s4:param: make sure secrets_db_connect() no longer creates on empty secrets.ldb

[bbaumbach/samba-autobuild/.git] / source4 / param / secrets.c

diff --git a/source4/param/secrets.c b/source4/param/secrets.c
index 8fc595fbb055b9929434f2fcc2f1f0418c949862..1df8620f53a1237ebb13a3c0bd7651fe9a0216f4 100644 (file)
--- a/source4/param/secrets.c
+++ b/source4/param/secrets.c
@@ -25,72 +25,31 @@
 #include "secrets.h"
 #include "param/param.h"
 #include "system/filesys.h"
-#include "tdb_wrap.h"
+#include "lib/tdb_wrap/tdb_wrap.h"
 #include "lib/ldb-samba/ldb_wrap.h"
-#include "lib/ldb/include/ldb.h"
+#include <ldb.h>
 #include "../lib/util/util_tdb.h"
 #include "librpc/gen_ndr/ndr_security.h"
 #include "dsdb/samdb/samdb.h"
 
 /**
- * Use a TDB to store an incrementing random seed.
- *
- * Initialised to the current pid, the very first time Samba starts,
- * and incremented by one each time it is needed.  
- * 
- * @note Not called by systems with a working /dev/urandom.
- */
-static void get_rand_seed(struct tdb_wrap *secretsdb, int *new_seed) 
-{
-       *new_seed = getpid();
-       if (secretsdb != NULL) {
-               tdb_change_int32_atomic(secretsdb->tdb, "INFO/random_seed", new_seed, 1);
-       }
-}
-
-/**
- * open up the secrets database
- */
-struct tdb_wrap *secrets_init(TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx, struct loadparm_context *lp_ctx)
+  create or connect to the secrets ldb
+*/
+struct ldb_context *secrets_db_create(TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx,
+                                     struct loadparm_context *lp_ctx)
 {
-       char *fname;
-       uint8_t dummy;
-       struct tdb_wrap *tdb;
-
-       fname = private_path(mem_ctx, lp_ctx, "secrets.tdb");
-
-       tdb = tdb_wrap_open(mem_ctx, fname, 0, TDB_DEFAULT, O_RDWR|O_CREAT, 0600);
-
-       if (!tdb) {
-               DEBUG(0,("Failed to open %s\n", fname));
-               talloc_free(fname);
-               return NULL;
-       }
-       talloc_free(fname);
-
-       /**
-        * Set a reseed function for the crypto random generator 
-        * 
-        * This avoids a problem where systems without /dev/urandom
-        * could send the same challenge to multiple clients
-        */
-       set_rand_reseed_callback((void (*) (void *, int *))get_rand_seed, tdb);
-
-       /* Ensure that the reseed is done now, while we are root, etc */
-       generate_random_buffer(&dummy, sizeof(dummy));
-
-       return tdb;
+       return ldb_wrap_connect(mem_ctx, NULL, lp_ctx, "secrets.ldb",
+                              NULL, NULL, 0);
 }
 
 /**
   connect to the secrets ldb
 */
 struct ldb_context *secrets_db_connect(TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx,
-                                       struct tevent_context *ev_ctx,
                                        struct loadparm_context *lp_ctx)
 {
-       return ldb_wrap_connect(mem_ctx, ev_ctx, lp_ctx, lpcfg_secrets_url(lp_ctx),
-                              NULL, NULL, 0);
+       return ldb_wrap_connect(mem_ctx, NULL, lp_ctx, "secrets.ldb",
+                              NULL, NULL, LDB_FLG_DONT_CREATE_DB);
 }
 
 /**
@@ -98,7 +57,6 @@ struct ldb_context *secrets_db_connect(TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx,
  * @return pointer to a SID object if the SID could be obtained, NULL otherwise
  */
 struct dom_sid *secrets_get_domain_sid(TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx,
-                                      struct tevent_context *ev_ctx,
                                       struct loadparm_context *lp_ctx,
                                       const char *domain,
                                       enum netr_SchannelType *sec_channel_type,
@@ -114,7 +72,7 @@ struct dom_sid *secrets_get_domain_sid(TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx,
 
        *errstring = NULL;
 
-       ldb = secrets_db_connect(mem_ctx, ev_ctx, lp_ctx);
+       ldb = secrets_db_connect(mem_ctx, lp_ctx);
        if (ldb == NULL) {
                DEBUG(5, ("secrets_db_connect failed\n"));
                return NULL;
@@ -139,14 +97,14 @@ struct dom_sid *secrets_get_domain_sid(TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx,
        }
 
        if (sec_channel_type) {
-               int v;
-               v = ldb_msg_find_attr_as_int(msg, "secureChannelType", -1);
-               if (v == -1) {
+               int t;
+               t = ldb_msg_find_attr_as_int(msg, "secureChannelType", -1);
+               if (t == -1) {
                        *errstring = talloc_asprintf(mem_ctx, "Failed to find secureChannelType for %s in %s",
                                                     domain, (char *) ldb_get_opaque(ldb, "ldb_url"));
                        return NULL;
                }
-               *sec_channel_type = v;
+               *sec_channel_type = t;
        }
 
        result = talloc(mem_ctx, struct dom_sid);
@@ -167,3 +125,28 @@ struct dom_sid *secrets_get_domain_sid(TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx,
 
        return result;
 }
+
+char *keytab_name_from_msg(TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx, struct ldb_context *ldb, struct ldb_message *msg) 
+{
+       const char *krb5keytab = ldb_msg_find_attr_as_string(msg, "krb5Keytab", NULL);
+       if (krb5keytab) {
+               return talloc_strdup(mem_ctx, krb5keytab);
+       } else {
+               char *file_keytab;
+               char *relative_path;
+               const char *privateKeytab = ldb_msg_find_attr_as_string(msg, "privateKeytab", NULL);
+               if (!privateKeytab) {
+                       return NULL;
+               }
+
+               relative_path = ldb_relative_path(ldb, mem_ctx, privateKeytab);
+               if (!relative_path) {
+                       return NULL;
+               }
+               file_keytab = talloc_asprintf(mem_ctx, "FILE:%s", relative_path);
+               talloc_free(relative_path);
+               return file_keytab;
+       }
+       return NULL;
+}
+