Merge branch 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/dtor/input

[sfrench/cifs-2.6.git] / Documentation / speculation.txt

diff --git a/Documentation/speculation.txt b/Documentation/speculation.txt
index e9e6cbae284164fd38963e3eb57ad7da3f772fb9..50d7ea857cff2102d3e58cc53c26dc309ad169d9 100644 (file)
--- a/Documentation/speculation.txt
+++ b/Documentation/speculation.txt
@@ -17,7 +17,7 @@ observed to extract secret information.
 
 For example, in the presence of branch prediction, it is possible for bounds
 checks to be ignored by code which is speculatively executed. Consider the
-following code:
+following code::
 
        int load_array(int *array, unsigned int index)
        {
@@ -27,7 +27,7 @@ following code:
                        return array[index];
        }
 
-Which, on arm64, may be compiled to an assembly sequence such as:
+Which, on arm64, may be compiled to an assembly sequence such as::
 
        CMP     <index>, #MAX_ARRAY_ELEMS
        B.LT    less
@@ -44,7 +44,7 @@ microarchitectural state which can be subsequently measured.
 
 More complex sequences involving multiple dependent memory accesses may
 result in sensitive information being leaked. Consider the following
-code, building on the prior example:
+code, building on the prior example::
 
        int load_dependent_arrays(int *arr1, int *arr2, int index)
        {
@@ -77,7 +77,7 @@ A call to array_index_nospec(index, size) returns a sanitized index
 value that is bounded to [0, size) even under cpu speculation
 conditions.
 
-This can be used to protect the earlier load_array() example:
+This can be used to protect the earlier load_array() example::
 
        int load_array(int *array, unsigned int index)
        {