{
TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx;
DATA_BLOB ticket;
- char *client, *p, *domain;
- fstring netbios_domain_name;
struct passwd *pw;
- fstring user;
int sess_vuid = req->vuid;
NTSTATUS ret = NT_STATUS_OK;
DATA_BLOB ap_rep, ap_rep_wrapped, response;
DATA_BLOB session_key = data_blob_null;
uint8 tok_id[2];
DATA_BLOB nullblob = data_blob_null;
- fstring real_username;
bool map_domainuser_to_guest = False;
bool username_was_mapped;
struct PAC_LOGON_INFO *logon_info = NULL;
struct smbd_server_connection *sconn = req->sconn;
+ char *principal;
+ char *user;
+ char *domain;
+ char *real_username;
ZERO_STRUCT(ticket);
ZERO_STRUCT(ap_rep);
}
ret = ads_verify_ticket(mem_ctx, lp_realm(), 0, &ticket,
- &client, &logon_info, &ap_rep,
+ &principal, &logon_info, &ap_rep,
&session_key, True);
data_blob_free(&ticket);
return;
}
- DEBUG(3,("Ticket name is [%s]\n", client));
-
- p = strchr_m(client, '@');
- if (!p) {
- DEBUG(3,("Doesn't look like a valid principal\n"));
+ ret = get_user_from_kerberos_info(talloc_tos(),
+ sconn->client_id.name,
+ principal, logon_info,
+ &username_was_mapped,
+ &map_domainuser_to_guest,
+ &user, &domain,
+ &real_username, &pw);
+ if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(ret)) {
data_blob_free(&ap_rep);
data_blob_free(&session_key);
talloc_destroy(mem_ctx);
return;
}
- *p = 0;
-
/* save the PAC data if we have it */
-
if (logon_info) {
- netsamlogon_cache_store( client, &logon_info->info3 );
- }
-
- if (!strequal(p+1, lp_realm())) {
- DEBUG(3,("Ticket for foreign realm %s@%s\n", client, p+1));
- if (!lp_allow_trusted_domains()) {
- data_blob_free(&ap_rep);
- data_blob_free(&session_key);
- talloc_destroy(mem_ctx);
- reply_nterror(req, nt_status_squash(
- NT_STATUS_LOGON_FAILURE));
- return;
- }
- }
-
- /* this gives a fully qualified user name (ie. with full realm).
- that leads to very long usernames, but what else can we do? */
-
- domain = p+1;
-
- if (logon_info && logon_info->info3.base.domain.string) {
- fstrcpy(netbios_domain_name,
- logon_info->info3.base.domain.string);
- domain = netbios_domain_name;
- DEBUG(10, ("Mapped to [%s] (using PAC)\n", domain));
-
- } else {
-
- /* If we have winbind running, we can (and must) shorten the
- username by using the short netbios name. Otherwise we will
- have inconsistent user names. With Kerberos, we get the
- fully qualified realm, with ntlmssp we get the short
- name. And even w2k3 does use ntlmssp if you for example
- connect to an ip address. */
-
- wbcErr wbc_status;
- struct wbcDomainInfo *info = NULL;
-
- DEBUG(10, ("Mapping [%s] to short name\n", domain));
-
- wbc_status = wbcDomainInfo(domain, &info);
-
- if (WBC_ERROR_IS_OK(wbc_status)) {
-
- fstrcpy(netbios_domain_name,
- info->short_name);
-
- wbcFreeMemory(info);
- domain = netbios_domain_name;
- DEBUG(10, ("Mapped to [%s] (using Winbind)\n", domain));
- } else {
- DEBUG(3, ("Could not find short name: %s\n",
- wbcErrorString(wbc_status)));
- }
+ netsamlogon_cache_store(user, &logon_info->info3);
}
- fstr_sprintf(user, "%s%c%s", domain, *lp_winbind_separator(), client);
-
- /* lookup the passwd struct, create a new user if necessary */
-
- username_was_mapped = map_username(user);
+ /* setup the string used by %U */
+ sub_set_smb_name(real_username);
- pw = smb_getpwnam( mem_ctx, user, real_username, True );
+ /* reload services so that the new %U is taken into account */
+ reload_services(sconn->msg_ctx, sconn->sock, True);
- if (pw) {
- /* if a real user check pam account restrictions */
- /* only really perfomed if "obey pam restriction" is true */
- /* do this before an eventual mapping to guest occurs */
- ret = smb_pam_accountcheck(pw->pw_name, sconn->client_id.name);
- if ( !NT_STATUS_IS_OK(ret)) {
- DEBUG(1,("PAM account restriction "
- "prevents user login\n"));
+ if (map_domainuser_to_guest) {
+ ret = make_server_info_guest(NULL, &server_info);
+ if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(ret)) {
+ DEBUG(1, ("make_server_info_guest failed: %s!\n",
+ nt_errstr(ret)));
data_blob_free(&ap_rep);
data_blob_free(&session_key);
TALLOC_FREE(mem_ctx);
reply_nterror(req, nt_status_squash(ret));
return;
}
- }
-
- if (!pw) {
-
- /* this was originally the behavior of Samba 2.2, if a user
- did not have a local uid but has been authenticated, then
- map them to a guest account */
-
- if (lp_map_to_guest() == MAP_TO_GUEST_ON_BAD_UID){
- map_domainuser_to_guest = True;
- fstrcpy(user,lp_guestaccount());
- pw = smb_getpwnam( mem_ctx, user, real_username, True );
- }
-
- /* extra sanity check that the guest account is valid */
-
- if ( !pw ) {
- DEBUG(1,("Username %s is invalid on this system\n",
- user));
- data_blob_free(&ap_rep);
- data_blob_free(&session_key);
- TALLOC_FREE(mem_ctx);
- reply_nterror(req, nt_status_squash(
- NT_STATUS_LOGON_FAILURE));
- return;
- }
- }
-
- /* setup the string used by %U */
-
- sub_set_smb_name( real_username );
- reload_services(sconn->msg_ctx, sconn->sock, True);
-
- if ( map_domainuser_to_guest ) {
- make_server_info_guest(NULL, &server_info);
} else if (logon_info) {
/* pass the unmapped username here since map_username()
will be called again from inside make_server_info_info3() */
- ret = make_server_info_info3(mem_ctx, client, domain,
+ ret = make_server_info_info3(mem_ctx, user, domain,
&server_info, &logon_info->info3);
- if ( !NT_STATUS_IS_OK(ret) ) {
+ if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(ret)) {
DEBUG(1,("make_server_info_info3 failed: %s!\n",
nt_errstr(ret)));
data_blob_free(&ap_rep);
* no need to free after this on success. A better interface would copy
* it.... */
- sess_vuid = register_existing_vuid(sconn,
- sess_vuid,
- server_info,
- nullblob,
- client);
+ sess_vuid = register_existing_vuid(sconn, sess_vuid,
+ server_info, nullblob, user);
reply_outbuf(req, 4, 0);
SSVAL(req->outbuf,smb_uid,sess_vuid);
git.samba.org / kai / samba.git / commitdiff