#include "auth/auth_sam.h"
#include "db_wrap.h"
#include "dsdb/samdb/samdb.h"
+#include "librpc/ndr/libndr.h"
+#include "librpc/gen_ndr/ndr_drsblobs.h"
+#include "libcli/auth/libcli_auth.h"
+#include "param/param.h"
enum hdb_ldb_ent_type
{ HDB_LDB_ENT_TYPE_CLIENT, HDB_LDB_ENT_TYPE_SERVER,
HDB_LDB_ENT_TYPE_KRBTGT, HDB_LDB_ENT_TYPE_ANY };
-static const char * const krb5_attrs[] = {
- "objectClass",
- "sAMAccountName",
-
- "userPrincipalName",
- "servicePrincipalName",
-
- "krb5Key",
-
- "userAccountControl",
-
- "pwdLastSet",
- "accountExpires",
-
- "whenCreated",
- "whenChanged",
-
- "msDS-KeyVersionNumber",
- NULL
-};
-
static const char *realm_ref_attrs[] = {
"nCName",
"dnsRoot",
talloc_free(entry_ex->ctx);
}
+static krb5_error_code LDB_message2entry_keys(krb5_context context,
+ TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx,
+ struct ldb_message *msg,
+ unsigned int userAccountControl,
+ hdb_entry_ex *entry_ex)
+{
+ krb5_error_code ret = 0;
+ NTSTATUS status;
+ struct samr_Password *hash;
+ const struct ldb_val *sc_val;
+ struct supplementalCredentialsBlob scb;
+ struct supplementalCredentialsPackage *scp = NULL;
+ struct package_PrimaryKerberosBlob _pkb;
+ struct package_PrimaryKerberosCtr3 *pkb3 = NULL;
+ uint32_t i;
+ uint32_t allocated_keys = 0;
+
+ entry_ex->entry.keys.val = NULL;
+ entry_ex->entry.keys.len = 0;
+
+ entry_ex->entry.kvno = ldb_msg_find_attr_as_int(msg, "msDS-KeyVersionNumber", 0);
+
+ /* Get keys from the db */
+
+ hash = samdb_result_hash(mem_ctx, msg, "unicodePwd");
+ sc_val = ldb_msg_find_ldb_val(msg, "supplementalCredentials");
+
+ /* unicodePwd for enctype 0x17 (23) if present */
+ if (hash) {
+ allocated_keys++;
+ }
+
+ /* supplementalCredentials if present */
+ if (sc_val) {
+ status = ndr_pull_struct_blob_all(sc_val, mem_ctx, &scb,
+ (ndr_pull_flags_fn_t)ndr_pull_supplementalCredentialsBlob);
+ if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(status)) {
+ dump_data(0, sc_val->data, sc_val->length);
+ ret = EINVAL;
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ for (i=0; i < scb.sub.num_packages; i++) {
+ if (scb.sub.packages[i].unknown1 != 0x00000001) {
+ continue;
+ }
+
+ if (strcmp("Primary:Kerberos", scb.sub.packages[i].name) != 0) {
+ continue;
+ }
+
+ if (!scb.sub.packages[i].data || !scb.sub.packages[i].data[0]) {
+ continue;
+ }
+
+ scp = &scb.sub.packages[i];
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+ /* Primary:Kerberos element of supplementalCredentials */
+ if (scp) {
+ DATA_BLOB blob;
+
+ blob = strhex_to_data_blob(scp->data);
+ if (!blob.data) {
+ ret = ENOMEM;
+ goto out;
+ }
+ talloc_steal(mem_ctx, blob.data);
+
+ /* TODO: use ndr_pull_struct_blob_all(), when the ndr layer handles it correct with relative pointers */
+ status = ndr_pull_struct_blob(&blob, mem_ctx, &_pkb,
+ (ndr_pull_flags_fn_t)ndr_pull_package_PrimaryKerberosBlob);
+ if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(status)) {
+ krb5_set_error_string(context, "LDB_message2entry_keys: could not parse package_PrimaryKerberosBlob");
+ krb5_warnx(context, "LDB_message2entry_keys: could not parse package_PrimaryKerberosBlob");
+ ret = EINVAL;
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ if (_pkb.version != 3) {
+ krb5_set_error_string(context, "LDB_message2entry_keys: could not parse PrimaryKerberos not version 3");
+ krb5_warnx(context, "LDB_message2entry_keys: could not parse PrimaryKerberos not version 3");
+ ret = EINVAL;
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ pkb3 = &_pkb.ctr.ctr3;
+
+ allocated_keys += pkb3->num_keys;
+ }
+
+ if (allocated_keys == 0) {
+ /* oh, no password. Apparently (comment in
+ * hdb-ldap.c) this violates the ASN.1, but this
+ * allows an entry with no keys (yet). */
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ /* allocate space to decode into */
+ entry_ex->entry.keys.len = 0;
+ entry_ex->entry.keys.val = calloc(allocated_keys, sizeof(Key));
+ if (entry_ex->entry.keys.val == NULL) {
+ ret = ENOMEM;
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ if (hash && !(userAccountControl & UF_USE_DES_KEY_ONLY)) {
+ Key key;
+
+ key.mkvno = 0;
+ key.salt = NULL; /* No salt for this enc type */
+
+ ret = krb5_keyblock_init(context,
+ ENCTYPE_ARCFOUR_HMAC_MD5,
+ hash->hash, sizeof(hash->hash),
+ &key.key);
+ if (ret) {
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ entry_ex->entry.keys.val[entry_ex->entry.keys.len] = key;
+ entry_ex->entry.keys.len++;
+ }
+
+ if (pkb3) {
+ for (i=0; i < pkb3->num_keys; i++) {
+ bool use = true;
+ Key key;
+
+ if (!pkb3->keys[i].value) continue;
+
+ if (userAccountControl & UF_USE_DES_KEY_ONLY) {
+ switch (pkb3->keys[i].keytype) {
+ case ENCTYPE_DES_CBC_CRC:
+ case ENCTYPE_DES_CBC_MD5:
+ break;
+ default:
+ use = false;
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (!use) continue;
+
+ key.mkvno = 0;
+
+ if (pkb3->salt.string) {
+ DATA_BLOB salt;
+
+ salt = data_blob_string_const(pkb3->salt.string);
+
+ key.salt = calloc(1, sizeof(*key.salt));
+ if (key.salt == NULL) {
+ ret = ENOMEM;
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ key.salt->type = hdb_pw_salt;
+
+ ret = krb5_data_copy(&key.salt->salt, salt.data, salt.length);
+ if (ret) {
+ free(key.salt);
+ key.salt = NULL;
+ goto out;
+ }
+ }
+
+ ret = krb5_keyblock_init(context,
+ pkb3->keys[i].keytype,
+ pkb3->keys[i].value->data,
+ pkb3->keys[i].value->length,
+ &key.key);
+ if (ret) {
+ if (key.salt) {
+ free_Salt(key.salt);
+ free(key.salt);
+ key.salt = NULL;
+ }
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ entry_ex->entry.keys.val[entry_ex->entry.keys.len] = key;
+ entry_ex->entry.keys.len++;
+ }
+ }
+
+out:
+ if (ret != 0) {
+ entry_ex->entry.keys.len = 0;
+ }
+ if (entry_ex->entry.keys.len == 0 && entry_ex->entry.keys.val) {
+ free(entry_ex->entry.keys.val);
+ entry_ex->entry.keys.val = NULL;
+ }
+ return ret;
+}
+
/*
* Construct an hdb_entry from a directory entry.
*/
struct hdb_ldb_private *private;
NTTIME acct_expiry;
- struct ldb_message_element *ldb_keys;
struct ldb_message_element *objectclasses;
struct ldb_val computer_val;
krb5_princ_set_realm(context, entry_ex->entry.principal, &strdup_realm);
}
- entry_ex->entry.kvno = ldb_msg_find_attr_as_int(msg, "msDS-KeyVersionNumber", 0);
-
entry_ex->entry.flags = uf2HDBFlags(context, userAccountControl, ent_type);
if (ent_type == HDB_LDB_ENT_TYPE_KRBTGT) {
entry_ex->entry.generation = NULL;
- /* Get krb5Key from the db */
-
- ldb_keys = ldb_msg_find_element(msg, "krb5Key");
-
- if (!ldb_keys) {
- /* oh, no password. Apparently (comment in
- * hdb-ldap.c) this violates the ASN.1, but this
- * allows an entry with no keys (yet). */
- entry_ex->entry.keys.val = NULL;
- entry_ex->entry.keys.len = 0;
- } else {
- /* allocate space to decode into */
- entry_ex->entry.keys.val = calloc(ldb_keys->num_values, sizeof(Key));
- if (entry_ex->entry.keys.val == NULL) {
- ret = ENOMEM;
- goto out;
- }
-
- entry_ex->entry.keys.len = 0;
-
- /* Decode Kerberos keys into the hdb structure */
- for (i=0; i < ldb_keys->num_values; i++) {
- size_t decode_len;
- Key key;
- ret = decode_Key(ldb_keys->values[i].data, ldb_keys->values[i].length,
- &key, &decode_len);
- if (ret) {
- /* Could be bougus data in the entry, or out of memory */
- goto out;
- }
-
- if (userAccountControl & UF_USE_DES_KEY_ONLY) {
- switch (key.key.keytype) {
- case KEYTYPE_DES:
- entry_ex->entry.keys.val[entry_ex->entry.keys.len] = key;
- entry_ex->entry.keys.len++;
- default:
- /* We must use DES keys only */
- break;
- }
- } else {
- entry_ex->entry.keys.val[entry_ex->entry.keys.len] = key;
- entry_ex->entry.keys.len++;
- }
- }
- }
+ /* Get keys from the db */
+ ret = LDB_message2entry_keys(context, private, msg, userAccountControl, entry_ex);
+ if (ret) {
+ /* Could be bougus data in the entry, or out of memory */
+ goto out;
+ }
entry_ex->entry.etypes = malloc(sizeof(*(entry_ex->entry.etypes)));
if (entry_ex->entry.etypes == NULL) {
private->realm_ref_msg = talloc_steal(private, realm_ref_msg);
private->samdb = (struct ldb_context *)db->hdb_db;
- entry_ex->check_client_access = hdb_ldb_check_client_access;
- entry_ex->authz_data_tgs_req = hdb_ldb_authz_data_tgs_req;
- entry_ex->authz_data_as_req = hdb_ldb_authz_data_as_req;
-
out:
if (ret != 0) {
/* This doesn't free ent itself, that is for the eventual caller to do */
krb5_error_code ret;
int lret;
char *filter = NULL;
- const char * const *princ_attrs = krb5_attrs;
+ const char * const *princ_attrs = user_attrs;
char *short_princ;
char *short_princ_talloc;
struct ldb_message **realm_ref_msg = NULL;
struct ldb_dn *realm_dn;
+ krb5_principal alloc_principal = NULL;
if (principal->name.name_string.len != 2
|| (strcmp(principal->name.name_string.val[0], KRB5_TGS_NAME) != 0)) {
/* Not a krbtgt */
if ((LDB_lookup_realm(context, (struct ldb_context *)db->hdb_db,
mem_ctx, principal->name.name_string.val[1], &realm_ref_msg) == 0)) {
/* us */
+ /* Cludge, cludge cludge. If the realm part of krbtgt/realm,
+ * is in our db, then direct the caller at our primary
+ * krgtgt */
+
+ const char *dnsdomain = ldb_msg_find_attr_as_string(realm_ref_msg[0], "dnsRoot", NULL);
+ char *realm_fixed = strupper_talloc(mem_ctx, dnsdomain);
+ if (!realm_fixed) {
+ krb5_set_error_string(context, "strupper_talloc: out of memory");
+ return ENOMEM;
+ }
+
+ ret = krb5_copy_principal(context, principal, &alloc_principal);
+ if (ret) {
+ return ret;
+ }
+
+ free(alloc_principal->name.name_string.val[1]);
+ alloc_principal->name.name_string.val[1] = strdup(realm_fixed);
+ talloc_free(realm_fixed);
+ if (!alloc_principal->name.name_string.val[1]) {
+ krb5_set_error_string(context, "LDB_fetch: strdup() failed!");
+ return ENOMEM;
+ }
+ principal = alloc_principal;
realm_dn = samdb_result_dn((struct ldb_context *)db->hdb_db, mem_ctx, realm_ref_msg[0], "nCName", NULL);
} else {
/* we should lookup trusted domains */
}
ldb_ret = gendb_search_dn((struct ldb_context *)db->hdb_db,
- mem_ctx, user_dn, &msg, krb5_attrs);
+ mem_ctx, user_dn, &msg, user_attrs);
if (ldb_ret != 1) {
return HDB_ERR_NOENTRY;
static krb5_error_code LDB_seq(krb5_context context, HDB *db, unsigned flags, hdb_entry_ex *entry)
{
krb5_error_code ret;
- struct hdb_ldb_seq *priv = (struct hdb_ldb_seq *)db->hdb_openp;
+ struct hdb_ldb_seq *priv = (struct hdb_ldb_seq *)db->hdb_dbc;
TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx;
hdb_entry_ex entry_ex;
memset(&entry_ex, '\0', sizeof(entry_ex));
if (ret != 0) {
talloc_free(priv);
- db->hdb_openp = NULL;
+ db->hdb_dbc = NULL;
} else {
talloc_free(mem_ctx);
}
hdb_entry_ex *entry)
{
struct ldb_context *ldb_ctx = (struct ldb_context *)db->hdb_db;
- struct hdb_ldb_seq *priv = (struct hdb_ldb_seq *)db->hdb_openp;
+ struct hdb_ldb_seq *priv = (struct hdb_ldb_seq *)db->hdb_dbc;
char *realm;
struct ldb_dn *realm_dn = NULL;
struct ldb_result *res = NULL;
if (priv) {
talloc_free(priv);
- db->hdb_openp = 0;
+ db->hdb_dbc = NULL;
}
priv = (struct hdb_ldb_seq *) talloc(db, struct hdb_ldb_seq);
lret = ldb_search(ldb_ctx, realm_dn,
LDB_SCOPE_SUBTREE, "(objectClass=user)",
- krb5_attrs, &res);
+ user_attrs, &res);
if (lret != LDB_SUCCESS) {
talloc_free(priv);
priv->msgs = talloc_steal(priv, res->msgs);
talloc_free(res);
- db->hdb_openp = priv;
+ db->hdb_dbc = priv;
ret = LDB_seq(context, db, flags, entry);
-
+
if (ret != 0) {
talloc_free(priv);
- db->hdb_openp = NULL;
+ db->hdb_dbc = NULL;
} else {
talloc_free(mem_ctx);
}
return NT_STATUS_CANT_ACCESS_DOMAIN_INFO;
}
- (*db)->hdb_openp = 0;
+ (*db)->hdb_dbc = NULL;
(*db)->hdb_open = LDB_open;
(*db)->hdb_close = LDB_close;
(*db)->hdb_fetch = LDB_fetch;
krb5_error_code hdb_ldb_create(krb5_context context, struct HDB **db, const char *arg)
{
NTSTATUS nt_status;
- /* Disgusting, ugly hack, but it means one less private hook */
- nt_status = kdc_hdb_ldb_create(context->mem_ctx, context, db, arg);
+ /* The global kdc_mem_ctx, Disgusting, ugly hack, but it means one less private hook */
+ nt_status = kdc_hdb_ldb_create(kdc_mem_ctx, context, db, arg);
if (NT_STATUS_IS_OK(nt_status)) {
return 0;
git.samba.org / kai / samba-autobuild / .git / blobdiff