2 * Copyright (c) 1997-2007 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan
3 * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden).
6 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
7 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
10 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
11 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
13 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
14 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
15 * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
17 * 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors
18 * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software
19 * without specific prior written permission.
21 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND
22 * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
23 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
24 * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
25 * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
26 * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
27 * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
28 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
29 * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
30 * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
38 #define MAX_TIME ((time_t)((1U << 31) - 1))
41 _kdc_fix_time(time_t **t)
47 if(**t == 0) **t = MAX_TIME; /* fix for old clients */
51 realloc_method_data(METHOD_DATA *md)
54 pa = realloc(md->val, (md->len + 1) * sizeof(*md->val));
63 set_salt_padata (METHOD_DATA *md, Salt *salt)
66 realloc_method_data(md);
67 md->val[md->len - 1].padata_type = salt->type;
68 der_copy_octet_string(&salt->salt,
69 &md->val[md->len - 1].padata_value);
74 _kdc_find_padata(const KDC_REQ *req, int *start, int type)
76 if (req->padata == NULL)
79 while(*start < req->padata->len){
81 if(req->padata->val[*start - 1].padata_type == type)
82 return &req->padata->val[*start - 1];
88 * This is a hack to allow predefined weak services, like afs to
89 * still use weak types
93 _kdc_is_weak_expection(krb5_principal principal, krb5_enctype etype)
95 if (principal->name.name_string.len > 0 &&
96 strcmp(principal->name.name_string.val[0], "afs") == 0 &&
97 (etype == ETYPE_DES_CBC_CRC
98 || etype == ETYPE_DES_CBC_MD4
99 || etype == ETYPE_DES_CBC_MD5))
106 * Detect if `key' is the using the the precomputed `default_salt'.
110 is_default_salt_p(const krb5_salt *default_salt, const Key *key)
112 if (key->salt == NULL)
114 if (default_salt->salttype != key->salt->type)
116 if (krb5_data_cmp(&default_salt->saltvalue, &key->salt->salt))
122 * return the first appropriate key of `princ' in `ret_key'. Look for
123 * all the etypes in (`etypes', `len'), stopping as soon as we find
124 * one, but preferring one that has default salt
128 _kdc_find_etype(krb5_context context, const hdb_entry_ex *princ,
129 krb5_enctype *etypes, unsigned len,
130 Key **ret_key, krb5_enctype *ret_etype)
133 krb5_error_code ret = KRB5KDC_ERR_ETYPE_NOSUPP;
136 krb5_get_pw_salt (context, princ->entry.principal, &def_salt);
138 for(i = 0; ret != 0 && i < len ; i++) {
141 if (krb5_enctype_valid(context, etypes[i]) != 0 &&
142 !_kdc_is_weak_expection(princ->entry.principal, etypes[i]))
145 while (hdb_next_enctype2key(context, &princ->entry, etypes[i], &key) == 0) {
146 if (key->key.keyvalue.length == 0) {
147 ret = KRB5KDC_ERR_NULL_KEY;
151 *ret_etype = etypes[i];
153 if (is_default_salt_p(&def_salt, key)) {
154 krb5_free_salt (context, def_salt);
159 krb5_free_salt (context, def_salt);
164 _kdc_make_anonymous_principalname (PrincipalName *pn)
166 pn->name_type = KRB5_NT_PRINCIPAL;
167 pn->name_string.len = 1;
168 pn->name_string.val = malloc(sizeof(*pn->name_string.val));
169 if (pn->name_string.val == NULL)
171 pn->name_string.val[0] = strdup("anonymous");
172 if (pn->name_string.val[0] == NULL) {
173 free(pn->name_string.val);
174 pn->name_string.val = NULL;
181 _kdc_log_timestamp(krb5_context context,
182 krb5_kdc_configuration *config,
184 KerberosTime authtime, KerberosTime *starttime,
185 KerberosTime endtime, KerberosTime *renew_till)
187 char authtime_str[100], starttime_str[100],
188 endtime_str[100], renewtime_str[100];
190 krb5_format_time(context, authtime,
191 authtime_str, sizeof(authtime_str), TRUE);
193 krb5_format_time(context, *starttime,
194 starttime_str, sizeof(starttime_str), TRUE);
196 strlcpy(starttime_str, "unset", sizeof(starttime_str));
197 krb5_format_time(context, endtime,
198 endtime_str, sizeof(endtime_str), TRUE);
200 krb5_format_time(context, *renew_till,
201 renewtime_str, sizeof(renewtime_str), TRUE);
203 strlcpy(renewtime_str, "unset", sizeof(renewtime_str));
205 kdc_log(context, config, 5,
206 "%s authtime: %s starttime: %s endtime: %s renew till: %s",
207 type, authtime_str, starttime_str, endtime_str, renewtime_str);
211 log_patypes(krb5_context context,
212 krb5_kdc_configuration *config,
215 struct rk_strpool *p = NULL;
219 for (i = 0; i < padata->len; i++) {
220 switch(padata->val[i].padata_type) {
221 case KRB5_PADATA_PK_AS_REQ:
222 p = rk_strpoolprintf(p, "PK-INIT(ietf)");
224 case KRB5_PADATA_PK_AS_REQ_WIN:
225 p = rk_strpoolprintf(p, "PK-INIT(win2k)");
227 case KRB5_PADATA_PA_PK_OCSP_RESPONSE:
228 p = rk_strpoolprintf(p, "OCSP");
230 case KRB5_PADATA_ENC_TIMESTAMP:
231 p = rk_strpoolprintf(p, "encrypted-timestamp");
234 p = rk_strpoolprintf(p, "%d", padata->val[i].padata_type);
237 if (p && i + 1 < padata->len)
238 p = rk_strpoolprintf(p, ", ");
240 kdc_log(context, config, 0, "out of memory");
245 p = rk_strpoolprintf(p, "none");
247 str = rk_strpoolcollect(p);
248 kdc_log(context, config, 0, "Client sent patypes: %s", str);
258 _kdc_encode_reply(krb5_context context,
259 krb5_kdc_configuration *config,
260 KDC_REP *rep, const EncTicketPart *et, EncKDCRepPart *ek,
262 int skvno, const EncryptionKey *skey,
263 int ckvno, const EncryptionKey *ckey,
273 ASN1_MALLOC_ENCODE(EncTicketPart, buf, buf_size, et, &len, ret);
275 kdc_log(context, config, 0, "Failed to encode ticket: %s",
276 krb5_get_err_text(context, ret));
279 if(buf_size != len) {
281 kdc_log(context, config, 0, "Internal error in ASN.1 encoder");
282 *e_text = "KDC internal error";
283 return KRB5KRB_ERR_GENERIC;
286 ret = krb5_crypto_init(context, skey, etype, &crypto);
289 kdc_log(context, config, 0, "krb5_crypto_init failed: %s",
290 krb5_get_err_text(context, ret));
294 ret = krb5_encrypt_EncryptedData(context,
300 &rep->ticket.enc_part);
302 krb5_crypto_destroy(context, crypto);
304 kdc_log(context, config, 0, "Failed to encrypt data: %s",
305 krb5_get_err_text(context, ret));
309 if(rep->msg_type == krb_as_rep && !config->encode_as_rep_as_tgs_rep)
310 ASN1_MALLOC_ENCODE(EncASRepPart, buf, buf_size, ek, &len, ret);
312 ASN1_MALLOC_ENCODE(EncTGSRepPart, buf, buf_size, ek, &len, ret);
314 kdc_log(context, config, 0, "Failed to encode KDC-REP: %s",
315 krb5_get_err_text(context, ret));
318 if(buf_size != len) {
320 kdc_log(context, config, 0, "Internal error in ASN.1 encoder");
321 *e_text = "KDC internal error";
322 return KRB5KRB_ERR_GENERIC;
324 ret = krb5_crypto_init(context, ckey, 0, &crypto);
327 kdc_log(context, config, 0, "krb5_crypto_init failed: %s",
328 krb5_get_err_text(context, ret));
331 if(rep->msg_type == krb_as_rep) {
332 krb5_encrypt_EncryptedData(context,
334 KRB5_KU_AS_REP_ENC_PART,
340 ASN1_MALLOC_ENCODE(AS_REP, buf, buf_size, rep, &len, ret);
342 krb5_encrypt_EncryptedData(context,
344 KRB5_KU_TGS_REP_ENC_PART_SESSION,
350 ASN1_MALLOC_ENCODE(TGS_REP, buf, buf_size, rep, &len, ret);
352 krb5_crypto_destroy(context, crypto);
354 kdc_log(context, config, 0, "Failed to encode KDC-REP: %s",
355 krb5_get_err_text(context, ret));
358 if(buf_size != len) {
360 kdc_log(context, config, 0, "Internal error in ASN.1 encoder");
361 *e_text = "KDC internal error";
362 return KRB5KRB_ERR_GENERIC;
365 reply->length = buf_size;
370 * Return 1 if the client have only older enctypes, this is for
371 * determining if the server should send ETYPE_INFO2 or not.
375 older_enctype(krb5_enctype enctype)
378 case ETYPE_DES_CBC_CRC:
379 case ETYPE_DES_CBC_MD4:
380 case ETYPE_DES_CBC_MD5:
381 case ETYPE_DES3_CBC_SHA1:
382 case ETYPE_ARCFOUR_HMAC_MD5:
383 case ETYPE_ARCFOUR_HMAC_MD5_56:
385 * The following three is "old" windows enctypes and is needed for
386 * windows 2000 hosts.
388 case ETYPE_ARCFOUR_MD4:
389 case ETYPE_ARCFOUR_HMAC_OLD:
390 case ETYPE_ARCFOUR_HMAC_OLD_EXP:
398 only_older_enctype_p(const KDC_REQ *req)
402 for(i = 0; i < req->req_body.etype.len; i++) {
403 if (!older_enctype(req->req_body.etype.val[i]))
413 static krb5_error_code
414 make_etype_info_entry(krb5_context context, ETYPE_INFO_ENTRY *ent, Key *key)
416 ent->etype = key->key.keytype;
419 ALLOC(ent->salttype);
421 if(key->salt->type == hdb_pw_salt)
422 *ent->salttype = 0; /* or 1? or NULL? */
423 else if(key->salt->type == hdb_afs3_salt)
426 kdc_log(context, config, 0, "unknown salt-type: %d",
428 return KRB5KRB_ERR_GENERIC;
430 /* according to `the specs', we can't send a salt if
431 we have AFS3 salted key, but that requires that you
432 *know* what cell you are using (e.g by assuming
433 that the cell is the same as the realm in lower
436 ALLOC(ent->salttype);
437 *ent->salttype = key->salt->type;
440 * We shouldn't sent salttype since it is incompatible with the
441 * specification and it breaks windows clients. The afs
442 * salting problem is solved by using KRB5-PADATA-AFS3-SALT
443 * implemented in Heimdal 0.7 and later.
445 ent->salttype = NULL;
447 krb5_copy_data(context, &key->salt->salt,
450 /* we return no salt type at all, as that should indicate
451 * the default salt type and make everybody happy. some
452 * systems (like w2k) dislike being told the salt type
455 ent->salttype = NULL;
461 static krb5_error_code
462 get_pa_etype_info(krb5_context context,
463 krb5_kdc_configuration *config,
464 METHOD_DATA *md, hdb_entry *client,
465 ENCTYPE *etypes, unsigned int etypes_len)
467 krb5_error_code ret = 0;
475 pa.len = client->keys.len;
476 if(pa.len > UINT_MAX/sizeof(*pa.val))
478 pa.val = malloc(pa.len * sizeof(*pa.val));
481 memset(pa.val, 0, pa.len * sizeof(*pa.val));
483 for(i = 0; i < client->keys.len; i++) {
484 for (j = 0; j < n; j++)
485 if (pa.val[j].etype == client->keys.val[i].key.keytype)
487 for(j = 0; j < etypes_len; j++) {
488 if(client->keys.val[i].key.keytype == etypes[j]) {
489 if (krb5_enctype_valid(context, etypes[j]) != 0)
491 if (!older_enctype(etypes[j]))
494 krb5_abortx(context, "internal error: n >= p.len");
495 if((ret = make_etype_info_entry(context,
497 &client->keys.val[i])) != 0) {
498 free_ETYPE_INFO(&pa);
506 for(i = 0; i < client->keys.len; i++) {
508 for(j = 0; j < etypes_len; j++) {
509 if(client->keys.val[i].key.keytype == etypes[j])
512 if (krb5_enctype_valid(context, client->keys.val[i].key.keytype) != 0)
514 if (!older_enctype(etypes[j]))
517 krb5_abortx(context, "internal error: n >= p.len");
518 if((ret = make_etype_info_entry(context,
520 &client->keys.val[i])) != 0) {
521 free_ETYPE_INFO(&pa);
528 /* stripped out dups, newer enctypes, and not valid enctypes */
532 ASN1_MALLOC_ENCODE(ETYPE_INFO, buf, len, &pa, &len, ret);
533 free_ETYPE_INFO(&pa);
536 ret = realloc_method_data(md);
541 md->val[md->len - 1].padata_type = KRB5_PADATA_ETYPE_INFO;
542 md->val[md->len - 1].padata_value.length = len;
543 md->val[md->len - 1].padata_value.data = buf;
551 extern int _krb5_AES_string_to_default_iterator;
553 static krb5_error_code
554 make_etype_info2_entry(ETYPE_INFO2_ENTRY *ent, Key *key)
556 ent->etype = key->key.keytype;
559 if (ent->salt == NULL)
561 *ent->salt = malloc(key->salt->salt.length + 1);
562 if (*ent->salt == NULL) {
567 memcpy(*ent->salt, key->salt->salt.data, key->salt->salt.length);
568 (*ent->salt)[key->salt->salt.length] = '\0';
572 ent->s2kparams = NULL;
574 switch (key->key.keytype) {
575 case ETYPE_AES128_CTS_HMAC_SHA1_96:
576 case ETYPE_AES256_CTS_HMAC_SHA1_96:
577 ALLOC(ent->s2kparams);
578 if (ent->s2kparams == NULL)
580 ent->s2kparams->length = 4;
581 ent->s2kparams->data = malloc(ent->s2kparams->length);
582 if (ent->s2kparams->data == NULL) {
583 free(ent->s2kparams);
584 ent->s2kparams = NULL;
587 _krb5_put_int(ent->s2kparams->data,
588 _krb5_AES_string_to_default_iterator,
589 ent->s2kparams->length);
591 case ETYPE_DES_CBC_CRC:
592 case ETYPE_DES_CBC_MD4:
593 case ETYPE_DES_CBC_MD5:
594 /* Check if this was a AFS3 salted key */
595 if(key->salt && key->salt->type == hdb_afs3_salt){
596 ALLOC(ent->s2kparams);
597 if (ent->s2kparams == NULL)
599 ent->s2kparams->length = 1;
600 ent->s2kparams->data = malloc(ent->s2kparams->length);
601 if (ent->s2kparams->data == NULL) {
602 free(ent->s2kparams);
603 ent->s2kparams = NULL;
606 _krb5_put_int(ent->s2kparams->data,
608 ent->s2kparams->length);
618 * Return an ETYPE-INFO2. Enctypes are storted the same way as in the
619 * database (client supported enctypes first, then the unsupported
623 static krb5_error_code
624 get_pa_etype_info2(krb5_context context,
625 krb5_kdc_configuration *config,
626 METHOD_DATA *md, hdb_entry *client,
627 ENCTYPE *etypes, unsigned int etypes_len)
629 krb5_error_code ret = 0;
636 pa.len = client->keys.len;
637 if(pa.len > UINT_MAX/sizeof(*pa.val))
639 pa.val = malloc(pa.len * sizeof(*pa.val));
642 memset(pa.val, 0, pa.len * sizeof(*pa.val));
644 for(i = 0; i < client->keys.len; i++) {
645 for (j = 0; j < n; j++)
646 if (pa.val[j].etype == client->keys.val[i].key.keytype)
648 for(j = 0; j < etypes_len; j++) {
649 if(client->keys.val[i].key.keytype == etypes[j]) {
650 if (krb5_enctype_valid(context, etypes[j]) != 0)
653 krb5_abortx(context, "internal error: n >= p.len");
654 if((ret = make_etype_info2_entry(&pa.val[n++],
655 &client->keys.val[i])) != 0) {
656 free_ETYPE_INFO2(&pa);
664 /* send enctypes that the client doesn't know about too */
665 for(i = 0; i < client->keys.len; i++) {
667 for(j = 0; j < etypes_len; j++) {
668 if(client->keys.val[i].key.keytype == etypes[j])
671 if (krb5_enctype_valid(context, client->keys.val[i].key.keytype) != 0)
674 krb5_abortx(context, "internal error: n >= p.len");
675 if((ret = make_etype_info2_entry(&pa.val[n++],
676 &client->keys.val[i])) != 0) {
677 free_ETYPE_INFO2(&pa);
684 /* stripped out dups, and not valid enctypes */
688 ASN1_MALLOC_ENCODE(ETYPE_INFO2, buf, len, &pa, &len, ret);
689 free_ETYPE_INFO2(&pa);
692 ret = realloc_method_data(md);
697 md->val[md->len - 1].padata_type = KRB5_PADATA_ETYPE_INFO2;
698 md->val[md->len - 1].padata_value.length = len;
699 md->val[md->len - 1].padata_value.data = buf;
708 log_as_req(krb5_context context,
709 krb5_kdc_configuration *config,
712 const KDC_REQ_BODY *b)
715 struct rk_strpool *p = NULL;
719 for (i = 0; i < b->etype.len; i++) {
720 ret = krb5_enctype_to_string(context, b->etype.val[i], &str);
722 p = rk_strpoolprintf(p, "%s", str);
725 p = rk_strpoolprintf(p, "%d", b->etype.val[i]);
726 if (p && i + 1 < b->etype.len)
727 p = rk_strpoolprintf(p, ", ");
729 kdc_log(context, config, 0, "out of memory");
734 p = rk_strpoolprintf(p, "no encryption types");
736 str = rk_strpoolcollect(p);
737 kdc_log(context, config, 0, "Client supported enctypes: %s", str);
744 ret = krb5_enctype_to_string(context, cetype, &cet);
746 ret = krb5_enctype_to_string(context, setype, &set);
748 kdc_log(context, config, 5, "Using %s/%s", cet, set);
754 kdc_log(context, config, 5, "Using e-types %d/%d", cetype, setype);
759 unparse_flags(KDCOptions2int(b->kdc_options), asn1_KDCOptions_units(),
760 fixedstr, sizeof(fixedstr));
762 kdc_log(context, config, 2, "Requested flags: %s", fixedstr);
767 * verify the flags on `client' and `server', returning 0
768 * if they are OK and generating an error messages and returning
769 * and error code otherwise.
773 _kdc_check_flags(krb5_context context,
774 krb5_kdc_configuration *config,
775 hdb_entry_ex *client_ex, const char *client_name,
776 hdb_entry_ex *server_ex, const char *server_name,
777 krb5_boolean is_as_req)
779 if(client_ex != NULL) {
780 hdb_entry *client = &client_ex->entry;
783 if (client->flags.invalid) {
784 kdc_log(context, config, 0,
785 "Client (%s) has invalid bit set", client_name);
786 return KRB5KDC_ERR_POLICY;
789 if(!client->flags.client){
790 kdc_log(context, config, 0,
791 "Principal may not act as client -- %s", client_name);
792 return KRB5KDC_ERR_POLICY;
795 if (client->valid_start && *client->valid_start > kdc_time) {
796 char starttime_str[100];
797 krb5_format_time(context, *client->valid_start,
798 starttime_str, sizeof(starttime_str), TRUE);
799 kdc_log(context, config, 0,
800 "Client not yet valid until %s -- %s",
801 starttime_str, client_name);
802 return KRB5KDC_ERR_CLIENT_NOTYET;
805 if (client->valid_end && *client->valid_end < kdc_time) {
806 char endtime_str[100];
807 krb5_format_time(context, *client->valid_end,
808 endtime_str, sizeof(endtime_str), TRUE);
809 kdc_log(context, config, 0,
810 "Client expired at %s -- %s",
811 endtime_str, client_name);
812 return KRB5KDC_ERR_NAME_EXP;
815 if (client->pw_end && *client->pw_end < kdc_time
816 && (server_ex == NULL || !server_ex->entry.flags.change_pw)) {
818 krb5_format_time(context, *client->pw_end,
819 pwend_str, sizeof(pwend_str), TRUE);
820 kdc_log(context, config, 0,
821 "Client's key has expired at %s -- %s",
822 pwend_str, client_name);
823 return KRB5KDC_ERR_KEY_EXPIRED;
829 if (server_ex != NULL) {
830 hdb_entry *server = &server_ex->entry;
832 if (server->flags.invalid) {
833 kdc_log(context, config, 0,
834 "Server has invalid flag set -- %s", server_name);
835 return KRB5KDC_ERR_POLICY;
838 if(!server->flags.server){
839 kdc_log(context, config, 0,
840 "Principal may not act as server -- %s", server_name);
841 return KRB5KDC_ERR_POLICY;
844 if(!is_as_req && server->flags.initial) {
845 kdc_log(context, config, 0,
846 "AS-REQ is required for server -- %s", server_name);
847 return KRB5KDC_ERR_POLICY;
850 if (server->valid_start && *server->valid_start > kdc_time) {
851 char starttime_str[100];
852 krb5_format_time(context, *server->valid_start,
853 starttime_str, sizeof(starttime_str), TRUE);
854 kdc_log(context, config, 0,
855 "Server not yet valid until %s -- %s",
856 starttime_str, server_name);
857 return KRB5KDC_ERR_SERVICE_NOTYET;
860 if (server->valid_end && *server->valid_end < kdc_time) {
861 char endtime_str[100];
862 krb5_format_time(context, *server->valid_end,
863 endtime_str, sizeof(endtime_str), TRUE);
864 kdc_log(context, config, 0,
865 "Server expired at %s -- %s",
866 endtime_str, server_name);
867 return KRB5KDC_ERR_SERVICE_EXP;
870 if (server->pw_end && *server->pw_end < kdc_time) {
872 krb5_format_time(context, *server->pw_end,
873 pwend_str, sizeof(pwend_str), TRUE);
874 kdc_log(context, config, 0,
875 "Server's key has expired at -- %s",
876 pwend_str, server_name);
877 return KRB5KDC_ERR_KEY_EXPIRED;
884 * Return TRUE if `from' is part of `addresses' taking into consideration
885 * the configuration variables that tells us how strict we should be about
890 _kdc_check_addresses(krb5_context context,
891 krb5_kdc_configuration *config,
892 HostAddresses *addresses, const struct sockaddr *from)
897 krb5_boolean only_netbios = TRUE;
900 if(config->check_ticket_addresses == 0)
903 if(addresses == NULL)
904 return config->allow_null_ticket_addresses;
906 for (i = 0; i < addresses->len; ++i) {
907 if (addresses->val[i].addr_type != KRB5_ADDRESS_NETBIOS) {
908 only_netbios = FALSE;
912 /* Windows sends it's netbios name, which I can only assume is
913 * used for the 'allowed workstations' check. This is painful,
914 * but we still want to check IP addresses if they happen to be
919 return config->allow_null_ticket_addresses;
921 ret = krb5_sockaddr2address (context, from, &addr);
925 result = krb5_address_search(context, &addr, addresses);
926 krb5_free_address (context, &addr);
935 send_pac_p(krb5_context context, KDC_REQ *req)
938 PA_PAC_REQUEST pacreq;
942 pa = _kdc_find_padata(req, &i, KRB5_PADATA_PA_PAC_REQUEST);
946 ret = decode_PA_PAC_REQUEST(pa->padata_value.data,
947 pa->padata_value.length,
952 i = pacreq.include_pac;
953 free_PA_PAC_REQUEST(&pacreq);
964 _kdc_as_rep(krb5_context context,
965 krb5_kdc_configuration *config,
967 const krb5_data *req_buffer,
970 struct sockaddr *from_addr,
973 KDC_REQ_BODY *b = &req->req_body;
975 KDCOptions f = b->kdc_options;
976 hdb_entry_ex *client = NULL, *server = NULL;
977 krb5_enctype cetype, setype, sessionetype;
981 krb5_principal client_princ = NULL, server_princ = NULL;
982 char *client_name = NULL, *server_name = NULL;
983 krb5_error_code ret = 0;
984 const char *e_text = NULL;
987 EncryptionKey *reply_key;
990 pk_client_params *pkp = NULL;
993 memset(&rep, 0, sizeof(rep));
994 krb5_data_zero(&e_data);
997 flags |= HDB_F_CANON;
999 if(b->sname == NULL){
1000 ret = KRB5KRB_ERR_GENERIC;
1001 e_text = "No server in request";
1003 ret = _krb5_principalname2krb5_principal (context,
1008 ret = krb5_unparse_name(context, server_princ, &server_name);
1011 kdc_log(context, config, 0,
1012 "AS-REQ malformed server name from %s", from);
1016 if(b->cname == NULL){
1017 ret = KRB5KRB_ERR_GENERIC;
1018 e_text = "No client in request";
1021 if (b->cname->name_type == KRB5_NT_ENTERPRISE_PRINCIPAL) {
1022 if (b->cname->name_string.len != 1) {
1023 kdc_log(context, config, 0,
1024 "AS-REQ malformed canon request from %s, "
1025 "enterprise name with %d name components",
1026 from, b->cname->name_string.len);
1027 ret = KRB5_PARSE_MALFORMED;
1030 ret = krb5_parse_name(context, b->cname->name_string.val[0],
1035 ret = _krb5_principalname2krb5_principal (context,
1042 ret = krb5_unparse_name(context, client_princ, &client_name);
1045 kdc_log(context, config, 0,
1046 "AS-REQ malformed client name from %s", from);
1050 kdc_log(context, config, 0, "AS-REQ %s from %s for %s",
1051 client_name, from, server_name);
1053 ret = _kdc_db_fetch(context, config, client_princ,
1054 HDB_F_GET_CLIENT | flags, NULL, &client);
1056 kdc_log(context, config, 0, "UNKNOWN -- %s: %s", client_name,
1057 krb5_get_err_text(context, ret));
1058 ret = KRB5KDC_ERR_C_PRINCIPAL_UNKNOWN;
1062 ret = _kdc_db_fetch(context, config, server_princ,
1063 HDB_F_GET_SERVER|HDB_F_GET_KRBTGT,
1066 kdc_log(context, config, 0, "UNKNOWN -- %s: %s", server_name,
1067 krb5_get_err_text(context, ret));
1068 ret = KRB5KDC_ERR_S_PRINCIPAL_UNKNOWN;
1072 ret = _kdc_windc_client_access(context, client, req, &e_data);
1076 ret = _kdc_check_flags(context, config,
1077 client, client_name,
1078 server, server_name,
1083 memset(&et, 0, sizeof(et));
1084 memset(&ek, 0, sizeof(ek));
1091 log_patypes(context, config, req->padata);
1094 kdc_log(context, config, 5,
1095 "Looking for PKINIT pa-data -- %s", client_name);
1097 e_text = "No PKINIT PA found";
1100 if ((pa = _kdc_find_padata(req, &i, KRB5_PADATA_PK_AS_REQ)))
1104 if((pa = _kdc_find_padata(req, &i, KRB5_PADATA_PK_AS_REQ_WIN)))
1108 char *client_cert = NULL;
1110 ret = _kdc_pk_rd_padata(context, config, req, pa, &pkp);
1112 ret = KRB5KRB_AP_ERR_BAD_INTEGRITY;
1113 kdc_log(context, config, 5,
1114 "Failed to decode PKINIT PA-DATA -- %s",
1118 if (ret == 0 && pkp == NULL)
1121 ret = _kdc_pk_check_client(context,
1127 e_text = "PKINIT certificate not allowed to "
1128 "impersonate principal";
1129 _kdc_pk_free_client_param(context, pkp);
1131 kdc_log(context, config, 0, "%s", e_text);
1136 et.flags.pre_authent = 1;
1137 kdc_log(context, config, 0,
1138 "PKINIT pre-authentication succeeded -- %s using %s",
1139 client_name, client_cert);
1146 kdc_log(context, config, 5, "Looking for ENC-TS pa-data -- %s",
1150 e_text = "No ENC-TS found";
1151 while((pa = _kdc_find_padata(req, &i, KRB5_PADATA_ENC_TIMESTAMP))){
1155 EncryptedData enc_data;
1161 ret = decode_EncryptedData(pa->padata_value.data,
1162 pa->padata_value.length,
1166 ret = KRB5KRB_AP_ERR_BAD_INTEGRITY;
1167 kdc_log(context, config, 5, "Failed to decode PA-DATA -- %s",
1172 ret = hdb_enctype2key(context, &client->entry,
1173 enc_data.etype, &pa_key);
1176 e_text = "No key matches pa-data";
1177 ret = KRB5KDC_ERR_ETYPE_NOSUPP;
1178 if(krb5_enctype_to_string(context, enc_data.etype, &estr))
1181 kdc_log(context, config, 5,
1182 "No client key matching pa-data (%d) -- %s",
1183 enc_data.etype, client_name);
1185 kdc_log(context, config, 5,
1186 "No client key matching pa-data (%s) -- %s",
1190 free_EncryptedData(&enc_data);
1195 ret = krb5_crypto_init(context, &pa_key->key, 0, &crypto);
1197 kdc_log(context, config, 0, "krb5_crypto_init failed: %s",
1198 krb5_get_err_text(context, ret));
1199 free_EncryptedData(&enc_data);
1203 ret = krb5_decrypt_EncryptedData (context,
1205 KRB5_KU_PA_ENC_TIMESTAMP,
1208 krb5_crypto_destroy(context, crypto);
1210 krb5_error_code ret2;
1211 ret2 = krb5_enctype_to_string(context,
1212 pa_key->key.keytype, &str);
1215 kdc_log(context, config, 5,
1216 "Failed to decrypt PA-DATA -- %s "
1217 "(enctype %s) error %s",
1219 str ? str : "unknown enctype",
1220 krb5_get_err_text(context, ret));
1223 if(hdb_next_enctype2key(context, &client->entry,
1224 enc_data.etype, &pa_key) == 0)
1226 e_text = "Failed to decrypt PA-DATA";
1228 free_EncryptedData(&enc_data);
1229 ret = KRB5KDC_ERR_PREAUTH_FAILED;
1232 free_EncryptedData(&enc_data);
1233 ret = decode_PA_ENC_TS_ENC(ts_data.data,
1237 krb5_data_free(&ts_data);
1239 e_text = "Failed to decode PA-ENC-TS-ENC";
1240 ret = KRB5KDC_ERR_PREAUTH_FAILED;
1241 kdc_log(context, config,
1242 5, "Failed to decode PA-ENC-TS_ENC -- %s",
1246 free_PA_ENC_TS_ENC(&p);
1247 if (abs(kdc_time - p.patimestamp) > context->max_skew) {
1248 char client_time[100];
1250 krb5_format_time(context, p.patimestamp,
1251 client_time, sizeof(client_time), TRUE);
1253 ret = KRB5KRB_AP_ERR_SKEW;
1254 kdc_log(context, config, 0,
1255 "Too large time skew, "
1256 "client time %s is out by %u > %u seconds -- %s",
1258 (unsigned)abs(kdc_time - p.patimestamp),
1262 /* This code is from samba, needs testing */
1264 * the following is needed to make windows clients
1265 * to retry using the timestamp in the error message
1267 * this is maybe a bug in windows to not trying when e_text
1272 e_text = "Too large time skew";
1276 et.flags.pre_authent = 1;
1278 ret = krb5_enctype_to_string(context,pa_key->key.keytype, &str);
1282 kdc_log(context, config, 2,
1283 "ENC-TS Pre-authentication succeeded -- %s using %s",
1284 client_name, str ? str : "unknown enctype");
1291 if(found_pa == 0 && config->require_preauth)
1293 /* We come here if we found a pa-enc-timestamp, but if there
1294 was some problem with it, other than too large skew */
1295 if(found_pa && et.flags.pre_authent == 0){
1296 kdc_log(context, config, 0, "%s -- %s", e_text, client_name);
1300 }else if (config->require_preauth
1301 || client->entry.flags.require_preauth
1302 || server->entry.flags.require_preauth) {
1303 METHOD_DATA method_data;
1309 method_data.len = 0;
1310 method_data.val = NULL;
1312 ret = realloc_method_data(&method_data);
1313 pa = &method_data.val[method_data.len-1];
1314 pa->padata_type = KRB5_PADATA_ENC_TIMESTAMP;
1315 pa->padata_value.length = 0;
1316 pa->padata_value.data = NULL;
1319 ret = realloc_method_data(&method_data);
1320 pa = &method_data.val[method_data.len-1];
1321 pa->padata_type = KRB5_PADATA_PK_AS_REQ;
1322 pa->padata_value.length = 0;
1323 pa->padata_value.data = NULL;
1325 ret = realloc_method_data(&method_data);
1326 pa = &method_data.val[method_data.len-1];
1327 pa->padata_type = KRB5_PADATA_PK_AS_REQ_WIN;
1328 pa->padata_value.length = 0;
1329 pa->padata_value.data = NULL;
1334 * - If the client only knows about old enctypes, then send
1335 * both info replies (we send 'info' first in the list).
1336 * - If the client is 'modern', because it knows about 'new'
1337 * enctype types, then only send the 'info2' reply.
1341 if (only_older_enctype_p(req))
1342 ret = get_pa_etype_info(context, config,
1343 &method_data, &client->entry,
1344 b->etype.val, b->etype.len);
1346 ret = get_pa_etype_info2(context, config, &method_data,
1347 &client->entry, b->etype.val, b->etype.len);
1350 ASN1_MALLOC_ENCODE(METHOD_DATA, buf, len, &method_data, &len, ret);
1351 free_METHOD_DATA(&method_data);
1354 e_data.length = len;
1355 e_text ="Need to use PA-ENC-TIMESTAMP/PA-PK-AS-REQ",
1357 ret = KRB5KDC_ERR_PREAUTH_REQUIRED;
1359 kdc_log(context, config, 0,
1360 "No preauth found, returning PREAUTH-REQUIRED -- %s",
1366 * Find the client key (for preauth ENC-TS verification and reply
1367 * encryption). Then the best encryption type for the KDC and
1368 * last the best session key that shared between the client and
1369 * KDC runtime enctypes.
1372 ret = _kdc_find_etype(context, client, b->etype.val, b->etype.len,
1375 kdc_log(context, config, 0,
1376 "Client (%s) has no support for etypes", client_name);
1380 ret = _kdc_get_preferred_key(context, config,
1381 server, server_name,
1387 * Select a session enctype from the list of the crypto systems
1388 * supported enctype, is supported by the client and is one of the
1389 * enctype of the enctype of the krbtgt.
1391 * The later is used as a hint what enctype all KDC are supporting
1392 * to make sure a newer version of KDC wont generate a session
1393 * enctype that and older version of a KDC in the same realm can't
1396 * But if the KDC admin is paranoid and doesn't want to have "no
1397 * the best" enctypes on the krbtgt, lets save the best pick from
1398 * the client list and hope that that will work for any other
1402 const krb5_enctype *p;
1403 krb5_enctype clientbest = ETYPE_NULL;
1406 p = krb5_kerberos_enctypes(context);
1408 sessionetype = ETYPE_NULL;
1410 for (i = 0; p[i] != ETYPE_NULL && sessionetype == ETYPE_NULL; i++) {
1411 if (krb5_enctype_valid(context, p[i]) != 0)
1414 for (j = 0; j < b->etype.len && sessionetype == ETYPE_NULL; j++) {
1416 /* check with client */
1417 if (p[i] != b->etype.val[j])
1419 /* save best of union of { client, crypto system } */
1420 if (clientbest == ETYPE_NULL)
1422 /* check with krbtgt */
1423 ret = hdb_enctype2key(context, &server->entry, p[i], &dummy);
1426 sessionetype = p[i];
1429 /* if krbtgt had no shared keys with client, pick clients best */
1430 if (clientbest != ETYPE_NULL && sessionetype == ETYPE_NULL) {
1431 sessionetype = clientbest;
1432 } else if (sessionetype == ETYPE_NULL) {
1433 kdc_log(context, config, 0,
1434 "Client (%s) from %s has no common enctypes with KDC"
1435 "to use for the session key",
1441 log_as_req(context, config, cetype, setype, b);
1443 if(f.renew || f.validate || f.proxy || f.forwarded || f.enc_tkt_in_skey
1444 || (f.request_anonymous && !config->allow_anonymous)) {
1445 ret = KRB5KDC_ERR_BADOPTION;
1446 kdc_log(context, config, 0, "Bad KDC options -- %s", client_name);
1451 rep.msg_type = krb_as_rep;
1452 copy_Realm(&client->entry.principal->realm, &rep.crealm);
1453 if (f.request_anonymous)
1454 _kdc_make_anonymous_principalname (&rep.cname);
1456 _krb5_principal2principalname(&rep.cname,
1457 client->entry.principal);
1458 rep.ticket.tkt_vno = 5;
1459 copy_Realm(&server->entry.principal->realm, &rep.ticket.realm);
1460 _krb5_principal2principalname(&rep.ticket.sname,
1461 server->entry.principal);
1462 /* java 1.6 expects the name to be the same type, lets allow that
1463 * uncomplicated name-types. */
1464 #define CNT(sp,t) (((sp)->sname->name_type) == KRB5_NT_##t)
1465 if (CNT(b, UNKNOWN) || CNT(b, PRINCIPAL) || CNT(b, SRV_INST) || CNT(b, SRV_HST) || CNT(b, SRV_XHST))
1466 rep.ticket.sname.name_type = b->sname->name_type;
1469 et.flags.initial = 1;
1470 if(client->entry.flags.forwardable && server->entry.flags.forwardable)
1471 et.flags.forwardable = f.forwardable;
1472 else if (f.forwardable) {
1473 ret = KRB5KDC_ERR_POLICY;
1474 kdc_log(context, config, 0,
1475 "Ticket may not be forwardable -- %s", client_name);
1478 if(client->entry.flags.proxiable && server->entry.flags.proxiable)
1479 et.flags.proxiable = f.proxiable;
1480 else if (f.proxiable) {
1481 ret = KRB5KDC_ERR_POLICY;
1482 kdc_log(context, config, 0,
1483 "Ticket may not be proxiable -- %s", client_name);
1486 if(client->entry.flags.postdate && server->entry.flags.postdate)
1487 et.flags.may_postdate = f.allow_postdate;
1488 else if (f.allow_postdate){
1489 ret = KRB5KDC_ERR_POLICY;
1490 kdc_log(context, config, 0,
1491 "Ticket may not be postdatable -- %s", client_name);
1495 /* check for valid set of addresses */
1496 if(!_kdc_check_addresses(context, config, b->addresses, from_addr)) {
1497 ret = KRB5KRB_AP_ERR_BADADDR;
1498 kdc_log(context, config, 0,
1499 "Bad address list requested -- %s", client_name);
1503 ret = krb5_generate_random_keyblock(context, sessionetype, &et.key);
1506 copy_PrincipalName(&rep.cname, &et.cname);
1507 copy_Realm(&rep.crealm, &et.crealm);
1513 start = et.authtime = kdc_time;
1515 if(f.postdated && req->req_body.from){
1516 ALLOC(et.starttime);
1517 start = *et.starttime = *req->req_body.from;
1518 et.flags.invalid = 1;
1519 et.flags.postdated = 1; /* XXX ??? */
1521 _kdc_fix_time(&b->till);
1524 /* be careful not overflowing */
1526 if(client->entry.max_life)
1527 t = start + min(t - start, *client->entry.max_life);
1528 if(server->entry.max_life)
1529 t = start + min(t - start, *server->entry.max_life);
1531 t = min(t, start + realm->max_life);
1534 if(f.renewable_ok && et.endtime < *b->till){
1536 if(b->rtime == NULL){
1540 if(*b->rtime < *b->till)
1541 *b->rtime = *b->till;
1543 if(f.renewable && b->rtime){
1547 if(client->entry.max_renew)
1548 t = start + min(t - start, *client->entry.max_renew);
1549 if(server->entry.max_renew)
1550 t = start + min(t - start, *server->entry.max_renew);
1552 t = min(t, start + realm->max_renew);
1554 ALLOC(et.renew_till);
1556 et.flags.renewable = 1;
1560 if (f.request_anonymous)
1561 et.flags.anonymous = 1;
1565 copy_HostAddresses(b->addresses, et.caddr);
1568 et.transited.tr_type = DOMAIN_X500_COMPRESS;
1569 krb5_data_zero(&et.transited.contents);
1571 copy_EncryptionKey(&et.key, &ek.key);
1573 /* The MIT ASN.1 library (obviously) doesn't tell lengths encoded
1574 * as 0 and as 0x80 (meaning indefinite length) apart, and is thus
1575 * incapable of correctly decoding SEQUENCE OF's of zero length.
1577 * To fix this, always send at least one no-op last_req
1579 * If there's a pw_end or valid_end we will use that,
1580 * otherwise just a dummy lr.
1582 ek.last_req.val = malloc(2 * sizeof(*ek.last_req.val));
1583 if (ek.last_req.val == NULL) {
1587 ek.last_req.len = 0;
1588 if (client->entry.pw_end
1589 && (config->kdc_warn_pwexpire == 0
1590 || kdc_time + config->kdc_warn_pwexpire >= *client->entry.pw_end)) {
1591 ek.last_req.val[ek.last_req.len].lr_type = LR_PW_EXPTIME;
1592 ek.last_req.val[ek.last_req.len].lr_value = *client->entry.pw_end;
1595 if (client->entry.valid_end) {
1596 ek.last_req.val[ek.last_req.len].lr_type = LR_ACCT_EXPTIME;
1597 ek.last_req.val[ek.last_req.len].lr_value = *client->entry.valid_end;
1600 if (ek.last_req.len == 0) {
1601 ek.last_req.val[ek.last_req.len].lr_type = LR_NONE;
1602 ek.last_req.val[ek.last_req.len].lr_value = 0;
1605 ek.nonce = b->nonce;
1606 if (client->entry.valid_end || client->entry.pw_end) {
1607 ALLOC(ek.key_expiration);
1608 if (client->entry.valid_end) {
1609 if (client->entry.pw_end)
1610 *ek.key_expiration = min(*client->entry.valid_end,
1611 *client->entry.pw_end);
1613 *ek.key_expiration = *client->entry.valid_end;
1615 *ek.key_expiration = *client->entry.pw_end;
1617 ek.key_expiration = NULL;
1618 ek.flags = et.flags;
1619 ek.authtime = et.authtime;
1621 ALLOC(ek.starttime);
1622 *ek.starttime = *et.starttime;
1624 ek.endtime = et.endtime;
1625 if (et.renew_till) {
1626 ALLOC(ek.renew_till);
1627 *ek.renew_till = *et.renew_till;
1629 copy_Realm(&rep.ticket.realm, &ek.srealm);
1630 copy_PrincipalName(&rep.ticket.sname, &ek.sname);
1633 copy_HostAddresses(et.caddr, ek.caddr);
1637 rep.padata->len = 0;
1638 rep.padata->val = NULL;
1640 reply_key = &ckey->key;
1643 ret = _kdc_pk_mk_pa_reply(context, config, pkp, client,
1645 &reply_key, rep.padata);
1648 ret = _kdc_add_inital_verified_cas(context,
1657 set_salt_padata (rep.padata, ckey->salt);
1659 /* Add signing of alias referral */
1660 if (f.canonicalize) {
1661 PA_ClientCanonicalized canon;
1667 memset(&canon, 0, sizeof(canon));
1669 canon.names.requested_name = *b->cname;
1670 canon.names.mapped_name = client->entry.principal->name;
1672 ASN1_MALLOC_ENCODE(PA_ClientCanonicalizedNames, data.data, data.length,
1673 &canon.names, &len, ret);
1676 if (data.length != len)
1677 krb5_abortx(context, "internal asn.1 error");
1679 /* sign using "returned session key" */
1680 ret = krb5_crypto_init(context, &et.key, 0, &crypto);
1686 ret = krb5_create_checksum(context, crypto,
1687 KRB5_KU_CANONICALIZED_NAMES, 0,
1688 data.data, data.length,
1689 &canon.canon_checksum);
1691 krb5_crypto_destroy(context, crypto);
1695 ASN1_MALLOC_ENCODE(PA_ClientCanonicalized, data.data, data.length,
1697 free_Checksum(&canon.canon_checksum);
1700 if (data.length != len)
1701 krb5_abortx(context, "internal asn.1 error");
1703 pa.padata_type = KRB5_PADATA_CLIENT_CANONICALIZED;
1704 pa.padata_value = data;
1705 ret = add_METHOD_DATA(rep.padata, &pa);
1711 if (rep.padata->len == 0) {
1717 if (send_pac_p(context, req)) {
1721 ret = _kdc_pac_generate(context, client, &p);
1723 kdc_log(context, config, 0, "PAC generation failed for -- %s",
1728 ret = _krb5_pac_sign(context, p, et.authtime,
1729 client->entry.principal,
1730 &skey->key, /* Server key */
1731 &skey->key, /* FIXME: should be krbtgt key */
1733 krb5_pac_free(context, p);
1735 kdc_log(context, config, 0, "PAC signing failed for -- %s",
1740 ret = _kdc_tkt_add_if_relevant_ad(context, &et,
1741 KRB5_AUTHDATA_WIN2K_PAC,
1743 krb5_data_free(&data);
1749 _kdc_log_timestamp(context, config, "AS-REQ", et.authtime, et.starttime,
1750 et.endtime, et.renew_till);
1752 /* do this as the last thing since this signs the EncTicketPart */
1753 ret = _kdc_add_KRB5SignedPath(context,
1763 ret = _kdc_encode_reply(context, config,
1764 &rep, &et, &ek, setype, server->entry.kvno,
1765 &skey->key, client->entry.kvno,
1766 reply_key, &e_text, reply);
1767 free_EncTicketPart(&et);
1768 free_EncKDCRepPart(&ek);
1773 if (datagram_reply && reply->length > config->max_datagram_reply_length) {
1774 krb5_data_free(reply);
1775 ret = KRB5KRB_ERR_RESPONSE_TOO_BIG;
1776 e_text = "Reply packet too large";
1782 krb5_mk_error(context,
1785 (e_data.data ? &e_data : NULL),
1795 _kdc_pk_free_client_param(context, pkp);
1800 krb5_free_principal(context, client_princ);
1803 krb5_free_principal(context, server_princ);
1806 _kdc_free_ent(context, client);
1808 _kdc_free_ent(context, server);
1813 * Add the AuthorizationData `data´ of `type´ to the last element in
1814 * the sequence of authorization_data in `tkt´ wrapped in an IF_RELEVANT
1818 _kdc_tkt_add_if_relevant_ad(krb5_context context,
1821 const krb5_data *data)
1823 krb5_error_code ret;
1826 if (tkt->authorization_data == NULL) {
1827 tkt->authorization_data = calloc(1, sizeof(*tkt->authorization_data));
1828 if (tkt->authorization_data == NULL) {
1829 krb5_set_error_message(context, ENOMEM, "out of memory");
1834 /* add the entry to the last element */
1836 AuthorizationData ad = { 0, NULL };
1837 AuthorizationDataElement ade;
1840 ade.ad_data = *data;
1842 ret = add_AuthorizationData(&ad, &ade);
1844 krb5_set_error_message(context, ret, "add AuthorizationData failed");
1848 ade.ad_type = KRB5_AUTHDATA_IF_RELEVANT;
1850 ASN1_MALLOC_ENCODE(AuthorizationData,
1851 ade.ad_data.data, ade.ad_data.length,
1853 free_AuthorizationData(&ad);
1855 krb5_set_error_message(context, ret, "ASN.1 encode of "
1856 "AuthorizationData failed");
1859 if (ade.ad_data.length != size)
1860 krb5_abortx(context, "internal asn.1 encoder error");
1862 ret = add_AuthorizationData(tkt->authorization_data, &ade);
1863 der_free_octet_string(&ade.ad_data);
1865 krb5_set_error_message(context, ret, "add AuthorizationData failed");