-/*
+/*
Unix SMB/CIFS implementation.
PAC Glue between Samba and the KDC
-
- Copyright (C) Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org> 2005
+
+ Copyright (C) Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org> 2005-2009
+ Copyright (C) Simo Sorce <idra@samba.org> 2010
This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
- the Free Software Foundation; either version 2 of the License, or
+ the Free Software Foundation; either version 3 of the License, or
(at your option) any later version.
-
+
This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the
GNU General Public License for more details.
-
+
You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
- along with this program; if not, write to the Free Software
- Foundation, Inc., 675 Mass Ave, Cambridge, MA 02139, USA.
+ along with this program. If not, see <http://www.gnu.org/licenses/>.
*/
#include "includes.h"
-#include "kdc/kdc.h"
-#include "include/ads.h"
+#include "../libds/common/flags.h"
#include "lib/ldb/include/ldb.h"
+#include "librpc/gen_ndr/ndr_krb5pac.h"
#include "librpc/gen_ndr/krb5pac.h"
#include "auth/auth.h"
#include "auth/auth_sam.h"
+#include "auth/auth_sam_reply.h"
+#include "kdc/kdc.h"
+#include "param/param.h"
-struct krb5_dh_moduli;
-struct _krb5_krb_auth_data;
-
-#include "heimdal/lib/krb5/krb5-private.h"
-
-/* Given the right private pointer from hdb_ldb, get a PAC from the attached ldb messages */
-static krb5_error_code samba_get_pac(krb5_context context,
- struct hdb_ldb_private *private,
- krb5_principal client,
- krb5_keyblock *krbtgt_keyblock,
- krb5_keyblock *server_keyblock,
- time_t tgs_authtime,
- krb5_data *pac)
+NTSTATUS samba_get_logon_info_pac_blob(TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx,
+ struct smb_iconv_convenience *ic,
+ struct auth_serversupplied_info *info,
+ DATA_BLOB *pac_data)
{
- krb5_error_code ret;
+ struct netr_SamInfo3 *info3;
+ union PAC_INFO pac_info;
+ enum ndr_err_code ndr_err;
NTSTATUS nt_status;
- struct auth_serversupplied_info *server_info;
- DATA_BLOB tmp_blob;
- TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx = talloc_named(private, 0, "samba_get_pac context");
- if (!mem_ctx) {
- return ENOMEM;
- }
+ ZERO_STRUCT(pac_info);
- nt_status = authsam_make_server_info(mem_ctx, private->samdb,
- private->msg,
- private->realm_ref_msg,
- data_blob(NULL, 0),
- data_blob(NULL, 0),
- &server_info);
+ nt_status = auth_convert_server_info_saminfo3(mem_ctx, info, &info3);
if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(nt_status)) {
- DEBUG(0, ("Getting user info for PAC failed: %s\n",
+ DEBUG(1, ("Getting Samba info failed: %s\n",
nt_errstr(nt_status)));
- return ENOMEM;
+ return nt_status;
}
- ret = kerberos_create_pac(mem_ctx, server_info,
- context,
- krbtgt_keyblock,
- server_keyblock,
- client,
- tgs_authtime,
- &tmp_blob);
-
- if (ret) {
- DEBUG(1, ("PAC encoding failed: %s\n",
- smb_get_krb5_error_message(context, ret, mem_ctx)));
- talloc_free(mem_ctx);
- return ret;
+ pac_info.logon_info.info = talloc_zero(mem_ctx, struct PAC_LOGON_INFO);
+ if (!mem_ctx) {
+ return NT_STATUS_NO_MEMORY;
}
- ret = krb5_data_copy(pac, tmp_blob.data, tmp_blob.length);
- talloc_free(mem_ctx);
- return ret;
-}
-
-/* Wrap the PAC in the right ASN.1. Will always free 'pac', on success or failure */
-static krb5_error_code wrap_pac(krb5_context context, krb5_data *pac, AuthorizationData **out)
-{
- krb5_error_code ret;
-
- unsigned char *buf;
- size_t buf_size;
- size_t len;
-
- AD_IF_RELEVANT if_relevant;
- AuthorizationData *auth_data;
-
- if_relevant.len = 1;
- if_relevant.val = malloc(sizeof(*if_relevant.val));
- if (!if_relevant.val) {
- krb5_data_free(pac);
- *out = NULL;
- return ENOMEM;
- }
+ pac_info.logon_info.info->info3 = *info3;
- if_relevant.val[0].ad_type = KRB5_AUTHDATA_WIN2K_PAC;
- if_relevant.val[0].ad_data.data = NULL;
- if_relevant.val[0].ad_data.length = 0;
-
- /* pac.data will be freed with this */
- if_relevant.val[0].ad_data.data = pac->data;
- if_relevant.val[0].ad_data.length = pac->length;
-
- ASN1_MALLOC_ENCODE(AuthorizationData, buf, buf_size, &if_relevant, &len, ret);
- free_AuthorizationData(&if_relevant);
- if (ret) {
- *out = NULL;
- return ret;
- }
-
- auth_data = malloc(sizeof(*auth_data));
- if (!auth_data) {
- free(buf);
- *out = NULL;
- return ret;
- }
- auth_data->len = 1;
- auth_data->val = malloc(sizeof(*auth_data->val));
- if (!auth_data->val) {
- free(buf);
- free(auth_data);
- *out = NULL;
- return ret;
+ ndr_err = ndr_push_union_blob(pac_data, mem_ctx, ic, &pac_info,
+ PAC_TYPE_LOGON_INFO,
+ (ndr_push_flags_fn_t)ndr_push_PAC_INFO);
+ if (!NDR_ERR_CODE_IS_SUCCESS(ndr_err)) {
+ nt_status = ndr_map_error2ntstatus(ndr_err);
+ DEBUG(1, ("PAC (presig) push failed: %s\n",
+ nt_errstr(nt_status)));
+ return nt_status;
}
- auth_data->val[0].ad_type = KRB5_AUTHDATA_IF_RELEVANT;
- auth_data->val[0].ad_data.length = len;
- auth_data->val[0].ad_data.data = buf;
- *out = auth_data;
- return 0;
+ return NT_STATUS_OK;
}
-
-/* Given a hdb_entry, create a PAC out of the private data
-
- Don't create it if the client has the UF_NO_AUTH_DATA_REQUIRED bit
- set, or if they specificaly asked not to get it.
-*/
-
-krb5_error_code hdb_ldb_authz_data_as_req(krb5_context context, struct hdb_entry_ex *entry_ex,
- METHOD_DATA* pa_data_seq,
- time_t authtime,
- EncryptionKey *tgtkey,
- EncryptionKey *sessionkey,
- AuthorizationData **out)
+krb5_error_code samba_make_krb5_pac(krb5_context context,
+ DATA_BLOB *pac_blob,
+ krb5_pac *pac)
{
+ krb5_data pac_data;
krb5_error_code ret;
- int i;
- krb5_data pac;
- krb5_boolean pac_wanted = TRUE;
- unsigned int userAccountControl;
- struct PA_PAC_REQUEST pac_request;
- struct hdb_ldb_private *private = talloc_get_type(entry_ex->ctx, struct hdb_ldb_private);
-
- /* The user account may be set not to want the PAC */
- userAccountControl = ldb_msg_find_uint(private->msg, "userAccountControl", 0);
- if (userAccountControl & UF_NO_AUTH_DATA_REQUIRED) {
- *out = NULL;
- return 0;
- }
- /* The user may not want a PAC */
- for (i=0; i<pa_data_seq->len; i++) {
- if (pa_data_seq->val[i].padata_type == KRB5_PADATA_PA_PAC_REQUEST) {
- ret = decode_PA_PAC_REQUEST(pa_data_seq->val[i].padata_value.data,
- pa_data_seq->val[i].padata_value.length,
- &pac_request, NULL);
- if (ret == 0) {
- pac_wanted = !!pac_request.include_pac;
- }
- free_PA_PAC_REQUEST(&pac_request);
- break;
- }
+ ret = krb5_data_copy(&pac_data, pac_blob->data, pac_blob->length);
+ if (ret != 0) {
+ return ret;
}
- if (!pac_wanted) {
- *out = NULL;
- return 0;
- }
-
- /* Get PAC from Samba */
- ret = samba_get_pac(context,
- private,
- entry_ex->entry.principal,
- tgtkey,
- tgtkey,
- authtime,
- &pac);
+ ret = krb5_pac_init(context, pac);
+ if (ret != 0) {
+ krb5_data_free(&pac_data);
+ return ret;
+ }
- if (ret) {
- *out = NULL;
+ ret = krb5_pac_add_buffer(context, *pac, PAC_TYPE_LOGON_INFO, &pac_data);
+ krb5_data_free(&pac_data);
+ if (ret != 0) {
return ret;
}
-
- return wrap_pac(context, &pac, out);
-}
-/* Resign (and reform, including possibly new groups) a PAC */
+ return ret;
+}
-krb5_error_code hdb_ldb_authz_data_tgs_req(krb5_context context, struct hdb_entry_ex *entry_ex,
- krb5_principal client,
- AuthorizationData *in,
- time_t authtime,
- EncryptionKey *tgtkey,
- EncryptionKey *servicekey,
- EncryptionKey *sessionkey,
- AuthorizationData **out)
+bool samba_princ_needs_pac(struct hdb_entry_ex *princ)
{
- NTSTATUS nt_status;
- krb5_error_code ret;
+ struct samba_kdc_entry *p = talloc_get_type(princ->ctx, struct samba_kdc_entry);
unsigned int userAccountControl;
- struct hdb_ldb_private *private = talloc_get_type(entry_ex->ctx, struct hdb_ldb_private);
- krb5_data k5pac_in, k5pac_out;
- DATA_BLOB pac_in, pac_out;
- struct PAC_LOGON_INFO *logon_info;
- union netr_Validation validation;
- struct auth_serversupplied_info *server_info_out;
-
- krb5_boolean found = FALSE;
- TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx;
-
/* The service account may be set not to want the PAC */
- userAccountControl = ldb_msg_find_uint(private->msg, "userAccountControl", 0);
+ userAccountControl = ldb_msg_find_attr_as_uint(p->msg, "userAccountControl", 0);
if (userAccountControl & UF_NO_AUTH_DATA_REQUIRED) {
- *out = NULL;
- return 0;
+ return false;
}
- ret = _krb5_find_type_in_ad(context, KRB5_AUTHDATA_WIN2K_PAC,
- &k5pac_in, &found, sessionkey, in);
- if (ret || !found) {
- *out = NULL;
- return 0;
- }
+ return true;
+}
- mem_ctx = talloc_new(private);
- if (!mem_ctx) {
- krb5_data_free(&k5pac_in);
- *out = NULL;
- return ENOMEM;
- }
+NTSTATUS samba_kdc_get_pac_blob(TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx,
+ struct hdb_entry_ex *client,
+ DATA_BLOB **_pac_blob)
+{
+ struct samba_kdc_entry *p = talloc_get_type(client->ctx, struct samba_kdc_entry);
+ struct auth_serversupplied_info *server_info;
+ DATA_BLOB *pac_blob;
+ NTSTATUS nt_status;
- pac_in = data_blob_talloc(mem_ctx, k5pac_in.data, k5pac_in.length);
- krb5_data_free(&k5pac_in);
- if (!pac_in.data) {
- talloc_free(mem_ctx);
- *out = NULL;
- return ENOMEM;
+ /* The user account may be set not to want the PAC */
+ if ( ! samba_princ_needs_pac(client)) {
+ *_pac_blob = NULL;
+ return NT_STATUS_OK;
}
-
- /* Parse the PAC again, for the logon info */
- nt_status = kerberos_pac_logon_info(mem_ctx, &logon_info,
- pac_in,
- context,
- tgtkey,
- tgtkey,
- client, authtime,
- &ret);
- if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(nt_status)) {
- DEBUG(1, ("Failed to parse PAC in TGT: %s/%s\n",
- nt_errstr(nt_status), error_message(ret)));
- talloc_free(mem_ctx);
- *out = NULL;
- return ret;
+ pac_blob = talloc_zero(mem_ctx, DATA_BLOB);
+ if (!pac_blob) {
+ return NT_STATUS_NO_MEMORY;
}
- /* Pull this right into the normal auth sysstem structures */
- validation.sam3 = &logon_info->info3;
- nt_status = make_server_info_netlogon_validation(mem_ctx,
- "",
- 3, &validation,
- &server_info_out);
+ nt_status = authsam_make_server_info(mem_ctx, p->kdc_db_ctx->samdb,
+ lp_netbios_name(p->kdc_db_ctx->lp_ctx),
+ lp_sam_name(p->kdc_db_ctx->lp_ctx),
+ p->realm_dn,
+ p->msg,
+ data_blob(NULL, 0),
+ data_blob(NULL, 0),
+ &server_info);
if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(nt_status)) {
- talloc_free(mem_ctx);
- *out = NULL;
- return ENOMEM;
- }
-
- /* And make a new PAC, possibly containing new groups */
- ret = kerberos_create_pac(mem_ctx,
- server_info_out,
- context,
- tgtkey,
- servicekey,
- client,
- authtime,
- &pac_out);
-
- if (ret != 0) {
- talloc_free(mem_ctx);
- *out = NULL;
- return ret;
+ DEBUG(0, ("Getting user info for PAC failed: %s\n",
+ nt_errstr(nt_status)));
+ return nt_status;
}
- ret = krb5_data_copy(&k5pac_out, pac_out.data, pac_out.length);
- if (ret != 0) {
- talloc_free(mem_ctx);
- *out = NULL;
- return ret;
+ nt_status = samba_get_logon_info_pac_blob(mem_ctx,
+ p->kdc_db_ctx->ic_ctx,
+ server_info, pac_blob);
+ if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(nt_status)) {
+ DEBUG(0, ("Building PAC failed: %s\n",
+ nt_errstr(nt_status)));
+ return nt_status;
}
- return wrap_pac(context, &k5pac_out, out);
+ *_pac_blob = pac_blob;
+ return NT_STATUS_OK;
}
-/* Given an hdb entry (and in particular it's private member), consult
- * the account_ok routine in auth/auth_sam.c for consistancy */
-
-krb5_error_code hdb_ldb_check_client_access(krb5_context context, hdb_entry_ex *entry_ex,
- HostAddresses *addresses)
+NTSTATUS samba_kdc_update_pac_blob(TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx,
+ krb5_context context,
+ struct smb_iconv_convenience *ic,
+ krb5_pac *pac, DATA_BLOB *pac_blob)
{
+ struct auth_serversupplied_info *server_info;
krb5_error_code ret;
NTSTATUS nt_status;
- TALLOC_CTX *tmp_ctx = talloc_new(entry_ex->ctx);
- struct hdb_ldb_private *private = talloc_get_type(entry_ex->ctx, struct hdb_ldb_private);
- char *name, *workstation = NULL;
- int i;
- if (!tmp_ctx) {
- return ENOMEM;
- }
-
- ret = krb5_unparse_name(context, entry_ex->entry.principal, &name);
- if (ret != 0) {
- talloc_free(tmp_ctx);
- return ret;
+ ret = kerberos_pac_to_server_info(mem_ctx, ic, *pac,
+ context, &server_info);
+ if (ret) {
+ return NT_STATUS_UNSUCCESSFUL;
}
- if (addresses) {
- for (i=0; i < addresses->len; i++) {
- if (addresses->val->addr_type == KRB5_ADDRESS_NETBIOS) {
- workstation = talloc_strndup(tmp_ctx, addresses->val->address.data, MIN(addresses->val->address.length, 15));
- if (workstation) {
- break;
- }
- }
- }
- }
+ nt_status = samba_get_logon_info_pac_blob(mem_ctx, ic,
+ server_info, pac_blob);
+
+ return nt_status;
+}
- /* Strip space padding */
- if (workstation) {
- i = MIN(strlen(workstation), 15);
- for (; i > 0 && workstation[i - 1] == ' '; i--) {
- workstation[i - 1] = '\0';
- }
+/* this function allocates 'data' using malloc.
+ * The caller is responsible for freeing it */
+void samba_kdc_build_edata_reply(NTSTATUS nt_status, DATA_BLOB *e_data)
+{
+ PA_DATA pa;
+ unsigned char *buf;
+ size_t len;
+ krb5_error_code ret = 0;
+
+ if (!e_data)
+ return;
+
+ pa.padata_type = KRB5_PADATA_PW_SALT;
+ pa.padata_value.length = 12;
+ pa.padata_value.data = malloc(pa.padata_value.length);
+ if (!pa.padata_value.data) {
+ e_data->length = 0;
+ e_data->data = NULL;
+ return;
}
- nt_status = authsam_account_ok(tmp_ctx,
- private->samdb,
- MSV1_0_ALLOW_SERVER_TRUST_ACCOUNT | MSV1_0_ALLOW_WORKSTATION_TRUST_ACCOUNT,
- private->msg,
- private->realm_ref_msg,
- workstation,
- name);
- free(name);
+ SIVAL(pa.padata_value.data, 0, NT_STATUS_V(nt_status));
+ SIVAL(pa.padata_value.data, 4, 0);
+ SIVAL(pa.padata_value.data, 8, 1);
- /* TODO: Need a more complete mapping of NTSTATUS to krb5kdc errors */
+ ASN1_MALLOC_ENCODE(PA_DATA, buf, len, &pa, &len, ret);
+ free(pa.padata_value.data);
- if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(nt_status)) {
- return KRB5KDC_ERR_POLICY;
+ e_data->data = buf;
+ e_data->length = len;
+
+ return;
+}
+
+/* function to map policy errors */
+krb5_error_code samba_kdc_map_policy_err(NTSTATUS nt_status)
+{
+ krb5_error_code ret;
+
+ if (NT_STATUS_EQUAL(nt_status, NT_STATUS_PASSWORD_MUST_CHANGE))
+ ret = KRB5KDC_ERR_KEY_EXPIRED;
+ else if (NT_STATUS_EQUAL(nt_status, NT_STATUS_PASSWORD_EXPIRED))
+ ret = KRB5KDC_ERR_KEY_EXPIRED;
+ else if (NT_STATUS_EQUAL(nt_status, NT_STATUS_ACCOUNT_EXPIRED))
+ ret = KRB5KDC_ERR_CLIENT_REVOKED;
+ else if (NT_STATUS_EQUAL(nt_status, NT_STATUS_ACCOUNT_DISABLED))
+ ret = KRB5KDC_ERR_CLIENT_REVOKED;
+ else if (NT_STATUS_EQUAL(nt_status, NT_STATUS_INVALID_LOGON_HOURS))
+ ret = KRB5KDC_ERR_CLIENT_REVOKED;
+ else if (NT_STATUS_EQUAL(nt_status, NT_STATUS_ACCOUNT_LOCKED_OUT))
+ ret = KRB5KDC_ERR_CLIENT_REVOKED;
+ else if (NT_STATUS_EQUAL(nt_status, NT_STATUS_INVALID_WORKSTATION))
+ ret = KRB5KDC_ERR_POLICY;
+ else
+ ret = KRB5KDC_ERR_POLICY;
+
+ return ret;
+}
+
+/* Given a kdc entry, consult the account_ok routine in auth/auth_sam.c
+ * for consistency */
+NTSTATUS samba_kdc_check_client_access(struct samba_kdc_entry *kdc_entry,
+ const char *client_name,
+ const char *workstation,
+ bool password_change)
+{
+ TALLOC_CTX *tmp_ctx;
+ NTSTATUS nt_status;
+
+ tmp_ctx = talloc_named(NULL, 0, "samba_kdc_check_client_access");
+ if (!tmp_ctx) {
+ return NT_STATUS_NO_MEMORY;
}
- return 0;
+
+ /* we allow all kinds of trusts here */
+ nt_status = authsam_account_ok(tmp_ctx,
+ kdc_entry->kdc_db_ctx->samdb,
+ MSV1_0_ALLOW_SERVER_TRUST_ACCOUNT |
+ MSV1_0_ALLOW_WORKSTATION_TRUST_ACCOUNT,
+ kdc_entry->realm_dn, kdc_entry->msg,
+ workstation, client_name,
+ true, password_change);
+
+ talloc_free(tmp_ctx);
+ return nt_status;
}
git.samba.org / ira / wip.git / blobdiff