#include "kdc/kdc.h"
#include "../lib/crypto/md4.h"
-enum hdb_ldb_ent_type
-{ HDB_SAMBA4_ENT_TYPE_CLIENT, HDB_SAMBA4_ENT_TYPE_SERVER,
+enum hdb_samba4_ent_type
+{ HDB_SAMBA4_ENT_TYPE_CLIENT, HDB_SAMBA4_ENT_TYPE_SERVER,
HDB_SAMBA4_ENT_TYPE_KRBTGT, HDB_SAMBA4_ENT_TYPE_TRUST, HDB_SAMBA4_ENT_TYPE_ANY };
enum trust_direction {
UNKNOWN = 0,
- INBOUND = LSA_TRUST_DIRECTION_INBOUND,
+ INBOUND = LSA_TRUST_DIRECTION_INBOUND,
OUTBOUND = LSA_TRUST_DIRECTION_OUTBOUND
};
return timegm(&tm);
}
-static HDBFlags uf2HDBFlags(krb5_context context, int userAccountControl, enum hdb_ldb_ent_type ent_type)
+static HDBFlags uf2HDBFlags(krb5_context context, int userAccountControl, enum hdb_samba4_ent_type ent_type)
{
HDBFlags flags = int2HDBFlags(0);
}
flags.invalid = 0;
}
-
+
if (userAccountControl & UF_INTERDOMAIN_TRUST_ACCOUNT) {
if (ent_type == HDB_SAMBA4_ENT_TYPE_CLIENT || ent_type == HDB_SAMBA4_ENT_TYPE_ANY) {
flags.client = 1;
}
if (userAccountControl & UF_TRUSTED_FOR_DELEGATION) {
flags.ok_as_delegate = 1;
- }
+ }
if (!(userAccountControl & UF_NOT_DELEGATED)) {
flags.forwardable = 1;
flags.proxiable = 1;
return flags;
}
-static int hdb_ldb_destructor(struct hdb_ldb_private *p)
+static int hdb_samba4_destructor(struct hdb_samba4_private *p)
{
hdb_entry_ex *entry_ex = p->entry_ex;
free_hdb_entry(&entry_ex->entry);
return 0;
}
-static void hdb_ldb_free_entry(krb5_context context, hdb_entry_ex *entry_ex)
+static void hdb_samba4_free_entry(krb5_context context, hdb_entry_ex *entry_ex)
{
talloc_free(entry_ex->ctx);
}
key.salt = NULL; /* No salt for this enc type */
ret = krb5_keyblock_init(context,
- ENCTYPE_ARCFOUR_HMAC_MD5,
- hash->hash, sizeof(hash->hash),
+ ENCTYPE_ARCFOUR_HMAC,
+ hash->hash, sizeof(hash->hash),
&key.key);
if (ret) {
goto out;
pkb4->keys[i].value->data,
pkb4->keys[i].value->length,
&key.key);
+ if (ret == KRB5_PROG_ETYPE_NOSUPP) {
+ DEBUG(2,("Unsupported keytype ignored - type %u\n",
+ pkb4->keys[i].keytype));
+ ret = 0;
+ continue;
+ }
if (ret) {
if (key.salt) {
free_Salt(key.salt);
/*
* Construct an hdb_entry from a directory entry.
*/
-static krb5_error_code hdb_samba4_message2entry(krb5_context context, HDB *db,
- struct loadparm_context *lp_ctx,
+static krb5_error_code hdb_samba4_message2entry(krb5_context context, HDB *db,
+ struct loadparm_context *lp_ctx,
TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx, krb5_const_principal principal,
- enum hdb_ldb_ent_type ent_type,
+ enum hdb_samba4_ent_type ent_type,
struct ldb_dn *realm_dn,
struct ldb_message *msg,
hdb_entry_ex *entry_ex)
krb5_boolean is_computer = FALSE;
char *realm = strupper_talloc(mem_ctx, lp_realm(lp_ctx));
- struct hdb_ldb_private *p;
+ struct hdb_samba4_private *p;
NTTIME acct_expiry;
NTSTATUS status;
const char *samAccountName = ldb_msg_find_attr_as_string(msg, "samAccountName", NULL);
computer_val.data = discard_const_p(uint8_t,"computer");
computer_val.length = strlen((const char *)computer_val.data);
-
+
if (!samAccountName) {
ret = ENOENT;
krb5_set_error_message(context, ret, "hdb_samba4_message2entry: no samAccountName present");
}
objectclasses = ldb_msg_find_element(msg, "objectClass");
-
+
if (objectclasses && ldb_msg_find_val(objectclasses, &computer_val)) {
is_computer = TRUE;
}
krb5_set_error_message(context, ret, "talloc_strdup: out of memory");
goto out;
}
-
- p = talloc(mem_ctx, struct hdb_ldb_private);
+
+ p = talloc(mem_ctx, struct hdb_samba4_private);
if (!p) {
ret = ENOMEM;
goto out;
goto out;
}
- talloc_set_destructor(p, hdb_ldb_destructor);
+ talloc_set_destructor(p, hdb_samba4_destructor);
entry_ex->ctx = p;
- entry_ex->free_entry = hdb_ldb_free_entry;
+ entry_ex->free_entry = hdb_samba4_free_entry;
userAccountControl = ldb_msg_find_attr_as_uint(msg, "userAccountControl", 0);
-
+
entry_ex->entry.principal = malloc(sizeof(*(entry_ex->entry.principal)));
if (ent_type == HDB_SAMBA4_ENT_TYPE_ANY && principal == NULL) {
krb5_make_principal(context, &entry_ex->entry.principal, realm, samAccountName, NULL);
* the client-specified realm. This code attempts to
* replace the client principal's realm with the one
* we determine from our records */
-
+
/* this has to be with malloc() */
krb5_principal_set_realm(context, entry_ex->entry.principal, realm);
}
* of the Heimdal KDC. They are stored in a the traditional
* DB for audit purposes, and still form part of the structure
* we must return */
-
+
/* use 'whenCreated' */
entry_ex->entry.created_by.time = ldb_msg_find_krb5time_ldap_time(msg, "whenCreated", 0);
/* use '???' */
entry_ex->entry.created_by.principal = NULL;
-
+
entry_ex->entry.modified_by = (Event *) malloc(sizeof(Event));
if (entry_ex->entry.modified_by == NULL) {
ret = ENOMEM;
krb5_set_error_message(context, ret, "malloc: out of memory");
goto out;
}
-
+
/* use 'whenChanged' */
entry_ex->entry.modified_by->time = ldb_msg_find_krb5time_ldap_time(msg, "whenChanged", 0);
/* use '???' */
} else {
NTTIME must_change_time
- = samdb_result_force_password_change((struct ldb_context *)db->hdb_db, mem_ctx,
+ = samdb_result_force_password_change((struct ldb_context *)db->hdb_db, mem_ctx,
realm_dn, msg);
if (must_change_time == 0x7FFFFFFFFFFFFFFFULL) {
entry_ex->entry.pw_end = NULL;
p->msg = talloc_steal(p, msg);
p->samdb = (struct ldb_context *)db->hdb_db;
-
+
out:
if (ret != 0) {
/* This doesn't free ent itself, that is for the eventual caller to do */
/*
* Construct an hdb_entry from a directory entry.
*/
-static krb5_error_code hdb_samba4_trust_message2entry(krb5_context context, HDB *db,
+static krb5_error_code hdb_samba4_trust_message2entry(krb5_context context, HDB *db,
struct loadparm_context *lp_ctx,
TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx, krb5_const_principal principal,
enum trust_direction direction,
struct ldb_message *msg,
hdb_entry_ex *entry_ex)
{
-
+
const char *dnsdomain;
char *realm;
DATA_BLOB password_utf16;
struct samr_Password password_hash;
const struct ldb_val *password_val;
struct trustAuthInOutBlob password_blob;
- struct hdb_ldb_private *p;
+ struct hdb_samba4_private *p;
enum ndr_err_code ndr_err;
int i, ret, trust_direction_flags;
- p = talloc(mem_ctx, struct hdb_ldb_private);
+ p = talloc(mem_ctx, struct hdb_samba4_private);
if (!p) {
ret = ENOMEM;
goto out;
p->lp_ctx = lp_ctx;
p->realm_dn = realm_dn;
- talloc_set_destructor(p, hdb_ldb_destructor);
+ talloc_set_destructor(p, hdb_samba4_destructor);
entry_ex->ctx = p;
- entry_ex->free_entry = hdb_ldb_free_entry;
+ entry_ex->free_entry = hdb_samba4_free_entry;
/* use 'whenCreated' */
entry_ex->entry.created_by.time = ldb_msg_find_krb5time_ldap_time(msg, "whenCreated", 0);
ret = ENOMEM;
goto out;
}
-
+
ret = krb5_keyblock_init(context,
- ENCTYPE_ARCFOUR_HMAC_MD5,
- password_hash.hash, sizeof(password_hash.hash),
+ ENCTYPE_ARCFOUR_HMAC,
+ password_hash.hash, sizeof(password_hash.hash),
&key.key);
-
+
entry_ex->entry.keys.val[entry_ex->entry.keys.len] = key;
entry_ex->entry.keys.len++;
}
-
+
entry_ex->entry.principal = malloc(sizeof(*(entry_ex->entry.principal)));
ret = copy_Principal(principal, entry_ex->entry.principal);
krb5_clear_error_message(context);
goto out;
}
-
+
/* While we have copied the client principal, tests
* show that Win2k3 returns the 'corrected' realm, not
* the client-specified realm. This code attempts to
* replace the client principal's realm with the one
* we determine from our records */
-
+
krb5_principal_set_realm(context, entry_ex->entry.principal, realm);
entry_ex->entry.flags = int2HDBFlags(0);
entry_ex->entry.flags.immutable = 1;
entry_ex->entry.flags.require_preauth = 1;
entry_ex->entry.pw_end = NULL;
-
+
entry_ex->entry.max_life = NULL;
entry_ex->entry.max_renew = NULL;
p->msg = talloc_steal(p, msg);
p->samdb = (struct ldb_context *)db->hdb_db;
-
+
out:
if (ret != 0) {
/* This doesn't free ent itself, that is for the eventual caller to do */
}
-static krb5_error_code hdb_samba4_lookup_trust(krb5_context context, struct ldb_context *ldb_ctx,
+static krb5_error_code hdb_samba4_lookup_trust(krb5_context context, struct ldb_context *ldb_ctx,
TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx,
const char *realm,
struct ldb_dn *realm_dn,
krb5_warnx(context, "hdb_samba4_open: use of a master key incompatible with LDB\n");
krb5_set_error_message(context, ret, "hdb_samba4_open: use of a master key incompatible with LDB\n");
return ret;
- }
+ }
return 0;
}
return HDB_ERR_DB_INUSE;
}
-static krb5_error_code hdb_samba4_fetch_client(krb5_context context, HDB *db,
- struct loadparm_context *lp_ctx,
- TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx,
- krb5_const_principal principal,
- unsigned flags,
- hdb_entry_ex *entry_ex) {
+static krb5_error_code hdb_samba4_lookup_client(krb5_context context, HDB *db,
+ struct loadparm_context *lp_ctx,
+ TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx,
+ krb5_const_principal principal,
+ const char **attrs,
+ struct ldb_dn **realm_dn,
+ struct ldb_message **msg) {
NTSTATUS nt_status;
char *principal_string;
- struct ldb_dn *realm_dn;
krb5_error_code ret;
- struct ldb_message *msg = NULL;
ret = krb5_unparse_name(context, principal, &principal_string);
-
+
if (ret != 0) {
return ret;
}
-
+
nt_status = sam_get_results_principal((struct ldb_context *)db->hdb_db,
- mem_ctx, principal_string,
- &realm_dn, &msg);
+ mem_ctx, principal_string, attrs,
+ realm_dn, msg);
free(principal_string);
if (NT_STATUS_EQUAL(nt_status, NT_STATUS_NO_SUCH_USER)) {
return HDB_ERR_NOENTRY;
} else if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(nt_status)) {
return EINVAL;
}
-
- ret = hdb_samba4_message2entry(context, db, lp_ctx, mem_ctx,
- principal, HDB_SAMBA4_ENT_TYPE_CLIENT,
- realm_dn, msg, entry_ex);
+
return ret;
}
-static krb5_error_code hdb_samba4_fetch_krbtgt(krb5_context context, HDB *db,
- struct loadparm_context *lp_ctx,
- TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx,
+static krb5_error_code hdb_samba4_fetch_client(krb5_context context, HDB *db,
+ struct loadparm_context *lp_ctx,
+ TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx,
+ krb5_const_principal principal,
+ unsigned flags,
+ hdb_entry_ex *entry_ex) {
+ struct ldb_dn *realm_dn;
+ krb5_error_code ret;
+ struct ldb_message *msg = NULL;
+
+ ret = hdb_samba4_lookup_client(context, db, lp_ctx,
+ mem_ctx, principal, user_attrs,
+ &realm_dn, &msg);
+ if (ret != 0) {
+ return ret;
+ }
+
+ ret = hdb_samba4_message2entry(context, db, lp_ctx, mem_ctx,
+ principal, HDB_SAMBA4_ENT_TYPE_CLIENT,
+ realm_dn, msg, entry_ex);
+ return ret;
+}
+
+static krb5_error_code hdb_samba4_fetch_krbtgt(krb5_context context, HDB *db,
+ struct loadparm_context *lp_ctx,
+ TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx,
krb5_const_principal principal,
unsigned flags,
hdb_entry_ex *entry_ex)
if (lp_is_my_domain_or_realm(lp_ctx, principal->realm)
&& lp_is_my_domain_or_realm(lp_ctx, principal->name.name_string.val[1])) {
- /* us */
+ /* us */
/* Cludge, cludge cludge. If the realm part of krbtgt/realm,
* is in our db, then direct the caller at our primary
* krbtgt */
int lret;
char *realm_fixed;
-
- lret = gendb_search_single_extended_dn(db->hdb_db, mem_ctx,
+
+ lret = gendb_search_single_extended_dn(db->hdb_db, mem_ctx,
realm_dn, LDB_SCOPE_SUBTREE,
- &msg, krbtgt_attrs,
- "(&(objectClass=user)(samAccountName=krbtgt))");
+ &msg, krbtgt_attrs,
+ "(&(objectClass=user)(samAccountName=krbtgt))");
if (lret == LDB_ERR_NO_SUCH_OBJECT) {
krb5_warnx(context, "hdb_samba4_fetch: could not find own KRBTGT in DB!");
krb5_set_error_message(context, HDB_ERR_NOENTRY, "hdb_samba4_fetch: could not find own KRBTGT in DB!");
krb5_set_error_message(context, HDB_ERR_NOENTRY, "hdb_samba4_fetch: could not find own KRBTGT in DB: %s", ldb_errstring(db->hdb_db));
return HDB_ERR_NOENTRY;
}
-
+
realm_fixed = strupper_talloc(mem_ctx, lp_realm(lp_ctx));
if (!realm_fixed) {
ret = ENOMEM;
krb5_set_error_message(context, ret, "strupper_talloc: out of memory");
return ret;
}
-
+
ret = krb5_copy_principal(context, principal, &alloc_principal);
if (ret) {
return ret;
}
-
+
free(alloc_principal->name.name_string.val[1]);
alloc_principal->name.name_string.val[1] = strdup(realm_fixed);
talloc_free(realm_fixed);
}
principal = alloc_principal;
- ret = hdb_samba4_message2entry(context, db, lp_ctx, mem_ctx,
- principal, HDB_SAMBA4_ENT_TYPE_KRBTGT,
+ ret = hdb_samba4_message2entry(context, db, lp_ctx, mem_ctx,
+ principal, HDB_SAMBA4_ENT_TYPE_KRBTGT,
realm_dn, msg, entry_ex);
if (ret != 0) {
- krb5_warnx(context, "hdb_samba4_fetch: self krbtgt message2entry failed");
+ krb5_warnx(context, "hdb_samba4_fetch: self krbtgt message2entry failed");
}
return ret;
}
/* Trusted domains are under CN=system */
-
- ret = hdb_samba4_lookup_trust(context, (struct ldb_context *)db->hdb_db,
- mem_ctx,
+
+ ret = hdb_samba4_lookup_trust(context, (struct ldb_context *)db->hdb_db,
+ mem_ctx,
realm, realm_dn, &msg);
-
+
if (ret != 0) {
krb5_warnx(context, "hdb_samba4_fetch: could not find principal in DB");
krb5_set_error_message(context, ret, "hdb_samba4_fetch: could not find principal in DB");
return ret;
}
-
- ret = hdb_samba4_trust_message2entry(context, db, lp_ctx, mem_ctx,
- principal, direction,
+
+ ret = hdb_samba4_trust_message2entry(context, db, lp_ctx, mem_ctx,
+ principal, direction,
realm_dn, msg, entry_ex);
if (ret != 0) {
- krb5_warnx(context, "hdb_samba4_fetch: trust_message2entry failed");
+ krb5_warnx(context, "hdb_samba4_fetch: trust_message2entry failed");
}
return ret;
-
+
/* we should lookup trusted domains */
return HDB_ERR_NOENTRY;
}
}
-static krb5_error_code hdb_samba4_lookup_server(krb5_context context, HDB *db,
+static krb5_error_code hdb_samba4_lookup_server(krb5_context context, HDB *db,
struct loadparm_context *lp_ctx,
- TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx,
+ TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx,
krb5_const_principal principal,
const char **attrs,
struct ldb_dn **realm_dn,
NTSTATUS nt_status;
struct ldb_dn *user_dn;
char *principal_string;
-
- ret = krb5_unparse_name_flags(context, principal,
- KRB5_PRINCIPAL_UNPARSE_NO_REALM,
+
+ ret = krb5_unparse_name_flags(context, principal,
+ KRB5_PRINCIPAL_UNPARSE_NO_REALM,
&principal_string);
if (ret != 0) {
return ret;
}
-
+
/* At this point we may find the host is known to be
* in a different realm, so we should generate a
* referral instead */
nt_status = crack_service_principal_name((struct ldb_context *)db->hdb_db,
- mem_ctx, principal_string,
+ mem_ctx, principal_string,
&user_dn, realm_dn);
free(principal_string);
-
+
if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(nt_status)) {
return HDB_ERR_NOENTRY;
}
-
+
ldb_ret = gendb_search_single_extended_dn((struct ldb_context *)db->hdb_db,
- mem_ctx,
+ mem_ctx,
user_dn, LDB_SCOPE_BASE,
msg, attrs,
"(objectClass=*)");
if (ldb_ret != LDB_SUCCESS) {
return HDB_ERR_NOENTRY;
}
-
+
} else {
int lret;
char *filter = NULL;
/* server as client principal case, but we must not lookup userPrincipalNames */
*realm_dn = ldb_get_default_basedn(db->hdb_db);
realm = krb5_principal_get_realm(context, principal);
-
+
/* TODO: Check if it is our realm, otherwise give referall */
-
+
ret = krb5_unparse_name_flags(context, principal, KRB5_PRINCIPAL_UNPARSE_NO_REALM, &short_princ);
-
+
if (ret != 0) {
krb5_set_error_message(context, ret, "hdb_samba4_lookup_principal: could not parse principal");
krb5_warnx(context, "hdb_samba4_lookup_principal: could not parse principal");
return ret;
}
-
- lret = gendb_search_single_extended_dn(db->hdb_db, mem_ctx,
+
+ lret = gendb_search_single_extended_dn(db->hdb_db, mem_ctx,
*realm_dn, LDB_SCOPE_SUBTREE,
- msg, attrs, "(&(objectClass=user)(samAccountName=%s))",
+ msg, attrs, "(&(objectClass=user)(samAccountName=%s))",
ldb_binary_encode_string(mem_ctx, short_princ));
free(short_princ);
if (lret == LDB_ERR_NO_SUCH_OBJECT) {
return HDB_ERR_NOENTRY;
}
if (lret != LDB_SUCCESS) {
- DEBUG(3, ("Failed single search for for %s - %s\n",
+ DEBUG(3, ("Failed single search for for %s - %s\n",
filter, ldb_errstring(db->hdb_db)));
return HDB_ERR_NOENTRY;
}
return 0;
}
-static krb5_error_code hdb_samba4_fetch_server(krb5_context context, HDB *db,
+static krb5_error_code hdb_samba4_fetch_server(krb5_context context, HDB *db,
struct loadparm_context *lp_ctx,
- TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx,
+ TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx,
krb5_const_principal principal,
unsigned flags,
hdb_entry_ex *entry_ex)
struct ldb_dn *realm_dn;
struct ldb_message *msg;
- ret = hdb_samba4_lookup_server(context, db, lp_ctx, mem_ctx, principal,
+ ret = hdb_samba4_lookup_server(context, db, lp_ctx, mem_ctx, principal,
server_attrs, &realm_dn, &msg);
if (ret != 0) {
return ret;
}
- ret = hdb_samba4_message2entry(context, db, lp_ctx, mem_ctx,
+ ret = hdb_samba4_message2entry(context, db, lp_ctx, mem_ctx,
principal, HDB_SAMBA4_ENT_TYPE_SERVER,
realm_dn, msg, entry_ex);
if (ret != 0) {
- krb5_warnx(context, "hdb_samba4_fetch: message2entry failed");
+ krb5_warnx(context, "hdb_samba4_fetch: message2entry failed");
}
return ret;
}
-
-static krb5_error_code hdb_samba4_fetch(krb5_context context, HDB *db,
+
+static krb5_error_code hdb_samba4_fetch(krb5_context context, HDB *db,
krb5_const_principal principal,
unsigned flags,
hdb_entry_ex *entry_ex)
return HDB_ERR_DB_INUSE;
}
-struct hdb_ldb_seq {
+struct hdb_samba4_seq {
struct ldb_context *ctx;
struct loadparm_context *lp_ctx;
int index;
static krb5_error_code hdb_samba4_seq(krb5_context context, HDB *db, unsigned flags, hdb_entry_ex *entry)
{
krb5_error_code ret;
- struct hdb_ldb_seq *priv = (struct hdb_ldb_seq *)db->hdb_dbc;
+ struct hdb_samba4_seq *priv = (struct hdb_samba4_seq *)db->hdb_dbc;
TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx;
hdb_entry_ex entry_ex;
memset(&entry_ex, '\0', sizeof(entry_ex));
}
if (priv->index < priv->count) {
- ret = hdb_samba4_message2entry(context, db, priv->lp_ctx,
- mem_ctx,
- NULL, HDB_SAMBA4_ENT_TYPE_ANY,
+ ret = hdb_samba4_message2entry(context, db, priv->lp_ctx,
+ mem_ctx,
+ NULL, HDB_SAMBA4_ENT_TYPE_ANY,
priv->realm_dn, priv->msgs[priv->index++], entry);
} else {
ret = HDB_ERR_NOENTRY;
}
if (ret != 0) {
- talloc_free(priv);
db->hdb_dbc = NULL;
} else {
talloc_free(mem_ctx);
hdb_entry_ex *entry)
{
struct ldb_context *ldb_ctx = (struct ldb_context *)db->hdb_db;
- struct loadparm_context *lp_ctx = talloc_get_type(ldb_get_opaque(ldb_ctx, "loadparm"),
+ struct loadparm_context *lp_ctx = talloc_get_type(ldb_get_opaque(ldb_ctx, "loadparm"),
struct loadparm_context);
- struct hdb_ldb_seq *priv = (struct hdb_ldb_seq *)db->hdb_dbc;
+ struct hdb_samba4_seq *priv = (struct hdb_samba4_seq *)db->hdb_dbc;
char *realm;
struct ldb_result *res = NULL;
krb5_error_code ret;
db->hdb_dbc = NULL;
}
- priv = (struct hdb_ldb_seq *) talloc(db, struct hdb_ldb_seq);
+ priv = (struct hdb_samba4_seq *) talloc(db, struct hdb_samba4_seq);
if (!priv) {
ret = ENOMEM;
krb5_set_error_message(context, ret, "talloc: out of memory");
talloc_free(priv);
return ret;
}
-
+
lret = ldb_search(ldb_ctx, priv, &res,
priv->realm_dn, LDB_SCOPE_SUBTREE, user_attrs,
"(objectClass=user)");
return 0;
}
-/* This interface is to be called by the KDC, which is expecting Samba
+
+/* Check if a given entry may delegate to this target principal
+ *
+ * This is currently a very nasty hack - allowing only delegation to itself.
+ */
+krb5_error_code hdb_samba4_check_constrained_delegation(krb5_context context, HDB *db,
+ hdb_entry_ex *entry,
+ krb5_const_principal target_principal)
+{
+ struct ldb_context *ldb_ctx = (struct ldb_context *)db->hdb_db;
+ struct loadparm_context *lp_ctx = talloc_get_type(ldb_get_opaque(ldb_ctx, "loadparm"),
+ struct loadparm_context);
+ krb5_error_code ret;
+ krb5_principal enterprise_prinicpal = NULL;
+ struct ldb_dn *realm_dn;
+ struct ldb_message *msg;
+ struct dom_sid *orig_sid;
+ struct dom_sid *target_sid;
+ struct hdb_samba4_private *p = talloc_get_type(entry->ctx, struct hdb_samba4_private);
+ const char *delegation_check_attrs[] = {
+ "objectSid", NULL
+ };
+
+ TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx = talloc_named(db, 0, "hdb_samba4_check_constrained_delegation");
+
+ if (!mem_ctx) {
+ ret = ENOMEM;
+ krb5_set_error_message(context, ret, "hdb_samba4_fetch: talloc_named() failed!");
+ return ret;
+ }
+
+ if (target_principal->name.name_type == KRB5_NT_ENTERPRISE_PRINCIPAL) {
+ /* Need to reparse the enterprise principal to find the real target */
+ if (target_principal->name.name_string.len != 1) {
+ ret = KRB5_PARSE_MALFORMED;
+ krb5_set_error_message(context, ret, "hdb_samba4_check_constrained_delegation: request for delegation to enterprise principal with wrong (%d) number of components",
+ target_principal->name.name_string.len);
+ talloc_free(mem_ctx);
+ return ret;
+ }
+ ret = krb5_parse_name(context, target_principal->name.name_string.val[0],
+ &enterprise_prinicpal);
+ if (ret) {
+ talloc_free(mem_ctx);
+ return ret;
+ }
+ target_principal = enterprise_prinicpal;
+ }
+
+ ret = hdb_samba4_lookup_server(context, db, lp_ctx, mem_ctx, target_principal,
+ delegation_check_attrs, &realm_dn, &msg);
+
+ krb5_free_principal(context, enterprise_prinicpal);
+
+ if (ret != 0) {
+ talloc_free(mem_ctx);
+ return ret;
+ }
+
+ orig_sid = samdb_result_dom_sid(mem_ctx, p->msg, "objectSid");
+ target_sid = samdb_result_dom_sid(mem_ctx, msg, "objectSid");
+
+ /* Allow delegation to the same principal, even if by a different
+ * name. The easy and safe way to prove this is by SID
+ * comparison */
+ if (!(orig_sid && target_sid && dom_sid_equal(orig_sid, target_sid))) {
+ talloc_free(mem_ctx);
+ return KRB5KDC_ERR_BADOPTION;
+ }
+
+ talloc_free(mem_ctx);
+ return ret;
+}
+
+/* Certificates printed by a the Certificate Authority might have a
+ * slightly different form of the user principal name to that in the
+ * database. Allow a mismatch where they both refer to the same
+ * SID */
+
+krb5_error_code hdb_samba4_check_pkinit_ms_upn_match(krb5_context context, HDB *db,
+ hdb_entry_ex *entry,
+ krb5_const_principal certificate_principal)
+{
+ struct ldb_context *ldb_ctx = (struct ldb_context *)db->hdb_db;
+ struct loadparm_context *lp_ctx = talloc_get_type(ldb_get_opaque(ldb_ctx, "loadparm"),
+ struct loadparm_context);
+ krb5_error_code ret;
+ struct ldb_dn *realm_dn;
+ struct ldb_message *msg;
+ struct dom_sid *orig_sid;
+ struct dom_sid *target_sid;
+ struct hdb_samba4_private *p = talloc_get_type(entry->ctx, struct hdb_samba4_private);
+ const char *ms_upn_check_attrs[] = {
+ "objectSid", NULL
+ };
+
+ TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx = talloc_named(db, 0, "hdb_samba4_check_constrained_delegation");
+
+ if (!mem_ctx) {
+ ret = ENOMEM;
+ krb5_set_error_message(context, ret, "hdb_samba4_fetch: talloc_named() failed!");
+ return ret;
+ }
+
+ ret = hdb_samba4_lookup_client(context, db, lp_ctx,
+ mem_ctx, certificate_principal,
+ ms_upn_check_attrs, &realm_dn, &msg);
+
+ if (ret != 0) {
+ talloc_free(mem_ctx);
+ return ret;
+ }
+
+ orig_sid = samdb_result_dom_sid(mem_ctx, p->msg, "objectSid");
+ target_sid = samdb_result_dom_sid(mem_ctx, msg, "objectSid");
+
+ /* Consider these to be the same principal, even if by a different
+ * name. The easy and safe way to prove this is by SID
+ * comparison */
+ if (!(orig_sid && target_sid && dom_sid_equal(orig_sid, target_sid))) {
+ talloc_free(mem_ctx);
+ return KRB5_KDC_ERR_CLIENT_NAME_MISMATCH;
+ }
+
+ talloc_free(mem_ctx);
+ return ret;
+}
+
+/* This interface is to be called by the KDC and libnet_keytab_dump, which is expecting Samba
* calling conventions. It is also called by a wrapper
- * (hdb_ldb_create) from the kpasswdd -> krb5 -> keytab_hdb -> hdb
+ * (hdb_samba4_create) from the kpasswdd -> krb5 -> keytab_hdb -> hdb
* code */
-NTSTATUS kdc_hdb_samba4_create(TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx,
- struct tevent_context *ev_ctx,
- struct loadparm_context *lp_ctx,
- krb5_context context, struct HDB **db, const char *arg)
+NTSTATUS hdb_samba4_create_kdc(TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx,
+ struct tevent_context *ev_ctx,
+ struct loadparm_context *lp_ctx,
+ krb5_context context, struct HDB **db)
{
- NTSTATUS nt_status;
struct auth_session_info *session_info;
+ NTSTATUS nt_status;
+
*db = talloc(mem_ctx, HDB);
if (!*db) {
krb5_set_error_message(context, ENOMEM, "malloc: out of memory");
(*db)->hdb_db = NULL;
(*db)->hdb_capability_flags = 0;
+#if 1
+ /* we would prefer to use system_session(), as that would
+ * allow us to share the samdb backend context with other parts of the
+ * system. For now we can't as we need to override the
+ * credentials to set CRED_DONT_USE_KERBEROS, which would
+ * break other users of the system_session */
+ DEBUG(0,("FIXME: Using new system session for hdb\n"));
nt_status = auth_system_session_info(*db, lp_ctx, &session_info);
if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(nt_status)) {
- return nt_status;
+ return nt_status;
+ }
+#else
+ session_info = system_session(lp_ctx);
+ if (session_info == NULL) {
+ return NT_STATUS_INTERNAL_ERROR;
}
-
+#endif
+
/* The idea here is very simple. Using Kerberos to
* authenticate the KDC to the LDAP server is higly likely to
* be circular.
*
* In future we may set this up to use EXERNAL and SSL
- * certificates, for now it will almost certainly be NTLMSSP
+ * certificates, for now it will almost certainly be NTLMSSP_SET_USERNAME
*/
-
- cli_credentials_set_kerberos_state(session_info->credentials,
+
+ cli_credentials_set_kerberos_state(session_info->credentials,
CRED_DONT_USE_KERBEROS);
/* Setup the link to LDB */
(*db)->hdb_db = samdb_connect(*db, ev_ctx, lp_ctx, session_info);
if ((*db)->hdb_db == NULL) {
- DEBUG(1, ("hdb_ldb_create: Cannot open samdb for KDC backend!"));
+ DEBUG(1, ("hdb_samba4_create: Cannot open samdb for KDC backend!"));
return NT_STATUS_CANT_ACCESS_DOMAIN_INFO;
}
(*db)->hdb_destroy = hdb_samba4_destroy;
(*db)->hdb_auth_status = NULL;
- (*db)->hdb_check_constrained_delegation = NULL;
+ (*db)->hdb_check_constrained_delegation = hdb_samba4_check_constrained_delegation;
+ (*db)->hdb_check_pkinit_ms_upn_match = hdb_samba4_check_pkinit_ms_upn_match;
return NT_STATUS_OK;
}
-krb5_error_code hdb_samba4_create(krb5_context context, struct HDB **db, const char *arg)
+static krb5_error_code hdb_samba4_create(krb5_context context, struct HDB **db, const char *arg)
{
NTSTATUS nt_status;
+ void *ptr;
+ struct hdb_samba4_context *hdb_samba4_context;
+
+ if (sscanf(arg, "&%p", &ptr) != 1) {
+ return EINVAL;
+ }
+ hdb_samba4_context = talloc_get_type_abort(ptr, struct hdb_samba4_context);
/* The global kdc_mem_ctx and kdc_lp_ctx, Disgusting, ugly hack, but it means one less private hook */
- nt_status = kdc_hdb_samba4_create(kdc_mem_ctx, kdc_ev_ctx, kdc_lp_ctx,
- context, db, arg);
+ nt_status = hdb_samba4_create_kdc(hdb_samba4_context, hdb_samba4_context->ev_ctx, hdb_samba4_context->lp_ctx,
+ context, db);
if (NT_STATUS_IS_OK(nt_status)) {
return 0;
}
return EINVAL;
}
+
+/* Only used in the hdb-backed keytab code
+ * for a keytab of 'samba4&<address>', to find
+ * kpasswd's key in the main DB, and to
+ * copy all the keys into a file (libnet_keytab_export)
+ *
+ * The <address> is the string form of a pointer to a talloced struct hdb_samba_context
+ */
+struct hdb_method hdb_samba4 = {
+ .interface_version = HDB_INTERFACE_VERSION,
+ .prefix = "samba4",
+ .create = hdb_samba4_create
+};
git.samba.org / ira / wip.git / blobdiff