* Routines for ssl dissection
* Copyright (c) 2000-2001, Scott Renfro <scott@renfro.org>
*
- * $Id: packet-ssl.c,v 1.22 2002/04/11 09:43:22 guy Exp $
+ * $Id: packet-ssl.c,v 1.29 2004/02/05 19:08:59 obiot Exp $
*
* Ethereal - Network traffic analyzer
* By Gerald Combs <gerald@ethereal.com>
* along with this program; if not, write to the Free Software
* Foundation, Inc., 59 Temple Place - Suite 330, Boston, MA 02111-1307, USA.
*
+ * See
+ *
+ * http://www.netscape.com/eng/security/SSL_2.html
+ *
+ * for SSL 2.0 specs.
+ *
+ * See
+ *
+ * http://www.netscape.com/eng/ssl3/
+ *
+ * for SSL 3.0 specs.
+ *
+ * See RFC 2246 for SSL 3.1/TLS 1.0 specs.
+ *
* Notes:
*
* - Uses conversations in a no-malloc fashion. Since we just want to
#include <glib.h>
-#ifdef NEED_SNPRINTF_H
-# include "snprintf.h"
-#endif
-
#include <epan/conversation.h>
#include "prefs.h"
#define SSL_ID_HANDSHAKE 0x16
#define SSL_ID_APP_DATA 0x17
-#define SSL_HND_HELLO_REQUEST 0x00
-#define SSL_HND_CLIENT_HELLO 0x01
-#define SSL_HND_SERVER_HELLO 0x02
-#define SSL_HND_CERTIFICATE 0x0b
-#define SSL_HND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHG 0x0c
-#define SSL_HND_CERT_REQUEST 0x0d
-#define SSL_HND_SVR_HELLO_DONE 0x0e
-#define SSL_HND_CERT_VERIFY 0x0f
-#define SSL_HND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHG 0x10
-#define SSL_HND_FINISHED 0x14
+#define SSL_HND_HELLO_REQUEST 0
+#define SSL_HND_CLIENT_HELLO 1
+#define SSL_HND_SERVER_HELLO 2
+#define SSL_HND_CERTIFICATE 11
+#define SSL_HND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHG 12
+#define SSL_HND_CERT_REQUEST 13
+#define SSL_HND_SVR_HELLO_DONE 14
+#define SSL_HND_CERT_VERIFY 15
+#define SSL_HND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHG 16
+#define SSL_HND_FINISHED 20
#define SSL2_HND_ERROR 0x00
#define SSL2_HND_CLIENT_HELLO 0x01
{ 0x00001c, "SSL_FORTEZZA_KEA_WITH_NULL_SHA" },
{ 0x00001d, "SSL_FORTEZZA_KEA_WITH_FORTEZZA_CBC_SHA" },
{ 0x00001e, "SSL_FORTEZZA_KEA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA" },
+ { 0x00002f, "TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA" },
+ { 0x000030, "TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA" },
+ { 0x000031, "TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA" },
+ { 0x000032, "TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA" },
+ { 0x000033, "TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA" },
+ { 0x000034, "TLS_DH_anon_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA" },
+ { 0x000035, "TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA" },
+ { 0x000036, "TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA" },
+ { 0x000037, "TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA" },
+ { 0x000038, "TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA" },
+ { 0x000039, "TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA" },
+ { 0x00003A, "TLS_DH_anon_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA" },
{ 0x000060, "TLS_RSA_EXPORT1024_WITH_RC4_56_MD5" },
{ 0x000061, "TLS_RSA_EXPORT1024_WITH_RC2_CBC_56_MD5" },
{ 0x000062, "TLS_RSA_EXPORT1024_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA" },
{ 0x00, NULL }
};
+#if 0
+/* XXX - would be used if we dissected the body of a Change Cipher Spec
+ message. */
static const value_string ssl_31_change_cipher_spec[] = {
{ 1, "Change Cipher Spec" },
{ 0x00, NULL },
};
+#endif
static const value_string ssl_31_alert_level[] = {
{ 1, "Warning" },
static const value_string ssl_31_compression_method[] = {
{ 0, "null" },
+ { 1, "ZLIB" },
{ 0x00, NULL }
};
+#if 0
+/* XXX - would be used if we dissected a Signature, as would be
+ seen in a server key exchange or certificate verify message. */
static const value_string ssl_31_key_exchange_algorithm[] = {
{ 0, "RSA" },
{ 1, "Diffie Hellman" },
{ 2, "DSA" },
{ 0x00, NULL }
};
+#endif
static const value_string ssl_31_client_certificate_type[] = {
{ 1, "RSA Sign" },
{ 0x00, NULL }
};
+#if 0
+/* XXX - would be used if we dissected exchnage keys, as would be
+ seen in a client key exchange message. */
static const value_string ssl_31_public_value_encoding[] = {
{ 0, "Implicit" },
{ 1, "Explicit" },
{ 0x00, NULL }
};
+#endif
static const value_string ssl_31_ciphersuite[] = {
{ 0x0000, "TLS_NULL_WITH_NULL_NULL" },
{ 0x001c, "SSL_FORTEZZA_KEA_WITH_NULL_SHA" },
{ 0x001d, "SSL_FORTEZZA_KEA_WITH_FORTEZZA_CBC_SHA" },
{ 0x001e, "SSL_FORTEZZA_KEA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA" },
+ { 0x002f, "TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA" },
+ { 0x0030, "TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA" },
+ { 0x0031, "TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA" },
+ { 0x0032, "TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA" },
+ { 0x0033, "TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA" },
+ { 0x0034, "TLS_DH_anon_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA" },
+ { 0x0035, "TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA" },
+ { 0x0036, "TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA" },
+ { 0x0037, "TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA" },
+ { 0x0038, "TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA" },
+ { 0x0039, "TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA" },
+ { 0x003A, "TLS_DH_anon_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA" },
+ { 0x0060, "TLS_RSA_EXPORT1024_WITH_RC4_56_MD5" },
+ { 0x0061, "TLS_RSA_EXPORT1024_WITH_RC2_CBC_56_MD5" },
{ 0x0062, "TLS_RSA_EXPORT1024_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA" },
{ 0x0063, "TLS_DHE_DSS_EXPORT1024_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA" },
{ 0x0064, "TLS_RSA_EXPORT1024_WITH_RC4_56_SHA" },
conv_data = conversation_get_proto_data(conversation, proto_ssl);
if (conv_data != NULL)
{
- conv_version = (guint)conv_data;
+ conv_version = GPOINTER_TO_UINT(conv_data);
}
/* Initialize the protocol column; we'll set it later when we
* this conversation, do so. */
if (conv_data == NULL)
{
- conv_data = (void *)conv_version;
+ conv_data = GINT_TO_POINTER(conv_version);
conversation_add_proto_data(conversation, proto_ssl, conv_data);
}
return offset;
}
}
-
+
} else {
-
+
/* if we don't have a valid content_type, there's no sense
* continuing any further
*/
dissect_ssl3_hnd_cert(tvb, ssl_hand_tree, offset);
break;
+ case SSL_HND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHG:
+ /* unimplemented */
+ break;
+
case SSL_HND_CERT_REQUEST:
dissect_ssl3_hnd_cert_req(tvb, ssl_hand_tree, offset);
break;
/* server_hello_done has no fields, so nothing to do! */
break;
- case SSL_HND_FINISHED:
- dissect_ssl3_hnd_finished(tvb, ssl_hand_tree,
- offset, conv_version);
+ case SSL_HND_CERT_VERIFY:
+ /* unimplemented */
break;
- case SSL_HND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHG:
- case SSL_HND_CERT_VERIFY:
case SSL_HND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHG:
/* unimplemented */
break;
+
+ case SSL_HND_FINISHED:
+ dissect_ssl3_hnd_finished(tvb, ssl_hand_tree,
+ offset, conv_version);
+ break;
}
}
proto_tree *cs_tree;
guint16 cipher_suite_length = 0;
guint8 compression_methods_length = 0;
+ guint8 compression_method;
if (tree)
{
while (compression_methods_length > 0)
{
- proto_tree_add_item(cs_tree, hf_ssl_handshake_comp_method,
- tvb, offset, 1, FALSE);
+ compression_method = tvb_get_guint8(tvb, offset);
+ if (compression_method < 64)
+ proto_tree_add_uint(cs_tree, hf_ssl_handshake_comp_method,
+ tvb, offset, 1, compression_method);
+ else if (compression_method > 63 && compression_method < 193)
+ proto_tree_add_text(cs_tree, tvb, offset, 1,
+ "Compression Method: Reserved - to be assigned by IANA (%u)",
+ compression_method);
+ else
+ proto_tree_add_text(cs_tree, tvb, offset, 1,
+ "Compression Method: Private use range (%u)",
+ compression_method);
offset++;
compression_methods_length--;
}
ssl_set_conv_version(pinfo, *conv_version);
}
}
-
+
/* if we get here, but don't have a version set for the
* conversation, then set a version for just this frame
* (e.g., on a client hello)
}
else
{
- /* dissect the message */
+ /* dissect the message */
switch (msg_type) {
case PCT_MSG_CLIENT_HELLO:
case PCT_MSG_SERVER_HELLO:
if (cipher_spec_length > 0)
{
/* provide a collapsing node for the cipher specs */
- ti = proto_tree_add_none_format(tree,
+ ti = proto_tree_add_none_format(tree,
hf_ssl_handshake_cipher_suites,
tvb, offset, cipher_spec_length,
"Cipher Specs (%u spec%s)",
/* get rid of the current data */
conversation_delete_proto_data(conversation, proto_ssl);
}
- conversation_add_proto_data(conversation, proto_ssl, (void *)version);
+ conversation_add_proto_data(conversation, proto_ssl, GINT_TO_POINTER(version));
}
static int
"When enabled, SSL records that span multiple TCP segments are desegmented",
&ssl_desegment);
}
-
+
register_dissector("ssl", dissect_ssl, proto_ssl);
}
git.samba.org / obnox / wireshark / wip.git / blobdiff