powerpc: Detect the trusted boot state of the system
authorNayna Jain <nayna@linux.ibm.com>
Tue, 5 Nov 2019 23:02:07 +0000 (17:02 -0600)
committerMichael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
Tue, 12 Nov 2019 01:25:49 +0000 (12:25 +1100)
commit2702809a4a1ab414d75c00936cda70ea77c8234e
tree73a331f2f9de6ec65b20fba05d78e1deb5183a32
parent4238fad366a660cbc6499ca1ea4be42bd4d1ac5b
powerpc: Detect the trusted boot state of the system

While secure boot permits only properly verified signed kernels to be
booted, trusted boot calculates the file hash of the kernel image and
stores the measurement prior to boot, that can be subsequently
compared against good known values via attestation services.

This patch reads the trusted boot state of a PowerNV system. The state
is used to conditionally enable additional measurement rules in the
IMA arch-specific policies.

Signed-off-by: Nayna Jain <nayna@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Eric Richter <erichte@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/e9eeee6b-b9bf-1e41-2954-61dbd6fbfbcf@linux.ibm.com
arch/powerpc/include/asm/secure_boot.h
arch/powerpc/kernel/secure_boot.c