-/*
+/*
Unix SMB/CIFS implementation.
PAC Glue between Samba and the KDC
-
- Copyright (C) Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org> 2005
+
+ Copyright (C) Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org> 2005-2009
+ Copyright (C) Simo Sorce <idra@samba.org> 2010
This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
- the Free Software Foundation; either version 2 of the License, or
+ the Free Software Foundation; either version 3 of the License, or
(at your option) any later version.
-
+
This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the
GNU General Public License for more details.
-
+
You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
- along with this program; if not, write to the Free Software
- Foundation, Inc., 675 Mass Ave, Cambridge, MA 02139, USA.
+ along with this program. If not, see <http://www.gnu.org/licenses/>.
*/
#include "includes.h"
-#include "kdc/kdc.h"
+#include "../libds/common/flags.h"
+#include <ldb.h>
+#include "auth/auth.h"
+#include "auth/auth_sam_reply.h"
+#include "system/kerberos.h"
+#include "auth/kerberos/kerberos.h"
+#include <hdb.h>
+#include "kdc/samba_kdc.h"
+#include "kdc/pac-glue.h"
+#include "param/param.h"
+#include "librpc/gen_ndr/ndr_krb5pac.h"
+#include "libcli/security/security.h"
+#include "dsdb/samdb/samdb.h"
+#include "auth/kerberos/pac_utils.h"
- krb5_error_code samba_get_pac(krb5_context context,
- struct krb5_kdc_configuration *config,
- krb5_principal client,
- krb5_keyblock *keyblock,
- krb5_data *pac)
+static
+NTSTATUS samba_get_logon_info_pac_blob(TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx,
+ struct auth_user_info_dc *info,
+ DATA_BLOB *pac_data)
{
- krb5_error_code ret;
+ struct netr_SamInfo3 *info3;
+ union PAC_INFO pac_info;
+ enum ndr_err_code ndr_err;
NTSTATUS nt_status;
- struct auth_serversupplied_info *server_info;
- char *username, *p;
- const char *realm;
- TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx = talloc_named(config, 0, "samba_get_pac context");
+
+ ZERO_STRUCT(pac_info);
+
+ nt_status = auth_convert_user_info_dc_saminfo3(mem_ctx, info, &info3);
+ if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(nt_status)) {
+ DEBUG(1, ("Getting Samba info failed: %s\n",
+ nt_errstr(nt_status)));
+ return nt_status;
+ }
+
+ pac_info.logon_info.info = talloc_zero(mem_ctx, struct PAC_LOGON_INFO);
+ if (!pac_info.logon_info.info) {
+ return NT_STATUS_NO_MEMORY;
+ }
+
+ pac_info.logon_info.info->info3 = *info3;
+
+ ndr_err = ndr_push_union_blob(pac_data, mem_ctx, &pac_info,
+ PAC_TYPE_LOGON_INFO,
+ (ndr_push_flags_fn_t)ndr_push_PAC_INFO);
+ if (!NDR_ERR_CODE_IS_SUCCESS(ndr_err)) {
+ nt_status = ndr_map_error2ntstatus(ndr_err);
+ DEBUG(1, ("PAC (presig) push failed: %s\n",
+ nt_errstr(nt_status)));
+ return nt_status;
+ }
+
+ return NT_STATUS_OK;
+}
+
+krb5_error_code samba_make_krb5_pac(krb5_context context,
+ DATA_BLOB *pac_blob,
+ DATA_BLOB *deleg_blob,
+ krb5_pac *pac)
+{
+ krb5_data pac_data;
+ krb5_data deleg_data;
+ krb5_error_code ret;
+
+ /* The user account may be set not to want the PAC */
+ if (!pac_blob) {
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ ret = krb5_copy_data_contents(&pac_data,
+ pac_blob->data,
+ pac_blob->length);
+ if (ret != 0) {
+ return ret;
+ }
+
+ ZERO_STRUCT(deleg_data);
+ if (deleg_blob) {
+ ret = krb5_copy_data_contents(&deleg_data,
+ deleg_blob->data,
+ deleg_blob->length);
+ if (ret != 0) {
+ kerberos_free_data_contents(context, &pac_data);
+ return ret;
+ }
+ }
+
+ ret = krb5_pac_init(context, pac);
+ if (ret != 0) {
+ kerberos_free_data_contents(context, &pac_data);
+ kerberos_free_data_contents(context, &deleg_data);
+ return ret;
+ }
+
+ ret = krb5_pac_add_buffer(context, *pac, PAC_TYPE_LOGON_INFO, &pac_data);
+ kerberos_free_data_contents(context, &pac_data);
+ if (ret != 0) {
+ kerberos_free_data_contents(context, &deleg_data);
+ return ret;
+ }
+
+ if (deleg_blob) {
+ ret = krb5_pac_add_buffer(context, *pac,
+ PAC_TYPE_CONSTRAINED_DELEGATION,
+ &deleg_data);
+ kerberos_free_data_contents(context, &deleg_data);
+ if (ret != 0) {
+ return ret;
+ }
+ }
+
+ return ret;
+}
+
+bool samba_princ_needs_pac(struct hdb_entry_ex *princ)
+{
+
+ struct samba_kdc_entry *p = talloc_get_type(princ->ctx, struct samba_kdc_entry);
+ uint32_t userAccountControl;
+
+
+ /* The service account may be set not to want the PAC */
+ userAccountControl = ldb_msg_find_attr_as_uint(p->msg, "userAccountControl", 0);
+ if (userAccountControl & UF_NO_AUTH_DATA_REQUIRED) {
+ return false;
+ }
+
+ return true;
+}
+
+/* Was the krbtgt in this DB (ie, should we check the incoming signature) and was it an RODC */
+int samba_krbtgt_is_in_db(struct hdb_entry_ex *princ, bool *is_in_db, bool *is_untrusted)
+{
+ NTSTATUS status;
+ struct samba_kdc_entry *p = talloc_get_type(princ->ctx, struct samba_kdc_entry);
+ int rodc_krbtgt_number, trust_direction;
+ uint32_t rid;
+
+ TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx = talloc_new(NULL);
if (!mem_ctx) {
return ENOMEM;
}
+
+ trust_direction = ldb_msg_find_attr_as_int(p->msg, "trustDirection", 0);
+
+ if (trust_direction != 0) {
+ /* Domain trust - we cannot check the sig, but we trust it for a correct PAC
+
+ This is exactly where we should flag for SID
+ validation when we do inter-foreest trusts
+ */
+ talloc_free(mem_ctx);
+ *is_untrusted = false;
+ *is_in_db = false;
+ return 0;
+ }
- ret = krb5_unparse_name(context, client, &username);
+ /* The lack of password controls etc applies to krbtgt by
+ * virtue of being that particular RID */
+ status = dom_sid_split_rid(NULL, samdb_result_dom_sid(mem_ctx, p->msg, "objectSid"), NULL, &rid);
- if (ret != 0) {
- krb5_set_error_string(context, "get pac: could not parse principal");
- krb5_warnx(context, "get pac: could not parse principal");
+ if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(status)) {
talloc_free(mem_ctx);
- return ret;
+ return EINVAL;
+ }
+
+ rodc_krbtgt_number = ldb_msg_find_attr_as_int(p->msg, "msDS-SecondaryKrbTgtNumber", -1);
+
+ if (p->kdc_db_ctx->my_krbtgt_number == 0) {
+ if (rid == DOMAIN_RID_KRBTGT) {
+ *is_untrusted = false;
+ *is_in_db = true;
+ talloc_free(mem_ctx);
+ return 0;
+ } else if (rodc_krbtgt_number != -1) {
+ *is_in_db = true;
+ *is_untrusted = true;
+ talloc_free(mem_ctx);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ } else if ((rid != DOMAIN_RID_KRBTGT) && (rodc_krbtgt_number == p->kdc_db_ctx->my_krbtgt_number)) {
+ talloc_free(mem_ctx);
+ *is_untrusted = false;
+ *is_in_db = true;
+ return 0;
+ } else if (rid == DOMAIN_RID_KRBTGT) {
+ /* krbtgt viewed from an RODC */
+ talloc_free(mem_ctx);
+ *is_untrusted = false;
+ *is_in_db = false;
+ return 0;
}
- /* parse the principal name */
- realm = krb5_principal_get_realm(context, client);
- username = talloc_strdup(mem_ctx, username);
- p = strchr(username, '@');
- if (p) {
- p[0] = '\0';
+ /* Another RODC */
+ talloc_free(mem_ctx);
+ *is_untrusted = true;
+ *is_in_db = false;
+ return 0;
+}
+
+NTSTATUS samba_kdc_get_pac_blob(TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx,
+ struct hdb_entry_ex *client,
+ DATA_BLOB **_pac_blob)
+{
+ struct samba_kdc_entry *p = talloc_get_type(client->ctx, struct samba_kdc_entry);
+ struct auth_user_info_dc *user_info_dc;
+ DATA_BLOB *pac_blob;
+ NTSTATUS nt_status;
+
+ /* The user account may be set not to want the PAC */
+ if ( ! samba_princ_needs_pac(client)) {
+ *_pac_blob = NULL;
+ return NT_STATUS_OK;
}
+ pac_blob = talloc_zero(mem_ctx, DATA_BLOB);
+ if (!pac_blob) {
+ return NT_STATUS_NO_MEMORY;
+ }
- nt_status = sam_get_server_info(mem_ctx, username, realm,
- data_blob(NULL, 0), data_blob(NULL, 0),
- &server_info);
+ nt_status = authsam_make_user_info_dc(mem_ctx, p->kdc_db_ctx->samdb,
+ lpcfg_netbios_name(p->kdc_db_ctx->lp_ctx),
+ lpcfg_sam_name(p->kdc_db_ctx->lp_ctx),
+ p->realm_dn,
+ p->msg,
+ data_blob(NULL, 0),
+ data_blob(NULL, 0),
+ &user_info_dc);
if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(nt_status)) {
DEBUG(0, ("Getting user info for PAC failed: %s\n",
nt_errstr(nt_status)));
- talloc_free(mem_ctx);
- return EINVAL;
+ return nt_status;
}
- ret = kerberos_encode_pac(mem_ctx, server_info,
- context,
- keyblock,
- pac);
+ nt_status = samba_get_logon_info_pac_blob(mem_ctx, user_info_dc, pac_blob);
+ if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(nt_status)) {
+ DEBUG(0, ("Building PAC failed: %s\n",
+ nt_errstr(nt_status)));
+ return nt_status;
+ }
+
+ *_pac_blob = pac_blob;
+ return NT_STATUS_OK;
+}
+
+NTSTATUS samba_kdc_update_pac_blob(TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx,
+ krb5_context context,
+ const krb5_pac pac, DATA_BLOB *pac_blob,
+ struct PAC_SIGNATURE_DATA *pac_srv_sig,
+ struct PAC_SIGNATURE_DATA *pac_kdc_sig)
+{
+ struct auth_user_info_dc *user_info_dc;
+ krb5_error_code ret;
+ NTSTATUS nt_status;
+
+ ret = kerberos_pac_to_user_info_dc(mem_ctx, pac,
+ context, &user_info_dc, pac_srv_sig, pac_kdc_sig);
+ if (ret) {
+ return NT_STATUS_UNSUCCESSFUL;
+ }
+
+ nt_status = samba_get_logon_info_pac_blob(mem_ctx,
+ user_info_dc, pac_blob);
+
+ return nt_status;
+}
+
+NTSTATUS samba_kdc_update_delegation_info_blob(TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx,
+ krb5_context context,
+ const krb5_pac pac,
+ const krb5_principal server_principal,
+ const krb5_principal proxy_principal,
+ DATA_BLOB *new_blob)
+{
+ krb5_data old_data;
+ DATA_BLOB old_blob;
+ krb5_error_code ret;
+ NTSTATUS nt_status;
+ enum ndr_err_code ndr_err;
+ union PAC_INFO info;
+ struct PAC_CONSTRAINED_DELEGATION _d;
+ struct PAC_CONSTRAINED_DELEGATION *d = NULL;
+ char *server = NULL;
+ char *proxy = NULL;
+ uint32_t i;
+ TALLOC_CTX *tmp_ctx = talloc_new(mem_ctx);
+
+ if (tmp_ctx == NULL) {
+ return NT_STATUS_NO_MEMORY;
+ }
+
+ ret = krb5_pac_get_buffer(context, pac, PAC_TYPE_CONSTRAINED_DELEGATION, &old_data);
+ if (ret == ENOENT) {
+ ZERO_STRUCT(old_data);
+ } else if (ret) {
+ talloc_free(tmp_ctx);
+ return NT_STATUS_UNSUCCESSFUL;
+ }
+
+ old_blob.length = old_data.length;
+ old_blob.data = (uint8_t *)old_data.data;
+
+ ZERO_STRUCT(info);
+ if (old_blob.length > 0) {
+ ndr_err = ndr_pull_union_blob(&old_blob, mem_ctx,
+ &info, PAC_TYPE_CONSTRAINED_DELEGATION,
+ (ndr_pull_flags_fn_t)ndr_pull_PAC_INFO);
+ if (!NDR_ERR_CODE_IS_SUCCESS(ndr_err)) {
+ kerberos_free_data_contents(context, &old_data);
+ nt_status = ndr_map_error2ntstatus(ndr_err);
+ DEBUG(0,("can't parse the PAC LOGON_INFO: %s\n", nt_errstr(nt_status)));
+ talloc_free(tmp_ctx);
+ return nt_status;
+ }
+ } else {
+ ZERO_STRUCT(_d);
+ info.constrained_delegation.info = &_d;
+ }
+ kerberos_free_data_contents(context, &old_data);
+
+ ret = krb5_unparse_name(context, server_principal, &server);
+ if (ret) {
+ talloc_free(tmp_ctx);
+ return NT_STATUS_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+ }
+
+ ret = krb5_unparse_name_flags(context, proxy_principal,
+ KRB5_PRINCIPAL_UNPARSE_NO_REALM, &proxy);
+ if (ret) {
+ SAFE_FREE(server);
+ talloc_free(tmp_ctx);
+ return NT_STATUS_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+ }
+
+ d = info.constrained_delegation.info;
+ i = d->num_transited_services;
+ d->proxy_target.string = server;
+ d->transited_services = talloc_realloc(mem_ctx, d->transited_services,
+ struct lsa_String, i + 1);
+ d->transited_services[i].string = proxy;
+ d->num_transited_services = i + 1;
+
+ ndr_err = ndr_push_union_blob(new_blob, mem_ctx,
+ &info, PAC_TYPE_CONSTRAINED_DELEGATION,
+ (ndr_push_flags_fn_t)ndr_push_PAC_INFO);
+ SAFE_FREE(server);
+ SAFE_FREE(proxy);
+ if (!NDR_ERR_CODE_IS_SUCCESS(ndr_err)) {
+ kerberos_free_data_contents(context, &old_data);
+ nt_status = ndr_map_error2ntstatus(ndr_err);
+ DEBUG(0,("can't parse the PAC LOGON_INFO: %s\n", nt_errstr(nt_status)));
+ talloc_free(tmp_ctx);
+ return nt_status;
+ }
+
+ talloc_free(tmp_ctx);
+ return NT_STATUS_OK;
+}
+
+/* this function allocates 'data' using malloc.
+ * The caller is responsible for freeing it */
+void samba_kdc_build_edata_reply(NTSTATUS nt_status, DATA_BLOB *e_data)
+{
+ PA_DATA pa;
+ unsigned char *buf;
+ size_t len;
+ krb5_error_code ret = 0;
+
+ if (!e_data)
+ return;
+
+ pa.padata_type = KRB5_PADATA_PW_SALT;
+ pa.padata_value.length = 12;
+ pa.padata_value.data = malloc(pa.padata_value.length);
+ if (!pa.padata_value.data) {
+ e_data->length = 0;
+ e_data->data = NULL;
+ return;
+ }
+
+ SIVAL(pa.padata_value.data, 0, NT_STATUS_V(nt_status));
+ SIVAL(pa.padata_value.data, 4, 0);
+ SIVAL(pa.padata_value.data, 8, 1);
+
+ ASN1_MALLOC_ENCODE(PA_DATA, buf, len, &pa, &len, ret);
+ free(pa.padata_value.data);
+
+ e_data->data = buf;
+ e_data->length = len;
+
+ return;
+}
+
+/* function to map policy errors */
+krb5_error_code samba_kdc_map_policy_err(NTSTATUS nt_status)
+{
+ krb5_error_code ret;
+
+ if (NT_STATUS_EQUAL(nt_status, NT_STATUS_PASSWORD_MUST_CHANGE))
+ ret = KRB5KDC_ERR_KEY_EXP;
+ else if (NT_STATUS_EQUAL(nt_status, NT_STATUS_PASSWORD_EXPIRED))
+ ret = KRB5KDC_ERR_KEY_EXP;
+ else if (NT_STATUS_EQUAL(nt_status, NT_STATUS_ACCOUNT_EXPIRED))
+ ret = KRB5KDC_ERR_CLIENT_REVOKED;
+ else if (NT_STATUS_EQUAL(nt_status, NT_STATUS_ACCOUNT_DISABLED))
+ ret = KRB5KDC_ERR_CLIENT_REVOKED;
+ else if (NT_STATUS_EQUAL(nt_status, NT_STATUS_INVALID_LOGON_HOURS))
+ ret = KRB5KDC_ERR_CLIENT_REVOKED;
+ else if (NT_STATUS_EQUAL(nt_status, NT_STATUS_ACCOUNT_LOCKED_OUT))
+ ret = KRB5KDC_ERR_CLIENT_REVOKED;
+ else if (NT_STATUS_EQUAL(nt_status, NT_STATUS_INVALID_WORKSTATION))
+ ret = KRB5KDC_ERR_POLICY;
+ else
+ ret = KRB5KDC_ERR_POLICY;
- talloc_free(mem_ctx);
-
return ret;
}
+
+/* Given a kdc entry, consult the account_ok routine in auth/auth_sam.c
+ * for consistency */
+NTSTATUS samba_kdc_check_client_access(struct samba_kdc_entry *kdc_entry,
+ const char *client_name,
+ const char *workstation,
+ bool password_change)
+{
+ TALLOC_CTX *tmp_ctx;
+ NTSTATUS nt_status;
+
+ tmp_ctx = talloc_named(NULL, 0, "samba_kdc_check_client_access");
+ if (!tmp_ctx) {
+ return NT_STATUS_NO_MEMORY;
+ }
+
+ /* we allow all kinds of trusts here */
+ nt_status = authsam_account_ok(tmp_ctx,
+ kdc_entry->kdc_db_ctx->samdb,
+ MSV1_0_ALLOW_SERVER_TRUST_ACCOUNT |
+ MSV1_0_ALLOW_WORKSTATION_TRUST_ACCOUNT,
+ kdc_entry->realm_dn, kdc_entry->msg,
+ workstation, client_name,
+ true, password_change);
+
+ talloc_free(tmp_ctx);
+ return nt_status;
+}
+
+int kdc_check_pac(krb5_context context,
+ DATA_BLOB srv_sig,
+ struct PAC_SIGNATURE_DATA *kdc_sig,
+ hdb_entry_ex *ent)
+{
+ krb5_enctype etype;
+ int ret;
+ krb5_keyblock keyblock;
+ Key *key;
+ if (kdc_sig->type == CKSUMTYPE_HMAC_MD5) {
+ etype = ENCTYPE_ARCFOUR_HMAC;
+ } else {
+ ret = krb5_cksumtype_to_enctype(context,
+ kdc_sig->type,
+ &etype);
+ if (ret != 0) {
+ return ret;
+ }
+ }
+
+#if HDB_ENCTYPE2KEY_TAKES_KEYSET
+ ret = hdb_enctype2key(context, &ent->entry, NULL, etype, &key);
+#else
+ ret = hdb_enctype2key(context, &ent->entry, etype, &key);
+#endif
+
+ if (ret != 0) {
+ return ret;
+ }
+
+ keyblock = key->key;
+
+ return check_pac_checksum(srv_sig, kdc_sig,
+ context, &keyblock);
+}
+
+
+
git.samba.org / kai / samba-autobuild / .git / blobdiff