2 Unix SMB/CIFS implementation.
4 Database Glue between Samba and the KDC
6 Copyright (C) Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org> 2005-2009
7 Copyright (C) Simo Sorce <idra@samba.org> 2010
9 This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
10 it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
11 the Free Software Foundation; either version 3 of the License, or
12 (at your option) any later version.
14 This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
15 but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
16 MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the
17 GNU General Public License for more details.
20 You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
21 along with this program. If not, see <http://www.gnu.org/licenses/>.
25 #include "libcli/security/security.h"
26 #include "auth/auth.h"
27 #include "auth/auth_sam.h"
28 #include "dsdb/samdb/samdb.h"
29 #include "dsdb/common/util.h"
30 #include "librpc/gen_ndr/ndr_drsblobs.h"
31 #include "param/param.h"
32 #include "../lib/crypto/md4.h"
33 #include "system/kerberos.h"
34 #include "auth/kerberos/kerberos.h"
36 #include "kdc/samba_kdc.h"
37 #include "kdc/kdc-glue.h"
38 #include "kdc/db-glue.h"
40 #define SAMBA_KVNO_GET_KRBTGT(kvno) \
41 ((uint16_t)(((uint32_t)kvno) >> 16))
43 #define SAMBA_KVNO_AND_KRBTGT(kvno, krbtgt) \
44 ((krb5_kvno)((((uint32_t)kvno) & 0xFFFF) | \
45 ((((uint32_t)krbtgt) << 16) & 0xFFFF0000)))
47 enum samba_kdc_ent_type
48 { SAMBA_KDC_ENT_TYPE_CLIENT, SAMBA_KDC_ENT_TYPE_SERVER,
49 SAMBA_KDC_ENT_TYPE_KRBTGT, SAMBA_KDC_ENT_TYPE_TRUST, SAMBA_KDC_ENT_TYPE_ANY };
51 enum trust_direction {
53 INBOUND = LSA_TRUST_DIRECTION_INBOUND,
54 OUTBOUND = LSA_TRUST_DIRECTION_OUTBOUND
57 static const char *trust_attrs[] = {
62 "msDS-SupportedEncryptionTypes",
70 static KerberosTime ldb_msg_find_krb5time_ldap_time(struct ldb_message *msg, const char *attr, KerberosTime default_val)
76 gentime = ldb_msg_find_attr_as_string(msg, attr, NULL);
80 tmp = strptime(gentime, "%Y%m%d%H%M%SZ", &tm);
88 static HDBFlags uf2HDBFlags(krb5_context context, uint32_t userAccountControl, enum samba_kdc_ent_type ent_type)
90 HDBFlags flags = int2HDBFlags(0);
92 /* we don't allow kadmin deletes */
95 /* mark the principal as invalid to start with */
100 /* All accounts are servers, but this may be disabled again in the caller */
103 /* Account types - clear the invalid bit if it turns out to be valid */
104 if (userAccountControl & UF_NORMAL_ACCOUNT) {
105 if (ent_type == SAMBA_KDC_ENT_TYPE_CLIENT || ent_type == SAMBA_KDC_ENT_TYPE_ANY) {
111 if (userAccountControl & UF_INTERDOMAIN_TRUST_ACCOUNT) {
112 if (ent_type == SAMBA_KDC_ENT_TYPE_CLIENT || ent_type == SAMBA_KDC_ENT_TYPE_ANY) {
117 if (userAccountControl & UF_WORKSTATION_TRUST_ACCOUNT) {
118 if (ent_type == SAMBA_KDC_ENT_TYPE_CLIENT || ent_type == SAMBA_KDC_ENT_TYPE_ANY) {
123 if (userAccountControl & UF_SERVER_TRUST_ACCOUNT) {
124 if (ent_type == SAMBA_KDC_ENT_TYPE_CLIENT || ent_type == SAMBA_KDC_ENT_TYPE_ANY) {
130 /* Not permitted to act as a client if disabled */
131 if (userAccountControl & UF_ACCOUNTDISABLE) {
134 if (userAccountControl & UF_LOCKOUT) {
135 flags.locked_out = 1;
138 if (userAccountControl & UF_PASSWORD_NOTREQD) {
143 UF_PASSWORD_CANT_CHANGE and UF_ENCRYPTED_TEXT_PASSWORD_ALLOWED are irrelevent
145 if (userAccountControl & UF_TEMP_DUPLICATE_ACCOUNT) {
149 /* UF_DONT_EXPIRE_PASSWD and UF_USE_DES_KEY_ONLY handled in samba_kdc_message2entry() */
152 if (userAccountControl & UF_MNS_LOGON_ACCOUNT) {
156 if (userAccountControl & UF_SMARTCARD_REQUIRED) {
157 flags.require_hwauth = 1;
159 if (userAccountControl & UF_TRUSTED_FOR_DELEGATION) {
160 flags.ok_as_delegate = 1;
162 if (userAccountControl & UF_TRUSTED_TO_AUTHENTICATE_FOR_DELEGATION) {
164 * this is confusing...
166 * UF_TRUSTED_FOR_DELEGATION
171 * UF_TRUSTED_TO_AUTHENTICATE_FOR_DELEGATION
172 * => trusted_for_delegation
174 flags.trusted_for_delegation = 1;
176 if (!(userAccountControl & UF_NOT_DELEGATED)) {
177 flags.forwardable = 1;
181 if (userAccountControl & UF_DONT_REQUIRE_PREAUTH) {
182 flags.require_preauth = 0;
184 flags.require_preauth = 1;
190 static int samba_kdc_entry_destructor(struct samba_kdc_entry *p)
192 hdb_entry_ex *entry_ex = p->entry_ex;
193 free_hdb_entry(&entry_ex->entry);
197 static void samba_kdc_free_entry(krb5_context context, hdb_entry_ex *entry_ex)
199 /* this function is called only from hdb_free_entry().
200 * Make sure we neutralize the destructor or we will
201 * get a double free later when hdb_free_entry() will
202 * try to call free_hdb_entry() */
203 talloc_set_destructor(entry_ex->ctx, NULL);
205 /* now proceed to free the talloc part */
206 talloc_free(entry_ex->ctx);
209 static krb5_error_code samba_kdc_message2entry_keys(krb5_context context,
210 struct samba_kdc_db_context *kdc_db_ctx,
212 struct ldb_message *msg,
215 uint32_t userAccountControl,
216 enum samba_kdc_ent_type ent_type,
217 hdb_entry_ex *entry_ex)
219 krb5_error_code ret = 0;
220 enum ndr_err_code ndr_err;
221 struct samr_Password *hash;
222 const struct ldb_val *sc_val;
223 struct supplementalCredentialsBlob scb;
224 struct supplementalCredentialsPackage *scpk = NULL;
225 bool newer_keys = false;
226 struct package_PrimaryKerberosBlob _pkb;
227 struct package_PrimaryKerberosCtr3 *pkb3 = NULL;
228 struct package_PrimaryKerberosCtr4 *pkb4 = NULL;
230 uint16_t allocated_keys = 0;
231 int rodc_krbtgt_number = 0;
233 uint32_t supported_enctypes
234 = ldb_msg_find_attr_as_uint(msg,
235 "msDS-SupportedEncryptionTypes",
238 if (rid == DOMAIN_RID_KRBTGT || is_rodc) {
239 /* KDCs (and KDCs on RODCs) use AES */
240 supported_enctypes |= ENC_HMAC_SHA1_96_AES128 | ENC_HMAC_SHA1_96_AES256;
241 } else if (userAccountControl & (UF_PARTIAL_SECRETS_ACCOUNT|UF_SERVER_TRUST_ACCOUNT)) {
242 /* DCs and RODCs comptuer accounts use AES */
243 supported_enctypes |= ENC_HMAC_SHA1_96_AES128 | ENC_HMAC_SHA1_96_AES256;
244 } else if (ent_type == SAMBA_KDC_ENT_TYPE_CLIENT ||
245 (ent_type == SAMBA_KDC_ENT_TYPE_ANY)) {
246 /* for AS-REQ the client chooses the enc types it
247 * supports, and this will vary between computers a
250 * likewise for 'any' return as much as is supported,
251 * to export into a keytab */
252 supported_enctypes = ENC_ALL_TYPES;
255 /* If UF_USE_DES_KEY_ONLY has been set, then don't allow use of the newer enc types */
256 if (userAccountControl & UF_USE_DES_KEY_ONLY) {
257 supported_enctypes = ENC_CRC32|ENC_RSA_MD5;
259 /* Otherwise, add in the default enc types */
260 supported_enctypes |= ENC_CRC32 | ENC_RSA_MD5 | ENC_RC4_HMAC_MD5;
263 /* Is this the krbtgt or a RODC krbtgt */
265 rodc_krbtgt_number = ldb_msg_find_attr_as_int(msg, "msDS-SecondaryKrbTgtNumber", -1);
267 if (rodc_krbtgt_number == -1) {
272 entry_ex->entry.keys.val = NULL;
273 entry_ex->entry.keys.len = 0;
275 kvno = ldb_msg_find_attr_as_int(msg, "msDS-KeyVersionNumber", 0);
277 kvno = SAMBA_KVNO_AND_KRBTGT(kvno, rodc_krbtgt_number);
279 entry_ex->entry.kvno = kvno;
281 /* Get keys from the db */
283 hash = samdb_result_hash(mem_ctx, msg, "unicodePwd");
284 sc_val = ldb_msg_find_ldb_val(msg, "supplementalCredentials");
286 /* unicodePwd for enctype 0x17 (23) if present */
291 /* supplementalCredentials if present */
293 ndr_err = ndr_pull_struct_blob_all(sc_val, mem_ctx, &scb,
294 (ndr_pull_flags_fn_t)ndr_pull_supplementalCredentialsBlob);
295 if (!NDR_ERR_CODE_IS_SUCCESS(ndr_err)) {
296 dump_data(0, sc_val->data, sc_val->length);
301 if (scb.sub.signature != SUPPLEMENTAL_CREDENTIALS_SIGNATURE) {
302 NDR_PRINT_DEBUG(supplementalCredentialsBlob, &scb);
307 for (i=0; i < scb.sub.num_packages; i++) {
308 if (strcmp("Primary:Kerberos-Newer-Keys", scb.sub.packages[i].name) == 0) {
309 scpk = &scb.sub.packages[i];
310 if (!scpk->data || !scpk->data[0]) {
316 } else if (strcmp("Primary:Kerberos", scb.sub.packages[i].name) == 0) {
317 scpk = &scb.sub.packages[i];
318 if (!scpk->data || !scpk->data[0]) {
322 * we don't break here in hope to find
323 * a Kerberos-Newer-Keys package
329 * Primary:Kerberos-Newer-Keys or Primary:Kerberos element
330 * of supplementalCredentials
335 blob = strhex_to_data_blob(mem_ctx, scpk->data);
341 /* we cannot use ndr_pull_struct_blob_all() here, as w2k and w2k3 add padding bytes */
342 ndr_err = ndr_pull_struct_blob(&blob, mem_ctx, &_pkb,
343 (ndr_pull_flags_fn_t)ndr_pull_package_PrimaryKerberosBlob);
344 if (!NDR_ERR_CODE_IS_SUCCESS(ndr_err)) {
346 krb5_set_error_message(context, ret, "samba_kdc_message2entry_keys: could not parse package_PrimaryKerberosBlob");
347 krb5_warnx(context, "samba_kdc_message2entry_keys: could not parse package_PrimaryKerberosBlob");
351 if (newer_keys && _pkb.version != 4) {
353 krb5_set_error_message(context, ret, "samba_kdc_message2entry_keys: Primary:Kerberos-Newer-Keys not version 4");
354 krb5_warnx(context, "samba_kdc_message2entry_keys: Primary:Kerberos-Newer-Keys not version 4");
358 if (!newer_keys && _pkb.version != 3) {
360 krb5_set_error_message(context, ret, "samba_kdc_message2entry_keys: could not parse Primary:Kerberos not version 3");
361 krb5_warnx(context, "samba_kdc_message2entry_keys: could not parse Primary:Kerberos not version 3");
365 if (_pkb.version == 4) {
366 pkb4 = &_pkb.ctr.ctr4;
367 allocated_keys += pkb4->num_keys;
368 } else if (_pkb.version == 3) {
369 pkb3 = &_pkb.ctr.ctr3;
370 allocated_keys += pkb3->num_keys;
374 if (allocated_keys == 0) {
375 if (kdc_db_ctx->rodc) {
376 /* We are on an RODC, but don't have keys for this account. Signal this to the caller */
377 return HDB_ERR_NOT_FOUND_HERE;
380 /* oh, no password. Apparently (comment in
381 * hdb-ldap.c) this violates the ASN.1, but this
382 * allows an entry with no keys (yet). */
386 /* allocate space to decode into */
387 entry_ex->entry.keys.len = 0;
388 entry_ex->entry.keys.val = calloc(allocated_keys, sizeof(Key));
389 if (entry_ex->entry.keys.val == NULL) {
394 if (hash && (supported_enctypes & ENC_RC4_HMAC_MD5)) {
398 key.salt = NULL; /* No salt for this enc type */
400 ret = krb5_keyblock_init(context,
401 ENCTYPE_ARCFOUR_HMAC,
402 hash->hash, sizeof(hash->hash),
408 entry_ex->entry.keys.val[entry_ex->entry.keys.len] = key;
409 entry_ex->entry.keys.len++;
413 for (i=0; i < pkb4->num_keys; i++) {
416 if (!pkb4->keys[i].value) continue;
418 if (!(kerberos_enctype_to_bitmap(pkb4->keys[i].keytype) & supported_enctypes)) {
425 if (pkb4->salt.string) {
428 salt = data_blob_string_const(pkb4->salt.string);
430 key.salt = calloc(1, sizeof(*key.salt));
431 if (key.salt == NULL) {
436 key.salt->type = hdb_pw_salt;
438 ret = krb5_data_copy(&key.salt->salt, salt.data, salt.length);
446 /* TODO: maybe pass the iteration_count somehow... */
448 ret = krb5_keyblock_init(context,
449 pkb4->keys[i].keytype,
450 pkb4->keys[i].value->data,
451 pkb4->keys[i].value->length,
453 if (ret == KRB5_PROG_ETYPE_NOSUPP) {
454 DEBUG(2,("Unsupported keytype ignored - type %u\n",
455 pkb4->keys[i].keytype));
468 entry_ex->entry.keys.val[entry_ex->entry.keys.len] = key;
469 entry_ex->entry.keys.len++;
472 for (i=0; i < pkb3->num_keys; i++) {
475 if (!pkb3->keys[i].value) continue;
477 if (!(kerberos_enctype_to_bitmap(pkb3->keys[i].keytype) & supported_enctypes)) {
484 if (pkb3->salt.string) {
487 salt = data_blob_string_const(pkb3->salt.string);
489 key.salt = calloc(1, sizeof(*key.salt));
490 if (key.salt == NULL) {
495 key.salt->type = hdb_pw_salt;
497 ret = krb5_data_copy(&key.salt->salt, salt.data, salt.length);
505 ret = krb5_keyblock_init(context,
506 pkb3->keys[i].keytype,
507 pkb3->keys[i].value->data,
508 pkb3->keys[i].value->length,
519 entry_ex->entry.keys.val[entry_ex->entry.keys.len] = key;
520 entry_ex->entry.keys.len++;
526 entry_ex->entry.keys.len = 0;
528 if (entry_ex->entry.keys.len == 0 && entry_ex->entry.keys.val) {
529 free(entry_ex->entry.keys.val);
530 entry_ex->entry.keys.val = NULL;
536 * Construct an hdb_entry from a directory entry.
538 static krb5_error_code samba_kdc_message2entry(krb5_context context,
539 struct samba_kdc_db_context *kdc_db_ctx,
540 TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx, krb5_const_principal principal,
541 enum samba_kdc_ent_type ent_type,
543 struct ldb_dn *realm_dn,
544 struct ldb_message *msg,
545 hdb_entry_ex *entry_ex)
547 struct loadparm_context *lp_ctx = kdc_db_ctx->lp_ctx;
548 uint32_t userAccountControl;
549 uint32_t msDS_User_Account_Control_Computed;
551 krb5_error_code ret = 0;
552 krb5_boolean is_computer = FALSE;
554 struct samba_kdc_entry *p;
559 bool is_rodc = false;
560 struct ldb_message_element *objectclasses;
561 struct ldb_val computer_val;
562 const char *samAccountName = ldb_msg_find_attr_as_string(msg, "samAccountName", NULL);
563 computer_val.data = discard_const_p(uint8_t,"computer");
564 computer_val.length = strlen((const char *)computer_val.data);
566 if (ldb_msg_find_element(msg, "msDS-SecondaryKrbTgtNumber")) {
570 if (!samAccountName) {
572 krb5_set_error_message(context, ret, "samba_kdc_message2entry: no samAccountName present");
576 objectclasses = ldb_msg_find_element(msg, "objectClass");
578 if (objectclasses && ldb_msg_find_val(objectclasses, &computer_val)) {
582 memset(entry_ex, 0, sizeof(*entry_ex));
584 p = talloc(mem_ctx, struct samba_kdc_entry);
590 p->kdc_db_ctx = kdc_db_ctx;
591 p->entry_ex = entry_ex;
592 p->realm_dn = talloc_reference(p, realm_dn);
598 talloc_set_destructor(p, samba_kdc_entry_destructor);
600 /* make sure we do not have bogus data in there */
601 memset(&entry_ex->entry, 0, sizeof(hdb_entry));
604 entry_ex->free_entry = samba_kdc_free_entry;
606 userAccountControl = ldb_msg_find_attr_as_uint(msg, "userAccountControl", 0);
608 msDS_User_Account_Control_Computed
609 = ldb_msg_find_attr_as_uint(msg,
610 "msDS-User-Account-Control-Computed",
614 * This brings in the lockout flag, block the account if not
615 * found. We need the weird UF_ACCOUNTDISABLE check because
616 * we do not want to fail open if the value is not returned,
617 * but 0 is a valid value (all OK)
619 if (msDS_User_Account_Control_Computed == UF_ACCOUNTDISABLE) {
621 krb5_set_error_message(context, ret, "samba_kdc_message2entry: "
622 "no msDS-User-Account-Control-Computed present");
625 userAccountControl |= msDS_User_Account_Control_Computed;
629 * If we are set to canonicalize, we get back the fixed UPPER
630 * case realm, and the real username (ie matching LDAP
633 * Otherwise, if we are set to enterprise, we
634 * get back the whole principal as-sent
636 * Finally, if we are not set to canonicalize, we get back the
637 * fixed UPPER case realm, but the as-sent username
640 entry_ex->entry.principal = malloc(sizeof(*(entry_ex->entry.principal)));
641 if (ent_type == SAMBA_KDC_ENT_TYPE_ANY && principal == NULL) {
642 krb5_make_principal(context, &entry_ex->entry.principal, lpcfg_realm(lp_ctx), samAccountName, NULL);
643 } else if (flags & HDB_F_CANON) {
644 krb5_make_principal(context, &entry_ex->entry.principal, lpcfg_realm(lp_ctx), samAccountName, NULL);
646 ret = copy_Principal(principal, entry_ex->entry.principal);
648 krb5_clear_error_message(context);
652 if (principal->name.name_type != KRB5_NT_ENTERPRISE_PRINCIPAL) {
653 /* While we have copied the client principal, tests
654 * show that Win2k3 returns the 'corrected' realm, not
655 * the client-specified realm. This code attempts to
656 * replace the client principal's realm with the one
657 * we determine from our records */
659 /* this has to be with malloc() */
660 krb5_principal_set_realm(context, entry_ex->entry.principal, lpcfg_realm(lp_ctx));
664 /* First try and figure out the flags based on the userAccountControl */
665 entry_ex->entry.flags = uf2HDBFlags(context, userAccountControl, ent_type);
667 /* Windows 2008 seems to enforce this (very sensible) rule by
668 * default - don't allow offline attacks on a user's password
669 * by asking for a ticket to them as a service (encrypted with
670 * their probably patheticly insecure password) */
672 if (entry_ex->entry.flags.server
673 && lpcfg_parm_bool(lp_ctx, NULL, "kdc", "require spn for service", true)) {
674 if (!is_computer && !ldb_msg_find_attr_as_string(msg, "servicePrincipalName", NULL)) {
675 entry_ex->entry.flags.server = 0;
679 if (flags & HDB_F_ADMIN_DATA) {
680 /* These (created_by, modified_by) parts of the entry are not relevant for Samba4's use
681 * of the Heimdal KDC. They are stored in a the traditional
682 * DB for audit purposes, and still form part of the structure
685 /* use 'whenCreated' */
686 entry_ex->entry.created_by.time = ldb_msg_find_krb5time_ldap_time(msg, "whenCreated", 0);
687 /* use 'kadmin' for now (needed by mit_samba) */
688 krb5_make_principal(context,
689 &entry_ex->entry.created_by.principal,
690 lpcfg_realm(lp_ctx), "kadmin", NULL);
692 entry_ex->entry.modified_by = (Event *) malloc(sizeof(Event));
693 if (entry_ex->entry.modified_by == NULL) {
695 krb5_set_error_message(context, ret, "malloc: out of memory");
699 /* use 'whenChanged' */
700 entry_ex->entry.modified_by->time = ldb_msg_find_krb5time_ldap_time(msg, "whenChanged", 0);
701 /* use 'kadmin' for now (needed by mit_samba) */
702 krb5_make_principal(context,
703 &entry_ex->entry.modified_by->principal,
704 lpcfg_realm(lp_ctx), "kadmin", NULL);
708 /* The lack of password controls etc applies to krbtgt by
709 * virtue of being that particular RID */
710 status = dom_sid_split_rid(NULL, samdb_result_dom_sid(mem_ctx, msg, "objectSid"), NULL, &rid);
712 if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(status)) {
717 if (rid == DOMAIN_RID_KRBTGT) {
718 entry_ex->entry.valid_end = NULL;
719 entry_ex->entry.pw_end = NULL;
721 entry_ex->entry.flags.invalid = 0;
722 entry_ex->entry.flags.server = 1;
724 /* Don't mark all requests for the krbtgt/realm as
725 * 'change password', as otherwise we could get into
726 * trouble, and not enforce the password expirty.
727 * Instead, only do it when request is for the kpasswd service */
728 if (ent_type == SAMBA_KDC_ENT_TYPE_SERVER
729 && principal->name.name_string.len == 2
730 && (strcmp(principal->name.name_string.val[0], "kadmin") == 0)
731 && (strcmp(principal->name.name_string.val[1], "changepw") == 0)
732 && lpcfg_is_my_domain_or_realm(lp_ctx, principal->realm)) {
733 entry_ex->entry.flags.change_pw = 1;
735 entry_ex->entry.flags.client = 0;
736 entry_ex->entry.flags.forwardable = 1;
737 entry_ex->entry.flags.ok_as_delegate = 1;
738 } else if (is_rodc) {
739 /* The RODC krbtgt account is like the main krbtgt,
740 * but it does not have a changepw or kadmin
743 entry_ex->entry.valid_end = NULL;
744 entry_ex->entry.pw_end = NULL;
746 /* Also don't allow the RODC krbtgt to be a client (it should not be needed) */
747 entry_ex->entry.flags.client = 0;
748 entry_ex->entry.flags.invalid = 0;
749 entry_ex->entry.flags.server = 1;
751 entry_ex->entry.flags.client = 0;
752 entry_ex->entry.flags.forwardable = 1;
753 entry_ex->entry.flags.ok_as_delegate = 0;
754 } else if (entry_ex->entry.flags.server && ent_type == SAMBA_KDC_ENT_TYPE_SERVER) {
755 /* The account/password expiry only applies when the account is used as a
756 * client (ie password login), not when used as a server */
758 /* Make very well sure we don't use this for a client,
759 * it could bypass the password restrictions */
760 entry_ex->entry.flags.client = 0;
762 entry_ex->entry.valid_end = NULL;
763 entry_ex->entry.pw_end = NULL;
766 NTTIME must_change_time
767 = samdb_result_force_password_change(kdc_db_ctx->samdb, mem_ctx,
769 if (must_change_time == 0x7FFFFFFFFFFFFFFFULL) {
770 entry_ex->entry.pw_end = NULL;
772 entry_ex->entry.pw_end = malloc(sizeof(*entry_ex->entry.pw_end));
773 if (entry_ex->entry.pw_end == NULL) {
777 *entry_ex->entry.pw_end = nt_time_to_unix(must_change_time);
780 acct_expiry = samdb_result_account_expires(msg);
781 if (acct_expiry == 0x7FFFFFFFFFFFFFFFULL) {
782 entry_ex->entry.valid_end = NULL;
784 entry_ex->entry.valid_end = malloc(sizeof(*entry_ex->entry.valid_end));
785 if (entry_ex->entry.valid_end == NULL) {
789 *entry_ex->entry.valid_end = nt_time_to_unix(acct_expiry);
793 entry_ex->entry.valid_start = NULL;
795 entry_ex->entry.max_life = malloc(sizeof(*entry_ex->entry.max_life));
796 if (entry_ex->entry.max_life == NULL) {
801 if (ent_type == SAMBA_KDC_ENT_TYPE_SERVER) {
802 *entry_ex->entry.max_life = kdc_db_ctx->policy.svc_tkt_lifetime;
803 } else if (ent_type == SAMBA_KDC_ENT_TYPE_KRBTGT || ent_type == SAMBA_KDC_ENT_TYPE_CLIENT) {
804 *entry_ex->entry.max_life = kdc_db_ctx->policy.usr_tkt_lifetime;
806 *entry_ex->entry.max_life = MIN(kdc_db_ctx->policy.svc_tkt_lifetime,
807 kdc_db_ctx->policy.usr_tkt_lifetime);
810 entry_ex->entry.max_renew = malloc(sizeof(*entry_ex->entry.max_life));
811 if (entry_ex->entry.max_renew == NULL) {
816 *entry_ex->entry.max_renew = kdc_db_ctx->policy.renewal_lifetime;
818 entry_ex->entry.generation = NULL;
820 /* Get keys from the db */
821 ret = samba_kdc_message2entry_keys(context, kdc_db_ctx, p, msg,
822 rid, is_rodc, userAccountControl,
825 /* Could be bougus data in the entry, or out of memory */
829 entry_ex->entry.etypes = malloc(sizeof(*(entry_ex->entry.etypes)));
830 if (entry_ex->entry.etypes == NULL) {
831 krb5_clear_error_message(context);
835 entry_ex->entry.etypes->len = entry_ex->entry.keys.len;
836 entry_ex->entry.etypes->val = calloc(entry_ex->entry.etypes->len, sizeof(int));
837 if (entry_ex->entry.etypes->val == NULL) {
838 krb5_clear_error_message(context);
842 for (i=0; i < entry_ex->entry.etypes->len; i++) {
843 entry_ex->entry.etypes->val[i] = entry_ex->entry.keys.val[i].key.keytype;
847 p->msg = talloc_steal(p, msg);
851 /* This doesn't free ent itself, that is for the eventual caller to do */
852 hdb_free_entry(context, entry_ex);
854 talloc_steal(kdc_db_ctx, entry_ex->ctx);
861 * Construct an hdb_entry from a directory entry.
862 * The kvno is what the remote client asked for
864 static krb5_error_code samba_kdc_trust_message2entry(krb5_context context,
865 struct samba_kdc_db_context *kdc_db_ctx,
866 TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx, krb5_const_principal principal,
867 enum trust_direction direction,
868 struct ldb_dn *realm_dn,
871 struct ldb_message *msg,
872 hdb_entry_ex *entry_ex)
874 struct loadparm_context *lp_ctx = kdc_db_ctx->lp_ctx;
875 const char *dnsdomain;
876 const char *realm = lpcfg_realm(lp_ctx);
877 DATA_BLOB password_utf16 = data_blob_null;
878 DATA_BLOB password_utf8 = data_blob_null;
879 struct samr_Password _password_hash;
880 const struct samr_Password *password_hash = NULL;
881 const struct ldb_val *password_val;
882 struct trustAuthInOutBlob password_blob;
883 struct samba_kdc_entry *p;
885 uint32_t current_kvno;
886 uint32_t num_keys = 0;
887 enum ndr_err_code ndr_err;
888 int ret, trust_direction_flags;
890 struct AuthenticationInformationArray *auth_array;
891 uint32_t supported_enctypes = ENC_RC4_HMAC_MD5;
893 if (dsdb_functional_level(kdc_db_ctx->samdb) >= DS_DOMAIN_FUNCTION_2008) {
894 supported_enctypes = ldb_msg_find_attr_as_uint(msg,
895 "msDS-SupportedEncryptionTypes",
899 p = talloc(mem_ctx, struct samba_kdc_entry);
905 p->kdc_db_ctx = kdc_db_ctx;
906 p->entry_ex = entry_ex;
907 p->realm_dn = realm_dn;
909 talloc_set_destructor(p, samba_kdc_entry_destructor);
911 /* make sure we do not have bogus data in there */
912 memset(&entry_ex->entry, 0, sizeof(hdb_entry));
915 entry_ex->free_entry = samba_kdc_free_entry;
917 /* use 'whenCreated' */
918 entry_ex->entry.created_by.time = ldb_msg_find_krb5time_ldap_time(msg, "whenCreated", 0);
919 /* use 'kadmin' for now (needed by mit_samba) */
920 krb5_make_principal(context,
921 &entry_ex->entry.created_by.principal,
922 realm, "kadmin", NULL);
924 entry_ex->entry.principal = malloc(sizeof(*(entry_ex->entry.principal)));
925 if (entry_ex->entry.principal == NULL) {
926 krb5_clear_error_message(context);
931 ret = copy_Principal(principal, entry_ex->entry.principal);
933 krb5_clear_error_message(context);
938 * While we have copied the client principal, tests
939 * show that Win2k3 returns the 'corrected' realm, not
940 * the client-specified realm. This code attempts to
941 * replace the client principal's realm with the one
942 * we determine from our records
945 krb5_principal_set_realm(context, entry_ex->entry.principal, realm);
947 entry_ex->entry.valid_start = NULL;
949 trust_direction_flags = ldb_msg_find_attr_as_int(msg, "trustDirection", 0);
951 if (direction == INBOUND) {
952 password_val = ldb_msg_find_ldb_val(msg, "trustAuthIncoming");
954 } else { /* OUTBOUND */
955 dnsdomain = ldb_msg_find_attr_as_string(msg, "trustPartner", NULL);
957 realm = strupper_talloc(mem_ctx, dnsdomain);
958 password_val = ldb_msg_find_ldb_val(msg, "trustAuthOutgoing");
961 if (!password_val || !(trust_direction_flags & direction)) {
962 krb5_clear_error_message(context);
963 ret = HDB_ERR_NOENTRY;
967 ndr_err = ndr_pull_struct_blob(password_val, mem_ctx, &password_blob,
968 (ndr_pull_flags_fn_t)ndr_pull_trustAuthInOutBlob);
969 if (!NDR_ERR_CODE_IS_SUCCESS(ndr_err)) {
970 krb5_clear_error_message(context);
976 /* we need to work out if we are going to use the current or
977 * the previous password hash.
978 * We base this on the kvno the client passes in. If the kvno
979 * passed in is equal to the current kvno in our database then
980 * we use the current structure. If it is the current kvno-1,
981 * then we use the previous substrucure.
984 /* first work out the current kvno */
986 for (i=0; i < password_blob.count; i++) {
987 if (password_blob.current.array[i].AuthType == TRUST_AUTH_TYPE_VERSION) {
988 current_kvno = password_blob.current.array[i].AuthInfo.version.version;
992 /* work out whether we will use the previous or current
994 if (password_blob.previous.count == 0) {
995 /* there is no previous password */
996 use_previous = false;
997 } else if (!(flags & HDB_F_KVNO_SPECIFIED) ||
998 kvno == current_kvno) {
999 use_previous = false;
1000 } else if ((kvno+1 == current_kvno) ||
1001 (kvno == 255 && current_kvno == 0)) {
1002 use_previous = true;
1004 DEBUG(1,(__location__ ": Request for unknown kvno %u - current kvno is %u\n",
1005 kvno, current_kvno));
1006 krb5_clear_error_message(context);
1007 ret = HDB_ERR_NOENTRY;
1012 auth_array = &password_blob.previous;
1014 auth_array = &password_blob.current;
1017 /* use the kvno the client specified, if available */
1018 if (flags & HDB_F_KVNO_SPECIFIED) {
1019 entry_ex->entry.kvno = kvno;
1021 entry_ex->entry.kvno = current_kvno;
1024 for (i=0; i < auth_array->count; i++) {
1025 if (auth_array->array[i].AuthType == TRUST_AUTH_TYPE_CLEAR) {
1028 password_utf16 = data_blob_const(auth_array->array[i].AuthInfo.clear.password,
1029 auth_array->array[i].AuthInfo.clear.size);
1030 if (password_utf16.length == 0) {
1034 if (supported_enctypes & ENC_RC4_HMAC_MD5) {
1035 mdfour(_password_hash.hash, password_utf16.data, password_utf16.length);
1036 if (password_hash == NULL) {
1039 password_hash = &_password_hash;
1042 if (!(supported_enctypes & (ENC_HMAC_SHA1_96_AES128|ENC_HMAC_SHA1_96_AES256))) {
1046 ok = convert_string_talloc(mem_ctx,
1047 CH_UTF16MUNGED, CH_UTF8,
1048 password_utf16.data,
1049 password_utf16.length,
1050 (void *)&password_utf8.data,
1051 &password_utf8.length);
1053 krb5_clear_error_message(context);
1058 if (supported_enctypes & ENC_HMAC_SHA1_96_AES128) {
1061 if (supported_enctypes & ENC_HMAC_SHA1_96_AES256) {
1065 } else if (auth_array->array[i].AuthType == TRUST_AUTH_TYPE_NT4OWF) {
1066 if (supported_enctypes & ENC_RC4_HMAC_MD5) {
1067 password_hash = &auth_array->array[i].AuthInfo.nt4owf.password;
1073 /* Must have found a cleartext or MD4 password */
1074 if (num_keys == 0) {
1075 DEBUG(1,(__location__ ": no usable key found\n"));
1076 krb5_clear_error_message(context);
1077 ret = HDB_ERR_NOENTRY;
1081 entry_ex->entry.keys.val = calloc(num_keys, sizeof(Key));
1082 if (entry_ex->entry.keys.val == NULL) {
1083 krb5_clear_error_message(context);
1088 if (password_utf8.length != 0) {
1090 krb5_const_principal salt_principal = principal;
1092 krb5_data cleartext_data;
1094 cleartext_data.data = password_utf8.data;
1095 cleartext_data.length = password_utf8.length;
1097 ret = krb5_get_pw_salt(context,
1104 if (supported_enctypes & ENC_HMAC_SHA1_96_AES256) {
1105 ret = krb5_string_to_key_data_salt(context,
1106 ENCTYPE_AES256_CTS_HMAC_SHA1_96,
1111 krb5_free_salt(context, salt);
1115 entry_ex->entry.keys.val[entry_ex->entry.keys.len] = key;
1116 entry_ex->entry.keys.len++;
1119 if (supported_enctypes & ENC_HMAC_SHA1_96_AES128) {
1120 ret = krb5_string_to_key_data_salt(context,
1121 ENCTYPE_AES128_CTS_HMAC_SHA1_96,
1126 krb5_free_salt(context, salt);
1130 entry_ex->entry.keys.val[entry_ex->entry.keys.len] = key;
1131 entry_ex->entry.keys.len++;
1134 krb5_free_salt(context, salt);
1137 if (password_hash != NULL) {
1140 ret = krb5_keyblock_init(context,
1141 ENCTYPE_ARCFOUR_HMAC,
1142 password_hash->hash,
1143 sizeof(password_hash->hash),
1149 entry_ex->entry.keys.val[entry_ex->entry.keys.len] = key;
1150 entry_ex->entry.keys.len++;
1153 entry_ex->entry.flags = int2HDBFlags(0);
1154 entry_ex->entry.flags.immutable = 1;
1155 entry_ex->entry.flags.invalid = 0;
1156 entry_ex->entry.flags.server = 1;
1157 entry_ex->entry.flags.require_preauth = 1;
1159 entry_ex->entry.pw_end = NULL;
1161 entry_ex->entry.max_life = NULL;
1163 entry_ex->entry.max_renew = NULL;
1165 entry_ex->entry.generation = NULL;
1167 entry_ex->entry.etypes = malloc(sizeof(*(entry_ex->entry.etypes)));
1168 if (entry_ex->entry.etypes == NULL) {
1169 krb5_clear_error_message(context);
1173 entry_ex->entry.etypes->len = entry_ex->entry.keys.len;
1174 entry_ex->entry.etypes->val = calloc(entry_ex->entry.etypes->len, sizeof(int));
1175 if (entry_ex->entry.etypes->val == NULL) {
1176 krb5_clear_error_message(context);
1180 for (i=0; i < entry_ex->entry.etypes->len; i++) {
1181 entry_ex->entry.etypes->val[i] = entry_ex->entry.keys.val[i].key.keytype;
1185 p->msg = talloc_steal(p, msg);
1189 /* This doesn't free ent itself, that is for the eventual caller to do */
1190 hdb_free_entry(context, entry_ex);
1192 talloc_steal(kdc_db_ctx, entry_ex->ctx);
1199 static krb5_error_code samba_kdc_lookup_trust(krb5_context context, struct ldb_context *ldb_ctx,
1200 TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx,
1202 struct ldb_dn *realm_dn,
1203 struct ldb_message **pmsg)
1206 const char * const *attrs = trust_attrs;
1208 status = sam_get_results_trust(ldb_ctx,
1209 mem_ctx, realm, realm, attrs,
1211 if (NT_STATUS_IS_OK(status)) {
1213 } else if (NT_STATUS_EQUAL(status, NT_STATUS_NOT_FOUND)) {
1214 return HDB_ERR_NOENTRY;
1215 } else if (NT_STATUS_EQUAL(status, NT_STATUS_NO_MEMORY)) {
1217 krb5_set_error_message(context, ret, "get_sam_result_trust: out of memory");
1221 krb5_set_error_message(context, ret, "get_sam_result_trust: %s", nt_errstr(status));
1226 static krb5_error_code samba_kdc_lookup_client(krb5_context context,
1227 struct samba_kdc_db_context *kdc_db_ctx,
1228 TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx,
1229 krb5_const_principal principal,
1231 struct ldb_dn **realm_dn,
1232 struct ldb_message **msg) {
1234 char *principal_string;
1236 if (principal->name.name_type == KRB5_NT_ENTERPRISE_PRINCIPAL) {
1237 principal_string = smb_krb5_principal_get_comp_string(mem_ctx, context,
1239 if (principal_string == NULL) {
1242 nt_status = sam_get_results_principal(kdc_db_ctx->samdb,
1243 mem_ctx, principal_string, attrs,
1245 TALLOC_FREE(principal_string);
1247 krb5_error_code ret;
1248 ret = krb5_unparse_name(context, principal, &principal_string);
1252 nt_status = sam_get_results_principal(kdc_db_ctx->samdb,
1253 mem_ctx, principal_string, attrs,
1255 free(principal_string);
1258 if (NT_STATUS_EQUAL(nt_status, NT_STATUS_NO_SUCH_USER)) {
1259 return HDB_ERR_NOENTRY;
1260 } else if (NT_STATUS_EQUAL(nt_status, NT_STATUS_NO_MEMORY)) {
1262 } else if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(nt_status)) {
1269 static krb5_error_code samba_kdc_fetch_client(krb5_context context,
1270 struct samba_kdc_db_context *kdc_db_ctx,
1271 TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx,
1272 krb5_const_principal principal,
1274 hdb_entry_ex *entry_ex) {
1275 struct ldb_dn *realm_dn;
1276 krb5_error_code ret;
1277 struct ldb_message *msg = NULL;
1279 ret = samba_kdc_lookup_client(context, kdc_db_ctx,
1280 mem_ctx, principal, user_attrs,
1286 ret = samba_kdc_message2entry(context, kdc_db_ctx, mem_ctx,
1287 principal, SAMBA_KDC_ENT_TYPE_CLIENT,
1289 realm_dn, msg, entry_ex);
1293 static krb5_error_code samba_kdc_fetch_krbtgt(krb5_context context,
1294 struct samba_kdc_db_context *kdc_db_ctx,
1295 TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx,
1296 krb5_const_principal principal,
1299 hdb_entry_ex *entry_ex)
1301 struct loadparm_context *lp_ctx = kdc_db_ctx->lp_ctx;
1302 krb5_error_code ret;
1303 struct ldb_message *msg = NULL;
1304 struct ldb_dn *realm_dn = ldb_get_default_basedn(kdc_db_ctx->samdb);
1306 krb5_principal alloc_principal = NULL;
1307 if (principal->name.name_string.len != 2
1308 || (strcmp(principal->name.name_string.val[0], KRB5_TGS_NAME) != 0)) {
1310 return HDB_ERR_NOENTRY;
1313 /* krbtgt case. Either us or a trusted realm */
1315 if (lpcfg_is_my_domain_or_realm(lp_ctx, principal->realm)
1316 && lpcfg_is_my_domain_or_realm(lp_ctx, principal->name.name_string.val[1])) {
1317 /* us, or someone quite like us */
1318 /* Cludge, cludge cludge. If the realm part of krbtgt/realm,
1319 * is in our db, then direct the caller at our primary
1323 unsigned int krbtgt_number;
1324 /* w2k8r2 sometimes gives us a kvno of 255 for inter-domain
1325 trust tickets. We don't yet know what this means, but we do
1326 seem to need to treat it as unspecified */
1327 if (flags & HDB_F_KVNO_SPECIFIED) {
1328 krbtgt_number = SAMBA_KVNO_GET_KRBTGT(kvno);
1329 if (kdc_db_ctx->rodc) {
1330 if (krbtgt_number != kdc_db_ctx->my_krbtgt_number) {
1331 return HDB_ERR_NOT_FOUND_HERE;
1335 krbtgt_number = kdc_db_ctx->my_krbtgt_number;
1338 if (krbtgt_number == kdc_db_ctx->my_krbtgt_number) {
1339 lret = dsdb_search_one(kdc_db_ctx->samdb, mem_ctx,
1340 &msg, kdc_db_ctx->krbtgt_dn, LDB_SCOPE_BASE,
1341 krbtgt_attrs, DSDB_SEARCH_NO_GLOBAL_CATALOG,
1342 "(objectClass=user)");
1344 /* We need to look up an RODC krbtgt (perhaps
1345 * ours, if we are an RODC, perhaps another
1346 * RODC if we are a read-write DC */
1347 lret = dsdb_search_one(kdc_db_ctx->samdb, mem_ctx,
1348 &msg, realm_dn, LDB_SCOPE_SUBTREE,
1350 DSDB_SEARCH_SHOW_EXTENDED_DN | DSDB_SEARCH_NO_GLOBAL_CATALOG,
1351 "(&(objectClass=user)(msDS-SecondaryKrbTgtNumber=%u))", (unsigned)(krbtgt_number));
1354 if (lret == LDB_ERR_NO_SUCH_OBJECT) {
1355 krb5_warnx(context, "samba_kdc_fetch: could not find KRBTGT number %u in DB!",
1356 (unsigned)(krbtgt_number));
1357 krb5_set_error_message(context, HDB_ERR_NOENTRY,
1358 "samba_kdc_fetch: could not find KRBTGT number %u in DB!",
1359 (unsigned)(krbtgt_number));
1360 return HDB_ERR_NOENTRY;
1361 } else if (lret != LDB_SUCCESS) {
1362 krb5_warnx(context, "samba_kdc_fetch: could not find KRBTGT number %u in DB!",
1363 (unsigned)(krbtgt_number));
1364 krb5_set_error_message(context, HDB_ERR_NOENTRY,
1365 "samba_kdc_fetch: could not find KRBTGT number %u in DB!",
1366 (unsigned)(krbtgt_number));
1367 return HDB_ERR_NOENTRY;
1371 * Windows seems to canonicalize the principal
1372 * in a TGS REP even if the client did not specify
1373 * the canonicalize flag.
1375 if (flags & (HDB_F_CANON|HDB_F_FOR_TGS_REQ)) {
1376 ret = krb5_copy_principal(context, principal, &alloc_principal);
1381 /* When requested to do so, ensure that the
1382 * both realm values in the principal are set
1383 * to the upper case, canonical realm */
1384 free(alloc_principal->name.name_string.val[1]);
1385 alloc_principal->name.name_string.val[1] = strdup(lpcfg_realm(lp_ctx));
1386 if (!alloc_principal->name.name_string.val[1]) {
1388 krb5_set_error_message(context, ret, "samba_kdc_fetch: strdup() failed!");
1391 principal = alloc_principal;
1394 ret = samba_kdc_message2entry(context, kdc_db_ctx, mem_ctx,
1395 principal, SAMBA_KDC_ENT_TYPE_KRBTGT,
1396 flags, realm_dn, msg, entry_ex);
1397 if (alloc_principal) {
1398 /* This is again copied in the message2entry call */
1399 krb5_free_principal(context, alloc_principal);
1402 krb5_warnx(context, "samba_kdc_fetch: self krbtgt message2entry failed");
1407 enum trust_direction direction = UNKNOWN;
1408 const char *realm = NULL;
1410 /* Either an inbound or outbound trust */
1412 if (strcasecmp(lpcfg_realm(lp_ctx), principal->realm) == 0) {
1413 /* look for inbound trust */
1414 direction = INBOUND;
1415 realm = principal->name.name_string.val[1];
1416 } else if (strcasecmp(lpcfg_realm(lp_ctx), principal->name.name_string.val[1]) == 0) {
1417 /* look for outbound trust */
1418 direction = OUTBOUND;
1419 realm = principal->realm;
1421 krb5_warnx(context, "samba_kdc_fetch: not our realm for trusts ('%s', '%s')",
1422 principal->realm, principal->name.name_string.val[1]);
1423 krb5_set_error_message(context, HDB_ERR_NOENTRY, "samba_kdc_fetch: not our realm for trusts ('%s', '%s')",
1424 principal->realm, principal->name.name_string.val[1]);
1425 return HDB_ERR_NOENTRY;
1428 /* Trusted domains are under CN=system */
1430 ret = samba_kdc_lookup_trust(context, kdc_db_ctx->samdb,
1432 realm, realm_dn, &msg);
1435 krb5_warnx(context, "samba_kdc_fetch: could not find principal in DB");
1436 krb5_set_error_message(context, ret, "samba_kdc_fetch: could not find principal in DB");
1440 ret = samba_kdc_trust_message2entry(context, kdc_db_ctx, mem_ctx,
1441 principal, direction,
1442 realm_dn, flags, kvno, msg, entry_ex);
1444 krb5_warnx(context, "samba_kdc_fetch: trust_message2entry failed for %s",
1445 ldb_dn_get_linearized(msg->dn));
1446 krb5_set_error_message(context, ret, "samba_kdc_fetch: "
1447 "trust_message2entry failed for %s",
1448 ldb_dn_get_linearized(msg->dn));
1455 static krb5_error_code samba_kdc_lookup_server(krb5_context context,
1456 struct samba_kdc_db_context *kdc_db_ctx,
1457 TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx,
1458 krb5_const_principal principal,
1460 struct ldb_dn **realm_dn,
1461 struct ldb_message **msg)
1463 krb5_error_code ret;
1464 if (principal->name.name_string.len >= 2) {
1465 /* 'normal server' case */
1468 struct ldb_dn *user_dn;
1469 char *principal_string;
1471 ret = krb5_unparse_name_flags(context, principal,
1472 KRB5_PRINCIPAL_UNPARSE_NO_REALM,
1478 /* At this point we may find the host is known to be
1479 * in a different realm, so we should generate a
1480 * referral instead */
1481 nt_status = crack_service_principal_name(kdc_db_ctx->samdb,
1482 mem_ctx, principal_string,
1483 &user_dn, realm_dn);
1484 free(principal_string);
1486 if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(nt_status)) {
1487 return HDB_ERR_NOENTRY;
1490 ldb_ret = dsdb_search_one(kdc_db_ctx->samdb,
1492 msg, user_dn, LDB_SCOPE_BASE,
1494 DSDB_SEARCH_SHOW_EXTENDED_DN | DSDB_SEARCH_NO_GLOBAL_CATALOG,
1496 if (ldb_ret != LDB_SUCCESS) {
1497 return HDB_ERR_NOENTRY;
1503 /* const char *realm; */
1504 /* server as client principal case, but we must not lookup userPrincipalNames */
1505 *realm_dn = ldb_get_default_basedn(kdc_db_ctx->samdb);
1506 /* realm = krb5_principal_get_realm(context, principal); */
1508 /* TODO: Check if it is our realm, otherwise give referral */
1510 ret = krb5_unparse_name_flags(context, principal, KRB5_PRINCIPAL_UNPARSE_NO_REALM, &short_princ);
1513 krb5_set_error_message(context, ret, "samba_kdc_lookup_principal: could not parse principal");
1514 krb5_warnx(context, "samba_kdc_lookup_principal: could not parse principal");
1518 lret = dsdb_search_one(kdc_db_ctx->samdb, mem_ctx, msg,
1519 *realm_dn, LDB_SCOPE_SUBTREE,
1521 DSDB_SEARCH_SHOW_EXTENDED_DN | DSDB_SEARCH_NO_GLOBAL_CATALOG,
1522 "(&(objectClass=user)(samAccountName=%s))",
1523 ldb_binary_encode_string(mem_ctx, short_princ));
1524 if (lret == LDB_ERR_NO_SUCH_OBJECT) {
1525 DEBUG(3, ("Failed to find an entry for %s\n", short_princ));
1527 return HDB_ERR_NOENTRY;
1529 if (lret != LDB_SUCCESS) {
1530 DEBUG(3, ("Failed single search for %s - %s\n",
1531 short_princ, ldb_errstring(kdc_db_ctx->samdb)));
1533 return HDB_ERR_NOENTRY;
1541 static krb5_error_code samba_kdc_fetch_server(krb5_context context,
1542 struct samba_kdc_db_context *kdc_db_ctx,
1543 TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx,
1544 krb5_const_principal principal,
1546 hdb_entry_ex *entry_ex)
1548 krb5_error_code ret;
1549 struct ldb_dn *realm_dn;
1550 struct ldb_message *msg;
1552 ret = samba_kdc_lookup_server(context, kdc_db_ctx, mem_ctx, principal,
1553 server_attrs, &realm_dn, &msg);
1558 ret = samba_kdc_message2entry(context, kdc_db_ctx, mem_ctx,
1559 principal, SAMBA_KDC_ENT_TYPE_SERVER,
1561 realm_dn, msg, entry_ex);
1563 krb5_warnx(context, "samba_kdc_fetch: message2entry failed");
1569 krb5_error_code samba_kdc_fetch(krb5_context context,
1570 struct samba_kdc_db_context *kdc_db_ctx,
1571 krb5_const_principal principal,
1574 hdb_entry_ex *entry_ex)
1576 krb5_error_code ret = HDB_ERR_NOENTRY;
1577 TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx;
1579 mem_ctx = talloc_named(kdc_db_ctx, 0, "samba_kdc_fetch context");
1582 krb5_set_error_message(context, ret, "samba_kdc_fetch: talloc_named() failed!");
1586 if (flags & HDB_F_GET_CLIENT) {
1587 ret = samba_kdc_fetch_client(context, kdc_db_ctx, mem_ctx, principal, flags, entry_ex);
1588 if (ret != HDB_ERR_NOENTRY) goto done;
1590 if (flags & HDB_F_GET_SERVER) {
1591 /* krbtgt fits into this situation for trusted realms, and for resolving different versions of our own realm name */
1592 ret = samba_kdc_fetch_krbtgt(context, kdc_db_ctx, mem_ctx, principal, flags, kvno, entry_ex);
1593 if (ret != HDB_ERR_NOENTRY) goto done;
1595 /* We return 'no entry' if it does not start with krbtgt/, so move to the common case quickly */
1596 ret = samba_kdc_fetch_server(context, kdc_db_ctx, mem_ctx, principal, flags, entry_ex);
1597 if (ret != HDB_ERR_NOENTRY) goto done;
1599 if (flags & HDB_F_GET_KRBTGT) {
1600 ret = samba_kdc_fetch_krbtgt(context, kdc_db_ctx, mem_ctx, principal, flags, kvno, entry_ex);
1601 if (ret != HDB_ERR_NOENTRY) goto done;
1605 talloc_free(mem_ctx);
1609 struct samba_kdc_seq {
1612 struct ldb_message **msgs;
1613 struct ldb_dn *realm_dn;
1616 static krb5_error_code samba_kdc_seq(krb5_context context,
1617 struct samba_kdc_db_context *kdc_db_ctx,
1618 hdb_entry_ex *entry)
1620 krb5_error_code ret;
1621 struct samba_kdc_seq *priv = kdc_db_ctx->seq_ctx;
1622 TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx;
1623 hdb_entry_ex entry_ex;
1624 memset(&entry_ex, '\0', sizeof(entry_ex));
1627 return HDB_ERR_NOENTRY;
1630 mem_ctx = talloc_named(priv, 0, "samba_kdc_seq context");
1634 krb5_set_error_message(context, ret, "samba_kdc_seq: talloc_named() failed!");
1638 if (priv->index < priv->count) {
1639 ret = samba_kdc_message2entry(context, kdc_db_ctx, mem_ctx,
1640 NULL, SAMBA_KDC_ENT_TYPE_ANY,
1641 HDB_F_ADMIN_DATA|HDB_F_GET_ANY,
1642 priv->realm_dn, priv->msgs[priv->index++], entry);
1644 ret = HDB_ERR_NOENTRY;
1649 kdc_db_ctx->seq_ctx = NULL;
1651 talloc_free(mem_ctx);
1657 krb5_error_code samba_kdc_firstkey(krb5_context context,
1658 struct samba_kdc_db_context *kdc_db_ctx,
1659 hdb_entry_ex *entry)
1661 struct ldb_context *ldb_ctx = kdc_db_ctx->samdb;
1662 struct samba_kdc_seq *priv = kdc_db_ctx->seq_ctx;
1664 struct ldb_result *res = NULL;
1665 krb5_error_code ret;
1666 TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx;
1671 kdc_db_ctx->seq_ctx = NULL;
1674 priv = (struct samba_kdc_seq *) talloc(kdc_db_ctx, struct samba_kdc_seq);
1677 krb5_set_error_message(context, ret, "talloc: out of memory");
1683 priv->realm_dn = ldb_get_default_basedn(ldb_ctx);
1686 mem_ctx = talloc_named(priv, 0, "samba_kdc_firstkey context");
1690 krb5_set_error_message(context, ret, "samba_kdc_firstkey: talloc_named() failed!");
1694 ret = krb5_get_default_realm(context, &realm);
1699 krb5_free_default_realm(context, realm);
1701 lret = dsdb_search(ldb_ctx, priv, &res,
1702 priv->realm_dn, LDB_SCOPE_SUBTREE, user_attrs,
1703 DSDB_SEARCH_NO_GLOBAL_CATALOG,
1704 "(objectClass=user)");
1706 if (lret != LDB_SUCCESS) {
1708 return HDB_ERR_NOENTRY;
1711 priv->count = res->count;
1712 priv->msgs = talloc_steal(priv, res->msgs);
1715 kdc_db_ctx->seq_ctx = priv;
1717 ret = samba_kdc_seq(context, kdc_db_ctx, entry);
1721 kdc_db_ctx->seq_ctx = NULL;
1723 talloc_free(mem_ctx);
1728 krb5_error_code samba_kdc_nextkey(krb5_context context,
1729 struct samba_kdc_db_context *kdc_db_ctx,
1730 hdb_entry_ex *entry)
1732 return samba_kdc_seq(context, kdc_db_ctx, entry);
1735 /* Check if a given entry may delegate or do s4u2self to this target principal
1737 * This is currently a very nasty hack - allowing only delegation to itself.
1740 samba_kdc_check_s4u2self(krb5_context context,
1741 struct samba_kdc_db_context *kdc_db_ctx,
1742 hdb_entry_ex *entry,
1743 krb5_const_principal target_principal)
1745 krb5_error_code ret;
1746 krb5_principal enterprise_prinicpal = NULL;
1747 struct ldb_dn *realm_dn;
1748 struct ldb_message *msg;
1749 struct dom_sid *orig_sid;
1750 struct dom_sid *target_sid;
1751 struct samba_kdc_entry *p = talloc_get_type(entry->ctx, struct samba_kdc_entry);
1752 const char *delegation_check_attrs[] = {
1756 TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx = talloc_named(kdc_db_ctx, 0, "samba_kdc_check_s4u2self");
1760 krb5_set_error_message(context, ret, "samba_kdc_check_s4u2self: talloc_named() failed!");
1764 if (target_principal->name.name_type == KRB5_NT_ENTERPRISE_PRINCIPAL) {
1765 /* Need to reparse the enterprise principal to find the real target */
1766 if (target_principal->name.name_string.len != 1) {
1767 ret = KRB5_PARSE_MALFORMED;
1768 krb5_set_error_message(context, ret, "samba_kdc_check_s4u2self: request for delegation to enterprise principal with wrong (%d) number of components",
1769 target_principal->name.name_string.len);
1770 talloc_free(mem_ctx);
1773 ret = krb5_parse_name(context, target_principal->name.name_string.val[0],
1774 &enterprise_prinicpal);
1776 talloc_free(mem_ctx);
1779 target_principal = enterprise_prinicpal;
1782 ret = samba_kdc_lookup_server(context, kdc_db_ctx, mem_ctx, target_principal,
1783 delegation_check_attrs, &realm_dn, &msg);
1785 krb5_free_principal(context, enterprise_prinicpal);
1788 talloc_free(mem_ctx);
1792 orig_sid = samdb_result_dom_sid(mem_ctx, p->msg, "objectSid");
1793 target_sid = samdb_result_dom_sid(mem_ctx, msg, "objectSid");
1795 /* Allow delegation to the same principal, even if by a different
1796 * name. The easy and safe way to prove this is by SID
1798 if (!(orig_sid && target_sid && dom_sid_equal(orig_sid, target_sid))) {
1799 talloc_free(mem_ctx);
1800 return KRB5KDC_ERR_BADOPTION;
1803 talloc_free(mem_ctx);
1807 /* Certificates printed by a the Certificate Authority might have a
1808 * slightly different form of the user principal name to that in the
1809 * database. Allow a mismatch where they both refer to the same
1813 samba_kdc_check_pkinit_ms_upn_match(krb5_context context,
1814 struct samba_kdc_db_context *kdc_db_ctx,
1815 hdb_entry_ex *entry,
1816 krb5_const_principal certificate_principal)
1818 krb5_error_code ret;
1819 struct ldb_dn *realm_dn;
1820 struct ldb_message *msg;
1821 struct dom_sid *orig_sid;
1822 struct dom_sid *target_sid;
1823 struct samba_kdc_entry *p = talloc_get_type(entry->ctx, struct samba_kdc_entry);
1824 const char *ms_upn_check_attrs[] = {
1828 TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx = talloc_named(kdc_db_ctx, 0, "samba_kdc_check_pkinit_ms_upn_match");
1832 krb5_set_error_message(context, ret, "samba_kdc_fetch: talloc_named() failed!");
1836 ret = samba_kdc_lookup_client(context, kdc_db_ctx,
1837 mem_ctx, certificate_principal,
1838 ms_upn_check_attrs, &realm_dn, &msg);
1841 talloc_free(mem_ctx);
1845 orig_sid = samdb_result_dom_sid(mem_ctx, p->msg, "objectSid");
1846 target_sid = samdb_result_dom_sid(mem_ctx, msg, "objectSid");
1848 /* Consider these to be the same principal, even if by a different
1849 * name. The easy and safe way to prove this is by SID
1851 if (!(orig_sid && target_sid && dom_sid_equal(orig_sid, target_sid))) {
1852 talloc_free(mem_ctx);
1853 return KRB5_KDC_ERR_CLIENT_NAME_MISMATCH;
1856 talloc_free(mem_ctx);
1861 * Check if a given entry may delegate to this target principal
1865 samba_kdc_check_s4u2proxy(krb5_context context,
1866 struct samba_kdc_db_context *kdc_db_ctx,
1867 hdb_entry_ex *entry,
1868 krb5_const_principal target_principal)
1870 krb5_error_code ret;
1872 const char *client_dn = NULL;
1873 const char *target_principal_name = NULL;
1874 struct ldb_message_element *el;
1878 struct samba_kdc_entry *p = talloc_get_type(entry->ctx, struct samba_kdc_entry);
1880 TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx = talloc_named(kdc_db_ctx, 0, "samba_kdc_check_s4u2proxy");
1884 krb5_set_error_message(context, ret,
1885 "samba_kdc_check_s4u2proxy:"
1886 " talloc_named() failed!");
1890 client_dn = ldb_dn_get_linearized(p->msg->dn);
1896 krb5_set_error_message(context, ret,
1897 "samba_kdc_check_s4u2proxy:"
1898 " ldb_dn_get_linearized() failed!");
1903 * The main heimdal code already checked that the target_principal
1904 * belongs to the same realm as the client.
1906 * So we just need the principal without the realm,
1907 * as that is what is configured in the "msDS-AllowedToDelegateTo"
1910 ret = krb5_unparse_name_flags(context, target_principal,
1911 KRB5_PRINCIPAL_UNPARSE_NO_REALM, &tmp);
1913 talloc_free(mem_ctx);
1914 krb5_set_error_message(context, ret,
1915 "samba_kdc_check_s4u2proxy:"
1916 " krb5_unparse_name() failed!");
1919 DEBUG(10,("samba_kdc_check_s4u2proxy: client[%s] for target[%s]\n",
1922 target_principal_name = talloc_strdup(mem_ctx, tmp);
1924 if (target_principal_name == NULL) {
1926 krb5_set_error_message(context, ret,
1927 "samba_kdc_check_s4u2proxy:"
1928 " talloc_strdup() failed!");
1932 el = ldb_msg_find_element(p->msg, "msDS-AllowedToDelegateTo");
1937 val = data_blob_string_const(target_principal_name);
1939 for (i=0; i<el->num_values; i++) {
1940 struct ldb_val *val1 = &val;
1941 struct ldb_val *val2 = &el->values[i];
1944 if (val1->length != val2->length) {
1948 cmp = strncasecmp((const char *)val1->data,
1949 (const char *)val2->data,
1963 DEBUG(10,("samba_kdc_check_s4u2proxy: client[%s] allowed target[%s]\n",
1965 talloc_free(mem_ctx);
1969 krb5_set_error_message(context, ret,
1970 "samba_kdc_check_s4u2proxy: client[%s] "
1971 "not allowed for delegation to target[%s]",
1973 target_principal_name);
1974 talloc_free(mem_ctx);
1975 return KRB5KDC_ERR_BADOPTION;
1978 NTSTATUS samba_kdc_setup_db_ctx(TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx, struct samba_kdc_base_context *base_ctx,
1979 struct samba_kdc_db_context **kdc_db_ctx_out)
1982 struct ldb_message *msg;
1983 struct auth_session_info *session_info;
1984 struct samba_kdc_db_context *kdc_db_ctx;
1985 /* The idea here is very simple. Using Kerberos to
1986 * authenticate the KDC to the LDAP server is higly likely to
1989 * In future we may set this up to use EXERNAL and SSL
1990 * certificates, for now it will almost certainly be NTLMSSP_SET_USERNAME
1993 kdc_db_ctx = talloc_zero(mem_ctx, struct samba_kdc_db_context);
1994 if (kdc_db_ctx == NULL) {
1995 return NT_STATUS_NO_MEMORY;
1997 kdc_db_ctx->ev_ctx = base_ctx->ev_ctx;
1998 kdc_db_ctx->lp_ctx = base_ctx->lp_ctx;
2000 /* get default kdc policy */
2001 lpcfg_default_kdc_policy(base_ctx->lp_ctx,
2002 &kdc_db_ctx->policy.svc_tkt_lifetime,
2003 &kdc_db_ctx->policy.usr_tkt_lifetime,
2004 &kdc_db_ctx->policy.renewal_lifetime);
2006 session_info = system_session(kdc_db_ctx->lp_ctx);
2007 if (session_info == NULL) {
2008 return NT_STATUS_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2011 /* Setup the link to LDB */
2012 kdc_db_ctx->samdb = samdb_connect(kdc_db_ctx, base_ctx->ev_ctx,
2013 base_ctx->lp_ctx, session_info, 0);
2014 if (kdc_db_ctx->samdb == NULL) {
2015 DEBUG(1, ("hdb_samba4_create: Cannot open samdb for KDC backend!"));
2016 talloc_free(kdc_db_ctx);
2017 return NT_STATUS_CANT_ACCESS_DOMAIN_INFO;
2020 /* Find out our own krbtgt kvno */
2021 ldb_ret = samdb_rodc(kdc_db_ctx->samdb, &kdc_db_ctx->rodc);
2022 if (ldb_ret != LDB_SUCCESS) {
2023 DEBUG(1, ("hdb_samba4_create: Cannot determine if we are an RODC in KDC backend: %s\n",
2024 ldb_errstring(kdc_db_ctx->samdb)));
2025 talloc_free(kdc_db_ctx);
2026 return NT_STATUS_CANT_ACCESS_DOMAIN_INFO;
2028 if (kdc_db_ctx->rodc) {
2029 int my_krbtgt_number;
2030 const char *secondary_keytab[] = { "msDS-SecondaryKrbTgtNumber", NULL };
2031 struct ldb_dn *account_dn;
2032 struct ldb_dn *server_dn = samdb_server_dn(kdc_db_ctx->samdb, kdc_db_ctx);
2034 DEBUG(1, ("hdb_samba4_create: Cannot determine server DN in KDC backend: %s\n",
2035 ldb_errstring(kdc_db_ctx->samdb)));
2036 talloc_free(kdc_db_ctx);
2037 return NT_STATUS_CANT_ACCESS_DOMAIN_INFO;
2040 ldb_ret = samdb_reference_dn(kdc_db_ctx->samdb, kdc_db_ctx, server_dn,
2041 "serverReference", &account_dn);
2042 if (ldb_ret != LDB_SUCCESS) {
2043 DEBUG(1, ("hdb_samba4_create: Cannot determine server account in KDC backend: %s\n",
2044 ldb_errstring(kdc_db_ctx->samdb)));
2045 talloc_free(kdc_db_ctx);
2046 return NT_STATUS_CANT_ACCESS_DOMAIN_INFO;
2049 ldb_ret = samdb_reference_dn(kdc_db_ctx->samdb, kdc_db_ctx, account_dn,
2050 "msDS-KrbTgtLink", &kdc_db_ctx->krbtgt_dn);
2051 talloc_free(account_dn);
2052 if (ldb_ret != LDB_SUCCESS) {
2053 DEBUG(1, ("hdb_samba4_create: Cannot determine RODC krbtgt account in KDC backend: %s\n",
2054 ldb_errstring(kdc_db_ctx->samdb)));
2055 talloc_free(kdc_db_ctx);
2056 return NT_STATUS_CANT_ACCESS_DOMAIN_INFO;
2059 ldb_ret = dsdb_search_one(kdc_db_ctx->samdb, kdc_db_ctx,
2060 &msg, kdc_db_ctx->krbtgt_dn, LDB_SCOPE_BASE,
2062 DSDB_SEARCH_NO_GLOBAL_CATALOG,
2063 "(&(objectClass=user)(msDS-SecondaryKrbTgtNumber=*))");
2064 if (ldb_ret != LDB_SUCCESS) {
2065 DEBUG(1, ("hdb_samba4_create: Cannot read krbtgt account %s in KDC backend to get msDS-SecondaryKrbTgtNumber: %s: %s\n",
2066 ldb_dn_get_linearized(kdc_db_ctx->krbtgt_dn),
2067 ldb_errstring(kdc_db_ctx->samdb),
2068 ldb_strerror(ldb_ret)));
2069 talloc_free(kdc_db_ctx);
2070 return NT_STATUS_CANT_ACCESS_DOMAIN_INFO;
2072 my_krbtgt_number = ldb_msg_find_attr_as_int(msg, "msDS-SecondaryKrbTgtNumber", -1);
2073 if (my_krbtgt_number == -1) {
2074 DEBUG(1, ("hdb_samba4_create: Cannot read msDS-SecondaryKrbTgtNumber from krbtgt account %s in KDC backend: got %d\n",
2075 ldb_dn_get_linearized(kdc_db_ctx->krbtgt_dn),
2077 talloc_free(kdc_db_ctx);
2078 return NT_STATUS_CANT_ACCESS_DOMAIN_INFO;
2080 kdc_db_ctx->my_krbtgt_number = my_krbtgt_number;
2083 kdc_db_ctx->my_krbtgt_number = 0;
2084 ldb_ret = dsdb_search_one(kdc_db_ctx->samdb, kdc_db_ctx,
2086 ldb_get_default_basedn(kdc_db_ctx->samdb),
2089 DSDB_SEARCH_NO_GLOBAL_CATALOG,
2090 "(&(objectClass=user)(samAccountName=krbtgt))");
2092 if (ldb_ret != LDB_SUCCESS) {
2093 DEBUG(1, ("samba_kdc_fetch: could not find own KRBTGT in DB: %s\n", ldb_errstring(kdc_db_ctx->samdb)));
2094 talloc_free(kdc_db_ctx);
2095 return NT_STATUS_CANT_ACCESS_DOMAIN_INFO;
2097 kdc_db_ctx->krbtgt_dn = talloc_steal(kdc_db_ctx, msg->dn);
2098 kdc_db_ctx->my_krbtgt_number = 0;
2101 *kdc_db_ctx_out = kdc_db_ctx;
2102 return NT_STATUS_OK;