->entry.flags.server = 1;
800 realm = smb_krb5_principal_get_realm(context, principal);
806 /* Don't mark all requests for the krbtgt/realm as
807 * 'change password', as otherwise we could get into
808 * trouble, and not enforce the password expirty.
809 * Instead, only do it when request is for the kpasswd service */
810 if (ent_type == SAMBA_KDC_ENT_TYPE_SERVER
811 && krb5_princ_size(context, principal) == 2
812 && (strcmp(krb5_principal_get_comp_string(context, principal, 0), "kadmin") == 0)
813 && (strcmp(krb5_principal_get_comp_string(context, principal, 1), "changepw") == 0)
814 && lpcfg_is_my_domain_or_realm(lp_ctx, realm)) {
815 entry_ex->entry.flags.change_pw = 1;
820 entry_ex->entry.flags.client = 0;
821 entry_ex->entry.flags.forwardable = 1;
822 entry_ex->entry.flags.ok_as_delegate = 1;
823 } else if (is_rodc) {
824 /* The RODC krbtgt account is like the main krbtgt,
825 * but it does not have a changepw or kadmin
828 entry_ex->entry.valid_end = NULL;
829 entry_ex->entry.pw_end = NULL;
831 /* Also don't allow the RODC krbtgt to be a client (it should not be needed) */
832 entry_ex->entry.flags.client = 0;
833 entry_ex->entry.flags.invalid = 0;
834 entry_ex->entry.flags.server = 1;
836 entry_ex->entry.flags.client = 0;
837 entry_ex->entry.flags.forwardable = 1;
838 entry_ex->entry.flags.ok_as_delegate = 0;
839 } else if (entry_ex->entry.flags.server && ent_type == SAMBA_KDC_ENT_TYPE_SERVER) {
840 /* The account/password expiry only applies when the account is used as a
841 * client (ie password login), not when used as a server */
843 /* Make very well sure we don't use this for a client,
844 * it could bypass the password restrictions */
845 entry_ex->entry.flags.client = 0;
847 entry_ex->entry.valid_end = NULL;
848 entry_ex->entry.pw_end = NULL;
851 NTTIME must_change_time
852 = samdb_result_force_password_change(kdc_db_ctx->samdb, mem_ctx,
854 if (must_change_time == 0x7FFFFFFFFFFFFFFFULL) {
855 entry_ex->entry.pw_end = NULL;
857 entry_ex->entry.pw_end = malloc(sizeof(*entry_ex->entry.pw_end));
858 if (entry_ex->entry.pw_end == NULL) {
862 *entry_ex->entry.pw_end = nt_time_to_unix(must_change_time);
865 acct_expiry = samdb_result_account_expires(msg);
866 if (acct_expiry == 0x7FFFFFFFFFFFFFFFULL) {
867 entry_ex->entry.valid_end = NULL;
869 entry_ex->entry.valid_end = malloc(sizeof(*entry_ex->entry.valid_end));
870 if (entry_ex->entry.valid_end == NULL) {
874 *entry_ex->entry.valid_end = nt_time_to_unix(acct_expiry);
878 entry_ex->entry.valid_start = NULL;
880 entry_ex->entry.max_life = malloc(sizeof(*entry_ex->entry.max_life));
881 if (entry_ex->entry.max_life == NULL) {
886 if (ent_type == SAMBA_KDC_ENT_TYPE_SERVER) {
887 *entry_ex->entry.max_life = kdc_db_ctx->policy.svc_tkt_lifetime;
888 } else if (ent_type == SAMBA_KDC_ENT_TYPE_KRBTGT || ent_type == SAMBA_KDC_ENT_TYPE_CLIENT) {
889 *entry_ex->entry.max_life = kdc_db_ctx->policy.usr_tkt_lifetime;
891 *entry_ex->entry.max_life = MIN(kdc_db_ctx->policy.svc_tkt_lifetime,
892 kdc_db_ctx->policy.usr_tkt_lifetime);
895 entry_ex->entry.max_renew = malloc(sizeof(*entry_ex->entry.max_life));
896 if (entry_ex->entry.max_renew == NULL) {
901 *entry_ex->entry.max_renew = kdc_db_ctx->policy.renewal_lifetime;
903 /* Get keys from the db */
904 ret = samba_kdc_message2entry_keys(context, kdc_db_ctx, p, msg,
905 rid, is_rodc, userAccountControl,
908 /* Could be bougus data in the entry, or out of memory */
912 entry_ex->entry.etypes = malloc(sizeof(*(entry_ex->entry.etypes)));
913 if (entry_ex->entry.etypes == NULL) {
914 krb5_clear_error_message(context);
918 entry_ex->entry.etypes->len = entry_ex->entry.keys.len;
919 entry_ex->entry.etypes->val = calloc(entry_ex->entry.etypes->len, sizeof(int));
920 if (entry_ex->entry.etypes->val == NULL) {
921 krb5_clear_error_message(context);
925 for (i=0; i < entry_ex->entry.etypes->len; i++) {
926 entry_ex->entry.etypes->val[i] = KRB5_KEY_TYPE(&entry_ex->entry.keys.val[i].key);
930 p->msg = talloc_steal(p, msg);
934 /* This doesn't free ent itself, that is for the eventual caller to do */
935 hdb_free_entry(context, entry_ex);
937 talloc_steal(kdc_db_ctx, entry_ex->ctx);
944 * Construct an hdb_entry from a directory entry.
945 * The kvno is what the remote client asked for
947 static krb5_error_code samba_kdc_trust_message2entry(krb5_context context,
948 struct samba_kdc_db_context *kdc_db_ctx,
949 TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx, krb5_const_principal principal,
950 enum trust_direction direction,
951 struct ldb_dn *realm_dn,
954 struct ldb_message *msg,
955 hdb_entry_ex *entry_ex)
957 struct loadparm_context *lp_ctx = kdc_db_ctx->lp_ctx;
958 const char *dnsdomain;
959 const char *realm = lpcfg_realm(lp_ctx);
960 DATA_BLOB password_utf16 = data_blob_null;
961 DATA_BLOB password_utf8 = data_blob_null;
962 struct samr_Password _password_hash;
963 const struct samr_Password *password_hash = NULL;
964 const struct ldb_val *password_val;
965 struct trustAuthInOutBlob password_blob;
966 struct samba_kdc_entry *p;
968 uint32_t current_kvno;
969 uint32_t num_keys = 0;
970 enum ndr_err_code ndr_err;
971 int ret, trust_direction_flags;
973 struct AuthenticationInformationArray *auth_array;
974 uint32_t supported_enctypes = ENC_RC4_HMAC_MD5;
976 if (dsdb_functional_level(kdc_db_ctx->samdb) >= DS_DOMAIN_FUNCTION_2008) {
977 supported_enctypes = ldb_msg_find_attr_as_uint(msg,
978 "msDS-SupportedEncryptionTypes",
982 trust_direction_flags = ldb_msg_find_attr_as_int(msg, "trustDirection", 0);
984 if (direction == INBOUND) {
985 password_val = ldb_msg_find_ldb_val(msg, "trustAuthIncoming");
987 } else { /* OUTBOUND */
988 dnsdomain = ldb_msg_find_attr_as_string(msg, "trustPartner", NULL);
990 realm = strupper_talloc(mem_ctx, dnsdomain);
991 password_val = ldb_msg_find_ldb_val(msg, "trustAuthOutgoing");
994 if (!password_val || !(trust_direction_flags & direction)) {
995 krb5_clear_error_message(context);
996 ret = HDB_ERR_NOENTRY;
1000 ndr_err = ndr_pull_struct_blob(password_val, mem_ctx, &password_blob,
1001 (ndr_pull_flags_fn_t)ndr_pull_trustAuthInOutBlob);
1002 if (!NDR_ERR_CODE_IS_SUCCESS(ndr_err)) {
1003 krb5_clear_error_message(context);
1008 p = talloc(mem_ctx, struct samba_kdc_entry);
1014 p->kdc_db_ctx = kdc_db_ctx;
1015 p->entry_ex = entry_ex;
1016 p->realm_dn = realm_dn;
1018 talloc_set_destructor(p, samba_kdc_entry_destructor);
1020 /* make sure we do not have bogus data in there */
1021 memset(&entry_ex->entry, 0, sizeof(hdb_entry));
1024 entry_ex->free_entry = samba_kdc_free_entry;
1026 /* use 'whenCreated' */
1027 entry_ex->entry.created_by.time = ldb_msg_find_krb5time_ldap_time(msg, "whenCreated", 0);
1028 /* use 'kadmin' for now (needed by mit_samba) */
1029 ret = smb_krb5_make_principal(context,
1030 &entry_ex->entry.created_by.principal,
1031 realm, "kadmin", NULL);
1033 krb5_clear_error_message(context);
1037 ret = krb5_copy_principal(context, principal, &entry_ex->entry.principal);
1039 krb5_clear_error_message(context);
1044 * While we have copied the client principal, tests
1045 * show that Win2k3 returns the 'corrected' realm, not
1046 * the client-specified realm. This code attempts to
1047 * replace the client principal's realm with the one
1048 * we determine from our records
1051 ret = smb_krb5_principal_set_realm(context, entry_ex->entry.principal, realm);
1053 krb5_clear_error_message(context);
1057 entry_ex->entry.valid_start = NULL;
1059 /* we need to work out if we are going to use the current or
1060 * the previous password hash.
1061 * We base this on the kvno the client passes in. If the kvno
1062 * passed in is equal to the current kvno in our database then
1063 * we use the current structure. If it is the current kvno-1,
1064 * then we use the previous substrucure.
1067 /* first work out the current kvno */
1069 for (i=0; i < password_blob.count; i++) {
1070 if (password_blob.current.array[i].AuthType == TRUST_AUTH_TYPE_VERSION) {
1071 current_kvno = password_blob.current.array[i].AuthInfo.version.version;
1075 /* work out whether we will use the previous or current
1077 if (password_blob.previous.count == 0) {
1078 /* there is no previous password */
1079 use_previous = false;
1080 } else if (!(flags & HDB_F_KVNO_SPECIFIED) ||
1081 kvno == current_kvno) {
1082 use_previous = false;
1083 } else if ((kvno+1 == current_kvno) ||
1084 (kvno == 255 && current_kvno == 0)) {
1085 use_previous = true;
1087 DEBUG(1,(__location__ ": Request for unknown kvno %u - current kvno is %u\n",
1088 kvno, current_kvno));
1089 krb5_clear_error_message(context);
1090 ret = HDB_ERR_NOENTRY;
1095 auth_array = &password_blob.previous;
1097 auth_array = &password_blob.current;
1100 /* use the kvno the client specified, if available */
1101 if (flags & HDB_F_KVNO_SPECIFIED) {
1102 entry_ex->entry.kvno = kvno;
1104 entry_ex->entry.kvno = current_kvno;
1107 for (i=0; i < auth_array->count; i++) {
1108 if (auth_array->array[i].AuthType == TRUST_AUTH_TYPE_CLEAR) {
1111 password_utf16 = data_blob_const(auth_array->array[i].AuthInfo.clear.password,
1112 auth_array->array[i].AuthInfo.clear.size);
1113 if (password_utf16.length == 0) {
1117 if (supported_enctypes & ENC_RC4_HMAC_MD5) {
1118 mdfour(_password_hash.hash, password_utf16.data, password_utf16.length);
1119 if (password_hash == NULL) {
1122 password_hash = &_password_hash;
1125 if (!(supported_enctypes & (ENC_HMAC_SHA1_96_AES128|ENC_HMAC_SHA1_96_AES256))) {
1129 ok = convert_string_talloc(mem_ctx,
1130 CH_UTF16MUNGED, CH_UTF8,
1131 password_utf16.data,
1132 password_utf16.length,
1133 (void *)&password_utf8.data,
1134 &password_utf8.length);
1136 krb5_clear_error_message(context);
1141 if (supported_enctypes & ENC_HMAC_SHA1_96_AES128) {
1144 if (supported_enctypes & ENC_HMAC_SHA1_96_AES256) {
1148 } else if (auth_array->array[i].AuthType == TRUST_AUTH_TYPE_NT4OWF) {
1149 if (supported_enctypes & ENC_RC4_HMAC_MD5) {
1150 password_hash = &auth_array->array[i].AuthInfo.nt4owf.password;
1156 /* Must have found a cleartext or MD4 password */
1157 if (num_keys == 0) {
1158 DEBUG(1,(__location__ ": no usable key found\n"));
1159 krb5_clear_error_message(context);
1160 ret = HDB_ERR_NOENTRY;
1164 entry_ex->entry.keys.val = calloc(num_keys, sizeof(Key));
1165 if (entry_ex->entry.keys.val == NULL) {
1166 krb5_clear_error_message(context);
1171 if (password_utf8.length != 0) {
1173 krb5_const_principal salt_principal = principal;
1175 krb5_data cleartext_data;
1177 cleartext_data.data = password_utf8.data;
1178 cleartext_data.length = password_utf8.length;
1180 ret = krb5_get_pw_salt(context,
1187 if (supported_enctypes & ENC_HMAC_SHA1_96_AES256) {
1188 ret = krb5_string_to_key_data_salt(context,
1189 ENCTYPE_AES256_CTS_HMAC_SHA1_96,
1194 krb5_free_salt(context, salt);
1198 entry_ex->entry.keys.val[entry_ex->entry.keys.len] = key;
1199 entry_ex->entry.keys.len++;
1202 if (supported_enctypes & ENC_HMAC_SHA1_96_AES128) {
1203 ret = krb5_string_to_key_data_salt(context,
1204 ENCTYPE_AES128_CTS_HMAC_SHA1_96,
1209 krb5_free_salt(context, salt);
1213 entry_ex->entry.keys.val[entry_ex->entry.keys.len] = key;
1214 entry_ex->entry.keys.len++;
1217 krb5_free_salt(context, salt);
1220 if (password_hash != NULL) {
1223 ret = smb_krb5_keyblock_init_contents(context,
1224 ENCTYPE_ARCFOUR_HMAC,
1225 password_hash->hash,
1226 sizeof(password_hash->hash),
1232 entry_ex->entry.keys.val[entry_ex->entry.keys.len] = key;
1233 entry_ex->entry.keys.len++;
1236 entry_ex->entry.flags = int2HDBFlags(0);
1237 entry_ex->entry.flags.immutable = 1;
1238 entry_ex->entry.flags.invalid = 0;
1239 entry_ex->entry.flags.server = 1;
1240 entry_ex->entry.flags.require_preauth = 1;
1242 entry_ex->entry.pw_end = NULL;
1244 entry_ex->entry.max_life = NULL;
1246 entry_ex->entry.max_renew = NULL;
1248 entry_ex->entry.etypes = malloc(sizeof(*(entry_ex->entry.etypes)));
1249 if (entry_ex->entry.etypes == NULL) {
1250 krb5_clear_error_message(context);
1254 entry_ex->entry.etypes->len = entry_ex->entry.keys.len;
1255 entry_ex->entry.etypes->val = calloc(entry_ex->entry.etypes->len, sizeof(int));
1256 if (entry_ex->entry.etypes->val == NULL) {
1257 krb5_clear_error_message(context);
1261 for (i=0; i < entry_ex->entry.etypes->len; i++) {
1262 entry_ex->entry.etypes->val[i] = KRB5_KEY_TYPE(&entry_ex->entry.keys.val[i].key);
1266 p->msg = talloc_steal(p, msg);
1270 /* This doesn't free ent itself, that is for the eventual caller to do */
1271 hdb_free_entry(context, entry_ex);
1273 talloc_steal(kdc_db_ctx, entry_ex->ctx);
1280 static krb5_error_code samba_kdc_lookup_trust(krb5_context context, struct ldb_context *ldb_ctx,
1281 TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx,
1283 struct ldb_dn *realm_dn,
1284 struct ldb_message **pmsg)
1287 const char * const *attrs = trust_attrs;
1289 status = sam_get_results_trust(ldb_ctx,
1290 mem_ctx, realm, realm, attrs,
1292 if (NT_STATUS_IS_OK(status)) {
1294 } else if (NT_STATUS_EQUAL(status, NT_STATUS_NOT_FOUND)) {
1295 return HDB_ERR_NOENTRY;
1296 } else if (NT_STATUS_EQUAL(status, NT_STATUS_NO_MEMORY)) {
1298 krb5_set_error_message(context, ret, "get_sam_result_trust: out of memory");
1302 krb5_set_error_message(context, ret, "get_sam_result_trust: %s", nt_errstr(status));
1307 static krb5_error_code samba_kdc_lookup_client(krb5_context context,
1308 struct samba_kdc_db_context *kdc_db_ctx,
1309 TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx,
1310 krb5_const_principal principal,
1312 struct ldb_dn **realm_dn,
1313 struct ldb_message **msg) {
1315 char *principal_string;
1317 if (smb_krb5_principal_get_type(context, principal) == KRB5_NT_ENTERPRISE_PRINCIPAL) {
1318 principal_string = smb_krb5_principal_get_comp_string(mem_ctx, context,
1320 if (principal_string == NULL) {
1323 nt_status = sam_get_results_principal(kdc_db_ctx->samdb,
1324 mem_ctx, principal_string, attrs,
1326 TALLOC_FREE(principal_string);
1328 krb5_error_code ret;
1329 ret = krb5_unparse_name(context, principal, &principal_string);
1333 nt_status = sam_get_results_principal(kdc_db_ctx->samdb,
1334 mem_ctx, principal_string, attrs,
1336 free(principal_string);
1339 if (NT_STATUS_EQUAL(nt_status, NT_STATUS_NO_SUCH_USER)) {
1340 return HDB_ERR_NOENTRY;
1341 } else if (NT_STATUS_EQUAL(nt_status, NT_STATUS_NO_MEMORY)) {
1343 } else if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(nt_status)) {
1350 static krb5_error_code samba_kdc_fetch_client(krb5_context context,
1351 struct samba_kdc_db_context *kdc_db_ctx,
1352 TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx,
1353 krb5_const_principal principal,
1355 hdb_entry_ex *entry_ex) {
1356 struct ldb_dn *realm_dn;
1357 krb5_error_code ret;
1358 struct ldb_message *msg = NULL;
1360 ret = samba_kdc_lookup_client(context, kdc_db_ctx,
1361 mem_ctx, principal, user_attrs,
1367 ret = samba_kdc_message2entry(context, kdc_db_ctx, mem_ctx,
1368 principal, SAMBA_KDC_ENT_TYPE_CLIENT,
1370 realm_dn, msg, entry_ex);
1374 static krb5_error_code samba_kdc_fetch_krbtgt(krb5_context context,
1375 struct samba_kdc_db_context *kdc_db_ctx,
1376 TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx,
1377 krb5_const_principal principal,
1380 hdb_entry_ex *entry_ex)
1382 struct loadparm_context *lp_ctx = kdc_db_ctx->lp_ctx;
1383 krb5_error_code ret;
1384 struct ldb_message *msg = NULL;
1385 struct ldb_dn *realm_dn = ldb_get_default_basedn(kdc_db_ctx->samdb);
1386 char *realm_from_princ, *realm_from_princ_malloc;
1387 krb5_principal alloc_principal = NULL;
1389 realm_from_princ_malloc = smb_krb5_principal_get_realm(context, principal);
1390 if (realm_from_princ_malloc == NULL) {
1392 return HDB_ERR_NOENTRY;
1394 realm_from_princ = talloc_strdup(mem_ctx, realm_from_princ_malloc);
1395 free(realm_from_princ_malloc);
1396 if (realm_from_princ == NULL) {
1397 return HDB_ERR_NOENTRY;
1400 if (krb5_princ_size(context, principal) != 2
1401 || (strcmp(krb5_principal_get_comp_string(context, principal, 0), KRB5_TGS_NAME) != 0)) {
1403 return HDB_ERR_NOENTRY;
1406 /* krbtgt case. Either us or a trusted realm */
1408 if (lpcfg_is_my_domain_or_realm(lp_ctx, realm_from_princ)
1409 && lpcfg_is_my_domain_or_realm(lp_ctx, krb5_principal_get_comp_string(context, principal, 1))) {
1410 /* us, or someone quite like us */
1411 /* Cludge, cludge cludge. If the realm part of krbtgt/realm,
1412 * is in our db, then direct the caller at our primary
1416 unsigned int krbtgt_number;
1417 /* w2k8r2 sometimes gives us a kvno of 255 for inter-domain
1418 trust tickets. We don't yet know what this means, but we do
1419 seem to need to treat it as unspecified */
1420 if (flags & HDB_F_KVNO_SPECIFIED) {
1421 krbtgt_number = SAMBA_KVNO_GET_KRBTGT(kvno);
1422 if (kdc_db_ctx->rodc) {
1423 if (krbtgt_number != kdc_db_ctx->my_krbtgt_number) {
1424 return HDB_ERR_NOT_FOUND_HERE;
1428 krbtgt_number = kdc_db_ctx->my_krbtgt_number;
1431 if (krbtgt_number == kdc_db_ctx->my_krbtgt_number) {
1432 lret = dsdb_search_one(kdc_db_ctx->samdb, mem_ctx,
1433 &msg, kdc_db_ctx->krbtgt_dn, LDB_SCOPE_BASE,
1434 krbtgt_attrs, DSDB_SEARCH_NO_GLOBAL_CATALOG,
1435 "(objectClass=user)");
1437 /* We need to look up an RODC krbtgt (perhaps
1438 * ours, if we are an RODC, perhaps another
1439 * RODC if we are a read-write DC */
1440 lret = dsdb_search_one(kdc_db_ctx->samdb, mem_ctx,
1441 &msg, realm_dn, LDB_SCOPE_SUBTREE,
1443 DSDB_SEARCH_SHOW_EXTENDED_DN | DSDB_SEARCH_NO_GLOBAL_CATALOG,
1444 "(&(objectClass=user)(msDS-SecondaryKrbTgtNumber=%u))", (unsigned)(krbtgt_number));
1447 if (lret == LDB_ERR_NO_SUCH_OBJECT) {
1448 krb5_warnx(context, "samba_kdc_fetch: could not find KRBTGT number %u in DB!",
1449 (unsigned)(krbtgt_number));
1450 krb5_set_error_message(context, HDB_ERR_NOENTRY,
1451 "samba_kdc_fetch: could not find KRBTGT number %u in DB!",
1452 (unsigned)(krbtgt_number));
1453 return HDB_ERR_NOENTRY;
1454 } else if (lret != LDB_SUCCESS) {
1455 krb5_warnx(context, "samba_kdc_fetch: could not find KRBTGT number %u in DB!",
1456 (unsigned)(krbtgt_number));
1457 krb5_set_error_message(context, HDB_ERR_NOENTRY,
1458 "samba_kdc_fetch: could not find KRBTGT number %u in DB!",
1459 (unsigned)(krbtgt_number));
1460 return HDB_ERR_NOENTRY;
1463 ret = samba_kdc_message2entry(context, kdc_db_ctx, mem_ctx,
1464 principal, SAMBA_KDC_ENT_TYPE_KRBTGT,
1465 flags, realm_dn, msg, entry_ex);
1466 if (alloc_principal) {
1467 /* This is again copied in the message2entry call */
1468 krb5_free_principal(context, alloc_principal);
1471 krb5_warnx(context, "samba_kdc_fetch: self krbtgt message2entry failed");
1476 enum trust_direction direction = UNKNOWN;
1477 const char *realm = NULL;
1479 /* Either an inbound or outbound trust */
1481 if (strcasecmp(lpcfg_realm(lp_ctx), realm_from_princ) == 0) {
1482 /* look for inbound trust */
1483 direction = INBOUND;
1484 realm = krb5_principal_get_comp_string(context, principal, 1);
1485 } else if (strcasecmp(lpcfg_realm(lp_ctx), krb5_principal_get_comp_string(context, principal, 1)) == 0) {
1486 /* look for outbound trust */
1487 direction = OUTBOUND;
1488 realm = realm_from_princ;
1490 krb5_warnx(context, "samba_kdc_fetch: not our realm for trusts ('%s', '%s')",
1492 krb5_principal_get_comp_string(context, principal, 1));
1493 krb5_set_error_message(context, HDB_ERR_NOENTRY, "samba_kdc_fetch: not our realm for trusts ('%s', '%s')",
1495 krb5_principal_get_comp_string(context, principal, 1));
1496 return HDB_ERR_NOENTRY;
1499 /* Trusted domains are under CN=system */
1501 ret = samba_kdc_lookup_trust(context, kdc_db_ctx->samdb,
1503 realm, realm_dn, &msg);
1506 krb5_warnx(context, "samba_kdc_fetch: could not find principal in DB");
1507 krb5_set_error_message(context, ret, "samba_kdc_fetch: could not find principal in DB");
1511 ret = samba_kdc_trust_message2entry(context, kdc_db_ctx, mem_ctx,
1512 principal, direction,
1513 realm_dn, flags, kvno, msg, entry_ex);
1515 krb5_warnx(context, "samba_kdc_fetch: trust_message2entry failed for %s",
1516 ldb_dn_get_linearized(msg->dn));
1517 krb5_set_error_message(context, ret, "samba_kdc_fetch: "
1518 "trust_message2entry failed for %s",
1519 ldb_dn_get_linearized(msg->dn));
1526 static krb5_error_code samba_kdc_lookup_server(krb5_context context,
1527 struct samba_kdc_db_context *kdc_db_ctx,
1528 TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx,
1529 krb5_const_principal principal,
1532 struct ldb_dn **realm_dn,
1533 struct ldb_message **msg)
1535 krb5_error_code ret;
1536 if ((smb_krb5_principal_get_type(context, principal) != KRB5_NT_ENTERPRISE_PRINCIPAL)
1537 && krb5_princ_size(context, principal) >= 2) {
1538 /* 'normal server' case */
1541 struct ldb_dn *user_dn;
1542 char *principal_string;
1544 ret = krb5_unparse_name_flags(context, principal,
1545 KRB5_PRINCIPAL_UNPARSE_NO_REALM,
1551 /* At this point we may find the host is known to be
1552 * in a different realm, so we should generate a
1553 * referral instead */
1554 nt_status = crack_service_principal_name(kdc_db_ctx->samdb,
1555 mem_ctx, principal_string,
1556 &user_dn, realm_dn);
1557 free(principal_string);
1559 if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(nt_status)) {
1560 return HDB_ERR_NOENTRY;
1563 ldb_ret = dsdb_search_one(kdc_db_ctx->samdb,
1565 msg, user_dn, LDB_SCOPE_BASE,
1567 DSDB_SEARCH_SHOW_EXTENDED_DN | DSDB_SEARCH_NO_GLOBAL_CATALOG,
1569 if (ldb_ret != LDB_SUCCESS) {
1570 return HDB_ERR_NOENTRY;
1573 } else if (!(flags & HDB_F_FOR_AS_REQ)
1574 && smb_krb5_principal_get_type(context, principal) == KRB5_NT_ENTERPRISE_PRINCIPAL) {
1576 * The behaviour of accepting an
1577 * KRB5_NT_ENTERPRISE_PRINCIPAL server principal
1578 * containing a UPN only applies to TGS-REQ packets,
1579 * not AS-REQ packets.
1581 return samba_kdc_lookup_client(context, kdc_db_ctx,
1582 mem_ctx, principal, attrs,
1587 * - the AS-REQ, where we only accept
1588 * samAccountName based lookups for the server, no
1589 * matter if the name is an
1590 * KRB5_NT_ENTERPRISE_PRINCIPAL or not
1591 * - for the TGS-REQ when we are not given an
1592 * KRB5_NT_ENTERPRISE_PRINCIPAL, which also must
1593 * only lookup samAccountName based names.
1597 krb5_principal enterprise_prinicpal = NULL;
1599 if (smb_krb5_principal_get_type(context, principal) == KRB5_NT_ENTERPRISE_PRINCIPAL) {
1600 /* Need to reparse the enterprise principal to find the real target */
1601 if (krb5_princ_size(context, principal) != 1) {
1602 ret = KRB5_PARSE_MALFORMED;
1603 krb5_set_error_message(context, ret, "samba_kdc_lookup_server: request for an "
1604 "enterprise principal with wrong (%d) number of components",
1605 krb5_princ_size(context, principal));
1608 ret = krb5_parse_name(context,
1609 krb5_principal_get_comp_string(context, principal, 0),
1610 &enterprise_prinicpal);
1614 principal = enterprise_prinicpal;
1617 /* server as client principal case, but we must not lookup userPrincipalNames */
1618 *realm_dn = ldb_get_default_basedn(kdc_db_ctx->samdb);
1620 /* TODO: Check if it is our realm, otherwise give referral */
1622 ret = krb5_unparse_name_flags(context, principal,
1623 KRB5_PRINCIPAL_UNPARSE_NO_REALM |
1624 KRB5_PRINCIPAL_UNPARSE_DISPLAY,
1628 krb5_set_error_message(context, ret, "samba_kdc_lookup_principal: could not parse principal");
1629 krb5_warnx(context, "samba_kdc_lookup_principal: could not parse principal");
1633 lret = dsdb_search_one(kdc_db_ctx->samdb, mem_ctx, msg,
1634 *realm_dn, LDB_SCOPE_SUBTREE,
1636 DSDB_SEARCH_SHOW_EXTENDED_DN | DSDB_SEARCH_NO_GLOBAL_CATALOG,
1637 "(&(objectClass=user)(samAccountName=%s))",
1638 ldb_binary_encode_string(mem_ctx, short_princ));
1639 if (lret == LDB_ERR_NO_SUCH_OBJECT) {
1640 DEBUG(3, ("Failed to find an entry for %s\n", short_princ));
1642 return HDB_ERR_NOENTRY;
1644 if (lret != LDB_SUCCESS) {
1645 DEBUG(3, ("Failed single search for %s - %s\n",
1646 short_princ, ldb_errstring(kdc_db_ctx->samdb)));
1648 return HDB_ERR_NOENTRY;
1653 return HDB_ERR_NOENTRY;
1658 static krb5_error_code samba_kdc_fetch_server(krb5_context context,
1659 struct samba_kdc_db_context *kdc_db_ctx,
1660 TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx,
1661 krb5_const_principal principal,
1663 hdb_entry_ex *entry_ex)
1665 krb5_error_code ret;
1666 struct ldb_dn *realm_dn;
1667 struct ldb_message *msg;
1669 ret = samba_kdc_lookup_server(context, kdc_db_ctx, mem_ctx, principal,
1670 flags, server_attrs, &realm_dn, &msg);
1675 ret = samba_kdc_message2entry(context, kdc_db_ctx, mem_ctx,
1676 principal, SAMBA_KDC_ENT_TYPE_SERVER,
1678 realm_dn, msg, entry_ex);
1680 krb5_warnx(context, "samba_kdc_fetch: message2entry failed");
1686 krb5_error_code samba_kdc_fetch(krb5_context context,
1687 struct samba_kdc_db_context *kdc_db_ctx,
1688 krb5_const_principal principal,
1691 hdb_entry_ex *entry_ex)
1693 krb5_error_code ret = HDB_ERR_NOENTRY;
1694 TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx;
1696 mem_ctx = talloc_named(kdc_db_ctx, 0, "samba_kdc_fetch context");
1699 krb5_set_error_message(context, ret, "samba_kdc_fetch: talloc_named() failed!");
1703 if (flags & HDB_F_GET_CLIENT) {
1704 ret = samba_kdc_fetch_client(context, kdc_db_ctx, mem_ctx, principal, flags, entry_ex);
1705 if (ret != HDB_ERR_NOENTRY) goto done;
1707 if (flags & HDB_F_GET_SERVER) {
1708 /* krbtgt fits into this situation for trusted realms, and for resolving different versions of our own realm name */
1709 ret = samba_kdc_fetch_krbtgt(context, kdc_db_ctx, mem_ctx, principal, flags, kvno, entry_ex);
1710 if (ret != HDB_ERR_NOENTRY) goto done;
1712 /* We return 'no entry' if it does not start with krbtgt/, so move to the common case quickly */
1713 ret = samba_kdc_fetch_server(context, kdc_db_ctx, mem_ctx, principal, flags, entry_ex);
1714 if (ret != HDB_ERR_NOENTRY) goto done;
1716 if (flags & HDB_F_GET_KRBTGT) {
1717 ret = samba_kdc_fetch_krbtgt(context, kdc_db_ctx, mem_ctx, principal, flags, kvno, entry_ex);
1718 if (ret != HDB_ERR_NOENTRY) goto done;
1722 talloc_free(mem_ctx);
1726 struct samba_kdc_seq {
1729 struct ldb_message **msgs;
1730 struct ldb_dn *realm_dn;
1733 static krb5_error_code samba_kdc_seq(krb5_context context,
1734 struct samba_kdc_db_context *kdc_db_ctx,
1735 hdb_entry_ex *entry)
1737 krb5_error_code ret;
1738 struct samba_kdc_seq *priv = kdc_db_ctx->seq_ctx;
1739 const char *realm = lpcfg_realm(kdc_db_ctx->lp_ctx);
1740 struct ldb_message *msg = NULL;
1741 const char *sAMAccountName = NULL;
1742 krb5_principal principal = NULL;
1743 TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx;
1746 return HDB_ERR_NOENTRY;
1749 mem_ctx = talloc_named(priv, 0, "samba_kdc_seq context");
1753 krb5_set_error_message(context, ret, "samba_kdc_seq: talloc_named() failed!");
1757 while (priv->index < priv->count) {
1758 msg = priv->msgs[priv->index++];
1760 sAMAccountName = ldb_msg_find_attr_as_string(msg, "sAMAccountName", NULL);
1761 if (sAMAccountName != NULL) {
1766 if (sAMAccountName == NULL) {
1767 ret = HDB_ERR_NOENTRY;
1771 ret = smb_krb5_make_principal(context, &principal,
1772 realm, sAMAccountName, NULL);
1777 ret = samba_kdc_message2entry(context, kdc_db_ctx, mem_ctx,
1778 principal, SAMBA_KDC_ENT_TYPE_ANY,
1779 HDB_F_ADMIN_DATA|HDB_F_GET_ANY,
1780 priv->realm_dn, msg, entry);
1783 if (principal != NULL) {
1784 krb5_free_principal(context, principal);
1789 kdc_db_ctx->seq_ctx = NULL;
1791 talloc_free(mem_ctx);
1797 krb5_error_code samba_kdc_firstkey(krb5_context context,
1798 struct samba_kdc_db_context *kdc_db_ctx,
1799 hdb_entry_ex *entry)
1801 struct ldb_context *ldb_ctx = kdc_db_ctx->samdb;
1802 struct samba_kdc_seq *priv = kdc_db_ctx->seq_ctx;
1804 struct ldb_result *res = NULL;
1805 krb5_error_code ret;
1806 TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx;
1811 kdc_db_ctx->seq_ctx = NULL;
1814 priv = (struct samba_kdc_seq *) talloc(kdc_db_ctx, struct samba_kdc_seq);
1817 krb5_set_error_message(context, ret, "talloc: out of memory");
1823 priv->realm_dn = ldb_get_default_basedn(ldb_ctx);
1826 mem_ctx = talloc_named(priv, 0, "samba_kdc_firstkey context");
1830 krb5_set_error_message(context, ret, "samba_kdc_firstkey: talloc_named() failed!");
1834 ret = krb5_get_default_realm(context, &realm);
1839 krb5_free_default_realm(context, realm);
1841 lret = dsdb_search(ldb_ctx, priv, &res,
1842 priv->realm_dn, LDB_SCOPE_SUBTREE, user_attrs,
1843 DSDB_SEARCH_NO_GLOBAL_CATALOG,
1844 "(objectClass=user)");
1846 if (lret != LDB_SUCCESS) {
1848 return HDB_ERR_NOENTRY;
1851 priv->count = res->count;
1852 priv->msgs = talloc_steal(priv, res->msgs);
1855 kdc_db_ctx->seq_ctx = priv;
1857 ret = samba_kdc_seq(context, kdc_db_ctx, entry);
1861 kdc_db_ctx->seq_ctx = NULL;
1863 talloc_free(mem_ctx);
1868 krb5_error_code samba_kdc_nextkey(krb5_context context,
1869 struct samba_kdc_db_context *kdc_db_ctx,
1870 hdb_entry_ex *entry)
1872 return samba_kdc_seq(context, kdc_db_ctx, entry);
1875 /* Check if a given entry may delegate or do s4u2self to this target principal
1877 * This is currently a very nasty hack - allowing only delegation to itself.
1880 samba_kdc_check_s4u2self(krb5_context context,
1881 struct samba_kdc_db_context *kdc_db_ctx,
1882 hdb_entry_ex *entry,
1883 krb5_const_principal target_principal)
1885 krb5_error_code ret;
1886 struct ldb_dn *realm_dn;
1887 struct ldb_message *msg;
1888 struct dom_sid *orig_sid;
1889 struct dom_sid *target_sid;
1890 struct samba_kdc_entry *p = talloc_get_type(entry->ctx, struct samba_kdc_entry);
1891 const char *delegation_check_attrs[] = {
1895 TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx = talloc_named(kdc_db_ctx, 0, "samba_kdc_check_s4u2self");
1899 krb5_set_error_message(context, ret, "samba_kdc_check_s4u2self: talloc_named() failed!");
1903 ret = samba_kdc_lookup_server(context, kdc_db_ctx, mem_ctx, target_principal,
1904 HDB_F_GET_CLIENT|HDB_F_GET_SERVER,
1905 delegation_check_attrs, &realm_dn, &msg);
1908 talloc_free(mem_ctx);
1912 orig_sid = samdb_result_dom_sid(mem_ctx, p->msg, "objectSid");
1913 target_sid = samdb_result_dom_sid(mem_ctx, msg, "objectSid");
1915 /* Allow delegation to the same principal, even if by a different
1916 * name. The easy and safe way to prove this is by SID
1918 if (!(orig_sid && target_sid && dom_sid_equal(orig_sid, target_sid))) {
1919 talloc_free(mem_ctx);
1920 return KRB5KDC_ERR_BADOPTION;
1923 talloc_free(mem_ctx);
1927 /* Certificates printed by a the Certificate Authority might have a
1928 * slightly different form of the user principal name to that in the
1929 * database. Allow a mismatch where they both refer to the same
1933 samba_kdc_check_pkinit_ms_upn_match(krb5_context context,
1934 struct samba_kdc_db_context *kdc_db_ctx,
1935 hdb_entry_ex *entry,
1936 krb5_const_principal certificate_principal)
1938 krb5_error_code ret;
1939 struct ldb_dn *realm_dn;
1940 struct ldb_message *msg;
1941 struct dom_sid *orig_sid;
1942 struct dom_sid *target_sid;
1943 struct samba_kdc_entry *p = talloc_get_type(entry->ctx, struct samba_kdc_entry);
1944 const char *ms_upn_check_attrs[] = {
1948 TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx = talloc_named(kdc_db_ctx, 0, "samba_kdc_check_pkinit_ms_upn_match");
1952 krb5_set_error_message(context, ret, "samba_kdc_fetch: talloc_named() failed!");
1956 ret = samba_kdc_lookup_client(context, kdc_db_ctx,
1957 mem_ctx, certificate_principal,
1958 ms_upn_check_attrs, &realm_dn, &msg);
1961 talloc_free(mem_ctx);
1965 orig_sid = samdb_result_dom_sid(mem_ctx, p->msg, "objectSid");
1966 target_sid = samdb_result_dom_sid(mem_ctx, msg, "objectSid");
1968 /* Consider these to be the same principal, even if by a different
1969 * name. The easy and safe way to prove this is by SID
1971 if (!(orig_sid && target_sid && dom_sid_equal(orig_sid, target_sid))) {
1972 talloc_free(mem_ctx);
1973 return KRB5_KDC_ERR_CLIENT_NAME_MISMATCH;
1976 talloc_free(mem_ctx);
1981 * Check if a given entry may delegate to this target principal
1985 samba_kdc_check_s4u2proxy(krb5_context context,
1986 struct samba_kdc_db_context *kdc_db_ctx,
1987 hdb_entry_ex *entry,
1988 krb5_const_principal target_principal)
1990 krb5_error_code ret;
1992 const char *client_dn = NULL;
1993 const char *target_principal_name = NULL;
1994 struct ldb_message_element *el;
1998 struct samba_kdc_entry *p = talloc_get_type(entry->ctx, struct samba_kdc_entry);
2000 TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx = talloc_named(kdc_db_ctx, 0, "samba_kdc_check_s4u2proxy");
2004 krb5_set_error_message(context, ret,
2005 "samba_kdc_check_s4u2proxy:"
2006 " talloc_named() failed!");
2010 client_dn = ldb_dn_get_linearized(p->msg->dn);
2016 krb5_set_error_message(context, ret,
2017 "samba_kdc_check_s4u2proxy:"
2018 " ldb_dn_get_linearized() failed!");
2023 * The main heimdal code already checked that the target_principal
2024 * belongs to the same realm as the client.
2026 * So we just need the principal without the realm,
2027 * as that is what is configured in the "msDS-AllowedToDelegateTo"
2030 ret = krb5_unparse_name_flags(context, target_principal,
2031 KRB5_PRINCIPAL_UNPARSE_NO_REALM, &tmp);
2033 talloc_free(mem_ctx);
2034 krb5_set_error_message(context, ret,
2035 "samba_kdc_check_s4u2proxy:"
2036 " krb5_unparse_name() failed!");
2039 DEBUG(10,("samba_kdc_check_s4u2proxy: client[%s] for target[%s]\n",
2042 target_principal_name = talloc_strdup(mem_ctx, tmp);
2044 if (target_principal_name == NULL) {
2046 krb5_set_error_message(context, ret,
2047 "samba_kdc_check_s4u2proxy:"
2048 " talloc_strdup() failed!");
2052 el = ldb_msg_find_element(p->msg, "msDS-AllowedToDelegateTo");
2057 val = data_blob_string_const(target_principal_name);
2059 for (i=0; i<el->num_values; i++) {
2060 struct ldb_val *val1 = &val;
2061 struct ldb_val *val2 = &el->values[i];
2064 if (val1->length != val2->length) {
2068 cmp = strncasecmp((const char *)val1->data,
2069 (const char *)val2->data,
2083 DEBUG(10,("samba_kdc_check_s4u2proxy: client[%s] allowed target[%s]\n",
2085 talloc_free(mem_ctx);
2089 krb5_set_error_message(context, ret,
2090 "samba_kdc_check_s4u2proxy: client[%s] "
2091 "not allowed for delegation to target[%s]",
2093 target_principal_name);
2094 talloc_free(mem_ctx);
2095 return KRB5KDC_ERR_BADOPTION;
2098 NTSTATUS samba_kdc_setup_db_ctx(TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx, struct samba_kdc_base_context *base_ctx,
2099 struct samba_kdc_db_context **kdc_db_ctx_out)
2102 struct ldb_message *msg;
2103 struct auth_session_info *session_info;
2104 struct samba_kdc_db_context *kdc_db_ctx;
2105 /* The idea here is very simple. Using Kerberos to
2106 * authenticate the KDC to the LDAP server is higly likely to
2109 * In future we may set this up to use EXERNAL and SSL
2110 * certificates, for now it will almost certainly be NTLMSSP_SET_USERNAME
2113 kdc_db_ctx = talloc_zero(mem_ctx, struct samba_kdc_db_context);
2114 if (kdc_db_ctx == NULL) {
2115 return NT_STATUS_NO_MEMORY;
2117 kdc_db_ctx->ev_ctx = base_ctx->ev_ctx;
2118 kdc_db_ctx->lp_ctx = base_ctx->lp_ctx;
2120 /* get default kdc policy */
2121 lpcfg_default_kdc_policy(base_ctx->lp_ctx,
2122 &kdc_db_ctx->policy.svc_tkt_lifetime,
2123 &kdc_db_ctx->policy.usr_tkt_lifetime,
2124 &kdc_db_ctx->policy.renewal_lifetime);
2126 session_info = system_session(kdc_db_ctx->lp_ctx);
2127 if (session_info == NULL) {
2128 return NT_STATUS_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2131 /* Setup the link to LDB */
2132 kdc_db_ctx->samdb = samdb_connect(kdc_db_ctx, base_ctx->ev_ctx,
2133 base_ctx->lp_ctx, session_info, 0);
2134 if (kdc_db_ctx->samdb == NULL) {
2135 DEBUG(1, ("samba_kdc_setup_db_ctx: Cannot open samdb for KDC backend!"));
2136 talloc_free(kdc_db_ctx);
2137 return NT_STATUS_CANT_ACCESS_DOMAIN_INFO;
2140 /* Find out our own krbtgt kvno */
2141 ldb_ret = samdb_rodc(kdc_db_ctx->samdb, &kdc_db_ctx->rodc);
2142 if (ldb_ret != LDB_SUCCESS) {
2143 DEBUG(1, ("samba_kdc_setup_db_ctx: Cannot determine if we are an RODC in KDC backend: %s\n",
2144 ldb_errstring(kdc_db_ctx->samdb)));
2145 talloc_free(kdc_db_ctx);
2146 return NT_STATUS_CANT_ACCESS_DOMAIN_INFO;
2148 if (kdc_db_ctx->rodc) {
2149 int my_krbtgt_number;
2150 const char *secondary_keytab[] = { "msDS-SecondaryKrbTgtNumber", NULL };
2151 struct ldb_dn *account_dn;
2152 struct ldb_dn *server_dn = samdb_server_dn(kdc_db_ctx->samdb, kdc_db_ctx);
2154 DEBUG(1, ("samba_kdc_setup_db_ctx: Cannot determine server DN in KDC backend: %s\n",
2155 ldb_errstring(kdc_db_ctx->samdb)));
2156 talloc_free(kdc_db_ctx);
2157 return NT_STATUS_CANT_ACCESS_DOMAIN_INFO;
2160 ldb_ret = samdb_reference_dn(kdc_db_ctx->samdb, kdc_db_ctx, server_dn,
2161 "serverReference", &account_dn);
2162 if (ldb_ret != LDB_SUCCESS) {
2163 DEBUG(1, ("samba_kdc_setup_db_ctx: Cannot determine server account in KDC backend: %s\n",
2164 ldb_errstring(kdc_db_ctx->samdb)));
2165 talloc_free(kdc_db_ctx);
2166 return NT_STATUS_CANT_ACCESS_DOMAIN_INFO;
2169 ldb_ret = samdb_reference_dn(kdc_db_ctx->samdb, kdc_db_ctx, account_dn,
2170 "msDS-KrbTgtLink", &kdc_db_ctx->krbtgt_dn);
2171 talloc_free(account_dn);
2172 if (ldb_ret != LDB_SUCCESS) {
2173 DEBUG(1, ("samba_kdc_setup_db_ctx: Cannot determine RODC krbtgt account in KDC backend: %s\n",
2174 ldb_errstring(kdc_db_ctx->samdb)));
2175 talloc_free(kdc_db_ctx);
2176 return NT_STATUS_CANT_ACCESS_DOMAIN_INFO;
2179 ldb_ret = dsdb_search_one(kdc_db_ctx->samdb, kdc_db_ctx,
2180 &msg, kdc_db_ctx->krbtgt_dn, LDB_SCOPE_BASE,
2182 DSDB_SEARCH_NO_GLOBAL_CATALOG,
2183 "(&(objectClass=user)(msDS-SecondaryKrbTgtNumber=*))");
2184 if (ldb_ret != LDB_SUCCESS) {
2185 DEBUG(1, ("samba_kdc_setup_db_ctx: Cannot read krbtgt account %s in KDC backend to get msDS-SecondaryKrbTgtNumber: %s: %s\n",
2186 ldb_dn_get_linearized(kdc_db_ctx->krbtgt_dn),
2187 ldb_errstring(kdc_db_ctx->samdb),
2188 ldb_strerror(ldb_ret)));
2189 talloc_free(kdc_db_ctx);
2190 return NT_STATUS_CANT_ACCESS_DOMAIN_INFO;
2192 my_krbtgt_number = ldb_msg_find_attr_as_int(msg, "msDS-SecondaryKrbTgtNumber", -1);
2193 if (my_krbtgt_number == -1) {
2194 DEBUG(1, ("samba_kdc_setup_db_ctx: Cannot read msDS-SecondaryKrbTgtNumber from krbtgt account %s in KDC backend: got %d\n",
2195 ldb_dn_get_linearized(kdc_db_ctx->krbtgt_dn),
2197 talloc_free(kdc_db_ctx);
2198 return NT_STATUS_CANT_ACCESS_DOMAIN_INFO;
2200 kdc_db_ctx->my_krbtgt_number = my_krbtgt_number;
2203 kdc_db_ctx->my_krbtgt_number = 0;
2204 ldb_ret = dsdb_search_one(kdc_db_ctx->samdb, kdc_db_ctx,
2206 ldb_get_default_basedn(kdc_db_ctx->samdb),
2209 DSDB_SEARCH_NO_GLOBAL_CATALOG,
2210 "(&(objectClass=user)(samAccountName=krbtgt))");
2212 if (ldb_ret != LDB_SUCCESS) {
2213 DEBUG(1, ("samba_kdc_fetch: could not find own KRBTGT in DB: %s\n", ldb_errstring(kdc_db_ctx->samdb)));
2214 talloc_free(kdc_db_ctx);
2215 return NT_STATUS_CANT_ACCESS_DOMAIN_INFO;
2217 kdc_db_ctx->krbtgt_dn = talloc_steal(kdc_db_ctx, msg->dn);
2218 kdc_db_ctx->my_krbtgt_number = 0;
2221 *kdc_db_ctx_out = kdc_db_ctx;
2222 return NT_STATUS_OK;