PAC Glue between Samba and the KDC
Copyright (C) Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org> 2005-2009
+ Copyright (C) Simo Sorce <idra@samba.org> 2010
This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
#include "includes.h"
#include "../libds/common/flags.h"
-#include "lib/ldb/include/ldb.h"
-#include "librpc/gen_ndr/ndr_krb5pac.h"
-#include "librpc/gen_ndr/krb5pac.h"
+#include <ldb.h>
#include "auth/auth.h"
-#include "auth/auth_sam.h"
#include "auth/auth_sam_reply.h"
-#include "kdc/kdc.h"
+#include "system/kerberos.h"
+#include "auth/kerberos/kerberos.h"
+#include "kdc/samba_kdc.h"
+#include "kdc/pac-glue.h"
#include "param/param.h"
-
-struct krb5_dh_moduli;
-struct _krb5_krb_auth_data;
-
-static krb5_error_code samba_kdc_plugin_init(krb5_context context, void **ptr)
-{
- *ptr = NULL;
- return 0;
-}
-
-static void samba_kdc_plugin_fini(void *ptr)
-{
- return;
-}
-
-static krb5_error_code make_pac(krb5_context context,
- TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx,
- struct smb_iconv_convenience *iconv_convenience,
- struct auth_serversupplied_info *server_info,
- krb5_pac *pac)
+#include "librpc/gen_ndr/ndr_krb5pac.h"
+#include "libcli/security/security.h"
+#include "dsdb/samdb/samdb.h"
+#include "auth/kerberos/pac_utils.h"
+
+static
+NTSTATUS samba_get_logon_info_pac_blob(TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx,
+ struct auth_user_info_dc *info,
+ DATA_BLOB *pac_data)
{
- union PAC_INFO info;
struct netr_SamInfo3 *info3;
- krb5_data pac_data;
- NTSTATUS nt_status;
+ union PAC_INFO pac_info;
enum ndr_err_code ndr_err;
- DATA_BLOB pac_out;
- krb5_error_code ret;
+ NTSTATUS nt_status;
- ZERO_STRUCT(info);
+ ZERO_STRUCT(pac_info);
- nt_status = auth_convert_server_info_saminfo3(mem_ctx, server_info, &info3);
+ nt_status = auth_convert_user_info_dc_saminfo3(mem_ctx, info, &info3);
if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(nt_status)) {
- DEBUG(1, ("Getting Samba info failed: %s\n", nt_errstr(nt_status)));
- return EINVAL;
+ DEBUG(1, ("Getting Samba info failed: %s\n",
+ nt_errstr(nt_status)));
+ return nt_status;
}
- info.logon_info.info = talloc_zero(mem_ctx, struct PAC_LOGON_INFO);
- if (!mem_ctx) {
- return ENOMEM;
+ pac_info.logon_info.info = talloc_zero(mem_ctx, struct PAC_LOGON_INFO);
+ if (!pac_info.logon_info.info) {
+ return NT_STATUS_NO_MEMORY;
}
- info.logon_info.info->info3 = *info3;
+ pac_info.logon_info.info->info3 = *info3;
- ndr_err = ndr_push_union_blob(&pac_out, mem_ctx, iconv_convenience, &info,
+ ndr_err = ndr_push_union_blob(pac_data, mem_ctx, &pac_info,
PAC_TYPE_LOGON_INFO,
(ndr_push_flags_fn_t)ndr_push_PAC_INFO);
if (!NDR_ERR_CODE_IS_SUCCESS(ndr_err)) {
nt_status = ndr_map_error2ntstatus(ndr_err);
- DEBUG(1, ("PAC (presig) push failed: %s\n", nt_errstr(nt_status)));
- return EINVAL;
+ DEBUG(1, ("PAC (presig) push failed: %s\n",
+ nt_errstr(nt_status)));
+ return nt_status;
}
- ret = krb5_data_copy(&pac_data, pac_out.data, pac_out.length);
+ return NT_STATUS_OK;
+}
+
+krb5_error_code samba_make_krb5_pac(krb5_context context,
+ DATA_BLOB *pac_blob,
+ DATA_BLOB *deleg_blob,
+ krb5_pac *pac)
+{
+ krb5_data pac_data;
+ krb5_data deleg_data;
+ krb5_error_code ret;
+
+ /* The user account may be set not to want the PAC */
+ if (!pac_blob) {
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ ret = krb5_copy_data_contents(&pac_data,
+ pac_blob->data,
+ pac_blob->length);
if (ret != 0) {
return ret;
}
+ ZERO_STRUCT(deleg_data);
+ if (deleg_blob) {
+ ret = krb5_copy_data_contents(&deleg_data,
+ deleg_blob->data,
+ deleg_blob->length);
+ if (ret != 0) {
+ kerberos_free_data_contents(context, &pac_data);
+ return ret;
+ }
+ }
+
ret = krb5_pac_init(context, pac);
if (ret != 0) {
- krb5_data_free(&pac_data);
+ kerberos_free_data_contents(context, &pac_data);
+ kerberos_free_data_contents(context, &deleg_data);
return ret;
}
ret = krb5_pac_add_buffer(context, *pac, PAC_TYPE_LOGON_INFO, &pac_data);
- krb5_data_free(&pac_data);
+ kerberos_free_data_contents(context, &pac_data);
if (ret != 0) {
+ kerberos_free_data_contents(context, &deleg_data);
return ret;
}
+ if (deleg_blob) {
+ ret = krb5_pac_add_buffer(context, *pac,
+ PAC_TYPE_CONSTRAINED_DELEGATION,
+ &deleg_data);
+ kerberos_free_data_contents(context, &deleg_data);
+ if (ret != 0) {
+ return ret;
+ }
+ }
+
return ret;
}
-/* Given the right private pointer from hdb_samba4, get a PAC from the attached ldb messages */
-static krb5_error_code samba_kdc_get_pac(void *priv,
- krb5_context context,
- struct hdb_entry_ex *client,
- krb5_pac *pac)
+bool samba_princ_needs_pac(struct samba_kdc_entry *skdc_entry)
{
- krb5_error_code ret;
- NTSTATUS nt_status;
- struct auth_serversupplied_info *server_info;
- struct hdb_samba4_private *p = talloc_get_type(client->ctx, struct hdb_samba4_private);
- TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx = talloc_named(p, 0, "samba_get_pac context");
- unsigned int userAccountControl;
- if (!mem_ctx) {
- return ENOMEM;
- }
+ uint32_t userAccountControl;
- /* The user account may be set not to want the PAC */
- userAccountControl = ldb_msg_find_attr_as_uint(p->msg, "userAccountControl", 0);
+ /* The service account may be set not to want the PAC */
+ userAccountControl = ldb_msg_find_attr_as_uint(skdc_entry->msg, "userAccountControl", 0);
if (userAccountControl & UF_NO_AUTH_DATA_REQUIRED) {
- *pac = NULL;
- return 0;
- }
-
- nt_status = authsam_make_server_info(mem_ctx, p->samdb,
- lp_netbios_name(p->lp_ctx),
- lp_sam_name(p->lp_ctx),
- p->realm_dn,
- p->msg,
- data_blob(NULL, 0),
- data_blob(NULL, 0),
- &server_info);
- if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(nt_status)) {
- DEBUG(0, ("Getting user info for PAC failed: %s\n",
- nt_errstr(nt_status)));
- return ENOMEM;
+ return false;
}
- ret = make_pac(context, mem_ctx, p->iconv_convenience, server_info, pac);
-
- talloc_free(mem_ctx);
- return ret;
+ return true;
}
-/* Resign (and reform, including possibly new groups) a PAC */
-
-static krb5_error_code samba_kdc_reget_pac(void *priv, krb5_context context,
- const krb5_principal client_principal,
- struct hdb_entry_ex *client,
- struct hdb_entry_ex *server, krb5_pac *pac)
+/* Was the krbtgt in this DB (ie, should we check the incoming signature) and was it an RODC */
+int samba_krbtgt_is_in_db(struct samba_kdc_entry *p,
+ bool *is_in_db,
+ bool *is_untrusted)
{
- krb5_error_code ret;
-
- unsigned int userAccountControl;
-
- struct hdb_samba4_private *p = talloc_get_type(server->ctx, struct hdb_samba4_private);
-
- struct auth_serversupplied_info *server_info_out;
-
- TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx = talloc_named(p, 0, "samba_get_pac context");
+ NTSTATUS status;
+ int rodc_krbtgt_number, trust_direction;
+ uint32_t rid;
+ TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx = talloc_new(NULL);
if (!mem_ctx) {
return ENOMEM;
}
-
- /* The service account may be set not to want the PAC */
- userAccountControl = ldb_msg_find_attr_as_uint(p->msg, "userAccountControl", 0);
- if (userAccountControl & UF_NO_AUTH_DATA_REQUIRED) {
+
+ trust_direction = ldb_msg_find_attr_as_int(p->msg, "trustDirection", 0);
+
+ if (trust_direction != 0) {
+ /* Domain trust - we cannot check the sig, but we trust it for a correct PAC
+
+ This is exactly where we should flag for SID
+ validation when we do inter-foreest trusts
+ */
talloc_free(mem_ctx);
- *pac = NULL;
+ *is_untrusted = false;
+ *is_in_db = false;
return 0;
}
- ret = kerberos_pac_to_server_info(mem_ctx, p->iconv_convenience,
- *pac, context, &server_info_out);
-
- /* We will compleatly regenerate this pac */
- krb5_pac_free(context, *pac);
+ /* The lack of password controls etc applies to krbtgt by
+ * virtue of being that particular RID */
+ status = dom_sid_split_rid(NULL, samdb_result_dom_sid(mem_ctx, p->msg, "objectSid"), NULL, &rid);
- if (ret) {
+ if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(status)) {
talloc_free(mem_ctx);
- return ret;
+ return EINVAL;
}
- ret = make_pac(context, mem_ctx, p->iconv_convenience, server_info_out, pac);
+ rodc_krbtgt_number = ldb_msg_find_attr_as_int(p->msg, "msDS-SecondaryKrbTgtNumber", -1);
+
+ if (p->kdc_db_ctx->my_krbtgt_number == 0) {
+ if (rid == DOMAIN_RID_KRBTGT) {
+ *is_untrusted = false;
+ *is_in_db = true;
+ talloc_free(mem_ctx);
+ return 0;
+ } else if (rodc_krbtgt_number != -1) {
+ *is_in_db = true;
+ *is_untrusted = true;
+ talloc_free(mem_ctx);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ } else if ((rid != DOMAIN_RID_KRBTGT) && (rodc_krbtgt_number == p->kdc_db_ctx->my_krbtgt_number)) {
+ talloc_free(mem_ctx);
+ *is_untrusted = false;
+ *is_in_db = true;
+ return 0;
+ } else if (rid == DOMAIN_RID_KRBTGT) {
+ /* krbtgt viewed from an RODC */
+ talloc_free(mem_ctx);
+ *is_untrusted = false;
+ *is_in_db = false;
+ return 0;
+ }
+ /* Another RODC */
talloc_free(mem_ctx);
- return ret;
+ *is_untrusted = true;
+ *is_in_db = false;
+ return 0;
}
-static void samba_kdc_build_edata_reply(TALLOC_CTX *tmp_ctx, krb5_data *e_data,
- NTSTATUS nt_status)
+NTSTATUS samba_kdc_get_pac_blob(TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx,
+ struct samba_kdc_entry *p,
+ DATA_BLOB **_pac_blob)
{
- PA_DATA pa;
- unsigned char *buf;
- size_t len;
- krb5_error_code ret = 0;
-
- if (!e_data)
- return;
-
- pa.padata_type = KRB5_PADATA_PW_SALT;
- pa.padata_value.length = 12;
- pa.padata_value.data = malloc(pa.padata_value.length);
- if (!pa.padata_value.data) {
- e_data->length = 0;
- e_data->data = NULL;
- return;
+ struct auth_user_info_dc *user_info_dc;
+ DATA_BLOB *pac_blob;
+ NTSTATUS nt_status;
+
+ /* The user account may be set not to want the PAC */
+ if ( ! samba_princ_needs_pac(p)) {
+ *_pac_blob = NULL;
+ return NT_STATUS_OK;
}
- SIVAL(pa.padata_value.data, 0, NT_STATUS_V(nt_status));
- SIVAL(pa.padata_value.data, 4, 0);
- SIVAL(pa.padata_value.data, 8, 1);
+ pac_blob = talloc_zero(mem_ctx, DATA_BLOB);
+ if (!pac_blob) {
+ return NT_STATUS_NO_MEMORY;
+ }
- ASN1_MALLOC_ENCODE(PA_DATA, buf, len, &pa, &len, ret);
- free(pa.padata_value.data);
+ nt_status = authsam_make_user_info_dc(mem_ctx, p->kdc_db_ctx->samdb,
+ lpcfg_netbios_name(p->kdc_db_ctx->lp_ctx),
+ lpcfg_sam_name(p->kdc_db_ctx->lp_ctx),
+ p->realm_dn,
+ p->msg,
+ data_blob(NULL, 0),
+ data_blob(NULL, 0),
+ &user_info_dc);
+ if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(nt_status)) {
+ DEBUG(0, ("Getting user info for PAC failed: %s\n",
+ nt_errstr(nt_status)));
+ return nt_status;
+ }
- e_data->data = buf;
- e_data->length = len;
+ nt_status = samba_get_logon_info_pac_blob(mem_ctx, user_info_dc, pac_blob);
+ if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(nt_status)) {
+ DEBUG(0, ("Building PAC failed: %s\n",
+ nt_errstr(nt_status)));
+ return nt_status;
+ }
- return;
+ *_pac_blob = pac_blob;
+ return NT_STATUS_OK;
}
-/* Given an hdb entry (and in particular it's private member), consult
- * the account_ok routine in auth/auth_sam.c for consistancy */
+NTSTATUS samba_kdc_update_pac_blob(TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx,
+ krb5_context context,
+ const krb5_pac pac, DATA_BLOB *pac_blob,
+ struct PAC_SIGNATURE_DATA *pac_srv_sig,
+ struct PAC_SIGNATURE_DATA *pac_kdc_sig)
+{
+ struct auth_user_info_dc *user_info_dc;
+ krb5_error_code ret;
+ NTSTATUS nt_status;
+
+ ret = kerberos_pac_to_user_info_dc(mem_ctx, pac,
+ context, &user_info_dc, pac_srv_sig, pac_kdc_sig);
+ if (ret) {
+ return NT_STATUS_UNSUCCESSFUL;
+ }
+ nt_status = samba_get_logon_info_pac_blob(mem_ctx,
+ user_info_dc, pac_blob);
+
+ return nt_status;
+}
-static krb5_error_code samba_kdc_check_client_access(void *priv,
- krb5_context context,
- krb5_kdc_configuration *config,
- hdb_entry_ex *client_ex, const char *client_name,
- hdb_entry_ex *server_ex, const char *server_name,
- KDC_REQ *req,
- krb5_data *e_data)
+NTSTATUS samba_kdc_update_delegation_info_blob(TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx,
+ krb5_context context,
+ const krb5_pac pac,
+ const krb5_principal server_principal,
+ const krb5_principal proxy_principal,
+ DATA_BLOB *new_blob)
{
+ krb5_data old_data;
+ DATA_BLOB old_blob;
krb5_error_code ret;
NTSTATUS nt_status;
- TALLOC_CTX *tmp_ctx;
- struct hdb_samba4_private *p;
- char *workstation = NULL;
- HostAddresses *addresses = req->req_body.addresses;
- int i;
- bool password_change;
-
- tmp_ctx = talloc_new(client_ex->ctx);
- p = talloc_get_type(client_ex->ctx, struct hdb_samba4_private);
+ enum ndr_err_code ndr_err;
+ union PAC_INFO info;
+ struct PAC_CONSTRAINED_DELEGATION _d;
+ struct PAC_CONSTRAINED_DELEGATION *d = NULL;
+ char *server = NULL;
+ char *proxy = NULL;
+ uint32_t i;
+ TALLOC_CTX *tmp_ctx = talloc_new(mem_ctx);
+
+ if (tmp_ctx == NULL) {
+ return NT_STATUS_NO_MEMORY;
+ }
- if (!tmp_ctx) {
- return ENOMEM;
+ ret = krb5_pac_get_buffer(context, pac, PAC_TYPE_CONSTRAINED_DELEGATION, &old_data);
+ if (ret == ENOENT) {
+ ZERO_STRUCT(old_data);
+ } else if (ret) {
+ talloc_free(tmp_ctx);
+ return NT_STATUS_UNSUCCESSFUL;
}
- if (addresses) {
- for (i=0; i < addresses->len; i++) {
- if (addresses->val->addr_type == KRB5_ADDRESS_NETBIOS) {
- workstation = talloc_strndup(tmp_ctx, addresses->val->address.data, MIN(addresses->val->address.length, 15));
- if (workstation) {
- break;
- }
- }
+ old_blob.length = old_data.length;
+ old_blob.data = (uint8_t *)old_data.data;
+
+ ZERO_STRUCT(info);
+ if (old_blob.length > 0) {
+ ndr_err = ndr_pull_union_blob(&old_blob, mem_ctx,
+ &info, PAC_TYPE_CONSTRAINED_DELEGATION,
+ (ndr_pull_flags_fn_t)ndr_pull_PAC_INFO);
+ if (!NDR_ERR_CODE_IS_SUCCESS(ndr_err)) {
+ kerberos_free_data_contents(context, &old_data);
+ nt_status = ndr_map_error2ntstatus(ndr_err);
+ DEBUG(0,("can't parse the PAC LOGON_INFO: %s\n", nt_errstr(nt_status)));
+ talloc_free(tmp_ctx);
+ return nt_status;
}
+ } else {
+ ZERO_STRUCT(_d);
+ info.constrained_delegation.info = &_d;
}
+ kerberos_free_data_contents(context, &old_data);
- /* Strip space padding */
- if (workstation) {
- i = MIN(strlen(workstation), 15);
- for (; i > 0 && workstation[i - 1] == ' '; i--) {
- workstation[i - 1] = '\0';
- }
+ ret = krb5_unparse_name(context, server_principal, &server);
+ if (ret) {
+ talloc_free(tmp_ctx);
+ return NT_STATUS_INTERNAL_ERROR;
}
- password_change = (server_ex && server_ex->entry.flags.change_pw);
+ ret = krb5_unparse_name_flags(context, proxy_principal,
+ KRB5_PRINCIPAL_UNPARSE_NO_REALM, &proxy);
+ if (ret) {
+ SAFE_FREE(server);
+ talloc_free(tmp_ctx);
+ return NT_STATUS_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+ }
- /* we allow all kinds of trusts here */
- nt_status = authsam_account_ok(tmp_ctx,
- p->samdb,
- MSV1_0_ALLOW_SERVER_TRUST_ACCOUNT | MSV1_0_ALLOW_WORKSTATION_TRUST_ACCOUNT,
- p->realm_dn,
- p->msg,
- workstation,
- client_name, true, password_change);
-
- if (NT_STATUS_IS_OK(nt_status)) {
- /* Now do the standard Heimdal check */
- ret = kdc_check_flags(context, config,
- client_ex, client_name,
- server_ex, server_name,
- req->msg_type == krb_as_req);
- } else {
- if (NT_STATUS_EQUAL(nt_status, NT_STATUS_PASSWORD_MUST_CHANGE))
- ret = KRB5KDC_ERR_KEY_EXPIRED;
- else if (NT_STATUS_EQUAL(nt_status, NT_STATUS_PASSWORD_EXPIRED))
- ret = KRB5KDC_ERR_KEY_EXPIRED;
- else if (NT_STATUS_EQUAL(nt_status, NT_STATUS_ACCOUNT_EXPIRED))
- ret = KRB5KDC_ERR_CLIENT_REVOKED;
- else if (NT_STATUS_EQUAL(nt_status, NT_STATUS_ACCOUNT_DISABLED))
- ret = KRB5KDC_ERR_CLIENT_REVOKED;
- else if (NT_STATUS_EQUAL(nt_status, NT_STATUS_INVALID_LOGON_HOURS))
- ret = KRB5KDC_ERR_CLIENT_REVOKED;
- else if (NT_STATUS_EQUAL(nt_status, NT_STATUS_ACCOUNT_LOCKED_OUT))
- ret = KRB5KDC_ERR_CLIENT_REVOKED;
- else if (NT_STATUS_EQUAL(nt_status, NT_STATUS_INVALID_WORKSTATION))
- ret = KRB5KDC_ERR_POLICY;
- else
- ret = KRB5KDC_ERR_POLICY;
-
- samba_kdc_build_edata_reply(tmp_ctx, e_data, nt_status);
+ d = info.constrained_delegation.info;
+ i = d->num_transited_services;
+ d->proxy_target.string = server;
+ d->transited_services = talloc_realloc(mem_ctx, d->transited_services,
+ struct lsa_String, i + 1);
+ d->transited_services[i].string = proxy;
+ d->num_transited_services = i + 1;
+
+ ndr_err = ndr_push_union_blob(new_blob, mem_ctx,
+ &info, PAC_TYPE_CONSTRAINED_DELEGATION,
+ (ndr_push_flags_fn_t)ndr_push_PAC_INFO);
+ SAFE_FREE(server);
+ SAFE_FREE(proxy);
+ if (!NDR_ERR_CODE_IS_SUCCESS(ndr_err)) {
+ kerberos_free_data_contents(context, &old_data);
+ nt_status = ndr_map_error2ntstatus(ndr_err);
+ DEBUG(0,("can't parse the PAC LOGON_INFO: %s\n", nt_errstr(nt_status)));
+ talloc_free(tmp_ctx);
+ return nt_status;
}
+ talloc_free(tmp_ctx);
+ return NT_STATUS_OK;
+}
+
+/* function to map policy errors */
+krb5_error_code samba_kdc_map_policy_err(NTSTATUS nt_status)
+{
+ krb5_error_code ret;
+
+ if (NT_STATUS_EQUAL(nt_status, NT_STATUS_PASSWORD_MUST_CHANGE))
+ ret = KRB5KDC_ERR_KEY_EXP;
+ else if (NT_STATUS_EQUAL(nt_status, NT_STATUS_PASSWORD_EXPIRED))
+ ret = KRB5KDC_ERR_KEY_EXP;
+ else if (NT_STATUS_EQUAL(nt_status, NT_STATUS_ACCOUNT_EXPIRED))
+ ret = KRB5KDC_ERR_CLIENT_REVOKED;
+ else if (NT_STATUS_EQUAL(nt_status, NT_STATUS_ACCOUNT_DISABLED))
+ ret = KRB5KDC_ERR_CLIENT_REVOKED;
+ else if (NT_STATUS_EQUAL(nt_status, NT_STATUS_INVALID_LOGON_HOURS))
+ ret = KRB5KDC_ERR_CLIENT_REVOKED;
+ else if (NT_STATUS_EQUAL(nt_status, NT_STATUS_ACCOUNT_LOCKED_OUT))
+ ret = KRB5KDC_ERR_CLIENT_REVOKED;
+ else if (NT_STATUS_EQUAL(nt_status, NT_STATUS_INVALID_WORKSTATION))
+ ret = KRB5KDC_ERR_POLICY;
+ else
+ ret = KRB5KDC_ERR_POLICY;
+
return ret;
}
-struct krb5plugin_windc_ftable windc_plugin_table = {
- .minor_version = KRB5_WINDC_PLUGING_MINOR,
- .init = samba_kdc_plugin_init,
- .fini = samba_kdc_plugin_fini,
- .pac_generate = samba_kdc_get_pac,
- .pac_verify = samba_kdc_reget_pac,
- .client_access = samba_kdc_check_client_access,
-};
+/* Given a kdc entry, consult the account_ok routine in auth/auth_sam.c
+ * for consistency */
+NTSTATUS samba_kdc_check_client_access(struct samba_kdc_entry *kdc_entry,
+ const char *client_name,
+ const char *workstation,
+ bool password_change)
+{
+ TALLOC_CTX *tmp_ctx;
+ NTSTATUS nt_status;
+
+ tmp_ctx = talloc_named(NULL, 0, "samba_kdc_check_client_access");
+ if (!tmp_ctx) {
+ return NT_STATUS_NO_MEMORY;
+ }
+ /* we allow all kinds of trusts here */
+ nt_status = authsam_account_ok(tmp_ctx,
+ kdc_entry->kdc_db_ctx->samdb,
+ MSV1_0_ALLOW_SERVER_TRUST_ACCOUNT |
+ MSV1_0_ALLOW_WORKSTATION_TRUST_ACCOUNT,
+ kdc_entry->realm_dn, kdc_entry->msg,
+ workstation, client_name,
+ true, password_change);
+
+ talloc_free(tmp_ctx);
+ return nt_status;
+}
git.samba.org / nivanova / samba-autobuild / .git / blobdiff