powerpc/speculation: Support 'mitigations=' cmdline option
authorJosh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Fri, 12 Apr 2019 20:39:30 +0000 (15:39 -0500)
committerThomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Wed, 17 Apr 2019 19:37:29 +0000 (21:37 +0200)
Configure powerpc CPU runtime speculation bug mitigations in accordance
with the 'mitigations=' cmdline option.  This affects Meltdown, Spectre
v1, Spectre v2, and Speculative Store Bypass.

The default behavior is unchanged.

Signed-off-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Tested-by: Jiri Kosina <jkosina@suse.cz> (on x86)
Reviewed-by: Jiri Kosina <jkosina@suse.cz>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: "H . Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Jiri Kosina <jikos@kernel.org>
Cc: Waiman Long <longman@redhat.com>
Cc: Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com>
Cc: Jon Masters <jcm@redhat.com>
Cc: Benjamin Herrenschmidt <benh@kernel.crashing.org>
Cc: Paul Mackerras <paulus@samba.org>
Cc: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
Cc: linuxppc-dev@lists.ozlabs.org
Cc: Martin Schwidefsky <schwidefsky@de.ibm.com>
Cc: Heiko Carstens <heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com>
Cc: linux-s390@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
Cc: linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org
Cc: linux-arch@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Cc: Tyler Hicks <tyhicks@canonical.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Randy Dunlap <rdunlap@infradead.org>
Cc: Steven Price <steven.price@arm.com>
Cc: Phil Auld <pauld@redhat.com>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/245a606e1a42a558a310220312d9b6adb9159df6.1555085500.git.jpoimboe@redhat.com

index 779ddeb2929cc0342b9905aeadbe49d6b3611416..ac7150a25a7a15fa0fcc7f0a1a88000ccd37bcd1 100644 (file)
-                       [X86] Control optional mitigations for CPU
+                       [X86,PPC] Control optional mitigations for CPU
                        vulnerabilities.  This is a set of curated,
                        arch-independent options, each of which is an
                        aggregation of existing arch-specific options.
                                Disable all optional CPU mitigations.  This
                                improves system performance, but it may also
                                expose users to several CPU vulnerabilities.
-                               Equivalent to: nopti [X86]
-                                              nospectre_v2 [X86]
+                               Equivalent to: nopti [X86,PPC]
+                                              nospectre_v1 [PPC]
+                                              nospectre_v2 [X86,PPC]
                                               spectre_v2_user=off [X86]
-                                              spec_store_bypass_disable=off [X86]
+                                              spec_store_bypass_disable=off [X86,PPC]
                                               l1tf=off [X86]
                        auto (default)
index 9b8631533e02a4559a4dfc4c23240db58e39192c..cdf3e73000e94d36698b9c760f2a9ca87d54ee15 100644 (file)
@@ -57,7 +57,7 @@ void setup_barrier_nospec(void)
        enable = security_ftr_enabled(SEC_FTR_FAVOUR_SECURITY) &&
-       if (!no_nospec)
+       if (!no_nospec && !cpu_mitigations_off())
@@ -116,7 +116,7 @@ static int __init handle_nospectre_v2(char *p)
 early_param("nospectre_v2", handle_nospectre_v2);
 void setup_spectre_v2(void)
-       if (no_spectrev2)
+       if (no_spectrev2 || cpu_mitigations_off())
                btb_flush_enabled = true;
@@ -307,7 +307,7 @@ void setup_stf_barrier(void)
        stf_enabled_flush_types = type;
-       if (!no_stf_barrier)
+       if (!no_stf_barrier && !cpu_mitigations_off())
index 236c1151a3a77057013313ed5da588673f5f3419..c7ec27ba8926a8b1a974e3c8cc56855467d35b70 100644 (file)
@@ -958,7 +958,7 @@ void setup_rfi_flush(enum l1d_flush_type types, bool enable)
        enabled_flush_types = types;
-       if (!no_rfi_flush)
+       if (!no_rfi_flush && !cpu_mitigations_off())