#include "includes.h"
-uint32 global_client_caps = 0;
+extern struct auth_context *negprot_global_auth_context;
+extern BOOL global_encrypted_passwords_negotiated;
+extern BOOL global_spnego_negotiated;
+extern enum protocol_types Protocol;
+extern int max_send;
-static struct auth_ntlmssp_state *global_ntlmssp_state;
+uint32 global_client_caps = 0;
/*
on a logon error possibly map the error to success if "map to guest"
return PTR_DIFF(p, start);
}
+/****************************************************************************
+ Start the signing engine if needed. Don't fail signing here.
+****************************************************************************/
+
+static void sessionsetup_start_signing_engine(const auth_serversupplied_info *server_info, char *inbuf)
+{
+ if (!server_info->guest && !srv_signing_started()) {
+ /* We need to start the signing engine
+ * here but a W2K client sends the old
+ * "BSRSPYL " signature instead of the
+ * correct one. Subsequent packets will
+ * be correct.
+ */
+ srv_check_sign_mac(inbuf, False);
+ }
+}
+
/****************************************************************************
Send a security blob via a session setup reply.
****************************************************************************/
-static BOOL reply_sesssetup_blob(connection_struct *conn, char *outbuf,
- DATA_BLOB blob, NTSTATUS nt_status)
+static BOOL reply_sesssetup_blob(connection_struct *conn,
+ const char *inbuf,
+ char *outbuf,
+ DATA_BLOB blob,
+ NTSTATUS nt_status)
{
char *p;
- set_message(outbuf,4,0,True);
+ if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(nt_status) && !NT_STATUS_EQUAL(nt_status, NT_STATUS_MORE_PROCESSING_REQUIRED)) {
+ ERROR_NT(nt_status_squash(nt_status));
+ } else {
+ set_message(inbuf,outbuf,4,0,True);
- nt_status = nt_status_squash(nt_status);
- SIVAL(outbuf, smb_rcls, NT_STATUS_V(nt_status));
- SSVAL(outbuf, smb_vwv0, 0xFF); /* no chaining possible */
- SSVAL(outbuf, smb_vwv3, blob.length);
- p = smb_buf(outbuf);
+ nt_status = nt_status_squash(nt_status);
+ SIVAL(outbuf, smb_rcls, NT_STATUS_V(nt_status));
+ SSVAL(outbuf, smb_vwv0, 0xFF); /* no chaining possible */
+ SSVAL(outbuf, smb_vwv3, blob.length);
+ p = smb_buf(outbuf);
- /* should we cap this? */
- memcpy(p, blob.data, blob.length);
- p += blob.length;
+ /* should we cap this? */
+ memcpy(p, blob.data, blob.length);
+ p += blob.length;
- p += add_signature( outbuf, p );
+ p += add_signature( outbuf, p );
- set_message_end(outbuf,p);
+ set_message_end(inbuf,outbuf,p);
+ }
+ show_msg(outbuf);
return send_smb(smbd_server_fd(),outbuf);
}
#ifdef HAVE_KRB5
+
+#if 0
+/* Experiment that failed. See "only happens with a KDC" comment below. */
+/****************************************************************************
+ Cerate a clock skew error blob for a Windows client.
+****************************************************************************/
+
+static BOOL make_krb5_skew_error(DATA_BLOB *pblob_out)
+{
+ krb5_context context = NULL;
+ krb5_error_code kerr = 0;
+ krb5_data reply;
+ krb5_principal host_princ = NULL;
+ char *host_princ_s = NULL;
+ BOOL ret = False;
+
+ *pblob_out = data_blob_null;
+
+ initialize_krb5_error_table();
+ kerr = krb5_init_context(&context);
+ if (kerr) {
+ return False;
+ }
+ /* Create server principal. */
+ asprintf(&host_princ_s, "%s$@%s", global_myname(), lp_realm());
+ if (!host_princ_s) {
+ goto out;
+ }
+ strlower_m(host_princ_s);
+
+ kerr = smb_krb5_parse_name(context, host_princ_s, &host_princ);
+ if (kerr) {
+ DEBUG(10,("make_krb5_skew_error: smb_krb5_parse_name failed for name %s: Error %s\n",
+ host_princ_s, error_message(kerr) ));
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ kerr = smb_krb5_mk_error(context, KRB5KRB_AP_ERR_SKEW, host_princ, &reply);
+ if (kerr) {
+ DEBUG(10,("make_krb5_skew_error: smb_krb5_mk_error failed: Error %s\n",
+ error_message(kerr) ));
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ *pblob_out = data_blob(reply.data, reply.length);
+ kerberos_free_data_contents(context,&reply);
+ ret = True;
+
+ out:
+
+ if (host_princ_s) {
+ SAFE_FREE(host_princ_s);
+ }
+ if (host_princ) {
+ krb5_free_principal(context, host_princ);
+ }
+ krb5_free_context(context);
+ return ret;
+}
+#endif
+
/****************************************************************************
-reply to a session setup spnego negotiate packet for kerberos
+ Reply to a session setup spnego negotiate packet for kerberos.
****************************************************************************/
+
static int reply_spnego_kerberos(connection_struct *conn,
char *inbuf, char *outbuf,
int length, int bufsize,
- DATA_BLOB *secblob)
+ DATA_BLOB *secblob,
+ BOOL *p_invalidate_vuid)
{
+ TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx;
DATA_BLOB ticket;
char *client, *p, *domain;
fstring netbios_domain_name;
- const struct passwd *pw;
- char *user;
+ struct passwd *pw;
+ fstring user;
int sess_vuid;
NTSTATUS ret;
- DATA_BLOB auth_data;
+ PAC_DATA *pac_data;
DATA_BLOB ap_rep, ap_rep_wrapped, response;
auth_serversupplied_info *server_info = NULL;
- DATA_BLOB session_key;
+ DATA_BLOB session_key = data_blob_null;
uint8 tok_id[2];
- BOOL foreign = False;
- DATA_BLOB nullblob = data_blob(NULL, 0);
+ DATA_BLOB nullblob = data_blob_null;
+ fstring real_username;
+ BOOL map_domainuser_to_guest = False;
+ BOOL username_was_mapped;
+ PAC_LOGON_INFO *logon_info = NULL;
ZERO_STRUCT(ticket);
- ZERO_STRUCT(auth_data);
+ ZERO_STRUCT(pac_data);
ZERO_STRUCT(ap_rep);
ZERO_STRUCT(ap_rep_wrapped);
ZERO_STRUCT(response);
+ /* Normally we will always invalidate the intermediate vuid. */
+ *p_invalidate_vuid = True;
+
+ mem_ctx = talloc_init("reply_spnego_kerberos");
+ if (mem_ctx == NULL) {
+ return ERROR_NT(nt_status_squash(NT_STATUS_NO_MEMORY));
+ }
+
if (!spnego_parse_krb5_wrap(*secblob, &ticket, tok_id)) {
- return ERROR_NT(NT_STATUS_LOGON_FAILURE);
+ talloc_destroy(mem_ctx);
+ return ERROR_NT(nt_status_squash(NT_STATUS_LOGON_FAILURE));
}
- ret = ads_verify_ticket(lp_realm(), &ticket, &client, &auth_data, &ap_rep, &session_key);
+ ret = ads_verify_ticket(mem_ctx, lp_realm(), 0, &ticket,
+ &client, &pac_data, &ap_rep,
+ &session_key, True);
data_blob_free(&ticket);
if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(ret)) {
- DEBUG(1,("Failed to verify incoming ticket!\n"));
- return ERROR_NT(NT_STATUS_LOGON_FAILURE);
- }
+#if 0
+ /* Experiment that failed. See "only happens with a KDC" comment below. */
+
+ if (NT_STATUS_EQUAL(ret, NT_STATUS_TIME_DIFFERENCE_AT_DC)) {
+
+ /*
+ * Windows in this case returns NT_STATUS_MORE_PROCESSING_REQUIRED
+ * with a negTokenTarg blob containing an krb5_error struct ASN1 encoded
+ * containing KRB5KRB_AP_ERR_SKEW. The client then fixes its
+ * clock and continues rather than giving an error. JRA.
+ * -- Looks like this only happens with a KDC. JRA.
+ */
+
+ BOOL ok = make_krb5_skew_error(&ap_rep);
+ if (!ok) {
+ talloc_destroy(mem_ctx);
+ return ERROR_NT(nt_status_squash(NT_STATUS_LOGON_FAILURE));
+ }
+ ap_rep_wrapped = spnego_gen_krb5_wrap(ap_rep, TOK_ID_KRB_ERROR);
+ response = spnego_gen_auth_response(&ap_rep_wrapped, ret, OID_KERBEROS5_OLD);
+ reply_sesssetup_blob(conn, inbuf, outbuf, response, NT_STATUS_MORE_PROCESSING_REQUIRED);
+
+ /*
+ * In this one case we don't invalidate the intermediate vuid.
+ * as we're expecting the client to re-use it for the next
+ * sessionsetupX packet. JRA.
+ */
- data_blob_free(&auth_data);
+ *p_invalidate_vuid = False;
+
+ data_blob_free(&ap_rep);
+ data_blob_free(&ap_rep_wrapped);
+ data_blob_free(&response);
+ talloc_destroy(mem_ctx);
+ return -1; /* already replied */
+ }
+#else
+ if (!NT_STATUS_EQUAL(ret, NT_STATUS_TIME_DIFFERENCE_AT_DC)) {
+ ret = NT_STATUS_LOGON_FAILURE;
+ }
+#endif
+ DEBUG(1,("Failed to verify incoming ticket with error %s!\n", nt_errstr(ret)));
+ talloc_destroy(mem_ctx);
+ return ERROR_NT(nt_status_squash(ret));
+ }
DEBUG(3,("Ticket name is [%s]\n", client));
if (!p) {
DEBUG(3,("Doesn't look like a valid principal\n"));
data_blob_free(&ap_rep);
+ data_blob_free(&session_key);
SAFE_FREE(client);
- return ERROR_NT(NT_STATUS_LOGON_FAILURE);
+ talloc_destroy(mem_ctx);
+ return ERROR_NT(nt_status_squash(NT_STATUS_LOGON_FAILURE));
}
*p = 0;
+
+ /* save the PAC data if we have it */
+
+ if (pac_data) {
+ logon_info = get_logon_info_from_pac(pac_data);
+ if (logon_info) {
+ netsamlogon_cache_store( client, &logon_info->info3 );
+ }
+ }
+
if (!strequal(p+1, lp_realm())) {
DEBUG(3,("Ticket for foreign realm %s@%s\n", client, p+1));
if (!lp_allow_trusted_domains()) {
data_blob_free(&ap_rep);
+ data_blob_free(&session_key);
SAFE_FREE(client);
- return ERROR_NT(NT_STATUS_LOGON_FAILURE);
+ talloc_destroy(mem_ctx);
+ return ERROR_NT(nt_status_squash(NT_STATUS_LOGON_FAILURE));
}
- foreign = True;
}
/* this gives a fully qualified user name (ie. with full realm).
domain = p+1;
- {
+ if (logon_info && logon_info->info3.hdr_logon_dom.uni_str_len) {
+
+ unistr2_to_ascii(netbios_domain_name, &logon_info->info3.uni_logon_dom, -1);
+ domain = netbios_domain_name;
+ DEBUG(10, ("Mapped to [%s] (using PAC)\n", domain));
+
+ } else {
+
/* If we have winbind running, we can (and must) shorten the
username by using the short netbios name. Otherwise we will
have inconsistent user names. With Kerberos, we get the
fstrcpy(wb_request.domain_name, domain);
- wb_result = winbindd_request(WINBINDD_DOMAIN_INFO,
+ wb_result = winbindd_request_response(WINBINDD_DOMAIN_INFO,
&wb_request, &wb_response);
if (wb_result == NSS_STATUS_SUCCESS) {
wb_response.data.domain_info.name);
domain = netbios_domain_name;
- DEBUG(10, ("Mapped to [%s]\n", domain));
+ DEBUG(10, ("Mapped to [%s] (using Winbind)\n", domain));
} else {
DEBUG(3, ("Could not find short name -- winbind "
"not running?\n"));
}
}
- asprintf(&user, "%s%c%s", domain, *lp_winbind_separator(), client);
-
- pw = smb_getpwnam( user );
+ fstr_sprintf(user, "%s%c%s", domain, *lp_winbind_separator(), client);
+ /* lookup the passwd struct, create a new user if necessary */
+
+ username_was_mapped = map_username( user );
+
+ pw = smb_getpwnam( mem_ctx, user, real_username, True );
+
+ if (pw) {
+ /* if a real user check pam account restrictions */
+ /* only really perfomed if "obey pam restriction" is true */
+ /* do this before an eventual mappign to guest occurs */
+ ret = smb_pam_accountcheck(pw->pw_name);
+ if ( !NT_STATUS_IS_OK(ret)) {
+ DEBUG(1, ("PAM account restriction prevents user login\n"));
+ data_blob_free(&ap_rep);
+ data_blob_free(&session_key);
+ TALLOC_FREE(mem_ctx);
+ return ERROR_NT(nt_status_squash(ret));
+ }
+ }
+
if (!pw) {
- DEBUG(1,("Username %s is invalid on this system\n",user));
- SAFE_FREE(user);
- SAFE_FREE(client);
- data_blob_free(&ap_rep);
- return ERROR_NT(NT_STATUS_LOGON_FAILURE);
+
+ /* this was originally the behavior of Samba 2.2, if a user
+ did not have a local uid but has been authenticated, then
+ map them to a guest account */
+
+ if (lp_map_to_guest() == MAP_TO_GUEST_ON_BAD_UID){
+ map_domainuser_to_guest = True;
+ fstrcpy(user,lp_guestaccount());
+ pw = smb_getpwnam( mem_ctx, user, real_username, True );
+ }
+
+ /* extra sanity check that the guest account is valid */
+
+ if ( !pw ) {
+ DEBUG(1,("Username %s is invalid on this system\n", user));
+ SAFE_FREE(client);
+ data_blob_free(&ap_rep);
+ data_blob_free(&session_key);
+ TALLOC_FREE(mem_ctx);
+ return ERROR_NT(nt_status_squash(NT_STATUS_LOGON_FAILURE));
+ }
}
/* setup the string used by %U */
- sub_set_smb_name(pw->pw_name);
+ sub_set_smb_name( real_username );
reload_services(True);
-
- if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(ret = make_server_info_pw(&server_info,pw))) {
- DEBUG(1,("make_server_info_from_pw failed!\n"));
- SAFE_FREE(user);
- SAFE_FREE(client);
- data_blob_free(&ap_rep);
- return ERROR_NT(ret);
- }
- /* make_server_info_pw does not set the domain. Without this we end up
- * with the local netbios name in substitutions for %D. */
+ if ( map_domainuser_to_guest ) {
+ make_server_info_guest(&server_info);
+ } else if (logon_info) {
+ /* pass the unmapped username here since map_username()
+ will be called again from inside make_server_info_info3() */
+
+ ret = make_server_info_info3(mem_ctx, client, domain,
+ &server_info, &logon_info->info3);
+ if ( !NT_STATUS_IS_OK(ret) ) {
+ DEBUG(1,("make_server_info_info3 failed: %s!\n",
+ nt_errstr(ret)));
+ SAFE_FREE(client);
+ data_blob_free(&ap_rep);
+ data_blob_free(&session_key);
+ TALLOC_FREE(mem_ctx);
+ return ERROR_NT(nt_status_squash(ret));
+ }
+
+ } else {
+ ret = make_server_info_pw(&server_info, real_username, pw);
+
+ if ( !NT_STATUS_IS_OK(ret) ) {
+ DEBUG(1,("make_server_info_pw failed: %s!\n",
+ nt_errstr(ret)));
+ SAFE_FREE(client);
+ data_blob_free(&ap_rep);
+ data_blob_free(&session_key);
+ TALLOC_FREE(mem_ctx);
+ return ERROR_NT(nt_status_squash(ret));
+ }
- if (server_info->sam_account != NULL) {
- pdb_set_domain(server_info->sam_account, domain, PDB_SET);
- }
+ /* make_server_info_pw does not set the domain. Without this
+ * we end up with the local netbios name in substitutions for
+ * %D. */
+
+ if (server_info->sam_account != NULL) {
+ pdb_set_domain(server_info->sam_account, domain, PDB_SET);
+ }
+ }
+
+ server_info->was_mapped |= username_was_mapped;
+
+ /* we need to build the token for the user. make_server_info_guest()
+ already does this */
+
+ if ( !server_info->ptok ) {
+ ret = create_local_token( server_info );
+ if ( !NT_STATUS_IS_OK(ret) ) {
+ SAFE_FREE(client);
+ data_blob_free(&ap_rep);
+ data_blob_free(&session_key);
+ TALLOC_FREE( mem_ctx );
+ TALLOC_FREE( server_info );
+ return ERROR_NT(nt_status_squash(ret));
+ }
+ }
/* register_vuid keeps the server info */
+ /* register_vuid takes ownership of session_key, no need to free after this.
+ A better interface would copy it.... */
sess_vuid = register_vuid(server_info, session_key, nullblob, client);
- SAFE_FREE(user);
SAFE_FREE(client);
- if (sess_vuid == -1) {
+ if (sess_vuid == UID_FIELD_INVALID ) {
ret = NT_STATUS_LOGON_FAILURE;
} else {
- set_message(outbuf,4,0,True);
+ /* current_user_info is changed on new vuid */
+ reload_services( True );
+
+ set_message(inbuf,outbuf,4,0,True);
SSVAL(outbuf, smb_vwv3, 0);
if (server_info->guest) {
SSVAL(outbuf, smb_uid, sess_vuid);
- if (!server_info->guest) {
- /* We need to start the signing engine
- * here but a W2K client sends the old
- * "BSRSPYL " signature instead of the
- * correct one. Subsequent packets will
- * be correct.
- */
- srv_check_sign_mac(inbuf);
- }
+ sessionsetup_start_signing_engine(server_info, inbuf);
}
/* wrap that up in a nice GSS-API wrapping */
if (NT_STATUS_IS_OK(ret)) {
ap_rep_wrapped = spnego_gen_krb5_wrap(ap_rep, TOK_ID_KRB_AP_REP);
} else {
- ap_rep_wrapped = data_blob(NULL, 0);
+ ap_rep_wrapped = data_blob_null;
}
response = spnego_gen_auth_response(&ap_rep_wrapped, ret, OID_KERBEROS5_OLD);
- reply_sesssetup_blob(conn, outbuf, response, ret);
+ reply_sesssetup_blob(conn, inbuf, outbuf, response, ret);
data_blob_free(&ap_rep);
data_blob_free(&ap_rep_wrapped);
data_blob_free(&response);
+ TALLOC_FREE(mem_ctx);
return -1; /* already replied */
}
Send a session setup reply, wrapped in SPNEGO.
Get vuid and check first.
End the NTLMSSP exchange context if we are OK/complete fail
+ This should be split into two functions, one to handle each
+ leg of the NTLM auth steps.
***************************************************************************/
static BOOL reply_spnego_ntlmssp(connection_struct *conn, char *inbuf, char *outbuf,
+ uint16 vuid,
AUTH_NTLMSSP_STATE **auth_ntlmssp_state,
- DATA_BLOB *ntlmssp_blob, NTSTATUS nt_status)
+ DATA_BLOB *ntlmssp_blob, NTSTATUS nt_status,
+ BOOL wrap)
{
BOOL ret;
DATA_BLOB response;
if (NT_STATUS_IS_OK(nt_status)) {
int sess_vuid;
- DATA_BLOB nullblob = data_blob(NULL, 0);
+ DATA_BLOB nullblob = data_blob_null;
DATA_BLOB session_key = data_blob((*auth_ntlmssp_state)->ntlmssp_state->session_key.data, (*auth_ntlmssp_state)->ntlmssp_state->session_key.length);
/* register_vuid keeps the server info */
sess_vuid = register_vuid(server_info, session_key, nullblob, (*auth_ntlmssp_state)->ntlmssp_state->user);
(*auth_ntlmssp_state)->server_info = NULL;
- if (sess_vuid == -1) {
+ if (sess_vuid == UID_FIELD_INVALID ) {
nt_status = NT_STATUS_LOGON_FAILURE;
} else {
- set_message(outbuf,4,0,True);
+ /* current_user_info is changed on new vuid */
+ reload_services( True );
+
+ set_message(inbuf,outbuf,4,0,True);
SSVAL(outbuf, smb_vwv3, 0);
if (server_info->guest) {
SSVAL(outbuf,smb_uid,sess_vuid);
- if (!server_info->guest) {
- /* We need to start the signing engine
- * here but a W2K client sends the old
- * "BSRSPYL " signature instead of the
- * correct one. Subsequent packets will
- * be correct.
- */
- srv_check_sign_mac(inbuf);
- }
+ sessionsetup_start_signing_engine(server_info, inbuf);
}
}
- response = spnego_gen_auth_response(ntlmssp_blob, nt_status, OID_NTLMSSP);
- ret = reply_sesssetup_blob(conn, outbuf, response, nt_status);
- data_blob_free(&response);
+ if (wrap) {
+ response = spnego_gen_auth_response(ntlmssp_blob, nt_status, OID_NTLMSSP);
+ } else {
+ response = *ntlmssp_blob;
+ }
+
+ ret = reply_sesssetup_blob(conn, inbuf, outbuf, response, nt_status);
+ if (wrap) {
+ data_blob_free(&response);
+ }
/* NT_STATUS_MORE_PROCESSING_REQUIRED from our NTLMSSP code tells us,
and the other end, that we are not finished yet. */
if (!ret || !NT_STATUS_EQUAL(nt_status, NT_STATUS_MORE_PROCESSING_REQUIRED)) {
+ /* NB. This is *NOT* an error case. JRA */
auth_ntlmssp_end(auth_ntlmssp_state);
+ /* Kill the intermediate vuid */
+ invalidate_vuid(vuid);
}
return ret;
}
/****************************************************************************
- Reply to a session setup spnego negotiate packet.
+ Is this a krb5 mechanism ?
****************************************************************************/
-static int reply_spnego_negotiate(connection_struct *conn,
- char *inbuf,
- char *outbuf,
- int length, int bufsize,
- DATA_BLOB blob1)
+NTSTATUS parse_spnego_mechanisms(DATA_BLOB blob_in, DATA_BLOB *pblob_out, BOOL *p_is_krb5)
{
char *OIDs[ASN1_MAX_OIDS];
- DATA_BLOB secblob;
int i;
- DATA_BLOB chal;
- BOOL got_kerberos = False;
- NTSTATUS nt_status;
+
+ *p_is_krb5 = False;
/* parse out the OIDs and the first sec blob */
- if (!parse_negTokenTarg(blob1, OIDs, &secblob)) {
- return ERROR_NT(NT_STATUS_LOGON_FAILURE);
+ if (!parse_negTokenTarg(blob_in, OIDs, pblob_out)) {
+ return NT_STATUS_LOGON_FAILURE;
}
/* only look at the first OID for determining the mechToken --
server sent back krb5/mskrb5/ntlmssp as mechtypes, but the
client (2ksp3) replied with ntlmssp/mskrb5/krb5 and an
NTLMSSP mechtoken. --jerry */
-
+
+#ifdef HAVE_KRB5
if (strcmp(OID_KERBEROS5, OIDs[0]) == 0 ||
strcmp(OID_KERBEROS5_OLD, OIDs[0]) == 0) {
- got_kerberos = True;
+ *p_is_krb5 = True;
}
+#endif
for (i=0;OIDs[i];i++) {
- DEBUG(3,("Got OID %s\n", OIDs[i]));
+ DEBUG(5,("parse_spnego_mechanisms: Got OID %s\n", OIDs[i]));
free(OIDs[i]);
}
- DEBUG(3,("Got secblob of size %lu\n", (unsigned long)secblob.length));
+ return NT_STATUS_OK;
+}
+
+/****************************************************************************
+ Reply to a session setup spnego negotiate packet.
+****************************************************************************/
+
+static int reply_spnego_negotiate(connection_struct *conn,
+ char *inbuf,
+ char *outbuf,
+ uint16 vuid,
+ int length, int bufsize,
+ DATA_BLOB blob1,
+ AUTH_NTLMSSP_STATE **auth_ntlmssp_state)
+{
+ DATA_BLOB secblob;
+ DATA_BLOB chal;
+ BOOL got_kerberos_mechanism = False;
+ NTSTATUS status;
+
+ status = parse_spnego_mechanisms(blob1, &secblob, &got_kerberos_mechanism);
+ if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(status)) {
+ /* Kill the intermediate vuid */
+ invalidate_vuid(vuid);
+ return ERROR_NT(nt_status_squash(status));
+ }
+
+ DEBUG(3,("reply_spnego_negotiate: Got secblob of size %lu\n", (unsigned long)secblob.length));
#ifdef HAVE_KRB5
- if (got_kerberos && (SEC_ADS == lp_security())) {
+ if ( got_kerberos_mechanism && ((lp_security()==SEC_ADS) || lp_use_kerberos_keytab()) ) {
+ BOOL destroy_vuid = True;
int ret = reply_spnego_kerberos(conn, inbuf, outbuf,
- length, bufsize, &secblob);
+ length, bufsize, &secblob, &destroy_vuid);
data_blob_free(&secblob);
+ if (destroy_vuid) {
+ /* Kill the intermediate vuid */
+ invalidate_vuid(vuid);
+ }
return ret;
}
#endif
- if (global_ntlmssp_state) {
- auth_ntlmssp_end(&global_ntlmssp_state);
+ if (*auth_ntlmssp_state) {
+ auth_ntlmssp_end(auth_ntlmssp_state);
}
- nt_status = auth_ntlmssp_start(&global_ntlmssp_state);
- if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(nt_status)) {
- return ERROR_NT(nt_status);
+ status = auth_ntlmssp_start(auth_ntlmssp_state);
+ if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(status)) {
+ /* Kill the intermediate vuid */
+ invalidate_vuid(vuid);
+ return ERROR_NT(nt_status_squash(status));
}
- nt_status = auth_ntlmssp_update(global_ntlmssp_state,
+ status = auth_ntlmssp_update(*auth_ntlmssp_state,
secblob, &chal);
data_blob_free(&secblob);
- reply_spnego_ntlmssp(conn, inbuf, outbuf, &global_ntlmssp_state,
- &chal, nt_status);
-
+ reply_spnego_ntlmssp(conn, inbuf, outbuf, vuid, auth_ntlmssp_state,
+ &chal, status, True);
+
data_blob_free(&chal);
/* already replied */
return -1;
}
-
+
/****************************************************************************
Reply to a session setup spnego auth packet.
****************************************************************************/
static int reply_spnego_auth(connection_struct *conn, char *inbuf, char *outbuf,
+ uint16 vuid,
int length, int bufsize,
- DATA_BLOB blob1)
+ DATA_BLOB blob1,
+ AUTH_NTLMSSP_STATE **auth_ntlmssp_state)
{
- DATA_BLOB auth, auth_reply;
- NTSTATUS nt_status = NT_STATUS_INVALID_PARAMETER;
+ DATA_BLOB auth = data_blob_null;
+ DATA_BLOB auth_reply = data_blob_null;
+ DATA_BLOB secblob = data_blob_null;
+ NTSTATUS status = NT_STATUS_INVALID_PARAMETER;
if (!spnego_parse_auth(blob1, &auth)) {
#if 0
file_save("auth.dat", blob1.data, blob1.length);
#endif
- return ERROR_NT(NT_STATUS_INVALID_PARAMETER);
+ /* Kill the intermediate vuid */
+ invalidate_vuid(vuid);
+
+ return ERROR_NT(nt_status_squash(NT_STATUS_INVALID_PARAMETER));
+ }
+
+ if (auth.data[0] == ASN1_APPLICATION(0)) {
+ /* Might be a second negTokenTarg packet */
+
+ BOOL got_krb5_mechanism = False;
+ status = parse_spnego_mechanisms(auth, &secblob, &got_krb5_mechanism);
+ if (NT_STATUS_IS_OK(status)) {
+ DEBUG(3,("reply_spnego_auth: Got secblob of size %lu\n", (unsigned long)secblob.length));
+#ifdef HAVE_KRB5
+ if ( got_krb5_mechanism && ((lp_security()==SEC_ADS) || lp_use_kerberos_keytab()) ) {
+ BOOL destroy_vuid = True;
+ int ret = reply_spnego_kerberos(conn, inbuf, outbuf,
+ length, bufsize, &secblob, &destroy_vuid);
+ data_blob_free(&secblob);
+ data_blob_free(&auth);
+ if (destroy_vuid) {
+ /* Kill the intermediate vuid */
+ invalidate_vuid(vuid);
+ }
+ return ret;
+ }
+#endif
+ }
}
+
+ /* If we get here it wasn't a negTokenTarg auth packet. */
+ data_blob_free(&secblob);
- if (!global_ntlmssp_state) {
+ if (!*auth_ntlmssp_state) {
+ /* Kill the intermediate vuid */
+ invalidate_vuid(vuid);
+
/* auth before negotiatiate? */
- return ERROR_NT(NT_STATUS_INVALID_PARAMETER);
+ return ERROR_NT(nt_status_squash(NT_STATUS_INVALID_PARAMETER));
}
- nt_status = auth_ntlmssp_update(global_ntlmssp_state,
- auth, &auth_reply);
+ status = auth_ntlmssp_update(*auth_ntlmssp_state,
+ auth, &auth_reply);
data_blob_free(&auth);
- reply_spnego_ntlmssp(conn, inbuf, outbuf, &global_ntlmssp_state,
- &auth_reply, nt_status);
+ reply_spnego_ntlmssp(conn, inbuf, outbuf, vuid,
+ auth_ntlmssp_state,
+ &auth_reply, status, True);
data_blob_free(&auth_reply);
return -1;
}
+/****************************************************************************
+ List to store partial SPNEGO auth fragments.
+****************************************************************************/
+
+static struct pending_auth_data *pd_list;
+
+/****************************************************************************
+ Delete an entry on the list.
+****************************************************************************/
+
+static void delete_partial_auth(struct pending_auth_data *pad)
+{
+ if (!pad) {
+ return;
+ }
+ DLIST_REMOVE(pd_list, pad);
+ data_blob_free(&pad->partial_data);
+ SAFE_FREE(pad);
+}
+
+/****************************************************************************
+ Search for a partial SPNEGO auth fragment matching an smbpid.
+****************************************************************************/
+
+static struct pending_auth_data *get_pending_auth_data(uint16 smbpid)
+{
+ struct pending_auth_data *pad;
+
+ for (pad = pd_list; pad; pad = pad->next) {
+ if (pad->smbpid == smbpid) {
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+ return pad;
+}
+
+/****************************************************************************
+ Check the size of an SPNEGO blob. If we need more return NT_STATUS_MORE_PROCESSING_REQUIRED,
+ else return NT_STATUS_OK. Don't allow the blob to be more than 64k.
+****************************************************************************/
+
+static NTSTATUS check_spnego_blob_complete(uint16 smbpid, uint16 vuid, DATA_BLOB *pblob)
+{
+ struct pending_auth_data *pad = NULL;
+ ASN1_DATA data;
+ size_t needed_len = 0;
+
+ pad = get_pending_auth_data(smbpid);
+
+ /* Ensure we have some data. */
+ if (pblob->length == 0) {
+ /* Caller can cope. */
+ DEBUG(2,("check_spnego_blob_complete: zero blob length !\n"));
+ delete_partial_auth(pad);
+ return NT_STATUS_OK;
+ }
+
+ /* Were we waiting for more data ? */
+ if (pad) {
+ DATA_BLOB tmp_blob;
+ size_t copy_len = MIN(65536, pblob->length);
+
+ /* Integer wrap paranoia.... */
+
+ if (pad->partial_data.length + copy_len < pad->partial_data.length ||
+ pad->partial_data.length + copy_len < copy_len) {
+
+ DEBUG(2,("check_spnego_blob_complete: integer wrap "
+ "pad->partial_data.length = %u, "
+ "copy_len = %u\n",
+ (unsigned int)pad->partial_data.length,
+ (unsigned int)copy_len ));
+
+ delete_partial_auth(pad);
+ return NT_STATUS_INVALID_PARAMETER;
+ }
+
+ DEBUG(10,("check_spnego_blob_complete: "
+ "pad->partial_data.length = %u, "
+ "pad->needed_len = %u, "
+ "copy_len = %u, "
+ "pblob->length = %u,\n",
+ (unsigned int)pad->partial_data.length,
+ (unsigned int)pad->needed_len,
+ (unsigned int)copy_len,
+ (unsigned int)pblob->length ));
+
+ tmp_blob = data_blob(NULL,
+ pad->partial_data.length + copy_len);
+
+ /* Concatenate the two (up to copy_len) bytes. */
+ memcpy(tmp_blob.data,
+ pad->partial_data.data,
+ pad->partial_data.length);
+ memcpy(tmp_blob.data + pad->partial_data.length,
+ pblob->data,
+ copy_len);
+
+ /* Replace the partial data. */
+ data_blob_free(&pad->partial_data);
+ pad->partial_data = tmp_blob;
+ ZERO_STRUCT(tmp_blob);
+
+ /* Are we done ? */
+ if (pblob->length >= pad->needed_len) {
+ /* Yes, replace pblob. */
+ data_blob_free(pblob);
+ *pblob = pad->partial_data;
+ ZERO_STRUCT(pad->partial_data);
+ delete_partial_auth(pad);
+ return NT_STATUS_OK;
+ }
+
+ /* Still need more data. */
+ pad->needed_len -= copy_len;
+ return NT_STATUS_MORE_PROCESSING_REQUIRED;
+ }
+
+ if ((pblob->data[0] != ASN1_APPLICATION(0)) &&
+ (pblob->data[0] != ASN1_CONTEXT(1))) {
+ /* Not something we can determine the
+ * length of.
+ */
+ return NT_STATUS_OK;
+ }
+
+ /* This is a new SPNEGO sessionsetup - see if
+ * the data given in this blob is enough.
+ */
+
+ asn1_load(&data, *pblob);
+ asn1_start_tag(&data, pblob->data[0]);
+ if (data.has_error || data.nesting == NULL) {
+ asn1_free(&data);
+ /* Let caller catch. */
+ return NT_STATUS_OK;
+ }
+
+ /* Integer wrap paranoia.... */
+
+ if (data.nesting->taglen + data.nesting->start < data.nesting->taglen ||
+ data.nesting->taglen + data.nesting->start < data.nesting->start) {
+
+ DEBUG(2,("check_spnego_blob_complete: integer wrap "
+ "data.nesting->taglen = %u, "
+ "data.nesting->start = %u\n",
+ (unsigned int)data.nesting->taglen,
+ (unsigned int)data.nesting->start ));
+
+ asn1_free(&data);
+ return NT_STATUS_INVALID_PARAMETER;
+ }
+
+ /* Total length of the needed asn1 is the tag length
+ * plus the current offset. */
+
+ needed_len = data.nesting->taglen + data.nesting->start;
+ asn1_free(&data);
+
+ DEBUG(10,("check_spnego_blob_complete: needed_len = %u, "
+ "pblob->length = %u\n",
+ (unsigned int)needed_len,
+ (unsigned int)pblob->length ));
+
+ if (needed_len <= pblob->length) {
+ /* Nothing to do - blob is complete. */
+ return NT_STATUS_OK;
+ }
+
+ /* Refuse the blob if it's bigger than 64k. */
+ if (needed_len > 65536) {
+ DEBUG(2,("check_spnego_blob_complete: needed_len too large (%u)\n",
+ (unsigned int)needed_len ));
+ return NT_STATUS_INVALID_PARAMETER;
+ }
+
+ /* We must store this blob until complete. */
+ if (!(pad = SMB_MALLOC_P(struct pending_auth_data))) {
+ return NT_STATUS_NO_MEMORY;
+ }
+ pad->needed_len = needed_len - pblob->length;
+ pad->partial_data = data_blob(pblob->data, pblob->length);
+ if (pad->partial_data.data == NULL) {
+ SAFE_FREE(pad);
+ return NT_STATUS_NO_MEMORY;
+ }
+ pad->smbpid = smbpid;
+ pad->vuid = vuid;
+ DLIST_ADD(pd_list, pad);
+
+ return NT_STATUS_MORE_PROCESSING_REQUIRED;
+}
+
/****************************************************************************
Reply to a session setup command.
+ conn POINTER CAN BE NULL HERE !
****************************************************************************/
static int reply_sesssetup_and_X_spnego(connection_struct *conn, char *inbuf,
char *p2;
uint16 data_blob_len = SVAL(inbuf, smb_vwv7);
enum remote_arch_types ra_type = get_remote_arch();
+ int vuid = SVAL(inbuf,smb_uid);
+ user_struct *vuser = NULL;
+ NTSTATUS status = NT_STATUS_OK;
+ uint16 smbpid = SVAL(inbuf,smb_pid);
+ uint16 smb_flag2 = SVAL(inbuf, smb_flg2);
DEBUG(3,("Doing spnego session setup\n"));
if (data_blob_len == 0) {
/* an invalid request */
- return ERROR_NT(NT_STATUS_LOGON_FAILURE);
+ return ERROR_NT(nt_status_squash(NT_STATUS_LOGON_FAILURE));
}
bufrem = smb_bufrem(inbuf, p);
#endif
p2 = inbuf + smb_vwv13 + data_blob_len;
- p2 += srvstr_pull_buf(inbuf, native_os, p2, sizeof(native_os), STR_TERMINATE);
- p2 += srvstr_pull_buf(inbuf, native_lanman, p2, sizeof(native_lanman), STR_TERMINATE);
- p2 += srvstr_pull_buf(inbuf, primary_domain, p2, sizeof(primary_domain), STR_TERMINATE);
+ p2 += srvstr_pull_buf(inbuf, smb_flag2, native_os, p2,
+ sizeof(native_os), STR_TERMINATE);
+ p2 += srvstr_pull_buf(inbuf, smb_flag2, native_lanman, p2,
+ sizeof(native_lanman), STR_TERMINATE);
+ p2 += srvstr_pull_buf(inbuf, smb_flag2, primary_domain, p2,
+ sizeof(primary_domain), STR_TERMINATE);
DEBUG(3,("NativeOS=[%s] NativeLanMan=[%s] PrimaryDomain=[%s]\n",
native_os, native_lanman, primary_domain));
if ( ra_type == RA_WIN2K ) {
+ /* Vista sets neither the OS or lanman strings */
+
+ if ( !strlen(native_os) && !strlen(native_lanman) )
+ set_remote_arch(RA_VISTA);
+
/* Windows 2003 doesn't set the native lanman string,
but does set primary domain which is a bug I think */
- if ( !strlen(native_lanman) )
+ if ( !strlen(native_lanman) ) {
ra_lanman_string( primary_domain );
- else
+ } else {
ra_lanman_string( native_lanman );
+ }
}
+ vuser = get_partial_auth_user_struct(vuid);
+ if (!vuser) {
+ struct pending_auth_data *pad = get_pending_auth_data(smbpid);
+ if (pad) {
+ DEBUG(10,("reply_sesssetup_and_X_spnego: found pending vuid %u\n",
+ (unsigned int)pad->vuid ));
+ vuid = pad->vuid;
+ vuser = get_partial_auth_user_struct(vuid);
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (!vuser) {
+ vuid = register_vuid(NULL, data_blob_null, data_blob_null, NULL);
+ if (vuid == UID_FIELD_INVALID ) {
+ data_blob_free(&blob1);
+ return ERROR_NT(nt_status_squash(NT_STATUS_INVALID_PARAMETER));
+ }
+
+ vuser = get_partial_auth_user_struct(vuid);
+ }
+
+ if (!vuser) {
+ data_blob_free(&blob1);
+ return ERROR_NT(nt_status_squash(NT_STATUS_INVALID_PARAMETER));
+ }
+
+ SSVAL(outbuf,smb_uid,vuid);
+
+ /* Large (greater than 4k) SPNEGO blobs are split into multiple
+ * sessionsetup requests as the Windows limit on the security blob
+ * field is 4k. Bug #4400. JRA.
+ */
+
+ status = check_spnego_blob_complete(smbpid, vuid, &blob1);
+ if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(status)) {
+ if (!NT_STATUS_EQUAL(status, NT_STATUS_MORE_PROCESSING_REQUIRED)) {
+ /* Real error - kill the intermediate vuid */
+ invalidate_vuid(vuid);
+ }
+ data_blob_free(&blob1);
+ return ERROR_NT(nt_status_squash(status));
+ }
+
if (blob1.data[0] == ASN1_APPLICATION(0)) {
/* its a negTokenTarg packet */
- ret = reply_spnego_negotiate(conn, inbuf, outbuf, length, bufsize, blob1);
+ ret = reply_spnego_negotiate(conn, inbuf, outbuf, vuid, length, bufsize, blob1,
+ &vuser->auth_ntlmssp_state);
data_blob_free(&blob1);
return ret;
}
if (blob1.data[0] == ASN1_CONTEXT(1)) {
/* its a auth packet */
- ret = reply_spnego_auth(conn, inbuf, outbuf, length, bufsize, blob1);
+ ret = reply_spnego_auth(conn, inbuf, outbuf, vuid, length, bufsize, blob1,
+ &vuser->auth_ntlmssp_state);
data_blob_free(&blob1);
return ret;
}
+ if (strncmp((char *)(blob1.data), "NTLMSSP", 7) == 0) {
+ DATA_BLOB chal;
+ if (!vuser->auth_ntlmssp_state) {
+ status = auth_ntlmssp_start(&vuser->auth_ntlmssp_state);
+ if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(status)) {
+ /* Kill the intermediate vuid */
+ invalidate_vuid(vuid);
+ data_blob_free(&blob1);
+ return ERROR_NT(nt_status_squash(status));
+ }
+ }
+
+ status = auth_ntlmssp_update(vuser->auth_ntlmssp_state,
+ blob1, &chal);
+
+ data_blob_free(&blob1);
+
+ reply_spnego_ntlmssp(conn, inbuf, outbuf, vuid,
+ &vuser->auth_ntlmssp_state,
+ &chal, status, False);
+ data_blob_free(&chal);
+ return -1;
+ }
+
/* what sort of packet is this? */
DEBUG(1,("Unknown packet in reply_sesssetup_and_X_spnego\n"));
data_blob_free(&blob1);
- return ERROR_NT(NT_STATUS_LOGON_FAILURE);
+ return ERROR_NT(nt_status_squash(NT_STATUS_LOGON_FAILURE));
}
/****************************************************************************
a new session setup with VC==0 is ignored.
****************************************************************************/
+static int shutdown_other_smbds(struct db_record *rec,
+ const struct connections_key *key,
+ const struct connections_data *crec,
+ void *private_data)
+{
+ const char *ip = (const char *)private_data;
+
+ if (!process_exists(crec->pid)) {
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ if (procid_is_me(&crec->pid)) {
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ if (strcmp(ip, crec->addr) != 0) {
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ messaging_send(smbd_messaging_context(), crec->pid, MSG_SHUTDOWN,
+ &data_blob_null);
+ return 0;
+}
+
static void setup_new_vc_session(void)
{
DEBUG(2,("setup_new_vc_session: New VC == 0, if NT4.x compatible we would close all old resources.\n"));
conn_close_all();
invalidate_all_vuids();
#endif
+ if (lp_reset_on_zero_vc()) {
+ connections_forall(shutdown_other_smbds, client_addr());
+ }
}
/****************************************************************************
fstring native_lanman;
fstring primary_domain;
static BOOL done_sesssetup = False;
- extern BOOL global_encrypted_passwords_negotiated;
- extern BOOL global_spnego_negotiated;
- extern int Protocol;
- extern int max_send;
-
auth_usersupplied_info *user_info = NULL;
- extern struct auth_context *negprot_global_auth_context;
auth_serversupplied_info *server_info = NULL;
+ uint16 smb_flag2 = SVAL(inbuf, smb_flg2);
NTSTATUS nt_status;
ZERO_STRUCT(nt_resp);
ZERO_STRUCT(plaintext_password);
- DEBUG(3,("wct=%d flg2=0x%x\n", CVAL(inbuf, smb_wct), SVAL(inbuf, smb_flg2)));
+ DEBUG(3,("wct=%d flg2=0x%x\n", CVAL(inbuf, smb_wct), smb_flag2));
/* a SPNEGO session setup has 12 command words, whereas a normal
NT1 session setup has 13. See the cifs spec. */
if (CVAL(inbuf, smb_wct) == 12 &&
- (SVAL(inbuf, smb_flg2) & FLAGS2_EXTENDED_SECURITY)) {
+ (smb_flag2 & FLAGS2_EXTENDED_SECURITY)) {
if (!global_spnego_negotiated) {
DEBUG(0,("reply_sesssetup_and_X: Rejecting attempt at SPNEGO session setup when it was not negoitiated.\n"));
- return ERROR_NT(NT_STATUS_UNSUCCESSFUL);
+ return ERROR_NT(nt_status_squash(NT_STATUS_LOGON_FAILURE));
}
if (SVAL(inbuf,smb_vwv4) == 0) {
if (Protocol < PROTOCOL_NT1) {
uint16 passlen1 = SVAL(inbuf,smb_vwv7);
+
+ /* Never do NT status codes with protocols before NT1 as we don't get client caps. */
+ remove_from_common_flags2(FLAGS2_32_BIT_ERROR_CODES);
+
if ((passlen1 > MAX_PASS_LEN) || (passlen1 > smb_bufrem(inbuf, smb_buf(inbuf)))) {
- return ERROR_NT(NT_STATUS_INVALID_PARAMETER);
+ return ERROR_NT(nt_status_squash(NT_STATUS_INVALID_PARAMETER));
}
if (doencrypt) {
plaintext_password.data[passlen1] = 0;
}
- srvstr_pull_buf(inbuf, user, smb_buf(inbuf)+passlen1, sizeof(user), STR_TERMINATE);
+ srvstr_pull_buf(inbuf, smb_flag2, user,
+ smb_buf(inbuf)+passlen1, sizeof(user),
+ STR_TERMINATE);
*domain = 0;
} else {
/* check for nasty tricks */
if (passlen1 > MAX_PASS_LEN || passlen1 > smb_bufrem(inbuf, p)) {
- return ERROR_NT(NT_STATUS_INVALID_PARAMETER);
+ return ERROR_NT(nt_status_squash(NT_STATUS_INVALID_PARAMETER));
}
if (passlen2 > MAX_PASS_LEN || passlen2 > smb_bufrem(inbuf, p+passlen1)) {
- return ERROR_NT(NT_STATUS_INVALID_PARAMETER);
+ return ERROR_NT(nt_status_squash(NT_STATUS_INVALID_PARAMETER));
}
/* Save the lanman2 password and the NT md4 password. */
nt_resp = data_blob(p+passlen1, passlen2);
} else {
pstring pass;
- BOOL unic=SVAL(inbuf, smb_flg2) & FLAGS2_UNICODE_STRINGS;
+ BOOL unic= smb_flag2 & FLAGS2_UNICODE_STRINGS;
+#if 0
+ /* This was the previous fix. Not sure if it's still valid. JRA. */
if ((ra_type == RA_WINNT) && (passlen2 == 0) && unic && passlen1) {
/* NT4.0 stuffs up plaintext unicode password lengths... */
srvstr_pull(inbuf, pass, smb_buf(inbuf) + 1,
sizeof(pass), passlen1, STR_TERMINATE);
+#endif
+
+ if (unic && (passlen2 == 0) && passlen1) {
+ /* Only a ascii plaintext password was sent. */
+ srvstr_pull(inbuf, smb_flag2, pass,
+ smb_buf(inbuf), sizeof(pass),
+ passlen1, STR_TERMINATE|STR_ASCII);
} else {
- srvstr_pull(inbuf, pass, smb_buf(inbuf),
- sizeof(pass), unic ? passlen2 : passlen1,
- STR_TERMINATE);
+ srvstr_pull(inbuf, smb_flag2, pass,
+ smb_buf(inbuf), sizeof(pass),
+ unic ? passlen2 : passlen1,
+ STR_TERMINATE);
}
plaintext_password = data_blob(pass, strlen(pass)+1);
}
p += passlen1 + passlen2;
- p += srvstr_pull_buf(inbuf, user, p, sizeof(user), STR_TERMINATE);
- p += srvstr_pull_buf(inbuf, domain, p, sizeof(domain), STR_TERMINATE);
- p += srvstr_pull_buf(inbuf, native_os, p, sizeof(native_os), STR_TERMINATE);
- p += srvstr_pull_buf(inbuf, native_lanman, p, sizeof(native_lanman), STR_TERMINATE);
+ p += srvstr_pull_buf(inbuf, smb_flag2, user, p,
+ sizeof(user), STR_TERMINATE);
+ p += srvstr_pull_buf(inbuf, smb_flag2, domain, p,
+ sizeof(domain), STR_TERMINATE);
+ p += srvstr_pull_buf(inbuf, smb_flag2, native_os,
+ p, sizeof(native_os), STR_TERMINATE);
+ p += srvstr_pull_buf(inbuf, smb_flag2,
+ native_lanman, p, sizeof(native_lanman),
+ STR_TERMINATE);
/* not documented or decoded by Ethereal but there is one more string
in the extra bytes which is the same as the PrimaryDomain when using
byte_count = SVAL(inbuf, smb_vwv13);
if ( PTR_DIFF(p, save_p) < byte_count)
- p += srvstr_pull_buf(inbuf, primary_domain, p, sizeof(primary_domain), STR_TERMINATE);
+ p += srvstr_pull_buf(inbuf, smb_flag2,
+ primary_domain, p,
+ sizeof(primary_domain),
+ STR_TERMINATE);
else
fstrcpy( primary_domain, "null" );
/* This has to be here, because this is a perfectly valid behaviour for guest logons :-( */
DEBUG(0,("reply_sesssetup_and_X: Rejecting attempt at 'normal' session setup after negotiating spnego.\n"));
- return ERROR_NT(NT_STATUS_UNSUCCESSFUL);
+ return ERROR_NT(nt_status_squash(NT_STATUS_LOGON_FAILURE));
}
fstrcpy(sub_user, user);
-
- /* setup the string used by %U */
- sub_set_smb_name(user);
} else {
fstrcpy(sub_user, lp_guestaccount());
}
map_username(sub_user);
add_session_user(sub_user);
+ add_session_workgroup(domain);
/* Then force it to null for the benfit of the code below */
*user = 0;
}
} else if (doencrypt) {
if (!negprot_global_auth_context) {
DEBUG(0, ("reply_sesssetup_and_X: Attempted encrypted session setup without negprot denied!\n"));
- return ERROR_NT(NT_STATUS_LOGON_FAILURE);
+ return ERROR_NT(nt_status_squash(NT_STATUS_LOGON_FAILURE));
}
nt_status = make_user_info_for_reply_enc(&user_info, user, domain,
lm_resp, nt_resp);
} else {
struct auth_context *plaintext_auth_context = NULL;
const uint8 *chal;
- if (NT_STATUS_IS_OK(nt_status = make_auth_context_subsystem(&plaintext_auth_context))) {
+
+ nt_status = make_auth_context_subsystem(&plaintext_auth_context);
+
+ if (NT_STATUS_IS_OK(nt_status)) {
chal = plaintext_auth_context->get_ntlm_challenge(plaintext_auth_context);
if (!make_user_info_for_reply(&user_info,
return ERROR_NT(nt_status_squash(nt_status));
}
- if (server_info->nt_session_key.data) {
- session_key = data_blob(server_info->nt_session_key.data, server_info->nt_session_key.length);
- } else if (server_info->lm_session_key.length >= 8 && lm_resp.length == 24) {
- session_key = data_blob(NULL, 16);
- SMBsesskeygen_lmv1(server_info->lm_session_key.data, lm_resp.data,
- session_key.data);
+ /* Ensure we can't possible take a code path leading to a null defref. */
+ if (!server_info) {
+ return ERROR_NT(nt_status_squash(NT_STATUS_LOGON_FAILURE));
+ }
+
+ nt_status = create_local_token(server_info);
+ if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(nt_status)) {
+ DEBUG(10, ("create_local_token failed: %s\n",
+ nt_errstr(nt_status)));
+ data_blob_free(&nt_resp);
+ data_blob_free(&lm_resp);
+ data_blob_clear_free(&plaintext_password);
+ return ERROR_NT(nt_status_squash(nt_status));
+ }
+
+ if (server_info->user_session_key.data) {
+ session_key = data_blob(server_info->user_session_key.data, server_info->user_session_key.length);
} else {
- session_key = data_blob(NULL, 0);
+ session_key = data_blob_null;
}
- data_blob_free(&lm_resp);
data_blob_clear_free(&plaintext_password);
/* it's ok - setup a reply */
- set_message(outbuf,3,0,True);
+ set_message(inbuf,outbuf,3,0,True);
if (Protocol >= PROTOCOL_NT1) {
char *p = smb_buf( outbuf );
p += add_signature( outbuf, p );
- set_message_end( outbuf, p );
+ set_message_end(inbuf, outbuf, p );
/* perhaps grab OS version here?? */
}
/* register the name and uid as being validated, so further connections
to a uid can get through without a password, on the same VC */
- /* register_vuid keeps the server info */
- sess_vuid = register_vuid(server_info, session_key, nt_resp, sub_user);
- data_blob_free(&nt_resp);
+ if (lp_security() == SEC_SHARE) {
+ sess_vuid = UID_FIELD_INVALID;
+ data_blob_free(&session_key);
+ TALLOC_FREE(server_info);
+ } else {
+ /* register_vuid keeps the server info */
+ sess_vuid = register_vuid(server_info, session_key,
+ nt_resp.data ? nt_resp : lm_resp,
+ sub_user);
+ if (sess_vuid == UID_FIELD_INVALID) {
+ data_blob_free(&nt_resp);
+ data_blob_free(&lm_resp);
+ return ERROR_NT(nt_status_squash(NT_STATUS_LOGON_FAILURE));
+ }
- if (sess_vuid == -1) {
- return ERROR_NT(NT_STATUS_LOGON_FAILURE);
- }
+ /* current_user_info is changed on new vuid */
+ reload_services( True );
- if (!server_info->guest && !srv_check_sign_mac(inbuf)) {
- exit_server("reply_sesssetup_and_X: bad smb signature");
+ sessionsetup_start_signing_engine(server_info, inbuf);
}
+ data_blob_free(&nt_resp);
+ data_blob_free(&lm_resp);
+
SSVAL(outbuf,smb_uid,sess_vuid);
SSVAL(inbuf,smb_uid,sess_vuid);
git.samba.org / ira / wip.git / blobdiff