ecryptfs: initialize new auth_tokens before teardown
authorEric Sandeen <sandeen@redhat.com>
Tue, 18 Dec 2007 00:19:52 +0000 (16:19 -0800)
committerLinus Torvalds <torvalds@woody.linux-foundation.org>
Tue, 18 Dec 2007 03:28:15 +0000 (19:28 -0800)
ecryptfs_destroy_mount_crypt_stat() checks whether each
auth_tok->global_auth_tok_key is nonzero and if so puts that key.  However,
in some early mount error paths nothing has initialized the pointer, and we
try to key_put() garbage.  Running the bad cipher tests in the testsuite
exposes this, and it's happy with the following change.

Signed-off-by: Eric Sandeen <sandeen@redhat.com>
Cc: Michael Halcrow <mhalcrow@us.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
fs/ecryptfs/keystore.c

index 263fed88c0cabac8e37e8b6801d50bdac0500326..f458c1f355655fcee80e3b8d4346d611686f3bc9 100644 (file)
@@ -1860,7 +1860,7 @@ ecryptfs_add_global_auth_tok(struct ecryptfs_mount_crypt_stat *mount_crypt_stat,
        struct ecryptfs_global_auth_tok *new_auth_tok;
        int rc = 0;
 
-       new_auth_tok = kmem_cache_alloc(ecryptfs_global_auth_tok_cache,
+       new_auth_tok = kmem_cache_zalloc(ecryptfs_global_auth_tok_cache,
                                        GFP_KERNEL);
        if (!new_auth_tok) {
                rc = -ENOMEM;