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3 <H2>Security Release - Samba 2.2.10 Available for Download</H2>
7 ==============================
8 Release Notes for Samba 2.2.10
10 ==============================
13 ######################## SECURITY RELEASE ########################
15 Summary: Potential Buffer Overrun in Samba 2.2.x
17 (http://cve.mitre.org/)
19 This is the latest stable release of the Samba 2.2 code base.
20 There are no further Samba 2.2.x releases planned at this time.
26 Affected Versions: Samba 2.2.0 through 2.2.9
28 A buffer overrun has been located in the code used to support
29 the 'mangling method = hash' smb.conf option. Affected Samba
30 2.2 installations can avoid this possible security bug by using
31 the hash2 mangling method. Server installations requiring
32 the hash mangling method are encouraged to upgrade to Samba v2.2.10
36 The source code can be downloaded from :
38 <a href="/samba/ftp">http://download.samba.org/samba/ftp/</a>
40 in the file samba-2.2.10.tar.gz. The uncompressed archive has
41 been signed using the Samba Distribution Key.
43 Our code, Our bugs, Our responsibility (<a href="https://bugzilla.samba.org/">Samba Bugzilla</a>).
47 Older releases notes for 2.2.x distributions follow
49 ------------------------------------------------------
51 =============================
52 Release Notes for Samba 2.2.9
54 =============================
56 This is the latest stable release of the Samba 2.2 code base.
57 This is a maintenance release of Samba 2.2.8a to address the
58 problem with user password changes after applying the Microsoft
59 hotfix described in KB828741 to Windows NT 4.0/200x/XP clients.
60 No other changes have been applied since Samba 2.2.8a.
62 There are no further Samba 2.2.x releases planned at this time.
65 The source code can be downloaded from :
67 <a href="/samba/ftp">http://download.samba.org/samba/ftp/</a>
69 in the file samba-2.2.9.tar.gz. The uncompressed archive has
70 been signed using the Samba Distribution Key.
72 As always, all bugs are our responsibility.
77 ------------------------------------------------------
79 ===========================================
80 What's new in Samba 2.2.8a - 7th April 2003
81 ===========================================
83 ****************************************
84 * IMPORTANT: Security bugfix for Samba *
85 ****************************************
90 Digital Defense, Inc. has alerted the Samba Team to a serious
91 vulnerability in all stable versions of Samba currently shipping.
92 The Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures (CVE) project has assigned
93 the ID CAN-2003-0201 to this defect.
95 This vulnerability, if exploited correctly, leads to an anonymous
96 user gaining root access on a Samba serving system. All versions
97 of Samba up to and including Samba 2.2.8 are vulnerable. An active
98 exploit of the bug has been reported in the wild. Alpha versions of
99 Samba 3.0 and above are *NOT* vulnerable.
105 The Samba Team would like to thank Erik Parker and the team at
106 Digital Defense, Inc. for their efforts spent in the responsible
107 and timely reporting of this bug.
113 The Samba 2.2.8a release contains only updates to address this
114 security issue. A roll-up patch for release 2.2.7a and 2.0.10
115 addressing both CAN-2003-0201 and CAN-2003-0085 can be obtained
116 from http://www.samba.org/samba/ftp/patches/security/.
119 ========================================
122 The release notes for 2.2.8 follow:
124 ****************************************
125 * IMPORTANT: Security bugfix for Samba *
126 ****************************************
132 The SuSE security audit team, in particular <a href="mailto:krahmer@suse.de">Sebastian
133 Krahmer</a>, has found a flaw in the Samba main smbd code which
134 could allow an external attacker to remotely and anonymously gain
135 Super User (root) privileges on a server running a Samba server.
137 This flaw exists in previous versions of Samba from 2.0.x to 2.2.7a
138 inclusive. This is a serious problem and all sites should either
139 upgrade to Samba 2.2.8 immediately or prohibit access to TCP ports 139
140 and 445. Advice created by Andrew Tridgell, the leader of the Samba Team,
141 on how to protect an unpatched Samba server is given at the end of this
144 The SMB/CIFS protocol implemented by Samba is vulnerable to many
145 attacks, even without specific security holes. The TCP ports 139 and
146 the new port 445 (used by Win2k and the Samba 3.0 alpha code in
147 particular) should never be exposed to untrusted networks.
152 A buffer overrun condition exists in the SMB/CIFS packet fragment
153 re-assembly code in smbd which would allow an attacker to cause smbd
154 to overwrite arbitrary areas of memory in its own process address
155 space. This could allow a skilled attacker to inject binary specific
156 exploit code into smbd.
158 This version of Samba adds explicit overrun and overflow checks on
159 fragment re-assembly of SMB/CIFS packets to ensure that only valid
160 re-assembly is performed by smbd.
162 In addition, the same checks have been added to the re-assembly
163 functions in the client code, making it safe for use in other
169 This security flaw was discovered and reported to the Samba Team by
170 Sebastian Krahmer <krahmer@suse.de> of the SuSE Security Audit Team.
171 The fix was prepared by Jeremy Allison and reviewed by engineers from
172 the Samba Team, SuSE, HP, SGI, Apple, and the Linux vendor engineers
173 on the Linux Vendor security mailing list.
175 The Samba Team would like to thank SuSE and Sebastian Krahmer for
176 their excellent auditing work and for drawing attention to this flaw.
181 As this is a security issue, patches for this flaw specific to earlier
182 versions of Samba will be posted on the samba-technical@samba.org
183 mailing list as requested.
186 ************************************
187 Protecting an unpatched Samba server
188 ************************************
190 Samba Team, March 2003
192 This is a note on how to provide your Samba server some
193 protection against the recently discovered remote security
194 hole if you are unable to upgrade to the fixed version
195 immediately. Even if you do upgrade you might like to think
196 about the suggestions in this note to provide you with
197 additional levels of protection.
200 Using host based protection
201 ---------------------------
203 In many installations of Samba the greatest threat comes for
204 outside your immediate network. By default Samba will accept
205 connections from any host, which means that if you run an
206 insecure version of Samba on a host that is directly
207 connected to the Internet you can be especially vulnerable.
209 One of the simplest fixes in this case is to use the 'hosts
210 allow' and 'hosts deny' options in the Samba smb.conf
211 configuration file to only allow access to your server from a
212 specific range of hosts. An example might be:
215 hosts allow = 127.0.0.1 192.168.2.0/24 192.168.3.0/24
216 hosts deny = 0.0.0.0/0
218 The above will only allow SMB connections from 'localhost'
219 (your own computer) and from the two private networks
220 192.168.2 and 192.168.3. All other connections will be
221 refused connections as soon as the client sends its first
222 packet. The refusal will be marked as a 'not listening on
226 Using interface protection
227 --------------------------
229 By default Samba will accept connections on any network
230 interface that it finds on your system. That means if you
231 have a ISDN line or a PPP connection to the Internet then
232 Samba will accept connections on those links. This may not be
235 You can change this behavior using options like the
239 bind interfaces only = yes
241 that tells Samba to only listen for connections on interfaces
242 with a name starting with 'eth' such as eth0, eth1, plus on
243 the loopback interface called 'lo'. The name you will need to
244 use depends on what OS you are using. In the above I used the
245 common name for ethernet adapters on Linux.
247 If you use the above and someone tries to make a SMB
248 connection to your host over a PPP interface called 'ppp0',
249 they will get a TCP connection refused reply. In that
250 case no Samba code is run at all as the operating system has
251 been told not to pass connections from that interface to any
258 Many people use a firewall to deny access to services that
259 they don't want exposed outside their network. This can be a
260 very good idea, although I would recommend using it in
261 conjunction with the above methods so that you are protected
262 even if your firewall is not active for some reason.
264 If you are setting up a firewall then you need to know what
265 TCP and UDP ports to allow and block. Samba uses the
268 UDP/137 - used by nmbd
269 UDP/138 - used by nmbd
270 TCP/139 - used by smbd
271 TCP/445 - used by smbd
273 The last one is important as many older firewall setups may
274 not be aware of it, given that this port was only added to
275 the protocol in recent years.
278 Using a IPC$ share deny
279 -----------------------
281 If the above methods are not suitable, then you could also
282 place a more specific deny on the IPC$ share that is used in
283 the recently discovered security hole. This allows you to
284 offer access to other shares while denying access to IPC$
285 from potentially untrustworthy hosts.
287 To do that you could use:
290 hosts allow = 192.168.115.0/24 127.0.0.1
291 hosts deny = 0.0.0.0/0
293 this would tell Samba that IPC$ connections are not allowed
294 from anywhere but the two listed places (localhost and a
295 local subnet). Connections to other shares would still be
296 allowed. As the IPC$ share is the only share that is always
297 accessible anonymously this provides some level of protection
298 against attackers that do not know a username/password for
302 If you use this method then clients will be given a 'access
303 denied' reply when they try to access the IPC$ share. That
304 means that those clients will not be able to browse shares,
305 and may also be unable to access some other resources.
307 I don't recommend this method unless you cannot use one of
308 the other methods listed above for some reason.
314 Of course the best solution is to upgrade Samba to a version
315 where the bug has been fixed. If you wish to also use one of
316 the additional measures above then that would certainly be a
319 Please check regularly on http://www.samba.org/ for updates
320 and important announcements.
323 ****************************************
324 ****************************************
326 -----------------------------------------------------------------
336 See the cvs log for SAMBA_2_2 for more details
338 1) smbumount lazy patch from Mandrake
339 2) Check for too many processes *before* the fork.
340 3) make sure we don't run over the end of 'name' in unix_convert()
341 4) set umask to 0 before creating socket directory.
342 5) Fix the LARGE_SMB_OFF_T problems and allow smbd to do the right
343 thing in interactive mode when a log file dir is also specified.
344 6) Fix delete on close semantics to match W2K.
345 7) Correctly return access denied on share mode deny when we can't
347 8) Always use safe_strcpy not pstrcpy for malloc()'d strings
348 9) Fixes for HP-UX only having limited POSIX lock range
349 10) Added uid/gid caching code. Reduces load on winbindd.
350 11) Removed extra copy of server name in the printername field (it was
351 mangling the the name to be \\server\\\server\printer
352 12) Fix dumb perror used without errno being set.
353 13) Do retries correctly if the connection to the DC has failed.
354 14) Correctly check for inet_addr fail.
355 15) Ensure we use getgrnam() unless BROKEN_GETGRNAM is defined.
356 16) Fix for missing if (setting_acls) on default perms.
357 17) Fix to cache the sidtype
358 18) fix printer settings on Solaris (big-endian) print servers.
359 ASCII -> UNICODE conversion bug.
360 19) Small fix check correct error return.
361 20) Ensure space_avail is unsigned.
362 21) patch to check for a valid [f]chmod_acl function pointer
363 before calling it. Fixes seg fault in audit VFS module
364 22) When checking is_locked() new WRITE locks conflict with existing
365 READ locks even if the context is the same.
366 23) Merge off-by-one crash fixes from HEAD
367 24) Move off-by-one buggy malloc()/safe_strcpy() combination to
369 25) Merge from HEAD. Use pstrcpy not safe_strcpy.
370 26) Fix to allow blocking lock notification to be done rapidly (no wait
371 for smb -> smb lock release). Adds new PENDING_LOCK type to lockdb
372 (does not interfere with existing locks).
373 27) Doxygen cleanups for code documentation
374 28) limit the unix domain sockets used by winbindd by adding a
375 "last_access" field to winbindd connections, and will close
376 the oldest idle connection once the number of open connections goes
377 over WINBINDD_MAX_SIMULTANEOUS_CLIENTS (defined in local.h as 200
379 29) Fix a couple of string handling errors in smbd/dir.c that would
381 30) Fix seg fault in smbpasswd when specifying the new password
382 as a command line argument
383 31) Correct 64-but file sizes issues with smbtar and smbclient
384 32) Add batch mode option to pdbedit
385 33) Add protection in nmbd against malformed reply packets
386 34) Fix bug with sendfile profiling support in smbstatus output
387 35) Correct bug in "hide unreadable" smb.conf parameter that
388 resulted in incorrect directory listings
389 36) Fix bug in group enumeration in winbindd
390 37) Correct build issues with libsmbclient on Solaris
391 38) Fix memory leak and bad pointer dereference in password
392 changing code in smbd
393 39) Fix for changing attributes on a file truncate
394 40) Ensure smbd process count never gets to -1 if limiting number
396 41) Ensure we return disk full by default on short writes
397 42) Don't delete jobs submitted after the lpq time
398 43) Fix reference count bug where smbds would not terminate
399 with no open resources
400 44) Performance fix when using quota support on HP-UX
401 45) Fixes for --with-ldapsam
402 * Default to port 389 when "ldap ssl != on"
403 * add support for rebinding to the master directory server
404 for password changes when "ldap server" points to a read-only
406 46) Add -W and -X command line flags to smbpasswd for extracting and
407 setting the machine/domain SID in secrets.tdb. See the
408 smbpasswd(8) man page for details.
409 47) Added (c) Luke Howard to winbind_nss_solaris.c for coded
410 obtained from PADL's nss_ldap library.
411 48) Fix bug in samr_dispinfo query in winbindd
412 49) Fix segfault in NTLMSSP password changing code for
414 50) Correct pstring/fstring mismatches
415 51) Send level II oplock break requests synchronously to prevent
416 condition where one smbd would continually lock a share entry
418 52) Miscellaneous cleanups for tdb error conditions and appending
420 53) Implement correct open file truncate semantics with DOS
422 54) Enforce wide links = no on files as well as directories
423 55) Include shared library checks for Stratus VOS
424 56) Include support for CUPS printer classes and logging the remote
426 57) Include "WinXP" (Windows XP) and "Win2K3" (Windows .NET) values
428 58) Increase the max PDU size to deal with some troublesome printer
429 drivers and Windows NT 4.0 clients
430 59) increment the process counter immediately after the fork
431 (not just when we receive the first smb packet)
432 60) Ensure rename sets errno correctly
433 61) Unify ACL code (back-port from 3.0)
434 62) Fix some further issues around off_t and large offsets
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