/*
- * Copyright (c) 1997-2006 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan
- * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden).
- * All rights reserved.
+ * Copyright (c) 1997-2007 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan
+ * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden).
+ * All rights reserved.
*
- * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
- * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
- * are met:
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
*
- * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
- * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
*
- * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
- * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
- * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
*
- * 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors
- * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software
- * without specific prior written permission.
+ * 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors
+ * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software
+ * without specific prior written permission.
*
- * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND
- * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
- * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
- * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
- * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
- * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
- * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
- * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
- * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
- * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
- * SUCH DAMAGE.
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND
+ * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
+ * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
+ * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
+ * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
+ * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
+ * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
+ * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
+ * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
+ * SUCH DAMAGE.
*/
#include "kdc_locl.h"
-RCSID("$Id: kerberos5.c,v 1.231 2007/01/04 13:27:27 lha Exp $");
+RCSID("$Id$");
#define MAX_TIME ((time_t)((1U << 31) - 1))
}
}
-PA_DATA*
-_kdc_find_padata(KDC_REQ *req, int *start, int type)
+const PA_DATA*
+_kdc_find_padata(const KDC_REQ *req, int *start, int type)
{
+ if (req->padata == NULL)
+ return NULL;
+
while(*start < req->padata->len){
(*start)++;
if(req->padata->val[*start - 1].padata_type == type)
return NULL;
}
+/*
+ * This is a hack to allow predefined weak services, like afs to
+ * still use weak types
+ */
+
+krb5_boolean
+_kdc_is_weak_exception(krb5_principal principal, krb5_enctype etype)
+{
+ if (principal->name.name_string.len > 0 &&
+ strcmp(principal->name.name_string.val[0], "afs") == 0 &&
+ (etype == ETYPE_DES_CBC_CRC
+ || etype == ETYPE_DES_CBC_MD4
+ || etype == ETYPE_DES_CBC_MD5))
+ return TRUE;
+ return FALSE;
+}
+
+
+/*
+ * Detect if `key' is the using the the precomputed `default_salt'.
+ */
+
+static krb5_boolean
+is_default_salt_p(const krb5_salt *default_salt, const Key *key)
+{
+ if (key->salt == NULL)
+ return TRUE;
+ if (default_salt->salttype != key->salt->type)
+ return FALSE;
+ if (krb5_data_cmp(&default_salt->saltvalue, &key->salt->salt))
+ return FALSE;
+ return TRUE;
+}
+
/*
* return the first appropriate key of `princ' in `ret_key'. Look for
* all the etypes in (`etypes', `len'), stopping as soon as we find
krb5_error_code
_kdc_find_etype(krb5_context context, const hdb_entry_ex *princ,
- krb5_enctype *etypes, unsigned len,
+ krb5_enctype *etypes, unsigned len,
Key **ret_key, krb5_enctype *ret_etype)
{
int i;
krb5_error_code ret = KRB5KDC_ERR_ETYPE_NOSUPP;
+ krb5_salt def_salt;
+
+ krb5_get_pw_salt (context, princ->entry.principal, &def_salt);
for(i = 0; ret != 0 && i < len ; i++) {
Key *key = NULL;
- if (krb5_enctype_valid(context, etypes[i]) != 0)
+ if (krb5_enctype_valid(context, etypes[i]) != 0 &&
+ !_kdc_is_weak_exception(princ->entry.principal, etypes[i]))
continue;
while (hdb_next_enctype2key(context, &princ->entry, etypes[i], &key) == 0) {
*ret_key = key;
*ret_etype = etypes[i];
ret = 0;
- if (key->salt == NULL)
+ if (is_default_salt_p(&def_salt, key)) {
+ krb5_free_salt (context, def_salt);
return ret;
+ }
}
}
+ krb5_free_salt (context, def_salt);
return ret;
}
}
void
-_kdc_log_timestamp(krb5_context context,
+_kdc_log_timestamp(krb5_context context,
krb5_kdc_configuration *config,
const char *type,
- KerberosTime authtime, KerberosTime *starttime,
+ KerberosTime authtime, KerberosTime *starttime,
KerberosTime endtime, KerberosTime *renew_till)
{
- char authtime_str[100], starttime_str[100],
+ char authtime_str[100], starttime_str[100],
endtime_str[100], renewtime_str[100];
-
- krb5_format_time(context, authtime,
- authtime_str, sizeof(authtime_str), TRUE);
+
+ krb5_format_time(context, authtime,
+ authtime_str, sizeof(authtime_str), TRUE);
if (starttime)
- krb5_format_time(context, *starttime,
- starttime_str, sizeof(starttime_str), TRUE);
+ krb5_format_time(context, *starttime,
+ starttime_str, sizeof(starttime_str), TRUE);
else
strlcpy(starttime_str, "unset", sizeof(starttime_str));
- krb5_format_time(context, endtime,
- endtime_str, sizeof(endtime_str), TRUE);
+ krb5_format_time(context, endtime,
+ endtime_str, sizeof(endtime_str), TRUE);
if (renew_till)
- krb5_format_time(context, *renew_till,
- renewtime_str, sizeof(renewtime_str), TRUE);
+ krb5_format_time(context, *renew_till,
+ renewtime_str, sizeof(renewtime_str), TRUE);
else
strlcpy(renewtime_str, "unset", sizeof(renewtime_str));
-
+
kdc_log(context, config, 5,
"%s authtime: %s starttime: %s endtime: %s renew till: %s",
type, authtime_str, starttime_str, endtime_str, renewtime_str);
}
static void
-log_patypes(krb5_context context,
+log_patypes(krb5_context context,
krb5_kdc_configuration *config,
METHOD_DATA *padata)
{
struct rk_strpool *p = NULL;
char *str;
int i;
-
+
for (i = 0; i < padata->len; i++) {
switch(padata->val[i].padata_type) {
case KRB5_PADATA_PK_AS_REQ:
krb5_error_code
_kdc_encode_reply(krb5_context context,
krb5_kdc_configuration *config,
- KDC_REP *rep, const EncTicketPart *et, EncKDCRepPart *ek,
- krb5_enctype etype,
+ KDC_REP *rep, const EncTicketPart *et, EncKDCRepPart *ek,
+ krb5_enctype etype,
int skvno, const EncryptionKey *skey,
- int ckvno, const EncryptionKey *ckey,
+ int ckvno, const EncryptionKey *reply_key,
const char **e_text,
krb5_data *reply)
{
ASN1_MALLOC_ENCODE(EncTicketPart, buf, buf_size, et, &len, ret);
if(ret) {
- kdc_log(context, config, 0, "Failed to encode ticket: %s",
+ kdc_log(context, config, 0, "Failed to encode ticket: %s",
krb5_get_err_text(context, ret));
return ret;
}
return ret;
}
- ret = krb5_encrypt_EncryptedData(context,
+ ret = krb5_encrypt_EncryptedData(context,
crypto,
KRB5_KU_TICKET,
buf,
krb5_get_err_text(context, ret));
return ret;
}
-
+
if(rep->msg_type == krb_as_rep && !config->encode_as_rep_as_tgs_rep)
ASN1_MALLOC_ENCODE(EncASRepPart, buf, buf_size, ek, &len, ret);
else
ASN1_MALLOC_ENCODE(EncTGSRepPart, buf, buf_size, ek, &len, ret);
if(ret) {
- kdc_log(context, config, 0, "Failed to encode KDC-REP: %s",
+ kdc_log(context, config, 0, "Failed to encode KDC-REP: %s",
krb5_get_err_text(context, ret));
return ret;
}
*e_text = "KDC internal error";
return KRB5KRB_ERR_GENERIC;
}
- ret = krb5_crypto_init(context, ckey, 0, &crypto);
+ ret = krb5_crypto_init(context, reply_key, 0, &crypto);
if (ret) {
free(buf);
kdc_log(context, config, 0, "krb5_crypto_init failed: %s",
}
krb5_crypto_destroy(context, crypto);
if(ret) {
- kdc_log(context, config, 0, "Failed to encode KDC-REP: %s",
+ kdc_log(context, config, 0, "Failed to encode KDC-REP: %s",
krb5_get_err_text(context, ret));
return ret;
}
return 0;
}
+/*
+ * Return 1 if the client have only older enctypes, this is for
+ * determining if the server should send ETYPE_INFO2 or not.
+ */
+
+static int
+older_enctype(krb5_enctype enctype)
+{
+ switch (enctype) {
+ case ETYPE_DES_CBC_CRC:
+ case ETYPE_DES_CBC_MD4:
+ case ETYPE_DES_CBC_MD5:
+ case ETYPE_DES3_CBC_SHA1:
+ case ETYPE_ARCFOUR_HMAC_MD5:
+ case ETYPE_ARCFOUR_HMAC_MD5_56:
+ /*
+ * The following three is "old" windows enctypes and is needed for
+ * windows 2000 hosts.
+ */
+ case ETYPE_ARCFOUR_MD4:
+ case ETYPE_ARCFOUR_HMAC_OLD:
+ case ETYPE_ARCFOUR_HMAC_OLD_EXP:
+ return 1;
+ default:
+ return 0;
+ }
+}
+
+/*
+ *
+ */
+
static krb5_error_code
make_etype_info_entry(krb5_context context, ETYPE_INFO_ENTRY *ent, Key *key)
{
else if(key->salt->type == hdb_afs3_salt)
*ent->salttype = 2;
else {
- kdc_log(context, config, 0, "unknown salt-type: %d",
+ kdc_log(context, config, 0, "unknown salt-type: %d",
key->salt->type);
return KRB5KRB_ERR_GENERIC;
}
ALLOC(ent->salttype);
*ent->salttype = key->salt->type;
#else
- /*
- * We shouldn't sent salttype since its incompatible with the
- * specification and its break windows clients. The afs
+ /*
+ * We shouldn't sent salttype since it is incompatible with the
+ * specification and it breaks windows clients. The afs
* salting problem is solved by using KRB5-PADATA-AFS3-SALT
* implemented in Heimdal 0.7 and later.
*/
}
static krb5_error_code
-get_pa_etype_info(krb5_context context,
+get_pa_etype_info(krb5_context context,
krb5_kdc_configuration *config,
- METHOD_DATA *md, hdb_entry *client,
- ENCTYPE *etypes, unsigned int etypes_len)
+ METHOD_DATA *md, Key *ckey)
{
krb5_error_code ret = 0;
- int i, j;
- unsigned int n = 0;
ETYPE_INFO pa;
unsigned char *buf;
size_t len;
-
- pa.len = client->keys.len;
- if(pa.len > UINT_MAX/sizeof(*pa.val))
- return ERANGE;
- pa.val = malloc(pa.len * sizeof(*pa.val));
+
+ pa.len = 1;
+ pa.val = calloc(1, sizeof(pa.val[0]));
if(pa.val == NULL)
return ENOMEM;
- memset(pa.val, 0, pa.len * sizeof(*pa.val));
-
- for(j = 0; j < etypes_len; j++) {
- for (i = 0; i < n; i++)
- if (pa.val[i].etype == etypes[j])
- goto skip1;
- for(i = 0; i < client->keys.len; i++) {
- if(client->keys.val[i].key.keytype == etypes[j]) {
- if (krb5_enctype_valid(context, etypes[j]) != 0)
- continue;
- if((ret = make_etype_info_entry(context,
- &pa.val[n++],
- &client->keys.val[i])) != 0) {
- free_ETYPE_INFO(&pa);
- return ret;
- }
- }
- }
- skip1:;
- }
- for(i = 0; i < client->keys.len; i++) {
- for(j = 0; j < etypes_len; j++) {
- if(client->keys.val[i].key.keytype == etypes[j])
- goto skip2;
- }
- if (krb5_enctype_valid(context, client->keys.val[i].key.keytype) != 0)
- continue;
- if((ret = make_etype_info_entry(context,
- &pa.val[n++],
- &client->keys.val[i])) != 0) {
- free_ETYPE_INFO(&pa);
- return ret;
- }
- skip2:;
- }
-
- if(n != pa.len) {
- char *name;
- ret = krb5_unparse_name(context, client->principal, &name);
- if (ret)
- name = rk_UNCONST("<unparse_name failed>");
- kdc_log(context, config, 0, "internal error in get_pa_etype_info(%s): %d != %d",
- name, n, pa.len);
- if (ret == 0)
- free(name);
- pa.len = n;
+
+ ret = make_etype_info_entry(context, &pa.val[0], ckey);
+ if (ret) {
+ free_ETYPE_INFO(&pa);
+ return ret;
}
ASN1_MALLOC_ENCODE(ETYPE_INFO, buf, len, &pa, &len, ret);
ent->s2kparams = NULL;
return ENOMEM;
}
- _krb5_put_int(ent->s2kparams->data,
- _krb5_AES_string_to_default_iterator,
+ _krb5_put_int(ent->s2kparams->data,
+ _krb5_AES_string_to_default_iterator,
ent->s2kparams->length);
break;
case ETYPE_DES_CBC_CRC:
ent->s2kparams = NULL;
return ENOMEM;
}
- _krb5_put_int(ent->s2kparams->data,
+ _krb5_put_int(ent->s2kparams->data,
1,
ent->s2kparams->length);
}
}
/*
- * Return 1 if the client have only older enctypes, this is for
- * determining if the server should send ETYPE_INFO2 or not.
- */
-
-static int
-only_older_enctype_p(const KDC_REQ *req)
-{
- int i;
-
- for(i = 0; i < req->req_body.etype.len; i++) {
- switch (req->req_body.etype.val[i]) {
- case ETYPE_DES_CBC_CRC:
- case ETYPE_DES_CBC_MD4:
- case ETYPE_DES_CBC_MD5:
- case ETYPE_DES3_CBC_SHA1:
- case ETYPE_ARCFOUR_HMAC_MD5:
- case ETYPE_ARCFOUR_HMAC_MD5_56:
- break;
- default:
- return 0;
- }
- }
- return 1;
-}
-
-/*
- *
+ * Return an ETYPE-INFO2. Enctypes are storted the same way as in the
+ * database (client supported enctypes first, then the unsupported
+ * enctypes).
*/
static krb5_error_code
-get_pa_etype_info2(krb5_context context,
+get_pa_etype_info2(krb5_context context,
krb5_kdc_configuration *config,
- METHOD_DATA *md, hdb_entry *client,
- ENCTYPE *etypes, unsigned int etypes_len)
+ METHOD_DATA *md, Key *ckey)
{
krb5_error_code ret = 0;
- int i, j;
- unsigned int n = 0;
ETYPE_INFO2 pa;
unsigned char *buf;
size_t len;
- pa.len = client->keys.len;
- if(pa.len > UINT_MAX/sizeof(*pa.val))
- return ERANGE;
- pa.val = malloc(pa.len * sizeof(*pa.val));
+ pa.len = 1;
+ pa.val = calloc(1, sizeof(pa.val[0]));
if(pa.val == NULL)
return ENOMEM;
- memset(pa.val, 0, pa.len * sizeof(*pa.val));
-
- for(j = 0; j < etypes_len; j++) {
- for (i = 0; i < n; i++)
- if (pa.val[i].etype == etypes[j])
- goto skip1;
- for(i = 0; i < client->keys.len; i++) {
- if(client->keys.val[i].key.keytype == etypes[j]) {
- if (krb5_enctype_valid(context, etypes[j]) != 0)
- continue;
- if((ret = make_etype_info2_entry(&pa.val[n++],
- &client->keys.val[i])) != 0) {
- free_ETYPE_INFO2(&pa);
- return ret;
- }
- }
- }
- skip1:;
- }
- for(i = 0; i < client->keys.len; i++) {
- for(j = 0; j < etypes_len; j++) {
- if(client->keys.val[i].key.keytype == etypes[j])
- goto skip2;
- }
- if (krb5_enctype_valid(context, client->keys.val[i].key.keytype) != 0)
- continue;
- if((ret = make_etype_info2_entry(&pa.val[n++],
- &client->keys.val[i])) != 0) {
- free_ETYPE_INFO2(&pa);
- return ret;
- }
- skip2:;
- }
-
- if(n != pa.len) {
- char *name;
- ret = krb5_unparse_name(context, client->principal, &name);
- if (ret)
- name = rk_UNCONST("<unparse_name failed>");
- kdc_log(context, config, 0,
- "internal error in get_pa_etype_info2(%s): %d != %d",
- name, n, pa.len);
- if (ret == 0)
- free(name);
- pa.len = n;
+
+ ret = make_etype_info2_entry(&pa.val[0], ckey);
+ if (ret) {
+ free_ETYPE_INFO2(&pa);
+ return ret;
}
ASN1_MALLOC_ENCODE(ETYPE_INFO2, buf, len, &pa, &len, ret);
const KDC_REQ_BODY *b)
{
krb5_error_code ret;
- struct rk_strpool *p = NULL;
+ struct rk_strpool *p;
char *str;
int i;
-
+
+ p = rk_strpoolprintf(NULL, "%s", "Client supported enctypes: ");
+
for (i = 0; i < b->etype.len; i++) {
ret = krb5_enctype_to_string(context, b->etype.val[i], &str);
if (ret == 0) {
}
if (p == NULL)
p = rk_strpoolprintf(p, "no encryption types");
-
- str = rk_strpoolcollect(p);
- kdc_log(context, config, 0, "Client supported enctypes: %s", str);
- free(str);
{
char *cet;
if(ret == 0) {
ret = krb5_enctype_to_string(context, setype, &set);
if (ret == 0) {
- kdc_log(context, config, 5, "Using %s/%s", cet, set);
+ p = rk_strpoolprintf(p, ", using %s/%s", cet, set);
free(set);
}
free(cet);
}
if (ret != 0)
- kdc_log(context, config, 5, "Using e-types %d/%d", cetype, setype);
+ p = rk_strpoolprintf(p, ", using enctypes %d/%d",
+ cetype, setype);
}
-
+
+ str = rk_strpoolcollect(p);
+ kdc_log(context, config, 0, "%s", str);
+ free(str);
+
{
- char _str[128];
- unparse_flags(KDCOptions2int(b->kdc_options), asn1_KDCOptions_units(),
- _str, sizeof(_str));
- if(*_str)
- kdc_log(context, config, 2, "Requested flags: %s", _str);
+ char fixedstr[128];
+ unparse_flags(KDCOptions2int(b->kdc_options), asn1_KDCOptions_units(),
+ fixedstr, sizeof(fixedstr));
+ if(*fixedstr)
+ kdc_log(context, config, 0, "Requested flags: %s", fixedstr);
}
}
*/
krb5_error_code
-_kdc_check_flags(krb5_context context,
- krb5_kdc_configuration *config,
- hdb_entry_ex *client_ex, const char *client_name,
- hdb_entry_ex *server_ex, const char *server_name,
- krb5_boolean is_as_req)
+kdc_check_flags(krb5_context context,
+ krb5_kdc_configuration *config,
+ hdb_entry_ex *client_ex, const char *client_name,
+ hdb_entry_ex *server_ex, const char *server_name,
+ krb5_boolean is_as_req)
{
if(client_ex != NULL) {
hdb_entry *client = &client_ex->entry;
/* check client */
if (client->flags.invalid) {
- kdc_log(context, config, 0,
+ kdc_log(context, config, 0,
"Client (%s) has invalid bit set", client_name);
return KRB5KDC_ERR_POLICY;
}
if (client->valid_start && *client->valid_start > kdc_time) {
char starttime_str[100];
- krb5_format_time(context, *client->valid_start,
- starttime_str, sizeof(starttime_str), TRUE);
+ krb5_format_time(context, *client->valid_start,
+ starttime_str, sizeof(starttime_str), TRUE);
kdc_log(context, config, 0,
- "Client not yet valid until %s -- %s",
+ "Client not yet valid until %s -- %s",
starttime_str, client_name);
return KRB5KDC_ERR_CLIENT_NOTYET;
}
if (client->valid_end && *client->valid_end < kdc_time) {
char endtime_str[100];
- krb5_format_time(context, *client->valid_end,
- endtime_str, sizeof(endtime_str), TRUE);
+ krb5_format_time(context, *client->valid_end,
+ endtime_str, sizeof(endtime_str), TRUE);
kdc_log(context, config, 0,
"Client expired at %s -- %s",
endtime_str, client_name);
return KRB5KDC_ERR_NAME_EXP;
}
- if (client->pw_end && *client->pw_end < kdc_time
+ if (client->pw_end && *client->pw_end < kdc_time
&& (server_ex == NULL || !server_ex->entry.flags.change_pw)) {
char pwend_str[100];
- krb5_format_time(context, *client->pw_end,
- pwend_str, sizeof(pwend_str), TRUE);
+ krb5_format_time(context, *client->pw_end,
+ pwend_str, sizeof(pwend_str), TRUE);
kdc_log(context, config, 0,
- "Client's key has expired at %s -- %s",
+ "Client's key has expired at %s -- %s",
pwend_str, client_name);
return KRB5KDC_ERR_KEY_EXPIRED;
}
}
/* check server */
-
+
if (server_ex != NULL) {
hdb_entry *server = &server_ex->entry;
if (server->valid_start && *server->valid_start > kdc_time) {
char starttime_str[100];
- krb5_format_time(context, *server->valid_start,
- starttime_str, sizeof(starttime_str), TRUE);
+ krb5_format_time(context, *server->valid_start,
+ starttime_str, sizeof(starttime_str), TRUE);
kdc_log(context, config, 0,
"Server not yet valid until %s -- %s",
starttime_str, server_name);
if (server->valid_end && *server->valid_end < kdc_time) {
char endtime_str[100];
- krb5_format_time(context, *server->valid_end,
- endtime_str, sizeof(endtime_str), TRUE);
+ krb5_format_time(context, *server->valid_end,
+ endtime_str, sizeof(endtime_str), TRUE);
kdc_log(context, config, 0,
- "Server expired at %s -- %s",
+ "Server expired at %s -- %s",
endtime_str, server_name);
return KRB5KDC_ERR_SERVICE_EXP;
}
if (server->pw_end && *server->pw_end < kdc_time) {
char pwend_str[100];
- krb5_format_time(context, *server->pw_end,
- pwend_str, sizeof(pwend_str), TRUE);
+ krb5_format_time(context, *server->pw_end,
+ pwend_str, sizeof(pwend_str), TRUE);
kdc_log(context, config, 0,
- "Server's key has expired at -- %s",
+ "Server's key has expired at -- %s",
pwend_str, server_name);
return KRB5KDC_ERR_KEY_EXPIRED;
}
*/
krb5_boolean
-_kdc_check_addresses(krb5_context context,
+_kdc_check_addresses(krb5_context context,
krb5_kdc_configuration *config,
HostAddresses *addresses, const struct sockaddr *from)
{
krb5_boolean result;
krb5_boolean only_netbios = TRUE;
int i;
-
+
if(config->check_ticket_addresses == 0)
return TRUE;
if(addresses == NULL)
return config->allow_null_ticket_addresses;
-
+
for (i = 0; i < addresses->len; ++i) {
if (addresses->val[i].addr_type != KRB5_ADDRESS_NETBIOS) {
only_netbios = FALSE;
{
krb5_error_code ret;
PA_PAC_REQUEST pacreq;
- PA_DATA *pa;
+ const PA_DATA *pa;
int i = 0;
-
+
pa = _kdc_find_padata(req, &i, KRB5_PADATA_PA_PAC_REQUEST);
if (pa == NULL)
return TRUE;
return TRUE;
}
+krb5_boolean
+_kdc_is_anonymous(krb5_context context, krb5_principal principal)
+{
+ if (principal->name.name_type != KRB5_NT_WELLKNOWN ||
+ principal->name.name_string.len != 2 ||
+ strcmp(principal->name.name_string.val[0], KRB5_WELLKNOWN_NAME) != 0 ||
+ strcmp(principal->name.name_string.val[1], KRB5_ANON_NAME) != 0)
+ return 0;
+ return 1;
+}
+
/*
*
*/
krb5_error_code
-_kdc_as_rep(krb5_context context,
+_kdc_as_rep(krb5_context context,
krb5_kdc_configuration *config,
- KDC_REQ *req,
- const krb5_data *req_buffer,
+ KDC_REQ *req,
+ const krb5_data *req_buffer,
krb5_data *reply,
const char *from,
struct sockaddr *from_addr,
KDCOptions f = b->kdc_options;
hdb_entry_ex *client = NULL, *server = NULL;
krb5_enctype cetype, setype, sessionetype;
+ krb5_data e_data;
EncTicketPart et;
EncKDCRepPart ek;
krb5_principal client_princ = NULL, server_princ = NULL;
char *client_name = NULL, *server_name = NULL;
krb5_error_code ret = 0;
const char *e_text = NULL;
- krb5_data e_data;
krb5_crypto crypto;
Key *ckey, *skey;
EncryptionKey *reply_key;
+ int flags = 0;
#ifdef PKINIT
pk_client_params *pkp = NULL;
#endif
memset(&rep, 0, sizeof(rep));
- memset(&e_data, 0, sizeof(e_data));
+ krb5_data_zero(&e_data);
+
+ if (f.canonicalize)
+ flags |= HDB_F_CANON;
if(b->sname == NULL){
ret = KRB5KRB_ERR_GENERIC;
e_text = "No server in request";
} else{
- _krb5_principalname2krb5_principal (context,
- &server_princ,
- *(b->sname),
- b->realm);
- ret = krb5_unparse_name(context, server_princ, &server_name);
+ ret = _krb5_principalname2krb5_principal (context,
+ &server_princ,
+ *(b->sname),
+ b->realm);
+ if (ret == 0)
+ ret = krb5_unparse_name(context, server_princ, &server_name);
}
if (ret) {
- kdc_log(context, config, 0,
+ kdc_log(context, config, 0,
"AS-REQ malformed server name from %s", from);
goto out;
}
-
if(b->cname == NULL){
ret = KRB5KRB_ERR_GENERIC;
e_text = "No client in request";
} else {
- _krb5_principalname2krb5_principal (context,
- &client_princ,
- *(b->cname),
- b->realm);
+
+ if (b->cname->name_type == KRB5_NT_ENTERPRISE_PRINCIPAL) {
+ if (b->cname->name_string.len != 1) {
+ kdc_log(context, config, 0,
+ "AS-REQ malformed canon request from %s, "
+ "enterprise name with %d name components",
+ from, b->cname->name_string.len);
+ ret = KRB5_PARSE_MALFORMED;
+ goto out;
+ }
+ ret = krb5_parse_name(context, b->cname->name_string.val[0],
+ &client_princ);
+ if (ret)
+ goto out;
+ } else {
+ ret = _krb5_principalname2krb5_principal (context,
+ &client_princ,
+ *(b->cname),
+ b->realm);
+ if (ret)
+ goto out;
+ }
+
ret = krb5_unparse_name(context, client_princ, &client_name);
}
if (ret) {
goto out;
}
- kdc_log(context, config, 0, "AS-REQ %s from %s for %s",
+ kdc_log(context, config, 0, "AS-REQ %s from %s for %s",
client_name, from, server_name);
- ret = _kdc_db_fetch(context, config, client_princ,
- HDB_F_GET_CLIENT, NULL, &client);
+ /*
+ *
+ */
+
+ if (_kdc_is_anonymous(context, client_princ)) {
+ if (!b->kdc_options.request_anonymous) {
+ kdc_log(context, config, 0, "Anonymous ticket w/o anonymous flag");
+ ret = KRB5KDC_ERR_C_PRINCIPAL_UNKNOWN;
+ goto out;
+ }
+ } else if (b->kdc_options.request_anonymous) {
+ kdc_log(context, config, 0,
+ "Request for a anonymous ticket with non "
+ "anonymous client name: %s", client_name);
+ ret = KRB5KDC_ERR_C_PRINCIPAL_UNKNOWN;
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ *
+ */
+
+ ret = _kdc_db_fetch(context, config, client_princ,
+ HDB_F_GET_CLIENT | flags, NULL, &client);
if(ret){
kdc_log(context, config, 0, "UNKNOWN -- %s: %s", client_name,
krb5_get_err_text(context, ret));
goto out;
}
- ret = _kdc_windc_client_access(context, client, req);
- if(ret)
- goto out;
+ memset(&et, 0, sizeof(et));
+ memset(&ek, 0, sizeof(ek));
- ret = _kdc_check_flags(context, config,
- client, client_name,
- server, server_name,
- TRUE);
- if(ret)
+ /*
+ * Find the client key for reply encryption and pa-type salt, Pick
+ * the client key upfront before the other keys because that is
+ * going to affect what enctypes we are going to use in
+ * ETYPE-INFO{,2}.
+ */
+
+ ret = _kdc_find_etype(context, client, b->etype.val, b->etype.len,
+ &ckey, &cetype);
+ if (ret) {
+ kdc_log(context, config, 0,
+ "Client (%s) has no support for etypes", client_name);
goto out;
+ }
- memset(&et, 0, sizeof(et));
- memset(&ek, 0, sizeof(ek));
+ /*
+ * Pre-auth processing
+ */
if(req->padata){
int i;
- PA_DATA *pa;
+ const PA_DATA *pa;
int found_pa = 0;
log_patypes(context, config, req->padata);
#ifdef PKINIT
- kdc_log(context, config, 5,
+ kdc_log(context, config, 5,
"Looking for PKINIT pa-data -- %s", client_name);
e_text = "No PKINIT PA found";
i = 0;
- if ((pa = _kdc_find_padata(req, &i, KRB5_PADATA_PK_AS_REQ)))
- ;
+ pa = _kdc_find_padata(req, &i, KRB5_PADATA_PK_AS_REQ);
if (pa == NULL) {
i = 0;
- if((pa = _kdc_find_padata(req, &i, KRB5_PADATA_PK_AS_REQ_WIN)))
- ;
+ pa = _kdc_find_padata(req, &i, KRB5_PADATA_PK_AS_REQ_WIN);
}
if (pa) {
char *client_cert = NULL;
- ret = _kdc_pk_rd_padata(context, config, req, pa, &pkp);
+ ret = _kdc_pk_rd_padata(context, config, req, pa, client, &pkp);
if (ret) {
ret = KRB5KRB_AP_ERR_BAD_INTEGRITY;
- kdc_log(context, config, 5,
- "Failed to decode PKINIT PA-DATA -- %s",
+ kdc_log(context, config, 5,
+ "Failed to decode PKINIT PA-DATA -- %s",
client_name);
goto ts_enc;
}
e_text = "PKINIT certificate not allowed to "
"impersonate principal";
_kdc_pk_free_client_param(context, pkp);
-
+
kdc_log(context, config, 0, "%s", e_text);
pkp = NULL;
- goto ts_enc;
+ goto out;
}
+
found_pa = 1;
et.flags.pre_authent = 1;
kdc_log(context, config, 0,
- "PKINIT pre-authentication succeeded -- %s using %s",
+ "PKINIT pre-authentication succeeded -- %s using %s",
client_name, client_cert);
free(client_cert);
if (pkp)
}
ts_enc:
#endif
- kdc_log(context, config, 5, "Looking for ENC-TS pa-data -- %s",
+ kdc_log(context, config, 5, "Looking for ENC-TS pa-data -- %s",
client_name);
i = 0;
EncryptedData enc_data;
Key *pa_key;
char *str;
-
+
found_pa = 1;
-
+
+ if (b->kdc_options.request_anonymous) {
+ ret = KRB5KRB_AP_ERR_BAD_INTEGRITY;
+ kdc_log(context, config, 0, "ENC-TS doesn't support anon");
+ goto out;
+ }
+
ret = decode_EncryptedData(pa->padata_value.data,
pa->padata_value.length,
&enc_data,
&len);
if (ret) {
ret = KRB5KRB_AP_ERR_BAD_INTEGRITY;
- kdc_log(context, config, 5, "Failed to decode PA-DATA -- %s",
+ kdc_log(context, config, 5, "Failed to decode PA-DATA -- %s",
client_name);
goto out;
}
-
- ret = hdb_enctype2key(context, &client->entry,
+
+ ret = hdb_enctype2key(context, &client->entry,
enc_data.etype, &pa_key);
if(ret){
char *estr;
if(krb5_enctype_to_string(context, enc_data.etype, &estr))
estr = NULL;
if(estr == NULL)
- kdc_log(context, config, 5,
- "No client key matching pa-data (%d) -- %s",
+ kdc_log(context, config, 5,
+ "No client key matching pa-data (%d) -- %s",
enc_data.etype, client_name);
else
kdc_log(context, config, 5,
- "No client key matching pa-data (%s) -- %s",
+ "No client key matching pa-data (%s) -- %s",
estr, client_name);
free(estr);
-
+
free_EncryptedData(&enc_data);
continue;
}
&enc_data,
&ts_data);
krb5_crypto_destroy(context, crypto);
+ /*
+ * Since the user might have several keys with the same
+ * enctype but with diffrent salting, we need to try all
+ * the keys with the same enctype.
+ */
if(ret){
krb5_error_code ret2;
- ret2 = krb5_enctype_to_string(context,
+ ret2 = krb5_enctype_to_string(context,
pa_key->key.keytype, &str);
if (ret2)
str = NULL;
- kdc_log(context, config, 5,
+ kdc_log(context, config, 5,
"Failed to decrypt PA-DATA -- %s "
"(enctype %s) error %s",
client_name,
- str ? str : "unknown enctype",
+ str ? str : "unknown enctype",
krb5_get_err_text(context, ret));
free(str);
- if(hdb_next_enctype2key(context, &client->entry,
+ if(hdb_next_enctype2key(context, &client->entry,
enc_data.etype, &pa_key) == 0)
goto try_next_key;
e_text = "Failed to decrypt PA-DATA";
if(ret){
e_text = "Failed to decode PA-ENC-TS-ENC";
ret = KRB5KDC_ERR_PREAUTH_FAILED;
- kdc_log(context, config,
+ kdc_log(context, config,
5, "Failed to decode PA-ENC-TS_ENC -- %s",
client_name);
continue;
if (abs(kdc_time - p.patimestamp) > context->max_skew) {
char client_time[100];
- krb5_format_time(context, p.patimestamp,
- client_time, sizeof(client_time), TRUE);
+ krb5_format_time(context, p.patimestamp,
+ client_time, sizeof(client_time), TRUE);
ret = KRB5KRB_AP_ERR_SKEW;
kdc_log(context, config, 0,
"Too large time skew, "
- "client time %s is out by %u > %u seconds -- %s",
- client_time,
- (unsigned)abs(kdc_time - p.patimestamp),
+ "client time %s is out by %u > %u seconds -- %s",
+ client_time,
+ (unsigned)abs(kdc_time - p.patimestamp),
context->max_skew,
client_name);
- /*
+#if 1
+ /* This code is from samba, needs testing */
+ /*
* the following is needed to make windows clients
* to retry using the timestamp in the error message
*
* is present...
*/
e_text = NULL;
+#else
+ e_text = "Too large time skew";
+#endif
goto out;
}
et.flags.pre_authent = 1;
str = NULL;
kdc_log(context, config, 2,
- "ENC-TS Pre-authentication succeeded -- %s using %s",
+ "ENC-TS Pre-authentication succeeded -- %s using %s",
client_name, str ? str : "unknown enctype");
free(str);
break;
goto out;
}
}else if (config->require_preauth
+ || b->kdc_options.request_anonymous /* hack to force anon */
|| client->entry.flags.require_preauth
|| server->entry.flags.require_preauth) {
METHOD_DATA method_data;
unsigned char *buf;
size_t len;
- use_pa:
+ use_pa:
method_data.len = 0;
method_data.val = NULL;
ret = realloc_method_data(&method_data);
+ if (ret) {
+ free_METHOD_DATA(&method_data);
+ goto out;
+ }
pa = &method_data.val[method_data.len-1];
pa->padata_type = KRB5_PADATA_ENC_TIMESTAMP;
pa->padata_value.length = 0;
#ifdef PKINIT
ret = realloc_method_data(&method_data);
+ if (ret) {
+ free_METHOD_DATA(&method_data);
+ goto out;
+ }
pa = &method_data.val[method_data.len-1];
pa->padata_type = KRB5_PADATA_PK_AS_REQ;
pa->padata_value.length = 0;
pa->padata_value.data = NULL;
+
+ ret = realloc_method_data(&method_data);
+ if (ret) {
+ free_METHOD_DATA(&method_data);
+ goto out;
+ }
+ pa = &method_data.val[method_data.len-1];
+ pa->padata_type = KRB5_PADATA_PK_AS_REQ_WIN;
+ pa->padata_value.length = 0;
+ pa->padata_value.data = NULL;
#endif
- /*
- * RFC4120 requires:
- * - If the client only knows about old enctypes, then send
- * both info replies (we send 'info' first in the list).
- * - If the client is 'modern', because it knows about 'new'
- * enctype types, then only send the 'info2' reply.
+ /*
+ * If there is a client key, send ETYPE_INFO{,2}
*/
-
- /* XXX check ret */
- if (only_older_enctype_p(req))
- ret = get_pa_etype_info(context, config,
- &method_data, &client->entry,
- b->etype.val, b->etype.len);
- /* XXX check ret */
- ret = get_pa_etype_info2(context, config, &method_data,
- &client->entry, b->etype.val, b->etype.len);
-
+ if (ckey) {
+
+ /*
+ * RFC4120 requires:
+ * - If the client only knows about old enctypes, then send
+ * both info replies (we send 'info' first in the list).
+ * - If the client is 'modern', because it knows about 'new'
+ * enctype types, then only send the 'info2' reply.
+ *
+ * Before we send the full list of etype-info data, we pick
+ * the client key we would have used anyway below, just pick
+ * that instead.
+ */
+
+ if (older_enctype(ckey->key.keytype)) {
+ ret = get_pa_etype_info(context, config,
+ &method_data, ckey);
+ if (ret) {
+ free_METHOD_DATA(&method_data);
+ goto out;
+ }
+ }
+ ret = get_pa_etype_info2(context, config,
+ &method_data, ckey);
+ if (ret) {
+ free_METHOD_DATA(&method_data);
+ goto out;
+ }
+ }
ASN1_MALLOC_ENCODE(METHOD_DATA, buf, len, &method_data, &len, ret);
free_METHOD_DATA(&method_data);
e_data.data = buf;
e_data.length = len;
e_text ="Need to use PA-ENC-TIMESTAMP/PA-PK-AS-REQ",
+
ret = KRB5KDC_ERR_PREAUTH_REQUIRED;
kdc_log(context, config, 0,
"No preauth found, returning PREAUTH-REQUIRED -- %s",
client_name);
-
goto out;
}
-
+
/*
- * Find the client key (for preauth ENC-TS verification and reply
- * encryption). Then the best encryption type for the KDC and
- * last the best session key that shared between the client and
- * KDC runtime enctypes.
+ * Verify flags after the user been required to prove its identity
+ * with in a preauth mech.
*/
- ret = _kdc_find_etype(context, client, b->etype.val, b->etype.len,
- &ckey, &cetype);
- if (ret) {
- kdc_log(context, config, 0,
- "Client (%s) has no support for etypes", client_name);
+ ret = _kdc_check_access(context, config, client, client_name,
+ server, server_name,
+ req, &e_data);
+ if(ret)
goto out;
- }
-
+
+ /*
+ * Selelct the best encryption type for the KDC with out regard to
+ * the client since the client never needs to read that data.
+ */
+
ret = _kdc_get_preferred_key(context, config,
server, server_name,
&setype, &skey);
if(ret)
goto out;
+ /*
+ * Select a session enctype from the list of the crypto systems
+ * supported enctype, is supported by the client and is one of the
+ * enctype of the enctype of the krbtgt.
+ *
+ * The later is used as a hint what enctype all KDC are supporting
+ * to make sure a newer version of KDC wont generate a session
+ * enctype that and older version of a KDC in the same realm can't
+ * decrypt.
+ *
+ * But if the KDC admin is paranoid and doesn't want to have "no
+ * the best" enctypes on the krbtgt, lets save the best pick from
+ * the client list and hope that that will work for any other
+ * KDCs.
+ */
{
const krb5_enctype *p;
- int i, j, y;
+ krb5_enctype clientbest = ETYPE_NULL;
+ int i, j;
p = krb5_kerberos_enctypes(context);
sessionetype = ETYPE_NULL;
for (i = 0; p[i] != ETYPE_NULL && sessionetype == ETYPE_NULL; i++) {
- /* check it's valid */
if (krb5_enctype_valid(context, p[i]) != 0)
continue;
- /* check if the client supports it */
for (j = 0; j < b->etype.len && sessionetype == ETYPE_NULL; j++) {
- if (p[i] == b->etype.val[j]) {
- /*
- * if the server (krbtgt) has explicit etypes,
- * check if it also supports it
- */
- if (server->entry.etypes) {
- for (y = 0; y < server->entry.etypes->len; y++) {
- if (p[i] == server->entry.etypes->val[y]) {
- sessionetype = p[i];
- break;
- }
- }
- } else {
- sessionetype = p[i];
- break;
- }
- }
+ Key *dummy;
+ /* check with client */
+ if (p[i] != b->etype.val[j])
+ continue;
+ /* save best of union of { client, crypto system } */
+ if (clientbest == ETYPE_NULL)
+ clientbest = p[i];
+ /* check with krbtgt */
+ ret = hdb_enctype2key(context, &server->entry, p[i], &dummy);
+ if (ret)
+ continue;
+ sessionetype = p[i];
}
}
- if (sessionetype == ETYPE_NULL) {
- kdc_log(context, config, 0,
+ /* if krbtgt had no shared keys with client, pick clients best */
+ if (clientbest != ETYPE_NULL && sessionetype == ETYPE_NULL) {
+ sessionetype = clientbest;
+ } else if (sessionetype == ETYPE_NULL) {
+ kdc_log(context, config, 0,
"Client (%s) from %s has no common enctypes with KDC"
"to use for the session key",
client_name, from);
kdc_log(context, config, 0, "Bad KDC options -- %s", client_name);
goto out;
}
-
+
rep.pvno = 5;
rep.msg_type = krb_as_rep;
- copy_Realm(&client->entry.principal->realm, &rep.crealm);
- if (f.request_anonymous)
- _kdc_make_anonymous_principalname (&rep.cname);
- else
- _krb5_principal2principalname(&rep.cname,
- client->entry.principal);
+
+ ret = copy_Realm(&client->entry.principal->realm, &rep.crealm);
+ if (ret)
+ goto out;
+ ret = _krb5_principal2principalname(&rep.cname, client->entry.principal);
+ if (ret)
+ goto out;
+
rep.ticket.tkt_vno = 5;
copy_Realm(&server->entry.principal->realm, &rep.ticket.realm);
- _krb5_principal2principalname(&rep.ticket.sname,
+ _krb5_principal2principalname(&rep.ticket.sname,
server->entry.principal);
+ /* java 1.6 expects the name to be the same type, lets allow that
+ * uncomplicated name-types. */
+#define CNT(sp,t) (((sp)->sname->name_type) == KRB5_NT_##t)
+ if (CNT(b, UNKNOWN) || CNT(b, PRINCIPAL) || CNT(b, SRV_INST) || CNT(b, SRV_HST) || CNT(b, SRV_XHST))
+ rep.ticket.sname.name_type = b->sname->name_type;
+#undef CNT
et.flags.initial = 1;
if(client->entry.flags.forwardable && server->entry.flags.forwardable)
et.flags.proxiable = f.proxiable;
else if (f.proxiable) {
ret = KRB5KDC_ERR_POLICY;
- kdc_log(context, config, 0,
+ kdc_log(context, config, 0,
"Ticket may not be proxiable -- %s", client_name);
goto out;
}
goto out;
}
- ret = krb5_generate_random_keyblock(context, sessionetype, &et.key);
+ ret = copy_PrincipalName(&rep.cname, &et.cname);
+ if (ret)
+ goto out;
+ ret = copy_Realm(&rep.crealm, &et.crealm);
if (ret)
goto out;
- copy_PrincipalName(&rep.cname, &et.cname);
- copy_Realm(&rep.crealm, &et.crealm);
-
+
{
time_t start;
time_t t;
start = et.authtime = kdc_time;
-
+
if(f.postdated && req->req_body.from){
ALLOC(et.starttime);
start = *et.starttime = *req->req_body.from;
if (f.request_anonymous)
et.flags.anonymous = 1;
-
+
if(b->addresses){
ALLOC(et.caddr);
copy_HostAddresses(b->addresses, et.caddr);
}
-
+
et.transited.tr_type = DOMAIN_X500_COMPRESS;
- krb5_data_zero(&et.transited.contents);
-
- copy_EncryptionKey(&et.key, &ek.key);
+ krb5_data_zero(&et.transited.contents);
/* The MIT ASN.1 library (obviously) doesn't tell lengths encoded
* as 0 and as 0x80 (meaning indefinite length) apart, and is thus
* otherwise just a dummy lr.
*/
ek.last_req.val = malloc(2 * sizeof(*ek.last_req.val));
+ if (ek.last_req.val == NULL) {
+ ret = ENOMEM;
+ goto out;
+ }
ek.last_req.len = 0;
if (client->entry.pw_end
&& (config->kdc_warn_pwexpire == 0
ALLOC(ek.key_expiration);
if (client->entry.valid_end) {
if (client->entry.pw_end)
- *ek.key_expiration = min(*client->entry.valid_end,
+ *ek.key_expiration = min(*client->entry.valid_end,
*client->entry.pw_end);
else
*ek.key_expiration = *client->entry.valid_end;
rep.padata->len = 0;
rep.padata->val = NULL;
- reply_key = &ckey->key;
#if PKINIT
if (pkp) {
- ret = _kdc_pk_mk_pa_reply(context, config, pkp, client,
- req, req_buffer,
- &reply_key, rep.padata);
+ e_text = "Failed to build PK-INIT reply";
+ ret = _kdc_pk_mk_pa_reply(context, config, pkp, client,
+ sessionetype, req, req_buffer,
+ &reply_key, &et.key, rep.padata);
if (ret)
goto out;
ret = _kdc_add_inital_verified_cas(context,
&et);
if (ret)
goto out;
- }
+ } else
#endif
+ if (ckey) {
+ reply_key = &ckey->key;
+ ret = krb5_generate_random_keyblock(context, sessionetype, &et.key);
+ if (ret)
+ goto out;
+ } else {
+ e_text = "Client have no reply key";
+ ret = KRB5KDC_ERR_CLIENT_NOTYET;
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ ret = copy_EncryptionKey(&et.key, &ek.key);
+ if (ret)
+ goto out;
+
+ if (ckey)
+ set_salt_padata (rep.padata, ckey->salt);
+
+ /* Add signing of alias referral */
+ if (f.canonicalize) {
+ PA_ClientCanonicalized canon;
+ krb5_data data;
+ PA_DATA pa;
+ krb5_crypto crypto;
+ size_t len;
+
+ memset(&canon, 0, sizeof(canon));
- set_salt_padata (rep.padata, ckey->salt);
+ canon.names.requested_name = *b->cname;
+ canon.names.mapped_name = client->entry.principal->name;
+
+ ASN1_MALLOC_ENCODE(PA_ClientCanonicalizedNames, data.data, data.length,
+ &canon.names, &len, ret);
+ if (ret)
+ goto out;
+ if (data.length != len)
+ krb5_abortx(context, "internal asn.1 error");
+
+ /* sign using "returned session key" */
+ ret = krb5_crypto_init(context, &et.key, 0, &crypto);
+ if (ret) {
+ free(data.data);
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ ret = krb5_create_checksum(context, crypto,
+ KRB5_KU_CANONICALIZED_NAMES, 0,
+ data.data, data.length,
+ &canon.canon_checksum);
+ free(data.data);
+ krb5_crypto_destroy(context, crypto);
+ if (ret)
+ goto out;
+
+ ASN1_MALLOC_ENCODE(PA_ClientCanonicalized, data.data, data.length,
+ &canon, &len, ret);
+ free_Checksum(&canon.canon_checksum);
+ if (ret)
+ goto out;
+ if (data.length != len)
+ krb5_abortx(context, "internal asn.1 error");
+
+ pa.padata_type = KRB5_PADATA_CLIENT_CANONICALIZED;
+ pa.padata_value = data;
+ ret = add_METHOD_DATA(rep.padata, &pa);
+ free(data.data);
+ if (ret)
+ goto out;
+ }
if (rep.padata->len == 0) {
free(rep.padata);
ret = _kdc_pac_generate(context, client, &p);
if (ret) {
- kdc_log(context, config, 0, "PAC generation failed for -- %s",
+ kdc_log(context, config, 0, "PAC generation failed for -- %s",
client_name);
goto out;
}
if (p != NULL) {
ret = _krb5_pac_sign(context, p, et.authtime,
client->entry.principal,
- &skey->key, /* Server key */
+ &skey->key, /* Server key */
&skey->key, /* FIXME: should be krbtgt key */
&data);
krb5_pac_free(context, p);
if (ret) {
- kdc_log(context, config, 0, "PAC signing failed for -- %s",
+ kdc_log(context, config, 0, "PAC signing failed for -- %s",
client_name);
goto out;
}
}
}
- _kdc_log_timestamp(context, config, "AS-REQ", et.authtime, et.starttime,
+ _kdc_log_timestamp(context, config, "AS-REQ", et.authtime, et.starttime,
et.endtime, et.renew_till);
/* do this as the last thing since this signs the EncTicketPart */
if (ret)
goto out;
- ret = _kdc_encode_reply(context, config,
- &rep, &et, &ek, setype, server->entry.kvno,
- &skey->key, client->entry.kvno,
+ ret = _kdc_encode_reply(context, config,
+ &rep, &et, &ek, setype, server->entry.kvno,
+ &skey->key, client->entry.kvno,
reply_key, &e_text, reply);
free_EncTicketPart(&et);
free_EncKDCRepPart(&ek);
}
/*
- * Add the AuthorizationData `data´ of `type´ to the last element in
- * the sequence of authorization_data in `tkt´ wrapped in an IF_RELEVANT
+ * Add the AuthorizationData `data´ of `type´ to the last element in
+ * the sequence of authorization_data in `tkt´ wrapped in an IF_RELEVANT
*/
krb5_error_code
if (tkt->authorization_data == NULL) {
tkt->authorization_data = calloc(1, sizeof(*tkt->authorization_data));
if (tkt->authorization_data == NULL) {
- krb5_set_error_string(context, "out of memory");
+ krb5_set_error_message(context, ENOMEM, "out of memory");
return ENOMEM;
}
}
ret = add_AuthorizationData(&ad, &ade);
if (ret) {
- krb5_set_error_string(context, "add AuthorizationData failed");
+ krb5_set_error_message(context, ret, "add AuthorizationData failed");
return ret;
}
ade.ad_type = KRB5_AUTHDATA_IF_RELEVANT;
- ASN1_MALLOC_ENCODE(AuthorizationData,
- ade.ad_data.data, ade.ad_data.length,
+ ASN1_MALLOC_ENCODE(AuthorizationData,
+ ade.ad_data.data, ade.ad_data.length,
&ad, &size, ret);
free_AuthorizationData(&ad);
if (ret) {
- krb5_set_error_string(context, "ASN.1 encode of "
- "AuthorizationData failed");
+ krb5_set_error_message(context, ret, "ASN.1 encode of "
+ "AuthorizationData failed");
return ret;
}
if (ade.ad_data.length != size)
ret = add_AuthorizationData(tkt->authorization_data, &ade);
der_free_octet_string(&ade.ad_data);
if (ret) {
- krb5_set_error_string(context, "add AuthorizationData failed");
+ krb5_set_error_message(context, ret, "add AuthorizationData failed");
return ret;
}
}
git.samba.org / ira / wip.git / blobdiff