security/selinux/ss/services.c

   1 /*
   2  * Implementation of the security services.
   3  *
   4  * Authors : Stephen Smalley, <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
   5  *           James Morris <jmorris@redhat.com>
   6  *
   7  * Updated: Trusted Computer Solutions, Inc. <dgoeddel@trustedcs.com>
   8  *
   9  *      Support for enhanced MLS infrastructure.
  10  *      Support for context based audit filters.
  11  *
  12  * Updated: Frank Mayer <mayerf@tresys.com> and Karl MacMillan <kmacmillan@tresys.com>
  13  *
  14  *      Added conditional policy language extensions
  15  *
  16  * Updated: Hewlett-Packard <paul@paul-moore.com>
  17  *
  18  *      Added support for NetLabel
  19  *      Added support for the policy capability bitmap
  20  *
  21  * Updated: Chad Sellers <csellers@tresys.com>
  22  *
  23  *  Added validation of kernel classes and permissions
  24  *
  25  * Updated: KaiGai Kohei <kaigai@ak.jp.nec.com>
  26  *
  27  *  Added support for bounds domain and audit messaged on masked permissions
  28  *
  29  * Updated: Guido Trentalancia <guido@trentalancia.com>
  30  *
  31  *  Added support for runtime switching of the policy type
  32  *
  33  * Copyright (C) 2008, 2009 NEC Corporation
  34  * Copyright (C) 2006, 2007 Hewlett-Packard Development Company, L.P.
  35  * Copyright (C) 2004-2006 Trusted Computer Solutions, Inc.
  36  * Copyright (C) 2003 - 2004, 2006 Tresys Technology, LLC
  37  * Copyright (C) 2003 Red Hat, Inc., James Morris <jmorris@redhat.com>
  38  *      This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
  39  *      it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
  40  *      the Free Software Foundation, version 2.
  41  */
  42 #include <linux/kernel.h>
  43 #include <linux/slab.h>
  44 #include <linux/string.h>
  45 #include <linux/spinlock.h>
  46 #include <linux/rcupdate.h>
  47 #include <linux/errno.h>
  48 #include <linux/in.h>
  49 #include <linux/sched.h>
  50 #include <linux/audit.h>
  51 #include <linux/mutex.h>
  52 #include <linux/selinux.h>
  53 #include <linux/flex_array.h>
  54 #include <linux/vmalloc.h>
  55 #include <net/netlabel.h>
  56
  57 #include "flask.h"
  58 #include "avc.h"
  59 #include "avc_ss.h"
  60 #include "security.h"
  61 #include "context.h"
  62 #include "policydb.h"
  63 #include "sidtab.h"
  64 #include "services.h"
  65 #include "conditional.h"
  66 #include "mls.h"
  67 #include "objsec.h"
  68 #include "netlabel.h"
  69 #include "xfrm.h"
  70 #include "ebitmap.h"
  71 #include "audit.h"
  72
  73 /* Policy capability names */
  74 char *selinux_policycap_names[__POLICYDB_CAPABILITY_MAX] = {
  75         "network_peer_controls",
  76         "open_perms",
  77         "extended_socket_class",
  78         "always_check_network",
  79         "cgroup_seclabel",
  80         "nnp_nosuid_transition"
  81 };
  82
  83 int selinux_policycap_netpeer;
  84 int selinux_policycap_openperm;
  85 int selinux_policycap_extsockclass;
  86 int selinux_policycap_alwaysnetwork;
  87 int selinux_policycap_cgroupseclabel;
  88 int selinux_policycap_nnp_nosuid_transition;
  89
  90 static DEFINE_RWLOCK(policy_rwlock);
  91
  92 static struct sidtab sidtab;
  93 struct policydb policydb;
  94 int ss_initialized;
  95
  96 /*
  97  * The largest sequence number that has been used when
  98  * providing an access decision to the access vector cache.
  99  * The sequence number only changes when a policy change
 100  * occurs.
 101  */
 102 static u32 latest_granting;
 103
 104 /* Forward declaration. */
 105 static int context_struct_to_string(struct context *context, char **scontext,
 106                                     u32 *scontext_len);
 107
 108 static void context_struct_compute_av(struct context *scontext,
 109                                         struct context *tcontext,
 110                                         u16 tclass,
 111                                         struct av_decision *avd,
 112                                         struct extended_perms *xperms);
 113
 114 struct selinux_mapping {
 115         u16 value; /* policy value */
 116         unsigned num_perms;
 117         u32 perms[sizeof(u32) * 8];
 118 };
 119
 120 static struct selinux_mapping *current_mapping;
 121 static u16 current_mapping_size;
 122
 123 static int selinux_set_mapping(struct policydb *pol,
 124                                struct security_class_mapping *map,
 125                                struct selinux_mapping **out_map_p,
 126                                u16 *out_map_size)
 127 {
 128         struct selinux_mapping *out_map = NULL;
 129         size_t size = sizeof(struct selinux_mapping);
 130         u16 i, j;
 131         unsigned k;
 132         bool print_unknown_handle = false;
 133
 134         /* Find number of classes in the input mapping */
 135         if (!map)
 136                 return -EINVAL;
 137         i = 0;
 138         while (map[i].name)
 139                 i++;
 140
 141         /* Allocate space for the class records, plus one for class zero */
 142         out_map = kcalloc(++i, size, GFP_ATOMIC);
 143         if (!out_map)
 144                 return -ENOMEM;
 145
 146         /* Store the raw class and permission values */
 147         j = 0;
 148         while (map[j].name) {
 149                 struct security_class_mapping *p_in = map + (j++);
 150                 struct selinux_mapping *p_out = out_map + j;
 151
 152                 /* An empty class string skips ahead */
 153                 if (!strcmp(p_in->name, "")) {
 154                         p_out->num_perms = 0;
 155                         continue;
 156                 }
 157
 158                 p_out->value = string_to_security_class(pol, p_in->name);
 159                 if (!p_out->value) {
 160                         printk(KERN_INFO
 161                                "SELinux:  Class %s not defined in policy.\n",
 162                                p_in->name);
 163                         if (pol->reject_unknown)
 164                                 goto err;
 165                         p_out->num_perms = 0;
 166                         print_unknown_handle = true;
 167                         continue;
 168                 }
 169
 170                 k = 0;
 171                 while (p_in->perms[k]) {
 172                         /* An empty permission string skips ahead */
 173                         if (!*p_in->perms[k]) {
 174                                 k++;
 175                                 continue;
 176                         }
 177                         p_out->perms[k] = string_to_av_perm(pol, p_out->value,
 178                                                             p_in->perms[k]);
 179                         if (!p_out->perms[k]) {
 180                                 printk(KERN_INFO
 181                                        "SELinux:  Permission %s in class %s not defined in policy.\n",
 182                                        p_in->perms[k], p_in->name);
 183                                 if (pol->reject_unknown)
 184                                         goto err;
 185                                 print_unknown_handle = true;
 186                         }
 187
 188                         k++;
 189                 }
 190                 p_out->num_perms = k;
 191         }
 192
 193         if (print_unknown_handle)
 194                 printk(KERN_INFO "SELinux: the above unknown classes and permissions will be %s\n",
 195                        pol->allow_unknown ? "allowed" : "denied");
 196
 197         *out_map_p = out_map;
 198         *out_map_size = i;
 199         return 0;
 200 err:
 201         kfree(out_map);
 202         return -EINVAL;
 203 }
 204
 205 /*
 206  * Get real, policy values from mapped values
 207  */
 208
 209 static u16 unmap_class(u16 tclass)
 210 {
 211         if (tclass < current_mapping_size)
 212                 return current_mapping[tclass].value;
 213
 214         return tclass;
 215 }
 216
 217 /*
 218  * Get kernel value for class from its policy value
 219  */
 220 static u16 map_class(u16 pol_value)
 221 {
 222         u16 i;
 223
 224         for (i = 1; i < current_mapping_size; i++) {
 225                 if (current_mapping[i].value == pol_value)
 226                         return i;
 227         }
 228
 229         return SECCLASS_NULL;
 230 }
 231
 232 static void map_decision(u16 tclass, struct av_decision *avd,
 233                          int allow_unknown)
 234 {
 235         if (tclass < current_mapping_size) {
 236                 unsigned i, n = current_mapping[tclass].num_perms;
 237                 u32 result;
 238
 239                 for (i = 0, result = 0; i < n; i++) {
 240                         if (avd->allowed & current_mapping[tclass].perms[i])
 241                                 result |= 1<<i;
 242                         if (allow_unknown && !current_mapping[tclass].perms[i])
 243                                 result |= 1<<i;
 244                 }
 245                 avd->allowed = result;
 246
 247                 for (i = 0, result = 0; i < n; i++)
 248                         if (avd->auditallow & current_mapping[tclass].perms[i])
 249                                 result |= 1<<i;
 250                 avd->auditallow = result;
 251
 252                 for (i = 0, result = 0; i < n; i++) {
 253                         if (avd->auditdeny & current_mapping[tclass].perms[i])
 254                                 result |= 1<<i;
 255                         if (!allow_unknown && !current_mapping[tclass].perms[i])
 256                                 result |= 1<<i;
 257                 }
 258                 /*
 259                  * In case the kernel has a bug and requests a permission
 260                  * between num_perms and the maximum permission number, we
 261                  * should audit that denial
 262                  */
 263                 for (; i < (sizeof(u32)*8); i++)
 264                         result |= 1<<i;
 265                 avd->auditdeny = result;
 266         }
 267 }
 268
 269 int security_mls_enabled(void)
 270 {
 271         return policydb.mls_enabled;
 272 }
 273
 274 /*
 275  * Return the boolean value of a constraint expression
 276  * when it is applied to the specified source and target
 277  * security contexts.
 278  *
 279  * xcontext is a special beast...  It is used by the validatetrans rules
 280  * only.  For these rules, scontext is the context before the transition,
 281  * tcontext is the context after the transition, and xcontext is the context
 282  * of the process performing the transition.  All other callers of
 283  * constraint_expr_eval should pass in NULL for xcontext.
 284  */
 285 static int constraint_expr_eval(struct context *scontext,
 286                                 struct context *tcontext,
 287                                 struct context *xcontext,
 288                                 struct constraint_expr *cexpr)
 289 {
 290         u32 val1, val2;
 291         struct context *c;
 292         struct role_datum *r1, *r2;
 293         struct mls_level *l1, *l2;
 294         struct constraint_expr *e;
 295         int s[CEXPR_MAXDEPTH];
 296         int sp = -1;
 297
 298         for (e = cexpr; e; e = e->next) {
 299                 switch (e->expr_type) {
 300                 case CEXPR_NOT:
 301                         BUG_ON(sp < 0);
 302                         s[sp] = !s[sp];
 303                         break;
 304                 case CEXPR_AND:
 305                         BUG_ON(sp < 1);
 306                         sp--;
 307                         s[sp] &= s[sp + 1];
 308                         break;
 309                 case CEXPR_OR:
 310                         BUG_ON(sp < 1);
 311                         sp--;
 312                         s[sp] |= s[sp + 1];
 313                         break;
 314                 case CEXPR_ATTR:
 315                         if (sp == (CEXPR_MAXDEPTH - 1))
 316                                 return 0;
 317                         switch (e->attr) {
 318                         case CEXPR_USER:
 319                                 val1 = scontext->user;
 320                                 val2 = tcontext->user;
 321                                 break;
 322                         case CEXPR_TYPE:
 323                                 val1 = scontext->type;
 324                                 val2 = tcontext->type;
 325                                 break;
 326                         case CEXPR_ROLE:
 327                                 val1 = scontext->role;
 328                                 val2 = tcontext->role;
 329                                 r1 = policydb.role_val_to_struct[val1 - 1];
 330                                 r2 = policydb.role_val_to_struct[val2 - 1];
 331                                 switch (e->op) {
 332                                 case CEXPR_DOM:
 333                                         s[++sp] = ebitmap_get_bit(&r1->dominates,
 334                                                                   val2 - 1);
 335                                         continue;
 336                                 case CEXPR_DOMBY:
 337                                         s[++sp] = ebitmap_get_bit(&r2->dominates,
 338                                                                   val1 - 1);
 339                                         continue;
 340                                 case CEXPR_INCOMP:
 341                                         s[++sp] = (!ebitmap_get_bit(&r1->dominates,
 342                                                                     val2 - 1) &&
 343                                                    !ebitmap_get_bit(&r2->dominates,
 344                                                                     val1 - 1));
 345                                         continue;
 346                                 default:
 347                                         break;
 348                                 }
 349                                 break;
 350                         case CEXPR_L1L2:
 351                                 l1 = &(scontext->range.level[0]);
 352                                 l2 = &(tcontext->range.level[0]);
 353                                 goto mls_ops;
 354                         case CEXPR_L1H2:
 355                                 l1 = &(scontext->range.level[0]);
 356                                 l2 = &(tcontext->range.level[1]);
 357                                 goto mls_ops;
 358                         case CEXPR_H1L2:
 359                                 l1 = &(scontext->range.level[1]);
 360                                 l2 = &(tcontext->range.level[0]);
 361                                 goto mls_ops;
 362                         case CEXPR_H1H2:
 363                                 l1 = &(scontext->range.level[1]);
 364                                 l2 = &(tcontext->range.level[1]);
 365                                 goto mls_ops;
 366                         case CEXPR_L1H1:
 367                                 l1 = &(scontext->range.level[0]);
 368                                 l2 = &(scontext->range.level[1]);
 369                                 goto mls_ops;
 370                         case CEXPR_L2H2:
 371                                 l1 = &(tcontext->range.level[0]);
 372                                 l2 = &(tcontext->range.level[1]);
 373                                 goto mls_ops;
 374 mls_ops:
 375                         switch (e->op) {
 376                         case CEXPR_EQ:
 377                                 s[++sp] = mls_level_eq(l1, l2);
 378                                 continue;
 379                         case CEXPR_NEQ:
 380                                 s[++sp] = !mls_level_eq(l1, l2);
 381                                 continue;
 382                         case CEXPR_DOM:
 383                                 s[++sp] = mls_level_dom(l1, l2);
 384                                 continue;
 385                         case CEXPR_DOMBY:
 386                                 s[++sp] = mls_level_dom(l2, l1);
 387                                 continue;
 388                         case CEXPR_INCOMP:
 389                                 s[++sp] = mls_level_incomp(l2, l1);
 390                                 continue;
 391                         default:
 392                                 BUG();
 393                                 return 0;
 394                         }
 395                         break;
 396                         default:
 397                                 BUG();
 398                                 return 0;
 399                         }
 400
 401                         switch (e->op) {
 402                         case CEXPR_EQ:
 403                                 s[++sp] = (val1 == val2);
 404                                 break;
 405                         case CEXPR_NEQ:
 406                                 s[++sp] = (val1 != val2);
 407                                 break;
 408                         default:
 409                                 BUG();
 410                                 return 0;
 411                         }
 412                         break;
 413                 case CEXPR_NAMES:
 414                         if (sp == (CEXPR_MAXDEPTH-1))
 415                                 return 0;
 416                         c = scontext;
 417                         if (e->attr & CEXPR_TARGET)
 418                                 c = tcontext;
 419                         else if (e->attr & CEXPR_XTARGET) {
 420                                 c = xcontext;
 421                                 if (!c) {
 422                                         BUG();
 423                                         return 0;
 424                                 }
 425                         }
 426                         if (e->attr & CEXPR_USER)
 427                                 val1 = c->user;
 428                         else if (e->attr & CEXPR_ROLE)
 429                                 val1 = c->role;
 430                         else if (e->attr & CEXPR_TYPE)
 431                                 val1 = c->type;
 432                         else {
 433                                 BUG();
 434                                 return 0;
 435                         }
 436
 437                         switch (e->op) {
 438                         case CEXPR_EQ:
 439                                 s[++sp] = ebitmap_get_bit(&e->names, val1 - 1);
 440                                 break;
 441                         case CEXPR_NEQ:
 442                                 s[++sp] = !ebitmap_get_bit(&e->names, val1 - 1);
 443                                 break;
 444                         default:
 445                                 BUG();
 446                                 return 0;
 447                         }
 448                         break;
 449                 default:
 450                         BUG();
 451                         return 0;
 452                 }
 453         }
 454
 455         BUG_ON(sp != 0);
 456         return s[0];
 457 }
 458
 459 /*
 460  * security_dump_masked_av - dumps masked permissions during
 461  * security_compute_av due to RBAC, MLS/Constraint and Type bounds.
 462  */
 463 static int dump_masked_av_helper(void *k, void *d, void *args)
 464 {
 465         struct perm_datum *pdatum = d;
 466         char **permission_names = args;
 467
 468         BUG_ON(pdatum->value < 1 || pdatum->value > 32);
 469
 470         permission_names[pdatum->value - 1] = (char *)k;
 471
 472         return 0;
 473 }
 474
 475 static void security_dump_masked_av(struct context *scontext,
 476                                     struct context *tcontext,
 477                                     u16 tclass,
 478                                     u32 permissions,
 479                                     const char *reason)
 480 {
 481         struct common_datum *common_dat;
 482         struct class_datum *tclass_dat;
 483         struct audit_buffer *ab;
 484         char *tclass_name;
 485         char *scontext_name = NULL;
 486         char *tcontext_name = NULL;
 487         char *permission_names[32];
 488         int index;
 489         u32 length;
 490         bool need_comma = false;
 491
 492         if (!permissions)
 493                 return;
 494
 495         tclass_name = sym_name(&policydb, SYM_CLASSES, tclass - 1);
 496         tclass_dat = policydb.class_val_to_struct[tclass - 1];
 497         common_dat = tclass_dat->comdatum;
 498
 499         /* init permission_names */
 500         if (common_dat &&
 501             hashtab_map(common_dat->permissions.table,
 502                         dump_masked_av_helper, permission_names) < 0)
 503                 goto out;
 504
 505         if (hashtab_map(tclass_dat->permissions.table,
 506                         dump_masked_av_helper, permission_names) < 0)
 507                 goto out;
 508
 509         /* get scontext/tcontext in text form */
 510         if (context_struct_to_string(scontext,
 511                                      &scontext_name, &length) < 0)
 512                 goto out;
 513
 514         if (context_struct_to_string(tcontext,
 515                                      &tcontext_name, &length) < 0)
 516                 goto out;
 517
 518         /* audit a message */
 519         ab = audit_log_start(current->audit_context,
 520                              GFP_ATOMIC, AUDIT_SELINUX_ERR);
 521         if (!ab)
 522                 goto out;
 523
 524         audit_log_format(ab, "op=security_compute_av reason=%s "
 525                          "scontext=%s tcontext=%s tclass=%s perms=",
 526                          reason, scontext_name, tcontext_name, tclass_name);
 527
 528         for (index = 0; index < 32; index++) {
 529                 u32 mask = (1 << index);
 530
 531                 if ((mask & permissions) == 0)
 532                         continue;
 533
 534                 audit_log_format(ab, "%s%s",
 535                                  need_comma ? "," : "",
 536                                  permission_names[index]
 537                                  ? permission_names[index] : "????");
 538                 need_comma = true;
 539         }
 540         audit_log_end(ab);
 541 out:
 542         /* release scontext/tcontext */
 543         kfree(tcontext_name);
 544         kfree(scontext_name);
 545
 546         return;
 547 }
 548
 549 /*
 550  * security_boundary_permission - drops violated permissions
 551  * on boundary constraint.
 552  */
 553 static void type_attribute_bounds_av(struct context *scontext,
 554                                      struct context *tcontext,
 555                                      u16 tclass,
 556                                      struct av_decision *avd)
 557 {
 558         struct context lo_scontext;
 559         struct context lo_tcontext, *tcontextp = tcontext;
 560         struct av_decision lo_avd;
 561         struct type_datum *source;
 562         struct type_datum *target;
 563         u32 masked = 0;
 564
 565         source = flex_array_get_ptr(policydb.type_val_to_struct_array,
 566                                     scontext->type - 1);
 567         BUG_ON(!source);
 568
 569         if (!source->bounds)
 570                 return;
 571
 572         target = flex_array_get_ptr(policydb.type_val_to_struct_array,
 573                                     tcontext->type - 1);
 574         BUG_ON(!target);
 575
 576         memset(&lo_avd, 0, sizeof(lo_avd));
 577
 578         memcpy(&lo_scontext, scontext, sizeof(lo_scontext));
 579         lo_scontext.type = source->bounds;
 580
 581         if (target->bounds) {
 582                 memcpy(&lo_tcontext, tcontext, sizeof(lo_tcontext));
 583                 lo_tcontext.type = target->bounds;
 584                 tcontextp = &lo_tcontext;
 585         }
 586
 587         context_struct_compute_av(&lo_scontext,
 588                                   tcontextp,
 589                                   tclass,
 590                                   &lo_avd,
 591                                   NULL);
 592
 593         masked = ~lo_avd.allowed & avd->allowed;
 594
 595         if (likely(!masked))
 596                 return;         /* no masked permission */
 597
 598         /* mask violated permissions */
 599         avd->allowed &= ~masked;
 600
 601         /* audit masked permissions */
 602         security_dump_masked_av(scontext, tcontext,
 603                                 tclass, masked, "bounds");
 604 }
 605
 606 /*
 607  * flag which drivers have permissions
 608  * only looking for ioctl based extended permssions
 609  */
 610 void services_compute_xperms_drivers(
 611                 struct extended_perms *xperms,
 612                 struct avtab_node *node)
 613 {
 614         unsigned int i;
 615
 616         if (node->datum.u.xperms->specified == AVTAB_XPERMS_IOCTLDRIVER) {
 617                 /* if one or more driver has all permissions allowed */
 618                 for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(xperms->drivers.p); i++)
 619                         xperms->drivers.p[i] |= node->datum.u.xperms->perms.p[i];
 620         } else if (node->datum.u.xperms->specified == AVTAB_XPERMS_IOCTLFUNCTION) {
 621                 /* if allowing permissions within a driver */
 622                 security_xperm_set(xperms->drivers.p,
 623                                         node->datum.u.xperms->driver);
 624         }
 625
 626         /* If no ioctl commands are allowed, ignore auditallow and auditdeny */
 627         if (node->key.specified & AVTAB_XPERMS_ALLOWED)
 628                 xperms->len = 1;
 629 }
 630
 631 /*
 632  * Compute access vectors and extended permissions based on a context
 633  * structure pair for the permissions in a particular class.
 634  */
 635 static void context_struct_compute_av(struct context *scontext,
 636                                         struct context *tcontext,
 637                                         u16 tclass,
 638                                         struct av_decision *avd,
 639                                         struct extended_perms *xperms)
 640 {
 641         struct constraint_node *constraint;
 642         struct role_allow *ra;
 643         struct avtab_key avkey;
 644         struct avtab_node *node;
 645         struct class_datum *tclass_datum;
 646         struct ebitmap *sattr, *tattr;
 647         struct ebitmap_node *snode, *tnode;
 648         unsigned int i, j;
 649
 650         avd->allowed = 0;
 651         avd->auditallow = 0;
 652         avd->auditdeny = 0xffffffff;
 653         if (xperms) {
 654                 memset(&xperms->drivers, 0, sizeof(xperms->drivers));
 655                 xperms->len = 0;
 656         }
 657
 658         if (unlikely(!tclass || tclass > policydb.p_classes.nprim)) {
 659                 if (printk_ratelimit())
 660                         printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux:  Invalid class %hu\n", tclass);
 661                 return;
 662         }
 663
 664         tclass_datum = policydb.class_val_to_struct[tclass - 1];
 665
 666         /*
 667          * If a specific type enforcement rule was defined for
 668          * this permission check, then use it.
 669          */
 670         avkey.target_class = tclass;
 671         avkey.specified = AVTAB_AV | AVTAB_XPERMS;
 672         sattr = flex_array_get(policydb.type_attr_map_array, scontext->type - 1);
 673         BUG_ON(!sattr);
 674         tattr = flex_array_get(policydb.type_attr_map_array, tcontext->type - 1);
 675         BUG_ON(!tattr);
 676         ebitmap_for_each_positive_bit(sattr, snode, i) {
 677                 ebitmap_for_each_positive_bit(tattr, tnode, j) {
 678                         avkey.source_type = i + 1;
 679                         avkey.target_type = j + 1;
 680                         for (node = avtab_search_node(&policydb.te_avtab, &avkey);
 681                              node;
 682                              node = avtab_search_node_next(node, avkey.specified)) {
 683                                 if (node->key.specified == AVTAB_ALLOWED)
 684                                         avd->allowed |= node->datum.u.data;
 685                                 else if (node->key.specified == AVTAB_AUDITALLOW)
 686                                         avd->auditallow |= node->datum.u.data;
 687                                 else if (node->key.specified == AVTAB_AUDITDENY)
 688                                         avd->auditdeny &= node->datum.u.data;
 689                                 else if (xperms && (node->key.specified & AVTAB_XPERMS))
 690                                         services_compute_xperms_drivers(xperms, node);
 691                         }
 692
 693                         /* Check conditional av table for additional permissions */
 694                         cond_compute_av(&policydb.te_cond_avtab, &avkey,
 695                                         avd, xperms);
 696
 697                 }
 698         }
 699
 700         /*
 701          * Remove any permissions prohibited by a constraint (this includes
 702          * the MLS policy).
 703          */
 704         constraint = tclass_datum->constraints;
 705         while (constraint) {
 706                 if ((constraint->permissions & (avd->allowed)) &&
 707                     !constraint_expr_eval(scontext, tcontext, NULL,
 708                                           constraint->expr)) {
 709                         avd->allowed &= ~(constraint->permissions);
 710                 }
 711                 constraint = constraint->next;
 712         }
 713
 714         /*
 715          * If checking process transition permission and the
 716          * role is changing, then check the (current_role, new_role)
 717          * pair.
 718          */
 719         if (tclass == policydb.process_class &&
 720             (avd->allowed & policydb.process_trans_perms) &&
 721             scontext->role != tcontext->role) {
 722                 for (ra = policydb.role_allow; ra; ra = ra->next) {
 723                         if (scontext->role == ra->role &&
 724                             tcontext->role == ra->new_role)
 725                                 break;
 726                 }
 727                 if (!ra)
 728                         avd->allowed &= ~policydb.process_trans_perms;
 729         }
 730
 731         /*
 732          * If the given source and target types have boundary
 733          * constraint, lazy checks have to mask any violated
 734          * permission and notice it to userspace via audit.
 735          */
 736         type_attribute_bounds_av(scontext, tcontext,
 737                                  tclass, avd);
 738 }
 739
 740 static int security_validtrans_handle_fail(struct context *ocontext,
 741                                            struct context *ncontext,
 742                                            struct context *tcontext,
 743                                            u16 tclass)
 744 {
 745         char *o = NULL, *n = NULL, *t = NULL;
 746         u32 olen, nlen, tlen;
 747
 748         if (context_struct_to_string(ocontext, &o, &olen))
 749                 goto out;
 750         if (context_struct_to_string(ncontext, &n, &nlen))
 751                 goto out;
 752         if (context_struct_to_string(tcontext, &t, &tlen))
 753                 goto out;
 754         audit_log(current->audit_context, GFP_ATOMIC, AUDIT_SELINUX_ERR,
 755                   "op=security_validate_transition seresult=denied"
 756                   " oldcontext=%s newcontext=%s taskcontext=%s tclass=%s",
 757                   o, n, t, sym_name(&policydb, SYM_CLASSES, tclass-1));
 758 out:
 759         kfree(o);
 760         kfree(n);
 761         kfree(t);
 762
 763         if (!selinux_enforcing)
 764                 return 0;
 765         return -EPERM;
 766 }
 767
 768 static int security_compute_validatetrans(u32 oldsid, u32 newsid, u32 tasksid,
 769                                           u16 orig_tclass, bool user)
 770 {
 771         struct context *ocontext;
 772         struct context *ncontext;
 773         struct context *tcontext;
 774         struct class_datum *tclass_datum;
 775         struct constraint_node *constraint;
 776         u16 tclass;
 777         int rc = 0;
 778
 779         if (!ss_initialized)
 780                 return 0;
 781
 782         read_lock(&policy_rwlock);
 783
 784         if (!user)
 785                 tclass = unmap_class(orig_tclass);
 786         else
 787                 tclass = orig_tclass;
 788
 789         if (!tclass || tclass > policydb.p_classes.nprim) {
 790                 rc = -EINVAL;
 791                 goto out;
 792         }
 793         tclass_datum = policydb.class_val_to_struct[tclass - 1];
 794
 795         ocontext = sidtab_search(&sidtab, oldsid);
 796         if (!ocontext) {
 797                 printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: %s:  unrecognized SID %d\n",
 798                         __func__, oldsid);
 799                 rc = -EINVAL;
 800                 goto out;
 801         }
 802
 803         ncontext = sidtab_search(&sidtab, newsid);
 804         if (!ncontext) {
 805                 printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: %s:  unrecognized SID %d\n",
 806                         __func__, newsid);
 807                 rc = -EINVAL;
 808                 goto out;
 809         }
 810
 811         tcontext = sidtab_search(&sidtab, tasksid);
 812         if (!tcontext) {
 813                 printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: %s:  unrecognized SID %d\n",
 814                         __func__, tasksid);
 815                 rc = -EINVAL;
 816                 goto out;
 817         }
 818
 819         constraint = tclass_datum->validatetrans;
 820         while (constraint) {
 821                 if (!constraint_expr_eval(ocontext, ncontext, tcontext,
 822                                           constraint->expr)) {
 823                         if (user)
 824                                 rc = -EPERM;
 825                         else
 826                                 rc = security_validtrans_handle_fail(ocontext,
 827                                                                      ncontext,
 828                                                                      tcontext,
 829                                                                      tclass);
 830                         goto out;
 831                 }
 832                 constraint = constraint->next;
 833         }
 834
 835 out:
 836         read_unlock(&policy_rwlock);
 837         return rc;
 838 }
 839
 840 int security_validate_transition_user(u32 oldsid, u32 newsid, u32 tasksid,
 841                                         u16 tclass)
 842 {
 843         return security_compute_validatetrans(oldsid, newsid, tasksid,
 844                                                 tclass, true);
 845 }
 846
 847 int security_validate_transition(u32 oldsid, u32 newsid, u32 tasksid,
 848                                  u16 orig_tclass)
 849 {
 850         return security_compute_validatetrans(oldsid, newsid, tasksid,
 851                                                 orig_tclass, false);
 852 }
 853
 854 /*
 855  * security_bounded_transition - check whether the given
 856  * transition is directed to bounded, or not.
 857  * It returns 0, if @newsid is bounded by @oldsid.
 858  * Otherwise, it returns error code.
 859  *
 860  * @oldsid : current security identifier
 861  * @newsid : destinated security identifier
 862  */
 863 int security_bounded_transition(u32 old_sid, u32 new_sid)
 864 {
 865         struct context *old_context, *new_context;
 866         struct type_datum *type;
 867         int index;
 868         int rc;
 869
 870         read_lock(&policy_rwlock);
 871
 872         rc = -EINVAL;
 873         old_context = sidtab_search(&sidtab, old_sid);
 874         if (!old_context) {
 875                 printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: %s: unrecognized SID %u\n",
 876                        __func__, old_sid);
 877                 goto out;
 878         }
 879
 880         rc = -EINVAL;
 881         new_context = sidtab_search(&sidtab, new_sid);
 882         if (!new_context) {
 883                 printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: %s: unrecognized SID %u\n",
 884                        __func__, new_sid);
 885                 goto out;
 886         }
 887
 888         rc = 0;
 889         /* type/domain unchanged */
 890         if (old_context->type == new_context->type)
 891                 goto out;
 892
 893         index = new_context->type;
 894         while (true) {
 895                 type = flex_array_get_ptr(policydb.type_val_to_struct_array,
 896                                           index - 1);
 897                 BUG_ON(!type);
 898
 899                 /* not bounded anymore */
 900                 rc = -EPERM;
 901                 if (!type->bounds)
 902                         break;
 903
 904                 /* @newsid is bounded by @oldsid */
 905                 rc = 0;
 906                 if (type->bounds == old_context->type)
 907                         break;
 908
 909                 index = type->bounds;
 910         }
 911
 912         if (rc) {
 913                 char *old_name = NULL;
 914                 char *new_name = NULL;
 915                 u32 length;
 916
 917                 if (!context_struct_to_string(old_context,
 918                                               &old_name, &length) &&
 919                     !context_struct_to_string(new_context,
 920                                               &new_name, &length)) {
 921                         audit_log(current->audit_context,
 922                                   GFP_ATOMIC, AUDIT_SELINUX_ERR,
 923                                   "op=security_bounded_transition "
 924                                   "seresult=denied "
 925                                   "oldcontext=%s newcontext=%s",
 926                                   old_name, new_name);
 927                 }
 928                 kfree(new_name);
 929                 kfree(old_name);
 930         }
 931 out:
 932         read_unlock(&policy_rwlock);
 933
 934         return rc;
 935 }
 936
 937 static void avd_init(struct av_decision *avd)
 938 {
 939         avd->allowed = 0;
 940         avd->auditallow = 0;
 941         avd->auditdeny = 0xffffffff;
 942         avd->seqno = latest_granting;
 943         avd->flags = 0;
 944 }
 945
 946 void services_compute_xperms_decision(struct extended_perms_decision *xpermd,
 947                                         struct avtab_node *node)
 948 {
 949         unsigned int i;
 950
 951         if (node->datum.u.xperms->specified == AVTAB_XPERMS_IOCTLFUNCTION) {
 952                 if (xpermd->driver != node->datum.u.xperms->driver)
 953                         return;
 954         } else if (node->datum.u.xperms->specified == AVTAB_XPERMS_IOCTLDRIVER) {
 955                 if (!security_xperm_test(node->datum.u.xperms->perms.p,
 956                                         xpermd->driver))
 957                         return;
 958         } else {
 959                 BUG();
 960         }
 961
 962         if (node->key.specified == AVTAB_XPERMS_ALLOWED) {
 963                 xpermd->used |= XPERMS_ALLOWED;
 964                 if (node->datum.u.xperms->specified == AVTAB_XPERMS_IOCTLDRIVER) {
 965                         memset(xpermd->allowed->p, 0xff,
 966                                         sizeof(xpermd->allowed->p));
 967                 }
 968                 if (node->datum.u.xperms->specified == AVTAB_XPERMS_IOCTLFUNCTION) {
 969                         for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(xpermd->allowed->p); i++)
 970                                 xpermd->allowed->p[i] |=
 971                                         node->datum.u.xperms->perms.p[i];
 972                 }
 973         } else if (node->key.specified == AVTAB_XPERMS_AUDITALLOW) {
 974                 xpermd->used |= XPERMS_AUDITALLOW;
 975                 if (node->datum.u.xperms->specified == AVTAB_XPERMS_IOCTLDRIVER) {
 976                         memset(xpermd->auditallow->p, 0xff,
 977                                         sizeof(xpermd->auditallow->p));
 978                 }
 979                 if (node->datum.u.xperms->specified == AVTAB_XPERMS_IOCTLFUNCTION) {
 980                         for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(xpermd->auditallow->p); i++)
 981                                 xpermd->auditallow->p[i] |=
 982                                         node->datum.u.xperms->perms.p[i];
 983                 }
 984         } else if (node->key.specified == AVTAB_XPERMS_DONTAUDIT) {
 985                 xpermd->used |= XPERMS_DONTAUDIT;
 986                 if (node->datum.u.xperms->specified == AVTAB_XPERMS_IOCTLDRIVER) {
 987                         memset(xpermd->dontaudit->p, 0xff,
 988                                         sizeof(xpermd->dontaudit->p));
 989                 }
 990                 if (node->datum.u.xperms->specified == AVTAB_XPERMS_IOCTLFUNCTION) {
 991                         for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(xpermd->dontaudit->p); i++)
 992                                 xpermd->dontaudit->p[i] |=
 993                                         node->datum.u.xperms->perms.p[i];
 994                 }
 995         } else {
 996                 BUG();
 997         }
 998 }
 999
1000 void security_compute_xperms_decision(u32 ssid,
1001                                 u32 tsid,
1002                                 u16 orig_tclass,
1003                                 u8 driver,
1004                                 struct extended_perms_decision *xpermd)
1005 {
1006         u16 tclass;
1007         struct context *scontext, *tcontext;
1008         struct avtab_key avkey;
1009         struct avtab_node *node;
1010         struct ebitmap *sattr, *tattr;
1011         struct ebitmap_node *snode, *tnode;
1012         unsigned int i, j;
1013
1014         xpermd->driver = driver;
1015         xpermd->used = 0;
1016         memset(xpermd->allowed->p, 0, sizeof(xpermd->allowed->p));
1017         memset(xpermd->auditallow->p, 0, sizeof(xpermd->auditallow->p));
1018         memset(xpermd->dontaudit->p, 0, sizeof(xpermd->dontaudit->p));
1019
1020         read_lock(&policy_rwlock);
1021         if (!ss_initialized)
1022                 goto allow;
1023
1024         scontext = sidtab_search(&sidtab, ssid);
1025         if (!scontext) {
1026                 printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: %s:  unrecognized SID %d\n",
1027                        __func__, ssid);
1028                 goto out;
1029         }
1030
1031         tcontext = sidtab_search(&sidtab, tsid);
1032         if (!tcontext) {
1033                 printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: %s:  unrecognized SID %d\n",
1034                        __func__, tsid);
1035                 goto out;
1036         }
1037
1038         tclass = unmap_class(orig_tclass);
1039         if (unlikely(orig_tclass && !tclass)) {
1040                 if (policydb.allow_unknown)
1041                         goto allow;
1042                 goto out;
1043         }
1044
1045
1046         if (unlikely(!tclass || tclass > policydb.p_classes.nprim)) {
1047                 pr_warn_ratelimited("SELinux:  Invalid class %hu\n", tclass);
1048                 goto out;
1049         }
1050
1051         avkey.target_class = tclass;
1052         avkey.specified = AVTAB_XPERMS;
1053         sattr = flex_array_get(policydb.type_attr_map_array,
1054                                 scontext->type - 1);
1055         BUG_ON(!sattr);
1056         tattr = flex_array_get(policydb.type_attr_map_array,
1057                                 tcontext->type - 1);
1058         BUG_ON(!tattr);
1059         ebitmap_for_each_positive_bit(sattr, snode, i) {
1060                 ebitmap_for_each_positive_bit(tattr, tnode, j) {
1061                         avkey.source_type = i + 1;
1062                         avkey.target_type = j + 1;
1063                         for (node = avtab_search_node(&policydb.te_avtab, &avkey);
1064                              node;
1065                              node = avtab_search_node_next(node, avkey.specified))
1066                                 services_compute_xperms_decision(xpermd, node);
1067
1068                         cond_compute_xperms(&policydb.te_cond_avtab,
1069                                                 &avkey, xpermd);
1070                 }
1071         }
1072 out:
1073         read_unlock(&policy_rwlock);
1074         return;
1075 allow:
1076         memset(xpermd->allowed->p, 0xff, sizeof(xpermd->allowed->p));
1077         goto out;
1078 }
1079
1080 /**
1081  * security_compute_av - Compute access vector decisions.
1082  * @ssid: source security identifier
1083  * @tsid: target security identifier
1084  * @tclass: target security class
1085  * @avd: access vector decisions
1086  * @xperms: extended permissions
1087  *
1088  * Compute a set of access vector decisions based on the
1089  * SID pair (@ssid, @tsid) for the permissions in @tclass.
1090  */
1091 void security_compute_av(u32 ssid,
1092                          u32 tsid,
1093                          u16 orig_tclass,
1094                          struct av_decision *avd,
1095                          struct extended_perms *xperms)
1096 {
1097         u16 tclass;
1098         struct context *scontext = NULL, *tcontext = NULL;
1099
1100         read_lock(&policy_rwlock);
1101         avd_init(avd);
1102         xperms->len = 0;
1103         if (!ss_initialized)
1104                 goto allow;
1105
1106         scontext = sidtab_search(&sidtab, ssid);
1107         if (!scontext) {
1108                 printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: %s:  unrecognized SID %d\n",
1109                        __func__, ssid);
1110                 goto out;
1111         }
1112
1113         /* permissive domain? */
1114         if (ebitmap_get_bit(&policydb.permissive_map, scontext->type))
1115                 avd->flags |= AVD_FLAGS_PERMISSIVE;
1116
1117         tcontext = sidtab_search(&sidtab, tsid);
1118         if (!tcontext) {
1119                 printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: %s:  unrecognized SID %d\n",
1120                        __func__, tsid);
1121                 goto out;
1122         }
1123
1124         tclass = unmap_class(orig_tclass);
1125         if (unlikely(orig_tclass && !tclass)) {
1126                 if (policydb.allow_unknown)
1127                         goto allow;
1128                 goto out;
1129         }
1130         context_struct_compute_av(scontext, tcontext, tclass, avd, xperms);
1131         map_decision(orig_tclass, avd, policydb.allow_unknown);
1132 out:
1133         read_unlock(&policy_rwlock);
1134         return;
1135 allow:
1136         avd->allowed = 0xffffffff;
1137         goto out;
1138 }
1139
1140 void security_compute_av_user(u32 ssid,
1141                               u32 tsid,
1142                               u16 tclass,
1143                               struct av_decision *avd)
1144 {
1145         struct context *scontext = NULL, *tcontext = NULL;
1146
1147         read_lock(&policy_rwlock);
1148         avd_init(avd);
1149         if (!ss_initialized)
1150                 goto allow;
1151
1152         scontext = sidtab_search(&sidtab, ssid);
1153         if (!scontext) {
1154                 printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: %s:  unrecognized SID %d\n",
1155                        __func__, ssid);
1156                 goto out;
1157         }
1158
1159         /* permissive domain? */
1160         if (ebitmap_get_bit(&policydb.permissive_map, scontext->type))
1161                 avd->flags |= AVD_FLAGS_PERMISSIVE;
1162
1163         tcontext = sidtab_search(&sidtab, tsid);
1164         if (!tcontext) {
1165                 printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: %s:  unrecognized SID %d\n",
1166                        __func__, tsid);
1167                 goto out;
1168         }
1169
1170         if (unlikely(!tclass)) {
1171                 if (policydb.allow_unknown)
1172                         goto allow;
1173                 goto out;
1174         }
1175
1176         context_struct_compute_av(scontext, tcontext, tclass, avd, NULL);
1177  out:
1178         read_unlock(&policy_rwlock);
1179         return;
1180 allow:
1181         avd->allowed = 0xffffffff;
1182         goto out;
1183 }
1184
1185 /*
1186  * Write the security context string representation of
1187  * the context structure `context' into a dynamically
1188  * allocated string of the correct size.  Set `*scontext'
1189  * to point to this string and set `*scontext_len' to
1190  * the length of the string.
1191  */
1192 static int context_struct_to_string(struct context *context, char **scontext, u32 *scontext_len)
1193 {
1194         char *scontextp;
1195
1196         if (scontext)
1197                 *scontext = NULL;
1198         *scontext_len = 0;
1199
1200         if (context->len) {
1201                 *scontext_len = context->len;
1202                 if (scontext) {
1203                         *scontext = kstrdup(context->str, GFP_ATOMIC);
1204                         if (!(*scontext))
1205                                 return -ENOMEM;
1206                 }
1207                 return 0;
1208         }
1209
1210         /* Compute the size of the context. */
1211         *scontext_len += strlen(sym_name(&policydb, SYM_USERS, context->user - 1)) + 1;
1212         *scontext_len += strlen(sym_name(&policydb, SYM_ROLES, context->role - 1)) + 1;
1213         *scontext_len += strlen(sym_name(&policydb, SYM_TYPES, context->type - 1)) + 1;
1214         *scontext_len += mls_compute_context_len(context);
1215
1216         if (!scontext)
1217                 return 0;
1218
1219         /* Allocate space for the context; caller must free this space. */
1220         scontextp = kmalloc(*scontext_len, GFP_ATOMIC);
1221         if (!scontextp)
1222                 return -ENOMEM;
1223         *scontext = scontextp;
1224
1225         /*
1226          * Copy the user name, role name and type name into the context.
1227          */
1228         scontextp += sprintf(scontextp, "%s:%s:%s",
1229                 sym_name(&policydb, SYM_USERS, context->user - 1),
1230                 sym_name(&policydb, SYM_ROLES, context->role - 1),
1231                 sym_name(&policydb, SYM_TYPES, context->type - 1));
1232
1233         mls_sid_to_context(context, &scontextp);
1234
1235         *scontextp = 0;
1236
1237         return 0;
1238 }
1239
1240 #include "initial_sid_to_string.h"
1241
1242 const char *security_get_initial_sid_context(u32 sid)
1243 {
1244         if (unlikely(sid > SECINITSID_NUM))
1245                 return NULL;
1246         return initial_sid_to_string[sid];
1247 }
1248
1249 static int security_sid_to_context_core(u32 sid, char **scontext,
1250                                         u32 *scontext_len, int force)
1251 {
1252         struct context *context;
1253         int rc = 0;
1254
1255         if (scontext)
1256                 *scontext = NULL;
1257         *scontext_len  = 0;
1258
1259         if (!ss_initialized) {
1260                 if (sid <= SECINITSID_NUM) {
1261                         char *scontextp;
1262
1263                         *scontext_len = strlen(initial_sid_to_string[sid]) + 1;
1264                         if (!scontext)
1265                                 goto out;
1266                         scontextp = kmemdup(initial_sid_to_string[sid],
1267                                             *scontext_len, GFP_ATOMIC);
1268                         if (!scontextp) {
1269                                 rc = -ENOMEM;
1270                                 goto out;
1271                         }
1272                         *scontext = scontextp;
1273                         goto out;
1274                 }
1275                 printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: %s:  called before initial "
1276                        "load_policy on unknown SID %d\n", __func__, sid);
1277                 rc = -EINVAL;
1278                 goto out;
1279         }
1280         read_lock(&policy_rwlock);
1281         if (force)
1282                 context = sidtab_search_force(&sidtab, sid);
1283         else
1284                 context = sidtab_search(&sidtab, sid);
1285         if (!context) {
1286                 printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: %s:  unrecognized SID %d\n",
1287                         __func__, sid);
1288                 rc = -EINVAL;
1289                 goto out_unlock;
1290         }
1291         rc = context_struct_to_string(context, scontext, scontext_len);
1292 out_unlock:
1293         read_unlock(&policy_rwlock);
1294 out:
1295         return rc;
1296
1297 }
1298
1299 /**
1300  * security_sid_to_context - Obtain a context for a given SID.
1301  * @sid: security identifier, SID
1302  * @scontext: security context
1303  * @scontext_len: length in bytes
1304  *
1305  * Write the string representation of the context associated with @sid
1306  * into a dynamically allocated string of the correct size.  Set @scontext
1307  * to point to this string and set @scontext_len to the length of the string.
1308  */
1309 int security_sid_to_context(u32 sid, char **scontext, u32 *scontext_len)
1310 {
1311         return security_sid_to_context_core(sid, scontext, scontext_len, 0);
1312 }
1313
1314 int security_sid_to_context_force(u32 sid, char **scontext, u32 *scontext_len)
1315 {
1316         return security_sid_to_context_core(sid, scontext, scontext_len, 1);
1317 }
1318
1319 /*
1320  * Caveat:  Mutates scontext.
1321  */
1322 static int string_to_context_struct(struct policydb *pol,
1323                                     struct sidtab *sidtabp,
1324                                     char *scontext,
1325                                     u32 scontext_len,
1326                                     struct context *ctx,
1327                                     u32 def_sid)
1328 {
1329         struct role_datum *role;
1330         struct type_datum *typdatum;
1331         struct user_datum *usrdatum;
1332         char *scontextp, *p, oldc;
1333         int rc = 0;
1334
1335         context_init(ctx);
1336
1337         /* Parse the security context. */
1338
1339         rc = -EINVAL;
1340         scontextp = (char *) scontext;
1341
1342         /* Extract the user. */
1343         p = scontextp;
1344         while (*p && *p != ':')
1345                 p++;
1346
1347         if (*p == 0)
1348                 goto out;
1349
1350         *p++ = 0;
1351
1352         usrdatum = hashtab_search(pol->p_users.table, scontextp);
1353         if (!usrdatum)
1354                 goto out;
1355
1356         ctx->user = usrdatum->value;
1357
1358         /* Extract role. */
1359         scontextp = p;
1360         while (*p && *p != ':')
1361                 p++;
1362
1363         if (*p == 0)
1364                 goto out;
1365
1366         *p++ = 0;
1367
1368         role = hashtab_search(pol->p_roles.table, scontextp);
1369         if (!role)
1370                 goto out;
1371         ctx->role = role->value;
1372
1373         /* Extract type. */
1374         scontextp = p;
1375         while (*p && *p != ':')
1376                 p++;
1377         oldc = *p;
1378         *p++ = 0;
1379
1380         typdatum = hashtab_search(pol->p_types.table, scontextp);
1381         if (!typdatum || typdatum->attribute)
1382                 goto out;
1383
1384         ctx->type = typdatum->value;
1385
1386         rc = mls_context_to_sid(pol, oldc, &p, ctx, sidtabp, def_sid);
1387         if (rc)
1388                 goto out;
1389
1390         rc = -EINVAL;
1391         if ((p - scontext) < scontext_len)
1392                 goto out;
1393
1394         /* Check the validity of the new context. */
1395         if (!policydb_context_isvalid(pol, ctx))
1396                 goto out;
1397         rc = 0;
1398 out:
1399         if (rc)
1400                 context_destroy(ctx);
1401         return rc;
1402 }
1403
1404 static int security_context_to_sid_core(const char *scontext, u32 scontext_len,
1405                                         u32 *sid, u32 def_sid, gfp_t gfp_flags,
1406                                         int force)
1407 {
1408         char *scontext2, *str = NULL;
1409         struct context context;
1410         int rc = 0;
1411
1412         /* An empty security context is never valid. */
1413         if (!scontext_len)
1414                 return -EINVAL;
1415
1416         if (!ss_initialized) {
1417                 int i;
1418
1419                 for (i = 1; i < SECINITSID_NUM; i++) {
1420                         if (!strcmp(initial_sid_to_string[i], scontext)) {
1421                                 *sid = i;
1422                                 return 0;
1423                         }
1424                 }
1425                 *sid = SECINITSID_KERNEL;
1426                 return 0;
1427         }
1428         *sid = SECSID_NULL;
1429
1430         /* Copy the string so that we can modify the copy as we parse it. */
1431         scontext2 = kmalloc(scontext_len + 1, gfp_flags);
1432         if (!scontext2)
1433                 return -ENOMEM;
1434         memcpy(scontext2, scontext, scontext_len);
1435         scontext2[scontext_len] = 0;
1436
1437         if (force) {
1438                 /* Save another copy for storing in uninterpreted form */
1439                 rc = -ENOMEM;
1440                 str = kstrdup(scontext2, gfp_flags);
1441                 if (!str)
1442                         goto out;
1443         }
1444
1445         read_lock(&policy_rwlock);
1446         rc = string_to_context_struct(&policydb, &sidtab, scontext2,
1447                                       scontext_len, &context, def_sid);
1448         if (rc == -EINVAL && force) {
1449                 context.str = str;
1450                 context.len = scontext_len;
1451                 str = NULL;
1452         } else if (rc)
1453                 goto out_unlock;
1454         rc = sidtab_context_to_sid(&sidtab, &context, sid);
1455         context_destroy(&context);
1456 out_unlock:
1457         read_unlock(&policy_rwlock);
1458 out:
1459         kfree(scontext2);
1460         kfree(str);
1461         return rc;
1462 }
1463
1464 /**
1465  * security_context_to_sid - Obtain a SID for a given security context.
1466  * @scontext: security context
1467  * @scontext_len: length in bytes
1468  * @sid: security identifier, SID
1469  * @gfp: context for the allocation
1470  *
1471  * Obtains a SID associated with the security context that
1472  * has the string representation specified by @scontext.
1473  * Returns -%EINVAL if the context is invalid, -%ENOMEM if insufficient
1474  * memory is available, or 0 on success.
1475  */
1476 int security_context_to_sid(const char *scontext, u32 scontext_len, u32 *sid,
1477                             gfp_t gfp)
1478 {
1479         return security_context_to_sid_core(scontext, scontext_len,
1480                                             sid, SECSID_NULL, gfp, 0);
1481 }
1482
1483 int security_context_str_to_sid(const char *scontext, u32 *sid, gfp_t gfp)
1484 {
1485         return security_context_to_sid(scontext, strlen(scontext), sid, gfp);
1486 }
1487
1488 /**
1489  * security_context_to_sid_default - Obtain a SID for a given security context,
1490  * falling back to specified default if needed.
1491  *
1492  * @scontext: security context
1493  * @scontext_len: length in bytes
1494  * @sid: security identifier, SID
1495  * @def_sid: default SID to assign on error
1496  *
1497  * Obtains a SID associated with the security context that
1498  * has the string representation specified by @scontext.
1499  * The default SID is passed to the MLS layer to be used to allow
1500  * kernel labeling of the MLS field if the MLS field is not present
1501  * (for upgrading to MLS without full relabel).
1502  * Implicitly forces adding of the context even if it cannot be mapped yet.
1503  * Returns -%EINVAL if the context is invalid, -%ENOMEM if insufficient
1504  * memory is available, or 0 on success.
1505  */
1506 int security_context_to_sid_default(const char *scontext, u32 scontext_len,
1507                                     u32 *sid, u32 def_sid, gfp_t gfp_flags)
1508 {
1509         return security_context_to_sid_core(scontext, scontext_len,
1510                                             sid, def_sid, gfp_flags, 1);
1511 }
1512
1513 int security_context_to_sid_force(const char *scontext, u32 scontext_len,
1514                                   u32 *sid)
1515 {
1516         return security_context_to_sid_core(scontext, scontext_len,
1517                                             sid, SECSID_NULL, GFP_KERNEL, 1);
1518 }
1519
1520 static int compute_sid_handle_invalid_context(
1521         struct context *scontext,
1522         struct context *tcontext,
1523         u16 tclass,
1524         struct context *newcontext)
1525 {
1526         char *s = NULL, *t = NULL, *n = NULL;
1527         u32 slen, tlen, nlen;
1528
1529         if (context_struct_to_string(scontext, &s, &slen))
1530                 goto out;
1531         if (context_struct_to_string(tcontext, &t, &tlen))
1532                 goto out;
1533         if (context_struct_to_string(newcontext, &n, &nlen))
1534                 goto out;
1535         audit_log(current->audit_context, GFP_ATOMIC, AUDIT_SELINUX_ERR,
1536                   "op=security_compute_sid invalid_context=%s"
1537                   " scontext=%s"
1538                   " tcontext=%s"
1539                   " tclass=%s",
1540                   n, s, t, sym_name(&policydb, SYM_CLASSES, tclass-1));
1541 out:
1542         kfree(s);
1543         kfree(t);
1544         kfree(n);
1545         if (!selinux_enforcing)
1546                 return 0;
1547         return -EACCES;
1548 }
1549
1550 static void filename_compute_type(struct policydb *p, struct context *newcontext,
1551                                   u32 stype, u32 ttype, u16 tclass,
1552                                   const char *objname)
1553 {
1554         struct filename_trans ft;
1555         struct filename_trans_datum *otype;
1556
1557         /*
1558          * Most filename trans rules are going to live in specific directories
1559          * like /dev or /var/run.  This bitmap will quickly skip rule searches
1560          * if the ttype does not contain any rules.
1561          */
1562         if (!ebitmap_get_bit(&p->filename_trans_ttypes, ttype))
1563                 return;
1564
1565         ft.stype = stype;
1566         ft.ttype = ttype;
1567         ft.tclass = tclass;
1568         ft.name = objname;
1569
1570         otype = hashtab_search(p->filename_trans, &ft);
1571         if (otype)
1572                 newcontext->type = otype->otype;
1573 }
1574
1575 static int security_compute_sid(u32 ssid,
1576                                 u32 tsid,
1577                                 u16 orig_tclass,
1578                                 u32 specified,
1579                                 const char *objname,
1580                                 u32 *out_sid,
1581                                 bool kern)
1582 {
1583         struct class_datum *cladatum = NULL;
1584         struct context *scontext = NULL, *tcontext = NULL, newcontext;
1585         struct role_trans *roletr = NULL;
1586         struct avtab_key avkey;
1587         struct avtab_datum *avdatum;
1588         struct avtab_node *node;
1589         u16 tclass;
1590         int rc = 0;
1591         bool sock;
1592
1593         if (!ss_initialized) {
1594                 switch (orig_tclass) {
1595                 case SECCLASS_PROCESS: /* kernel value */
1596                         *out_sid = ssid;
1597                         break;
1598                 default:
1599                         *out_sid = tsid;
1600                         break;
1601                 }
1602                 goto out;
1603         }
1604
1605         context_init(&newcontext);
1606
1607         read_lock(&policy_rwlock);
1608
1609         if (kern) {
1610                 tclass = unmap_class(orig_tclass);
1611                 sock = security_is_socket_class(orig_tclass);
1612         } else {
1613                 tclass = orig_tclass;
1614                 sock = security_is_socket_class(map_class(tclass));
1615         }
1616
1617         scontext = sidtab_search(&sidtab, ssid);
1618         if (!scontext) {
1619                 printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: %s:  unrecognized SID %d\n",
1620                        __func__, ssid);
1621                 rc = -EINVAL;
1622                 goto out_unlock;
1623         }
1624         tcontext = sidtab_search(&sidtab, tsid);
1625         if (!tcontext) {
1626                 printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: %s:  unrecognized SID %d\n",
1627                        __func__, tsid);
1628                 rc = -EINVAL;
1629                 goto out_unlock;
1630         }
1631
1632         if (tclass && tclass <= policydb.p_classes.nprim)
1633                 cladatum = policydb.class_val_to_struct[tclass - 1];
1634
1635         /* Set the user identity. */
1636         switch (specified) {
1637         case AVTAB_TRANSITION:
1638         case AVTAB_CHANGE:
1639                 if (cladatum && cladatum->default_user == DEFAULT_TARGET) {
1640                         newcontext.user = tcontext->user;
1641                 } else {
1642                         /* notice this gets both DEFAULT_SOURCE and unset */
1643                         /* Use the process user identity. */
1644                         newcontext.user = scontext->user;
1645                 }
1646                 break;
1647         case AVTAB_MEMBER:
1648                 /* Use the related object owner. */
1649                 newcontext.user = tcontext->user;
1650                 break;
1651         }
1652
1653         /* Set the role to default values. */
1654         if (cladatum && cladatum->default_role == DEFAULT_SOURCE) {
1655                 newcontext.role = scontext->role;
1656         } else if (cladatum && cladatum->default_role == DEFAULT_TARGET) {
1657                 newcontext.role = tcontext->role;
1658         } else {
1659                 if ((tclass == policydb.process_class) || (sock == true))
1660                         newcontext.role = scontext->role;
1661                 else
1662                         newcontext.role = OBJECT_R_VAL;
1663         }
1664
1665         /* Set the type to default values. */
1666         if (cladatum && cladatum->default_type == DEFAULT_SOURCE) {
1667                 newcontext.type = scontext->type;
1668         } else if (cladatum && cladatum->default_type == DEFAULT_TARGET) {
1669                 newcontext.type = tcontext->type;
1670         } else {
1671                 if ((tclass == policydb.process_class) || (sock == true)) {
1672                         /* Use the type of process. */
1673                         newcontext.type = scontext->type;
1674                 } else {
1675                         /* Use the type of the related object. */
1676                         newcontext.type = tcontext->type;
1677                 }
1678         }
1679
1680         /* Look for a type transition/member/change rule. */
1681         avkey.source_type = scontext->type;
1682         avkey.target_type = tcontext->type;
1683         avkey.target_class = tclass;
1684         avkey.specified = specified;
1685         avdatum = avtab_search(&policydb.te_avtab, &avkey);
1686
1687         /* If no permanent rule, also check for enabled conditional rules */
1688         if (!avdatum) {
1689                 node = avtab_search_node(&policydb.te_cond_avtab, &avkey);
1690                 for (; node; node = avtab_search_node_next(node, specified)) {
1691                         if (node->key.specified & AVTAB_ENABLED) {
1692                                 avdatum = &node->datum;
1693                                 break;
1694                         }
1695                 }
1696         }
1697
1698         if (avdatum) {
1699                 /* Use the type from the type transition/member/change rule. */
1700                 newcontext.type = avdatum->u.data;
1701         }
1702
1703         /* if we have a objname this is a file trans check so check those rules */
1704         if (objname)
1705                 filename_compute_type(&policydb, &newcontext, scontext->type,
1706                                       tcontext->type, tclass, objname);
1707
1708         /* Check for class-specific changes. */
1709         if (specified & AVTAB_TRANSITION) {
1710                 /* Look for a role transition rule. */
1711                 for (roletr = policydb.role_tr; roletr; roletr = roletr->next) {
1712                         if ((roletr->role == scontext->role) &&
1713                             (roletr->type == tcontext->type) &&
1714                             (roletr->tclass == tclass)) {
1715                                 /* Use the role transition rule. */
1716                                 newcontext.role = roletr->new_role;
1717                                 break;
1718                         }
1719                 }
1720         }
1721
1722         /* Set the MLS attributes.
1723            This is done last because it may allocate memory. */
1724         rc = mls_compute_sid(scontext, tcontext, tclass, specified,
1725                              &newcontext, sock);
1726         if (rc)
1727                 goto out_unlock;
1728
1729         /* Check the validity of the context. */
1730         if (!policydb_context_isvalid(&policydb, &newcontext)) {
1731                 rc = compute_sid_handle_invalid_context(scontext,
1732                                                         tcontext,
1733                                                         tclass,
1734                                                         &newcontext);
1735                 if (rc)
1736                         goto out_unlock;
1737         }
1738         /* Obtain the sid for the context. */
1739         rc = sidtab_context_to_sid(&sidtab, &newcontext, out_sid);
1740 out_unlock:
1741         read_unlock(&policy_rwlock);
1742         context_destroy(&newcontext);
1743 out:
1744         return rc;
1745 }
1746
1747 /**
1748  * security_transition_sid - Compute the SID for a new subject/object.
1749  * @ssid: source security identifier
1750  * @tsid: target security identifier
1751  * @tclass: target security class
1752  * @out_sid: security identifier for new subject/object
1753  *
1754  * Compute a SID to use for labeling a new subject or object in the
1755  * class @tclass based on a SID pair (@ssid, @tsid).
1756  * Return -%EINVAL if any of the parameters are invalid, -%ENOMEM
1757  * if insufficient memory is available, or %0 if the new SID was
1758  * computed successfully.
1759  */
1760 int security_transition_sid(u32 ssid, u32 tsid, u16 tclass,
1761                             const struct qstr *qstr, u32 *out_sid)
1762 {
1763         return security_compute_sid(ssid, tsid, tclass, AVTAB_TRANSITION,
1764                                     qstr ? qstr->name : NULL, out_sid, true);
1765 }
1766
1767 int security_transition_sid_user(u32 ssid, u32 tsid, u16 tclass,
1768                                  const char *objname, u32 *out_sid)
1769 {
1770         return security_compute_sid(ssid, tsid, tclass, AVTAB_TRANSITION,
1771                                     objname, out_sid, false);
1772 }
1773
1774 /**
1775  * security_member_sid - Compute the SID for member selection.
1776  * @ssid: source security identifier
1777  * @tsid: target security identifier
1778  * @tclass: target security class
1779  * @out_sid: security identifier for selected member
1780  *
1781  * Compute a SID to use when selecting a member of a polyinstantiated
1782  * object of class @tclass based on a SID pair (@ssid, @tsid).
1783  * Return -%EINVAL if any of the parameters are invalid, -%ENOMEM
1784  * if insufficient memory is available, or %0 if the SID was
1785  * computed successfully.
1786  */
1787 int security_member_sid(u32 ssid,
1788                         u32 tsid,
1789                         u16 tclass,
1790                         u32 *out_sid)
1791 {
1792         return security_compute_sid(ssid, tsid, tclass, AVTAB_MEMBER, NULL,
1793                                     out_sid, false);
1794 }
1795
1796 /**
1797  * security_change_sid - Compute the SID for object relabeling.
1798  * @ssid: source security identifier
1799  * @tsid: target security identifier
1800  * @tclass: target security class
1801  * @out_sid: security identifier for selected member
1802  *
1803  * Compute a SID to use for relabeling an object of class @tclass
1804  * based on a SID pair (@ssid, @tsid).
1805  * Return -%EINVAL if any of the parameters are invalid, -%ENOMEM
1806  * if insufficient memory is available, or %0 if the SID was
1807  * computed successfully.
1808  */
1809 int security_change_sid(u32 ssid,
1810                         u32 tsid,
1811                         u16 tclass,
1812                         u32 *out_sid)
1813 {
1814         return security_compute_sid(ssid, tsid, tclass, AVTAB_CHANGE, NULL,
1815                                     out_sid, false);
1816 }
1817
1818 /* Clone the SID into the new SID table. */
1819 static int clone_sid(u32 sid,
1820                      struct context *context,
1821                      void *arg)
1822 {
1823         struct sidtab *s = arg;
1824
1825         if (sid > SECINITSID_NUM)
1826                 return sidtab_insert(s, sid, context);
1827         else
1828                 return 0;
1829 }
1830
1831 static inline int convert_context_handle_invalid_context(struct context *context)
1832 {
1833         char *s;
1834         u32 len;
1835
1836         if (selinux_enforcing)
1837                 return -EINVAL;
1838
1839         if (!context_struct_to_string(context, &s, &len)) {
1840                 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux:  Context %s would be invalid if enforcing\n", s);
1841                 kfree(s);
1842         }
1843         return 0;
1844 }
1845
1846 struct convert_context_args {
1847         struct policydb *oldp;
1848         struct policydb *newp;
1849 };
1850
1851 /*
1852  * Convert the values in the security context
1853  * structure `c' from the values specified
1854  * in the policy `p->oldp' to the values specified
1855  * in the policy `p->newp'.  Verify that the
1856  * context is valid under the new policy.
1857  */
1858 static int convert_context(u32 key,
1859                            struct context *c,
1860                            void *p)
1861 {
1862         struct convert_context_args *args;
1863         struct context oldc;
1864         struct ocontext *oc;
1865         struct mls_range *range;
1866         struct role_datum *role;
1867         struct type_datum *typdatum;
1868         struct user_datum *usrdatum;
1869         char *s;
1870         u32 len;
1871         int rc = 0;
1872
1873         if (key <= SECINITSID_NUM)
1874                 goto out;
1875
1876         args = p;
1877
1878         if (c->str) {
1879                 struct context ctx;
1880
1881                 rc = -ENOMEM;
1882                 s = kstrdup(c->str, GFP_KERNEL);
1883                 if (!s)
1884                         goto out;
1885
1886                 rc = string_to_context_struct(args->newp, NULL, s,
1887                                               c->len, &ctx, SECSID_NULL);
1888                 kfree(s);
1889                 if (!rc) {
1890                         printk(KERN_INFO "SELinux:  Context %s became valid (mapped).\n",
1891                                c->str);
1892                         /* Replace string with mapped representation. */
1893                         kfree(c->str);
1894                         memcpy(c, &ctx, sizeof(*c));
1895                         goto out;
1896                 } else if (rc == -EINVAL) {
1897                         /* Retain string representation for later mapping. */
1898                         rc = 0;
1899                         goto out;
1900                 } else {
1901                         /* Other error condition, e.g. ENOMEM. */
1902                         printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux:   Unable to map context %s, rc = %d.\n",
1903                                c->str, -rc);
1904                         goto out;
1905                 }
1906         }
1907
1908         rc = context_cpy(&oldc, c);
1909         if (rc)
1910                 goto out;
1911
1912         /* Convert the user. */
1913         rc = -EINVAL;
1914         usrdatum = hashtab_search(args->newp->p_users.table,
1915                                   sym_name(args->oldp, SYM_USERS, c->user - 1));
1916         if (!usrdatum)
1917                 goto bad;
1918         c->user = usrdatum->value;
1919
1920         /* Convert the role. */
1921         rc = -EINVAL;
1922         role = hashtab_search(args->newp->p_roles.table,
1923                               sym_name(args->oldp, SYM_ROLES, c->role - 1));
1924         if (!role)
1925                 goto bad;
1926         c->role = role->value;
1927
1928         /* Convert the type. */
1929         rc = -EINVAL;
1930         typdatum = hashtab_search(args->newp->p_types.table,
1931                                   sym_name(args->oldp, SYM_TYPES, c->type - 1));
1932         if (!typdatum)
1933                 goto bad;
1934         c->type = typdatum->value;
1935
1936         /* Convert the MLS fields if dealing with MLS policies */
1937         if (args->oldp->mls_enabled && args->newp->mls_enabled) {
1938                 rc = mls_convert_context(args->oldp, args->newp, c);
1939                 if (rc)
1940                         goto bad;
1941         } else if (args->oldp->mls_enabled && !args->newp->mls_enabled) {
1942                 /*
1943                  * Switching between MLS and non-MLS policy:
1944                  * free any storage used by the MLS fields in the
1945                  * context for all existing entries in the sidtab.
1946                  */
1947                 mls_context_destroy(c);
1948         } else if (!args->oldp->mls_enabled && args->newp->mls_enabled) {
1949                 /*
1950                  * Switching between non-MLS and MLS policy:
1951                  * ensure that the MLS fields of the context for all
1952                  * existing entries in the sidtab are filled in with a
1953                  * suitable default value, likely taken from one of the
1954                  * initial SIDs.
1955                  */
1956                 oc = args->newp->ocontexts[OCON_ISID];
1957                 while (oc && oc->sid[0] != SECINITSID_UNLABELED)
1958                         oc = oc->next;
1959                 rc = -EINVAL;
1960                 if (!oc) {
1961                         printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux:  unable to look up"
1962                                 " the initial SIDs list\n");
1963                         goto bad;
1964                 }
1965                 range = &oc->context[0].range;
1966                 rc = mls_range_set(c, range);
1967                 if (rc)
1968                         goto bad;
1969         }
1970
1971         /* Check the validity of the new context. */
1972         if (!policydb_context_isvalid(args->newp, c)) {
1973                 rc = convert_context_handle_invalid_context(&oldc);
1974                 if (rc)
1975                         goto bad;
1976         }
1977
1978         context_destroy(&oldc);
1979
1980         rc = 0;
1981 out:
1982         return rc;
1983 bad:
1984         /* Map old representation to string and save it. */
1985         rc = context_struct_to_string(&oldc, &s, &len);
1986         if (rc)
1987                 return rc;
1988         context_destroy(&oldc);
1989         context_destroy(c);
1990         c->str = s;
1991         c->len = len;
1992         printk(KERN_INFO "SELinux:  Context %s became invalid (unmapped).\n",
1993                c->str);
1994         rc = 0;
1995         goto out;
1996 }
1997
1998 static void security_load_policycaps(void)
1999 {
2000         unsigned int i;
2001         struct ebitmap_node *node;
2002
2003         selinux_policycap_netpeer = ebitmap_get_bit(&policydb.policycaps,
2004                                                   POLICYDB_CAPABILITY_NETPEER);
2005         selinux_policycap_openperm = ebitmap_get_bit(&policydb.policycaps,
2006                                                   POLICYDB_CAPABILITY_OPENPERM);
2007         selinux_policycap_extsockclass = ebitmap_get_bit(&policydb.policycaps,
2008                                           POLICYDB_CAPABILITY_EXTSOCKCLASS);
2009         selinux_policycap_alwaysnetwork = ebitmap_get_bit(&policydb.policycaps,
2010                                                   POLICYDB_CAPABILITY_ALWAYSNETWORK);
2011         selinux_policycap_cgroupseclabel =
2012                 ebitmap_get_bit(&policydb.policycaps,
2013                                 POLICYDB_CAPABILITY_CGROUPSECLABEL);
2014         selinux_policycap_nnp_nosuid_transition =
2015                 ebitmap_get_bit(&policydb.policycaps,
2016                                 POLICYDB_CAPABILITY_NNP_NOSUID_TRANSITION);
2017
2018         for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(selinux_policycap_names); i++)
2019                 pr_info("SELinux:  policy capability %s=%d\n",
2020                         selinux_policycap_names[i],
2021                         ebitmap_get_bit(&policydb.policycaps, i));
2022
2023         ebitmap_for_each_positive_bit(&policydb.policycaps, node, i) {
2024                 if (i >= ARRAY_SIZE(selinux_policycap_names))
2025                         pr_info("SELinux:  unknown policy capability %u\n",
2026                                 i);
2027         }
2028 }
2029
2030 static int security_preserve_bools(struct policydb *p);
2031
2032 /**
2033  * security_load_policy - Load a security policy configuration.
2034  * @data: binary policy data
2035  * @len: length of data in bytes
2036  *
2037  * Load a new set of security policy configuration data,
2038  * validate it and convert the SID table as necessary.
2039  * This function will flush the access vector cache after
2040  * loading the new policy.
2041  */
2042 int security_load_policy(void *data, size_t len)
2043 {
2044         struct policydb *oldpolicydb, *newpolicydb;
2045         struct sidtab oldsidtab, newsidtab;
2046         struct selinux_mapping *oldmap, *map = NULL;
2047         struct convert_context_args args;
2048         u32 seqno;
2049         u16 map_size;
2050         int rc = 0;
2051         struct policy_file file = { data, len }, *fp = &file;
2052
2053         oldpolicydb = kzalloc(2 * sizeof(*oldpolicydb), GFP_KERNEL);
2054         if (!oldpolicydb) {
2055                 rc = -ENOMEM;
2056                 goto out;
2057         }
2058         newpolicydb = oldpolicydb + 1;
2059
2060         if (!ss_initialized) {
2061                 avtab_cache_init();
2062                 ebitmap_cache_init();
2063                 hashtab_cache_init();
2064                 rc = policydb_read(&policydb, fp);
2065                 if (rc) {
2066                         avtab_cache_destroy();
2067                         ebitmap_cache_destroy();
2068                         hashtab_cache_destroy();
2069                         goto out;
2070                 }
2071
2072                 policydb.len = len;
2073                 rc = selinux_set_mapping(&policydb, secclass_map,
2074                                          &current_mapping,
2075                                          &current_mapping_size);
2076                 if (rc) {
2077                         policydb_destroy(&policydb);
2078                         avtab_cache_destroy();
2079                         ebitmap_cache_destroy();
2080                         hashtab_cache_destroy();
2081                         goto out;
2082                 }
2083
2084                 rc = policydb_load_isids(&policydb, &sidtab);
2085                 if (rc) {
2086                         policydb_destroy(&policydb);
2087                         avtab_cache_destroy();
2088                         ebitmap_cache_destroy();
2089                         hashtab_cache_destroy();
2090                         goto out;
2091                 }
2092
2093                 security_load_policycaps();
2094                 ss_initialized = 1;
2095                 seqno = ++latest_granting;
2096                 selinux_complete_init();
2097                 avc_ss_reset(seqno);
2098                 selnl_notify_policyload(seqno);
2099                 selinux_status_update_policyload(seqno);
2100                 selinux_netlbl_cache_invalidate();
2101                 selinux_xfrm_notify_policyload();
2102                 goto out;
2103         }
2104
2105 #if 0
2106         sidtab_hash_eval(&sidtab, "sids");
2107 #endif
2108
2109         rc = policydb_read(newpolicydb, fp);
2110         if (rc)
2111                 goto out;
2112
2113         newpolicydb->len = len;
2114         /* If switching between different policy types, log MLS status */
2115         if (policydb.mls_enabled && !newpolicydb->mls_enabled)
2116                 printk(KERN_INFO "SELinux: Disabling MLS support...\n");
2117         else if (!policydb.mls_enabled && newpolicydb->mls_enabled)
2118                 printk(KERN_INFO "SELinux: Enabling MLS support...\n");
2119
2120         rc = policydb_load_isids(newpolicydb, &newsidtab);
2121         if (rc) {
2122                 printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux:  unable to load the initial SIDs\n");
2123                 policydb_destroy(newpolicydb);
2124                 goto out;
2125         }
2126
2127         rc = selinux_set_mapping(newpolicydb, secclass_map, &map, &map_size);
2128         if (rc)
2129                 goto err;
2130
2131         rc = security_preserve_bools(newpolicydb);
2132         if (rc) {
2133                 printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux:  unable to preserve booleans\n");
2134                 goto err;
2135         }
2136
2137         /* Clone the SID table. */
2138         sidtab_shutdown(&sidtab);
2139
2140         rc = sidtab_map(&sidtab, clone_sid, &newsidtab);
2141         if (rc)
2142                 goto err;
2143
2144         /*
2145          * Convert the internal representations of contexts
2146          * in the new SID table.
2147          */
2148         args.oldp = &policydb;
2149         args.newp = newpolicydb;
2150         rc = sidtab_map(&newsidtab, convert_context, &args);
2151         if (rc) {
2152                 printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux:  unable to convert the internal"
2153                         " representation of contexts in the new SID"
2154                         " table\n");
2155                 goto err;
2156         }
2157
2158         /* Save the old policydb and SID table to free later. */
2159         memcpy(oldpolicydb, &policydb, sizeof(policydb));
2160         sidtab_set(&oldsidtab, &sidtab);
2161
2162         /* Install the new policydb and SID table. */
2163         write_lock_irq(&policy_rwlock);
2164         memcpy(&policydb, newpolicydb, sizeof(policydb));
2165         sidtab_set(&sidtab, &newsidtab);
2166         security_load_policycaps();
2167         oldmap = current_mapping;
2168         current_mapping = map;
2169         current_mapping_size = map_size;
2170         seqno = ++latest_granting;
2171         write_unlock_irq(&policy_rwlock);
2172
2173         /* Free the old policydb and SID table. */
2174         policydb_destroy(oldpolicydb);
2175         sidtab_destroy(&oldsidtab);
2176         kfree(oldmap);
2177
2178         avc_ss_reset(seqno);
2179         selnl_notify_policyload(seqno);
2180         selinux_status_update_policyload(seqno);
2181         selinux_netlbl_cache_invalidate();
2182         selinux_xfrm_notify_policyload();
2183
2184         rc = 0;
2185         goto out;
2186
2187 err:
2188         kfree(map);
2189         sidtab_destroy(&newsidtab);
2190         policydb_destroy(newpolicydb);
2191
2192 out:
2193         kfree(oldpolicydb);
2194         return rc;
2195 }
2196
2197 size_t security_policydb_len(void)
2198 {
2199         size_t len;
2200
2201         read_lock(&policy_rwlock);
2202         len = policydb.len;
2203         read_unlock(&policy_rwlock);
2204
2205         return len;
2206 }
2207
2208 /**
2209  * security_port_sid - Obtain the SID for a port.
2210  * @protocol: protocol number
2211  * @port: port number
2212  * @out_sid: security identifier
2213  */
2214 int security_port_sid(u8 protocol, u16 port, u32 *out_sid)
2215 {
2216         struct ocontext *c;
2217         int rc = 0;
2218
2219         read_lock(&policy_rwlock);
2220
2221         c = policydb.ocontexts[OCON_PORT];
2222         while (c) {
2223                 if (c->u.port.protocol == protocol &&
2224                     c->u.port.low_port <= port &&
2225                     c->u.port.high_port >= port)
2226                         break;
2227                 c = c->next;
2228         }
2229
2230         if (c) {
2231                 if (!c->sid[0]) {
2232                         rc = sidtab_context_to_sid(&sidtab,
2233                                                    &c->context[0],
2234                                                    &c->sid[0]);
2235                         if (rc)
2236                                 goto out;
2237                 }
2238                 *out_sid = c->sid[0];
2239         } else {
2240                 *out_sid = SECINITSID_PORT;
2241         }
2242
2243 out:
2244         read_unlock(&policy_rwlock);
2245         return rc;
2246 }
2247
2248 /**
2249  * security_pkey_sid - Obtain the SID for a pkey.
2250  * @subnet_prefix: Subnet Prefix
2251  * @pkey_num: pkey number
2252  * @out_sid: security identifier
2253  */
2254 int security_ib_pkey_sid(u64 subnet_prefix, u16 pkey_num, u32 *out_sid)
2255 {
2256         struct ocontext *c;
2257         int rc = 0;
2258
2259         read_lock(&policy_rwlock);
2260
2261         c = policydb.ocontexts[OCON_IBPKEY];
2262         while (c) {
2263                 if (c->u.ibpkey.low_pkey <= pkey_num &&
2264                     c->u.ibpkey.high_pkey >= pkey_num &&
2265                     c->u.ibpkey.subnet_prefix == subnet_prefix)
2266                         break;
2267
2268                 c = c->next;
2269         }
2270
2271         if (c) {
2272                 if (!c->sid[0]) {
2273                         rc = sidtab_context_to_sid(&sidtab,
2274                                                    &c->context[0],
2275                                                    &c->sid[0]);
2276                         if (rc)
2277                                 goto out;
2278                 }
2279                 *out_sid = c->sid[0];
2280         } else
2281                 *out_sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
2282
2283 out:
2284         read_unlock(&policy_rwlock);
2285         return rc;
2286 }
2287
2288 /**
2289  * security_ib_endport_sid - Obtain the SID for a subnet management interface.
2290  * @dev_name: device name
2291  * @port: port number
2292  * @out_sid: security identifier
2293  */
2294 int security_ib_endport_sid(const char *dev_name, u8 port_num, u32 *out_sid)
2295 {
2296         struct ocontext *c;
2297         int rc = 0;
2298
2299         read_lock(&policy_rwlock);
2300
2301         c = policydb.ocontexts[OCON_IBENDPORT];
2302         while (c) {
2303                 if (c->u.ibendport.port == port_num &&
2304                     !strncmp(c->u.ibendport.dev_name,
2305                              dev_name,
2306                              IB_DEVICE_NAME_MAX))
2307                         break;
2308
2309                 c = c->next;
2310         }
2311
2312         if (c) {
2313                 if (!c->sid[0]) {
2314                         rc = sidtab_context_to_sid(&sidtab,
2315                                                    &c->context[0],
2316                                                    &c->sid[0]);
2317                         if (rc)
2318                                 goto out;
2319                 }
2320                 *out_sid = c->sid[0];
2321         } else
2322                 *out_sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
2323
2324 out:
2325         read_unlock(&policy_rwlock);
2326         return rc;
2327 }
2328
2329 /**
2330  * security_netif_sid - Obtain the SID for a network interface.
2331  * @name: interface name
2332  * @if_sid: interface SID
2333  */
2334 int security_netif_sid(char *name, u32 *if_sid)
2335 {
2336         int rc = 0;
2337         struct ocontext *c;
2338
2339         read_lock(&policy_rwlock);
2340
2341         c = policydb.ocontexts[OCON_NETIF];
2342         while (c) {
2343                 if (strcmp(name, c->u.name) == 0)
2344                         break;
2345                 c = c->next;
2346         }
2347
2348         if (c) {
2349                 if (!c->sid[0] || !c->sid[1]) {
2350                         rc = sidtab_context_to_sid(&sidtab,
2351                                                   &c->context[0],
2352                                                   &c->sid[0]);
2353                         if (rc)
2354                                 goto out;
2355                         rc = sidtab_context_to_sid(&sidtab,
2356                                                    &c->context[1],
2357                                                    &c->sid[1]);
2358                         if (rc)
2359                                 goto out;
2360                 }
2361                 *if_sid = c->sid[0];
2362         } else
2363                 *if_sid = SECINITSID_NETIF;
2364
2365 out:
2366         read_unlock(&policy_rwlock);
2367         return rc;
2368 }
2369
2370 static int match_ipv6_addrmask(u32 *input, u32 *addr, u32 *mask)
2371 {
2372         int i, fail = 0;
2373
2374         for (i = 0; i < 4; i++)
2375                 if (addr[i] != (input[i] & mask[i])) {
2376                         fail = 1;
2377                         break;
2378                 }
2379
2380         return !fail;
2381 }
2382
2383 /**
2384  * security_node_sid - Obtain the SID for a node (host).
2385  * @domain: communication domain aka address family
2386  * @addrp: address
2387  * @addrlen: address length in bytes
2388  * @out_sid: security identifier
2389  */
2390 int security_node_sid(u16 domain,
2391                       void *addrp,
2392                       u32 addrlen,
2393                       u32 *out_sid)
2394 {
2395         int rc;
2396         struct ocontext *c;
2397
2398         read_lock(&policy_rwlock);
2399
2400         switch (domain) {
2401         case AF_INET: {
2402                 u32 addr;
2403
2404                 rc = -EINVAL;
2405                 if (addrlen != sizeof(u32))
2406                         goto out;
2407
2408                 addr = *((u32 *)addrp);
2409
2410                 c = policydb.ocontexts[OCON_NODE];
2411                 while (c) {
2412                         if (c->u.node.addr == (addr & c->u.node.mask))
2413                                 break;
2414                         c = c->next;
2415                 }
2416                 break;
2417         }
2418
2419         case AF_INET6:
2420                 rc = -EINVAL;
2421                 if (addrlen != sizeof(u64) * 2)
2422                         goto out;
2423                 c = policydb.ocontexts[OCON_NODE6];
2424                 while (c) {
2425                         if (match_ipv6_addrmask(addrp, c->u.node6.addr,
2426                                                 c->u.node6.mask))
2427                                 break;
2428                         c = c->next;
2429                 }
2430                 break;
2431
2432         default:
2433                 rc = 0;
2434                 *out_sid = SECINITSID_NODE;
2435                 goto out;
2436         }
2437
2438         if (c) {
2439                 if (!c->sid[0]) {
2440                         rc = sidtab_context_to_sid(&sidtab,
2441                                                    &c->context[0],
2442                                                    &c->sid[0]);
2443                         if (rc)
2444                                 goto out;
2445                 }
2446                 *out_sid = c->sid[0];
2447         } else {
2448                 *out_sid = SECINITSID_NODE;
2449         }
2450
2451         rc = 0;
2452 out:
2453         read_unlock(&policy_rwlock);
2454         return rc;
2455 }
2456
2457 #define SIDS_NEL 25
2458
2459 /**
2460  * security_get_user_sids - Obtain reachable SIDs for a user.
2461  * @fromsid: starting SID
2462  * @username: username
2463  * @sids: array of reachable SIDs for user
2464  * @nel: number of elements in @sids
2465  *
2466  * Generate the set of SIDs for legal security contexts
2467  * for a given user that can be reached by @fromsid.
2468  * Set *@sids to point to a dynamically allocated
2469  * array containing the set of SIDs.  Set *@nel to the
2470  * number of elements in the array.
2471  */
2472
2473 int security_get_user_sids(u32 fromsid,
2474                            char *username,
2475                            u32 **sids,
2476                            u32 *nel)
2477 {
2478         struct context *fromcon, usercon;
2479         u32 *mysids = NULL, *mysids2, sid;
2480         u32 mynel = 0, maxnel = SIDS_NEL;
2481         struct user_datum *user;
2482         struct role_datum *role;
2483         struct ebitmap_node *rnode, *tnode;
2484         int rc = 0, i, j;
2485
2486         *sids = NULL;
2487         *nel = 0;
2488
2489         if (!ss_initialized)
2490                 goto out;
2491
2492         read_lock(&policy_rwlock);
2493
2494         context_init(&usercon);
2495
2496         rc = -EINVAL;
2497         fromcon = sidtab_search(&sidtab, fromsid);
2498         if (!fromcon)
2499                 goto out_unlock;
2500
2501         rc = -EINVAL;
2502         user = hashtab_search(policydb.p_users.table, username);
2503         if (!user)
2504                 goto out_unlock;
2505
2506         usercon.user = user->value;
2507
2508         rc = -ENOMEM;
2509         mysids = kcalloc(maxnel, sizeof(*mysids), GFP_ATOMIC);
2510         if (!mysids)
2511                 goto out_unlock;
2512
2513         ebitmap_for_each_positive_bit(&user->roles, rnode, i) {
2514                 role = policydb.role_val_to_struct[i];
2515                 usercon.role = i + 1;
2516                 ebitmap_for_each_positive_bit(&role->types, tnode, j) {
2517                         usercon.type = j + 1;
2518
2519                         if (mls_setup_user_range(fromcon, user, &usercon))
2520                                 continue;
2521
2522                         rc = sidtab_context_to_sid(&sidtab, &usercon, &sid);
2523                         if (rc)
2524                                 goto out_unlock;
2525                         if (mynel < maxnel) {
2526                                 mysids[mynel++] = sid;
2527                         } else {
2528                                 rc = -ENOMEM;
2529                                 maxnel += SIDS_NEL;
2530                                 mysids2 = kcalloc(maxnel, sizeof(*mysids2), GFP_ATOMIC);
2531                                 if (!mysids2)
2532                                         goto out_unlock;
2533                                 memcpy(mysids2, mysids, mynel * sizeof(*mysids2));
2534                                 kfree(mysids);
2535                                 mysids = mysids2;
2536                                 mysids[mynel++] = sid;
2537                         }
2538                 }
2539         }
2540         rc = 0;
2541 out_unlock:
2542         read_unlock(&policy_rwlock);
2543         if (rc || !mynel) {
2544                 kfree(mysids);
2545                 goto out;
2546         }
2547
2548         rc = -ENOMEM;
2549         mysids2 = kcalloc(mynel, sizeof(*mysids2), GFP_KERNEL);
2550         if (!mysids2) {
2551                 kfree(mysids);
2552                 goto out;
2553         }
2554         for (i = 0, j = 0; i < mynel; i++) {
2555                 struct av_decision dummy_avd;
2556                 rc = avc_has_perm_noaudit(fromsid, mysids[i],
2557                                           SECCLASS_PROCESS, /* kernel value */
2558                                           PROCESS__TRANSITION, AVC_STRICT,
2559                                           &dummy_avd);
2560                 if (!rc)
2561                         mysids2[j++] = mysids[i];
2562                 cond_resched();
2563         }
2564         rc = 0;
2565         kfree(mysids);
2566         *sids = mysids2;
2567         *nel = j;
2568 out:
2569         return rc;
2570 }
2571
2572 /**
2573  * __security_genfs_sid - Helper to obtain a SID for a file in a filesystem
2574  * @fstype: filesystem type
2575  * @path: path from root of mount
2576  * @sclass: file security class
2577  * @sid: SID for path
2578  *
2579  * Obtain a SID to use for a file in a filesystem that
2580  * cannot support xattr or use a fixed labeling behavior like
2581  * transition SIDs or task SIDs.
2582  *
2583  * The caller must acquire the policy_rwlock before calling this function.
2584  */
2585 static inline int __security_genfs_sid(const char *fstype,
2586                                        char *path,
2587                                        u16 orig_sclass,
2588                                        u32 *sid)
2589 {
2590         int len;
2591         u16 sclass;
2592         struct genfs *genfs;
2593         struct ocontext *c;
2594         int rc, cmp = 0;
2595
2596         while (path[0] == '/' && path[1] == '/')
2597                 path++;
2598
2599         sclass = unmap_class(orig_sclass);
2600         *sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
2601
2602         for (genfs = policydb.genfs; genfs; genfs = genfs->next) {
2603                 cmp = strcmp(fstype, genfs->fstype);
2604                 if (cmp <= 0)
2605                         break;
2606         }
2607
2608         rc = -ENOENT;
2609         if (!genfs || cmp)
2610                 goto out;
2611
2612         for (c = genfs->head; c; c = c->next) {
2613                 len = strlen(c->u.name);
2614                 if ((!c->v.sclass || sclass == c->v.sclass) &&
2615                     (strncmp(c->u.name, path, len) == 0))
2616                         break;
2617         }
2618
2619         rc = -ENOENT;
2620         if (!c)
2621                 goto out;
2622
2623         if (!c->sid[0]) {
2624                 rc = sidtab_context_to_sid(&sidtab, &c->context[0], &c->sid[0]);
2625                 if (rc)
2626                         goto out;
2627         }
2628
2629         *sid = c->sid[0];
2630         rc = 0;
2631 out:
2632         return rc;
2633 }
2634
2635 /**
2636  * security_genfs_sid - Obtain a SID for a file in a filesystem
2637  * @fstype: filesystem type
2638  * @path: path from root of mount
2639  * @sclass: file security class
2640  * @sid: SID for path
2641  *
2642  * Acquire policy_rwlock before calling __security_genfs_sid() and release
2643  * it afterward.
2644  */
2645 int security_genfs_sid(const char *fstype,
2646                        char *path,
2647                        u16 orig_sclass,
2648                        u32 *sid)
2649 {
2650         int retval;
2651
2652         read_lock(&policy_rwlock);
2653         retval = __security_genfs_sid(fstype, path, orig_sclass, sid);
2654         read_unlock(&policy_rwlock);
2655         return retval;
2656 }
2657
2658 /**
2659  * security_fs_use - Determine how to handle labeling for a filesystem.
2660  * @sb: superblock in question
2661  */
2662 int security_fs_use(struct super_block *sb)
2663 {
2664         int rc = 0;
2665         struct ocontext *c;
2666         struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = sb->s_security;
2667         const char *fstype = sb->s_type->name;
2668
2669         read_lock(&policy_rwlock);
2670
2671         c = policydb.ocontexts[OCON_FSUSE];
2672         while (c) {
2673                 if (strcmp(fstype, c->u.name) == 0)
2674                         break;
2675                 c = c->next;
2676         }
2677
2678         if (c) {
2679                 sbsec->behavior = c->v.behavior;
2680                 if (!c->sid[0]) {
2681                         rc = sidtab_context_to_sid(&sidtab, &c->context[0],
2682                                                    &c->sid[0]);
2683                         if (rc)
2684                                 goto out;
2685                 }
2686                 sbsec->sid = c->sid[0];
2687         } else {
2688                 rc = __security_genfs_sid(fstype, "/", SECCLASS_DIR,
2689                                           &sbsec->sid);
2690                 if (rc) {
2691                         sbsec->behavior = SECURITY_FS_USE_NONE;
2692                         rc = 0;
2693                 } else {
2694                         sbsec->behavior = SECURITY_FS_USE_GENFS;
2695                 }
2696         }
2697
2698 out:
2699         read_unlock(&policy_rwlock);
2700         return rc;
2701 }
2702
2703 int security_get_bools(int *len, char ***names, int **values)
2704 {
2705         int i, rc;
2706
2707         read_lock(&policy_rwlock);
2708         *names = NULL;
2709         *values = NULL;
2710
2711         rc = 0;
2712         *len = policydb.p_bools.nprim;
2713         if (!*len)
2714                 goto out;
2715
2716         rc = -ENOMEM;
2717         *names = kcalloc(*len, sizeof(char *), GFP_ATOMIC);
2718         if (!*names)
2719                 goto err;
2720
2721         rc = -ENOMEM;
2722         *values = kcalloc(*len, sizeof(int), GFP_ATOMIC);
2723         if (!*values)
2724                 goto err;
2725
2726         for (i = 0; i < *len; i++) {
2727                 (*values)[i] = policydb.bool_val_to_struct[i]->state;
2728
2729                 rc = -ENOMEM;
2730                 (*names)[i] = kstrdup(sym_name(&policydb, SYM_BOOLS, i), GFP_ATOMIC);
2731                 if (!(*names)[i])
2732                         goto err;
2733         }
2734         rc = 0;
2735 out:
2736         read_unlock(&policy_rwlock);
2737         return rc;
2738 err:
2739         if (*names) {
2740                 for (i = 0; i < *len; i++)
2741                         kfree((*names)[i]);
2742         }
2743         kfree(*values);
2744         goto out;
2745 }
2746
2747
2748 int security_set_bools(int len, int *values)
2749 {
2750         int i, rc;
2751         int lenp, seqno = 0;
2752         struct cond_node *cur;
2753
2754         write_lock_irq(&policy_rwlock);
2755
2756         rc = -EFAULT;
2757         lenp = policydb.p_bools.nprim;
2758         if (len != lenp)
2759                 goto out;
2760
2761         for (i = 0; i < len; i++) {
2762                 if (!!values[i] != policydb.bool_val_to_struct[i]->state) {
2763                         audit_log(current->audit_context, GFP_ATOMIC,
2764                                 AUDIT_MAC_CONFIG_CHANGE,
2765                                 "bool=%s val=%d old_val=%d auid=%u ses=%u",
2766                                 sym_name(&policydb, SYM_BOOLS, i),
2767                                 !!values[i],
2768                                 policydb.bool_val_to_struct[i]->state,
2769                                 from_kuid(&init_user_ns, audit_get_loginuid(current)),
2770                                 audit_get_sessionid(current));
2771                 }
2772                 if (values[i])
2773                         policydb.bool_val_to_struct[i]->state = 1;
2774                 else
2775                         policydb.bool_val_to_struct[i]->state = 0;
2776         }
2777
2778         for (cur = policydb.cond_list; cur; cur = cur->next) {
2779                 rc = evaluate_cond_node(&policydb, cur);
2780                 if (rc)
2781                         goto out;
2782         }
2783
2784         seqno = ++latest_granting;
2785         rc = 0;
2786 out:
2787         write_unlock_irq(&policy_rwlock);
2788         if (!rc) {
2789                 avc_ss_reset(seqno);
2790                 selnl_notify_policyload(seqno);
2791                 selinux_status_update_policyload(seqno);
2792                 selinux_xfrm_notify_policyload();
2793         }
2794         return rc;
2795 }
2796
2797 int security_get_bool_value(int index)
2798 {
2799         int rc;
2800         int len;
2801
2802         read_lock(&policy_rwlock);
2803
2804         rc = -EFAULT;
2805         len = policydb.p_bools.nprim;
2806         if (index >= len)
2807                 goto out;
2808
2809         rc = policydb.bool_val_to_struct[index]->state;
2810 out:
2811         read_unlock(&policy_rwlock);
2812         return rc;
2813 }
2814
2815 static int security_preserve_bools(struct policydb *p)
2816 {
2817         int rc, nbools = 0, *bvalues = NULL, i;
2818         char **bnames = NULL;
2819         struct cond_bool_datum *booldatum;
2820         struct cond_node *cur;
2821
2822         rc = security_get_bools(&nbools, &bnames, &bvalues);
2823         if (rc)
2824                 goto out;
2825         for (i = 0; i < nbools; i++) {
2826                 booldatum = hashtab_search(p->p_bools.table, bnames[i]);
2827                 if (booldatum)
2828                         booldatum->state = bvalues[i];
2829         }
2830         for (cur = p->cond_list; cur; cur = cur->next) {
2831                 rc = evaluate_cond_node(p, cur);
2832                 if (rc)
2833                         goto out;
2834         }
2835
2836 out:
2837         if (bnames) {
2838                 for (i = 0; i < nbools; i++)
2839                         kfree(bnames[i]);
2840         }
2841         kfree(bnames);
2842         kfree(bvalues);
2843         return rc;
2844 }
2845
2846 /*
2847  * security_sid_mls_copy() - computes a new sid based on the given
2848  * sid and the mls portion of mls_sid.
2849  */
2850 int security_sid_mls_copy(u32 sid, u32 mls_sid, u32 *new_sid)
2851 {
2852         struct context *context1;
2853         struct context *context2;
2854         struct context newcon;
2855         char *s;
2856         u32 len;
2857         int rc;
2858
2859         rc = 0;
2860         if (!ss_initialized || !policydb.mls_enabled) {
2861                 *new_sid = sid;
2862                 goto out;
2863         }
2864
2865         context_init(&newcon);
2866
2867         read_lock(&policy_rwlock);
2868
2869         rc = -EINVAL;
2870         context1 = sidtab_search(&sidtab, sid);
2871         if (!context1) {
2872                 printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: %s:  unrecognized SID %d\n",
2873                         __func__, sid);
2874                 goto out_unlock;
2875         }
2876
2877         rc = -EINVAL;
2878         context2 = sidtab_search(&sidtab, mls_sid);
2879         if (!context2) {
2880                 printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: %s:  unrecognized SID %d\n",
2881                         __func__, mls_sid);
2882                 goto out_unlock;
2883         }
2884
2885         newcon.user = context1->user;
2886         newcon.role = context1->role;
2887         newcon.type = context1->type;
2888         rc = mls_context_cpy(&newcon, context2);
2889         if (rc)
2890                 goto out_unlock;
2891
2892         /* Check the validity of the new context. */
2893         if (!policydb_context_isvalid(&policydb, &newcon)) {
2894                 rc = convert_context_handle_invalid_context(&newcon);
2895                 if (rc) {
2896                         if (!context_struct_to_string(&newcon, &s, &len)) {
2897                                 audit_log(current->audit_context,
2898                                           GFP_ATOMIC, AUDIT_SELINUX_ERR,
2899                                           "op=security_sid_mls_copy "
2900                                           "invalid_context=%s", s);
2901                                 kfree(s);
2902                         }
2903                         goto out_unlock;
2904                 }
2905         }
2906
2907         rc = sidtab_context_to_sid(&sidtab, &newcon, new_sid);
2908 out_unlock:
2909         read_unlock(&policy_rwlock);
2910         context_destroy(&newcon);
2911 out:
2912         return rc;
2913 }
2914
2915 /**
2916  * security_net_peersid_resolve - Compare and resolve two network peer SIDs
2917  * @nlbl_sid: NetLabel SID
2918  * @nlbl_type: NetLabel labeling protocol type
2919  * @xfrm_sid: XFRM SID
2920  *
2921  * Description:
2922  * Compare the @nlbl_sid and @xfrm_sid values and if the two SIDs can be
2923  * resolved into a single SID it is returned via @peer_sid and the function
2924  * returns zero.  Otherwise @peer_sid is set to SECSID_NULL and the function
2925  * returns a negative value.  A table summarizing the behavior is below:
2926  *
2927  *                                 | function return |      @sid
2928  *   ------------------------------+-----------------+-----------------
2929  *   no peer labels                |        0        |    SECSID_NULL
2930  *   single peer label             |        0        |    <peer_label>
2931  *   multiple, consistent labels   |        0        |    <peer_label>
2932  *   multiple, inconsistent labels |    -<errno>     |    SECSID_NULL
2933  *
2934  */
2935 int security_net_peersid_resolve(u32 nlbl_sid, u32 nlbl_type,
2936                                  u32 xfrm_sid,
2937                                  u32 *peer_sid)
2938 {
2939         int rc;
2940         struct context *nlbl_ctx;
2941         struct context *xfrm_ctx;
2942
2943         *peer_sid = SECSID_NULL;
2944
2945         /* handle the common (which also happens to be the set of easy) cases
2946          * right away, these two if statements catch everything involving a
2947          * single or absent peer SID/label */
2948         if (xfrm_sid == SECSID_NULL) {
2949                 *peer_sid = nlbl_sid;
2950                 return 0;
2951         }
2952         /* NOTE: an nlbl_type == NETLBL_NLTYPE_UNLABELED is a "fallback" label
2953          * and is treated as if nlbl_sid == SECSID_NULL when a XFRM SID/label
2954          * is present */
2955         if (nlbl_sid == SECSID_NULL || nlbl_type == NETLBL_NLTYPE_UNLABELED) {
2956                 *peer_sid = xfrm_sid;
2957                 return 0;
2958         }
2959
2960         /* we don't need to check ss_initialized here since the only way both
2961          * nlbl_sid and xfrm_sid are not equal to SECSID_NULL would be if the
2962          * security server was initialized and ss_initialized was true */
2963         if (!policydb.mls_enabled)
2964                 return 0;
2965
2966         read_lock(&policy_rwlock);
2967
2968         rc = -EINVAL;
2969         nlbl_ctx = sidtab_search(&sidtab, nlbl_sid);
2970         if (!nlbl_ctx) {
2971                 printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: %s:  unrecognized SID %d\n",
2972                        __func__, nlbl_sid);
2973                 goto out;
2974         }
2975         rc = -EINVAL;
2976         xfrm_ctx = sidtab_search(&sidtab, xfrm_sid);
2977         if (!xfrm_ctx) {
2978                 printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: %s:  unrecognized SID %d\n",
2979                        __func__, xfrm_sid);
2980                 goto out;
2981         }
2982         rc = (mls_context_cmp(nlbl_ctx, xfrm_ctx) ? 0 : -EACCES);
2983         if (rc)
2984                 goto out;
2985
2986         /* at present NetLabel SIDs/labels really only carry MLS
2987          * information so if the MLS portion of the NetLabel SID
2988          * matches the MLS portion of the labeled XFRM SID/label
2989          * then pass along the XFRM SID as it is the most
2990          * expressive */
2991         *peer_sid = xfrm_sid;
2992 out:
2993         read_unlock(&policy_rwlock);
2994         return rc;
2995 }
2996
2997 static int get_classes_callback(void *k, void *d, void *args)
2998 {
2999         struct class_datum *datum = d;
3000         char *name = k, **classes = args;
3001         int value = datum->value - 1;
3002
3003         classes[value] = kstrdup(name, GFP_ATOMIC);
3004         if (!classes[value])
3005                 return -ENOMEM;
3006
3007         return 0;
3008 }
3009
3010 int security_get_classes(char ***classes, int *nclasses)
3011 {
3012         int rc;
3013
3014         read_lock(&policy_rwlock);
3015
3016         rc = -ENOMEM;
3017         *nclasses = policydb.p_classes.nprim;
3018         *classes = kcalloc(*nclasses, sizeof(**classes), GFP_ATOMIC);
3019         if (!*classes)
3020                 goto out;
3021
3022         rc = hashtab_map(policydb.p_classes.table, get_classes_callback,
3023                         *classes);
3024         if (rc) {
3025                 int i;
3026                 for (i = 0; i < *nclasses; i++)
3027                         kfree((*classes)[i]);
3028                 kfree(*classes);
3029         }
3030
3031 out:
3032         read_unlock(&policy_rwlock);
3033         return rc;
3034 }
3035
3036 static int get_permissions_callback(void *k, void *d, void *args)
3037 {
3038         struct perm_datum *datum = d;
3039         char *name = k, **perms = args;
3040         int value = datum->value - 1;
3041
3042         perms[value] = kstrdup(name, GFP_ATOMIC);
3043         if (!perms[value])
3044                 return -ENOMEM;
3045
3046         return 0;
3047 }
3048
3049 int security_get_permissions(char *class, char ***perms, int *nperms)
3050 {
3051         int rc, i;
3052         struct class_datum *match;
3053
3054         read_lock(&policy_rwlock);
3055
3056         rc = -EINVAL;
3057         match = hashtab_search(policydb.p_classes.table, class);
3058         if (!match) {
3059                 printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: %s:  unrecognized class %s\n",
3060                         __func__, class);
3061                 goto out;
3062         }
3063
3064         rc = -ENOMEM;
3065         *nperms = match->permissions.nprim;
3066         *perms = kcalloc(*nperms, sizeof(**perms), GFP_ATOMIC);
3067         if (!*perms)
3068                 goto out;
3069
3070         if (match->comdatum) {
3071                 rc = hashtab_map(match->comdatum->permissions.table,
3072                                 get_permissions_callback, *perms);
3073                 if (rc)
3074                         goto err;
3075         }
3076
3077         rc = hashtab_map(match->permissions.table, get_permissions_callback,
3078                         *perms);
3079         if (rc)
3080                 goto err;
3081
3082 out:
3083         read_unlock(&policy_rwlock);
3084         return rc;
3085
3086 err:
3087         read_unlock(&policy_rwlock);
3088         for (i = 0; i < *nperms; i++)
3089                 kfree((*perms)[i]);
3090         kfree(*perms);
3091         return rc;
3092 }
3093
3094 int security_get_reject_unknown(void)
3095 {
3096         return policydb.reject_unknown;
3097 }
3098
3099 int security_get_allow_unknown(void)
3100 {
3101         return policydb.allow_unknown;
3102 }
3103
3104 /**
3105  * security_policycap_supported - Check for a specific policy capability
3106  * @req_cap: capability
3107  *
3108  * Description:
3109  * This function queries the currently loaded policy to see if it supports the
3110  * capability specified by @req_cap.  Returns true (1) if the capability is
3111  * supported, false (0) if it isn't supported.
3112  *
3113  */
3114 int security_policycap_supported(unsigned int req_cap)
3115 {
3116         int rc;
3117
3118         read_lock(&policy_rwlock);
3119         rc = ebitmap_get_bit(&policydb.policycaps, req_cap);
3120         read_unlock(&policy_rwlock);
3121
3122         return rc;
3123 }
3124
3125 struct selinux_audit_rule {
3126         u32 au_seqno;
3127         struct context au_ctxt;
3128 };
3129
3130 void selinux_audit_rule_free(void *vrule)
3131 {
3132         struct selinux_audit_rule *rule = vrule;
3133
3134         if (rule) {
3135                 context_destroy(&rule->au_ctxt);
3136                 kfree(rule);
3137         }
3138 }
3139
3140 int selinux_audit_rule_init(u32 field, u32 op, char *rulestr, void **vrule)
3141 {
3142         struct selinux_audit_rule *tmprule;
3143         struct role_datum *roledatum;
3144         struct type_datum *typedatum;
3145         struct user_datum *userdatum;
3146         struct selinux_audit_rule **rule = (struct selinux_audit_rule **)vrule;
3147         int rc = 0;
3148
3149         *rule = NULL;
3150
3151         if (!ss_initialized)
3152                 return -EOPNOTSUPP;
3153
3154         switch (field) {
3155         case AUDIT_SUBJ_USER:
3156         case AUDIT_SUBJ_ROLE:
3157         case AUDIT_SUBJ_TYPE:
3158         case AUDIT_OBJ_USER:
3159         case AUDIT_OBJ_ROLE:
3160         case AUDIT_OBJ_TYPE:
3161                 /* only 'equals' and 'not equals' fit user, role, and type */
3162                 if (op != Audit_equal && op != Audit_not_equal)
3163                         return -EINVAL;
3164                 break;
3165         case AUDIT_SUBJ_SEN:
3166         case AUDIT_SUBJ_CLR:
3167         case AUDIT_OBJ_LEV_LOW:
3168         case AUDIT_OBJ_LEV_HIGH:
3169                 /* we do not allow a range, indicated by the presence of '-' */
3170                 if (strchr(rulestr, '-'))
3171                         return -EINVAL;
3172                 break;
3173         default:
3174                 /* only the above fields are valid */
3175                 return -EINVAL;
3176         }
3177
3178         tmprule = kzalloc(sizeof(struct selinux_audit_rule), GFP_KERNEL);
3179         if (!tmprule)
3180                 return -ENOMEM;
3181
3182         context_init(&tmprule->au_ctxt);
3183
3184         read_lock(&policy_rwlock);
3185
3186         tmprule->au_seqno = latest_granting;
3187
3188         switch (field) {
3189         case AUDIT_SUBJ_USER:
3190         case AUDIT_OBJ_USER:
3191                 rc = -EINVAL;
3192                 userdatum = hashtab_search(policydb.p_users.table, rulestr);
3193                 if (!userdatum)
3194                         goto out;
3195                 tmprule->au_ctxt.user = userdatum->value;
3196                 break;
3197         case AUDIT_SUBJ_ROLE:
3198         case AUDIT_OBJ_ROLE:
3199                 rc = -EINVAL;
3200                 roledatum = hashtab_search(policydb.p_roles.table, rulestr);
3201                 if (!roledatum)
3202                         goto out;
3203                 tmprule->au_ctxt.role = roledatum->value;
3204                 break;
3205         case AUDIT_SUBJ_TYPE:
3206         case AUDIT_OBJ_TYPE:
3207                 rc = -EINVAL;
3208                 typedatum = hashtab_search(policydb.p_types.table, rulestr);
3209                 if (!typedatum)
3210                         goto out;
3211                 tmprule->au_ctxt.type = typedatum->value;
3212                 break;
3213         case AUDIT_SUBJ_SEN:
3214         case AUDIT_SUBJ_CLR:
3215         case AUDIT_OBJ_LEV_LOW:
3216         case AUDIT_OBJ_LEV_HIGH:
3217                 rc = mls_from_string(rulestr, &tmprule->au_ctxt, GFP_ATOMIC);
3218                 if (rc)
3219                         goto out;
3220                 break;
3221         }
3222         rc = 0;
3223 out:
3224         read_unlock(&policy_rwlock);
3225
3226         if (rc) {
3227                 selinux_audit_rule_free(tmprule);
3228                 tmprule = NULL;
3229         }
3230
3231         *rule = tmprule;
3232
3233         return rc;
3234 }
3235
3236 /* Check to see if the rule contains any selinux fields */
3237 int selinux_audit_rule_known(struct audit_krule *rule)
3238 {
3239         int i;
3240
3241         for (i = 0; i < rule->field_count; i++) {
3242                 struct audit_field *f = &rule->fields[i];
3243                 switch (f->type) {
3244                 case AUDIT_SUBJ_USER:
3245                 case AUDIT_SUBJ_ROLE:
3246                 case AUDIT_SUBJ_TYPE:
3247                 case AUDIT_SUBJ_SEN:
3248                 case AUDIT_SUBJ_CLR:
3249                 case AUDIT_OBJ_USER:
3250                 case AUDIT_OBJ_ROLE:
3251                 case AUDIT_OBJ_TYPE:
3252                 case AUDIT_OBJ_LEV_LOW:
3253                 case AUDIT_OBJ_LEV_HIGH:
3254                         return 1;
3255                 }
3256         }
3257
3258         return 0;
3259 }
3260
3261 int selinux_audit_rule_match(u32 sid, u32 field, u32 op, void *vrule,
3262                              struct audit_context *actx)
3263 {
3264         struct context *ctxt;
3265         struct mls_level *level;
3266         struct selinux_audit_rule *rule = vrule;
3267         int match = 0;
3268
3269         if (unlikely(!rule)) {
3270                 WARN_ONCE(1, "selinux_audit_rule_match: missing rule\n");
3271                 return -ENOENT;
3272         }
3273
3274         read_lock(&policy_rwlock);
3275
3276         if (rule->au_seqno < latest_granting) {
3277                 match = -ESTALE;
3278                 goto out;
3279         }
3280
3281         ctxt = sidtab_search(&sidtab, sid);
3282         if (unlikely(!ctxt)) {
3283                 WARN_ONCE(1, "selinux_audit_rule_match: unrecognized SID %d\n",
3284                           sid);
3285                 match = -ENOENT;
3286                 goto out;
3287         }
3288
3289         /* a field/op pair that is not caught here will simply fall through
3290            without a match */
3291         switch (field) {
3292         case AUDIT_SUBJ_USER:
3293         case AUDIT_OBJ_USER:
3294                 switch (op) {
3295                 case Audit_equal:
3296                         match = (ctxt->user == rule->au_ctxt.user);
3297                         break;
3298                 case Audit_not_equal:
3299                         match = (ctxt->user != rule->au_ctxt.user);
3300                         break;
3301                 }
3302                 break;
3303         case AUDIT_SUBJ_ROLE:
3304         case AUDIT_OBJ_ROLE:
3305                 switch (op) {
3306                 case Audit_equal:
3307                         match = (ctxt->role == rule->au_ctxt.role);
3308                         break;
3309                 case Audit_not_equal:
3310                         match = (ctxt->role != rule->au_ctxt.role);
3311                         break;
3312                 }
3313                 break;
3314         case AUDIT_SUBJ_TYPE:
3315         case AUDIT_OBJ_TYPE:
3316                 switch (op) {
3317                 case Audit_equal:
3318                         match = (ctxt->type == rule->au_ctxt.type);
3319                         break;
3320                 case Audit_not_equal:
3321                         match = (ctxt->type != rule->au_ctxt.type);
3322                         break;
3323                 }
3324                 break;
3325         case AUDIT_SUBJ_SEN:
3326         case AUDIT_SUBJ_CLR:
3327         case AUDIT_OBJ_LEV_LOW:
3328         case AUDIT_OBJ_LEV_HIGH:
3329                 level = ((field == AUDIT_SUBJ_SEN ||
3330                           field == AUDIT_OBJ_LEV_LOW) ?
3331                          &ctxt->range.level[0] : &ctxt->range.level[1]);
3332                 switch (op) {
3333                 case Audit_equal:
3334                         match = mls_level_eq(&rule->au_ctxt.range.level[0],
3335                                              level);
3336                         break;
3337                 case Audit_not_equal:
3338                         match = !mls_level_eq(&rule->au_ctxt.range.level[0],
3339                                               level);
3340                         break;
3341                 case Audit_lt:
3342                         match = (mls_level_dom(&rule->au_ctxt.range.level[0],
3343                                                level) &&
3344                                  !mls_level_eq(&rule->au_ctxt.range.level[0],
3345                                                level));
3346                         break;
3347                 case Audit_le:
3348                         match = mls_level_dom(&rule->au_ctxt.range.level[0],
3349                                               level);
3350                         break;
3351                 case Audit_gt:
3352                         match = (mls_level_dom(level,
3353                                               &rule->au_ctxt.range.level[0]) &&
3354                                  !mls_level_eq(level,
3355                                                &rule->au_ctxt.range.level[0]));
3356                         break;
3357                 case Audit_ge:
3358                         match = mls_level_dom(level,
3359                                               &rule->au_ctxt.range.level[0]);
3360                         break;
3361                 }
3362         }
3363
3364 out:
3365         read_unlock(&policy_rwlock);
3366         return match;
3367 }
3368
3369 static int (*aurule_callback)(void) = audit_update_lsm_rules;
3370
3371 static int aurule_avc_callback(u32 event)
3372 {
3373         int err = 0;
3374
3375         if (event == AVC_CALLBACK_RESET && aurule_callback)
3376                 err = aurule_callback();
3377         return err;
3378 }
3379
3380 static int __init aurule_init(void)
3381 {
3382         int err;
3383
3384         err = avc_add_callback(aurule_avc_callback, AVC_CALLBACK_RESET);
3385         if (err)
3386                 panic("avc_add_callback() failed, error %d\n", err);
3387
3388         return err;
3389 }
3390 __initcall(aurule_init);
3391
3392 #ifdef CONFIG_NETLABEL
3393 /**
3394  * security_netlbl_cache_add - Add an entry to the NetLabel cache
3395  * @secattr: the NetLabel packet security attributes
3396  * @sid: the SELinux SID
3397  *
3398  * Description:
3399  * Attempt to cache the context in @ctx, which was derived from the packet in
3400  * @skb, in the NetLabel subsystem cache.  This function assumes @secattr has
3401  * already been initialized.
3402  *
3403  */
3404 static void security_netlbl_cache_add(struct netlbl_lsm_secattr *secattr,
3405                                       u32 sid)
3406 {
3407         u32 *sid_cache;
3408
3409         sid_cache = kmalloc(sizeof(*sid_cache), GFP_ATOMIC);
3410         if (sid_cache == NULL)
3411                 return;
3412         secattr->cache = netlbl_secattr_cache_alloc(GFP_ATOMIC);
3413         if (secattr->cache == NULL) {
3414                 kfree(sid_cache);
3415                 return;
3416         }
3417
3418         *sid_cache = sid;
3419         secattr->cache->free = kfree;
3420         secattr->cache->data = sid_cache;
3421         secattr->flags |= NETLBL_SECATTR_CACHE;
3422 }
3423
3424 /**
3425  * security_netlbl_secattr_to_sid - Convert a NetLabel secattr to a SELinux SID
3426  * @secattr: the NetLabel packet security attributes
3427  * @sid: the SELinux SID
3428  *
3429  * Description:
3430  * Convert the given NetLabel security attributes in @secattr into a
3431  * SELinux SID.  If the @secattr field does not contain a full SELinux
3432  * SID/context then use SECINITSID_NETMSG as the foundation.  If possible the
3433  * 'cache' field of @secattr is set and the CACHE flag is set; this is to
3434  * allow the @secattr to be used by NetLabel to cache the secattr to SID
3435  * conversion for future lookups.  Returns zero on success, negative values on
3436  * failure.
3437  *
3438  */
3439 int security_netlbl_secattr_to_sid(struct netlbl_lsm_secattr *secattr,
3440                                    u32 *sid)
3441 {
3442         int rc;
3443         struct context *ctx;
3444         struct context ctx_new;
3445
3446         if (!ss_initialized) {
3447                 *sid = SECSID_NULL;
3448                 return 0;
3449         }
3450
3451         read_lock(&policy_rwlock);
3452
3453         if (secattr->flags & NETLBL_SECATTR_CACHE)
3454                 *sid = *(u32 *)secattr->cache->data;
3455         else if (secattr->flags & NETLBL_SECATTR_SECID)
3456                 *sid = secattr->attr.secid;
3457         else if (secattr->flags & NETLBL_SECATTR_MLS_LVL) {
3458                 rc = -EIDRM;
3459                 ctx = sidtab_search(&sidtab, SECINITSID_NETMSG);
3460                 if (ctx == NULL)
3461                         goto out;
3462
3463                 context_init(&ctx_new);
3464                 ctx_new.user = ctx->user;
3465                 ctx_new.role = ctx->role;
3466                 ctx_new.type = ctx->type;
3467                 mls_import_netlbl_lvl(&ctx_new, secattr);
3468                 if (secattr->flags & NETLBL_SECATTR_MLS_CAT) {
3469                         rc = mls_import_netlbl_cat(&ctx_new, secattr);
3470                         if (rc)
3471                                 goto out;
3472                 }
3473                 rc = -EIDRM;
3474                 if (!mls_context_isvalid(&policydb, &ctx_new))
3475                         goto out_free;
3476
3477                 rc = sidtab_context_to_sid(&sidtab, &ctx_new, sid);
3478                 if (rc)
3479                         goto out_free;
3480
3481                 security_netlbl_cache_add(secattr, *sid);
3482
3483                 ebitmap_destroy(&ctx_new.range.level[0].cat);
3484         } else
3485                 *sid = SECSID_NULL;
3486
3487         read_unlock(&policy_rwlock);
3488         return 0;
3489 out_free:
3490         ebitmap_destroy(&ctx_new.range.level[0].cat);
3491 out:
3492         read_unlock(&policy_rwlock);
3493         return rc;
3494 }
3495
3496 /**
3497  * security_netlbl_sid_to_secattr - Convert a SELinux SID to a NetLabel secattr
3498  * @sid: the SELinux SID
3499  * @secattr: the NetLabel packet security attributes
3500  *
3501  * Description:
3502  * Convert the given SELinux SID in @sid into a NetLabel security attribute.
3503  * Returns zero on success, negative values on failure.
3504  *
3505  */
3506 int security_netlbl_sid_to_secattr(u32 sid, struct netlbl_lsm_secattr *secattr)
3507 {
3508         int rc;
3509         struct context *ctx;
3510
3511         if (!ss_initialized)
3512                 return 0;
3513
3514         read_lock(&policy_rwlock);
3515
3516         rc = -ENOENT;
3517         ctx = sidtab_search(&sidtab, sid);
3518         if (ctx == NULL)
3519                 goto out;
3520
3521         rc = -ENOMEM;
3522         secattr->domain = kstrdup(sym_name(&policydb, SYM_TYPES, ctx->type - 1),
3523                                   GFP_ATOMIC);
3524         if (secattr->domain == NULL)
3525                 goto out;
3526
3527         secattr->attr.secid = sid;
3528         secattr->flags |= NETLBL_SECATTR_DOMAIN_CPY | NETLBL_SECATTR_SECID;
3529         mls_export_netlbl_lvl(ctx, secattr);
3530         rc = mls_export_netlbl_cat(ctx, secattr);
3531 out:
3532         read_unlock(&policy_rwlock);
3533         return rc;
3534 }
3535 #endif /* CONFIG_NETLABEL */
3536
3537 /**
3538  * security_read_policy - read the policy.
3539  * @data: binary policy data
3540  * @len: length of data in bytes
3541  *
3542  */
3543 int security_read_policy(void **data, size_t *len)
3544 {
3545         int rc;
3546         struct policy_file fp;
3547
3548         if (!ss_initialized)
3549                 return -EINVAL;
3550
3551         *len = security_policydb_len();
3552
3553         *data = vmalloc_user(*len);
3554         if (!*data)
3555                 return -ENOMEM;
3556
3557         fp.data = *data;
3558         fp.len = *len;
3559
3560         read_lock(&policy_rwlock);
3561         rc = policydb_write(&policydb, &fp);
3562         read_unlock(&policy_rwlock);
3563
3564         if (rc)
3565                 return rc;
3566
3567         *len = (unsigned long)fp.data - (unsigned long)*data;
3568         return 0;
3569
3570 }