r10454: * prevent privilege code from storing an empty SID

  (and filter it out if one is already there)
* Fix LUID value match in privilege_set_to_se_priv()
  (fix jmcd's bug report).
(This used to be commit 356334264f5cd3a2480c3288ec40e0ee63264e1b)

diff --git a/source3/lib/privileges.c b/source3/lib/privileges.c
index a2797f2a5d8127475c0f35d42f25c12d64611991..d95c1ba4c132b12e021b50ad8b62b7747a730423 100644 (file)
--- a/source3/lib/privileges.c
+++ b/source3/lib/privileges.c
@@ -286,6 +286,11 @@ static BOOL set_privileges( const DOM_SID *sid, SE_PRIV *mask )
        if ( !tdb )
                return False;
 
+       if ( !sid || (sid->num_auths == 0) ) {
+               DEBUG(0,("set_privileges: Refusing to store empty SID!\n"));
+               return False;
+       }
+
        /* PRIV_<SID> (NULL terminated) as the key */
        
        fstr_sprintf( keystr, "%s%s", PRIVPREFIX, sid_string_static(sid) );
@@ -498,6 +503,12 @@ static int priv_traverse_fn(TDB_CONTEXT *t, TDB_DATA key, TDB_DATA data, void *s
                
        fstrcpy( sid_string, &key.dptr[strlen(PRIVPREFIX)] );
 
+       /* this is a last ditch safety check to preventing returning
+          and invalid SID (i've somehow run into this on development branches) */
+
+       if ( strcmp( "S-0-0", sid_string ) == 0 )
+               return 0;
+
        if ( !string_to_sid(&sid, sid_string) ) {
                DEBUG(0,("travsersal_fn_enum__acct: Could not convert SID [%s]\n",
                        sid_string));
@@ -812,11 +823,28 @@ BOOL se_priv_to_privilege_set( PRIVILEGE_SET *set, SE_PRIV *mask )
 /*******************************************************************
 *******************************************************************/
 
-BOOL privilege_set_to_se_priv( SE_PRIV *mask, PRIVILEGE_SET *privset )
+static BOOL luid_to_se_priv( LUID *luid, SE_PRIV *mask )
 {
        int i;
        uint32 num_privs = count_all_privileges();
        
+       for ( i=0; i<num_privs; i++ ) {
+               if ( luid->low == privs[i].luid.low ) {
+                       se_priv_copy( mask, &privs[i].se_priv );
+                       return True;
+               }
+       }
+
+       return False;
+}
+
+/*******************************************************************
+*******************************************************************/
+
+BOOL privilege_set_to_se_priv( SE_PRIV *mask, PRIVILEGE_SET *privset )
+{
+       int i;
+       
        ZERO_STRUCTP( mask );
        
        for ( i=0; i<privset->count; i++ ) {
@@ -828,12 +856,8 @@ BOOL privilege_set_to_se_priv( SE_PRIV *mask, PRIVILEGE_SET *privset )
                if ( privset->set[i].luid.high != 0 )
                        return False;
                
-               /* make sure :LUID.low is in range */   
-               if ( privset->set[i].luid.low == 0 || privset->set[i].luid.low > num_privs )
-                       return False;
-               
-               r = privs[privset->set[i].luid.low - 1].se_priv;
-               se_priv_add( mask, &r );
+               if ( luid_to_se_priv( &privset->set[i].luid, &r ) )             
+                       se_priv_add( mask, &r );
        }
 
        return True;