s390/livepatch: Implement reliable stack tracing for the consistency model

The livepatch consistency model requires reliable stack tracing
architecture support in order to work properly. In order to achieve
this, two main issues have to be solved. First, reliable and consistent
call chain backtracing has to be ensured. Second, the unwinder needs to
be able to detect stack corruptions and return errors.

The "zSeries ELF Application Binary Interface Supplement" says:

  "The stack pointer points to the first word of the lowest allocated
  stack frame. If the "back chain" is implemented this word will point to
  the previously allocated stack frame (towards higher addresses), except
  for the first stack frame, which shall have a back chain of zero (NULL).
  The stack shall grow downwards, in other words towards lower addresses."

"back chain" is optional. GCC option -mbackchain enables it. Quoting
Martin Schwidefsky [1]:

  "The compiler is called with the -mbackchain option, all normal C
  function will store the backchain in the function prologue. All
  functions written in assembler code should do the same, if you find one
  that does not we should fix that. The end result is that a task that
  *voluntarily* called schedule() should have a proper backchain at all
  times.

  Dependent on the use case this may or may not be enough. Asynchronous
  interrupts may stop the CPU at the beginning of a function, if kernel
  preemption is enabled we can end up with a broken backchain.  The
  production kernels for IBM Z are all compiled *without* kernel
  preemption. So yes, we might get away without the objtool support.

  On a side-note, we do have a line item to implement the ORC unwinder for
  the kernel, that includes the objtool support. Once we have that we can
  drop the -mbackchain option for the kernel build. That gives us a nice
  little performance benefit. I hope that the change from backchain to the
  ORC unwinder will not be too hard to implement in the livepatch tools."

Since -mbackchain is enabled by default when the kernel is compiled, the
call chain backtracing should be currently ensured and objtool should
not be necessary for livepatch purposes.

Regarding the second issue, stack corruptions and non-reliable states
have to be recognized by the unwinder. Mainly it means to detect
preemption or page faults, the end of the task stack must be reached,
return addresses must be valid text addresses and hacks like function
graph tracing and kretprobes must be properly detected.

Unwinding a running task's stack is not a problem, because there is a
livepatch requirement that every checked task is blocked, except for the
current task. Due to that, the implementation can be much simpler
compared to the existing non-reliable infrastructure. We can consider a
task's kernel/thread stack only and skip the other stacks.

[1] 20180912121106.31ffa97c@mschwideX1 [not archived on lore.kernel.org]

Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20191106095601.29986-5-mbenes@suse.cz
Reviewed-by: Heiko Carstens <heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com>
Tested-by: Miroslav Benes <mbenes@suse.cz>
Signed-off-by: Miroslav Benes <mbenes@suse.cz>
Signed-off-by: Vasily Gorbik <gor@linux.ibm.com>

diff --git a/arch/s390/Kconfig b/arch/s390/Kconfig
index 2528eb9d01fbc34ca185167bad2b04f4bcdc9c7d..367a87c5d7b85ff4046a9fa25dfd6d04f0aa5203 100644 (file)
--- a/arch/s390/Kconfig
+++ b/arch/s390/Kconfig
@@ -170,6 +170,7 @@ config S390
        select HAVE_PERF_EVENTS
        select HAVE_RCU_TABLE_FREE
        select HAVE_REGS_AND_STACK_ACCESS_API
+       select HAVE_RELIABLE_STACKTRACE
        select HAVE_RSEQ
        select HAVE_SYSCALL_TRACEPOINTS
        select HAVE_VIRT_CPU_ACCOUNTING

diff --git a/arch/s390/kernel/stacktrace.c b/arch/s390/kernel/stacktrace.c
index f8fc4f8aef9b1585252a25532d8d19f4498c3984..fc5419ac64c8a5a4b7cf8d695e3f734beb2f9dac 100644 (file)
--- a/arch/s390/kernel/stacktrace.c
+++ b/arch/s390/kernel/stacktrace.c
@@ -9,6 +9,7 @@
 #include <linux/stacktrace.h>
 #include <asm/stacktrace.h>
 #include <asm/unwind.h>
+#include <asm/kprobes.h>
 
 void arch_stack_walk(stack_trace_consume_fn consume_entry, void *cookie,
                     struct task_struct *task, struct pt_regs *regs)
@@ -22,3 +23,45 @@ void arch_stack_walk(stack_trace_consume_fn consume_entry, void *cookie,
                        break;
        }
 }
+
+/*
+ * This function returns an error if it detects any unreliable features of the
+ * stack.  Otherwise it guarantees that the stack trace is reliable.
+ *
+ * If the task is not 'current', the caller *must* ensure the task is inactive.
+ */
+int arch_stack_walk_reliable(stack_trace_consume_fn consume_entry,
+                            void *cookie, struct task_struct *task)
+{
+       struct unwind_state state;
+       unsigned long addr;
+
+       unwind_for_each_frame(&state, task, NULL, 0) {
+               if (state.stack_info.type != STACK_TYPE_TASK)
+                       return -EINVAL;
+
+               if (state.regs)
+                       return -EINVAL;
+
+               addr = unwind_get_return_address(&state);
+               if (!addr)
+                       return -EINVAL;
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_KPROBES
+               /*
+                * Mark stacktraces with kretprobed functions on them
+                * as unreliable.
+                */
+               if (state.ip == (unsigned long)kretprobe_trampoline)
+                       return -EINVAL;
+#endif
+
+               if (!consume_entry(cookie, addr, false))
+                       return -EINVAL;
+       }
+
+       /* Check for stack corruption */
+       if (unwind_error(&state))
+               return -EINVAL;
+       return 0;
+}