<para>"allow nt4 crypto = yes" allows weak crypto to be negotiated, maybe via downgrade attacks.</para>
- <para>This option yields precedence to the 'reject md5 clients' option.</para>
+ <para>This option is over-ridden by the 'reject md5 clients' option.</para>
</description>
<value type="default">no</value>
<para>The behavior can be overwritten per interface name (e.g. lsarpc, netlogon, samr, srvsvc,
winreg, wkssvc ...) by using 'allow dcerpc auth level connect:interface = yes' as option.</para>
- <para>This option yields precedence to the implementation specific restrictions.
+ <para>This option is over-ridden by the implementation specific restrictions.
E.g. the drsuapi and backupkey protocols require DCERPC_AUTH_LEVEL_PRIVACY.
The dnsserver protocol requires DCERPC_AUTH_LEVEL_INTEGRITY.
</para>
<para>Note that for active directory domains this is hardcoded to
<smbconfoption name="client schannel">yes</smbconfoption>.</para>
- <para>This option yields precedence to the <smbconfoption name="require strong key"/> option.</para>
+ <para>This option is over-ridden by the <smbconfoption name="require strong key"/> option.</para>
</description>
<value type="default">yes</value>
<value type="example">auto</value>
<para>If you still have legacy domain members use the <smbconfoption name="server require schannel:COMPUTERACCOUNT"/> option.
</para>
- <para>This option yields precedence to the <smbconfoption name="server require schannel:COMPUTERACCOUNT"/> option.</para>
+ <para>This option is over-ridden by the <smbconfoption name="server require schannel:COMPUTERACCOUNT"/> option.</para>
</description>
<para>Note for active directory domain this option is hardcoded to 'yes'</para>
- <para>This option yields precedence to the <smbconfoption name="reject md5 servers"/> option.</para>
+ <para>This option is over-ridden by the <smbconfoption name="reject md5 servers"/> option.</para>
<para>This option overrides the <smbconfoption name="client schannel"/> option.</para>
</description>