2 Unix SMB/CIFS implementation.
4 Database Glue between Samba and the KDC
6 Copyright (C) Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org> 2005-2009
7 Copyright (C) Simo Sorce <idra@samba.org> 2010
9 This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
10 it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
11 the Free Software Foundation; either version 3 of the License, or
12 (at your option) any later version.
14 This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
15 but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
16 MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the
17 GNU General Public License for more details.
20 You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
21 along with this program. If not, see <http://www.gnu.org/licenses/>.
25 #include "libcli/security/security.h"
26 #include "auth/auth.h"
27 #include "auth/auth_sam.h"
28 #include "dsdb/samdb/samdb.h"
29 #include "dsdb/common/util.h"
30 #include "librpc/gen_ndr/ndr_drsblobs.h"
31 #include "param/param.h"
32 #include "../lib/crypto/md4.h"
33 #include "system/kerberos.h"
34 #include "auth/kerberos/kerberos.h"
36 #include "kdc/samba_kdc.h"
37 #include "kdc/db-glue.h"
39 #define SAMBA_KVNO_GET_KRBTGT(kvno) \
40 ((uint16_t)(((uint32_t)kvno) >> 16))
42 #define SAMBA_KVNO_AND_KRBTGT(kvno, krbtgt) \
43 ((krb5_kvno)((((uint32_t)kvno) & 0xFFFF) | \
44 ((((uint32_t)krbtgt) << 16) & 0xFFFF0000)))
46 enum samba_kdc_ent_type
47 { SAMBA_KDC_ENT_TYPE_CLIENT, SAMBA_KDC_ENT_TYPE_SERVER,
48 SAMBA_KDC_ENT_TYPE_KRBTGT, SAMBA_KDC_ENT_TYPE_TRUST, SAMBA_KDC_ENT_TYPE_ANY };
50 enum trust_direction {
52 INBOUND = LSA_TRUST_DIRECTION_INBOUND,
53 OUTBOUND = LSA_TRUST_DIRECTION_OUTBOUND
56 static const char *trust_attrs[] = {
61 "msDS-SupportedEncryptionTypes",
69 static KerberosTime ldb_msg_find_krb5time_ldap_time(struct ldb_message *msg, const char *attr, KerberosTime default_val)
75 gentime = ldb_msg_find_attr_as_string(msg, attr, NULL);
79 tmp = strptime(gentime, "%Y%m%d%H%M%SZ", &tm);
87 static HDBFlags uf2HDBFlags(krb5_context context, uint32_t userAccountControl, enum samba_kdc_ent_type ent_type)
89 HDBFlags flags = int2HDBFlags(0);
91 /* we don't allow kadmin deletes */
94 /* mark the principal as invalid to start with */
99 /* All accounts are servers, but this may be disabled again in the caller */
102 /* Account types - clear the invalid bit if it turns out to be valid */
103 if (userAccountControl & UF_NORMAL_ACCOUNT) {
104 if (ent_type == SAMBA_KDC_ENT_TYPE_CLIENT || ent_type == SAMBA_KDC_ENT_TYPE_ANY) {
110 if (userAccountControl & UF_INTERDOMAIN_TRUST_ACCOUNT) {
111 if (ent_type == SAMBA_KDC_ENT_TYPE_CLIENT || ent_type == SAMBA_KDC_ENT_TYPE_ANY) {
116 if (userAccountControl & UF_WORKSTATION_TRUST_ACCOUNT) {
117 if (ent_type == SAMBA_KDC_ENT_TYPE_CLIENT || ent_type == SAMBA_KDC_ENT_TYPE_ANY) {
122 if (userAccountControl & UF_SERVER_TRUST_ACCOUNT) {
123 if (ent_type == SAMBA_KDC_ENT_TYPE_CLIENT || ent_type == SAMBA_KDC_ENT_TYPE_ANY) {
129 /* Not permitted to act as a client if disabled */
130 if (userAccountControl & UF_ACCOUNTDISABLE) {
133 if (userAccountControl & UF_LOCKOUT) {
134 flags.locked_out = 1;
137 if (userAccountControl & UF_PASSWORD_NOTREQD) {
142 UF_PASSWORD_CANT_CHANGE and UF_ENCRYPTED_TEXT_PASSWORD_ALLOWED are irrelevent
144 if (userAccountControl & UF_TEMP_DUPLICATE_ACCOUNT) {
148 /* UF_DONT_EXPIRE_PASSWD and UF_USE_DES_KEY_ONLY handled in samba_kdc_message2entry() */
151 if (userAccountControl & UF_MNS_LOGON_ACCOUNT) {
155 if (userAccountControl & UF_SMARTCARD_REQUIRED) {
156 flags.require_hwauth = 1;
158 if (userAccountControl & UF_TRUSTED_FOR_DELEGATION) {
159 flags.ok_as_delegate = 1;
161 if (userAccountControl & UF_TRUSTED_TO_AUTHENTICATE_FOR_DELEGATION) {
163 * this is confusing...
165 * UF_TRUSTED_FOR_DELEGATION
170 * UF_TRUSTED_TO_AUTHENTICATE_FOR_DELEGATION
171 * => trusted_for_delegation
173 flags.trusted_for_delegation = 1;
175 if (!(userAccountControl & UF_NOT_DELEGATED)) {
176 flags.forwardable = 1;
180 if (userAccountControl & UF_DONT_REQUIRE_PREAUTH) {
181 flags.require_preauth = 0;
183 flags.require_preauth = 1;
189 static int samba_kdc_entry_destructor(struct samba_kdc_entry *p)
191 hdb_entry_ex *entry_ex = p->entry_ex;
192 free_hdb_entry(&entry_ex->entry);
196 static void samba_kdc_free_entry(krb5_context context, hdb_entry_ex *entry_ex)
198 /* this function is called only from hdb_free_entry().
199 * Make sure we neutralize the destructor or we will
200 * get a double free later when hdb_free_entry() will
201 * try to call free_hdb_entry() */
202 talloc_set_destructor(entry_ex->ctx, NULL);
204 /* now proceed to free the talloc part */
205 talloc_free(entry_ex->ctx);
208 static krb5_error_code samba_kdc_message2entry_keys(krb5_context context,
209 struct samba_kdc_db_context *kdc_db_ctx,
211 struct ldb_message *msg,
214 uint32_t userAccountControl,
215 enum samba_kdc_ent_type ent_type,
216 hdb_entry_ex *entry_ex)
218 krb5_error_code ret = 0;
219 enum ndr_err_code ndr_err;
220 struct samr_Password *hash;
221 const struct ldb_val *sc_val;
222 struct supplementalCredentialsBlob scb;
223 struct supplementalCredentialsPackage *scpk = NULL;
224 bool newer_keys = false;
225 struct package_PrimaryKerberosBlob _pkb;
226 struct package_PrimaryKerberosCtr3 *pkb3 = NULL;
227 struct package_PrimaryKerberosCtr4 *pkb4 = NULL;
229 uint16_t allocated_keys = 0;
230 int rodc_krbtgt_number = 0;
232 uint32_t supported_enctypes
233 = ldb_msg_find_attr_as_uint(msg,
234 "msDS-SupportedEncryptionTypes",
237 if (rid == DOMAIN_RID_KRBTGT || is_rodc) {
238 /* KDCs (and KDCs on RODCs) use AES */
239 supported_enctypes |= ENC_HMAC_SHA1_96_AES128 | ENC_HMAC_SHA1_96_AES256;
240 } else if (userAccountControl & (UF_PARTIAL_SECRETS_ACCOUNT|UF_SERVER_TRUST_ACCOUNT)) {
241 /* DCs and RODCs comptuer accounts use AES */
242 supported_enctypes |= ENC_HMAC_SHA1_96_AES128 | ENC_HMAC_SHA1_96_AES256;
243 } else if (ent_type == SAMBA_KDC_ENT_TYPE_CLIENT ||
244 (ent_type == SAMBA_KDC_ENT_TYPE_ANY)) {
245 /* for AS-REQ the client chooses the enc types it
246 * supports, and this will vary between computers a
249 * likewise for 'any' return as much as is supported,
250 * to export into a keytab */
251 supported_enctypes = ENC_ALL_TYPES;
254 /* If UF_USE_DES_KEY_ONLY has been set, then don't allow use of the newer enc types */
255 if (userAccountControl & UF_USE_DES_KEY_ONLY) {
256 supported_enctypes = ENC_CRC32|ENC_RSA_MD5;
258 /* Otherwise, add in the default enc types */
259 supported_enctypes |= ENC_CRC32 | ENC_RSA_MD5 | ENC_RC4_HMAC_MD5;
262 /* Is this the krbtgt or a RODC krbtgt */
264 rodc_krbtgt_number = ldb_msg_find_attr_as_int(msg, "msDS-SecondaryKrbTgtNumber", -1);
266 if (rodc_krbtgt_number == -1) {
271 entry_ex->entry.keys.val = NULL;
272 entry_ex->entry.keys.len = 0;
274 kvno = ldb_msg_find_attr_as_int(msg, "msDS-KeyVersionNumber", 0);
276 kvno = SAMBA_KVNO_AND_KRBTGT(kvno, rodc_krbtgt_number);
278 entry_ex->entry.kvno = kvno;
280 /* Get keys from the db */
282 hash = samdb_result_hash(mem_ctx, msg, "unicodePwd");
283 sc_val = ldb_msg_find_ldb_val(msg, "supplementalCredentials");
285 /* unicodePwd for enctype 0x17 (23) if present */
290 /* supplementalCredentials if present */
292 ndr_err = ndr_pull_struct_blob_all(sc_val, mem_ctx, &scb,
293 (ndr_pull_flags_fn_t)ndr_pull_supplementalCredentialsBlob);
294 if (!NDR_ERR_CODE_IS_SUCCESS(ndr_err)) {
295 dump_data(0, sc_val->data, sc_val->length);
300 if (scb.sub.signature != SUPPLEMENTAL_CREDENTIALS_SIGNATURE) {
301 NDR_PRINT_DEBUG(supplementalCredentialsBlob, &scb);
306 for (i=0; i < scb.sub.num_packages; i++) {
307 if (strcmp("Primary:Kerberos-Newer-Keys", scb.sub.packages[i].name) == 0) {
308 scpk = &scb.sub.packages[i];
309 if (!scpk->data || !scpk->data[0]) {
315 } else if (strcmp("Primary:Kerberos", scb.sub.packages[i].name) == 0) {
316 scpk = &scb.sub.packages[i];
317 if (!scpk->data || !scpk->data[0]) {
321 * we don't break here in hope to find
322 * a Kerberos-Newer-Keys package
328 * Primary:Kerberos-Newer-Keys or Primary:Kerberos element
329 * of supplementalCredentials
334 blob = strhex_to_data_blob(mem_ctx, scpk->data);
340 /* we cannot use ndr_pull_struct_blob_all() here, as w2k and w2k3 add padding bytes */
341 ndr_err = ndr_pull_struct_blob(&blob, mem_ctx, &_pkb,
342 (ndr_pull_flags_fn_t)ndr_pull_package_PrimaryKerberosBlob);
343 if (!NDR_ERR_CODE_IS_SUCCESS(ndr_err)) {
345 krb5_set_error_message(context, ret, "samba_kdc_message2entry_keys: could not parse package_PrimaryKerberosBlob");
346 krb5_warnx(context, "samba_kdc_message2entry_keys: could not parse package_PrimaryKerberosBlob");
350 if (newer_keys && _pkb.version != 4) {
352 krb5_set_error_message(context, ret, "samba_kdc_message2entry_keys: Primary:Kerberos-Newer-Keys not version 4");
353 krb5_warnx(context, "samba_kdc_message2entry_keys: Primary:Kerberos-Newer-Keys not version 4");
357 if (!newer_keys && _pkb.version != 3) {
359 krb5_set_error_message(context, ret, "samba_kdc_message2entry_keys: could not parse Primary:Kerberos not version 3");
360 krb5_warnx(context, "samba_kdc_message2entry_keys: could not parse Primary:Kerberos not version 3");
364 if (_pkb.version == 4) {
365 pkb4 = &_pkb.ctr.ctr4;
366 allocated_keys += pkb4->num_keys;
367 } else if (_pkb.version == 3) {
368 pkb3 = &_pkb.ctr.ctr3;
369 allocated_keys += pkb3->num_keys;
373 if (allocated_keys == 0) {
374 if (kdc_db_ctx->rodc) {
375 /* We are on an RODC, but don't have keys for this account. Signal this to the caller */
376 /* TODO: We need to call a generalised version of auth_sam_trigger_repl_secret from here */
377 return HDB_ERR_NOT_FOUND_HERE;
380 /* oh, no password. Apparently (comment in
381 * hdb-ldap.c) this violates the ASN.1, but this
382 * allows an entry with no keys (yet). */
386 /* allocate space to decode into */
387 entry_ex->entry.keys.len = 0;
388 entry_ex->entry.keys.val = calloc(allocated_keys, sizeof(Key));
389 if (entry_ex->entry.keys.val == NULL) {
394 if (hash && (supported_enctypes & ENC_RC4_HMAC_MD5)) {
398 key.salt = NULL; /* No salt for this enc type */
400 ret = smb_krb5_keyblock_init_contents(context,
401 ENCTYPE_ARCFOUR_HMAC,
409 entry_ex->entry.keys.val[entry_ex->entry.keys.len] = key;
410 entry_ex->entry.keys.len++;
414 for (i=0; i < pkb4->num_keys; i++) {
417 if (!pkb4->keys[i].value) continue;
419 if (!(kerberos_enctype_to_bitmap(pkb4->keys[i].keytype) & supported_enctypes)) {
426 if (pkb4->salt.string) {
429 salt = data_blob_string_const(pkb4->salt.string);
431 key.salt = calloc(1, sizeof(*key.salt));
432 if (key.salt == NULL) {
437 key.salt->type = hdb_pw_salt;
439 ret = krb5_data_copy(&key.salt->salt, salt.data, salt.length);
447 /* TODO: maybe pass the iteration_count somehow... */
449 ret = smb_krb5_keyblock_init_contents(context,
450 pkb4->keys[i].keytype,
451 pkb4->keys[i].value->data,
452 pkb4->keys[i].value->length,
454 if (ret == KRB5_PROG_ETYPE_NOSUPP) {
455 DEBUG(2,("Unsupported keytype ignored - type %u\n",
456 pkb4->keys[i].keytype));
469 entry_ex->entry.keys.val[entry_ex->entry.keys.len] = key;
470 entry_ex->entry.keys.len++;
473 for (i=0; i < pkb3->num_keys; i++) {
476 if (!pkb3->keys[i].value) continue;
478 if (!(kerberos_enctype_to_bitmap(pkb3->keys[i].keytype) & supported_enctypes)) {
485 if (pkb3->salt.string) {
488 salt = data_blob_string_const(pkb3->salt.string);
490 key.salt = calloc(1, sizeof(*key.salt));
491 if (key.salt == NULL) {
496 key.salt->type = hdb_pw_salt;
498 ret = krb5_data_copy(&key.salt->salt, salt.data, salt.length);
506 ret = smb_krb5_keyblock_init_contents(context,
507 pkb3->keys[i].keytype,
508 pkb3->keys[i].value->data,
509 pkb3->keys[i].value->length,
520 entry_ex->entry.keys.val[entry_ex->entry.keys.len] = key;
521 entry_ex->entry.keys.len++;
527 entry_ex->entry.keys.len = 0;
529 if (entry_ex->entry.keys.len == 0 && entry_ex->entry.keys.val) {
530 free(entry_ex->entry.keys.val);
531 entry_ex->entry.keys.val = NULL;
537 * Construct an hdb_entry from a directory entry.
539 static krb5_error_code samba_kdc_message2entry(krb5_context context,
540 struct samba_kdc_db_context *kdc_db_ctx,
541 TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx, krb5_const_principal principal,
542 enum samba_kdc_ent_type ent_type,
544 struct ldb_dn *realm_dn,
545 struct ldb_message *msg,
546 hdb_entry_ex *entry_ex)
548 struct loadparm_context *lp_ctx = kdc_db_ctx->lp_ctx;
549 uint32_t userAccountControl;
550 uint32_t msDS_User_Account_Control_Computed;
552 krb5_error_code ret = 0;
553 krb5_boolean is_computer = FALSE;
555 struct samba_kdc_entry *p;
560 bool is_rodc = false;
561 struct ldb_message_element *objectclasses;
562 struct ldb_val computer_val;
563 const char *samAccountName = ldb_msg_find_attr_as_string(msg, "samAccountName", NULL);
564 computer_val.data = discard_const_p(uint8_t,"computer");
565 computer_val.length = strlen((const char *)computer_val.data);
567 if (ldb_msg_find_element(msg, "msDS-SecondaryKrbTgtNumber")) {
571 if (!samAccountName) {
573 krb5_set_error_message(context, ret, "samba_kdc_message2entry: no samAccountName present");
577 objectclasses = ldb_msg_find_element(msg, "objectClass");
579 if (objectclasses && ldb_msg_find_val(objectclasses, &computer_val)) {
583 memset(entry_ex, 0, sizeof(*entry_ex));
585 p = talloc(mem_ctx, struct samba_kdc_entry);
591 p->kdc_db_ctx = kdc_db_ctx;
592 p->entry_ex = entry_ex;
593 p->realm_dn = talloc_reference(p, realm_dn);
599 talloc_set_destructor(p, samba_kdc_entry_destructor);
601 /* make sure we do not have bogus data in there */
602 memset(&entry_ex->entry, 0, sizeof(hdb_entry));
605 entry_ex->free_entry = samba_kdc_free_entry;
607 userAccountControl = ldb_msg_find_attr_as_uint(msg, "userAccountControl", 0);
609 msDS_User_Account_Control_Computed
610 = ldb_msg_find_attr_as_uint(msg,
611 "msDS-User-Account-Control-Computed",
615 * This brings in the lockout flag, block the account if not
616 * found. We need the weird UF_ACCOUNTDISABLE check because
617 * we do not want to fail open if the value is not returned,
618 * but 0 is a valid value (all OK)
620 if (msDS_User_Account_Control_Computed == UF_ACCOUNTDISABLE) {
622 krb5_set_error_message(context, ret, "samba_kdc_message2entry: "
623 "no msDS-User-Account-Control-Computed present");
626 userAccountControl |= msDS_User_Account_Control_Computed;
630 * If we are set to canonicalize, we get back the fixed UPPER
631 * case realm, and the real username (ie matching LDAP
634 * Otherwise, if we are set to enterprise, we
635 * get back the whole principal as-sent
637 * Finally, if we are not set to canonicalize, we get back the
638 * fixed UPPER case realm, but the as-sent username
641 entry_ex->entry.principal = malloc(sizeof(*(entry_ex->entry.principal)));
642 if (ent_type == SAMBA_KDC_ENT_TYPE_KRBTGT) {
643 if (flags & (HDB_F_CANON)) {
645 * When requested to do so, ensure that the
646 * both realm values in the principal are set
647 * to the upper case, canonical realm
649 ret = krb5_make_principal(context, &entry_ex->entry.principal,
650 lpcfg_realm(lp_ctx), "krbtgt",
651 lpcfg_realm(lp_ctx), NULL);
653 krb5_clear_error_message(context);
656 krb5_principal_set_type(context, entry_ex->entry.principal, KRB5_NT_SRV_INST);
658 ret = krb5_copy_principal(context, principal, &entry_ex->entry.principal);
660 krb5_clear_error_message(context);
664 * this appears to be required regardless of
665 * the canonicalize flag from the client
667 ret = krb5_principal_set_realm(context, entry_ex->entry.principal, lpcfg_realm(lp_ctx));
669 krb5_clear_error_message(context);
674 } else if (ent_type == SAMBA_KDC_ENT_TYPE_ANY && principal == NULL) {
675 ret = krb5_make_principal(context, &entry_ex->entry.principal, lpcfg_realm(lp_ctx), samAccountName, NULL);
677 krb5_clear_error_message(context);
680 } else if (flags & HDB_F_CANON && flags & HDB_F_FOR_AS_REQ) {
682 * HDB_F_CANON maps from the canonicalize flag in the
683 * packet, and has a different meaning between AS-REQ
684 * and TGS-REQ. We only change the principal in the AS-REQ case
686 ret = krb5_make_principal(context, &entry_ex->entry.principal, lpcfg_realm(lp_ctx), samAccountName, NULL);
688 krb5_clear_error_message(context);
692 ret = krb5_copy_principal(context, principal, &entry_ex->entry.principal);
694 krb5_clear_error_message(context);
698 if (krb5_principal_get_type(context, principal) != KRB5_NT_ENTERPRISE_PRINCIPAL) {
699 /* While we have copied the client principal, tests
700 * show that Win2k3 returns the 'corrected' realm, not
701 * the client-specified realm. This code attempts to
702 * replace the client principal's realm with the one
703 * we determine from our records */
705 /* this has to be with malloc() */
706 ret = krb5_principal_set_realm(context, entry_ex->entry.principal, lpcfg_realm(lp_ctx));
708 krb5_clear_error_message(context);
714 /* First try and figure out the flags based on the userAccountControl */
715 entry_ex->entry.flags = uf2HDBFlags(context, userAccountControl, ent_type);
717 /* Windows 2008 seems to enforce this (very sensible) rule by
718 * default - don't allow offline attacks on a user's password
719 * by asking for a ticket to them as a service (encrypted with
720 * their probably patheticly insecure password) */
722 if (entry_ex->entry.flags.server
723 && lpcfg_parm_bool(lp_ctx, NULL, "kdc", "require spn for service", true)) {
724 if (!is_computer && !ldb_msg_find_attr_as_string(msg, "servicePrincipalName", NULL)) {
725 entry_ex->entry.flags.server = 0;
729 * To give the correct type of error to the client, we must
730 * not just return the entry without .server set, we must
731 * pretend the principal does not exist. Otherwise we may
732 * return ERR_POLICY instead of
733 * KRB5KDC_ERR_S_PRINCIPAL_UNKNOWN
735 if (ent_type == SAMBA_KDC_ENT_TYPE_SERVER && entry_ex->entry.flags.server == 0) {
736 ret = HDB_ERR_NOENTRY;
737 krb5_set_error_message(context, ret, "samba_kdc_message2entry: no servicePrincipalName present for this server, refusing with no-such-entry");
740 if (flags & HDB_F_ADMIN_DATA) {
741 /* These (created_by, modified_by) parts of the entry are not relevant for Samba4's use
742 * of the Heimdal KDC. They are stored in a the traditional
743 * DB for audit purposes, and still form part of the structure
746 /* use 'whenCreated' */
747 entry_ex->entry.created_by.time = ldb_msg_find_krb5time_ldap_time(msg, "whenCreated", 0);
748 /* use 'kadmin' for now (needed by mit_samba) */
749 ret = krb5_make_principal(context,
750 &entry_ex->entry.created_by.principal,
751 lpcfg_realm(lp_ctx), "kadmin", NULL);
753 krb5_clear_error_message(context);
757 entry_ex->entry.modified_by = (Event *) malloc(sizeof(Event));
758 if (entry_ex->entry.modified_by == NULL) {
760 krb5_set_error_message(context, ret, "malloc: out of memory");
764 /* use 'whenChanged' */
765 entry_ex->entry.modified_by->time = ldb_msg_find_krb5time_ldap_time(msg, "whenChanged", 0);
766 /* use 'kadmin' for now (needed by mit_samba) */
767 ret = krb5_make_principal(context,
768 &entry_ex->entry.modified_by->principal,
769 lpcfg_realm(lp_ctx), "kadmin", NULL);
771 krb5_clear_error_message(context);
777 /* The lack of password controls etc applies to krbtgt by
778 * virtue of being that particular RID */
779 status = dom_sid_split_rid(NULL, samdb_result_dom_sid(mem_ctx, msg, "objectSid"), NULL, &rid);
781 if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(status)) {
786 if (rid == DOMAIN_RID_KRBTGT) {
787 entry_ex->entry.valid_end = NULL;
788 entry_ex->entry.pw_end = NULL;
790 entry_ex->entry.flags.invalid = 0;
791 entry_ex->entry.flags.server = 1;
793 /* Don't mark all requests for the krbtgt/realm as
794 * 'change password', as otherwise we could get into
795 * trouble, and not enforce the password expirty.
796 * Instead, only do it when request is for the kpasswd service */
797 if (ent_type == SAMBA_KDC_ENT_TYPE_SERVER
798 && principal->name.name_string.len == 2
799 && (strcmp(principal->name.name_string.val[0], "kadmin") == 0)
800 && (strcmp(principal->name.name_string.val[1], "changepw") == 0)
801 && lpcfg_is_my_domain_or_realm(lp_ctx, principal->realm)) {
802 entry_ex->entry.flags.change_pw = 1;
804 entry_ex->entry.flags.client = 0;
805 entry_ex->entry.flags.forwardable = 1;
806 entry_ex->entry.flags.ok_as_delegate = 1;
807 } else if (is_rodc) {
808 /* The RODC krbtgt account is like the main krbtgt,
809 * but it does not have a changepw or kadmin
812 entry_ex->entry.valid_end = NULL;
813 entry_ex->entry.pw_end = NULL;
815 /* Also don't allow the RODC krbtgt to be a client (it should not be needed) */
816 entry_ex->entry.flags.client = 0;
817 entry_ex->entry.flags.invalid = 0;
818 entry_ex->entry.flags.server = 1;
820 entry_ex->entry.flags.client = 0;
821 entry_ex->entry.flags.forwardable = 1;
822 entry_ex->entry.flags.ok_as_delegate = 0;
823 } else if (entry_ex->entry.flags.server && ent_type == SAMBA_KDC_ENT_TYPE_SERVER) {
824 /* The account/password expiry only applies when the account is used as a
825 * client (ie password login), not when used as a server */
827 /* Make very well sure we don't use this for a client,
828 * it could bypass the password restrictions */
829 entry_ex->entry.flags.client = 0;
831 entry_ex->entry.valid_end = NULL;
832 entry_ex->entry.pw_end = NULL;
835 NTTIME must_change_time
836 = samdb_result_force_password_change(kdc_db_ctx->samdb, mem_ctx,
838 if (must_change_time == 0x7FFFFFFFFFFFFFFFULL) {
839 entry_ex->entry.pw_end = NULL;
841 entry_ex->entry.pw_end = malloc(sizeof(*entry_ex->entry.pw_end));
842 if (entry_ex->entry.pw_end == NULL) {
846 *entry_ex->entry.pw_end = nt_time_to_unix(must_change_time);
849 acct_expiry = samdb_result_account_expires(msg);
850 if (acct_expiry == 0x7FFFFFFFFFFFFFFFULL) {
851 entry_ex->entry.valid_end = NULL;
853 entry_ex->entry.valid_end = malloc(sizeof(*entry_ex->entry.valid_end));
854 if (entry_ex->entry.valid_end == NULL) {
858 *entry_ex->entry.valid_end = nt_time_to_unix(acct_expiry);
862 entry_ex->entry.valid_start = NULL;
864 entry_ex->entry.max_life = malloc(sizeof(*entry_ex->entry.max_life));
865 if (entry_ex->entry.max_life == NULL) {
870 if (ent_type == SAMBA_KDC_ENT_TYPE_SERVER) {
871 *entry_ex->entry.max_life = kdc_db_ctx->policy.svc_tkt_lifetime;
872 } else if (ent_type == SAMBA_KDC_ENT_TYPE_KRBTGT || ent_type == SAMBA_KDC_ENT_TYPE_CLIENT) {
873 *entry_ex->entry.max_life = kdc_db_ctx->policy.usr_tkt_lifetime;
875 *entry_ex->entry.max_life = MIN(kdc_db_ctx->policy.svc_tkt_lifetime,
876 kdc_db_ctx->policy.usr_tkt_lifetime);
879 entry_ex->entry.max_renew = malloc(sizeof(*entry_ex->entry.max_life));
880 if (entry_ex->entry.max_renew == NULL) {
885 *entry_ex->entry.max_renew = kdc_db_ctx->policy.renewal_lifetime;
887 /* Get keys from the db */
888 ret = samba_kdc_message2entry_keys(context, kdc_db_ctx, p, msg,
889 rid, is_rodc, userAccountControl,
892 /* Could be bougus data in the entry, or out of memory */
896 entry_ex->entry.etypes = malloc(sizeof(*(entry_ex->entry.etypes)));
897 if (entry_ex->entry.etypes == NULL) {
898 krb5_clear_error_message(context);
902 entry_ex->entry.etypes->len = entry_ex->entry.keys.len;
903 entry_ex->entry.etypes->val = calloc(entry_ex->entry.etypes->len, sizeof(int));
904 if (entry_ex->entry.etypes->val == NULL) {
905 krb5_clear_error_message(context);
909 for (i=0; i < entry_ex->entry.etypes->len; i++) {
910 entry_ex->entry.etypes->val[i] = entry_ex->entry.keys.val[i].key.keytype;
914 p->msg = talloc_steal(p, msg);
918 /* This doesn't free ent itself, that is for the eventual caller to do */
919 hdb_free_entry(context, entry_ex);
921 talloc_steal(kdc_db_ctx, entry_ex->ctx);
928 * Construct an hdb_entry from a directory entry.
929 * The kvno is what the remote client asked for
931 static krb5_error_code samba_kdc_trust_message2entry(krb5_context context,
932 struct samba_kdc_db_context *kdc_db_ctx,
933 TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx, krb5_const_principal principal,
934 enum trust_direction direction,
935 struct ldb_dn *realm_dn,
938 struct ldb_message *msg,
939 hdb_entry_ex *entry_ex)
941 struct loadparm_context *lp_ctx = kdc_db_ctx->lp_ctx;
942 const char *dnsdomain;
943 const char *realm = lpcfg_realm(lp_ctx);
944 DATA_BLOB password_utf16 = data_blob_null;
945 DATA_BLOB password_utf8 = data_blob_null;
946 struct samr_Password _password_hash;
947 const struct samr_Password *password_hash = NULL;
948 const struct ldb_val *password_val;
949 struct trustAuthInOutBlob password_blob;
950 struct samba_kdc_entry *p;
952 uint32_t current_kvno;
953 uint32_t num_keys = 0;
954 enum ndr_err_code ndr_err;
955 int ret, trust_direction_flags;
957 struct AuthenticationInformationArray *auth_array;
958 uint32_t supported_enctypes = ENC_RC4_HMAC_MD5;
960 if (dsdb_functional_level(kdc_db_ctx->samdb) >= DS_DOMAIN_FUNCTION_2008) {
961 supported_enctypes = ldb_msg_find_attr_as_uint(msg,
962 "msDS-SupportedEncryptionTypes",
966 trust_direction_flags = ldb_msg_find_attr_as_int(msg, "trustDirection", 0);
968 if (direction == INBOUND) {
969 password_val = ldb_msg_find_ldb_val(msg, "trustAuthIncoming");
971 } else { /* OUTBOUND */
972 dnsdomain = ldb_msg_find_attr_as_string(msg, "trustPartner", NULL);
974 realm = strupper_talloc(mem_ctx, dnsdomain);
975 password_val = ldb_msg_find_ldb_val(msg, "trustAuthOutgoing");
978 if (!password_val || !(trust_direction_flags & direction)) {
979 krb5_clear_error_message(context);
980 ret = HDB_ERR_NOENTRY;
984 ndr_err = ndr_pull_struct_blob(password_val, mem_ctx, &password_blob,
985 (ndr_pull_flags_fn_t)ndr_pull_trustAuthInOutBlob);
986 if (!NDR_ERR_CODE_IS_SUCCESS(ndr_err)) {
987 krb5_clear_error_message(context);
992 p = talloc(mem_ctx, struct samba_kdc_entry);
998 p->kdc_db_ctx = kdc_db_ctx;
999 p->entry_ex = entry_ex;
1000 p->realm_dn = realm_dn;
1002 talloc_set_destructor(p, samba_kdc_entry_destructor);
1004 /* make sure we do not have bogus data in there */
1005 memset(&entry_ex->entry, 0, sizeof(hdb_entry));
1008 entry_ex->free_entry = samba_kdc_free_entry;
1010 /* use 'whenCreated' */
1011 entry_ex->entry.created_by.time = ldb_msg_find_krb5time_ldap_time(msg, "whenCreated", 0);
1012 /* use 'kadmin' for now (needed by mit_samba) */
1013 ret = krb5_make_principal(context,
1014 &entry_ex->entry.created_by.principal,
1015 realm, "kadmin", NULL);
1017 krb5_clear_error_message(context);
1021 entry_ex->entry.principal = malloc(sizeof(*(entry_ex->entry.principal)));
1022 if (entry_ex->entry.principal == NULL) {
1023 krb5_clear_error_message(context);
1028 ret = copy_Principal(principal, entry_ex->entry.principal);
1030 krb5_clear_error_message(context);
1035 * While we have copied the client principal, tests
1036 * show that Win2k3 returns the 'corrected' realm, not
1037 * the client-specified realm. This code attempts to
1038 * replace the client principal's realm with the one
1039 * we determine from our records
1042 ret = krb5_principal_set_realm(context, entry_ex->entry.principal, realm);
1044 krb5_clear_error_message(context);
1048 entry_ex->entry.valid_start = NULL;
1050 /* we need to work out if we are going to use the current or
1051 * the previous password hash.
1052 * We base this on the kvno the client passes in. If the kvno
1053 * passed in is equal to the current kvno in our database then
1054 * we use the current structure. If it is the current kvno-1,
1055 * then we use the previous substrucure.
1058 /* first work out the current kvno */
1060 for (i=0; i < password_blob.count; i++) {
1061 if (password_blob.current.array[i].AuthType == TRUST_AUTH_TYPE_VERSION) {
1062 current_kvno = password_blob.current.array[i].AuthInfo.version.version;
1066 /* work out whether we will use the previous or current
1068 if (password_blob.previous.count == 0) {
1069 /* there is no previous password */
1070 use_previous = false;
1071 } else if (!(flags & HDB_F_KVNO_SPECIFIED) ||
1072 kvno == current_kvno) {
1073 use_previous = false;
1074 } else if ((kvno+1 == current_kvno) ||
1075 (kvno == 255 && current_kvno == 0)) {
1076 use_previous = true;
1078 DEBUG(1,(__location__ ": Request for unknown kvno %u - current kvno is %u\n",
1079 kvno, current_kvno));
1080 krb5_clear_error_message(context);
1081 ret = HDB_ERR_NOENTRY;
1086 auth_array = &password_blob.previous;
1088 auth_array = &password_blob.current;
1091 /* use the kvno the client specified, if available */
1092 if (flags & HDB_F_KVNO_SPECIFIED) {
1093 entry_ex->entry.kvno = kvno;
1095 entry_ex->entry.kvno = current_kvno;
1098 for (i=0; i < auth_array->count; i++) {
1099 if (auth_array->array[i].AuthType == TRUST_AUTH_TYPE_CLEAR) {
1102 password_utf16 = data_blob_const(auth_array->array[i].AuthInfo.clear.password,
1103 auth_array->array[i].AuthInfo.clear.size);
1104 if (password_utf16.length == 0) {
1108 if (supported_enctypes & ENC_RC4_HMAC_MD5) {
1109 mdfour(_password_hash.hash, password_utf16.data, password_utf16.length);
1110 if (password_hash == NULL) {
1113 password_hash = &_password_hash;
1116 if (!(supported_enctypes & (ENC_HMAC_SHA1_96_AES128|ENC_HMAC_SHA1_96_AES256))) {
1120 ok = convert_string_talloc(mem_ctx,
1121 CH_UTF16MUNGED, CH_UTF8,
1122 password_utf16.data,
1123 password_utf16.length,
1124 (void *)&password_utf8.data,
1125 &password_utf8.length);
1127 krb5_clear_error_message(context);
1132 if (supported_enctypes & ENC_HMAC_SHA1_96_AES128) {
1135 if (supported_enctypes & ENC_HMAC_SHA1_96_AES256) {
1139 } else if (auth_array->array[i].AuthType == TRUST_AUTH_TYPE_NT4OWF) {
1140 if (supported_enctypes & ENC_RC4_HMAC_MD5) {
1141 password_hash = &auth_array->array[i].AuthInfo.nt4owf.password;
1147 /* Must have found a cleartext or MD4 password */
1148 if (num_keys == 0) {
1149 DEBUG(1,(__location__ ": no usable key found\n"));
1150 krb5_clear_error_message(context);
1151 ret = HDB_ERR_NOENTRY;
1155 entry_ex->entry.keys.val = calloc(num_keys, sizeof(Key));
1156 if (entry_ex->entry.keys.val == NULL) {
1157 krb5_clear_error_message(context);
1162 if (password_utf8.length != 0) {
1164 krb5_const_principal salt_principal = principal;
1166 krb5_data cleartext_data;
1168 cleartext_data.data = password_utf8.data;
1169 cleartext_data.length = password_utf8.length;
1171 ret = krb5_get_pw_salt(context,
1178 if (supported_enctypes & ENC_HMAC_SHA1_96_AES256) {
1179 ret = krb5_string_to_key_data_salt(context,
1180 ENCTYPE_AES256_CTS_HMAC_SHA1_96,
1185 krb5_free_salt(context, salt);
1189 entry_ex->entry.keys.val[entry_ex->entry.keys.len] = key;
1190 entry_ex->entry.keys.len++;
1193 if (supported_enctypes & ENC_HMAC_SHA1_96_AES128) {
1194 ret = krb5_string_to_key_data_salt(context,
1195 ENCTYPE_AES128_CTS_HMAC_SHA1_96,
1200 krb5_free_salt(context, salt);
1204 entry_ex->entry.keys.val[entry_ex->entry.keys.len] = key;
1205 entry_ex->entry.keys.len++;
1208 krb5_free_salt(context, salt);
1211 if (password_hash != NULL) {
1214 ret = smb_krb5_keyblock_init_contents(context,
1215 ENCTYPE_ARCFOUR_HMAC,
1216 password_hash->hash,
1217 sizeof(password_hash->hash),
1223 entry_ex->entry.keys.val[entry_ex->entry.keys.len] = key;
1224 entry_ex->entry.keys.len++;
1227 entry_ex->entry.flags = int2HDBFlags(0);
1228 entry_ex->entry.flags.immutable = 1;
1229 entry_ex->entry.flags.invalid = 0;
1230 entry_ex->entry.flags.server = 1;
1231 entry_ex->entry.flags.require_preauth = 1;
1233 entry_ex->entry.pw_end = NULL;
1235 entry_ex->entry.max_life = NULL;
1237 entry_ex->entry.max_renew = NULL;
1239 entry_ex->entry.etypes = malloc(sizeof(*(entry_ex->entry.etypes)));
1240 if (entry_ex->entry.etypes == NULL) {
1241 krb5_clear_error_message(context);
1245 entry_ex->entry.etypes->len = entry_ex->entry.keys.len;
1246 entry_ex->entry.etypes->val = calloc(entry_ex->entry.etypes->len, sizeof(int));
1247 if (entry_ex->entry.etypes->val == NULL) {
1248 krb5_clear_error_message(context);
1252 for (i=0; i < entry_ex->entry.etypes->len; i++) {
1253 entry_ex->entry.etypes->val[i] = entry_ex->entry.keys.val[i].key.keytype;
1257 p->msg = talloc_steal(p, msg);
1261 /* This doesn't free ent itself, that is for the eventual caller to do */
1262 hdb_free_entry(context, entry_ex);
1264 talloc_steal(kdc_db_ctx, entry_ex->ctx);
1271 static krb5_error_code samba_kdc_lookup_trust(krb5_context context, struct ldb_context *ldb_ctx,
1272 TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx,
1274 struct ldb_dn *realm_dn,
1275 struct ldb_message **pmsg)
1278 const char * const *attrs = trust_attrs;
1280 status = sam_get_results_trust(ldb_ctx,
1281 mem_ctx, realm, realm, attrs,
1283 if (NT_STATUS_IS_OK(status)) {
1285 } else if (NT_STATUS_EQUAL(status, NT_STATUS_NOT_FOUND)) {
1286 return HDB_ERR_NOENTRY;
1287 } else if (NT_STATUS_EQUAL(status, NT_STATUS_NO_MEMORY)) {
1289 krb5_set_error_message(context, ret, "get_sam_result_trust: out of memory");
1293 krb5_set_error_message(context, ret, "get_sam_result_trust: %s", nt_errstr(status));
1298 static krb5_error_code samba_kdc_lookup_client(krb5_context context,
1299 struct samba_kdc_db_context *kdc_db_ctx,
1300 TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx,
1301 krb5_const_principal principal,
1303 struct ldb_dn **realm_dn,
1304 struct ldb_message **msg) {
1306 char *principal_string;
1308 if (krb5_principal_get_type(context, principal) == KRB5_NT_ENTERPRISE_PRINCIPAL) {
1309 principal_string = smb_krb5_principal_get_comp_string(mem_ctx, context,
1311 if (principal_string == NULL) {
1314 nt_status = sam_get_results_principal(kdc_db_ctx->samdb,
1315 mem_ctx, principal_string, attrs,
1317 TALLOC_FREE(principal_string);
1319 krb5_error_code ret;
1320 ret = krb5_unparse_name(context, principal, &principal_string);
1324 nt_status = sam_get_results_principal(kdc_db_ctx->samdb,
1325 mem_ctx, principal_string, attrs,
1327 free(principal_string);
1330 if (NT_STATUS_EQUAL(nt_status, NT_STATUS_NO_SUCH_USER)) {
1331 return HDB_ERR_NOENTRY;
1332 } else if (NT_STATUS_EQUAL(nt_status, NT_STATUS_NO_MEMORY)) {
1334 } else if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(nt_status)) {
1341 static krb5_error_code samba_kdc_fetch_client(krb5_context context,
1342 struct samba_kdc_db_context *kdc_db_ctx,
1343 TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx,
1344 krb5_const_principal principal,
1346 hdb_entry_ex *entry_ex) {
1347 struct ldb_dn *realm_dn;
1348 krb5_error_code ret;
1349 struct ldb_message *msg = NULL;
1351 ret = samba_kdc_lookup_client(context, kdc_db_ctx,
1352 mem_ctx, principal, user_attrs,
1358 ret = samba_kdc_message2entry(context, kdc_db_ctx, mem_ctx,
1359 principal, SAMBA_KDC_ENT_TYPE_CLIENT,
1361 realm_dn, msg, entry_ex);
1365 static krb5_error_code samba_kdc_fetch_krbtgt(krb5_context context,
1366 struct samba_kdc_db_context *kdc_db_ctx,
1367 TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx,
1368 krb5_const_principal principal,
1371 hdb_entry_ex *entry_ex)
1373 struct loadparm_context *lp_ctx = kdc_db_ctx->lp_ctx;
1374 krb5_error_code ret;
1375 struct ldb_message *msg = NULL;
1376 struct ldb_dn *realm_dn = ldb_get_default_basedn(kdc_db_ctx->samdb);
1378 krb5_principal alloc_principal = NULL;
1379 if (principal->name.name_string.len != 2
1380 || (strcmp(principal->name.name_string.val[0], KRB5_TGS_NAME) != 0)) {
1382 return HDB_ERR_NOENTRY;
1385 /* krbtgt case. Either us or a trusted realm */
1387 if (lpcfg_is_my_domain_or_realm(lp_ctx, principal->realm)
1388 && lpcfg_is_my_domain_or_realm(lp_ctx, principal->name.name_string.val[1])) {
1389 /* us, or someone quite like us */
1390 /* Cludge, cludge cludge. If the realm part of krbtgt/realm,
1391 * is in our db, then direct the caller at our primary
1395 unsigned int krbtgt_number;
1396 /* w2k8r2 sometimes gives us a kvno of 255 for inter-domain
1397 trust tickets. We don't yet know what this means, but we do
1398 seem to need to treat it as unspecified */
1399 if (flags & HDB_F_KVNO_SPECIFIED) {
1400 krbtgt_number = SAMBA_KVNO_GET_KRBTGT(kvno);
1401 if (kdc_db_ctx->rodc) {
1402 if (krbtgt_number != kdc_db_ctx->my_krbtgt_number) {
1403 return HDB_ERR_NOT_FOUND_HERE;
1407 krbtgt_number = kdc_db_ctx->my_krbtgt_number;
1410 if (krbtgt_number == kdc_db_ctx->my_krbtgt_number) {
1411 lret = dsdb_search_one(kdc_db_ctx->samdb, mem_ctx,
1412 &msg, kdc_db_ctx->krbtgt_dn, LDB_SCOPE_BASE,
1413 krbtgt_attrs, DSDB_SEARCH_NO_GLOBAL_CATALOG,
1414 "(objectClass=user)");
1416 /* We need to look up an RODC krbtgt (perhaps
1417 * ours, if we are an RODC, perhaps another
1418 * RODC if we are a read-write DC */
1419 lret = dsdb_search_one(kdc_db_ctx->samdb, mem_ctx,
1420 &msg, realm_dn, LDB_SCOPE_SUBTREE,
1422 DSDB_SEARCH_SHOW_EXTENDED_DN | DSDB_SEARCH_NO_GLOBAL_CATALOG,
1423 "(&(objectClass=user)(msDS-SecondaryKrbTgtNumber=%u))", (unsigned)(krbtgt_number));
1426 if (lret == LDB_ERR_NO_SUCH_OBJECT) {
1427 krb5_warnx(context, "samba_kdc_fetch: could not find KRBTGT number %u in DB!",
1428 (unsigned)(krbtgt_number));
1429 krb5_set_error_message(context, HDB_ERR_NOENTRY,
1430 "samba_kdc_fetch: could not find KRBTGT number %u in DB!",
1431 (unsigned)(krbtgt_number));
1432 return HDB_ERR_NOENTRY;
1433 } else if (lret != LDB_SUCCESS) {
1434 krb5_warnx(context, "samba_kdc_fetch: could not find KRBTGT number %u in DB!",
1435 (unsigned)(krbtgt_number));
1436 krb5_set_error_message(context, HDB_ERR_NOENTRY,
1437 "samba_kdc_fetch: could not find KRBTGT number %u in DB!",
1438 (unsigned)(krbtgt_number));
1439 return HDB_ERR_NOENTRY;
1442 ret = samba_kdc_message2entry(context, kdc_db_ctx, mem_ctx,
1443 principal, SAMBA_KDC_ENT_TYPE_KRBTGT,
1444 flags, realm_dn, msg, entry_ex);
1445 if (alloc_principal) {
1446 /* This is again copied in the message2entry call */
1447 krb5_free_principal(context, alloc_principal);
1450 krb5_warnx(context, "samba_kdc_fetch: self krbtgt message2entry failed");
1455 enum trust_direction direction = UNKNOWN;
1456 const char *realm = NULL;
1458 /* Either an inbound or outbound trust */
1460 if (strcasecmp(lpcfg_realm(lp_ctx), principal->realm) == 0) {
1461 /* look for inbound trust */
1462 direction = INBOUND;
1463 realm = principal->name.name_string.val[1];
1464 } else if (strcasecmp(lpcfg_realm(lp_ctx), principal->name.name_string.val[1]) == 0) {
1465 /* look for outbound trust */
1466 direction = OUTBOUND;
1467 realm = principal->realm;
1469 krb5_warnx(context, "samba_kdc_fetch: not our realm for trusts ('%s', '%s')",
1470 principal->realm, principal->name.name_string.val[1]);
1471 krb5_set_error_message(context, HDB_ERR_NOENTRY, "samba_kdc_fetch: not our realm for trusts ('%s', '%s')",
1472 principal->realm, principal->name.name_string.val[1]);
1473 return HDB_ERR_NOENTRY;
1476 /* Trusted domains are under CN=system */
1478 ret = samba_kdc_lookup_trust(context, kdc_db_ctx->samdb,
1480 realm, realm_dn, &msg);
1483 krb5_warnx(context, "samba_kdc_fetch: could not find principal in DB");
1484 krb5_set_error_message(context, ret, "samba_kdc_fetch: could not find principal in DB");
1488 ret = samba_kdc_trust_message2entry(context, kdc_db_ctx, mem_ctx,
1489 principal, direction,
1490 realm_dn, flags, kvno, msg, entry_ex);
1492 krb5_warnx(context, "samba_kdc_fetch: trust_message2entry failed for %s",
1493 ldb_dn_get_linearized(msg->dn));
1494 krb5_set_error_message(context, ret, "samba_kdc_fetch: "
1495 "trust_message2entry failed for %s",
1496 ldb_dn_get_linearized(msg->dn));
1503 static krb5_error_code samba_kdc_lookup_server(krb5_context context,
1504 struct samba_kdc_db_context *kdc_db_ctx,
1505 TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx,
1506 krb5_const_principal principal,
1509 struct ldb_dn **realm_dn,
1510 struct ldb_message **msg)
1512 krb5_error_code ret;
1513 if ((smb_krb5_principal_get_type(context, principal) != KRB5_NT_ENTERPRISE_PRINCIPAL)
1514 && krb5_princ_size(context, principal) >= 2) {
1515 /* 'normal server' case */
1518 struct ldb_dn *user_dn;
1519 char *principal_string;
1521 ret = krb5_unparse_name_flags(context, principal,
1522 KRB5_PRINCIPAL_UNPARSE_NO_REALM,
1528 /* At this point we may find the host is known to be
1529 * in a different realm, so we should generate a
1530 * referral instead */
1531 nt_status = crack_service_principal_name(kdc_db_ctx->samdb,
1532 mem_ctx, principal_string,
1533 &user_dn, realm_dn);
1534 free(principal_string);
1536 if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(nt_status)) {
1537 return HDB_ERR_NOENTRY;
1540 ldb_ret = dsdb_search_one(kdc_db_ctx->samdb,
1542 msg, user_dn, LDB_SCOPE_BASE,
1544 DSDB_SEARCH_SHOW_EXTENDED_DN | DSDB_SEARCH_NO_GLOBAL_CATALOG,
1546 if (ldb_ret != LDB_SUCCESS) {
1547 return HDB_ERR_NOENTRY;
1550 } else if (!(flags & HDB_F_FOR_AS_REQ)
1551 && smb_krb5_principal_get_type(context, principal) == KRB5_NT_ENTERPRISE_PRINCIPAL) {
1553 * The behaviour of accepting an
1554 * KRB5_NT_ENTERPRISE_PRINCIPAL server principal
1555 * containing a UPN only applies to TGS-REQ packets,
1556 * not AS-REQ packets.
1558 return samba_kdc_lookup_client(context, kdc_db_ctx,
1559 mem_ctx, principal, attrs,
1564 * - the AS-REQ, where we only accept
1565 * samAccountName based lookups for the server, no
1566 * matter if the name is an
1567 * KRB5_NT_ENTERPRISE_PRINCIPAL or not
1568 * - for the TGS-REQ when we are not given an
1569 * KRB5_NT_ENTERPRISE_PRINCIPAL, which also must
1570 * only lookup samAccountName based names.
1574 krb5_principal enterprise_prinicpal = NULL;
1576 if (smb_krb5_principal_get_type(context, principal) == KRB5_NT_ENTERPRISE_PRINCIPAL) {
1577 /* Need to reparse the enterprise principal to find the real target */
1578 if (principal->name.name_string.len != 1) {
1579 ret = KRB5_PARSE_MALFORMED;
1580 krb5_set_error_message(context, ret, "samba_kdc_lookup_server: request for an "
1581 "enterprise principal with wrong (%d) number of components",
1582 principal->name.name_string.len);
1585 ret = krb5_parse_name(context, principal->name.name_string.val[0],
1586 &enterprise_prinicpal);
1588 talloc_free(mem_ctx);
1591 principal = enterprise_prinicpal;
1594 /* server as client principal case, but we must not lookup userPrincipalNames */
1595 *realm_dn = ldb_get_default_basedn(kdc_db_ctx->samdb);
1597 /* TODO: Check if it is our realm, otherwise give referral */
1599 ret = krb5_unparse_name_flags(context, principal,
1600 KRB5_PRINCIPAL_UNPARSE_NO_REALM |
1601 KRB5_PRINCIPAL_UNPARSE_DISPLAY,
1605 krb5_set_error_message(context, ret, "samba_kdc_lookup_principal: could not parse principal");
1606 krb5_warnx(context, "samba_kdc_lookup_principal: could not parse principal");
1610 lret = dsdb_search_one(kdc_db_ctx->samdb, mem_ctx, msg,
1611 *realm_dn, LDB_SCOPE_SUBTREE,
1613 DSDB_SEARCH_SHOW_EXTENDED_DN | DSDB_SEARCH_NO_GLOBAL_CATALOG,
1614 "(&(objectClass=user)(samAccountName=%s))",
1615 ldb_binary_encode_string(mem_ctx, short_princ));
1616 if (lret == LDB_ERR_NO_SUCH_OBJECT) {
1617 DEBUG(3, ("Failed to find an entry for %s\n", short_princ));
1619 return HDB_ERR_NOENTRY;
1621 if (lret != LDB_SUCCESS) {
1622 DEBUG(3, ("Failed single search for %s - %s\n",
1623 short_princ, ldb_errstring(kdc_db_ctx->samdb)));
1625 return HDB_ERR_NOENTRY;
1630 return HDB_ERR_NOENTRY;
1635 static krb5_error_code samba_kdc_fetch_server(krb5_context context,
1636 struct samba_kdc_db_context *kdc_db_ctx,
1637 TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx,
1638 krb5_const_principal principal,
1640 hdb_entry_ex *entry_ex)
1642 krb5_error_code ret;
1643 struct ldb_dn *realm_dn;
1644 struct ldb_message *msg;
1646 ret = samba_kdc_lookup_server(context, kdc_db_ctx, mem_ctx, principal,
1647 flags, server_attrs, &realm_dn, &msg);
1652 ret = samba_kdc_message2entry(context, kdc_db_ctx, mem_ctx,
1653 principal, SAMBA_KDC_ENT_TYPE_SERVER,
1655 realm_dn, msg, entry_ex);
1657 krb5_warnx(context, "samba_kdc_fetch: message2entry failed");
1663 krb5_error_code samba_kdc_fetch(krb5_context context,
1664 struct samba_kdc_db_context *kdc_db_ctx,
1665 krb5_const_principal principal,
1668 hdb_entry_ex *entry_ex)
1670 krb5_error_code ret = HDB_ERR_NOENTRY;
1671 TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx;
1673 mem_ctx = talloc_named(kdc_db_ctx, 0, "samba_kdc_fetch context");
1676 krb5_set_error_message(context, ret, "samba_kdc_fetch: talloc_named() failed!");
1680 if (flags & HDB_F_GET_CLIENT) {
1681 ret = samba_kdc_fetch_client(context, kdc_db_ctx, mem_ctx, principal, flags, entry_ex);
1682 if (ret != HDB_ERR_NOENTRY) goto done;
1684 if (flags & HDB_F_GET_SERVER) {
1685 /* krbtgt fits into this situation for trusted realms, and for resolving different versions of our own realm name */
1686 ret = samba_kdc_fetch_krbtgt(context, kdc_db_ctx, mem_ctx, principal, flags, kvno, entry_ex);
1687 if (ret != HDB_ERR_NOENTRY) goto done;
1689 /* We return 'no entry' if it does not start with krbtgt/, so move to the common case quickly */
1690 ret = samba_kdc_fetch_server(context, kdc_db_ctx, mem_ctx, principal, flags, entry_ex);
1691 if (ret != HDB_ERR_NOENTRY) goto done;
1693 if (flags & HDB_F_GET_KRBTGT) {
1694 ret = samba_kdc_fetch_krbtgt(context, kdc_db_ctx, mem_ctx, principal, flags, kvno, entry_ex);
1695 if (ret != HDB_ERR_NOENTRY) goto done;
1699 talloc_free(mem_ctx);
1703 struct samba_kdc_seq {
1706 struct ldb_message **msgs;
1707 struct ldb_dn *realm_dn;
1710 static krb5_error_code samba_kdc_seq(krb5_context context,
1711 struct samba_kdc_db_context *kdc_db_ctx,
1712 hdb_entry_ex *entry)
1714 krb5_error_code ret;
1715 struct samba_kdc_seq *priv = kdc_db_ctx->seq_ctx;
1716 TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx;
1719 return HDB_ERR_NOENTRY;
1722 mem_ctx = talloc_named(priv, 0, "samba_kdc_seq context");
1726 krb5_set_error_message(context, ret, "samba_kdc_seq: talloc_named() failed!");
1730 if (priv->index < priv->count) {
1731 ret = samba_kdc_message2entry(context, kdc_db_ctx, mem_ctx,
1732 NULL, SAMBA_KDC_ENT_TYPE_ANY,
1733 HDB_F_ADMIN_DATA|HDB_F_GET_ANY,
1734 priv->realm_dn, priv->msgs[priv->index++], entry);
1736 ret = HDB_ERR_NOENTRY;
1741 kdc_db_ctx->seq_ctx = NULL;
1743 talloc_free(mem_ctx);
1749 krb5_error_code samba_kdc_firstkey(krb5_context context,
1750 struct samba_kdc_db_context *kdc_db_ctx,
1751 hdb_entry_ex *entry)
1753 struct ldb_context *ldb_ctx = kdc_db_ctx->samdb;
1754 struct samba_kdc_seq *priv = kdc_db_ctx->seq_ctx;
1756 struct ldb_result *res = NULL;
1757 krb5_error_code ret;
1758 TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx;
1763 kdc_db_ctx->seq_ctx = NULL;
1766 priv = (struct samba_kdc_seq *) talloc(kdc_db_ctx, struct samba_kdc_seq);
1769 krb5_set_error_message(context, ret, "talloc: out of memory");
1775 priv->realm_dn = ldb_get_default_basedn(ldb_ctx);
1778 mem_ctx = talloc_named(priv, 0, "samba_kdc_firstkey context");
1782 krb5_set_error_message(context, ret, "samba_kdc_firstkey: talloc_named() failed!");
1786 ret = krb5_get_default_realm(context, &realm);
1791 krb5_free_default_realm(context, realm);
1793 lret = dsdb_search(ldb_ctx, priv, &res,
1794 priv->realm_dn, LDB_SCOPE_SUBTREE, user_attrs,
1795 DSDB_SEARCH_NO_GLOBAL_CATALOG,
1796 "(objectClass=user)");
1798 if (lret != LDB_SUCCESS) {
1800 return HDB_ERR_NOENTRY;
1803 priv->count = res->count;
1804 priv->msgs = talloc_steal(priv, res->msgs);
1807 kdc_db_ctx->seq_ctx = priv;
1809 ret = samba_kdc_seq(context, kdc_db_ctx, entry);
1813 kdc_db_ctx->seq_ctx = NULL;
1815 talloc_free(mem_ctx);
1820 krb5_error_code samba_kdc_nextkey(krb5_context context,
1821 struct samba_kdc_db_context *kdc_db_ctx,
1822 hdb_entry_ex *entry)
1824 return samba_kdc_seq(context, kdc_db_ctx, entry);
1827 /* Check if a given entry may delegate or do s4u2self to this target principal
1829 * This is currently a very nasty hack - allowing only delegation to itself.
1832 samba_kdc_check_s4u2self(krb5_context context,
1833 struct samba_kdc_db_context *kdc_db_ctx,
1834 hdb_entry_ex *entry,
1835 krb5_const_principal target_principal)
1837 krb5_error_code ret;
1838 struct ldb_dn *realm_dn;
1839 struct ldb_message *msg;
1840 struct dom_sid *orig_sid;
1841 struct dom_sid *target_sid;
1842 struct samba_kdc_entry *p = talloc_get_type(entry->ctx, struct samba_kdc_entry);
1843 const char *delegation_check_attrs[] = {
1847 TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx = talloc_named(kdc_db_ctx, 0, "samba_kdc_check_s4u2self");
1851 krb5_set_error_message(context, ret, "samba_kdc_check_s4u2self: talloc_named() failed!");
1855 ret = samba_kdc_lookup_server(context, kdc_db_ctx, mem_ctx, target_principal,
1856 HDB_F_GET_CLIENT|HDB_F_GET_SERVER,
1857 delegation_check_attrs, &realm_dn, &msg);
1860 talloc_free(mem_ctx);
1864 orig_sid = samdb_result_dom_sid(mem_ctx, p->msg, "objectSid");
1865 target_sid = samdb_result_dom_sid(mem_ctx, msg, "objectSid");
1867 /* Allow delegation to the same principal, even if by a different
1868 * name. The easy and safe way to prove this is by SID
1870 if (!(orig_sid && target_sid && dom_sid_equal(orig_sid, target_sid))) {
1871 talloc_free(mem_ctx);
1872 return KRB5KDC_ERR_BADOPTION;
1875 talloc_free(mem_ctx);
1879 /* Certificates printed by a the Certificate Authority might have a
1880 * slightly different form of the user principal name to that in the
1881 * database. Allow a mismatch where they both refer to the same
1885 samba_kdc_check_pkinit_ms_upn_match(krb5_context context,
1886 struct samba_kdc_db_context *kdc_db_ctx,
1887 hdb_entry_ex *entry,
1888 krb5_const_principal certificate_principal)
1890 krb5_error_code ret;
1891 struct ldb_dn *realm_dn;
1892 struct ldb_message *msg;
1893 struct dom_sid *orig_sid;
1894 struct dom_sid *target_sid;
1895 struct samba_kdc_entry *p = talloc_get_type(entry->ctx, struct samba_kdc_entry);
1896 const char *ms_upn_check_attrs[] = {
1900 TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx = talloc_named(kdc_db_ctx, 0, "samba_kdc_check_pkinit_ms_upn_match");
1904 krb5_set_error_message(context, ret, "samba_kdc_fetch: talloc_named() failed!");
1908 ret = samba_kdc_lookup_client(context, kdc_db_ctx,
1909 mem_ctx, certificate_principal,
1910 ms_upn_check_attrs, &realm_dn, &msg);
1913 talloc_free(mem_ctx);
1917 orig_sid = samdb_result_dom_sid(mem_ctx, p->msg, "objectSid");
1918 target_sid = samdb_result_dom_sid(mem_ctx, msg, "objectSid");
1920 /* Consider these to be the same principal, even if by a different
1921 * name. The easy and safe way to prove this is by SID
1923 if (!(orig_sid && target_sid && dom_sid_equal(orig_sid, target_sid))) {
1924 talloc_free(mem_ctx);
1925 return KRB5_KDC_ERR_CLIENT_NAME_MISMATCH;
1928 talloc_free(mem_ctx);
1933 * Check if a given entry may delegate to this target principal
1937 samba_kdc_check_s4u2proxy(krb5_context context,
1938 struct samba_kdc_db_context *kdc_db_ctx,
1939 hdb_entry_ex *entry,
1940 krb5_const_principal target_principal)
1942 krb5_error_code ret;
1944 const char *client_dn = NULL;
1945 const char *target_principal_name = NULL;
1946 struct ldb_message_element *el;
1950 struct samba_kdc_entry *p = talloc_get_type(entry->ctx, struct samba_kdc_entry);
1952 TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx = talloc_named(kdc_db_ctx, 0, "samba_kdc_check_s4u2proxy");
1956 krb5_set_error_message(context, ret,
1957 "samba_kdc_check_s4u2proxy:"
1958 " talloc_named() failed!");
1962 client_dn = ldb_dn_get_linearized(p->msg->dn);
1968 krb5_set_error_message(context, ret,
1969 "samba_kdc_check_s4u2proxy:"
1970 " ldb_dn_get_linearized() failed!");
1975 * The main heimdal code already checked that the target_principal
1976 * belongs to the same realm as the client.
1978 * So we just need the principal without the realm,
1979 * as that is what is configured in the "msDS-AllowedToDelegateTo"
1982 ret = krb5_unparse_name_flags(context, target_principal,
1983 KRB5_PRINCIPAL_UNPARSE_NO_REALM, &tmp);
1985 talloc_free(mem_ctx);
1986 krb5_set_error_message(context, ret,
1987 "samba_kdc_check_s4u2proxy:"
1988 " krb5_unparse_name() failed!");
1991 DEBUG(10,("samba_kdc_check_s4u2proxy: client[%s] for target[%s]\n",
1994 target_principal_name = talloc_strdup(mem_ctx, tmp);
1996 if (target_principal_name == NULL) {
1998 krb5_set_error_message(context, ret,
1999 "samba_kdc_check_s4u2proxy:"
2000 " talloc_strdup() failed!");
2004 el = ldb_msg_find_element(p->msg, "msDS-AllowedToDelegateTo");
2009 val = data_blob_string_const(target_principal_name);
2011 for (i=0; i<el->num_values; i++) {
2012 struct ldb_val *val1 = &val;
2013 struct ldb_val *val2 = &el->values[i];
2016 if (val1->length != val2->length) {
2020 cmp = strncasecmp((const char *)val1->data,
2021 (const char *)val2->data,
2035 DEBUG(10,("samba_kdc_check_s4u2proxy: client[%s] allowed target[%s]\n",
2037 talloc_free(mem_ctx);
2041 krb5_set_error_message(context, ret,
2042 "samba_kdc_check_s4u2proxy: client[%s] "
2043 "not allowed for delegation to target[%s]",
2045 target_principal_name);
2046 talloc_free(mem_ctx);
2047 return KRB5KDC_ERR_BADOPTION;
2050 NTSTATUS samba_kdc_setup_db_ctx(TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx, struct samba_kdc_base_context *base_ctx,
2051 struct samba_kdc_db_context **kdc_db_ctx_out)
2054 struct ldb_message *msg;
2055 struct auth_session_info *session_info;
2056 struct samba_kdc_db_context *kdc_db_ctx;
2057 /* The idea here is very simple. Using Kerberos to
2058 * authenticate the KDC to the LDAP server is higly likely to
2061 * In future we may set this up to use EXERNAL and SSL
2062 * certificates, for now it will almost certainly be NTLMSSP_SET_USERNAME
2065 kdc_db_ctx = talloc_zero(mem_ctx, struct samba_kdc_db_context);
2066 if (kdc_db_ctx == NULL) {
2067 return NT_STATUS_NO_MEMORY;
2069 kdc_db_ctx->ev_ctx = base_ctx->ev_ctx;
2070 kdc_db_ctx->lp_ctx = base_ctx->lp_ctx;
2072 /* get default kdc policy */
2073 lpcfg_default_kdc_policy(base_ctx->lp_ctx,
2074 &kdc_db_ctx->policy.svc_tkt_lifetime,
2075 &kdc_db_ctx->policy.usr_tkt_lifetime,
2076 &kdc_db_ctx->policy.renewal_lifetime);
2078 session_info = system_session(kdc_db_ctx->lp_ctx);
2079 if (session_info == NULL) {
2080 return NT_STATUS_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2083 /* Setup the link to LDB */
2084 kdc_db_ctx->samdb = samdb_connect(kdc_db_ctx, base_ctx->ev_ctx,
2085 base_ctx->lp_ctx, session_info, 0);
2086 if (kdc_db_ctx->samdb == NULL) {
2087 DEBUG(1, ("samba_kdc_setup_db_ctx: Cannot open samdb for KDC backend!"));
2088 talloc_free(kdc_db_ctx);
2089 return NT_STATUS_CANT_ACCESS_DOMAIN_INFO;
2092 /* Find out our own krbtgt kvno */
2093 ldb_ret = samdb_rodc(kdc_db_ctx->samdb, &kdc_db_ctx->rodc);
2094 if (ldb_ret != LDB_SUCCESS) {
2095 DEBUG(1, ("samba_kdc_setup_db_ctx: Cannot determine if we are an RODC in KDC backend: %s\n",
2096 ldb_errstring(kdc_db_ctx->samdb)));
2097 talloc_free(kdc_db_ctx);
2098 return NT_STATUS_CANT_ACCESS_DOMAIN_INFO;
2100 if (kdc_db_ctx->rodc) {
2101 int my_krbtgt_number;
2102 const char *secondary_keytab[] = { "msDS-SecondaryKrbTgtNumber", NULL };
2103 struct ldb_dn *account_dn;
2104 struct ldb_dn *server_dn = samdb_server_dn(kdc_db_ctx->samdb, kdc_db_ctx);
2106 DEBUG(1, ("samba_kdc_setup_db_ctx: Cannot determine server DN in KDC backend: %s\n",
2107 ldb_errstring(kdc_db_ctx->samdb)));
2108 talloc_free(kdc_db_ctx);
2109 return NT_STATUS_CANT_ACCESS_DOMAIN_INFO;
2112 ldb_ret = samdb_reference_dn(kdc_db_ctx->samdb, kdc_db_ctx, server_dn,
2113 "serverReference", &account_dn);
2114 if (ldb_ret != LDB_SUCCESS) {
2115 DEBUG(1, ("samba_kdc_setup_db_ctx: Cannot determine server account in KDC backend: %s\n",
2116 ldb_errstring(kdc_db_ctx->samdb)));
2117 talloc_free(kdc_db_ctx);
2118 return NT_STATUS_CANT_ACCESS_DOMAIN_INFO;
2121 ldb_ret = samdb_reference_dn(kdc_db_ctx->samdb, kdc_db_ctx, account_dn,
2122 "msDS-KrbTgtLink", &kdc_db_ctx->krbtgt_dn);
2123 talloc_free(account_dn);
2124 if (ldb_ret != LDB_SUCCESS) {
2125 DEBUG(1, ("samba_kdc_setup_db_ctx: Cannot determine RODC krbtgt account in KDC backend: %s\n",
2126 ldb_errstring(kdc_db_ctx->samdb)));
2127 talloc_free(kdc_db_ctx);
2128 return NT_STATUS_CANT_ACCESS_DOMAIN_INFO;
2131 ldb_ret = dsdb_search_one(kdc_db_ctx->samdb, kdc_db_ctx,
2132 &msg, kdc_db_ctx->krbtgt_dn, LDB_SCOPE_BASE,
2134 DSDB_SEARCH_NO_GLOBAL_CATALOG,
2135 "(&(objectClass=user)(msDS-SecondaryKrbTgtNumber=*))");
2136 if (ldb_ret != LDB_SUCCESS) {
2137 DEBUG(1, ("samba_kdc_setup_db_ctx: Cannot read krbtgt account %s in KDC backend to get msDS-SecondaryKrbTgtNumber: %s: %s\n",
2138 ldb_dn_get_linearized(kdc_db_ctx->krbtgt_dn),
2139 ldb_errstring(kdc_db_ctx->samdb),
2140 ldb_strerror(ldb_ret)));
2141 talloc_free(kdc_db_ctx);
2142 return NT_STATUS_CANT_ACCESS_DOMAIN_INFO;
2144 my_krbtgt_number = ldb_msg_find_attr_as_int(msg, "msDS-SecondaryKrbTgtNumber", -1);
2145 if (my_krbtgt_number == -1) {
2146 DEBUG(1, ("samba_kdc_setup_db_ctx: Cannot read msDS-SecondaryKrbTgtNumber from krbtgt account %s in KDC backend: got %d\n",
2147 ldb_dn_get_linearized(kdc_db_ctx->krbtgt_dn),
2149 talloc_free(kdc_db_ctx);
2150 return NT_STATUS_CANT_ACCESS_DOMAIN_INFO;
2152 kdc_db_ctx->my_krbtgt_number = my_krbtgt_number;
2155 kdc_db_ctx->my_krbtgt_number = 0;
2156 ldb_ret = dsdb_search_one(kdc_db_ctx->samdb, kdc_db_ctx,
2158 ldb_get_default_basedn(kdc_db_ctx->samdb),
2161 DSDB_SEARCH_NO_GLOBAL_CATALOG,
2162 "(&(objectClass=user)(samAccountName=krbtgt))");
2164 if (ldb_ret != LDB_SUCCESS) {
2165 DEBUG(1, ("samba_kdc_fetch: could not find own KRBTGT in DB: %s\n", ldb_errstring(kdc_db_ctx->samdb)));
2166 talloc_free(kdc_db_ctx);
2167 return NT_STATUS_CANT_ACCESS_DOMAIN_INFO;
2169 kdc_db_ctx->krbtgt_dn = talloc_steal(kdc_db_ctx, msg->dn);
2170 kdc_db_ctx->my_krbtgt_number = 0;
2173 *kdc_db_ctx_out = kdc_db_ctx;
2174 return NT_STATUS_OK;