signal, x86: Delay calling signals in atomic on RT enabled kernels
[sfrench/cifs-2.6.git] / kernel / stackleak.c
1 // SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
2 /*
3  * This code fills the used part of the kernel stack with a poison value
4  * before returning to userspace. It's part of the STACKLEAK feature
5  * ported from grsecurity/PaX.
6  *
7  * Author: Alexander Popov <alex.popov@linux.com>
8  *
9  * STACKLEAK reduces the information which kernel stack leak bugs can
10  * reveal and blocks some uninitialized stack variable attacks.
11  */
12
13 #include <linux/stackleak.h>
14 #include <linux/kprobes.h>
15
16 #ifdef CONFIG_STACKLEAK_RUNTIME_DISABLE
17 #include <linux/jump_label.h>
18 #include <linux/sysctl.h>
19 #include <linux/init.h>
20
21 static DEFINE_STATIC_KEY_FALSE(stack_erasing_bypass);
22
23 #ifdef CONFIG_SYSCTL
24 static int stack_erasing_sysctl(struct ctl_table *table, int write,
25                         void __user *buffer, size_t *lenp, loff_t *ppos)
26 {
27         int ret = 0;
28         int state = !static_branch_unlikely(&stack_erasing_bypass);
29         int prev_state = state;
30
31         table->data = &state;
32         table->maxlen = sizeof(int);
33         ret = proc_dointvec_minmax(table, write, buffer, lenp, ppos);
34         state = !!state;
35         if (ret || !write || state == prev_state)
36                 return ret;
37
38         if (state)
39                 static_branch_disable(&stack_erasing_bypass);
40         else
41                 static_branch_enable(&stack_erasing_bypass);
42
43         pr_warn("stackleak: kernel stack erasing is %s\n",
44                                         state ? "enabled" : "disabled");
45         return ret;
46 }
47 static struct ctl_table stackleak_sysctls[] = {
48         {
49                 .procname       = "stack_erasing",
50                 .data           = NULL,
51                 .maxlen         = sizeof(int),
52                 .mode           = 0600,
53                 .proc_handler   = stack_erasing_sysctl,
54                 .extra1         = SYSCTL_ZERO,
55                 .extra2         = SYSCTL_ONE,
56         },
57         {}
58 };
59
60 static int __init stackleak_sysctls_init(void)
61 {
62         register_sysctl_init("kernel", stackleak_sysctls);
63         return 0;
64 }
65 late_initcall(stackleak_sysctls_init);
66 #endif /* CONFIG_SYSCTL */
67
68 #define skip_erasing()  static_branch_unlikely(&stack_erasing_bypass)
69 #else
70 #define skip_erasing()  false
71 #endif /* CONFIG_STACKLEAK_RUNTIME_DISABLE */
72
73 asmlinkage void noinstr stackleak_erase(void)
74 {
75         /* It would be nice not to have 'kstack_ptr' and 'boundary' on stack */
76         unsigned long kstack_ptr = current->lowest_stack;
77         unsigned long boundary = (unsigned long)end_of_stack(current);
78         unsigned int poison_count = 0;
79         const unsigned int depth = STACKLEAK_SEARCH_DEPTH / sizeof(unsigned long);
80
81         if (skip_erasing())
82                 return;
83
84         /* Check that 'lowest_stack' value is sane */
85         if (unlikely(kstack_ptr - boundary >= THREAD_SIZE))
86                 kstack_ptr = boundary;
87
88         /* Search for the poison value in the kernel stack */
89         while (kstack_ptr > boundary && poison_count <= depth) {
90                 if (*(unsigned long *)kstack_ptr == STACKLEAK_POISON)
91                         poison_count++;
92                 else
93                         poison_count = 0;
94
95                 kstack_ptr -= sizeof(unsigned long);
96         }
97
98         /*
99          * One 'long int' at the bottom of the thread stack is reserved and
100          * should not be poisoned (see CONFIG_SCHED_STACK_END_CHECK=y).
101          */
102         if (kstack_ptr == boundary)
103                 kstack_ptr += sizeof(unsigned long);
104
105 #ifdef CONFIG_STACKLEAK_METRICS
106         current->prev_lowest_stack = kstack_ptr;
107 #endif
108
109         /*
110          * Now write the poison value to the kernel stack. Start from
111          * 'kstack_ptr' and move up till the new 'boundary'. We assume that
112          * the stack pointer doesn't change when we write poison.
113          */
114         if (on_thread_stack())
115                 boundary = current_stack_pointer;
116         else
117                 boundary = current_top_of_stack();
118
119         while (kstack_ptr < boundary) {
120                 *(unsigned long *)kstack_ptr = STACKLEAK_POISON;
121                 kstack_ptr += sizeof(unsigned long);
122         }
123
124         /* Reset the 'lowest_stack' value for the next syscall */
125         current->lowest_stack = current_top_of_stack() - THREAD_SIZE/64;
126 }
127
128 void __used __no_caller_saved_registers noinstr stackleak_track_stack(void)
129 {
130         unsigned long sp = current_stack_pointer;
131
132         /*
133          * Having CONFIG_STACKLEAK_TRACK_MIN_SIZE larger than
134          * STACKLEAK_SEARCH_DEPTH makes the poison search in
135          * stackleak_erase() unreliable. Let's prevent that.
136          */
137         BUILD_BUG_ON(CONFIG_STACKLEAK_TRACK_MIN_SIZE > STACKLEAK_SEARCH_DEPTH);
138
139         /* 'lowest_stack' should be aligned on the register width boundary */
140         sp = ALIGN(sp, sizeof(unsigned long));
141         if (sp < current->lowest_stack &&
142             sp >= (unsigned long)task_stack_page(current) +
143                                                 sizeof(unsigned long)) {
144                 current->lowest_stack = sp;
145         }
146 }
147 EXPORT_SYMBOL(stackleak_track_stack);