r25398: Parse loadparm context to all lp_*() functions.
[ira/wip.git] / source4 / smb_server / smb / negprot.c
index f5ae0aa507811591f3438e04875545b1990ec69e..a35f86367b9aed2007064dd070df9371225949e4 100644 (file)
@@ -91,7 +91,7 @@ this any more it probably doesn't matter
 ****************************************************************************/
 static void reply_coreplus(struct smbsrv_request *req, uint16_t choice)
 {
-       uint16_t raw = (lp_readraw()?1:0) | (lp_writeraw()?2:0);
+       uint16_t raw = (lp_readraw(global_loadparm)?1:0) | (lp_writeraw(global_loadparm)?2:0);
 
        smbsrv_setup_reply(req, 13, 0);
 
@@ -122,13 +122,13 @@ static void reply_coreplus(struct smbsrv_request *req, uint16_t choice)
 ****************************************************************************/
 static void reply_lanman1(struct smbsrv_request *req, uint16_t choice)
 {
-       int raw = (lp_readraw()?1:0) | (lp_writeraw()?2:0);
+       int raw = (lp_readraw(global_loadparm)?1:0) | (lp_writeraw(global_loadparm)?2:0);
        int secword=0;
        time_t t = req->request_time.tv_sec;
 
-       req->smb_conn->negotiate.encrypted_passwords = lp_encrypted_passwords();
+       req->smb_conn->negotiate.encrypted_passwords = lp_encrypted_passwords(global_loadparm);
 
-       if (lp_security() != SEC_SHARE)
+       if (lp_security(global_loadparm) != SEC_SHARE)
                secword |= NEGOTIATE_SECURITY_USER_LEVEL;
 
        if (req->smb_conn->negotiate.encrypted_passwords)
@@ -145,7 +145,7 @@ static void reply_lanman1(struct smbsrv_request *req, uint16_t choice)
        SSVAL(req->out.vwv, VWV(0), choice);
        SSVAL(req->out.vwv, VWV(1), secword); 
        SSVAL(req->out.vwv, VWV(2), req->smb_conn->negotiate.max_recv);
-       SSVAL(req->out.vwv, VWV(3), lp_maxmux());
+       SSVAL(req->out.vwv, VWV(3), lp_maxmux(global_loadparm));
        SSVAL(req->out.vwv, VWV(4), 1);
        SSVAL(req->out.vwv, VWV(5), raw); 
        SIVAL(req->out.vwv, VWV(6), req->smb_conn->connection->server_id.id);
@@ -180,13 +180,13 @@ static void reply_lanman1(struct smbsrv_request *req, uint16_t choice)
 ****************************************************************************/
 static void reply_lanman2(struct smbsrv_request *req, uint16_t choice)
 {
-       int raw = (lp_readraw()?1:0) | (lp_writeraw()?2:0);
+       int raw = (lp_readraw(global_loadparm)?1:0) | (lp_writeraw(global_loadparm)?2:0);
        int secword=0;
        time_t t = req->request_time.tv_sec;
 
-       req->smb_conn->negotiate.encrypted_passwords = lp_encrypted_passwords();
+       req->smb_conn->negotiate.encrypted_passwords = lp_encrypted_passwords(global_loadparm);
   
-       if (lp_security() != SEC_SHARE)
+       if (lp_security(global_loadparm) != SEC_SHARE)
                secword |= NEGOTIATE_SECURITY_USER_LEVEL;
 
        if (req->smb_conn->negotiate.encrypted_passwords)
@@ -199,7 +199,7 @@ static void reply_lanman2(struct smbsrv_request *req, uint16_t choice)
        SSVAL(req->out.vwv, VWV(0), choice);
        SSVAL(req->out.vwv, VWV(1), secword); 
        SSVAL(req->out.vwv, VWV(2), req->smb_conn->negotiate.max_recv);
-       SSVAL(req->out.vwv, VWV(3), lp_maxmux());
+       SSVAL(req->out.vwv, VWV(3), lp_maxmux(global_loadparm));
        SSVAL(req->out.vwv, VWV(4), 1);
        SSVAL(req->out.vwv, VWV(5), raw); 
        SIVAL(req->out.vwv, VWV(6), req->smb_conn->connection->server_id.id);
@@ -214,7 +214,7 @@ static void reply_lanman2(struct smbsrv_request *req, uint16_t choice)
                get_challenge(req->smb_conn, req->out.data);
        }
 
-       req_push_str(req, NULL, lp_workgroup(), -1, STR_TERMINATE);
+       req_push_str(req, NULL, lp_workgroup(global_loadparm), -1, STR_TERMINATE);
 
        if (req->smb_conn->signing.mandatory_signing) {
                smbsrv_terminate_connection(req->smb_conn, 
@@ -236,8 +236,8 @@ static void reply_nt1_orig(struct smbsrv_request *req)
                req->out.ptr += 8;
                SCVAL(req->out.vwv+1, VWV(16), 8);
        }
-       req_push_str(req, NULL, lp_workgroup(), -1, STR_UNICODE|STR_TERMINATE|STR_NOALIGN);
-       req_push_str(req, NULL, lp_netbios_name(), -1, STR_UNICODE|STR_TERMINATE|STR_NOALIGN);
+       req_push_str(req, NULL, lp_workgroup(global_loadparm), -1, STR_UNICODE|STR_TERMINATE|STR_NOALIGN);
+       req_push_str(req, NULL, lp_netbios_name(global_loadparm), -1, STR_UNICODE|STR_TERMINATE|STR_NOALIGN);
        DEBUG(3,("not using extended security (SPNEGO or NTLMSSP)\n"));
 }
 
@@ -260,24 +260,24 @@ static void reply_nt1(struct smbsrv_request *req, uint16_t choice)
                CAP_NT_FIND | CAP_LOCK_AND_READ | 
                CAP_LEVEL_II_OPLOCKS | CAP_NT_SMBS | CAP_RPC_REMOTE_APIS;
 
-       req->smb_conn->negotiate.encrypted_passwords = lp_encrypted_passwords();
+       req->smb_conn->negotiate.encrypted_passwords = lp_encrypted_passwords(global_loadparm);
 
        /* do spnego in user level security if the client
           supports it and we can do encrypted passwords */
        
        if (req->smb_conn->negotiate.encrypted_passwords && 
-           (lp_security() != SEC_SHARE) &&
-           lp_use_spnego() &&
+           (lp_security(global_loadparm) != SEC_SHARE) &&
+           lp_use_spnego(global_loadparm) &&
            (req->flags2 & FLAGS2_EXTENDED_SECURITY)) {
                negotiate_spnego = True; 
                capabilities |= CAP_EXTENDED_SECURITY;
        }
        
-       if (lp_unix_extensions()) {
+       if (lp_unix_extensions(global_loadparm)) {
                capabilities |= CAP_UNIX;
        }
        
-       if (lp_large_readwrite()) {
+       if (lp_large_readwrite(global_loadparm)) {
                capabilities |= CAP_LARGE_READX | CAP_LARGE_WRITEX | CAP_W2K_SMBS;
        }
 
@@ -286,24 +286,24 @@ static void reply_nt1(struct smbsrv_request *req, uint16_t choice)
                capabilities |= CAP_LARGE_FILES;
        }
 
-       if (lp_readraw() && lp_writeraw()) {
+       if (lp_readraw(global_loadparm) && lp_writeraw(global_loadparm)) {
                capabilities |= CAP_RAW_MODE;
        }
        
        /* allow for disabling unicode */
-       if (lp_unicode()) {
+       if (lp_unicode(global_loadparm)) {
                capabilities |= CAP_UNICODE;
        }
 
-       if (lp_nt_status_support()) {
+       if (lp_nt_status_support(global_loadparm)) {
                capabilities |= CAP_STATUS32;
        }
        
-       if (lp_host_msdfs()) {
+       if (lp_host_msdfs(global_loadparm)) {
                capabilities |= CAP_DFS;
        }
        
-       if (lp_security() != SEC_SHARE) {
+       if (lp_security(global_loadparm) != SEC_SHARE) {
                secword |= NEGOTIATE_SECURITY_USER_LEVEL;
        }
 
@@ -330,7 +330,7 @@ static void reply_nt1(struct smbsrv_request *req, uint16_t choice)
           this is the one and only SMB packet that is malformed in
           the specification - all the command words after the secword
           are offset by 1 byte */
-       SSVAL(req->out.vwv+1, VWV(1), lp_maxmux());
+       SSVAL(req->out.vwv+1, VWV(1), lp_maxmux(global_loadparm));
        SSVAL(req->out.vwv+1, VWV(2), 1); /* num vcs */
        SIVAL(req->out.vwv+1, VWV(3), req->smb_conn->negotiate.max_recv);
        SIVAL(req->out.vwv+1, VWV(5), 0x10000); /* raw size. full 64k */
@@ -371,7 +371,7 @@ static void reply_nt1(struct smbsrv_request *req, uint16_t choice)
                        return;
                }
                
-               cli_credentials_set_conf(server_credentials);
+               cli_credentials_set_conf(server_credentials, global_loadparm);
                nt_status = cli_credentials_set_machine_account(server_credentials);
                if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(nt_status)) {
                        DEBUG(10, ("Failed to obtain server credentials, perhaps a standalone server?: %s\n", nt_errstr(nt_status)));
@@ -517,8 +517,10 @@ void smbsrv_reply_negprot(struct smbsrv_request *req)
        for (protocol = 0; supported_protocols[protocol].proto_name; protocol++) {
                int i;
 
-               if (supported_protocols[protocol].protocol_level > lp_srv_maxprotocol()) continue;
-               if (supported_protocols[protocol].protocol_level < lp_srv_minprotocol()) continue;
+               if (supported_protocols[protocol].protocol_level > lp_srv_maxprotocol(global_loadparm)) 
+                       continue;
+               if (supported_protocols[protocol].protocol_level < lp_srv_minprotocol(global_loadparm)) 
+                       continue;
 
                for (i = 0; i < protos_count; i++) {
                        if (strcmp(supported_protocols[protocol].proto_name, protos[i]) != 0) continue;