ethtool: fix a potential missing-check bug

In ethtool_get_rxnfc(), the object "info" is firstly copied from
user-space. If the FLOW_RSS flag is set in the member field flow_type of
"info" (and cmd is ETHTOOL_GRXFH), info needs to be copied again from
user-space because FLOW_RSS is newer and has new definition, as mentioned
in the comment. However, given that the user data resides in user-space, a
malicious user can race to change the data after the first copy. By doing
so, the user can inject inconsistent data. For example, in the second
copy, the FLOW_RSS flag could be cleared in the field flow_type of "info".
In the following execution, "info" will be used in the function
ops->get_rxnfc(). Such inconsistent data can potentially lead to unexpected
information leakage since ops->get_rxnfc() will prepare various types of
data according to flow_type, and the prepared data will be eventually
copied to user-space. This inconsistent data may also cause undefined
behaviors based on how ops->get_rxnfc() is implemented.

This patch simply re-verifies the flow_type field of "info" after the
second copy. If the value is not as expected, an error code will be
returned.

Signed-off-by: Wenwen Wang <wang6495@umn.edu>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>

diff --git a/net/core/ethtool.c b/net/core/ethtool.c
index 03416e6dd5d7b0c2bb4dbfc805832e4fb67fba92..ba02f0dfe85cdae884cf3ac7f53600cfef079a56 100644 (file)
--- a/net/core/ethtool.c
+++ b/net/core/ethtool.c
@@ -1032,6 +1032,11 @@ static noinline_for_stack int ethtool_get_rxnfc(struct net_device *dev,
                info_size = sizeof(info);
                if (copy_from_user(&info, useraddr, info_size))
                        return -EFAULT;
+               /* Since malicious users may modify the original data,
+                * we need to check whether FLOW_RSS is still requested.
+                */
+               if (!(info.flow_type & FLOW_RSS))
+                       return -EINVAL;
        }
 
        if (info.cmd == ETHTOOL_GRXCLSRLALL) {