2 Unix SMB/CIFS implementation.
4 Database Glue between Samba and the KDC
6 Copyright (C) Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org> 2005-2009
7 Copyright (C) Simo Sorce <idra@samba.org> 2010
9 This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
10 it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
11 the Free Software Foundation; either version 3 of the License, or
12 (at your option) any later version.
14 This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
15 but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
16 MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the
17 GNU General Public License for more details.
20 You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
21 along with this program. If not, see <http://www.gnu.org/licenses/>.
25 #include "system/time.h"
26 #include "../libds/common/flags.h"
27 #include "lib/ldb/include/ldb.h"
28 #include "librpc/gen_ndr/netlogon.h"
29 #include "libcli/security/security.h"
30 #include "auth/auth.h"
31 #include "auth/credentials/credentials.h"
32 #include "auth/auth_sam.h"
33 #include "dsdb/samdb/samdb.h"
34 #include "dsdb/common/util.h"
35 #include "librpc/ndr/libndr.h"
36 #include "librpc/gen_ndr/ndr_drsblobs.h"
37 #include "librpc/gen_ndr/lsa.h"
38 #include "libcli/auth/libcli_auth.h"
39 #include "param/param.h"
40 #include "../lib/crypto/md4.h"
41 #include "system/kerberos.h"
42 #include "auth/kerberos/kerberos.h"
44 #include "kdc/samba_kdc.h"
45 #include "kdc/db-glue.h"
47 enum samba_kdc_ent_type
48 { SAMBA_KDC_ENT_TYPE_CLIENT, SAMBA_KDC_ENT_TYPE_SERVER,
49 SAMBA_KDC_ENT_TYPE_KRBTGT, SAMBA_KDC_ENT_TYPE_TRUST, SAMBA_KDC_ENT_TYPE_ANY };
51 enum trust_direction {
53 INBOUND = LSA_TRUST_DIRECTION_INBOUND,
54 OUTBOUND = LSA_TRUST_DIRECTION_OUTBOUND
57 static const char *trust_attrs[] = {
62 "msDS-SupportedEncryptionTypes",
69 static KerberosTime ldb_msg_find_krb5time_ldap_time(struct ldb_message *msg, const char *attr, KerberosTime default_val)
75 gentime = ldb_msg_find_attr_as_string(msg, attr, NULL);
79 tmp = strptime(gentime, "%Y%m%d%H%M%SZ", &tm);
87 static HDBFlags uf2HDBFlags(krb5_context context, uint32_t userAccountControl, enum samba_kdc_ent_type ent_type)
89 HDBFlags flags = int2HDBFlags(0);
91 /* we don't allow kadmin deletes */
94 /* mark the principal as invalid to start with */
99 /* All accounts are servers, but this may be disabled again in the caller */
102 /* Account types - clear the invalid bit if it turns out to be valid */
103 if (userAccountControl & UF_NORMAL_ACCOUNT) {
104 if (ent_type == SAMBA_KDC_ENT_TYPE_CLIENT || ent_type == SAMBA_KDC_ENT_TYPE_ANY) {
110 if (userAccountControl & UF_INTERDOMAIN_TRUST_ACCOUNT) {
111 if (ent_type == SAMBA_KDC_ENT_TYPE_CLIENT || ent_type == SAMBA_KDC_ENT_TYPE_ANY) {
116 if (userAccountControl & UF_WORKSTATION_TRUST_ACCOUNT) {
117 if (ent_type == SAMBA_KDC_ENT_TYPE_CLIENT || ent_type == SAMBA_KDC_ENT_TYPE_ANY) {
122 if (userAccountControl & UF_SERVER_TRUST_ACCOUNT) {
123 if (ent_type == SAMBA_KDC_ENT_TYPE_CLIENT || ent_type == SAMBA_KDC_ENT_TYPE_ANY) {
129 /* Not permitted to act as a client if disabled */
130 if (userAccountControl & UF_ACCOUNTDISABLE) {
133 if (userAccountControl & UF_LOCKOUT) {
137 if (userAccountControl & UF_PASSWORD_NOTREQD) {
142 UF_PASSWORD_CANT_CHANGE and UF_ENCRYPTED_TEXT_PASSWORD_ALLOWED are irrelevent
144 if (userAccountControl & UF_TEMP_DUPLICATE_ACCOUNT) {
148 /* UF_DONT_EXPIRE_PASSWD and UF_USE_DES_KEY_ONLY handled in samba_kdc_message2entry() */
151 if (userAccountControl & UF_MNS_LOGON_ACCOUNT) {
155 if (userAccountControl & UF_SMARTCARD_REQUIRED) {
156 flags.require_hwauth = 1;
158 if (userAccountControl & UF_TRUSTED_FOR_DELEGATION) {
159 flags.ok_as_delegate = 1;
161 if (!(userAccountControl & UF_NOT_DELEGATED)) {
162 flags.forwardable = 1;
166 if (userAccountControl & UF_DONT_REQUIRE_PREAUTH) {
167 flags.require_preauth = 0;
169 flags.require_preauth = 1;
175 static int samba_kdc_entry_destructor(struct samba_kdc_entry *p)
177 hdb_entry_ex *entry_ex = p->entry_ex;
178 free_hdb_entry(&entry_ex->entry);
182 static void samba_kdc_free_entry(krb5_context context, hdb_entry_ex *entry_ex)
184 /* this function is called only from hdb_free_entry().
185 * Make sure we neutralize the destructor or we will
186 * get a double free later when hdb_free_entry() will
187 * try to call free_hdb_entry() */
188 talloc_set_destructor(entry_ex->ctx, NULL);
190 /* now proceed to free the talloc part */
191 talloc_free(entry_ex->ctx);
194 static krb5_error_code samba_kdc_message2entry_keys(krb5_context context,
195 struct samba_kdc_db_context *kdc_db_ctx,
197 struct ldb_message *msg,
200 uint32_t userAccountControl,
201 enum samba_kdc_ent_type ent_type,
202 hdb_entry_ex *entry_ex)
204 krb5_error_code ret = 0;
205 enum ndr_err_code ndr_err;
206 struct samr_Password *hash;
207 const struct ldb_val *sc_val;
208 struct supplementalCredentialsBlob scb;
209 struct supplementalCredentialsPackage *scpk = NULL;
210 bool newer_keys = false;
211 struct package_PrimaryKerberosBlob _pkb;
212 struct package_PrimaryKerberosCtr3 *pkb3 = NULL;
213 struct package_PrimaryKerberosCtr4 *pkb4 = NULL;
215 uint16_t allocated_keys = 0;
216 int rodc_krbtgt_number = 0;
217 uint32_t supported_enctypes;
219 if (rid == DOMAIN_RID_KRBTGT || is_rodc) {
220 /* KDCs (and KDCs on RODCs) use AES, but not DES */
221 supported_enctypes = ENC_ALL_TYPES;
222 supported_enctypes &= ~(ENC_CRC32|ENC_RSA_MD5);
223 } else if (userAccountControl & (UF_PARTIAL_SECRETS_ACCOUNT|UF_SERVER_TRUST_ACCOUNT)) {
224 /* DCs and RODCs comptuer accounts use AES */
225 supported_enctypes = ENC_ALL_TYPES;
226 } else if (ent_type == SAMBA_KDC_ENT_TYPE_CLIENT ||
227 (ent_type == SAMBA_KDC_ENT_TYPE_ANY)) {
228 /* for AS-REQ the client chooses the enc types it
229 * supports, and this will vary between computers a
230 * user logs in from. However, some accounts may be
231 * banned from using DES, so allow the default to be
234 * likewise for 'any' return as much as is supported,
235 * to export into a keytab */
236 supported_enctypes = ldb_msg_find_attr_as_uint(msg, "msDS-SupportedEncryptionTypes",
239 /* However, if this is a TGS-REQ, then lock it down to
240 * a reasonable guess as to what the server can decode
241 * - we must use whatever is in
242 * "msDS-SupportedEncryptionTypes", or the 'old' set
243 * of keys (ie, what Windows 2000 supported) */
244 supported_enctypes = ldb_msg_find_attr_as_uint(msg, "msDS-SupportedEncryptionTypes",
245 ENC_CRC32 | ENC_RSA_MD5 | ENC_RC4_HMAC_MD5);
248 /* Is this the krbtgt or a RODC krbtgt */
250 rodc_krbtgt_number = ldb_msg_find_attr_as_int(msg, "msDS-SecondaryKrbTgtNumber", -1);
252 if (rodc_krbtgt_number == -1) {
258 /* If UF_USE_DES_KEY_ONLY has been set, then don't allow use of the newer enc types */
259 if (userAccountControl & UF_USE_DES_KEY_ONLY) {
260 /* However, this still won't allow use of DES, if we
261 * were told not to by msDS-SupportedEncTypes */
262 supported_enctypes &= ENC_CRC32|ENC_RSA_MD5;
265 case SAMBA_KDC_ENT_TYPE_KRBTGT:
266 case SAMBA_KDC_ENT_TYPE_TRUST:
267 /* Unless a very special effort it made,
268 * disallow trust tickets to be DES encrypted,
269 * it's just too dangerous */
270 supported_enctypes &= ~(ENC_CRC32|ENC_RSA_MD5);
274 /* No further restrictions */
278 entry_ex->entry.keys.val = NULL;
279 entry_ex->entry.keys.len = 0;
281 entry_ex->entry.kvno = ldb_msg_find_attr_as_int(msg, "msDS-KeyVersionNumber", 0);
283 entry_ex->entry.kvno |= (rodc_krbtgt_number << 16);
286 /* Get keys from the db */
288 hash = samdb_result_hash(mem_ctx, msg, "unicodePwd");
289 sc_val = ldb_msg_find_ldb_val(msg, "supplementalCredentials");
291 /* unicodePwd for enctype 0x17 (23) if present */
296 /* supplementalCredentials if present */
298 ndr_err = ndr_pull_struct_blob_all(sc_val, mem_ctx, &scb,
299 (ndr_pull_flags_fn_t)ndr_pull_supplementalCredentialsBlob);
300 if (!NDR_ERR_CODE_IS_SUCCESS(ndr_err)) {
301 dump_data(0, sc_val->data, sc_val->length);
306 if (scb.sub.signature != SUPPLEMENTAL_CREDENTIALS_SIGNATURE) {
307 NDR_PRINT_DEBUG(supplementalCredentialsBlob, &scb);
312 for (i=0; i < scb.sub.num_packages; i++) {
313 if (strcmp("Primary:Kerberos-Newer-Keys", scb.sub.packages[i].name) == 0) {
314 scpk = &scb.sub.packages[i];
315 if (!scpk->data || !scpk->data[0]) {
321 } else if (strcmp("Primary:Kerberos", scb.sub.packages[i].name) == 0) {
322 scpk = &scb.sub.packages[i];
323 if (!scpk->data || !scpk->data[0]) {
327 * we don't break here in hope to find
328 * a Kerberos-Newer-Keys package
334 * Primary:Kerberos-Newer-Keys or Primary:Kerberos element
335 * of supplementalCredentials
340 blob = strhex_to_data_blob(mem_ctx, scpk->data);
346 /* we cannot use ndr_pull_struct_blob_all() here, as w2k and w2k3 add padding bytes */
347 ndr_err = ndr_pull_struct_blob(&blob, mem_ctx, &_pkb,
348 (ndr_pull_flags_fn_t)ndr_pull_package_PrimaryKerberosBlob);
349 if (!NDR_ERR_CODE_IS_SUCCESS(ndr_err)) {
351 krb5_set_error_message(context, ret, "samba_kdc_message2entry_keys: could not parse package_PrimaryKerberosBlob");
352 krb5_warnx(context, "samba_kdc_message2entry_keys: could not parse package_PrimaryKerberosBlob");
356 if (newer_keys && _pkb.version != 4) {
358 krb5_set_error_message(context, ret, "samba_kdc_message2entry_keys: Primary:Kerberos-Newer-Keys not version 4");
359 krb5_warnx(context, "samba_kdc_message2entry_keys: Primary:Kerberos-Newer-Keys not version 4");
363 if (!newer_keys && _pkb.version != 3) {
365 krb5_set_error_message(context, ret, "samba_kdc_message2entry_keys: could not parse Primary:Kerberos not version 3");
366 krb5_warnx(context, "samba_kdc_message2entry_keys: could not parse Primary:Kerberos not version 3");
370 if (_pkb.version == 4) {
371 pkb4 = &_pkb.ctr.ctr4;
372 allocated_keys += pkb4->num_keys;
373 } else if (_pkb.version == 3) {
374 pkb3 = &_pkb.ctr.ctr3;
375 allocated_keys += pkb3->num_keys;
379 if (allocated_keys == 0) {
380 if (kdc_db_ctx->rodc) {
381 /* We are on an RODC, but don't have keys for this account. Signal this to the caller */
382 return HDB_ERR_NOT_FOUND_HERE;
385 /* oh, no password. Apparently (comment in
386 * hdb-ldap.c) this violates the ASN.1, but this
387 * allows an entry with no keys (yet). */
391 /* allocate space to decode into */
392 entry_ex->entry.keys.len = 0;
393 entry_ex->entry.keys.val = calloc(allocated_keys, sizeof(Key));
394 if (entry_ex->entry.keys.val == NULL) {
399 if (hash && (supported_enctypes & ENC_RC4_HMAC_MD5)) {
403 key.salt = NULL; /* No salt for this enc type */
405 ret = krb5_keyblock_init(context,
406 ENCTYPE_ARCFOUR_HMAC,
407 hash->hash, sizeof(hash->hash),
413 entry_ex->entry.keys.val[entry_ex->entry.keys.len] = key;
414 entry_ex->entry.keys.len++;
418 for (i=0; i < pkb4->num_keys; i++) {
421 if (!pkb4->keys[i].value) continue;
423 if (!(kerberos_enctype_to_bitmap(pkb4->keys[i].keytype) & supported_enctypes)) {
430 if (pkb4->salt.string) {
433 salt = data_blob_string_const(pkb4->salt.string);
435 key.salt = calloc(1, sizeof(*key.salt));
436 if (key.salt == NULL) {
441 key.salt->type = hdb_pw_salt;
443 ret = krb5_data_copy(&key.salt->salt, salt.data, salt.length);
451 /* TODO: maybe pass the iteration_count somehow... */
453 ret = krb5_keyblock_init(context,
454 pkb4->keys[i].keytype,
455 pkb4->keys[i].value->data,
456 pkb4->keys[i].value->length,
458 if (ret == KRB5_PROG_ETYPE_NOSUPP) {
459 DEBUG(2,("Unsupported keytype ignored - type %u\n",
460 pkb4->keys[i].keytype));
473 entry_ex->entry.keys.val[entry_ex->entry.keys.len] = key;
474 entry_ex->entry.keys.len++;
477 for (i=0; i < pkb3->num_keys; i++) {
480 if (!pkb3->keys[i].value) continue;
482 if (!(kerberos_enctype_to_bitmap(pkb3->keys[i].keytype) & supported_enctypes)) {
489 if (pkb3->salt.string) {
492 salt = data_blob_string_const(pkb3->salt.string);
494 key.salt = calloc(1, sizeof(*key.salt));
495 if (key.salt == NULL) {
500 key.salt->type = hdb_pw_salt;
502 ret = krb5_data_copy(&key.salt->salt, salt.data, salt.length);
510 ret = krb5_keyblock_init(context,
511 pkb3->keys[i].keytype,
512 pkb3->keys[i].value->data,
513 pkb3->keys[i].value->length,
524 entry_ex->entry.keys.val[entry_ex->entry.keys.len] = key;
525 entry_ex->entry.keys.len++;
531 entry_ex->entry.keys.len = 0;
533 if (entry_ex->entry.keys.len == 0 && entry_ex->entry.keys.val) {
534 free(entry_ex->entry.keys.val);
535 entry_ex->entry.keys.val = NULL;
541 * Construct an hdb_entry from a directory entry.
543 static krb5_error_code samba_kdc_message2entry(krb5_context context,
544 struct samba_kdc_db_context *kdc_db_ctx,
545 TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx, krb5_const_principal principal,
546 enum samba_kdc_ent_type ent_type,
548 struct ldb_dn *realm_dn,
549 struct ldb_message *msg,
550 hdb_entry_ex *entry_ex)
552 struct loadparm_context *lp_ctx = kdc_db_ctx->lp_ctx;
553 uint32_t userAccountControl;
555 krb5_error_code ret = 0;
556 krb5_boolean is_computer = FALSE;
558 struct samba_kdc_entry *p;
563 bool is_rodc = false;
564 struct ldb_message_element *objectclasses;
565 struct ldb_val computer_val;
566 const char *samAccountName = ldb_msg_find_attr_as_string(msg, "samAccountName", NULL);
567 computer_val.data = discard_const_p(uint8_t,"computer");
568 computer_val.length = strlen((const char *)computer_val.data);
570 if (ldb_msg_find_element(msg, "msDS-SecondaryKrbTgtNumber")) {
574 if (!samAccountName) {
576 krb5_set_error_message(context, ret, "samba_kdc_message2entry: no samAccountName present");
580 objectclasses = ldb_msg_find_element(msg, "objectClass");
582 if (objectclasses && ldb_msg_find_val(objectclasses, &computer_val)) {
586 memset(entry_ex, 0, sizeof(*entry_ex));
588 p = talloc(mem_ctx, struct samba_kdc_entry);
594 p->kdc_db_ctx = kdc_db_ctx;
595 p->entry_ex = entry_ex;
596 p->realm_dn = talloc_reference(p, realm_dn);
602 talloc_set_destructor(p, samba_kdc_entry_destructor);
604 /* make sure we do not have bogus data in there */
605 memset(&entry_ex->entry, 0, sizeof(hdb_entry));
608 entry_ex->free_entry = samba_kdc_free_entry;
610 userAccountControl = ldb_msg_find_attr_as_uint(msg, "userAccountControl", 0);
613 entry_ex->entry.principal = malloc(sizeof(*(entry_ex->entry.principal)));
614 if (ent_type == SAMBA_KDC_ENT_TYPE_ANY && principal == NULL) {
615 krb5_make_principal(context, &entry_ex->entry.principal, lpcfg_realm(lp_ctx), samAccountName, NULL);
617 ret = copy_Principal(principal, entry_ex->entry.principal);
619 krb5_clear_error_message(context);
623 /* While we have copied the client principal, tests
624 * show that Win2k3 returns the 'corrected' realm, not
625 * the client-specified realm. This code attempts to
626 * replace the client principal's realm with the one
627 * we determine from our records */
629 /* this has to be with malloc() */
630 krb5_principal_set_realm(context, entry_ex->entry.principal, lpcfg_realm(lp_ctx));
633 /* First try and figure out the flags based on the userAccountControl */
634 entry_ex->entry.flags = uf2HDBFlags(context, userAccountControl, ent_type);
636 /* Windows 2008 seems to enforce this (very sensible) rule by
637 * default - don't allow offline attacks on a user's password
638 * by asking for a ticket to them as a service (encrypted with
639 * their probably patheticly insecure password) */
641 if (entry_ex->entry.flags.server
642 && lpcfg_parm_bool(lp_ctx, NULL, "kdc", "require spn for service", true)) {
643 if (!is_computer && !ldb_msg_find_attr_as_string(msg, "servicePrincipalName", NULL)) {
644 entry_ex->entry.flags.server = 0;
648 if (flags & HDB_F_ADMIN_DATA) {
649 /* These (created_by, modified_by) parts of the entry are not relevant for Samba4's use
650 * of the Heimdal KDC. They are stored in a the traditional
651 * DB for audit purposes, and still form part of the structure
654 /* use 'whenCreated' */
655 entry_ex->entry.created_by.time = ldb_msg_find_krb5time_ldap_time(msg, "whenCreated", 0);
656 /* use 'kadmin' for now (needed by mit_samba) */
657 krb5_make_principal(context,
658 &entry_ex->entry.created_by.principal,
659 lpcfg_realm(lp_ctx), "kadmin", NULL);
661 entry_ex->entry.modified_by = (Event *) malloc(sizeof(Event));
662 if (entry_ex->entry.modified_by == NULL) {
664 krb5_set_error_message(context, ret, "malloc: out of memory");
668 /* use 'whenChanged' */
669 entry_ex->entry.modified_by->time = ldb_msg_find_krb5time_ldap_time(msg, "whenChanged", 0);
670 /* use 'kadmin' for now (needed by mit_samba) */
671 krb5_make_principal(context,
672 &entry_ex->entry.modified_by->principal,
673 lpcfg_realm(lp_ctx), "kadmin", NULL);
677 /* The lack of password controls etc applies to krbtgt by
678 * virtue of being that particular RID */
679 status = dom_sid_split_rid(NULL, samdb_result_dom_sid(mem_ctx, msg, "objectSid"), NULL, &rid);
681 if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(status)) {
686 if (rid == DOMAIN_RID_KRBTGT) {
687 entry_ex->entry.valid_end = NULL;
688 entry_ex->entry.pw_end = NULL;
690 entry_ex->entry.flags.invalid = 0;
691 entry_ex->entry.flags.server = 1;
693 /* Don't mark all requests for the krbtgt/realm as
694 * 'change password', as otherwise we could get into
695 * trouble, and not enforce the password expirty.
696 * Instead, only do it when request is for the kpasswd service */
697 if (ent_type == SAMBA_KDC_ENT_TYPE_SERVER
698 && principal->name.name_string.len == 2
699 && (strcmp(principal->name.name_string.val[0], "kadmin") == 0)
700 && (strcmp(principal->name.name_string.val[1], "changepw") == 0)
701 && lpcfg_is_my_domain_or_realm(lp_ctx, principal->realm)) {
702 entry_ex->entry.flags.change_pw = 1;
704 entry_ex->entry.flags.client = 0;
705 entry_ex->entry.flags.forwardable = 1;
706 entry_ex->entry.flags.ok_as_delegate = 1;
707 } else if (is_rodc) {
708 /* The RODC krbtgt account is like the main krbtgt,
709 * but it does not have a changepw or kadmin
712 entry_ex->entry.valid_end = NULL;
713 entry_ex->entry.pw_end = NULL;
715 /* Also don't allow the RODC krbtgt to be a client (it should not be needed) */
716 entry_ex->entry.flags.client = 0;
717 entry_ex->entry.flags.invalid = 0;
718 entry_ex->entry.flags.server = 1;
720 entry_ex->entry.flags.client = 0;
721 entry_ex->entry.flags.forwardable = 1;
722 entry_ex->entry.flags.ok_as_delegate = 0;
723 } else if (entry_ex->entry.flags.server && ent_type == SAMBA_KDC_ENT_TYPE_SERVER) {
724 /* The account/password expiry only applies when the account is used as a
725 * client (ie password login), not when used as a server */
727 /* Make very well sure we don't use this for a client,
728 * it could bypass the password restrictions */
729 entry_ex->entry.flags.client = 0;
731 entry_ex->entry.valid_end = NULL;
732 entry_ex->entry.pw_end = NULL;
735 NTTIME must_change_time
736 = samdb_result_force_password_change(kdc_db_ctx->samdb, mem_ctx,
738 if (must_change_time == 0x7FFFFFFFFFFFFFFFULL) {
739 entry_ex->entry.pw_end = NULL;
741 entry_ex->entry.pw_end = malloc(sizeof(*entry_ex->entry.pw_end));
742 if (entry_ex->entry.pw_end == NULL) {
746 *entry_ex->entry.pw_end = nt_time_to_unix(must_change_time);
749 acct_expiry = samdb_result_account_expires(msg);
750 if (acct_expiry == 0x7FFFFFFFFFFFFFFFULL) {
751 entry_ex->entry.valid_end = NULL;
753 entry_ex->entry.valid_end = malloc(sizeof(*entry_ex->entry.valid_end));
754 if (entry_ex->entry.valid_end == NULL) {
758 *entry_ex->entry.valid_end = nt_time_to_unix(acct_expiry);
762 entry_ex->entry.valid_start = NULL;
764 entry_ex->entry.max_life = NULL;
766 entry_ex->entry.max_renew = NULL;
768 entry_ex->entry.generation = NULL;
770 /* Get keys from the db */
771 ret = samba_kdc_message2entry_keys(context, kdc_db_ctx, p, msg,
772 rid, is_rodc, userAccountControl,
775 /* Could be bougus data in the entry, or out of memory */
779 entry_ex->entry.etypes = malloc(sizeof(*(entry_ex->entry.etypes)));
780 if (entry_ex->entry.etypes == NULL) {
781 krb5_clear_error_message(context);
785 entry_ex->entry.etypes->len = entry_ex->entry.keys.len;
786 entry_ex->entry.etypes->val = calloc(entry_ex->entry.etypes->len, sizeof(int));
787 if (entry_ex->entry.etypes->val == NULL) {
788 krb5_clear_error_message(context);
792 for (i=0; i < entry_ex->entry.etypes->len; i++) {
793 entry_ex->entry.etypes->val[i] = entry_ex->entry.keys.val[i].key.keytype;
797 p->msg = talloc_steal(p, msg);
801 /* This doesn't free ent itself, that is for the eventual caller to do */
802 hdb_free_entry(context, entry_ex);
804 talloc_steal(kdc_db_ctx, entry_ex->ctx);
811 * Construct an hdb_entry from a directory entry.
813 static krb5_error_code samba_kdc_trust_message2entry(krb5_context context,
814 struct samba_kdc_db_context *kdc_db_ctx,
815 TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx, krb5_const_principal principal,
816 enum trust_direction direction,
817 struct ldb_dn *realm_dn,
818 struct ldb_message *msg,
819 hdb_entry_ex *entry_ex)
821 struct loadparm_context *lp_ctx = kdc_db_ctx->lp_ctx;
822 const char *dnsdomain;
823 const char *realm = lpcfg_realm(lp_ctx);
824 DATA_BLOB password_utf16;
825 struct samr_Password password_hash;
826 const struct ldb_val *password_val;
827 struct trustAuthInOutBlob password_blob;
828 struct samba_kdc_entry *p;
830 enum ndr_err_code ndr_err;
831 int ret, trust_direction_flags;
834 p = talloc(mem_ctx, struct samba_kdc_entry);
840 p->kdc_db_ctx = kdc_db_ctx;
841 p->entry_ex = entry_ex;
842 p->realm_dn = realm_dn;
844 talloc_set_destructor(p, samba_kdc_entry_destructor);
846 /* make sure we do not have bogus data in there */
847 memset(&entry_ex->entry, 0, sizeof(hdb_entry));
850 entry_ex->free_entry = samba_kdc_free_entry;
852 /* use 'whenCreated' */
853 entry_ex->entry.created_by.time = ldb_msg_find_krb5time_ldap_time(msg, "whenCreated", 0);
854 /* use 'kadmin' for now (needed by mit_samba) */
855 krb5_make_principal(context,
856 &entry_ex->entry.created_by.principal,
857 realm, "kadmin", NULL);
859 entry_ex->entry.valid_start = NULL;
861 trust_direction_flags = ldb_msg_find_attr_as_int(msg, "trustDirection", 0);
863 if (direction == INBOUND) {
864 password_val = ldb_msg_find_ldb_val(msg, "trustAuthIncoming");
866 } else { /* OUTBOUND */
867 dnsdomain = ldb_msg_find_attr_as_string(msg, "trustPartner", NULL);
869 realm = strupper_talloc(mem_ctx, dnsdomain);
870 password_val = ldb_msg_find_ldb_val(msg, "trustAuthOutgoing");
873 if (!password_val || !(trust_direction_flags & direction)) {
878 ndr_err = ndr_pull_struct_blob(password_val, mem_ctx, &password_blob,
879 (ndr_pull_flags_fn_t)ndr_pull_trustAuthInOutBlob);
880 if (!NDR_ERR_CODE_IS_SUCCESS(ndr_err)) {
885 entry_ex->entry.kvno = -1;
886 for (i=0; i < password_blob.count; i++) {
887 if (password_blob.current.array[i].AuthType == TRUST_AUTH_TYPE_VERSION) {
888 entry_ex->entry.kvno = password_blob.current.array[i].AuthInfo.version.version;
892 for (i=0; i < password_blob.count; i++) {
893 if (password_blob.current.array[i].AuthType == TRUST_AUTH_TYPE_CLEAR) {
894 password_utf16 = data_blob_const(password_blob.current.array[i].AuthInfo.clear.password,
895 password_blob.current.array[i].AuthInfo.clear.size);
896 /* In the future, generate all sorts of
897 * hashes, but for now we can't safely convert
898 * the random strings windows uses into
901 /* but as it is utf16 already, we can get the NT password/arcfour-hmac-md5 key */
902 mdfour(password_hash.hash, password_utf16.data, password_utf16.length);
904 } else if (password_blob.current.array[i].AuthType == TRUST_AUTH_TYPE_NT4OWF) {
905 password_hash = password_blob.current.array[i].AuthInfo.nt4owf.password;
910 if (i < password_blob.count) {
912 /* Must have found a cleartext or MD4 password */
913 entry_ex->entry.keys.val = calloc(1, sizeof(Key));
916 key.salt = NULL; /* No salt for this enc type */
918 if (entry_ex->entry.keys.val == NULL) {
923 ret = krb5_keyblock_init(context,
924 ENCTYPE_ARCFOUR_HMAC,
925 password_hash.hash, sizeof(password_hash.hash),
928 entry_ex->entry.keys.val[entry_ex->entry.keys.len] = key;
929 entry_ex->entry.keys.len++;
932 entry_ex->entry.principal = malloc(sizeof(*(entry_ex->entry.principal)));
934 ret = copy_Principal(principal, entry_ex->entry.principal);
936 krb5_clear_error_message(context);
940 /* While we have copied the client principal, tests
941 * show that Win2k3 returns the 'corrected' realm, not
942 * the client-specified realm. This code attempts to
943 * replace the client principal's realm with the one
944 * we determine from our records */
946 krb5_principal_set_realm(context, entry_ex->entry.principal, realm);
947 entry_ex->entry.flags = int2HDBFlags(0);
948 entry_ex->entry.flags.immutable = 1;
949 entry_ex->entry.flags.invalid = 0;
950 entry_ex->entry.flags.server = 1;
951 entry_ex->entry.flags.require_preauth = 1;
953 entry_ex->entry.pw_end = NULL;
955 entry_ex->entry.max_life = NULL;
957 entry_ex->entry.max_renew = NULL;
959 entry_ex->entry.generation = NULL;
961 entry_ex->entry.etypes = malloc(sizeof(*(entry_ex->entry.etypes)));
962 if (entry_ex->entry.etypes == NULL) {
963 krb5_clear_error_message(context);
967 entry_ex->entry.etypes->len = entry_ex->entry.keys.len;
968 entry_ex->entry.etypes->val = calloc(entry_ex->entry.etypes->len, sizeof(int));
969 if (entry_ex->entry.etypes->val == NULL) {
970 krb5_clear_error_message(context);
974 for (i=0; i < entry_ex->entry.etypes->len; i++) {
975 entry_ex->entry.etypes->val[i] = entry_ex->entry.keys.val[i].key.keytype;
979 p->msg = talloc_steal(p, msg);
983 /* This doesn't free ent itself, that is for the eventual caller to do */
984 hdb_free_entry(context, entry_ex);
986 talloc_steal(kdc_db_ctx, entry_ex->ctx);
993 static krb5_error_code samba_kdc_lookup_trust(krb5_context context, struct ldb_context *ldb_ctx,
996 struct ldb_dn *realm_dn,
997 struct ldb_message **pmsg)
1000 krb5_error_code ret;
1001 char *filter = NULL;
1002 const char * const *attrs = trust_attrs;
1004 struct ldb_result *res = NULL;
1005 filter = talloc_asprintf(mem_ctx, "(&(objectClass=trustedDomain)(|(flatname=%s)(trustPartner=%s)))", realm, realm);
1009 krb5_set_error_message(context, ret, "talloc_asprintf: out of memory");
1013 lret = ldb_search(ldb_ctx, mem_ctx, &res,
1014 ldb_get_default_basedn(ldb_ctx),
1015 LDB_SCOPE_SUBTREE, attrs, "%s", filter);
1016 if (lret != LDB_SUCCESS) {
1017 DEBUG(3, ("Failed to search for %s: %s\n", filter, ldb_errstring(ldb_ctx)));
1018 return HDB_ERR_NOENTRY;
1019 } else if (res->count == 0 || res->count > 1) {
1020 DEBUG(3, ("Failed find a single entry for %s: got %d\n", filter, res->count));
1022 return HDB_ERR_NOENTRY;
1024 talloc_steal(mem_ctx, res->msgs);
1025 *pmsg = res->msgs[0];
1030 static krb5_error_code samba_kdc_lookup_client(krb5_context context,
1031 struct samba_kdc_db_context *kdc_db_ctx,
1032 TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx,
1033 krb5_const_principal principal,
1035 struct ldb_dn **realm_dn,
1036 struct ldb_message **msg) {
1038 char *principal_string;
1039 krb5_error_code ret;
1041 ret = krb5_unparse_name(context, principal, &principal_string);
1047 nt_status = sam_get_results_principal(kdc_db_ctx->samdb,
1048 mem_ctx, principal_string, attrs,
1050 free(principal_string);
1051 if (NT_STATUS_EQUAL(nt_status, NT_STATUS_NO_SUCH_USER)) {
1052 return HDB_ERR_NOENTRY;
1053 } else if (NT_STATUS_EQUAL(nt_status, NT_STATUS_NO_MEMORY)) {
1055 } else if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(nt_status)) {
1062 static krb5_error_code samba_kdc_fetch_client(krb5_context context,
1063 struct samba_kdc_db_context *kdc_db_ctx,
1064 TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx,
1065 krb5_const_principal principal,
1067 hdb_entry_ex *entry_ex) {
1068 struct ldb_dn *realm_dn;
1069 krb5_error_code ret;
1070 struct ldb_message *msg = NULL;
1072 ret = samba_kdc_lookup_client(context, kdc_db_ctx,
1073 mem_ctx, principal, user_attrs,
1079 ret = samba_kdc_message2entry(context, kdc_db_ctx, mem_ctx,
1080 principal, SAMBA_KDC_ENT_TYPE_CLIENT,
1082 realm_dn, msg, entry_ex);
1086 static krb5_error_code samba_kdc_fetch_krbtgt(krb5_context context,
1087 struct samba_kdc_db_context *kdc_db_ctx,
1088 TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx,
1089 krb5_const_principal principal,
1091 uint32_t krbtgt_number,
1092 hdb_entry_ex *entry_ex)
1094 struct loadparm_context *lp_ctx = kdc_db_ctx->lp_ctx;
1095 krb5_error_code ret;
1096 struct ldb_message *msg = NULL;
1097 struct ldb_dn *realm_dn = ldb_get_default_basedn(kdc_db_ctx->samdb);
1099 krb5_principal alloc_principal = NULL;
1100 if (principal->name.name_string.len != 2
1101 || (strcmp(principal->name.name_string.val[0], KRB5_TGS_NAME) != 0)) {
1103 return HDB_ERR_NOENTRY;
1106 /* krbtgt case. Either us or a trusted realm */
1108 if (lpcfg_is_my_domain_or_realm(lp_ctx, principal->realm)
1109 && lpcfg_is_my_domain_or_realm(lp_ctx, principal->name.name_string.val[1])) {
1110 /* us, or someone quite like us */
1111 /* Cludge, cludge cludge. If the realm part of krbtgt/realm,
1112 * is in our db, then direct the caller at our primary
1118 if (krbtgt_number == kdc_db_ctx->my_krbtgt_number) {
1119 lret = dsdb_search_one(kdc_db_ctx->samdb, mem_ctx,
1120 &msg, kdc_db_ctx->krbtgt_dn, LDB_SCOPE_BASE,
1122 "(objectClass=user)");
1124 /* We need to look up an RODC krbtgt (perhaps
1125 * ours, if we are an RODC, perhaps another
1126 * RODC if we are a read-write DC */
1127 lret = dsdb_search_one(kdc_db_ctx->samdb, mem_ctx,
1128 &msg, realm_dn, LDB_SCOPE_SUBTREE,
1130 DSDB_SEARCH_SHOW_EXTENDED_DN,
1131 "(&(objectClass=user)(msDS-SecondaryKrbTgtNumber=%u))", (unsigned)(krbtgt_number));
1134 if (lret == LDB_ERR_NO_SUCH_OBJECT) {
1135 krb5_warnx(context, "samba_kdc_fetch: could not find KRBTGT number %u in DB!",
1136 (unsigned)(krbtgt_number));
1137 krb5_set_error_message(context, HDB_ERR_NOENTRY,
1138 "samba_kdc_fetch: could not find KRBTGT number %u in DB!",
1139 (unsigned)(krbtgt_number));
1140 return HDB_ERR_NOENTRY;
1141 } else if (lret != LDB_SUCCESS) {
1142 krb5_warnx(context, "samba_kdc_fetch: could not find KRBTGT number %u in DB!",
1143 (unsigned)(krbtgt_number));
1144 krb5_set_error_message(context, HDB_ERR_NOENTRY,
1145 "samba_kdc_fetch: could not find KRBTGT number %u in DB!",
1146 (unsigned)(krbtgt_number));
1147 return HDB_ERR_NOENTRY;
1150 realm_fixed = strupper_talloc(mem_ctx, lpcfg_realm(lp_ctx));
1153 krb5_set_error_message(context, ret, "strupper_talloc: out of memory");
1157 ret = krb5_copy_principal(context, principal, &alloc_principal);
1162 free(alloc_principal->name.name_string.val[1]);
1163 alloc_principal->name.name_string.val[1] = strdup(realm_fixed);
1164 talloc_free(realm_fixed);
1165 if (!alloc_principal->name.name_string.val[1]) {
1167 krb5_set_error_message(context, ret, "samba_kdc_fetch: strdup() failed!");
1170 principal = alloc_principal;
1172 ret = samba_kdc_message2entry(context, kdc_db_ctx, mem_ctx,
1173 principal, SAMBA_KDC_ENT_TYPE_KRBTGT,
1174 flags, realm_dn, msg, entry_ex);
1176 krb5_warnx(context, "samba_kdc_fetch: self krbtgt message2entry failed");
1181 enum trust_direction direction = UNKNOWN;
1182 const char *realm = NULL;
1184 /* Either an inbound or outbound trust */
1186 if (strcasecmp(lpcfg_realm(lp_ctx), principal->realm) == 0) {
1187 /* look for inbound trust */
1188 direction = INBOUND;
1189 realm = principal->name.name_string.val[1];
1190 } else if (strcasecmp(lpcfg_realm(lp_ctx), principal->name.name_string.val[1]) == 0) {
1191 /* look for outbound trust */
1192 direction = OUTBOUND;
1193 realm = principal->realm;
1195 krb5_warnx(context, "samba_kdc_fetch: not our realm for trusts ('%s', '%s')",
1196 principal->realm, principal->name.name_string.val[1]);
1197 krb5_set_error_message(context, HDB_ERR_NOENTRY, "samba_kdc_fetch: not our realm for trusts ('%s', '%s')",
1198 principal->realm, principal->name.name_string.val[1]);
1199 return HDB_ERR_NOENTRY;
1202 /* Trusted domains are under CN=system */
1204 ret = samba_kdc_lookup_trust(context, kdc_db_ctx->samdb,
1206 realm, realm_dn, &msg);
1209 krb5_warnx(context, "samba_kdc_fetch: could not find principal in DB");
1210 krb5_set_error_message(context, ret, "samba_kdc_fetch: could not find principal in DB");
1214 ret = samba_kdc_trust_message2entry(context, kdc_db_ctx, mem_ctx,
1215 principal, direction,
1216 realm_dn, msg, entry_ex);
1218 krb5_warnx(context, "samba_kdc_fetch: trust_message2entry failed");
1225 static krb5_error_code samba_kdc_lookup_server(krb5_context context,
1226 struct samba_kdc_db_context *kdc_db_ctx,
1227 TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx,
1228 krb5_const_principal principal,
1230 struct ldb_dn **realm_dn,
1231 struct ldb_message **msg)
1233 krb5_error_code ret;
1234 if (principal->name.name_string.len >= 2) {
1235 /* 'normal server' case */
1238 struct ldb_dn *user_dn;
1239 char *principal_string;
1241 ret = krb5_unparse_name_flags(context, principal,
1242 KRB5_PRINCIPAL_UNPARSE_NO_REALM,
1248 /* At this point we may find the host is known to be
1249 * in a different realm, so we should generate a
1250 * referral instead */
1251 nt_status = crack_service_principal_name(kdc_db_ctx->samdb,
1252 mem_ctx, principal_string,
1253 &user_dn, realm_dn);
1254 free(principal_string);
1256 if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(nt_status)) {
1257 return HDB_ERR_NOENTRY;
1260 ldb_ret = dsdb_search_one(kdc_db_ctx->samdb,
1262 msg, user_dn, LDB_SCOPE_BASE,
1263 attrs, DSDB_SEARCH_SHOW_EXTENDED_DN, "(objectClass=*)");
1264 if (ldb_ret != LDB_SUCCESS) {
1265 return HDB_ERR_NOENTRY;
1270 char *filter = NULL;
1273 /* server as client principal case, but we must not lookup userPrincipalNames */
1274 *realm_dn = ldb_get_default_basedn(kdc_db_ctx->samdb);
1275 realm = krb5_principal_get_realm(context, principal);
1277 /* TODO: Check if it is our realm, otherwise give referall */
1279 ret = krb5_unparse_name_flags(context, principal, KRB5_PRINCIPAL_UNPARSE_NO_REALM, &short_princ);
1282 krb5_set_error_message(context, ret, "samba_kdc_lookup_principal: could not parse principal");
1283 krb5_warnx(context, "samba_kdc_lookup_principal: could not parse principal");
1287 lret = dsdb_search_one(kdc_db_ctx->samdb, mem_ctx, msg,
1288 *realm_dn, LDB_SCOPE_SUBTREE,
1290 DSDB_SEARCH_SHOW_EXTENDED_DN,
1291 "(&(objectClass=user)(samAccountName=%s))",
1292 ldb_binary_encode_string(mem_ctx, short_princ));
1294 if (lret == LDB_ERR_NO_SUCH_OBJECT) {
1295 DEBUG(3, ("Failed find a entry for %s\n", filter));
1296 return HDB_ERR_NOENTRY;
1298 if (lret != LDB_SUCCESS) {
1299 DEBUG(3, ("Failed single search for for %s - %s\n",
1300 filter, ldb_errstring(kdc_db_ctx->samdb)));
1301 return HDB_ERR_NOENTRY;
1308 static krb5_error_code samba_kdc_fetch_server(krb5_context context,
1309 struct samba_kdc_db_context *kdc_db_ctx,
1310 TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx,
1311 krb5_const_principal principal,
1313 hdb_entry_ex *entry_ex)
1315 krb5_error_code ret;
1316 struct ldb_dn *realm_dn;
1317 struct ldb_message *msg;
1319 ret = samba_kdc_lookup_server(context, kdc_db_ctx, mem_ctx, principal,
1320 server_attrs, &realm_dn, &msg);
1325 ret = samba_kdc_message2entry(context, kdc_db_ctx, mem_ctx,
1326 principal, SAMBA_KDC_ENT_TYPE_SERVER,
1328 realm_dn, msg, entry_ex);
1330 krb5_warnx(context, "samba_kdc_fetch: message2entry failed");
1336 krb5_error_code samba_kdc_fetch(krb5_context context,
1337 struct samba_kdc_db_context *kdc_db_ctx,
1338 krb5_const_principal principal,
1341 hdb_entry_ex *entry_ex)
1343 krb5_error_code ret = HDB_ERR_NOENTRY;
1344 TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx;
1345 unsigned int krbtgt_number;
1346 if (flags & HDB_F_KVNO_SPECIFIED) {
1347 krbtgt_number = kvno >> 16;
1348 if (kdc_db_ctx->rodc) {
1349 if (krbtgt_number != kdc_db_ctx->my_krbtgt_number) {
1350 return HDB_ERR_NOT_FOUND_HERE;
1354 krbtgt_number = kdc_db_ctx->my_krbtgt_number;
1357 mem_ctx = talloc_named(kdc_db_ctx, 0, "samba_kdc_fetch context");
1360 krb5_set_error_message(context, ret, "samba_kdc_fetch: talloc_named() failed!");
1364 if (flags & HDB_F_GET_CLIENT) {
1365 ret = samba_kdc_fetch_client(context, kdc_db_ctx, mem_ctx, principal, flags, entry_ex);
1366 if (ret != HDB_ERR_NOENTRY) goto done;
1368 if (flags & HDB_F_GET_SERVER) {
1369 /* krbtgt fits into this situation for trusted realms, and for resolving different versions of our own realm name */
1370 ret = samba_kdc_fetch_krbtgt(context, kdc_db_ctx, mem_ctx, principal, flags, krbtgt_number, entry_ex);
1371 if (ret != HDB_ERR_NOENTRY) goto done;
1373 /* We return 'no entry' if it does not start with krbtgt/, so move to the common case quickly */
1374 ret = samba_kdc_fetch_server(context, kdc_db_ctx, mem_ctx, principal, flags, entry_ex);
1375 if (ret != HDB_ERR_NOENTRY) goto done;
1377 if (flags & HDB_F_GET_KRBTGT) {
1378 ret = samba_kdc_fetch_krbtgt(context, kdc_db_ctx, mem_ctx, principal, flags, krbtgt_number, entry_ex);
1379 if (ret != HDB_ERR_NOENTRY) goto done;
1383 talloc_free(mem_ctx);
1387 struct samba_kdc_seq {
1390 struct ldb_message **msgs;
1391 struct ldb_dn *realm_dn;
1394 static krb5_error_code samba_kdc_seq(krb5_context context,
1395 struct samba_kdc_db_context *kdc_db_ctx,
1396 hdb_entry_ex *entry)
1398 krb5_error_code ret;
1399 struct samba_kdc_seq *priv = kdc_db_ctx->seq_ctx;
1400 TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx;
1401 hdb_entry_ex entry_ex;
1402 memset(&entry_ex, '\0', sizeof(entry_ex));
1405 return HDB_ERR_NOENTRY;
1408 mem_ctx = talloc_named(priv, 0, "samba_kdc_seq context");
1412 krb5_set_error_message(context, ret, "samba_kdc_seq: talloc_named() failed!");
1416 if (priv->index < priv->count) {
1417 ret = samba_kdc_message2entry(context, kdc_db_ctx, mem_ctx,
1418 NULL, SAMBA_KDC_ENT_TYPE_ANY,
1419 HDB_F_ADMIN_DATA|HDB_F_GET_ANY,
1420 priv->realm_dn, priv->msgs[priv->index++], entry);
1422 ret = HDB_ERR_NOENTRY;
1427 kdc_db_ctx->seq_ctx = NULL;
1429 talloc_free(mem_ctx);
1435 krb5_error_code samba_kdc_firstkey(krb5_context context,
1436 struct samba_kdc_db_context *kdc_db_ctx,
1437 hdb_entry_ex *entry)
1439 struct ldb_context *ldb_ctx = kdc_db_ctx->samdb;
1440 struct samba_kdc_seq *priv = kdc_db_ctx->seq_ctx;
1442 struct ldb_result *res = NULL;
1443 krb5_error_code ret;
1444 TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx;
1449 kdc_db_ctx->seq_ctx = NULL;
1452 priv = (struct samba_kdc_seq *) talloc(kdc_db_ctx, struct samba_kdc_seq);
1455 krb5_set_error_message(context, ret, "talloc: out of memory");
1461 priv->realm_dn = ldb_get_default_basedn(ldb_ctx);
1464 mem_ctx = talloc_named(priv, 0, "samba_kdc_firstkey context");
1468 krb5_set_error_message(context, ret, "samba_kdc_firstkey: talloc_named() failed!");
1472 ret = krb5_get_default_realm(context, &realm);
1478 lret = ldb_search(ldb_ctx, priv, &res,
1479 priv->realm_dn, LDB_SCOPE_SUBTREE, user_attrs,
1480 "(objectClass=user)");
1482 if (lret != LDB_SUCCESS) {
1484 return HDB_ERR_NOENTRY;
1487 priv->count = res->count;
1488 priv->msgs = talloc_steal(priv, res->msgs);
1491 kdc_db_ctx->seq_ctx = priv;
1493 ret = samba_kdc_seq(context, kdc_db_ctx, entry);
1497 kdc_db_ctx->seq_ctx = NULL;
1499 talloc_free(mem_ctx);
1504 krb5_error_code samba_kdc_nextkey(krb5_context context,
1505 struct samba_kdc_db_context *kdc_db_ctx,
1506 hdb_entry_ex *entry)
1508 return samba_kdc_seq(context, kdc_db_ctx, entry);
1511 /* Check if a given entry may delegate or do s4u2self to this target principal
1513 * This is currently a very nasty hack - allowing only delegation to itself.
1515 * This is shared between the constrained delegation and S4U2Self code.
1518 samba_kdc_check_identical_client_and_server(krb5_context context,
1519 struct samba_kdc_db_context *kdc_db_ctx,
1520 hdb_entry_ex *entry,
1521 krb5_const_principal target_principal)
1523 krb5_error_code ret;
1524 krb5_principal enterprise_prinicpal = NULL;
1525 struct ldb_dn *realm_dn;
1526 struct ldb_message *msg;
1527 struct dom_sid *orig_sid;
1528 struct dom_sid *target_sid;
1529 struct samba_kdc_entry *p = talloc_get_type(entry->ctx, struct samba_kdc_entry);
1530 const char *delegation_check_attrs[] = {
1534 TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx = talloc_named(kdc_db_ctx, 0, "samba_kdc_check_constrained_delegation");
1538 krb5_set_error_message(context, ret, "samba_kdc_fetch: talloc_named() failed!");
1542 if (target_principal->name.name_type == KRB5_NT_ENTERPRISE_PRINCIPAL) {
1543 /* Need to reparse the enterprise principal to find the real target */
1544 if (target_principal->name.name_string.len != 1) {
1545 ret = KRB5_PARSE_MALFORMED;
1546 krb5_set_error_message(context, ret, "samba_kdc_check_constrained_delegation: request for delegation to enterprise principal with wrong (%d) number of components",
1547 target_principal->name.name_string.len);
1548 talloc_free(mem_ctx);
1551 ret = krb5_parse_name(context, target_principal->name.name_string.val[0],
1552 &enterprise_prinicpal);
1554 talloc_free(mem_ctx);
1557 target_principal = enterprise_prinicpal;
1560 ret = samba_kdc_lookup_server(context, kdc_db_ctx, mem_ctx, target_principal,
1561 delegation_check_attrs, &realm_dn, &msg);
1563 krb5_free_principal(context, enterprise_prinicpal);
1566 talloc_free(mem_ctx);
1570 orig_sid = samdb_result_dom_sid(mem_ctx, p->msg, "objectSid");
1571 target_sid = samdb_result_dom_sid(mem_ctx, msg, "objectSid");
1573 /* Allow delegation to the same principal, even if by a different
1574 * name. The easy and safe way to prove this is by SID
1576 if (!(orig_sid && target_sid && dom_sid_equal(orig_sid, target_sid))) {
1577 talloc_free(mem_ctx);
1578 return KRB5KDC_ERR_BADOPTION;
1581 talloc_free(mem_ctx);
1585 /* Certificates printed by a the Certificate Authority might have a
1586 * slightly different form of the user principal name to that in the
1587 * database. Allow a mismatch where they both refer to the same
1591 samba_kdc_check_pkinit_ms_upn_match(krb5_context context,
1592 struct samba_kdc_db_context *kdc_db_ctx,
1593 hdb_entry_ex *entry,
1594 krb5_const_principal certificate_principal)
1596 krb5_error_code ret;
1597 struct ldb_dn *realm_dn;
1598 struct ldb_message *msg;
1599 struct dom_sid *orig_sid;
1600 struct dom_sid *target_sid;
1601 struct samba_kdc_entry *p = talloc_get_type(entry->ctx, struct samba_kdc_entry);
1602 const char *ms_upn_check_attrs[] = {
1606 TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx = talloc_named(kdc_db_ctx, 0, "samba_kdc_check_pkinit_ms_upn_match");
1610 krb5_set_error_message(context, ret, "samba_kdc_fetch: talloc_named() failed!");
1614 ret = samba_kdc_lookup_client(context, kdc_db_ctx,
1615 mem_ctx, certificate_principal,
1616 ms_upn_check_attrs, &realm_dn, &msg);
1619 talloc_free(mem_ctx);
1623 orig_sid = samdb_result_dom_sid(mem_ctx, p->msg, "objectSid");
1624 target_sid = samdb_result_dom_sid(mem_ctx, msg, "objectSid");
1626 /* Consider these to be the same principal, even if by a different
1627 * name. The easy and safe way to prove this is by SID
1629 if (!(orig_sid && target_sid && dom_sid_equal(orig_sid, target_sid))) {
1630 talloc_free(mem_ctx);
1631 return KRB5_KDC_ERR_CLIENT_NAME_MISMATCH;
1634 talloc_free(mem_ctx);
1638 NTSTATUS samba_kdc_setup_db_ctx(TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx, struct samba_kdc_base_context *base_ctx,
1639 struct samba_kdc_db_context **kdc_db_ctx_out)
1642 struct ldb_message *msg;
1643 struct auth_session_info *session_info;
1644 struct samba_kdc_db_context *kdc_db_ctx;
1645 /* The idea here is very simple. Using Kerberos to
1646 * authenticate the KDC to the LDAP server is higly likely to
1649 * In future we may set this up to use EXERNAL and SSL
1650 * certificates, for now it will almost certainly be NTLMSSP_SET_USERNAME
1653 kdc_db_ctx = talloc_zero(mem_ctx, struct samba_kdc_db_context);
1654 if (kdc_db_ctx == NULL) {
1655 return NT_STATUS_NO_MEMORY;
1657 kdc_db_ctx->ev_ctx = base_ctx->ev_ctx;
1658 kdc_db_ctx->lp_ctx = base_ctx->lp_ctx;
1660 session_info = system_session(kdc_db_ctx->lp_ctx);
1661 if (session_info == NULL) {
1662 return NT_STATUS_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1665 /* Setup the link to LDB */
1666 kdc_db_ctx->samdb = samdb_connect(kdc_db_ctx, base_ctx->ev_ctx,
1667 base_ctx->lp_ctx, session_info, 0);
1668 if (kdc_db_ctx->samdb == NULL) {
1669 DEBUG(1, ("hdb_samba4_create: Cannot open samdb for KDC backend!"));
1670 talloc_free(kdc_db_ctx);
1671 return NT_STATUS_CANT_ACCESS_DOMAIN_INFO;
1674 /* Find out our own krbtgt kvno */
1675 ldb_ret = samdb_rodc(kdc_db_ctx->samdb, &kdc_db_ctx->rodc);
1676 if (ldb_ret != LDB_SUCCESS) {
1677 DEBUG(1, ("hdb_samba4_create: Cannot determine if we are an RODC in KDC backend: %s\n",
1678 ldb_errstring(kdc_db_ctx->samdb)));
1679 talloc_free(kdc_db_ctx);
1680 return NT_STATUS_CANT_ACCESS_DOMAIN_INFO;
1682 if (kdc_db_ctx->rodc) {
1683 int my_krbtgt_number;
1684 const char *secondary_keytab[] = { "msDS-SecondaryKrbTgtNumber", NULL };
1685 struct ldb_dn *account_dn;
1686 struct ldb_dn *server_dn = samdb_server_dn(kdc_db_ctx->samdb, kdc_db_ctx);
1688 DEBUG(1, ("hdb_samba4_create: Cannot determine server DN in KDC backend: %s\n",
1689 ldb_errstring(kdc_db_ctx->samdb)));
1690 talloc_free(kdc_db_ctx);
1691 return NT_STATUS_CANT_ACCESS_DOMAIN_INFO;
1694 ldb_ret = samdb_reference_dn(kdc_db_ctx->samdb, kdc_db_ctx, server_dn,
1695 "serverReference", &account_dn);
1696 if (ldb_ret != LDB_SUCCESS) {
1697 DEBUG(1, ("hdb_samba4_create: Cannot determine server account in KDC backend: %s\n",
1698 ldb_errstring(kdc_db_ctx->samdb)));
1699 talloc_free(kdc_db_ctx);
1700 return NT_STATUS_CANT_ACCESS_DOMAIN_INFO;
1703 ldb_ret = samdb_reference_dn(kdc_db_ctx->samdb, kdc_db_ctx, account_dn,
1704 "msDS-KrbTgtLink", &kdc_db_ctx->krbtgt_dn);
1705 talloc_free(account_dn);
1706 if (ldb_ret != LDB_SUCCESS) {
1707 DEBUG(1, ("hdb_samba4_create: Cannot determine RODC krbtgt account in KDC backend: %s\n",
1708 ldb_errstring(kdc_db_ctx->samdb)));
1709 talloc_free(kdc_db_ctx);
1710 return NT_STATUS_CANT_ACCESS_DOMAIN_INFO;
1713 ldb_ret = dsdb_search_one(kdc_db_ctx->samdb, kdc_db_ctx,
1714 &msg, kdc_db_ctx->krbtgt_dn, LDB_SCOPE_BASE,
1717 "(&(objectClass=user)(msDS-SecondaryKrbTgtNumber=*))");
1718 if (ldb_ret != LDB_SUCCESS) {
1719 DEBUG(1, ("hdb_samba4_create: Cannot read krbtgt account %s in KDC backend to get msDS-SecondaryKrbTgtNumber: %s: %s\n",
1720 ldb_dn_get_linearized(kdc_db_ctx->krbtgt_dn),
1721 ldb_errstring(kdc_db_ctx->samdb),
1722 ldb_strerror(ldb_ret)));
1723 talloc_free(kdc_db_ctx);
1724 return NT_STATUS_CANT_ACCESS_DOMAIN_INFO;
1726 my_krbtgt_number = ldb_msg_find_attr_as_int(msg, "msDS-SecondaryKrbTgtNumber", -1);
1727 if (my_krbtgt_number == -1) {
1728 DEBUG(1, ("hdb_samba4_create: Cannot read msDS-SecondaryKrbTgtNumber from krbtgt account %s in KDC backend: got %d\n",
1729 ldb_dn_get_linearized(kdc_db_ctx->krbtgt_dn),
1731 talloc_free(kdc_db_ctx);
1732 return NT_STATUS_CANT_ACCESS_DOMAIN_INFO;
1734 kdc_db_ctx->my_krbtgt_number = my_krbtgt_number;
1737 kdc_db_ctx->my_krbtgt_number = 0;
1738 ldb_ret = dsdb_search_one(kdc_db_ctx->samdb, kdc_db_ctx,
1739 &msg, NULL, LDB_SCOPE_SUBTREE,
1741 DSDB_SEARCH_SHOW_EXTENDED_DN,
1742 "(&(objectClass=user)(samAccountName=krbtgt))");
1744 if (ldb_ret != LDB_SUCCESS) {
1745 DEBUG(1, ("samba_kdc_fetch: could not find own KRBTGT in DB: %s\n", ldb_errstring(kdc_db_ctx->samdb)));
1746 talloc_free(kdc_db_ctx);
1747 return NT_STATUS_CANT_ACCESS_DOMAIN_INFO;
1749 kdc_db_ctx->krbtgt_dn = talloc_steal(kdc_db_ctx, msg->dn);
1750 kdc_db_ctx->my_krbtgt_number = 0;
1753 *kdc_db_ctx_out = kdc_db_ctx;
1754 return NT_STATUS_OK;