Fixes for multi-PDU schannel - based on Volker's code. This code needs

tidying up. Samsync still doesn't work due to bad parsing of net_io_sam_alias_info
with a blank description. Still working on this....
Jeremy.
(This used to be commit 942fede9a57a9319cf67388004dd45fa8a045f41)

diff --git a/source3/rpc_client/cli_pipe.c b/source3/rpc_client/cli_pipe.c
index a0be3d9774f881d736ddbe1dbea6de3ae111c707..b3e8deeeef430509a669650225755adcd7eb5607 100644 (file)
--- a/source3/rpc_client/cli_pipe.c
+++ b/source3/rpc_client/cli_pipe.c
@@ -174,7 +174,8 @@ static void NTLMSSPcalc_ap( struct cli_state *cli, unsigned char *data, uint32 l
  Never on bind requests/responses.
  ****************************************************************************/
 
-static BOOL rpc_auth_pipe(struct cli_state *cli, prs_struct *rdata, int len, int auth_len)
+static BOOL rpc_auth_pipe(struct cli_state *cli, prs_struct *rdata,
+               uint32 fragment_start, int len, int auth_len, int *pauth_padding_len)
 {
        /*
         * The following is that length of the data we must sign or seal.
@@ -187,12 +188,14 @@ static BOOL rpc_auth_pipe(struct cli_state *cli, prs_struct *rdata, int len, int
        /*
         * The start of the data to sign/seal is just after the RPC headers.
         */
-       char *reply_data = prs_data_p(rdata) + RPC_HEADER_LEN + RPC_HDR_REQ_LEN;
+       char *reply_data = prs_data_p(rdata) + fragment_start + RPC_HEADER_LEN + RPC_HDR_REQ_LEN;
 
        BOOL auth_verify = ((cli->ntlmssp_srv_flgs & NTLMSSP_NEGOTIATE_SIGN) != 0);
        BOOL auth_seal = ((cli->ntlmssp_srv_flgs & NTLMSSP_NEGOTIATE_SEAL) != 0);
        BOOL auth_schannel = (cli->saved_netlogon_pipe_fnum != 0);
 
+       *pauth_padding_len = 0;
+
        DEBUG(5,("rpc_auth_pipe: len: %d auth_len: %d verify %s seal %s schannel %s\n",
                  len, auth_len, BOOLSTR(auth_verify), BOOLSTR(auth_seal), BOOLSTR(auth_schannel)));
 
@@ -297,8 +300,10 @@ static BOOL rpc_auth_pipe(struct cli_state *cli, prs_struct *rdata, int len, int
 
        if (auth_schannel) {
                RPC_AUTH_NETSEC_CHK chk;
-               char data[RPC_AUTH_NETSEC_CHK_LEN];
-               char *dp = prs_data_p(rdata) + len - auth_len;
+               RPC_HDR_AUTH rhdr_auth;
+               char data[RPC_HDR_AUTH_LEN+RPC_AUTH_NETSEC_CHK_LEN];
+               char *dp = prs_data_p(rdata) + fragment_start + len -
+                                       RPC_HDR_AUTH_LEN - RPC_AUTH_NETSEC_CHK_LEN;
                prs_struct auth_verf;
 
                if (auth_len != RPC_AUTH_NETSEC_CHK_LEN) {
@@ -322,7 +327,19 @@ static BOOL rpc_auth_pipe(struct cli_state *cli, prs_struct *rdata, int len, int
                /* The endinness must be preserved. JRA. */
                prs_set_endian_data( &auth_verf, rdata->bigendian_data);
 
-               prs_give_memory(&auth_verf, data, RPC_AUTH_NETSEC_CHK_LEN, False);
+               prs_give_memory(&auth_verf, data, sizeof(data), False);
+
+               if (!smb_io_rpc_hdr_auth("auth_hdr", &rhdr_auth, &auth_verf, 0)) {
+                       DEBUG(0, ("rpc_auth_pipe: Could not parse schannel auth header\n"));
+                       return False;
+               }
+
+               if ((rhdr_auth.auth_type != NETSEC_AUTH_TYPE) ||
+                               (rhdr_auth.auth_level != NETSEC_AUTH_LEVEL)) {
+                       DEBUG(0, ("rpc_auth_pipe: Got wrong schannel auth type/level: %d/%d\n",
+                               rhdr_auth.auth_type, rhdr_auth.auth_level));
+                       return False;
+               }
 
                if (!smb_io_rpc_auth_netsec_chk("schannel_auth_sign", &chk, &auth_verf, 0)) {
                        DEBUG(0, ("rpc_auth_pipe: schannel unmarshalling "
@@ -336,6 +353,7 @@ static BOOL rpc_auth_pipe(struct cli_state *cli, prs_struct *rdata, int len, int
                        DEBUG(0, ("rpc_auth_pipe: Could not decode schannel\n"));
                        return False;
                }
+               *pauth_padding_len = rhdr_auth.padding;
        }
        return True;
 }
@@ -379,6 +397,7 @@ static BOOL rpc_api_pipe(struct cli_state *cli, prs_struct *data, prs_struct *rd
        char *prdata = NULL;
        uint32 rdata_len = 0;
        uint32 current_offset = 0;
+       uint32 fragment_start = 0;
        uint32 max_data = cli->max_xmit_frag ? cli->max_xmit_frag : 1024;
 
        /* Create setup parameters - must be in native byte order. */
@@ -469,7 +488,10 @@ static BOOL rpc_api_pipe(struct cli_state *cli, prs_struct *data, prs_struct *rd
         */
 
        if (rhdr.auth_len != 0) {
-               if(!rpc_auth_pipe(cli, rdata, rhdr.frag_len, rhdr.auth_len))
+               int auth_padding_len = 0;
+
+               if(!rpc_auth_pipe(cli, rdata, fragment_start, rhdr.frag_len,
+                                       rhdr.auth_len, &auth_padding_len))
                        return False;
                /*
                 * Drop the auth footers from the current offset.
@@ -477,7 +499,7 @@ static BOOL rpc_api_pipe(struct cli_state *cli, prs_struct *data, prs_struct *rd
                 * The auth footers consist of the auth_data and the
                 * preceeding 8 byte auth_header.
                 */
-               current_offset -= (rhdr.auth_len + RPC_HDR_AUTH_LEN);
+               current_offset -= (auth_padding_len + RPC_HDR_AUTH_LEN + rhdr.auth_len);
        }
        
        /* 
@@ -557,12 +579,17 @@ static BOOL rpc_api_pipe(struct cli_state *cli, prs_struct *data, prs_struct *rd
                if (!rpc_read(cli, rdata, len, &current_offset))
                        return False;
 
+               fragment_start = current_offset - len - RPC_HEADER_LEN - RPC_HDR_RESP_LEN;
+
                /*
                 * Verify any authentication footer.
                 */
 
                if (rhdr.auth_len != 0 ) {
-                       if(!rpc_auth_pipe(cli, rdata, rhdr.frag_len, rhdr.auth_len))
+                       int auth_padding_len = 0;
+
+                       if(!rpc_auth_pipe(cli, rdata, fragment_start, rhdr.frag_len,
+                                               rhdr.auth_len, &auth_padding_len))
                                return False;
                        /*
                         * Drop the auth footers from the current offset.
@@ -570,7 +597,7 @@ static BOOL rpc_api_pipe(struct cli_state *cli, prs_struct *data, prs_struct *rd
                         * preceeding 8 byte auth_header.
                         * We need this if there are more fragments.
                         */
-                       current_offset -= (rhdr.auth_len + RPC_HDR_AUTH_LEN);
+                       current_offset -= (auth_padding_len + RPC_HDR_AUTH_LEN + rhdr.auth_len);
                }
        }