LOCKING_OBJ = locking/locking.o locking/locking_shm.o locking/locking_slow.o \
locking/shmem.o locking/shmem_sysv.o
-PASSDB_OBJ = passdb/passdb.o passdb/smbpassfile.o passdb/smbpass.o
+PASSDB_OBJ = passdb/passdb.o passdb/smbpassfile.o passdb/smbpass.o \
+ passdb/pass_check.o
SMBD_OBJ1 = smbd/server.o smbd/access.o smbd/chgpasswd.o smbd/connection.o \
smbd/dfree.o smbd/dir.o smbd/password.o \
smbd/groupname.o smbd/ipc.o smbd/ldap.o smbd/mangle.o \
smbd/message.o smbd/nispass.o smbd/nttrans.o \
- smbd/pipes.o smbd/predict.o \
- smbd/print_svid.o smbd/printing.o smbd/quotas.o smbd/reply.o \
- smbd/ssl.o smbd/trans2.o smbd/uid.o
+ smbd/pipes.o smbd/predict.o smbd/print_svid.o smbd/printing.o \
+ smbd/quotas.o smbd/reply.o smbd/ssl.o smbd/trans2.o smbd/uid.o
SMBD_OBJ = $(SMBD_OBJ1) $(PARAM_OBJ) $(LIBSMB_OBJ) $(UBIQX_OBJ) \
$(RPC_SERVER_OBJ) $(RPC_CLIENT_OBJ) $(RPC_PARSE_OBJ) \
$(PASSDB_OBJ) $(LIB_OBJ)
SWAT_OBJ = web/cgi.o web/diagnose.o web/startstop.o web/statuspage.o \
- web/swat.o \
- smbd/password.o \
- $(LIBSMB_OBJ) $(LOCKING_OBJ) \
+ web/swat.o $(LIBSMB_OBJ) $(LOCKING_OBJ) \
$(PARAM_OBJ) $(PASSDB_OBJ) $(RPC_CLIENT_OBJ) $(RPC_PARSE_OBJ) \
$(UBIQX_OBJ) $(LIB_OBJ)
--- /dev/null
+/*
+ Unix SMB/Netbios implementation.
+ Version 1.9.
+ Password checking
+ Copyright (C) Andrew Tridgell 1992-1998
+
+ This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
+ it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
+ the Free Software Foundation; either version 2 of the License, or
+ (at your option) any later version.
+
+ This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
+ but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
+ MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the
+ GNU General Public License for more details.
+
+ You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
+ along with this program; if not, write to the Free Software
+ Foundation, Inc., 675 Mass Ave, Cambridge, MA 02139, USA.
+*/
+
+/* this module is for checking a username/password against a system
+ password database. The SMB encrypted password support is elsewhere */
+
+#include "includes.h"
+
+extern int DEBUGLEVEL;
+
+/* these are kept here to keep the string_combinations function simple */
+static char this_user[100]="";
+static char this_salt[100]="";
+static char this_crypted[100]="";
+
+
+/****************************************************************************
+update the enhanced security database. Only relevant for OSF1 at the moment.
+****************************************************************************/
+static void update_protected_database(char *user, BOOL result)
+{
+#ifdef OSF1_ENH_SEC
+ struct pr_passwd *mypasswd;
+ time_t starttime;
+
+ mypasswd = getprpwnam (user);
+ starttime = time (NULL);
+
+ if (result) {
+ mypasswd->ufld.fd_slogin = starttime;
+ mypasswd->ufld.fd_nlogins = 0;
+
+ putprpwnam(user,mypasswd);
+ } else {
+ mypasswd->ufld.fd_ulogin = starttime;
+ mypasswd->ufld.fd_nlogins = mypasswd->ufld.fd_nlogins + 1;
+ if (mypasswd->ufld.fd_max_tries != 0 &&
+ mypasswd->ufld.fd_nlogins > mypasswd->ufld.fd_max_tries) {
+ mypasswd->uflg.fg_lock = 0;
+ DEBUG(3,("Account %s is disabled\n", user));
+ }
+ putprpwnam(user ,mypasswd);
+ }
+#endif
+}
+
+
+#ifdef HAVE_PAM
+/*******************************************************************
+check on PAM authentication
+********************************************************************/
+
+/* We first need some helper functions */
+#include <security/pam_appl.h>
+/* Static variables used to communicate between the conversation function
+ * and the server_login function
+ */
+static char *PAM_username;
+static char *PAM_password;
+
+/* PAM conversation function
+ * Here we assume (for now, at least) that echo on means login name, and
+ * echo off means password.
+ */
+static int PAM_conv (int num_msg,
+ const struct pam_message **msg,
+ struct pam_response **resp,
+ void *appdata_ptr) {
+ int replies = 0;
+ struct pam_response *reply = NULL;
+
+ #define COPY_STRING(s) (s) ? strdup(s) : NULL
+
+ reply = malloc(sizeof(struct pam_response) * num_msg);
+ if (!reply) return PAM_CONV_ERR;
+
+ for (replies = 0; replies < num_msg; replies++) {
+ switch (msg[replies]->msg_style) {
+ case PAM_PROMPT_ECHO_ON:
+ reply[replies].resp_retcode = PAM_SUCCESS;
+ reply[replies].resp = COPY_STRING(PAM_username);
+ /* PAM frees resp */
+ break;
+ case PAM_PROMPT_ECHO_OFF:
+ reply[replies].resp_retcode = PAM_SUCCESS;
+ reply[replies].resp = COPY_STRING(PAM_password);
+ /* PAM frees resp */
+ break;
+ case PAM_TEXT_INFO:
+ /* fall through */
+ case PAM_ERROR_MSG:
+ /* ignore it... */
+ reply[replies].resp_retcode = PAM_SUCCESS;
+ reply[replies].resp = NULL;
+ break;
+ default:
+ /* Must be an error of some sort... */
+ free (reply);
+ return PAM_CONV_ERR;
+ }
+ }
+ if (reply) *resp = reply;
+ return PAM_SUCCESS;
+}
+static struct pam_conv PAM_conversation = {
+ &PAM_conv,
+ NULL
+};
+
+
+static BOOL pam_auth(char *this_user,char *password)
+{
+ pam_handle_t *pamh;
+ int pam_error;
+
+ /* Now use PAM to do authentication. For now, we won't worry about
+ * session logging, only authentication. Bail out if there are any
+ * errors. Since this is a limited protocol, and an even more limited
+ * function within a server speaking this protocol, we can't be as
+ * verbose as would otherwise make sense.
+ * Query: should we be using PAM_SILENT to shut PAM up?
+ */
+ #define PAM_BAIL if (pam_error != PAM_SUCCESS) { \
+ pam_end(pamh, 0); return False; \
+ }
+ PAM_password = password;
+ PAM_username = this_user;
+ pam_error = pam_start("samba", this_user, &PAM_conversation, &pamh);
+ PAM_BAIL;
+/* Setting PAM_SILENT stops generation of error messages to syslog
+ * to enable debugging on Red Hat Linux set:
+ * /etc/pam.d/samba:
+ * auth required /lib/security/pam_pwdb.so nullok shadow audit
+ * _OR_ change PAM_SILENT to 0 to force detailed reporting (logging)
+ */
+ pam_error = pam_authenticate(pamh, PAM_SILENT);
+ PAM_BAIL;
+ /* It is not clear to me that account management is the right thing
+ * to do, but it is not clear that it isn't, either. This can be
+ * removed if no account management should be done. Alternately,
+ * put a pam_allow.so entry in /etc/pam.conf for account handling. */
+ pam_error = pam_acct_mgmt(pamh, PAM_SILENT);
+ PAM_BAIL;
+ pam_end(pamh, PAM_SUCCESS);
+ /* If this point is reached, the user has been authenticated. */
+ return(True);
+}
+#endif
+
+
+#ifdef WITH_AFS
+/*******************************************************************
+check on AFS authentication
+********************************************************************/
+static BOOL afs_auth(char *this_user,char *password)
+{
+ long password_expires = 0;
+ char *reason;
+
+ /* For versions of AFS prior to 3.3, this routine has few arguments, */
+ /* but since I can't find the old documentation... :-) */
+ setpag();
+ if (ka_UserAuthenticateGeneral(KA_USERAUTH_VERSION+KA_USERAUTH_DOSETPAG,
+ this_user,
+ (char *) 0, /* instance */
+ (char *) 0, /* cell */
+ password,
+ 0, /* lifetime, default */
+ &password_expires, /*days 'til it expires */
+ 0, /* spare 2 */
+ &reason) == 0) {
+ return(True);
+ }
+ return(False);
+}
+#endif
+
+
+#ifdef WITH_DFS
+
+/*****************************************************************
+ This new version of the DFS_AUTH code was donated by Karsten Muuss
+ <muuss@or.uni-bonn.de>. It fixes the following problems with the
+ old code :
+
+ - Server credentials may expire
+ - Client credential cache files have wrong owner
+ - purge_context() function is called with invalid argument
+
+ This new code was modified to ensure that on exit the uid/gid is
+ still root, and the original directory is restored. JRA.
+******************************************************************/
+
+sec_login_handle_t my_dce_sec_context;
+int dcelogin_atmost_once = 0;
+
+/*******************************************************************
+check on a DCE/DFS authentication
+********************************************************************/
+static BOOL dfs_auth(char *this_user,char *password)
+{
+ error_status_t err;
+ int err2;
+ int prterr;
+ signed32 expire_time, current_time;
+ boolean32 password_reset;
+ struct passwd *pw;
+ sec_passwd_rec_t passwd_rec;
+ sec_login_auth_src_t auth_src = sec_login_auth_src_network;
+ unsigned char dce_errstr[dce_c_error_string_len];
+
+ if (dcelogin_atmost_once) return(False);
+
+#ifdef HAVE_CRYPT
+ /*
+ * We only go for a DCE login context if the given password
+ * matches that stored in the local password file..
+ * Assumes local passwd file is kept in sync w/ DCE RGY!
+ */
+
+ if (strcmp((char *)crypt(password,this_salt),this_crypted)) {
+ return(False);
+ }
+#endif
+
+ sec_login_get_current_context(&my_dce_sec_context, &err);
+ if (err != error_status_ok ) {
+ dce_error_inq_text(err, dce_errstr, &err2);
+ DEBUG(0,("DCE can't get current context. %s\n", dce_errstr));
+
+ return(False);
+ }
+
+ sec_login_certify_identity(my_dce_sec_context, &err);
+ if (err != error_status_ok) {
+ dce_error_inq_text(err, dce_errstr, &err2);
+ DEBUG(0,("DCE can't get current context. %s\n", dce_errstr));
+
+ return(False);
+ }
+
+ sec_login_get_expiration(my_dce_sec_context, &expire_time, &err);
+ if (err != error_status_ok) {
+ dce_error_inq_text(err, dce_errstr, &err2);
+ DEBUG(0,("DCE can't get expiration. %s\n", dce_errstr));
+
+ return(False);
+ }
+
+ time(¤t_time);
+
+ if (expire_time < (current_time + 60)) {
+ struct passwd *pw;
+ sec_passwd_rec_t *key;
+
+ sec_login_get_pwent(my_dce_sec_context,
+ (sec_login_passwd_t*)&pw, &err);
+ if (err != error_status_ok ) {
+ dce_error_inq_text(err, dce_errstr, &err2);
+ DEBUG(0,("DCE can't get pwent. %s\n", dce_errstr));
+
+ return(False);
+ }
+
+ sec_login_refresh_identity(my_dce_sec_context, &err);
+ if (err != error_status_ok) {
+ dce_error_inq_text(err, dce_errstr, &err2);
+ DEBUG(0,("DCE can't refresh identity. %s\n",
+ dce_errstr));
+
+ return(False);
+ }
+
+ sec_key_mgmt_get_key(rpc_c_authn_dce_secret, NULL,
+ (unsigned char *)pw->pw_name,
+ sec_c_key_version_none,
+ (void**)&key, &err);
+ if (err != error_status_ok) {
+ dce_error_inq_text(err, dce_errstr, &err2);
+ DEBUG(0,("DCE can't get key for %s. %s\n",
+ pw->pw_name, dce_errstr));
+
+ return(False);
+ }
+
+ sec_login_valid_and_cert_ident(my_dce_sec_context, key,
+ &password_reset, &auth_src,
+ &err);
+ if (err != error_status_ok ) {
+ dce_error_inq_text(err, dce_errstr, &err2);
+ DEBUG(0,("DCE can't validate and certify identity for %s. %s\n",
+ pw->pw_name, dce_errstr));
+ }
+
+ sec_key_mgmt_free_key(key, &err);
+ if (err != error_status_ok ) {
+ dce_error_inq_text(err, dce_errstr, &err2);
+ DEBUG(0,("DCE can't free key.\n", dce_errstr));
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (sec_login_setup_identity((unsigned char *)this_user,
+ sec_login_no_flags,
+ &my_dce_sec_context,
+ &err) == 0) {
+ dce_error_inq_text(err, dce_errstr, &err2);
+ DEBUG(0,("DCE Setup Identity for %s failed: %s\n",
+ this_user,dce_errstr));
+ return(False);
+ }
+
+ sec_login_get_pwent(my_dce_sec_context,
+ (sec_login_passwd_t*)&pw, &err);
+ if (err != error_status_ok) {
+ dce_error_inq_text(err, dce_errstr, &err2);
+ DEBUG(0,("DCE can't get pwent. %s\n", dce_errstr));
+
+ return(False);
+ }
+
+ sec_login_purge_context(&my_dce_sec_context, &err);
+ if (err != error_status_ok) {
+ dce_error_inq_text(err, dce_errstr, &err2);
+ DEBUG(0,("DCE can't purge context. %s\n", dce_errstr));
+
+ return(False);
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * NB. I'd like to change these to call something like become_user()
+ * instead but currently we don't have a connection
+ * context to become the correct user. This is already
+ * fairly platform specific code however, so I think
+ * this should be ok. I have added code to go
+ * back to being root on error though. JRA.
+ */
+
+ if (setregid(-1, pw->pw_gid) != 0) {
+ DEBUG(0,("Can't set egid to %d (%s)\n",
+ pw->pw_gid, strerror(errno)));
+ return False;
+ }
+
+ if (setreuid(-1, pw->pw_uid) != 0) {
+ setgid(0);
+ DEBUG(0,("Can't set euid to %d (%s)\n",
+ pw->pw_uid, strerror(errno)));
+ return False;
+ }
+
+ if (sec_login_setup_identity((unsigned char *)this_user,
+ sec_login_no_flags,
+ &my_dce_sec_context,
+ &err) == 0) {
+ dce_error_inq_text(err, dce_errstr, &err2);
+ /* Go back to root, JRA. */
+ setuid(0);
+ setgid(0);
+ DEBUG(0,("DCE Setup Identity for %s failed: %s\n",
+ this_user,dce_errstr));
+ return(False);
+ }
+
+ sec_login_get_pwent(my_dce_sec_context,
+ (sec_login_passwd_t*)&pw, &err);
+ if (err != error_status_ok ) {
+ dce_error_inq_text(err, dce_errstr, &err2);
+ /* Go back to root, JRA. */
+ setuid(0);
+ setgid(0);
+ DEBUG(0,("DCE can't get pwent. %s\n", dce_errstr));
+
+ return(False);
+ }
+
+ passwd_rec.version_number = sec_passwd_c_version_none;
+ passwd_rec.pepper = NULL;
+ passwd_rec.key.key_type = sec_passwd_plain;
+ passwd_rec.key.tagged_union.plain = (idl_char *)password;
+
+ sec_login_validate_identity(my_dce_sec_context,
+ &passwd_rec, &password_reset,
+ &auth_src, &err);
+ if (err != error_status_ok ) {
+ dce_error_inq_text(err, dce_errstr, &err2);
+ /* Go back to root, JRA. */
+ setuid(0);
+ setgid(0);
+ DEBUG(0,("DCE Identity Validation failed for principal %s: %s\n",
+ this_user,dce_errstr));
+
+ return(False);
+ }
+
+ sec_login_certify_identity(my_dce_sec_context, &err);
+ if (err != error_status_ok) {
+ dce_error_inq_text(err, dce_errstr, &err2);
+ /* Go back to root, JRA. */
+ setuid(0);
+ setgid(0);
+ DEBUG(0,("DCE certify identity failed: %s\n", dce_errstr));
+
+ return(False);
+ }
+
+ if (auth_src != sec_login_auth_src_network) {
+ DEBUG(0,("DCE context has no network credentials.\n"));
+ }
+
+ sec_login_set_context(my_dce_sec_context, &err);
+ if (err != error_status_ok) {
+ dce_error_inq_text(err, dce_errstr, &err2);
+ DEBUG(0,("DCE login failed for principal %s, cant set context: %s\n",
+ this_user,dce_errstr));
+
+ sec_login_purge_context(&my_dce_sec_context, &err);
+ /* Go back to root, JRA. */
+ setuid(0);
+ setgid(0);
+ return(False);
+ }
+
+ sec_login_get_pwent(my_dce_sec_context,
+ (sec_login_passwd_t*)&pw, &err);
+ if (err != error_status_ok) {
+ dce_error_inq_text(err, dce_errstr, &err2);
+ DEBUG(0,("DCE can't get pwent. %s\n", dce_errstr));
+
+ /* Go back to root, JRA. */
+ setuid(0);
+ setgid(0);
+ return(False);
+ }
+
+ DEBUG(0,("DCE login succeeded for principal %s on pid %d\n",
+ this_user, getpid()));
+
+ DEBUG(3,("DCE principal: %s\n"
+ " uid: %d\n"
+ " gid: %d\n",
+ pw->pw_name, pw->pw_uid, pw->pw_gid));
+ DEBUG(3,(" info: %s\n"
+ " dir: %s\n"
+ " shell: %s\n",
+ pw->pw_gecos, pw->pw_dir, pw->pw_shell));
+
+ sec_login_get_expiration(my_dce_sec_context, &expire_time, &err);
+ if (err != error_status_ok) {
+ dce_error_inq_text(err, dce_errstr, &err2);
+ /* Go back to root, JRA. */
+ setuid(0);
+ setgid(0);
+ DEBUG(0,("DCE can't get expiration. %s\n", dce_errstr));
+
+ return(False);
+ }
+
+ setuid(0);
+ setgid(0);
+
+ DEBUG(0,("DCE context expires: %s",asctime(localtime(&expire_time))));
+
+ dcelogin_atmost_once = 1;
+ return (True);
+}
+
+void dfs_unlogin(void)
+{
+ error_status_t err;
+ int err2;
+ unsigned char dce_errstr[dce_c_error_string_len];
+
+ sec_login_purge_context(&my_dce_sec_context, &err);
+ if (err != error_status_ok) {
+ dce_error_inq_text(err, dce_errstr, &err2);
+ DEBUG(0,("DCE purge login context failed for server instance %d: %s\n",
+ getpid(), dce_errstr));
+ }
+}
+#endif
+
+#ifdef KRB5_AUTH
+/*******************************************************************
+check on Kerberos authentication
+********************************************************************/
+static BOOL krb5_auth(char *this_user,char *password)
+{
+ krb5_data tgtname = {
+ 0,
+ KRB5_TGS_NAME_SIZE,
+ KRB5_TGS_NAME
+ };
+ krb5_context kcontext;
+ krb5_principal kprinc;
+ krb5_principal server;
+ krb5_creds kcreds;
+ int options = 0;
+ krb5_address **addrs = (krb5_address **)0;
+ krb5_preauthtype *preauth = NULL;
+ krb5_keytab keytab = NULL;
+ krb5_timestamp now;
+ krb5_ccache ccache = NULL;
+ int retval;
+ char *name;
+
+ if (retval=krb5_init_context(&kcontext)) {
+ return(False);
+ }
+
+ if (retval = krb5_timeofday(kcontext, &now)) {
+ return(False);
+ }
+
+ if (retval = krb5_cc_default(kcontext, &ccache)) {
+ return(False);
+ }
+
+ if (retval = krb5_parse_name(kcontext, this_user, &kprinc)) {
+ return(False);
+ }
+
+ memset((char *)&kcreds, 0, sizeof(kcreds));
+
+ kcreds.client = kprinc;
+
+ if ((retval = krb5_build_principal_ext(kcontext, &server,
+ krb5_princ_realm(kcontext, kprinc)->length,
+ krb5_princ_realm(kcontext, kprinc)->data,
+ tgtname.length,
+ tgtname.data,
+ krb5_princ_realm(kcontext, kprinc)->length,
+ krb5_princ_realm(kcontext, kprinc)->data,
+ 0))) {
+ return(False);
+ }
+
+ kcreds.server = server;
+
+ retval = krb5_get_in_tkt_with_password(kcontext,
+ options,
+ addrs,
+ NULL,
+ preauth,
+ password,
+ 0,
+ &kcreds,
+ 0);
+
+ if (retval) {
+ return(False);
+ }
+
+ return(True);
+}
+#endif /* KRB5_AUTH */
+
+#ifdef KRB4_AUTH
+/*******************************************************************
+check on Kerberos authentication
+********************************************************************/
+static BOOL krb4_auth(char *this_user,char *password)
+{
+ char realm[REALM_SZ];
+ char tkfile[MAXPATHLEN];
+
+ if (krb_get_lrealm(realm, 1) != KSUCCESS) {
+ (void) safe_strcpy(realm, KRB_REALM, sizeof (realm) - 1);
+ }
+
+ (void) slprintf(tkfile, sizeof(tkfile) - 1, "/tmp/samba_tkt_%d",
+ getpid());
+
+ krb_set_tkt_string(tkfile);
+ if (krb_verify_user(this_user, "", realm,
+ password, 0,
+ "rmcd") == KSUCCESS) {
+ unlink(tkfile);
+ return 1;
+ }
+ unlink(tkfile);
+ return 0;
+}
+#endif /* KRB4_AUTH */
+
+#ifdef LINUX_BIGCRYPT
+/****************************************************************************
+an enhanced crypt for Linux to handle password longer than 8 characters
+****************************************************************************/
+static int linux_bigcrypt(char *password,char *salt1, char *crypted)
+{
+#define LINUX_PASSWORD_SEG_CHARS 8
+ char salt[3];
+ int i;
+
+ StrnCpy(salt,salt1,2);
+ crypted +=2;
+
+ for ( i=strlen(password); i > 0; i -= LINUX_PASSWORD_SEG_CHARS) {
+ char * p = crypt(password,salt) + 2;
+ if (strncmp(p, crypted, LINUX_PASSWORD_SEG_CHARS) != 0)
+ return(0);
+ password += LINUX_PASSWORD_SEG_CHARS;
+ crypted += strlen(p);
+ }
+
+ return(1);
+}
+#endif
+
+#ifdef OSF1_ENH_SEC
+/****************************************************************************
+an enhanced crypt for OSF1
+****************************************************************************/
+static char *osf1_bigcrypt(char *password,char *salt1)
+{
+ static char result[AUTH_MAX_PASSWD_LENGTH] = "";
+ char *p1;
+ char *p2=password;
+ char salt[3];
+ int i;
+ int parts = strlen(password) / AUTH_CLEARTEXT_SEG_CHARS;
+ if (strlen(password)%AUTH_CLEARTEXT_SEG_CHARS) {
+ parts++;
+ }
+
+ StrnCpy(salt,salt1,2);
+ StrnCpy(result,salt1,2);
+
+ for (i=0; i<parts;i++) {
+ p1 = crypt(p2,salt);
+ strncat(result,p1+2,AUTH_MAX_PASSWD_LENGTH-strlen(p1+2)-1);
+ StrnCpy(salt,&result[2+i*AUTH_CIPHERTEXT_SEG_CHARS],2);
+ p2 += AUTH_CLEARTEXT_SEG_CHARS;
+ }
+
+ return(result);
+}
+#endif
+
+
+/****************************************************************************
+apply a function to upper/lower case combinations
+of a string and return true if one of them returns true.
+try all combinations with N uppercase letters.
+offset is the first char to try and change (start with 0)
+it assumes the string starts lowercased
+****************************************************************************/
+static BOOL string_combinations2(char *s,int offset,BOOL (*fn)(char *),int N)
+{
+ int len = strlen(s);
+ int i;
+
+#ifdef PASSWORD_LENGTH
+ len = MIN(len,PASSWORD_LENGTH);
+#endif
+
+ if (N <= 0 || offset >= len) {
+ return(fn(s));
+ }
+
+ for (i=offset;i<(len-(N-1));i++) {
+ char c = s[i];
+ if (!islower(c)) continue;
+ s[i] = toupper(c);
+ if (string_combinations2(s,i+1,fn,N-1))
+ return(True);
+ s[i] = c;
+ }
+ return(False);
+}
+
+/****************************************************************************
+apply a function to upper/lower case combinations
+of a string and return true if one of them returns true.
+try all combinations with up to N uppercase letters.
+offset is the first char to try and change (start with 0)
+it assumes the string starts lowercased
+****************************************************************************/
+static BOOL string_combinations(char *s,BOOL (*fn)(char *),int N)
+{
+ int n;
+ for (n=1;n<=N;n++)
+ if (string_combinations2(s,0,fn,n)) return(True);
+ return(False);
+}
+
+
+/****************************************************************************
+core of password checking routine
+****************************************************************************/
+static BOOL password_check(char *password)
+{
+
+#ifdef HAVE_PAM
+ /* This falls through if the password check fails
+ - if HAVE_CRYPT is not defined this causes an error msg
+ saying Warning - no crypt available
+ - if HAVE_CRYPT is defined this is a potential security hole
+ as it may authenticate via the crypt call when PAM
+ settings say it should fail.
+ if (pam_auth(this_user,password)) return(True);
+ Hence we make a direct return to avoid a second chance!!!
+ */
+ return (pam_auth(this_user,password));
+#endif
+
+#ifdef WITH_AFS
+ if (afs_auth(this_user,password)) return(True);
+#endif
+
+#ifdef WITH_DFS
+ if (dfs_auth(this_user,password)) return(True);
+#endif
+
+#ifdef KRB5_AUTH
+ if (krb5_auth(this_user,password)) return(True);
+#endif
+
+#ifdef KRB4_AUTH
+ if (krb4_auth(this_user,password)) return(True);
+#endif
+
+#ifdef OSF1_ENH_SEC
+ {
+ BOOL ret = (strcmp(osf1_bigcrypt(password,this_salt),this_crypted) == 0);
+ if(!ret) {
+ DEBUG(2,("OSF1_ENH_SEC failed. Trying normal crypt.\n"));
+ ret = (strcmp((char *)crypt(password,this_salt),this_crypted) == 0);
+ }
+ return ret;
+ }
+#endif
+
+#ifdef ULTRIX_AUTH
+ return (strcmp((char *)crypt16(password, this_salt ),this_crypted) == 0);
+#endif
+
+#ifdef LINUX_BIGCRYPT
+ return(linux_bigcrypt(password,this_salt,this_crypted));
+#endif
+
+#ifdef HAVE_BIGCRYPT
+ return(strcmp(bigcrypt(password,this_salt),this_crypted) == 0);
+#endif
+
+#ifndef HAVE_CRYPT
+ DEBUG(1,("Warning - no crypt available\n"));
+ return(False);
+#else
+ return(strcmp((char *)crypt(password,this_salt),this_crypted) == 0);
+#endif
+}
+
+
+
+/****************************************************************************
+check if a username/password is OK
+the function pointer fn() points to a function to call when a successful
+match is found and is used to update the encrypted password file
+return True on correct match, False otherwise
+****************************************************************************/
+BOOL pass_check(char *user,char *password, int pwlen, struct passwd *pwd,
+ BOOL (*fn)(char *, char *))
+{
+ pstring pass2;
+ int level = lp_passwordlevel();
+ struct passwd *pass;
+
+ if (password) password[pwlen] = 0;
+
+#if DEBUG_PASSWORD
+ DEBUG(100,("checking user=[%s] pass=[%s]\n",user,password));
+#endif
+
+ if (!password) {
+ return(False);
+ }
+
+ if (((!*password) || (!pwlen)) && !lp_null_passwords()) {
+ return(False);
+ }
+
+ if (pwd && !user) {
+ pass = (struct passwd *) pwd;
+ user = pass->pw_name;
+ } else {
+ pass = Get_Pwnam(user,True);
+ }
+
+
+ DEBUG(4,("Checking password for user %s (l=%d)\n",user,pwlen));
+
+ if (!pass) {
+ DEBUG(3,("Couldn't find user %s\n",user));
+ return(False);
+ }
+
+#ifdef HAVE_GETSPNAM
+ {
+ struct spwd *spass;
+
+ /* many shadow systems require you to be root to get
+ the password, in most cases this should already be
+ the case when this function is called, except
+ perhaps for IPC password changing requests */
+
+ spass = getspnam(pass->pw_name);
+ if (spass && spass->sp_pwdp) {
+ pass->pw_passwd = spass->sp_pwdp;
+ }
+ }
+#elif defined(IA_UINFO)
+ {
+ /* Need to get password with SVR4.2's ia_ functions
+ instead of get{sp,pw}ent functions. Required by
+ UnixWare 2.x, tested on version
+ 2.1. (tangent@cyberport.com) */
+ uinfo_t uinfo;
+ if (ia_openinfo(pass->pw_name, &uinfo) != -1) {
+ ia_get_logpwd(uinfo, &(pass->pw_passwd));
+ }
+ }
+#endif
+
+#ifdef HAVE_GETPRPWNAM
+ {
+ struct pr_passwd *pr_pw = getprpwnam(pass->pw_name);
+ if (pr_pw && pr_pw->ufld.fd_encrypt)
+ pass->pw_passwd = pr_pw->ufld.fd_encrypt;
+ }
+#endif
+
+#ifdef OSF1_ENH_SEC
+ {
+ struct pr_passwd *mypasswd;
+ DEBUG(5,("Checking password for user %s in OSF1_ENH_SEC\n",
+ user));
+ mypasswd = getprpwnam (user);
+ if (mypasswd) {
+ fstrcpy(pass->pw_name,mypasswd->ufld.fd_name);
+ fstrcpy(pass->pw_passwd,mypasswd->ufld.fd_encrypt);
+ } else {
+ DEBUG(5,("No entry for user %s in protected database !\n",
+ user));
+ return(False);
+ }
+ }
+#endif
+
+#ifdef ULTRIX_AUTH
+ {
+ AUTHORIZATION *ap = getauthuid(pass->pw_uid);
+ if (ap) {
+ fstrcpy(pass->pw_passwd, ap->a_password);
+ endauthent();
+ }
+ }
+#endif
+
+ /* extract relevant info */
+ fstrcpy(this_user,pass->pw_name);
+ fstrcpy(this_salt,pass->pw_passwd);
+ /* crypt on some platforms (HPUX in particular)
+ won't work with more than 2 salt characters. */
+ this_salt[2] = 0;
+
+ fstrcpy(this_crypted,pass->pw_passwd);
+
+ if (!*this_crypted) {
+ if (!lp_null_passwords()) {
+ DEBUG(2,("Disallowing %s with null password\n",
+ this_user));
+ return(False);
+ }
+ if (!*password) {
+ DEBUG(3,("Allowing access to %s with null password\n",
+ this_user));
+ return(True);
+ }
+ }
+
+ /* try it as it came to us */
+ if (password_check(password)) {
+ update_protected_database(user,True);
+ if (fn) fn(user,password);
+ return(True);
+ }
+
+ /* if the password was given to us with mixed case then we don't
+ need to proceed as we know it hasn't been case modified by the
+ client */
+ if (strhasupper(password) && strhaslower(password)) {
+ return(False);
+ }
+
+ /* make a copy of it */
+ StrnCpy(pass2,password,sizeof(pstring)-1);
+
+ /* try all lowercase */
+ strlower(password);
+ if (password_check(password)) {
+ update_protected_database(user,True);
+ if (fn) fn(user,password);
+ return(True);
+ }
+
+ /* give up? */
+ if (level < 1) {
+ update_protected_database(user,False);
+
+ /* restore it */
+ fstrcpy(password,pass2);
+
+ return(False);
+ }
+
+ /* last chance - all combinations of up to level chars upper! */
+ strlower(password);
+
+ if (string_combinations(password,password_check,level)) {
+ update_protected_database(user,True);
+ if (fn) fn(user,password);
+ return(True);
+ }
+
+ update_protected_database(user,False);
+
+ /* restore it */
+ fstrcpy(password,pass2);
+
+ return(False);
+}
char *ufc_crypt(char *key,char *salt);
+/*The following definitions come from lib/username.c */
+
+char *get_home_dir(char *user);
+BOOL map_username(char *user);
+struct passwd *Get_Pwnam(char *user,BOOL allow_change);
+BOOL user_in_list(char *user,char *list);
+
/*The following definitions come from lib/util.c */
char *tmpdir(void);
BOOL pcap_printername_ok(char *pszPrintername, char *pszPrintcapname);
void pcap_printer_fn(void (*fn)(char *, char *));
+/*The following definitions come from passdb/pass_check.c */
+
+void dfs_unlogin(void);
+BOOL pass_check(char *user,char *password, int pwlen, struct passwd *pwd,
+ BOOL (*fn)(char *, char *));
+
/*The following definitions come from passdb/passdb.c */
BOOL initialize_password_db(void);
BOOL get_trust_account_password( unsigned char *ret_pwd, time_t *pass_last_set_time);
BOOL set_trust_account_password( unsigned char *md4_new_pwd);
-/*The following definitions come from passdb/username.c */
-
-char *get_home_dir(char *user);
-BOOL map_username(char *user);
-struct passwd *Get_Pwnam(char *user,BOOL allow_change);
-BOOL user_in_list(char *user,char *list);
-
/*The following definitions come from rpc_client/cli_login.c */
BOOL cli_nt_setup_creds(struct cli_state *cli, unsigned char mach_pwd[16]);
int setup_groups(char *user, int uid, int gid, int *p_ngroups, GID_T **p_groups);
uint16 register_vuid(int uid,int gid, char *unix_name, char *requested_name, BOOL guest);
void add_session_user(char *user);
-BOOL update_smbpassword_file( char *user, fstring password);
-void dfs_unlogin(void);
-BOOL password_check(char *password);
+BOOL update_smbpassword_file(char *user, char *password);
BOOL smb_password_check(char *password, unsigned char *part_passwd, unsigned char *c8);
BOOL smb_password_ok(struct smb_passwd *smb_pass,
uchar lm_pass[24], uchar nt_pass[24]);
--- /dev/null
+/*
+ Unix SMB/Netbios implementation.
+ Version 1.9.
+ Password checking
+ Copyright (C) Andrew Tridgell 1992-1998
+
+ This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
+ it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
+ the Free Software Foundation; either version 2 of the License, or
+ (at your option) any later version.
+
+ This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
+ but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
+ MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the
+ GNU General Public License for more details.
+
+ You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
+ along with this program; if not, write to the Free Software
+ Foundation, Inc., 675 Mass Ave, Cambridge, MA 02139, USA.
+*/
+
+/* this module is for checking a username/password against a system
+ password database. The SMB encrypted password support is elsewhere */
+
+#include "includes.h"
+
+extern int DEBUGLEVEL;
+
+/* these are kept here to keep the string_combinations function simple */
+static char this_user[100]="";
+static char this_salt[100]="";
+static char this_crypted[100]="";
+
+
+/****************************************************************************
+update the enhanced security database. Only relevant for OSF1 at the moment.
+****************************************************************************/
+static void update_protected_database(char *user, BOOL result)
+{
+#ifdef OSF1_ENH_SEC
+ struct pr_passwd *mypasswd;
+ time_t starttime;
+
+ mypasswd = getprpwnam (user);
+ starttime = time (NULL);
+
+ if (result) {
+ mypasswd->ufld.fd_slogin = starttime;
+ mypasswd->ufld.fd_nlogins = 0;
+
+ putprpwnam(user,mypasswd);
+ } else {
+ mypasswd->ufld.fd_ulogin = starttime;
+ mypasswd->ufld.fd_nlogins = mypasswd->ufld.fd_nlogins + 1;
+ if (mypasswd->ufld.fd_max_tries != 0 &&
+ mypasswd->ufld.fd_nlogins > mypasswd->ufld.fd_max_tries) {
+ mypasswd->uflg.fg_lock = 0;
+ DEBUG(3,("Account %s is disabled\n", user));
+ }
+ putprpwnam(user ,mypasswd);
+ }
+#endif
+}
+
+
+#ifdef HAVE_PAM
+/*******************************************************************
+check on PAM authentication
+********************************************************************/
+
+/* We first need some helper functions */
+#include <security/pam_appl.h>
+/* Static variables used to communicate between the conversation function
+ * and the server_login function
+ */
+static char *PAM_username;
+static char *PAM_password;
+
+/* PAM conversation function
+ * Here we assume (for now, at least) that echo on means login name, and
+ * echo off means password.
+ */
+static int PAM_conv (int num_msg,
+ const struct pam_message **msg,
+ struct pam_response **resp,
+ void *appdata_ptr) {
+ int replies = 0;
+ struct pam_response *reply = NULL;
+
+ #define COPY_STRING(s) (s) ? strdup(s) : NULL
+
+ reply = malloc(sizeof(struct pam_response) * num_msg);
+ if (!reply) return PAM_CONV_ERR;
+
+ for (replies = 0; replies < num_msg; replies++) {
+ switch (msg[replies]->msg_style) {
+ case PAM_PROMPT_ECHO_ON:
+ reply[replies].resp_retcode = PAM_SUCCESS;
+ reply[replies].resp = COPY_STRING(PAM_username);
+ /* PAM frees resp */
+ break;
+ case PAM_PROMPT_ECHO_OFF:
+ reply[replies].resp_retcode = PAM_SUCCESS;
+ reply[replies].resp = COPY_STRING(PAM_password);
+ /* PAM frees resp */
+ break;
+ case PAM_TEXT_INFO:
+ /* fall through */
+ case PAM_ERROR_MSG:
+ /* ignore it... */
+ reply[replies].resp_retcode = PAM_SUCCESS;
+ reply[replies].resp = NULL;
+ break;
+ default:
+ /* Must be an error of some sort... */
+ free (reply);
+ return PAM_CONV_ERR;
+ }
+ }
+ if (reply) *resp = reply;
+ return PAM_SUCCESS;
+}
+static struct pam_conv PAM_conversation = {
+ &PAM_conv,
+ NULL
+};
+
+
+static BOOL pam_auth(char *this_user,char *password)
+{
+ pam_handle_t *pamh;
+ int pam_error;
+
+ /* Now use PAM to do authentication. For now, we won't worry about
+ * session logging, only authentication. Bail out if there are any
+ * errors. Since this is a limited protocol, and an even more limited
+ * function within a server speaking this protocol, we can't be as
+ * verbose as would otherwise make sense.
+ * Query: should we be using PAM_SILENT to shut PAM up?
+ */
+ #define PAM_BAIL if (pam_error != PAM_SUCCESS) { \
+ pam_end(pamh, 0); return False; \
+ }
+ PAM_password = password;
+ PAM_username = this_user;
+ pam_error = pam_start("samba", this_user, &PAM_conversation, &pamh);
+ PAM_BAIL;
+/* Setting PAM_SILENT stops generation of error messages to syslog
+ * to enable debugging on Red Hat Linux set:
+ * /etc/pam.d/samba:
+ * auth required /lib/security/pam_pwdb.so nullok shadow audit
+ * _OR_ change PAM_SILENT to 0 to force detailed reporting (logging)
+ */
+ pam_error = pam_authenticate(pamh, PAM_SILENT);
+ PAM_BAIL;
+ /* It is not clear to me that account management is the right thing
+ * to do, but it is not clear that it isn't, either. This can be
+ * removed if no account management should be done. Alternately,
+ * put a pam_allow.so entry in /etc/pam.conf for account handling. */
+ pam_error = pam_acct_mgmt(pamh, PAM_SILENT);
+ PAM_BAIL;
+ pam_end(pamh, PAM_SUCCESS);
+ /* If this point is reached, the user has been authenticated. */
+ return(True);
+}
+#endif
+
+
+#ifdef WITH_AFS
+/*******************************************************************
+check on AFS authentication
+********************************************************************/
+static BOOL afs_auth(char *this_user,char *password)
+{
+ long password_expires = 0;
+ char *reason;
+
+ /* For versions of AFS prior to 3.3, this routine has few arguments, */
+ /* but since I can't find the old documentation... :-) */
+ setpag();
+ if (ka_UserAuthenticateGeneral(KA_USERAUTH_VERSION+KA_USERAUTH_DOSETPAG,
+ this_user,
+ (char *) 0, /* instance */
+ (char *) 0, /* cell */
+ password,
+ 0, /* lifetime, default */
+ &password_expires, /*days 'til it expires */
+ 0, /* spare 2 */
+ &reason) == 0) {
+ return(True);
+ }
+ return(False);
+}
+#endif
+
+
+#ifdef WITH_DFS
+
+/*****************************************************************
+ This new version of the DFS_AUTH code was donated by Karsten Muuss
+ <muuss@or.uni-bonn.de>. It fixes the following problems with the
+ old code :
+
+ - Server credentials may expire
+ - Client credential cache files have wrong owner
+ - purge_context() function is called with invalid argument
+
+ This new code was modified to ensure that on exit the uid/gid is
+ still root, and the original directory is restored. JRA.
+******************************************************************/
+
+sec_login_handle_t my_dce_sec_context;
+int dcelogin_atmost_once = 0;
+
+/*******************************************************************
+check on a DCE/DFS authentication
+********************************************************************/
+static BOOL dfs_auth(char *this_user,char *password)
+{
+ error_status_t err;
+ int err2;
+ int prterr;
+ signed32 expire_time, current_time;
+ boolean32 password_reset;
+ struct passwd *pw;
+ sec_passwd_rec_t passwd_rec;
+ sec_login_auth_src_t auth_src = sec_login_auth_src_network;
+ unsigned char dce_errstr[dce_c_error_string_len];
+
+ if (dcelogin_atmost_once) return(False);
+
+#ifdef HAVE_CRYPT
+ /*
+ * We only go for a DCE login context if the given password
+ * matches that stored in the local password file..
+ * Assumes local passwd file is kept in sync w/ DCE RGY!
+ */
+
+ if (strcmp((char *)crypt(password,this_salt),this_crypted)) {
+ return(False);
+ }
+#endif
+
+ sec_login_get_current_context(&my_dce_sec_context, &err);
+ if (err != error_status_ok ) {
+ dce_error_inq_text(err, dce_errstr, &err2);
+ DEBUG(0,("DCE can't get current context. %s\n", dce_errstr));
+
+ return(False);
+ }
+
+ sec_login_certify_identity(my_dce_sec_context, &err);
+ if (err != error_status_ok) {
+ dce_error_inq_text(err, dce_errstr, &err2);
+ DEBUG(0,("DCE can't get current context. %s\n", dce_errstr));
+
+ return(False);
+ }
+
+ sec_login_get_expiration(my_dce_sec_context, &expire_time, &err);
+ if (err != error_status_ok) {
+ dce_error_inq_text(err, dce_errstr, &err2);
+ DEBUG(0,("DCE can't get expiration. %s\n", dce_errstr));
+
+ return(False);
+ }
+
+ time(¤t_time);
+
+ if (expire_time < (current_time + 60)) {
+ struct passwd *pw;
+ sec_passwd_rec_t *key;
+
+ sec_login_get_pwent(my_dce_sec_context,
+ (sec_login_passwd_t*)&pw, &err);
+ if (err != error_status_ok ) {
+ dce_error_inq_text(err, dce_errstr, &err2);
+ DEBUG(0,("DCE can't get pwent. %s\n", dce_errstr));
+
+ return(False);
+ }
+
+ sec_login_refresh_identity(my_dce_sec_context, &err);
+ if (err != error_status_ok) {
+ dce_error_inq_text(err, dce_errstr, &err2);
+ DEBUG(0,("DCE can't refresh identity. %s\n",
+ dce_errstr));
+
+ return(False);
+ }
+
+ sec_key_mgmt_get_key(rpc_c_authn_dce_secret, NULL,
+ (unsigned char *)pw->pw_name,
+ sec_c_key_version_none,
+ (void**)&key, &err);
+ if (err != error_status_ok) {
+ dce_error_inq_text(err, dce_errstr, &err2);
+ DEBUG(0,("DCE can't get key for %s. %s\n",
+ pw->pw_name, dce_errstr));
+
+ return(False);
+ }
+
+ sec_login_valid_and_cert_ident(my_dce_sec_context, key,
+ &password_reset, &auth_src,
+ &err);
+ if (err != error_status_ok ) {
+ dce_error_inq_text(err, dce_errstr, &err2);
+ DEBUG(0,("DCE can't validate and certify identity for %s. %s\n",
+ pw->pw_name, dce_errstr));
+ }
+
+ sec_key_mgmt_free_key(key, &err);
+ if (err != error_status_ok ) {
+ dce_error_inq_text(err, dce_errstr, &err2);
+ DEBUG(0,("DCE can't free key.\n", dce_errstr));
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (sec_login_setup_identity((unsigned char *)this_user,
+ sec_login_no_flags,
+ &my_dce_sec_context,
+ &err) == 0) {
+ dce_error_inq_text(err, dce_errstr, &err2);
+ DEBUG(0,("DCE Setup Identity for %s failed: %s\n",
+ this_user,dce_errstr));
+ return(False);
+ }
+
+ sec_login_get_pwent(my_dce_sec_context,
+ (sec_login_passwd_t*)&pw, &err);
+ if (err != error_status_ok) {
+ dce_error_inq_text(err, dce_errstr, &err2);
+ DEBUG(0,("DCE can't get pwent. %s\n", dce_errstr));
+
+ return(False);
+ }
+
+ sec_login_purge_context(&my_dce_sec_context, &err);
+ if (err != error_status_ok) {
+ dce_error_inq_text(err, dce_errstr, &err2);
+ DEBUG(0,("DCE can't purge context. %s\n", dce_errstr));
+
+ return(False);
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * NB. I'd like to change these to call something like become_user()
+ * instead but currently we don't have a connection
+ * context to become the correct user. This is already
+ * fairly platform specific code however, so I think
+ * this should be ok. I have added code to go
+ * back to being root on error though. JRA.
+ */
+
+ if (setregid(-1, pw->pw_gid) != 0) {
+ DEBUG(0,("Can't set egid to %d (%s)\n",
+ pw->pw_gid, strerror(errno)));
+ return False;
+ }
+
+ if (setreuid(-1, pw->pw_uid) != 0) {
+ setgid(0);
+ DEBUG(0,("Can't set euid to %d (%s)\n",
+ pw->pw_uid, strerror(errno)));
+ return False;
+ }
+
+ if (sec_login_setup_identity((unsigned char *)this_user,
+ sec_login_no_flags,
+ &my_dce_sec_context,
+ &err) == 0) {
+ dce_error_inq_text(err, dce_errstr, &err2);
+ /* Go back to root, JRA. */
+ setuid(0);
+ setgid(0);
+ DEBUG(0,("DCE Setup Identity for %s failed: %s\n",
+ this_user,dce_errstr));
+ return(False);
+ }
+
+ sec_login_get_pwent(my_dce_sec_context,
+ (sec_login_passwd_t*)&pw, &err);
+ if (err != error_status_ok ) {
+ dce_error_inq_text(err, dce_errstr, &err2);
+ /* Go back to root, JRA. */
+ setuid(0);
+ setgid(0);
+ DEBUG(0,("DCE can't get pwent. %s\n", dce_errstr));
+
+ return(False);
+ }
+
+ passwd_rec.version_number = sec_passwd_c_version_none;
+ passwd_rec.pepper = NULL;
+ passwd_rec.key.key_type = sec_passwd_plain;
+ passwd_rec.key.tagged_union.plain = (idl_char *)password;
+
+ sec_login_validate_identity(my_dce_sec_context,
+ &passwd_rec, &password_reset,
+ &auth_src, &err);
+ if (err != error_status_ok ) {
+ dce_error_inq_text(err, dce_errstr, &err2);
+ /* Go back to root, JRA. */
+ setuid(0);
+ setgid(0);
+ DEBUG(0,("DCE Identity Validation failed for principal %s: %s\n",
+ this_user,dce_errstr));
+
+ return(False);
+ }
+
+ sec_login_certify_identity(my_dce_sec_context, &err);
+ if (err != error_status_ok) {
+ dce_error_inq_text(err, dce_errstr, &err2);
+ /* Go back to root, JRA. */
+ setuid(0);
+ setgid(0);
+ DEBUG(0,("DCE certify identity failed: %s\n", dce_errstr));
+
+ return(False);
+ }
+
+ if (auth_src != sec_login_auth_src_network) {
+ DEBUG(0,("DCE context has no network credentials.\n"));
+ }
+
+ sec_login_set_context(my_dce_sec_context, &err);
+ if (err != error_status_ok) {
+ dce_error_inq_text(err, dce_errstr, &err2);
+ DEBUG(0,("DCE login failed for principal %s, cant set context: %s\n",
+ this_user,dce_errstr));
+
+ sec_login_purge_context(&my_dce_sec_context, &err);
+ /* Go back to root, JRA. */
+ setuid(0);
+ setgid(0);
+ return(False);
+ }
+
+ sec_login_get_pwent(my_dce_sec_context,
+ (sec_login_passwd_t*)&pw, &err);
+ if (err != error_status_ok) {
+ dce_error_inq_text(err, dce_errstr, &err2);
+ DEBUG(0,("DCE can't get pwent. %s\n", dce_errstr));
+
+ /* Go back to root, JRA. */
+ setuid(0);
+ setgid(0);
+ return(False);
+ }
+
+ DEBUG(0,("DCE login succeeded for principal %s on pid %d\n",
+ this_user, getpid()));
+
+ DEBUG(3,("DCE principal: %s\n"
+ " uid: %d\n"
+ " gid: %d\n",
+ pw->pw_name, pw->pw_uid, pw->pw_gid));
+ DEBUG(3,(" info: %s\n"
+ " dir: %s\n"
+ " shell: %s\n",
+ pw->pw_gecos, pw->pw_dir, pw->pw_shell));
+
+ sec_login_get_expiration(my_dce_sec_context, &expire_time, &err);
+ if (err != error_status_ok) {
+ dce_error_inq_text(err, dce_errstr, &err2);
+ /* Go back to root, JRA. */
+ setuid(0);
+ setgid(0);
+ DEBUG(0,("DCE can't get expiration. %s\n", dce_errstr));
+
+ return(False);
+ }
+
+ setuid(0);
+ setgid(0);
+
+ DEBUG(0,("DCE context expires: %s",asctime(localtime(&expire_time))));
+
+ dcelogin_atmost_once = 1;
+ return (True);
+}
+
+void dfs_unlogin(void)
+{
+ error_status_t err;
+ int err2;
+ unsigned char dce_errstr[dce_c_error_string_len];
+
+ sec_login_purge_context(&my_dce_sec_context, &err);
+ if (err != error_status_ok) {
+ dce_error_inq_text(err, dce_errstr, &err2);
+ DEBUG(0,("DCE purge login context failed for server instance %d: %s\n",
+ getpid(), dce_errstr));
+ }
+}
+#endif
+
+#ifdef KRB5_AUTH
+/*******************************************************************
+check on Kerberos authentication
+********************************************************************/
+static BOOL krb5_auth(char *this_user,char *password)
+{
+ krb5_data tgtname = {
+ 0,
+ KRB5_TGS_NAME_SIZE,
+ KRB5_TGS_NAME
+ };
+ krb5_context kcontext;
+ krb5_principal kprinc;
+ krb5_principal server;
+ krb5_creds kcreds;
+ int options = 0;
+ krb5_address **addrs = (krb5_address **)0;
+ krb5_preauthtype *preauth = NULL;
+ krb5_keytab keytab = NULL;
+ krb5_timestamp now;
+ krb5_ccache ccache = NULL;
+ int retval;
+ char *name;
+
+ if (retval=krb5_init_context(&kcontext)) {
+ return(False);
+ }
+
+ if (retval = krb5_timeofday(kcontext, &now)) {
+ return(False);
+ }
+
+ if (retval = krb5_cc_default(kcontext, &ccache)) {
+ return(False);
+ }
+
+ if (retval = krb5_parse_name(kcontext, this_user, &kprinc)) {
+ return(False);
+ }
+
+ memset((char *)&kcreds, 0, sizeof(kcreds));
+
+ kcreds.client = kprinc;
+
+ if ((retval = krb5_build_principal_ext(kcontext, &server,
+ krb5_princ_realm(kcontext, kprinc)->length,
+ krb5_princ_realm(kcontext, kprinc)->data,
+ tgtname.length,
+ tgtname.data,
+ krb5_princ_realm(kcontext, kprinc)->length,
+ krb5_princ_realm(kcontext, kprinc)->data,
+ 0))) {
+ return(False);
+ }
+
+ kcreds.server = server;
+
+ retval = krb5_get_in_tkt_with_password(kcontext,
+ options,
+ addrs,
+ NULL,
+ preauth,
+ password,
+ 0,
+ &kcreds,
+ 0);
+
+ if (retval) {
+ return(False);
+ }
+
+ return(True);
+}
+#endif /* KRB5_AUTH */
+
+#ifdef KRB4_AUTH
+/*******************************************************************
+check on Kerberos authentication
+********************************************************************/
+static BOOL krb4_auth(char *this_user,char *password)
+{
+ char realm[REALM_SZ];
+ char tkfile[MAXPATHLEN];
+
+ if (krb_get_lrealm(realm, 1) != KSUCCESS) {
+ (void) safe_strcpy(realm, KRB_REALM, sizeof (realm) - 1);
+ }
+
+ (void) slprintf(tkfile, sizeof(tkfile) - 1, "/tmp/samba_tkt_%d",
+ getpid());
+
+ krb_set_tkt_string(tkfile);
+ if (krb_verify_user(this_user, "", realm,
+ password, 0,
+ "rmcd") == KSUCCESS) {
+ unlink(tkfile);
+ return 1;
+ }
+ unlink(tkfile);
+ return 0;
+}
+#endif /* KRB4_AUTH */
+
+#ifdef LINUX_BIGCRYPT
+/****************************************************************************
+an enhanced crypt for Linux to handle password longer than 8 characters
+****************************************************************************/
+static int linux_bigcrypt(char *password,char *salt1, char *crypted)
+{
+#define LINUX_PASSWORD_SEG_CHARS 8
+ char salt[3];
+ int i;
+
+ StrnCpy(salt,salt1,2);
+ crypted +=2;
+
+ for ( i=strlen(password); i > 0; i -= LINUX_PASSWORD_SEG_CHARS) {
+ char * p = crypt(password,salt) + 2;
+ if (strncmp(p, crypted, LINUX_PASSWORD_SEG_CHARS) != 0)
+ return(0);
+ password += LINUX_PASSWORD_SEG_CHARS;
+ crypted += strlen(p);
+ }
+
+ return(1);
+}
+#endif
+
+#ifdef OSF1_ENH_SEC
+/****************************************************************************
+an enhanced crypt for OSF1
+****************************************************************************/
+static char *osf1_bigcrypt(char *password,char *salt1)
+{
+ static char result[AUTH_MAX_PASSWD_LENGTH] = "";
+ char *p1;
+ char *p2=password;
+ char salt[3];
+ int i;
+ int parts = strlen(password) / AUTH_CLEARTEXT_SEG_CHARS;
+ if (strlen(password)%AUTH_CLEARTEXT_SEG_CHARS) {
+ parts++;
+ }
+
+ StrnCpy(salt,salt1,2);
+ StrnCpy(result,salt1,2);
+
+ for (i=0; i<parts;i++) {
+ p1 = crypt(p2,salt);
+ strncat(result,p1+2,AUTH_MAX_PASSWD_LENGTH-strlen(p1+2)-1);
+ StrnCpy(salt,&result[2+i*AUTH_CIPHERTEXT_SEG_CHARS],2);
+ p2 += AUTH_CLEARTEXT_SEG_CHARS;
+ }
+
+ return(result);
+}
+#endif
+
+
+/****************************************************************************
+apply a function to upper/lower case combinations
+of a string and return true if one of them returns true.
+try all combinations with N uppercase letters.
+offset is the first char to try and change (start with 0)
+it assumes the string starts lowercased
+****************************************************************************/
+static BOOL string_combinations2(char *s,int offset,BOOL (*fn)(char *),int N)
+{
+ int len = strlen(s);
+ int i;
+
+#ifdef PASSWORD_LENGTH
+ len = MIN(len,PASSWORD_LENGTH);
+#endif
+
+ if (N <= 0 || offset >= len) {
+ return(fn(s));
+ }
+
+ for (i=offset;i<(len-(N-1));i++) {
+ char c = s[i];
+ if (!islower(c)) continue;
+ s[i] = toupper(c);
+ if (string_combinations2(s,i+1,fn,N-1))
+ return(True);
+ s[i] = c;
+ }
+ return(False);
+}
+
+/****************************************************************************
+apply a function to upper/lower case combinations
+of a string and return true if one of them returns true.
+try all combinations with up to N uppercase letters.
+offset is the first char to try and change (start with 0)
+it assumes the string starts lowercased
+****************************************************************************/
+static BOOL string_combinations(char *s,BOOL (*fn)(char *),int N)
+{
+ int n;
+ for (n=1;n<=N;n++)
+ if (string_combinations2(s,0,fn,n)) return(True);
+ return(False);
+}
+
+
+/****************************************************************************
+core of password checking routine
+****************************************************************************/
+static BOOL password_check(char *password)
+{
+
+#ifdef HAVE_PAM
+ /* This falls through if the password check fails
+ - if HAVE_CRYPT is not defined this causes an error msg
+ saying Warning - no crypt available
+ - if HAVE_CRYPT is defined this is a potential security hole
+ as it may authenticate via the crypt call when PAM
+ settings say it should fail.
+ if (pam_auth(this_user,password)) return(True);
+ Hence we make a direct return to avoid a second chance!!!
+ */
+ return (pam_auth(this_user,password));
+#endif
+
+#ifdef WITH_AFS
+ if (afs_auth(this_user,password)) return(True);
+#endif
+
+#ifdef WITH_DFS
+ if (dfs_auth(this_user,password)) return(True);
+#endif
+
+#ifdef KRB5_AUTH
+ if (krb5_auth(this_user,password)) return(True);
+#endif
+
+#ifdef KRB4_AUTH
+ if (krb4_auth(this_user,password)) return(True);
+#endif
+
+#ifdef OSF1_ENH_SEC
+ {
+ BOOL ret = (strcmp(osf1_bigcrypt(password,this_salt),this_crypted) == 0);
+ if(!ret) {
+ DEBUG(2,("OSF1_ENH_SEC failed. Trying normal crypt.\n"));
+ ret = (strcmp((char *)crypt(password,this_salt),this_crypted) == 0);
+ }
+ return ret;
+ }
+#endif
+
+#ifdef ULTRIX_AUTH
+ return (strcmp((char *)crypt16(password, this_salt ),this_crypted) == 0);
+#endif
+
+#ifdef LINUX_BIGCRYPT
+ return(linux_bigcrypt(password,this_salt,this_crypted));
+#endif
+
+#ifdef HAVE_BIGCRYPT
+ return(strcmp(bigcrypt(password,this_salt),this_crypted) == 0);
+#endif
+
+#ifndef HAVE_CRYPT
+ DEBUG(1,("Warning - no crypt available\n"));
+ return(False);
+#else
+ return(strcmp((char *)crypt(password,this_salt),this_crypted) == 0);
+#endif
+}
+
+
+
+/****************************************************************************
+check if a username/password is OK
+the function pointer fn() points to a function to call when a successful
+match is found and is used to update the encrypted password file
+return True on correct match, False otherwise
+****************************************************************************/
+BOOL pass_check(char *user,char *password, int pwlen, struct passwd *pwd,
+ BOOL (*fn)(char *, char *))
+{
+ pstring pass2;
+ int level = lp_passwordlevel();
+ struct passwd *pass;
+
+ if (password) password[pwlen] = 0;
+
+#if DEBUG_PASSWORD
+ DEBUG(100,("checking user=[%s] pass=[%s]\n",user,password));
+#endif
+
+ if (!password) {
+ return(False);
+ }
+
+ if (((!*password) || (!pwlen)) && !lp_null_passwords()) {
+ return(False);
+ }
+
+ if (pwd && !user) {
+ pass = (struct passwd *) pwd;
+ user = pass->pw_name;
+ } else {
+ pass = Get_Pwnam(user,True);
+ }
+
+
+ DEBUG(4,("Checking password for user %s (l=%d)\n",user,pwlen));
+
+ if (!pass) {
+ DEBUG(3,("Couldn't find user %s\n",user));
+ return(False);
+ }
+
+#ifdef HAVE_GETSPNAM
+ {
+ struct spwd *spass;
+
+ /* many shadow systems require you to be root to get
+ the password, in most cases this should already be
+ the case when this function is called, except
+ perhaps for IPC password changing requests */
+
+ spass = getspnam(pass->pw_name);
+ if (spass && spass->sp_pwdp) {
+ pass->pw_passwd = spass->sp_pwdp;
+ }
+ }
+#elif defined(IA_UINFO)
+ {
+ /* Need to get password with SVR4.2's ia_ functions
+ instead of get{sp,pw}ent functions. Required by
+ UnixWare 2.x, tested on version
+ 2.1. (tangent@cyberport.com) */
+ uinfo_t uinfo;
+ if (ia_openinfo(pass->pw_name, &uinfo) != -1) {
+ ia_get_logpwd(uinfo, &(pass->pw_passwd));
+ }
+ }
+#endif
+
+#ifdef HAVE_GETPRPWNAM
+ {
+ struct pr_passwd *pr_pw = getprpwnam(pass->pw_name);
+ if (pr_pw && pr_pw->ufld.fd_encrypt)
+ pass->pw_passwd = pr_pw->ufld.fd_encrypt;
+ }
+#endif
+
+#ifdef OSF1_ENH_SEC
+ {
+ struct pr_passwd *mypasswd;
+ DEBUG(5,("Checking password for user %s in OSF1_ENH_SEC\n",
+ user));
+ mypasswd = getprpwnam (user);
+ if (mypasswd) {
+ fstrcpy(pass->pw_name,mypasswd->ufld.fd_name);
+ fstrcpy(pass->pw_passwd,mypasswd->ufld.fd_encrypt);
+ } else {
+ DEBUG(5,("No entry for user %s in protected database !\n",
+ user));
+ return(False);
+ }
+ }
+#endif
+
+#ifdef ULTRIX_AUTH
+ {
+ AUTHORIZATION *ap = getauthuid(pass->pw_uid);
+ if (ap) {
+ fstrcpy(pass->pw_passwd, ap->a_password);
+ endauthent();
+ }
+ }
+#endif
+
+ /* extract relevant info */
+ fstrcpy(this_user,pass->pw_name);
+ fstrcpy(this_salt,pass->pw_passwd);
+ /* crypt on some platforms (HPUX in particular)
+ won't work with more than 2 salt characters. */
+ this_salt[2] = 0;
+
+ fstrcpy(this_crypted,pass->pw_passwd);
+
+ if (!*this_crypted) {
+ if (!lp_null_passwords()) {
+ DEBUG(2,("Disallowing %s with null password\n",
+ this_user));
+ return(False);
+ }
+ if (!*password) {
+ DEBUG(3,("Allowing access to %s with null password\n",
+ this_user));
+ return(True);
+ }
+ }
+
+ /* try it as it came to us */
+ if (password_check(password)) {
+ update_protected_database(user,True);
+ if (fn) fn(user,password);
+ return(True);
+ }
+
+ /* if the password was given to us with mixed case then we don't
+ need to proceed as we know it hasn't been case modified by the
+ client */
+ if (strhasupper(password) && strhaslower(password)) {
+ return(False);
+ }
+
+ /* make a copy of it */
+ StrnCpy(pass2,password,sizeof(pstring)-1);
+
+ /* try all lowercase */
+ strlower(password);
+ if (password_check(password)) {
+ update_protected_database(user,True);
+ if (fn) fn(user,password);
+ return(True);
+ }
+
+ /* give up? */
+ if (level < 1) {
+ update_protected_database(user,False);
+
+ /* restore it */
+ fstrcpy(password,pass2);
+
+ return(False);
+ }
+
+ /* last chance - all combinations of up to level chars upper! */
+ strlower(password);
+
+ if (string_combinations(password,password_check,level)) {
+ update_protected_database(user,True);
+ if (fn) fn(user,password);
+ return(True);
+ }
+
+ update_protected_database(user,False);
+
+ /* restore it */
+ fstrcpy(password,pass2);
+
+ return(False);
+}
extern pstring global_myname;
extern fstring global_myworkgroup;
-/* these are kept here to keep the string_combinations function simple */
-static char this_user[100]="";
-static char this_salt[100]="";
-static char this_crypted[100]="";
-
/* Data to do lanman1/2 password challenge. */
static unsigned char saved_challenge[8];
static BOOL challenge_sent=False;
}
-#ifdef OSF1_ENH_SEC
-/****************************************************************************
-an enhanced crypt for OSF1
-****************************************************************************/
-static char *osf1_bigcrypt(char *password,char *salt1)
-{
- static char result[AUTH_MAX_PASSWD_LENGTH] = "";
- char *p1;
- char *p2=password;
- char salt[3];
- int i;
- int parts = strlen(password) / AUTH_CLEARTEXT_SEG_CHARS;
- if (strlen(password)%AUTH_CLEARTEXT_SEG_CHARS)
- parts++;
-
- StrnCpy(salt,salt1,2);
- StrnCpy(result,salt1,2);
-
- for (i=0; i<parts;i++)
- {
- p1 = crypt(p2,salt);
- strncat(result,p1+2,AUTH_MAX_PASSWD_LENGTH-strlen(p1+2)-1);
- StrnCpy(salt,&result[2+i*AUTH_CIPHERTEXT_SEG_CHARS],2);
- p2 += AUTH_CLEARTEXT_SEG_CHARS;
- }
-
- return(result);
-}
-#endif
-
/****************************************************************************
update the encrypted smbpasswd file from the plaintext username and password
*****************************************************************************/
-BOOL update_smbpassword_file( char *user, fstring password)
-{
- struct smb_passwd *smbpw;
- BOOL ret;
-
- become_root(0);
- smbpw = getsmbpwnam(user);
- unbecome_root(0);
-
- if(smbpw == NULL)
- {
- DEBUG(0,("update_smbpassword_file: getsmbpwnam returned NULL\n"));
- return False;
- }
-
- /* Here, the flag is one, because we want to ignore the XXXXXXX'd out password */
- ret = change_oem_password( smbpw, password, True);
- if (ret == False)
- DEBUG(3,("update_smbpasswd_file: change_oem_password returned False\n"));
-
- return ret;
-}
-
-/****************************************************************************
-update the enhanced security database. Only relevant for OSF1 at the moment.
-****************************************************************************/
-static void update_protected_database( char *user, BOOL result)
-{
-#ifdef OSF1_ENH_SEC
- struct pr_passwd *mypasswd;
- time_t starttime;
-
- mypasswd = getprpwnam (user);
- starttime = time (NULL);
-
- if (result)
- {
- mypasswd->ufld.fd_slogin = starttime;
- mypasswd->ufld.fd_nlogins = 0;
-
- putprpwnam(user,mypasswd);
-
- DEBUG(3,("Update protected database for Account %s after succesful connection\n",user));
- }
- else
- {
- mypasswd->ufld.fd_ulogin = starttime;
- mypasswd->ufld.fd_nlogins = mypasswd->ufld.fd_nlogins + 1;
- if ( mypasswd->ufld.fd_max_tries != 0 && mypasswd->ufld.fd_nlogins > mypasswd->ufld.fd_max_tries )
- {
- mypasswd->uflg.fg_lock = 0;
- DEBUG(3,("Account is disabled -- see Account Administrator.\n"));
- }
- putprpwnam ( user , mypasswd );
- DEBUG(3,("Update protected database for Account %s after refusing connection\n",user));
- }
-#else
- DEBUG(6,("Updated database with %s %s\n",user,BOOLSTR(result)));
-#endif
-}
-
-
-#ifdef HAVE_PAM
-/*******************************************************************
-check on PAM authentication
-********************************************************************/
-
-/* We first need some helper functions */
-#include <security/pam_appl.h>
-/* Static variables used to communicate between the conversation function
- * and the server_login function
- */
-static char *PAM_username;
-static char *PAM_password;
-
-/* PAM conversation function
- * Here we assume (for now, at least) that echo on means login name, and
- * echo off means password.
- */
-static int PAM_conv (int num_msg,
- const struct pam_message **msg,
- struct pam_response **resp,
- void *appdata_ptr) {
- int replies = 0;
- struct pam_response *reply = NULL;
-
- #define COPY_STRING(s) (s) ? strdup(s) : NULL
-
- reply = malloc(sizeof(struct pam_response) * num_msg);
- if (!reply) return PAM_CONV_ERR;
-
- for (replies = 0; replies < num_msg; replies++) {
- switch (msg[replies]->msg_style) {
- case PAM_PROMPT_ECHO_ON:
- reply[replies].resp_retcode = PAM_SUCCESS;
- reply[replies].resp = COPY_STRING(PAM_username);
- /* PAM frees resp */
- break;
- case PAM_PROMPT_ECHO_OFF:
- reply[replies].resp_retcode = PAM_SUCCESS;
- reply[replies].resp = COPY_STRING(PAM_password);
- /* PAM frees resp */
- break;
- case PAM_TEXT_INFO:
- /* fall through */
- case PAM_ERROR_MSG:
- /* ignore it... */
- reply[replies].resp_retcode = PAM_SUCCESS;
- reply[replies].resp = NULL;
- break;
- default:
- /* Must be an error of some sort... */
- free (reply);
- return PAM_CONV_ERR;
- }
- }
- if (reply) *resp = reply;
- return PAM_SUCCESS;
-}
-static struct pam_conv PAM_conversation = {
- &PAM_conv,
- NULL
-};
-
-
-static BOOL pam_auth(char *this_user,char *password)
+BOOL update_smbpassword_file(char *user, char *password)
{
- pam_handle_t *pamh;
- int pam_error;
-
- /* Now use PAM to do authentication. For now, we won't worry about
- * session logging, only authentication. Bail out if there are any
- * errors. Since this is a limited protocol, and an even more limited
- * function within a server speaking this protocol, we can't be as
- * verbose as would otherwise make sense.
- * Query: should we be using PAM_SILENT to shut PAM up?
- */
- #define PAM_BAIL if (pam_error != PAM_SUCCESS) { \
- pam_end(pamh, 0); return False; \
- }
- PAM_password = password;
- PAM_username = this_user;
- pam_error = pam_start("samba", this_user, &PAM_conversation, &pamh);
- PAM_BAIL;
-/* Setting PAM_SILENT stops generation of error messages to syslog
- * to enable debugging on Red Hat Linux set:
- * /etc/pam.d/samba:
- * auth required /lib/security/pam_pwdb.so nullok shadow audit
- * _OR_ change PAM_SILENT to 0 to force detailed reporting (logging)
- */
- pam_error = pam_authenticate(pamh, PAM_SILENT);
- PAM_BAIL;
- /* It is not clear to me that account management is the right thing
- * to do, but it is not clear that it isn't, either. This can be
- * removed if no account management should be done. Alternately,
- * put a pam_allow.so entry in /etc/pam.conf for account handling. */
- pam_error = pam_acct_mgmt(pamh, PAM_SILENT);
- PAM_BAIL;
- pam_end(pamh, PAM_SUCCESS);
- /* If this point is reached, the user has been authenticated. */
- return(True);
-}
-#endif
-
-
-#ifdef WITH_AFS
-/*******************************************************************
-check on AFS authentication
-********************************************************************/
-static BOOL afs_auth(char *this_user,char *password)
-{
- long password_expires = 0;
- char *reason;
-
- /* For versions of AFS prior to 3.3, this routine has few arguments, */
- /* but since I can't find the old documentation... :-) */
- setpag();
- if (ka_UserAuthenticateGeneral(KA_USERAUTH_VERSION+KA_USERAUTH_DOSETPAG,
- this_user,
- (char *) 0, /* instance */
- (char *) 0, /* cell */
- password,
- 0, /* lifetime, default */
- &password_expires, /*days 'til it expires */
- 0, /* spare 2 */
- &reason) == 0)
- return(True);
- return(False);
-}
-#endif
-
-
-#ifdef WITH_DFS
-
-/*****************************************************************
- This new version of the DFS_AUTH code was donated by Karsten Muuss
- <muuss@or.uni-bonn.de>. It fixes the following problems with the
- old code :
-
- - Server credentials may expire
- - Client credential cache files have wrong owner
- - purge_context() function is called with invalid argument
-
- This new code was modified to ensure that on exit the uid/gid is
- still root, and the original directory is restored. JRA.
-******************************************************************/
-
-sec_login_handle_t my_dce_sec_context;
-int dcelogin_atmost_once = 0;
-
-/*******************************************************************
-check on a DCE/DFS authentication
-********************************************************************/
-static BOOL dfs_auth(char *this_user,char *password)
-{
- error_status_t err;
- int err2;
- int prterr;
- signed32 expire_time, current_time;
- boolean32 password_reset;
- struct passwd *pw;
- sec_passwd_rec_t passwd_rec;
- sec_login_auth_src_t auth_src = sec_login_auth_src_network;
- unsigned char dce_errstr[dce_c_error_string_len];
-
- if (dcelogin_atmost_once) return(False);
-
-#ifdef HAVE_CRYPT
- /*
- * We only go for a DCE login context if the given password
- * matches that stored in the local password file..
- * Assumes local passwd file is kept in sync w/ DCE RGY!
- */
-
- if ( strcmp((char *)crypt(password,this_salt),this_crypted) )
- return(False);
-#endif
-
- sec_login_get_current_context(&my_dce_sec_context, &err);
- if (err != error_status_ok ) {
- dce_error_inq_text(err, dce_errstr, &err2);
- DEBUG(0,("DCE can't get current context. %s\n", dce_errstr));
-
- return(False);
- }
-
- sec_login_certify_identity(my_dce_sec_context, &err);
- if (err != error_status_ok ) {
- dce_error_inq_text(err, dce_errstr, &err2);
- DEBUG(0,("DCE can't get current context. %s\n", dce_errstr));
-
- return(False);
- }
-
- sec_login_get_expiration(my_dce_sec_context, &expire_time, &err);
- if (err != error_status_ok ) {
- dce_error_inq_text(err, dce_errstr, &err2);
- DEBUG(0,("DCE can't get expiration. %s\n", dce_errstr));
-
- return(False);
- }
-
- time(¤t_time);
-
- if (expire_time < (current_time + 60)) {
- struct passwd *pw;
- sec_passwd_rec_t *key;
-
- sec_login_get_pwent(my_dce_sec_context,
- (sec_login_passwd_t*)&pw, &err);
- if (err != error_status_ok ) {
- dce_error_inq_text(err, dce_errstr, &err2);
- DEBUG(0,("DCE can't get pwent. %s\n", dce_errstr));
-
- return(False);
- }
-
- sec_login_refresh_identity(my_dce_sec_context, &err);
- if (err != error_status_ok ) {
- dce_error_inq_text(err, dce_errstr, &err2);
- DEBUG(0,("DCE can't refresh identity. %s\n", dce_errstr));
-
- return(False);
- }
-
- sec_key_mgmt_get_key(rpc_c_authn_dce_secret, NULL,
- (unsigned char *)pw->pw_name,
- sec_c_key_version_none,
- (void**)&key, &err);
- if (err != error_status_ok ) {
- dce_error_inq_text(err, dce_errstr, &err2);
- DEBUG(0,("DCE can't get key for %s. %s\n", pw->pw_name, dce_errstr));
-
- return(False);
- }
-
- sec_login_valid_and_cert_ident(my_dce_sec_context, key,
- &password_reset, &auth_src, &err);
- if (err != error_status_ok ) {
- dce_error_inq_text(err, dce_errstr, &err2);
- DEBUG(0,("DCE can't validate and certify identity for %s. %s\n",
- pw->pw_name, dce_errstr));
- }
-
- sec_key_mgmt_free_key(key, &err);
- if (err != error_status_ok ) {
- dce_error_inq_text(err, dce_errstr, &err2);
- DEBUG(0,("DCE can't free key.\n", dce_errstr));
- }
- }
-
- if (sec_login_setup_identity((unsigned char *)this_user,
- sec_login_no_flags,
- &my_dce_sec_context,
- &err) == 0)
-
- {
- dce_error_inq_text(err, dce_errstr, &err2);
- DEBUG(0,("DCE Setup Identity for %s failed: %s\n",
- this_user,dce_errstr));
- return(False);
- }
-
- sec_login_get_pwent(my_dce_sec_context,
- (sec_login_passwd_t*)&pw, &err);
- if (err != error_status_ok ) {
- dce_error_inq_text(err, dce_errstr, &err2);
- DEBUG(0,("DCE can't get pwent. %s\n", dce_errstr));
-
- return(False);
- }
-
- sec_login_purge_context(&my_dce_sec_context, &err);
- if (err != error_status_ok ) {
- dce_error_inq_text(err, dce_errstr, &err2);
- DEBUG(0,("DCE can't purge context. %s\n", dce_errstr));
-
- return(False);
- }
-
- /*
- * NB. I'd like to change these to call something like become_user()
- * instead but currently we don't have a connection
- * context to become the correct user. This is already
- * fairly platform specific code however, so I think
- * this should be ok. I have added code to go
- * back to being root on error though. JRA.
- */
-
- if (setregid(-1, pw->pw_gid) != 0) {
- DEBUG(0,("Can't set egid to %d (%s)\n", pw->pw_gid, strerror(errno)));
- return False;
- }
-
- if (setreuid(-1, pw->pw_uid) != 0) {
- setgid(0);
- DEBUG(0,("Can't set euid to %d (%s)\n", pw->pw_uid, strerror(errno)));
- return False;
- }
-
- if (sec_login_setup_identity((unsigned char *)this_user,
- sec_login_no_flags,
- &my_dce_sec_context,
- &err) == 0)
-
- {
- dce_error_inq_text(err, dce_errstr, &err2);
- /* Go back to root, JRA. */
- setuid(0);
- setgid(0);
- DEBUG(0,("DCE Setup Identity for %s failed: %s\n",
- this_user,dce_errstr));
- return(False);
- }
-
- sec_login_get_pwent(my_dce_sec_context,
- (sec_login_passwd_t*)&pw, &err);
- if (err != error_status_ok ) {
- dce_error_inq_text(err, dce_errstr, &err2);
- /* Go back to root, JRA. */
- setuid(0);
- setgid(0);
- DEBUG(0,("DCE can't get pwent. %s\n", dce_errstr));
-
- return(False);
- }
-
- passwd_rec.version_number = sec_passwd_c_version_none;
- passwd_rec.pepper = NULL;
- passwd_rec.key.key_type = sec_passwd_plain;
- passwd_rec.key.tagged_union.plain = (idl_char *)password;
-
- sec_login_validate_identity(my_dce_sec_context,
- &passwd_rec, &password_reset,
- &auth_src, &err);
- if (err != error_status_ok ) {
- dce_error_inq_text(err, dce_errstr, &err2);
- /* Go back to root, JRA. */
- setuid(0);
- setgid(0);
- DEBUG(0,("DCE Identity Validation failed for principal %s: %s\n",
- this_user,dce_errstr));
-
- return(False);
- }
-
- sec_login_certify_identity(my_dce_sec_context, &err);
- if (err != error_status_ok ) {
- dce_error_inq_text(err, dce_errstr, &err2);
- /* Go back to root, JRA. */
- setuid(0);
- setgid(0);
- DEBUG(0,("DCE certify identity failed: %s\n", dce_errstr));
-
- return(False);
- }
-
- if (auth_src != sec_login_auth_src_network) {
- DEBUG(0,("DCE context has no network credentials.\n"));
- }
-
- sec_login_set_context(my_dce_sec_context, &err);
- if (err != error_status_ok ) {
- dce_error_inq_text(err, dce_errstr, &err2);
- DEBUG(0,("DCE login failed for principal %s, cant set context: %s\n",
- this_user,dce_errstr));
-
- sec_login_purge_context(&my_dce_sec_context, &err);
- /* Go back to root, JRA. */
- setuid(0);
- setgid(0);
- return(False);
- }
-
- sec_login_get_pwent(my_dce_sec_context,
- (sec_login_passwd_t*)&pw, &err);
- if (err != error_status_ok ) {
- dce_error_inq_text(err, dce_errstr, &err2);
- DEBUG(0,("DCE can't get pwent. %s\n", dce_errstr));
-
- /* Go back to root, JRA. */
- setuid(0);
- setgid(0);
- return(False);
- }
-
- DEBUG(0,("DCE login succeeded for principal %s on pid %d\n",
- this_user, getpid()));
-
- DEBUG(3,("DCE principal: %s\n"
- " uid: %d\n"
- " gid: %d\n",
- pw->pw_name, pw->pw_uid, pw->pw_gid));
- DEBUG(3,(" info: %s\n"
- " dir: %s\n"
- " shell: %s\n",
- pw->pw_gecos, pw->pw_dir, pw->pw_shell));
-
- sec_login_get_expiration(my_dce_sec_context, &expire_time, &err);
- if (err != error_status_ok ) {
- dce_error_inq_text(err, dce_errstr, &err2);
- /* Go back to root, JRA. */
- setuid(0);
- setgid(0);
- DEBUG(0,("DCE can't get expiration. %s\n", dce_errstr));
-
- return(False);
- }
-
- setuid(0);
- setgid(0);
-
- DEBUG(0,("DCE context expires: %s",asctime(localtime(&expire_time))));
-
- dcelogin_atmost_once = 1;
- return (True);
-}
-
-void dfs_unlogin(void)
-{
- error_status_t err;
- int err2;
- unsigned char dce_errstr[dce_c_error_string_len];
-
- sec_login_purge_context(&my_dce_sec_context, &err);
- if (err != error_status_ok )
- {
- dce_error_inq_text(err, dce_errstr, &err2);
- DEBUG(0,("DCE purge login context failed for server instance %d: %s\n",
- getpid(), dce_errstr));
- }
-}
-#endif
-
-#ifdef KRB5_AUTH
-/*******************************************************************
-check on Kerberos authentication
-********************************************************************/
-static BOOL krb5_auth(char *this_user,char *password)
-{
- krb5_data tgtname = {
- 0,
- KRB5_TGS_NAME_SIZE,
- KRB5_TGS_NAME
- };
- krb5_context kcontext;
- krb5_principal kprinc;
- krb5_principal server;
- krb5_creds kcreds;
- int options = 0;
- krb5_address **addrs = (krb5_address **)0;
- krb5_preauthtype *preauth = NULL;
- krb5_keytab keytab = NULL;
- krb5_timestamp now;
- krb5_ccache ccache = NULL;
- int retval;
- char *name;
-
- if ( retval=krb5_init_context(&kcontext))
- {
- return(False);
- }
-
- if ( retval = krb5_timeofday(kcontext, &now) )
- {
- return(False);
- }
-
- if ( retval = krb5_cc_default(kcontext, &ccache) )
- {
- return(False);
- }
+ struct smb_passwd *smbpw;
+ BOOL ret;
- if ( retval = krb5_parse_name(kcontext, this_user, &kprinc) )
- {
- return(False);
- }
-
- memset((char *)&kcreds, 0, sizeof(kcreds));
-
- kcreds.client = kprinc;
+ become_root(0);
+ smbpw = getsmbpwnam(user);
+ unbecome_root(0);
- if ((retval = krb5_build_principal_ext(kcontext, &server,
- krb5_princ_realm(kcontext, kprinc)->length,
- krb5_princ_realm(kcontext, kprinc)->data,
- tgtname.length,
- tgtname.data,
- krb5_princ_realm(kcontext, kprinc)->length,
- krb5_princ_realm(kcontext, kprinc)->data,
- 0)))
- {
- return(False);
+ if(smbpw == NULL) {
+ DEBUG(0,("getsmbpwnam returned NULL\n"));
+ return False;
}
-
- kcreds.server = server;
-
- retval = krb5_get_in_tkt_with_password(kcontext,
- options,
- addrs,
- NULL,
- preauth,
- password,
- 0,
- &kcreds,
- 0);
-
- if ( retval )
- {
- return(False);
+
+ /* Here, the flag is one, because we want to ignore the
+ XXXXXXX'd out password */
+ ret = change_oem_password( smbpw, password, True);
+ if (ret == False) {
+ DEBUG(3,("change_oem_password returned False\n"));
}
- return(True);
-}
-#endif /* KRB5_AUTH */
-
-#ifdef KRB4_AUTH
-/*******************************************************************
-check on Kerberos authentication
-********************************************************************/
-static BOOL krb4_auth(char *this_user,char *password)
-{
- char realm[REALM_SZ];
- char tkfile[MAXPATHLEN];
-
- if (krb_get_lrealm(realm, 1) != KSUCCESS)
- (void) safe_strcpy(realm, KRB_REALM, sizeof (realm) - 1);
-
- (void) slprintf(tkfile, sizeof(tkfile) - 1, "/tmp/samba_tkt_%d", getpid());
-
- krb_set_tkt_string(tkfile);
- if (krb_verify_user(this_user, "", realm,
- password, 0,
- "rmcd") == KSUCCESS) {
- unlink(tkfile);
- return 1;
- }
- unlink(tkfile);
- return 0;
-}
-#endif /* KRB4_AUTH */
-
-#ifdef LINUX_BIGCRYPT
-/****************************************************************************
-an enhanced crypt for Linux to handle password longer than 8 characters
-****************************************************************************/
-static int linux_bigcrypt(char *password,char *salt1, char *crypted)
-{
-#define LINUX_PASSWORD_SEG_CHARS 8
- char salt[3];
- int i;
-
- StrnCpy(salt,salt1,2);
- crypted +=2;
-
- for ( i=strlen(password); i > 0; i -= LINUX_PASSWORD_SEG_CHARS) {
- char * p = crypt(password,salt) + 2;
- if (strncmp(p, crypted, LINUX_PASSWORD_SEG_CHARS) != 0)
- return(0);
- password += LINUX_PASSWORD_SEG_CHARS;
- crypted += strlen(p);
- }
-
- return(1);
+ return ret;
}
-#endif
-
-
-/****************************************************************************
-apply a function to upper/lower case combinations
-of a string and return true if one of them returns true.
-try all combinations with N uppercase letters.
-offset is the first char to try and change (start with 0)
-it assumes the string starts lowercased
-****************************************************************************/
-static BOOL string_combinations2(char *s,int offset,BOOL (*fn)(char *),int N)
-{
- int len = strlen(s);
- int i;
-
-#ifdef PASSWORD_LENGTH
- len = MIN(len,PASSWORD_LENGTH);
-#endif
-
- if (N <= 0 || offset >= len)
- return(fn(s));
-
- for (i=offset;i<(len-(N-1));i++)
- {
- char c = s[i];
- if (!islower(c)) continue;
- s[i] = toupper(c);
- if (string_combinations2(s,i+1,fn,N-1))
- return(True);
- s[i] = c;
- }
- return(False);
-}
-
-/****************************************************************************
-apply a function to upper/lower case combinations
-of a string and return true if one of them returns true.
-try all combinations with up to N uppercase letters.
-offset is the first char to try and change (start with 0)
-it assumes the string starts lowercased
-****************************************************************************/
-static BOOL string_combinations(char *s,BOOL (*fn)(char *),int N)
-{
- int n;
- for (n=1;n<=N;n++)
- if (string_combinations2(s,0,fn,n)) return(True);
- return(False);
-}
-
-
-
-/****************************************************************************
-core of password checking routine
-****************************************************************************/
-BOOL password_check(char *password)
-{
-
-#ifdef HAVE_PAM
-/* This falls through if the password check fails
- - if HAVE_CRYPT is not defined this causes an error msg
- saying Warning - no crypt available
- - if HAVE_CRYPT is defined this is a potential security hole
- as it may authenticate via the crypt call when PAM
- settings say it should fail.
- if (pam_auth(this_user,password)) return(True);
- Hence we make a direct return to avoid a second chance!!!
-*/
- return (pam_auth(this_user,password));
-#endif
-
-#ifdef WITH_AFS
- if (afs_auth(this_user,password)) return(True);
-#endif
-#ifdef WITH_DFS
- if (dfs_auth(this_user,password)) return(True);
-#endif
-#ifdef KRB5_AUTH
- if (krb5_auth(this_user,password)) return(True);
-#endif
-#ifdef KRB4_AUTH
- if (krb4_auth(this_user,password)) return(True);
-#endif
-#ifdef OSF1_ENH_SEC
- {
- BOOL ret = (strcmp(osf1_bigcrypt(password,this_salt),this_crypted) == 0);
- if(!ret) {
- DEBUG(2,("password_check: OSF1_ENH_SEC failed. Trying normal crypt.\n"));
- ret = (strcmp((char *)crypt(password,this_salt),this_crypted) == 0);
- }
- return ret;
- }
-#endif
-
-#ifdef ULTRIX_AUTH
- return (strcmp((char *)crypt16(password, this_salt ),this_crypted) == 0);
-#endif
-
-#ifdef LINUX_BIGCRYPT
- return(linux_bigcrypt(password,this_salt,this_crypted));
-#endif
-
-#ifdef HAVE_BIGCRYPT
- return(strcmp(bigcrypt(password,this_salt),this_crypted) == 0);
-#endif
-
-#ifndef HAVE_CRYPT
- DEBUG(1,("Warning - no crypt available\n"));
- return(False);
-#else
- return(strcmp((char *)crypt(password,this_salt),this_crypted) == 0);
-#endif
-}
/****************************************************************************
core of smb password checking routine.
Do a specific test for an smb password being correct, given a smb_password and
the lanman and NT responses.
****************************************************************************/
-
BOOL smb_password_ok(struct smb_passwd *smb_pass,
uchar lm_pass[24], uchar nt_pass[24])
{
- uchar challenge[8];
+ uchar challenge[8];
- if (!lm_pass || !smb_pass) return(False);
+ if (!lm_pass || !smb_pass) return(False);
- if(smb_pass->acct_ctrl & ACB_DISABLED)
- {
- DEBUG(3,("smb_password_ok: account for user %s was disabled.\n", smb_pass->smb_name));
- return(False);
- }
-
- if (!last_challenge(challenge))
- {
- DEBUG(1,("smb_password_ok: no challenge done - password failed\n"));
- return False;
- }
+ if(smb_pass->acct_ctrl & ACB_DISABLED) {
+ DEBUG(3,("account for user %s was disabled.\n",
+ smb_pass->smb_name));
+ return(False);
+ }
- DEBUG(4,("smb_password_ok: Checking SMB password for user %s\n", smb_pass->smb_name));
+ if (!last_challenge(challenge)) {
+ DEBUG(1,("no challenge done - password failed\n"));
+ return False;
+ }
- if ((Protocol >= PROTOCOL_NT1) && (smb_pass->smb_nt_passwd != NULL))
- {
- /* We have the NT MD4 hash challenge available - see if we can
- use it (ie. does it exist in the smbpasswd file).
- */
- DEBUG(4,("smb_password_ok: Checking NT MD4 password\n"));
- if (smb_password_check((char *)nt_pass, (uchar *)smb_pass->smb_nt_passwd, challenge))
- {
- DEBUG(4,("smb_password_ok: NT MD4 password check succeeded\n"));
- return(True);
- }
- DEBUG(4,("smb_password_ok: NT MD4 password check failed\n"));
- }
+ DEBUG(4,("Checking SMB password for user %s\n",
+ smb_pass->smb_name));
+
+ if ((Protocol >= PROTOCOL_NT1) && (smb_pass->smb_nt_passwd != NULL)) {
+ /* We have the NT MD4 hash challenge available - see if we can
+ use it (ie. does it exist in the smbpasswd file).
+ */
+ DEBUG(4,("smb_password_ok: Checking NT MD4 password\n"));
+ if (smb_password_check((char *)nt_pass,
+ (uchar *)smb_pass->smb_nt_passwd,
+ challenge)) {
+ DEBUG(4,("NT MD4 password check succeeded\n"));
+ return(True);
+ }
+ DEBUG(4,("NT MD4 password check failed\n"));
+ }
- /* Try against the lanman password. smb_pass->smb_passwd == NULL means
- no password, allow access. */
+ /* Try against the lanman password. smb_pass->smb_passwd == NULL means
+ no password, allow access. */
- DEBUG(4,("Checking LM MD4 password\n"));
+ DEBUG(4,("Checking LM MD4 password\n"));
- if((smb_pass->smb_passwd == NULL) && (smb_pass->acct_ctrl & ACB_PWNOTREQ))
- {
- DEBUG(4,("smb_password_ok: no password required for user %s\n", smb_pass->smb_name));
- return True;
- }
+ if((smb_pass->smb_passwd == NULL) &&
+ (smb_pass->acct_ctrl & ACB_PWNOTREQ)) {
+ DEBUG(4,("no password required for user %s\n",
+ smb_pass->smb_name));
+ return True;
+ }
- if((smb_pass->smb_passwd != NULL) && smb_password_check((char *)lm_pass, (uchar *)smb_pass->smb_passwd, challenge))
- {
- DEBUG(4,("smb_password_ok: LM MD4 password check succeeded\n"));
- return(True);
- }
+ if((smb_pass->smb_passwd != NULL) &&
+ smb_password_check((char *)lm_pass,
+ (uchar *)smb_pass->smb_passwd, challenge)) {
+ DEBUG(4,("LM MD4 password check succeeded\n"));
+ return(True);
+ }
- DEBUG(4,("smb_password_ok: LM MD4 password check failed\n"));
+ DEBUG(4,("LM MD4 password check failed\n"));
- return False;
+ return False;
}
+
/****************************************************************************
-check if a username/password is OK
+check if a username/password is OK assuming the password is a 24 byte
+SMB hash
+return True if the password is correct, False otherwise
****************************************************************************/
-BOOL password_ok(char *user,char *password, int pwlen, struct passwd *pwd)
+static BOOL pass_check_smb(char *user,char *password, struct passwd *pwd)
{
- pstring pass2;
- int level = lp_passwordlevel();
- struct passwd *pass;
- uchar challenge[8];
- struct smb_passwd *smb_pass;
- BOOL update_encrypted = lp_update_encrypted();
- BOOL challenge_done = False;
+ struct passwd *pass;
+ uchar challenge[8];
+ struct smb_passwd *smb_pass;
+ BOOL challenge_done;
- if (password) password[pwlen] = 0;
-
- if (pwlen == 24)
- challenge_done = last_challenge(challenge);
-
-#if DEBUG_PASSWORD
- if (challenge_done)
- {
- int i;
- DEBUG(100,("checking user=[%s] pass=[",user));
- for( i = 0; i < 24; i++)
- DEBUG(100,("%0x ", (unsigned char)password[i]));
- DEBUG(100,("]\n"));
- } else {
- DEBUG(100,("checking user=[%s] pass=[%s]\n",user,password));
- }
-#endif
-
- if (!password)
- return(False);
-
- if (((!*password) || (!pwlen)) && !lp_null_passwords())
- return(False);
-
- if (pwd && !user)
- {
- pass = (struct passwd *) pwd;
- user = pass->pw_name;
- }
- else
- pass = Get_Pwnam(user,True);
-
- DEBUG(4,("SMB Password - pwlen = %d, challenge_done = %d\n", pwlen, challenge_done));
+ if (!password) {
+ return(False);
+ }
- if ((pwlen == 24) && challenge_done)
- {
- DEBUG(4,("Checking SMB password for user %s (l=24)\n",user));
+ challenge_done = last_challenge(challenge);
- if (!pass)
- {
- DEBUG(3,("Couldn't find user %s\n",user));
- return(False);
+ if (!challenge_done) {
+ DEBUG(0,("Error: challenge not done for user=%s\n", user));
+ return False;
}
- smb_pass = getsmbpwnam(user);
+ if (pwd && !user) {
+ pass = (struct passwd *) pwd;
+ user = pass->pw_name;
+ } else {
+ pass = Get_Pwnam(user,True);
+ }
- if (!smb_pass)
- {
- DEBUG(3,("Couldn't find user %s in smb_passwd file.\n", user));
- return(False);
+ if (!pass) {
+ DEBUG(3,("Couldn't find user %s\n",user));
+ return(False);
}
- /* Quit if the account was disabled. */
- if(smb_pass->acct_ctrl & ACB_DISABLED)
- {
- DEBUG(3,("password_ok: account for user %s was disabled.\n", user));
- return(False);
- }
+ smb_pass = getsmbpwnam(user);
- /* Ensure the uid's match */
- if (smb_pass->smb_userid != pass->pw_uid)
- {
- DEBUG(3,("Error : UNIX and SMB uids in password files do not match !\n"));
- return(False);
+ if (!smb_pass) {
+ DEBUG(3,("Couldn't find user %s in smb_passwd file.\n", user));
+ return(False);
}
- if(smb_password_ok( smb_pass, (unsigned char *)password,(uchar *)password))
- {
- update_protected_database(user,True);
- return(True);
+ /* Quit if the account was disabled. */
+ if(smb_pass->acct_ctrl & ACB_DISABLED) {
+ DEBUG(3,("account for user %s was disabled.\n", user));
+ return(False);
}
- DEBUG(3,("Error smb_password_check failed\n"));
- }
-
- DEBUG(4,("Checking password for user %s (l=%d)\n",user,pwlen));
-
- if (!pass)
- {
- DEBUG(3,("Couldn't find user %s\n",user));
- return(False);
- }
-
-#ifdef HAVE_GETSPNAM
- {
- struct spwd *spass;
-
- /* many shadow systems require you to be root to get the password,
- in most cases this should already be the case when this
- function is called, except perhaps for IPC password changing
- requests */
-
- spass = getspnam(pass->pw_name);
- if (spass && spass->sp_pwdp)
- pass->pw_passwd = spass->sp_pwdp;
- }
-#elif defined(IA_UINFO)
- {
- /* Need to get password with SVR4.2's ia_ functions instead of
- get{sp,pw}ent functions. Required by UnixWare 2.x, tested on
- version 2.1. (tangent@cyberport.com) */
- uinfo_t uinfo;
- if (ia_openinfo(pass->pw_name, &uinfo) != -1)
- ia_get_logpwd(uinfo, &(pass->pw_passwd));
- }
-#endif
-
-#ifdef HAVE_GETPRPWNAM
- {
- struct pr_passwd *pr_pw = getprpwnam(pass->pw_name);
- if (pr_pw && pr_pw->ufld.fd_encrypt)
- pass->pw_passwd = pr_pw->ufld.fd_encrypt;
- }
-#endif
-
-#ifdef OSF1_ENH_SEC
- {
- struct pr_passwd *mypasswd;
- DEBUG(5,("Checking password for user %s in OSF1_ENH_SEC\n",user));
- mypasswd = getprpwnam (user);
- if ( mypasswd )
- {
- fstrcpy(pass->pw_name,mypasswd->ufld.fd_name);
- fstrcpy(pass->pw_passwd,mypasswd->ufld.fd_encrypt);
- }
- else
- {
- DEBUG(5,("No entry for user %s in protected database !\n",user));
- return(False);
- }
- }
-#endif
-
-#ifdef ULTRIX_AUTH
- {
- AUTHORIZATION *ap = getauthuid( pass->pw_uid );
- if (ap)
- {
- fstrcpy( pass->pw_passwd, ap->a_password );
- endauthent();
- }
- }
-#endif
-
- /* extract relevant info */
- fstrcpy(this_user,pass->pw_name);
- fstrcpy(this_salt,pass->pw_passwd);
- /* crypt on some platforms (HPUX in particular)
- won't work with more than 2 salt characters. */
- this_salt[2] = 0;
-
- fstrcpy(this_crypted,pass->pw_passwd);
-
- if (!*this_crypted) {
- if (!lp_null_passwords()) {
- DEBUG(2,("Disallowing access to %s due to null password\n",this_user));
- return(False);
- }
- if (!*password) {
- DEBUG(3,("Allowing access to %s with null password\n",this_user));
- return(True);
- }
- }
-
- /* try it as it came to us */
- if (password_check(password))
- {
- update_protected_database(user,True);
- if (update_encrypted)
- update_smbpassword_file(user,password);
- return(True);
- }
-
- /* if the password was given to us with mixed case then we don't
- need to proceed as we know it hasn't been case modified by the
- client */
- if (strhasupper(password) && strhaslower(password))
- return(False);
-
- /* make a copy of it */
- StrnCpy(pass2,password,sizeof(pstring)-1);
-
- /* try all lowercase */
- strlower(password);
- if (password_check(password))
- {
- update_protected_database(user,True);
- if (update_encrypted)
- update_smbpassword_file(user,password);
- return(True);
- }
-
- /* give up? */
- if (level < 1)
- {
- update_protected_database(user,False);
-
- /* restore it */
- fstrcpy(password,pass2);
-
- return(False);
- }
-
- /* last chance - all combinations of up to level chars upper! */
- strlower(password);
-
- if (string_combinations(password,password_check,level))
- {
- update_protected_database(user,True);
- if (update_encrypted)
- update_smbpassword_file(user,password);
- return(True);
- }
+ /* Ensure the uid's match */
+ if (smb_pass->smb_userid != pass->pw_uid) {
+ DEBUG(3,("Error : UNIX and SMB uids in password files do not match !\n"));
+ return(False);
+ }
- update_protected_database(user,False);
-
- /* restore it */
- fstrcpy(password,pass2);
-
- return(False);
+ if (smb_password_ok(smb_pass,
+ (unsigned char *)password,
+ (uchar *)password)) {
+ return(True);
+ }
+
+ DEBUG(3,("Error smb_password_check failed\n"));
+ return False;
}
-
+/****************************************************************************
+check if a username/password pair is OK either via the system password
+database or the encrypted SMB password database
+return True if the password is correct, False otherwise
+****************************************************************************/
+BOOL password_ok(char *user,char *password, int pwlen, struct passwd *pwd)
+{
+ if (pwlen == 24) {
+ /* if it is 24 bytes long then assume it is an encrypted
+ password */
+ return pass_check_smb(user, password, pwd);
+ }
+
+ return pass_check(user, password, pwlen, pwd,
+ lp_update_encrypted() ?
+ update_smbpassword_file : NULL);
+}
/****************************************************************************
check if a username is valid
****************************************************************************/
BOOL user_ok(char *user,int snum)
{
- pstring valid, invalid;
- BOOL ret;
-
- StrnCpy(valid, lp_valid_users(snum), sizeof(pstring));
- StrnCpy(invalid, lp_invalid_users(snum), sizeof(pstring));
+ pstring valid, invalid;
+ BOOL ret;
- string_sub(valid,"%S",lp_servicename(snum));
- string_sub(invalid,"%S",lp_servicename(snum));
+ StrnCpy(valid, lp_valid_users(snum), sizeof(pstring));
+ StrnCpy(invalid, lp_invalid_users(snum), sizeof(pstring));
- ret = !user_in_list(user,invalid);
-
- if (ret && valid && *valid)
- ret = user_in_list(user,valid);
+ string_sub(valid,"%S",lp_servicename(snum));
+ string_sub(invalid,"%S",lp_servicename(snum));
+
+ ret = !user_in_list(user,invalid);
+
+ if (ret && valid && *valid) {
+ ret = user_in_list(user,valid);
+ }
- if (ret && lp_onlyuser(snum)) {
- char *user_list = lp_username(snum);
- string_sub(user_list,"%S",lp_servicename(snum));
- ret = user_in_list(user,user_list);
- }
+ if (ret && lp_onlyuser(snum)) {
+ char *user_list = lp_username(snum);
+ string_sub(user_list,"%S",lp_servicename(snum));
+ ret = user_in_list(user,user_list);
+ }
- return(ret);
+ return(ret);
}
if (Connections[i].open)
close_cnum(i,(uint16)-1);
#ifdef WITH_DFS
- if (dcelogin_atmost_once)
+ if (dcelogin_atmost_once) {
dfs_unlogin();
+ }
#endif
if (!reason) {
int oldlevel = DEBUGLEVEL;
}
- return password_ok(user, pass, strlen(pass), NULL);
+ return pass_check(user, pass, strlen(pass), NULL, NULL);
}
git.samba.org / kai / samba.git / commitdiff