s390/speculation: Support 'mitigations=' cmdline option
authorJosh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Fri, 12 Apr 2019 20:39:31 +0000 (15:39 -0500)
committerThomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Wed, 17 Apr 2019 19:37:29 +0000 (21:37 +0200)
Configure s390 runtime CPU speculation bug mitigations in accordance
with the 'mitigations=' cmdline option.  This affects Spectre v1 and
Spectre v2.

The default behavior is unchanged.

Signed-off-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Tested-by: Jiri Kosina <jkosina@suse.cz> (on x86)
Reviewed-by: Jiri Kosina <jkosina@suse.cz>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: "H . Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Jiri Kosina <jikos@kernel.org>
Cc: Waiman Long <longman@redhat.com>
Cc: Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com>
Cc: Jon Masters <jcm@redhat.com>
Cc: Benjamin Herrenschmidt <benh@kernel.crashing.org>
Cc: Paul Mackerras <paulus@samba.org>
Cc: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
Cc: linuxppc-dev@lists.ozlabs.org
Cc: Martin Schwidefsky <schwidefsky@de.ibm.com>
Cc: Heiko Carstens <heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com>
Cc: linux-s390@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
Cc: linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org
Cc: linux-arch@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Cc: Tyler Hicks <tyhicks@canonical.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Randy Dunlap <rdunlap@infradead.org>
Cc: Steven Price <steven.price@arm.com>
Cc: Phil Auld <pauld@redhat.com>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/e4a161805458a5ec88812aac0307ae3908a030fc.1555085500.git.jpoimboe@redhat.com

index ac7150a25a7a15fa0fcc7f0a1a88000ccd37bcd1..1ae93872b79fd8f165dc7564d5a73c6b2d412811 100644 (file)
-                       [X86,PPC] Control optional mitigations for CPU
+                       [X86,PPC,S390] Control optional mitigations for CPU
                        vulnerabilities.  This is a set of curated,
                        arch-independent options, each of which is an
                        aggregation of existing arch-specific options.
                                expose users to several CPU vulnerabilities.
                                Equivalent to: nopti [X86,PPC]
                                               nospectre_v1 [PPC]
-                                              nospectre_v2 [X86,PPC]
+                                              nobp=0 [S390]
+                                              nospectre_v2 [X86,PPC,S390]
                                               spectre_v2_user=off [X86]
                                               spec_store_bypass_disable=off [X86,PPC]
                                               l1tf=off [X86]
index bdddaae9655984dfbf59ccee386c7bb3608cb183..649135cbedd5c4407f16d89f4020d5022f40395e 100644 (file)
@@ -1,6 +1,7 @@
 // SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
 #include <linux/module.h>
 #include <linux/device.h>
+#include <linux/cpu.h>
 #include <asm/nospec-branch.h>
 static int __init nobp_setup_early(char *str)
@@ -58,7 +59,7 @@ early_param("nospectre_v2", nospectre_v2_setup_early);
 void __init nospec_auto_detect(void)
-       if (test_facility(156)) {
+       if (test_facility(156) || cpu_mitigations_off()) {
                 * The machine supports etokens.
                 * Disable expolines and disable nobp.