*/
#include "../rt_config.h"
// WPA OUI
-UCHAR OUI_WPA_NONE_AKM[4] = {0x00, 0x50, 0xF2, 0x00};
-UCHAR OUI_WPA_VERSION[4] = {0x00, 0x50, 0xF2, 0x01};
-UCHAR OUI_WPA_WEP40[4] = {0x00, 0x50, 0xF2, 0x01};
-UCHAR OUI_WPA_TKIP[4] = {0x00, 0x50, 0xF2, 0x02};
-UCHAR OUI_WPA_CCMP[4] = {0x00, 0x50, 0xF2, 0x04};
-UCHAR OUI_WPA_WEP104[4] = {0x00, 0x50, 0xF2, 0x05};
-UCHAR OUI_WPA_8021X_AKM[4] = {0x00, 0x50, 0xF2, 0x01};
-UCHAR OUI_WPA_PSK_AKM[4] = {0x00, 0x50, 0xF2, 0x02};
+UCHAR OUI_WPA_NONE_AKM[4] = { 0x00, 0x50, 0xF2, 0x00 };
+UCHAR OUI_WPA_VERSION[4] = { 0x00, 0x50, 0xF2, 0x01 };
+UCHAR OUI_WPA_WEP40[4] = { 0x00, 0x50, 0xF2, 0x01 };
+UCHAR OUI_WPA_TKIP[4] = { 0x00, 0x50, 0xF2, 0x02 };
+UCHAR OUI_WPA_CCMP[4] = { 0x00, 0x50, 0xF2, 0x04 };
+UCHAR OUI_WPA_WEP104[4] = { 0x00, 0x50, 0xF2, 0x05 };
+UCHAR OUI_WPA_8021X_AKM[4] = { 0x00, 0x50, 0xF2, 0x01 };
+UCHAR OUI_WPA_PSK_AKM[4] = { 0x00, 0x50, 0xF2, 0x02 };
+
// WPA2 OUI
-UCHAR OUI_WPA2_WEP40[4] = {0x00, 0x0F, 0xAC, 0x01};
-UCHAR OUI_WPA2_TKIP[4] = {0x00, 0x0F, 0xAC, 0x02};
-UCHAR OUI_WPA2_CCMP[4] = {0x00, 0x0F, 0xAC, 0x04};
-UCHAR OUI_WPA2_8021X_AKM[4] = {0x00, 0x0F, 0xAC, 0x01};
-UCHAR OUI_WPA2_PSK_AKM[4] = {0x00, 0x0F, 0xAC, 0x02};
-UCHAR OUI_WPA2_WEP104[4] = {0x00, 0x0F, 0xAC, 0x05};
-// MSA OUI
-UCHAR OUI_MSA_8021X_AKM[4] = {0x00, 0x0F, 0xAC, 0x05}; // Not yet final - IEEE 802.11s-D1.06
-UCHAR OUI_MSA_PSK_AKM[4] = {0x00, 0x0F, 0xAC, 0x06}; // Not yet final - IEEE 802.11s-D1.06
+UCHAR OUI_WPA2_WEP40[4] = { 0x00, 0x0F, 0xAC, 0x01 };
+UCHAR OUI_WPA2_TKIP[4] = { 0x00, 0x0F, 0xAC, 0x02 };
+UCHAR OUI_WPA2_CCMP[4] = { 0x00, 0x0F, 0xAC, 0x04 };
+UCHAR OUI_WPA2_8021X_AKM[4] = { 0x00, 0x0F, 0xAC, 0x01 };
+UCHAR OUI_WPA2_PSK_AKM[4] = { 0x00, 0x0F, 0xAC, 0x02 };
+UCHAR OUI_WPA2_WEP104[4] = { 0x00, 0x0F, 0xAC, 0x05 };
+
+static VOID ConstructEapolKeyData(IN PMAC_TABLE_ENTRY pEntry,
+ IN UCHAR GroupKeyWepStatus,
+ IN UCHAR keyDescVer,
+ IN UCHAR MsgType,
+ IN UCHAR DefaultKeyIdx,
+ IN UCHAR * GTK,
+ IN UCHAR * RSNIE,
+ IN UCHAR RSNIE_LEN, OUT PEAPOL_PACKET pMsg);
+
+static VOID CalculateMIC(IN UCHAR KeyDescVer,
+ IN UCHAR * PTK, OUT PEAPOL_PACKET pMsg);
+
+static VOID WpaEAPPacketAction(IN PRTMP_ADAPTER pAd, IN MLME_QUEUE_ELEM * Elem);
+
+static VOID WpaEAPOLASFAlertAction(IN PRTMP_ADAPTER pAd,
+ IN MLME_QUEUE_ELEM * Elem);
+
+static VOID WpaEAPOLLogoffAction(IN PRTMP_ADAPTER pAd,
+ IN MLME_QUEUE_ELEM * Elem);
+
+static VOID WpaEAPOLStartAction(IN PRTMP_ADAPTER pAd,
+ IN MLME_QUEUE_ELEM * Elem);
+
+static VOID WpaEAPOLKeyAction(IN PRTMP_ADAPTER pAd, IN MLME_QUEUE_ELEM * Elem);
+
+/*
+ ==========================================================================
+ Description:
+ association state machine init, including state transition and timer init
+ Parameters:
+ S - pointer to the association state machine
+ ==========================================================================
+ */
+VOID WpaStateMachineInit(IN PRTMP_ADAPTER pAd,
+ IN STATE_MACHINE * S, OUT STATE_MACHINE_FUNC Trans[])
+{
+ StateMachineInit(S, (STATE_MACHINE_FUNC *) Trans, MAX_WPA_PTK_STATE,
+ MAX_WPA_MSG, (STATE_MACHINE_FUNC) Drop, WPA_PTK,
+ WPA_MACHINE_BASE);
+
+ StateMachineSetAction(S, WPA_PTK, MT2_EAPPacket,
+ (STATE_MACHINE_FUNC) WpaEAPPacketAction);
+ StateMachineSetAction(S, WPA_PTK, MT2_EAPOLStart,
+ (STATE_MACHINE_FUNC) WpaEAPOLStartAction);
+ StateMachineSetAction(S, WPA_PTK, MT2_EAPOLLogoff,
+ (STATE_MACHINE_FUNC) WpaEAPOLLogoffAction);
+ StateMachineSetAction(S, WPA_PTK, MT2_EAPOLKey,
+ (STATE_MACHINE_FUNC) WpaEAPOLKeyAction);
+ StateMachineSetAction(S, WPA_PTK, MT2_EAPOLASFAlert,
+ (STATE_MACHINE_FUNC) WpaEAPOLASFAlertAction);
+}
+
+/*
+ ==========================================================================
+ Description:
+ this is state machine function.
+ When receiving EAP packets which is for 802.1x authentication use.
+ Not use in PSK case
+ Return:
+ ==========================================================================
+*/
+VOID WpaEAPPacketAction(IN PRTMP_ADAPTER pAd, IN MLME_QUEUE_ELEM * Elem)
+{
+}
+
+VOID WpaEAPOLASFAlertAction(IN PRTMP_ADAPTER pAd, IN MLME_QUEUE_ELEM * Elem)
+{
+}
+
+VOID WpaEAPOLLogoffAction(IN PRTMP_ADAPTER pAd, IN MLME_QUEUE_ELEM * Elem)
+{
+}
+
+/*
+ ==========================================================================
+ Description:
+ Start 4-way HS when rcv EAPOL_START which may create by our driver in assoc.c
+ Return:
+ ==========================================================================
+*/
+VOID WpaEAPOLStartAction(IN PRTMP_ADAPTER pAd, IN MLME_QUEUE_ELEM * Elem)
+{
+ MAC_TABLE_ENTRY *pEntry;
+ PHEADER_802_11 pHeader;
+
+ DBGPRINT(RT_DEBUG_TRACE, ("WpaEAPOLStartAction ===> \n"));
+
+ pHeader = (PHEADER_802_11) Elem->Msg;
+
+ //For normaol PSK, we enqueue an EAPOL-Start command to trigger the process.
+ if (Elem->MsgLen == 6)
+ pEntry = MacTableLookup(pAd, Elem->Msg);
+ else {
+ pEntry = MacTableLookup(pAd, pHeader->Addr2);
+ }
+
+ if (pEntry) {
+ DBGPRINT(RT_DEBUG_TRACE,
+ (" PortSecured(%d), WpaState(%d), AuthMode(%d), PMKID_CacheIdx(%d) \n",
+ pEntry->PortSecured, pEntry->WpaState,
+ pEntry->AuthMode, pEntry->PMKID_CacheIdx));
+
+ if ((pEntry->PortSecured == WPA_802_1X_PORT_NOT_SECURED)
+ && (pEntry->WpaState < AS_PTKSTART)
+ && ((pEntry->AuthMode == Ndis802_11AuthModeWPAPSK)
+ || (pEntry->AuthMode == Ndis802_11AuthModeWPA2PSK)
+ || ((pEntry->AuthMode == Ndis802_11AuthModeWPA2)
+ && (pEntry->PMKID_CacheIdx != ENTRY_NOT_FOUND)))) {
+ pEntry->PrivacyFilter = Ndis802_11PrivFilter8021xWEP;
+ pEntry->WpaState = AS_INITPSK;
+ pEntry->PortSecured = WPA_802_1X_PORT_NOT_SECURED;
+ NdisZeroMemory(pEntry->R_Counter,
+ sizeof(pEntry->R_Counter));
+ pEntry->ReTryCounter = PEER_MSG1_RETRY_TIMER_CTR;
+
+ WPAStart4WayHS(pAd, pEntry, PEER_MSG1_RETRY_EXEC_INTV);
+ }
+ }
+}
+
+/*
+ ==========================================================================
+ Description:
+ This is state machine function.
+ When receiving EAPOL packets which is for 802.1x key management.
+ Use both in WPA, and WPAPSK case.
+ In this function, further dispatch to different functions according to the received packet. 3 categories are :
+ 1. normal 4-way pairwisekey and 2-way groupkey handshake
+ 2. MIC error (Countermeasures attack) report packet from STA.
+ 3. Request for pairwise/group key update from STA
+ Return:
+ ==========================================================================
+*/
+VOID WpaEAPOLKeyAction(IN PRTMP_ADAPTER pAd, IN MLME_QUEUE_ELEM * Elem)
+{
+ MAC_TABLE_ENTRY *pEntry;
+ PHEADER_802_11 pHeader;
+ PEAPOL_PACKET pEapol_packet;
+ KEY_INFO peerKeyInfo;
+
+ DBGPRINT(RT_DEBUG_TRACE, ("WpaEAPOLKeyAction ===>\n"));
+
+ pHeader = (PHEADER_802_11) Elem->Msg;
+ pEapol_packet =
+ (PEAPOL_PACKET) & Elem->Msg[LENGTH_802_11 + LENGTH_802_1_H];
+
+ NdisZeroMemory((PUCHAR) & peerKeyInfo, sizeof(peerKeyInfo));
+ NdisMoveMemory((PUCHAR) & peerKeyInfo,
+ (PUCHAR) & pEapol_packet->KeyDesc.KeyInfo,
+ sizeof(KEY_INFO));
+
+ hex_dump("Received Eapol frame", (unsigned char *)pEapol_packet,
+ (Elem->MsgLen - LENGTH_802_11 - LENGTH_802_1_H));
+
+ *((USHORT *) & peerKeyInfo) = cpu2le16(*((USHORT *) & peerKeyInfo));
+
+ do {
+ pEntry = MacTableLookup(pAd, pHeader->Addr2);
+
+ if (!pEntry
+ || ((!pEntry->ValidAsCLI) && (!pEntry->ValidAsApCli)))
+ break;
+
+ if (pEntry->AuthMode < Ndis802_11AuthModeWPA)
+ break;
+
+ DBGPRINT(RT_DEBUG_TRACE,
+ ("Receive EAPoL-Key frame from STA %02X-%02X-%02X-%02X-%02X-%02X\n",
+ PRINT_MAC(pEntry->Addr)));
+
+ if (((pEapol_packet->ProVer != EAPOL_VER)
+ && (pEapol_packet->ProVer != EAPOL_VER2))
+ || ((pEapol_packet->KeyDesc.Type != WPA1_KEY_DESC)
+ && (pEapol_packet->KeyDesc.Type != WPA2_KEY_DESC))) {
+ DBGPRINT(RT_DEBUG_ERROR,
+ ("Key descripter does not match with WPA rule\n"));
+ break;
+ }
+ // The value 1 shall be used for all EAPOL-Key frames to and from a STA when
+ // neither the group nor pairwise ciphers are CCMP for Key Descriptor 1.
+ if ((pEntry->WepStatus == Ndis802_11Encryption2Enabled)
+ && (peerKeyInfo.KeyDescVer != DESC_TYPE_TKIP)) {
+ DBGPRINT(RT_DEBUG_ERROR,
+ ("Key descripter version not match(TKIP) \n"));
+ break;
+ }
+ // The value 2 shall be used for all EAPOL-Key frames to and from a STA when
+ // either the pairwise or the group cipher is AES-CCMP for Key Descriptor 2.
+ else if ((pEntry->WepStatus == Ndis802_11Encryption3Enabled)
+ && (peerKeyInfo.KeyDescVer != DESC_TYPE_AES)) {
+ DBGPRINT(RT_DEBUG_ERROR,
+ ("Key descripter version not match(AES) \n"));
+ break;
+ }
+ // Check if this STA is in class 3 state and the WPA state is started
+ if ((pEntry->Sst == SST_ASSOC)
+ && (pEntry->WpaState >= AS_INITPSK)) {
+ // Check the Key Ack (bit 7) of the Key Information to determine the Authenticator
+ // or not.
+ // An EAPOL-Key frame that is sent by the Supplicant in response to an EAPOL-
+ // Key frame from the Authenticator must not have the Ack bit set.
+ if (peerKeyInfo.KeyAck == 1) {
+ // The frame is snet by Authenticator.
+ // So the Supplicant side shall handle this.
+
+ if ((peerKeyInfo.Secure == 0)
+ && (peerKeyInfo.Request == 0)
+ && (peerKeyInfo.Error == 0)
+ && (peerKeyInfo.KeyType == PAIRWISEKEY)) {
+ // Process 1. the message 1 of 4-way HS in WPA or WPA2
+ // EAPOL-Key(0,0,1,0,P,0,0,ANonce,0,DataKD_M1)
+ // 2. the message 3 of 4-way HS in WPA
+ // EAPOL-Key(0,1,1,1,P,0,KeyRSC,ANonce,MIC,DataKD_M3)
+ if (peerKeyInfo.KeyMic == 0)
+ PeerPairMsg1Action(pAd, pEntry,
+ Elem);
+ else
+ PeerPairMsg3Action(pAd, pEntry,
+ Elem);
+ } else if ((peerKeyInfo.Secure == 1)
+ && (peerKeyInfo.KeyMic == 1)
+ && (peerKeyInfo.Request == 0)
+ && (peerKeyInfo.Error == 0)) {
+ // Process 1. the message 3 of 4-way HS in WPA2
+ // EAPOL-Key(1,1,1,1,P,0,KeyRSC,ANonce,MIC,DataKD_M3)
+ // 2. the message 1 of group KS in WPA or WPA2
+ // EAPOL-Key(1,1,1,0,G,0,Key RSC,0, MIC,GTK[N])
+ if (peerKeyInfo.KeyType == PAIRWISEKEY)
+ PeerPairMsg3Action(pAd, pEntry,
+ Elem);
+ else
+ PeerGroupMsg1Action(pAd, pEntry,
+ Elem);
+ }
+ } else {
+ // The frame is snet by Supplicant.
+ // So the Authenticator side shall handle this.
+ if ((peerKeyInfo.Request == 0) &&
+ (peerKeyInfo.Error == 0) &&
+ (peerKeyInfo.KeyMic == 1)) {
+ if (peerKeyInfo.Secure == 0
+ && peerKeyInfo.KeyType ==
+ PAIRWISEKEY) {
+ // EAPOL-Key(0,1,0,0,P,0,0,SNonce,MIC,Data)
+ // Process 1. message 2 of 4-way HS in WPA or WPA2
+ // 2. message 4 of 4-way HS in WPA
+ if (CONV_ARRARY_TO_UINT16
+ (pEapol_packet->KeyDesc.
+ KeyDataLen) == 0) {
+ PeerPairMsg4Action(pAd,
+ pEntry,
+ Elem);
+ } else {
+ PeerPairMsg2Action(pAd,
+ pEntry,
+ Elem);
+ }
+ } else if (peerKeyInfo.Secure == 1
+ && peerKeyInfo.KeyType ==
+ PAIRWISEKEY) {
+ // EAPOL-Key(1,1,0,0,P,0,0,0,MIC,0)
+ // Process message 4 of 4-way HS in WPA2
+ PeerPairMsg4Action(pAd, pEntry,
+ Elem);
+ } else if (peerKeyInfo.Secure == 1
+ && peerKeyInfo.KeyType ==
+ GROUPKEY) {
+ // EAPOL-Key(1,1,0,0,G,0,0,0,MIC,0)
+ // Process message 2 of Group key HS in WPA or WPA2
+ PeerGroupMsg2Action(pAd, pEntry,
+ &Elem->
+ Msg
+ [LENGTH_802_11],
+ (Elem->
+ MsgLen -
+ LENGTH_802_11));
+ }
+ }
+ }
+ }
+ } while (FALSE);
+}
+
+/*
+ ========================================================================
+
+ Routine Description:
+ Copy frame from waiting queue into relative ring buffer and set
+ appropriate ASIC register to kick hardware encryption before really
+ sent out to air.
+
+ Arguments:
+ pAd Pointer to our adapter
+ PNDIS_PACKET Pointer to outgoing Ndis frame
+ NumberOfFrag Number of fragment required
+
+ Return Value:
+ None
+
+ Note:
+
+ ========================================================================
+*/
+VOID RTMPToWirelessSta(IN PRTMP_ADAPTER pAd,
+ IN PMAC_TABLE_ENTRY pEntry,
+ IN PUCHAR pHeader802_3,
+ IN UINT HdrLen,
+ IN PUCHAR pData, IN UINT DataLen, IN BOOLEAN bClearFrame)
+{
+ PNDIS_PACKET pPacket;
+ NDIS_STATUS Status;
+
+ if ((!pEntry) || ((!pEntry->ValidAsCLI) && (!pEntry->ValidAsApCli)))
+ return;
+
+ do {
+ // build a NDIS packet
+ Status =
+ RTMPAllocateNdisPacket(pAd, &pPacket, pHeader802_3, HdrLen,
+ pData, DataLen);
+ if (Status != NDIS_STATUS_SUCCESS)
+ break;
+
+ if (bClearFrame)
+ RTMP_SET_PACKET_CLEAR_EAP_FRAME(pPacket, 1);
+ else
+ RTMP_SET_PACKET_CLEAR_EAP_FRAME(pPacket, 0);
+ {
+ RTMP_SET_PACKET_SOURCE(pPacket, PKTSRC_NDIS);
+
+ RTMP_SET_PACKET_NET_DEVICE_MBSSID(pPacket, MAIN_MBSSID); // set a default value
+ if (pEntry->apidx != 0)
+ RTMP_SET_PACKET_NET_DEVICE_MBSSID(pPacket,
+ pEntry->
+ apidx);
+
+ RTMP_SET_PACKET_WCID(pPacket, (UCHAR) pEntry->Aid);
+ RTMP_SET_PACKET_MOREDATA(pPacket, FALSE);
+ }
+
+ {
+ // send out the packet
+ Status = STASendPacket(pAd, pPacket);
+ if (Status == NDIS_STATUS_SUCCESS) {
+ UCHAR Index;
+
+ // Dequeue one frame from TxSwQueue0..3 queue and process it
+ // There are three place calling dequeue for TX ring.
+ // 1. Here, right after queueing the frame.
+ // 2. At the end of TxRingTxDone service routine.
+ // 3. Upon NDIS call RTMPSendPackets
+ if ((!RTMP_TEST_FLAG
+ (pAd, fRTMP_ADAPTER_BSS_SCAN_IN_PROGRESS))
+ &&
+ (!RTMP_TEST_FLAG
+ (pAd, fRTMP_ADAPTER_RESET_IN_PROGRESS))) {
+ for (Index = 0; Index < 5; Index++)
+ if (pAd->TxSwQueue[Index].
+ Number > 0)
+ RTMPDeQueuePacket(pAd,
+ FALSE,
+ Index,
+ MAX_TX_PROCESS);
+ }
+ }
+ }
+
+ } while (FALSE);
+}
+
+/*
+ ==========================================================================
+ Description:
+ This is a function to initilize 4-way handshake
+
+ Return:
+
+ ==========================================================================
+*/
+VOID WPAStart4WayHS(IN PRTMP_ADAPTER pAd,
+ IN MAC_TABLE_ENTRY * pEntry, IN ULONG TimeInterval)
+{
+ UCHAR Header802_3[14];
+ EAPOL_PACKET EAPOLPKT;
+ PUINT8 pBssid = NULL;
+ UCHAR group_cipher = Ndis802_11WEPDisabled;
+
+ DBGPRINT(RT_DEBUG_TRACE, ("===> WPAStart4WayHS\n"));
+
+ if (RTMP_TEST_FLAG
+ (pAd,
+ fRTMP_ADAPTER_RESET_IN_PROGRESS | fRTMP_ADAPTER_HALT_IN_PROGRESS))
+ {
+ DBGPRINT(RT_DEBUG_ERROR,
+ ("[ERROR]WPAStart4WayHS : The interface is closed...\n"));
+ return;
+ }
+
+ if (pBssid == NULL) {
+ DBGPRINT(RT_DEBUG_ERROR,
+ ("[ERROR]WPAStart4WayHS : No corresponding Authenticator.\n"));
+ return;
+ }
+ // Check the status
+ if ((pEntry->WpaState > AS_PTKSTART) || (pEntry->WpaState < AS_INITPMK)) {
+ DBGPRINT(RT_DEBUG_ERROR,
+ ("[ERROR]WPAStart4WayHS : Not expect calling\n"));
+ return;
+ }
+
+ // Increment replay counter by 1
+ ADD_ONE_To_64BIT_VAR(pEntry->R_Counter);
+
+ // Randomly generate ANonce
+ GenRandom(pAd, (UCHAR *) pBssid, pEntry->ANonce);
+
+ // Construct EAPoL message - Pairwise Msg 1
+ // EAPOL-Key(0,0,1,0,P,0,0,ANonce,0,DataKD_M1)
+ NdisZeroMemory(&EAPOLPKT, sizeof(EAPOL_PACKET));
+ ConstructEapolMsg(pEntry, group_cipher, EAPOL_PAIR_MSG_1, 0, // Default key index
+ pEntry->ANonce, NULL, // TxRSC
+ NULL, // GTK
+ NULL, // RSNIE
+ 0, // RSNIE length
+ &EAPOLPKT);
+
+ // Make outgoing frame
+ MAKE_802_3_HEADER(Header802_3, pEntry->Addr, pBssid, EAPOL);
+ RTMPToWirelessSta(pAd, pEntry, Header802_3,
+ LENGTH_802_3, (PUCHAR) & EAPOLPKT,
+ CONV_ARRARY_TO_UINT16(EAPOLPKT.Body_Len) + 4,
+ (pEntry->PortSecured ==
+ WPA_802_1X_PORT_SECURED) ? FALSE : TRUE);
+
+ // Trigger Retry Timer
+ RTMPModTimer(&pEntry->RetryTimer, TimeInterval);
+
+ // Update State
+ pEntry->WpaState = AS_PTKSTART;
+
+ DBGPRINT(RT_DEBUG_TRACE,
+ ("<=== WPAStart4WayHS: send Msg1 of 4-way \n"));
+
+}
+
+/*
+ ========================================================================
+
+ Routine Description:
+ Process Pairwise key Msg-1 of 4-way handshaking and send Msg-2
+
+ Arguments:
+ pAd Pointer to our adapter
+ Elem Message body
+
+ Return Value:
+ None
+
+ Note:
+
+ ========================================================================
+*/
+VOID PeerPairMsg1Action(IN PRTMP_ADAPTER pAd,
+ IN MAC_TABLE_ENTRY * pEntry, IN MLME_QUEUE_ELEM * Elem)
+{
+ UCHAR PTK[80];
+ UCHAR Header802_3[14];
+ PEAPOL_PACKET pMsg1;
+ UINT MsgLen;
+ EAPOL_PACKET EAPOLPKT;
+ PUINT8 pCurrentAddr = NULL;
+ PUINT8 pmk_ptr = NULL;
+ UCHAR group_cipher = Ndis802_11WEPDisabled;
+ PUINT8 rsnie_ptr = NULL;
+ UCHAR rsnie_len = 0;
+
+ DBGPRINT(RT_DEBUG_TRACE, ("===> PeerPairMsg1Action \n"));
+
+ if ((!pEntry) || ((!pEntry->ValidAsCLI) && (!pEntry->ValidAsApCli)))
+ return;
+
+ if (Elem->MsgLen <
+ (LENGTH_802_11 + LENGTH_802_1_H + LENGTH_EAPOL_H +
+ sizeof(KEY_DESCRIPTER) - MAX_LEN_OF_RSNIE - 2))
+ return;
+
+ {
+ pCurrentAddr = pAd->CurrentAddress;
+ pmk_ptr = pAd->StaCfg.PMK;
+ group_cipher = pAd->StaCfg.GroupCipher;
+ rsnie_ptr = pAd->StaCfg.RSN_IE;
+ rsnie_len = pAd->StaCfg.RSNIE_Len;
+ }
+
+ // Store the received frame
+ pMsg1 = (PEAPOL_PACKET) & Elem->Msg[LENGTH_802_11 + LENGTH_802_1_H];
+ MsgLen = Elem->MsgLen - LENGTH_802_11 - LENGTH_802_1_H;
+
+ // Sanity Check peer Pairwise message 1 - Replay Counter
+ if (PeerWpaMessageSanity(pAd, pMsg1, MsgLen, EAPOL_PAIR_MSG_1, pEntry)
+ == FALSE)
+ return;
+
+ // Store Replay counter, it will use to verify message 3 and construct message 2
+ NdisMoveMemory(pEntry->R_Counter, pMsg1->KeyDesc.ReplayCounter,
+ LEN_KEY_DESC_REPLAY);
+
+ // Store ANonce
+ NdisMoveMemory(pEntry->ANonce, pMsg1->KeyDesc.KeyNonce,
+ LEN_KEY_DESC_NONCE);
+
+ // Generate random SNonce
+ GenRandom(pAd, (UCHAR *) pCurrentAddr, pEntry->SNonce);
+
+ {
+ // Calculate PTK(ANonce, SNonce)
+ WpaDerivePTK(pAd,
+ pmk_ptr,
+ pEntry->ANonce,
+ pEntry->Addr,
+ pEntry->SNonce, pCurrentAddr, PTK, LEN_PTK);
+
+ // Save key to PTK entry
+ NdisMoveMemory(pEntry->PTK, PTK, LEN_PTK);
+ }
+
+ // Update WpaState
+ pEntry->WpaState = AS_PTKINIT_NEGOTIATING;
+
+ // Construct EAPoL message - Pairwise Msg 2
+ // EAPOL-Key(0,1,0,0,P,0,0,SNonce,MIC,DataKD_M2)
+ NdisZeroMemory(&EAPOLPKT, sizeof(EAPOL_PACKET));
+ ConstructEapolMsg(pEntry, group_cipher, EAPOL_PAIR_MSG_2, 0, // DefaultKeyIdx
+ pEntry->SNonce, NULL, // TxRsc
+ NULL, // GTK
+ (UCHAR *) rsnie_ptr, rsnie_len, &EAPOLPKT);
+
+ // Make outgoing frame
+ MAKE_802_3_HEADER(Header802_3, pEntry->Addr, pCurrentAddr, EAPOL);
+
+ RTMPToWirelessSta(pAd, pEntry,
+ Header802_3, sizeof(Header802_3), (PUCHAR) & EAPOLPKT,
+ CONV_ARRARY_TO_UINT16(EAPOLPKT.Body_Len) + 4, TRUE);
+
+ DBGPRINT(RT_DEBUG_TRACE,
+ ("<=== PeerPairMsg1Action: send Msg2 of 4-way \n"));
+}
+
+/*
+ ==========================================================================
+ Description:
+ When receiving the second packet of 4-way pairwisekey handshake.
+ Return:
+ ==========================================================================
+*/
+VOID PeerPairMsg2Action(IN PRTMP_ADAPTER pAd,
+ IN MAC_TABLE_ENTRY * pEntry, IN MLME_QUEUE_ELEM * Elem)
+{
+ UCHAR PTK[80];
+ BOOLEAN Cancelled;
+ PHEADER_802_11 pHeader;
+ EAPOL_PACKET EAPOLPKT;
+ PEAPOL_PACKET pMsg2;
+ UINT MsgLen;
+ UCHAR Header802_3[LENGTH_802_3];
+ UCHAR TxTsc[6];
+ PUINT8 pBssid = NULL;
+ PUINT8 pmk_ptr = NULL;
+ PUINT8 gtk_ptr = NULL;
+ UCHAR default_key = 0;
+ UCHAR group_cipher = Ndis802_11WEPDisabled;
+ PUINT8 rsnie_ptr = NULL;
+ UCHAR rsnie_len = 0;
+
+ DBGPRINT(RT_DEBUG_TRACE, ("===> PeerPairMsg2Action \n"));
+
+ if ((!pEntry) || (!pEntry->ValidAsCLI))
+ return;
+
+ if (Elem->MsgLen <
+ (LENGTH_802_11 + LENGTH_802_1_H + LENGTH_EAPOL_H +
+ sizeof(KEY_DESCRIPTER) - MAX_LEN_OF_RSNIE - 2))
+ return;
+
+ // check Entry in valid State
+ if (pEntry->WpaState < AS_PTKSTART)
+ return;
+
+ // pointer to 802.11 header
+ pHeader = (PHEADER_802_11) Elem->Msg;
+
+ // skip 802.11_header(24-byte) and LLC_header(8)
+ pMsg2 = (PEAPOL_PACKET) & Elem->Msg[LENGTH_802_11 + LENGTH_802_1_H];
+ MsgLen = Elem->MsgLen - LENGTH_802_11 - LENGTH_802_1_H;
+
+ // Store SNonce
+ NdisMoveMemory(pEntry->SNonce, pMsg2->KeyDesc.KeyNonce,
+ LEN_KEY_DESC_NONCE);
+
+ {
+ // Derive PTK
+ WpaDerivePTK(pAd, (UCHAR *) pmk_ptr, pEntry->ANonce, // ANONCE
+ (UCHAR *) pBssid, pEntry->SNonce, // SNONCE
+ pEntry->Addr, PTK, LEN_PTK);
+
+ NdisMoveMemory(pEntry->PTK, PTK, LEN_PTK);
+ }
+
+ // Sanity Check peer Pairwise message 2 - Replay Counter, MIC, RSNIE
+ if (PeerWpaMessageSanity(pAd, pMsg2, MsgLen, EAPOL_PAIR_MSG_2, pEntry)
+ == FALSE)
+ return;
+
+ do {
+ // delete retry timer
+ RTMPCancelTimer(&pEntry->RetryTimer, &Cancelled);
+
+ // Change state
+ pEntry->WpaState = AS_PTKINIT_NEGOTIATING;
+
+ // Increment replay counter by 1
+ ADD_ONE_To_64BIT_VAR(pEntry->R_Counter);
+
+ // Construct EAPoL message - Pairwise Msg 3
+ NdisZeroMemory(&EAPOLPKT, sizeof(EAPOL_PACKET));
+ ConstructEapolMsg(pEntry,
+ group_cipher,
+ EAPOL_PAIR_MSG_3,
+ default_key,
+ pEntry->ANonce,
+ TxTsc,
+ (UCHAR *) gtk_ptr,
+ (UCHAR *) rsnie_ptr, rsnie_len, &EAPOLPKT);
+
+ // Make outgoing frame
+ MAKE_802_3_HEADER(Header802_3, pEntry->Addr, pBssid, EAPOL);
+ RTMPToWirelessSta(pAd, pEntry, Header802_3, LENGTH_802_3,
+ (PUCHAR) & EAPOLPKT,
+ CONV_ARRARY_TO_UINT16(EAPOLPKT.Body_Len) + 4,
+ (pEntry->PortSecured ==
+ WPA_802_1X_PORT_SECURED) ? FALSE : TRUE);
+
+ pEntry->ReTryCounter = PEER_MSG3_RETRY_TIMER_CTR;
+ RTMPSetTimer(&pEntry->RetryTimer, PEER_MSG3_RETRY_EXEC_INTV);
+
+ // Update State
+ pEntry->WpaState = AS_PTKINIT_NEGOTIATING;
+ } while (FALSE);
+
+ DBGPRINT(RT_DEBUG_TRACE,
+ ("<=== PeerPairMsg2Action: send Msg3 of 4-way \n"));
+}
+
+/*
+ ========================================================================
+
+ Routine Description:
+ Process Pairwise key Msg 3 of 4-way handshaking and send Msg 4
+
+ Arguments:
+ pAd Pointer to our adapter
+ Elem Message body
+
+ Return Value:
+ None
+
+ Note:
+
+ ========================================================================
+*/
+VOID PeerPairMsg3Action(IN PRTMP_ADAPTER pAd,
+ IN MAC_TABLE_ENTRY * pEntry, IN MLME_QUEUE_ELEM * Elem)
+{
+ PHEADER_802_11 pHeader;
+ UCHAR Header802_3[14];
+ EAPOL_PACKET EAPOLPKT;
+ PEAPOL_PACKET pMsg3;
+ UINT MsgLen;
+ PUINT8 pCurrentAddr = NULL;
+ UCHAR group_cipher = Ndis802_11WEPDisabled;
+
+ DBGPRINT(RT_DEBUG_TRACE, ("===> PeerPairMsg3Action \n"));
+
+ if ((!pEntry) || ((!pEntry->ValidAsCLI) && (!pEntry->ValidAsApCli)))
+ return;
+
+ if (Elem->MsgLen <
+ (LENGTH_802_11 + LENGTH_802_1_H + LENGTH_EAPOL_H +
+ sizeof(KEY_DESCRIPTER) - MAX_LEN_OF_RSNIE - 2))
+ return;
+
+ {
+ pCurrentAddr = pAd->CurrentAddress;
+ group_cipher = pAd->StaCfg.GroupCipher;
+
+ }
+
+ // Record 802.11 header & the received EAPOL packet Msg3
+ pHeader = (PHEADER_802_11) Elem->Msg;
+ pMsg3 = (PEAPOL_PACKET) & Elem->Msg[LENGTH_802_11 + LENGTH_802_1_H];
+ MsgLen = Elem->MsgLen - LENGTH_802_11 - LENGTH_802_1_H;
+
+ // Sanity Check peer Pairwise message 3 - Replay Counter, MIC, RSNIE
+ if (PeerWpaMessageSanity(pAd, pMsg3, MsgLen, EAPOL_PAIR_MSG_3, pEntry)
+ == FALSE)
+ return;
+
+ // Save Replay counter, it will use construct message 4
+ NdisMoveMemory(pEntry->R_Counter, pMsg3->KeyDesc.ReplayCounter,
+ LEN_KEY_DESC_REPLAY);
+
+ // Double check ANonce
+ if (!NdisEqualMemory
+ (pEntry->ANonce, pMsg3->KeyDesc.KeyNonce, LEN_KEY_DESC_NONCE)) {
+ return;
+ }
+ // Construct EAPoL message - Pairwise Msg 4
+ NdisZeroMemory(&EAPOLPKT, sizeof(EAPOL_PACKET));
+ ConstructEapolMsg(pEntry, group_cipher, EAPOL_PAIR_MSG_4, 0, // group key index not used in message 4
+ NULL, // Nonce not used in message 4
+ NULL, // TxRSC not used in message 4
+ NULL, // GTK not used in message 4
+ NULL, // RSN IE not used in message 4
+ 0, &EAPOLPKT);
+
+ // Update WpaState
+ pEntry->WpaState = AS_PTKINITDONE;
+
+ // Update pairwise key
+ {
+ PCIPHER_KEY pSharedKey;
+
+ pSharedKey = &pAd->SharedKey[BSS0][0];
+
+ NdisMoveMemory(pAd->StaCfg.PTK, pEntry->PTK, LEN_PTK);
+
+ // Prepare pair-wise key information into shared key table
+ NdisZeroMemory(pSharedKey, sizeof(CIPHER_KEY));
+ pSharedKey->KeyLen = LEN_TKIP_EK;
+ NdisMoveMemory(pSharedKey->Key, &pAd->StaCfg.PTK[32],
+ LEN_TKIP_EK);
+ NdisMoveMemory(pSharedKey->RxMic, &pAd->StaCfg.PTK[48],
+ LEN_TKIP_RXMICK);
+ NdisMoveMemory(pSharedKey->TxMic,
+ &pAd->StaCfg.PTK[48 + LEN_TKIP_RXMICK],
+ LEN_TKIP_TXMICK);
+
+ // Decide its ChiperAlg
+ if (pAd->StaCfg.PairCipher == Ndis802_11Encryption2Enabled)
+ pSharedKey->CipherAlg = CIPHER_TKIP;
+ else if (pAd->StaCfg.PairCipher == Ndis802_11Encryption3Enabled)
+ pSharedKey->CipherAlg = CIPHER_AES;
+ else
+ pSharedKey->CipherAlg = CIPHER_NONE;
+
+ // Update these related information to MAC_TABLE_ENTRY
+ pEntry = &pAd->MacTab.Content[BSSID_WCID];
+ NdisMoveMemory(pEntry->PairwiseKey.Key, &pAd->StaCfg.PTK[32],
+ LEN_TKIP_EK);
+ NdisMoveMemory(pEntry->PairwiseKey.RxMic, &pAd->StaCfg.PTK[48],
+ LEN_TKIP_RXMICK);
+ NdisMoveMemory(pEntry->PairwiseKey.TxMic,
+ &pAd->StaCfg.PTK[48 + LEN_TKIP_RXMICK],
+ LEN_TKIP_TXMICK);
+ pEntry->PairwiseKey.CipherAlg = pSharedKey->CipherAlg;
+
+ // Update pairwise key information to ASIC Shared Key Table
+ AsicAddSharedKeyEntry(pAd,
+ BSS0,
+ 0,
+ pSharedKey->CipherAlg,
+ pSharedKey->Key,
+ pSharedKey->TxMic, pSharedKey->RxMic);
+
+ // Update ASIC WCID attribute table and IVEIV table
+ RTMPAddWcidAttributeEntry(pAd,
+ BSS0,
+ 0, pSharedKey->CipherAlg, pEntry);
+
+ }
+
+ // open 802.1x port control and privacy filter
+ if (pEntry->AuthMode == Ndis802_11AuthModeWPA2PSK ||
+ pEntry->AuthMode == Ndis802_11AuthModeWPA2) {
+ pEntry->PortSecured = WPA_802_1X_PORT_SECURED;
+ pEntry->PrivacyFilter = Ndis802_11PrivFilterAcceptAll;
+
+ STA_PORT_SECURED(pAd);
+ // Indicate Connected for GUI
+ pAd->IndicateMediaState = NdisMediaStateConnected;
+ DBGPRINT(RT_DEBUG_TRACE,
+ ("PeerPairMsg3Action: AuthMode(%s) PairwiseCipher(%s) GroupCipher(%s) \n",
+ GetAuthMode(pEntry->AuthMode),
+ GetEncryptType(pEntry->WepStatus),
+ GetEncryptType(group_cipher)));
+ } else {
+ }
+
+ // Init 802.3 header and send out
+ MAKE_802_3_HEADER(Header802_3, pEntry->Addr, pCurrentAddr, EAPOL);
+ RTMPToWirelessSta(pAd, pEntry,
+ Header802_3, sizeof(Header802_3),
+ (PUCHAR) & EAPOLPKT,
+ CONV_ARRARY_TO_UINT16(EAPOLPKT.Body_Len) + 4, TRUE);
+
+ DBGPRINT(RT_DEBUG_TRACE,
+ ("<=== PeerPairMsg3Action: send Msg4 of 4-way \n"));
+}
+
+/*
+ ==========================================================================
+ Description:
+ When receiving the last packet of 4-way pairwisekey handshake.
+ Initilize 2-way groupkey handshake following.
+ Return:
+ ==========================================================================
+*/
+VOID PeerPairMsg4Action(IN PRTMP_ADAPTER pAd,
+ IN MAC_TABLE_ENTRY * pEntry, IN MLME_QUEUE_ELEM * Elem)
+{
+ PEAPOL_PACKET pMsg4;
+ PHEADER_802_11 pHeader;
+ UINT MsgLen;
+ BOOLEAN Cancelled;
+ UCHAR group_cipher = Ndis802_11WEPDisabled;
+
+ DBGPRINT(RT_DEBUG_TRACE, ("===> PeerPairMsg4Action\n"));
+
+ do {
+ if ((!pEntry) || (!pEntry->ValidAsCLI))
+ break;
+
+ if (Elem->MsgLen <
+ (LENGTH_802_11 + LENGTH_802_1_H + LENGTH_EAPOL_H +
+ sizeof(KEY_DESCRIPTER) - MAX_LEN_OF_RSNIE - 2))
+ break;
+
+ if (pEntry->WpaState < AS_PTKINIT_NEGOTIATING)
+ break;
+
+ // pointer to 802.11 header
+ pHeader = (PHEADER_802_11) Elem->Msg;
+
+ // skip 802.11_header(24-byte) and LLC_header(8)
+ pMsg4 =
+ (PEAPOL_PACKET) & Elem->Msg[LENGTH_802_11 + LENGTH_802_1_H];
+ MsgLen = Elem->MsgLen - LENGTH_802_11 - LENGTH_802_1_H;
+
+ // Sanity Check peer Pairwise message 4 - Replay Counter, MIC
+ if (PeerWpaMessageSanity
+ (pAd, pMsg4, MsgLen, EAPOL_PAIR_MSG_4, pEntry) == FALSE)
+ break;
+
+ // 3. uses the MLME.SETKEYS.request to configure PTK into MAC
+ NdisZeroMemory(&pEntry->PairwiseKey, sizeof(CIPHER_KEY));
+
+ // reset IVEIV in Asic
+ AsicUpdateWCIDIVEIV(pAd, pEntry->Aid, 1, 0);
+
+ pEntry->PairwiseKey.KeyLen = LEN_TKIP_EK;
+ NdisMoveMemory(pEntry->PairwiseKey.Key, &pEntry->PTK[32],
+ LEN_TKIP_EK);
+ NdisMoveMemory(pEntry->PairwiseKey.RxMic,
+ &pEntry->PTK[TKIP_AP_RXMICK_OFFSET],
+ LEN_TKIP_RXMICK);
+ NdisMoveMemory(pEntry->PairwiseKey.TxMic,
+ &pEntry->PTK[TKIP_AP_TXMICK_OFFSET],
+ LEN_TKIP_TXMICK);
+
+ // Set pairwise key to Asic
+ {
+ pEntry->PairwiseKey.CipherAlg = CIPHER_NONE;
+ if (pEntry->WepStatus == Ndis802_11Encryption2Enabled)
+ pEntry->PairwiseKey.CipherAlg = CIPHER_TKIP;
+ else if (pEntry->WepStatus ==
+ Ndis802_11Encryption3Enabled)
+ pEntry->PairwiseKey.CipherAlg = CIPHER_AES;
+
+ // Add Pair-wise key to Asic
+ AsicAddPairwiseKeyEntry(pAd,
+ pEntry->Addr,
+ (UCHAR) pEntry->Aid,
+ &pEntry->PairwiseKey);
+
+ // update WCID attribute table and IVEIV table for this entry
+ RTMPAddWcidAttributeEntry(pAd,
+ pEntry->apidx,
+ 0,
+ pEntry->PairwiseKey.CipherAlg,
+ pEntry);
+ }
+
+ // 4. upgrade state
+ pEntry->PrivacyFilter = Ndis802_11PrivFilterAcceptAll;
+ pEntry->WpaState = AS_PTKINITDONE;
+ pEntry->PortSecured = WPA_802_1X_PORT_SECURED;
+
+ if (pEntry->AuthMode == Ndis802_11AuthModeWPA2 ||
+ pEntry->AuthMode == Ndis802_11AuthModeWPA2PSK) {
+ pEntry->GTKState = REKEY_ESTABLISHED;
+ RTMPCancelTimer(&pEntry->RetryTimer, &Cancelled);
+
+ // send wireless event - for set key done WPA2
+ if (pAd->CommonCfg.bWirelessEvent)
+ RTMPSendWirelessEvent(pAd,
+ IW_SET_KEY_DONE_WPA2_EVENT_FLAG,
+ pEntry->Addr,
+ pEntry->apidx, 0);
+
+ DBGPRINT(RT_DEBUG_OFF,
+ ("AP SETKEYS DONE - WPA2, AuthMode(%d)=%s, WepStatus(%d)=%s, GroupWepStatus(%d)=%s\n\n",
+ pEntry->AuthMode,
+ GetAuthMode(pEntry->AuthMode),
+ pEntry->WepStatus,
+ GetEncryptType(pEntry->WepStatus),
+ group_cipher, GetEncryptType(group_cipher)));
+ } else {
+ // 5. init Group 2-way handshake if necessary.
+ WPAStart2WayGroupHS(pAd, pEntry);
+
+ pEntry->ReTryCounter = GROUP_MSG1_RETRY_TIMER_CTR;
+ RTMPModTimer(&pEntry->RetryTimer,
+ PEER_MSG3_RETRY_EXEC_INTV);
+ }
+ } while (FALSE);
+
+}
+
+/*
+ ==========================================================================
+ Description:
+ This is a function to send the first packet of 2-way groupkey handshake
+ Return:
+
+ ==========================================================================
+*/
+VOID WPAStart2WayGroupHS(IN PRTMP_ADAPTER pAd, IN MAC_TABLE_ENTRY * pEntry)
+{
+ UCHAR Header802_3[14];
+ UCHAR TxTsc[6];
+ EAPOL_PACKET EAPOLPKT;
+ UCHAR group_cipher = Ndis802_11WEPDisabled;
+ UCHAR default_key = 0;
+ PUINT8 gnonce_ptr = NULL;
+ PUINT8 gtk_ptr = NULL;
+ PUINT8 pBssid = NULL;
+
+ DBGPRINT(RT_DEBUG_TRACE, ("===> WPAStart2WayGroupHS\n"));
+
+ if ((!pEntry) || (!pEntry->ValidAsCLI))
+ return;
+
+ do {
+ // Increment replay counter by 1
+ ADD_ONE_To_64BIT_VAR(pEntry->R_Counter);
+
+ // Construct EAPoL message - Group Msg 1
+ NdisZeroMemory(&EAPOLPKT, sizeof(EAPOL_PACKET));
+ ConstructEapolMsg(pEntry,
+ group_cipher,
+ EAPOL_GROUP_MSG_1,
+ default_key,
+ (UCHAR *) gnonce_ptr,
+ TxTsc, (UCHAR *) gtk_ptr, NULL, 0, &EAPOLPKT);
+
+ // Make outgoing frame
+ MAKE_802_3_HEADER(Header802_3, pEntry->Addr, pBssid, EAPOL);
+ RTMPToWirelessSta(pAd, pEntry,
+ Header802_3, LENGTH_802_3,
+ (PUCHAR) & EAPOLPKT,
+ CONV_ARRARY_TO_UINT16(EAPOLPKT.Body_Len) + 4,
+ FALSE);
+
+ } while (FALSE);
+
+ DBGPRINT(RT_DEBUG_TRACE,
+ ("<=== WPAStart2WayGroupHS : send out Group Message 1 \n"));
+
+ return;
+}
+
+/*
+ ========================================================================
+
+ Routine Description:
+ Process Group key 2-way handshaking
+
+ Arguments:
+ pAd Pointer to our adapter
+ Elem Message body
+
+ Return Value:
+ None
+
+ Note:
+
+ ========================================================================
+*/
+VOID PeerGroupMsg1Action(IN PRTMP_ADAPTER pAd,
+ IN MAC_TABLE_ENTRY * pEntry, IN MLME_QUEUE_ELEM * Elem)
+{
+ UCHAR Header802_3[14];
+ EAPOL_PACKET EAPOLPKT;
+ PEAPOL_PACKET pGroup;
+ UINT MsgLen;
+ BOOLEAN Cancelled;
+ UCHAR default_key = 0;
+ UCHAR group_cipher = Ndis802_11WEPDisabled;
+ PUINT8 pCurrentAddr = NULL;
+
+ DBGPRINT(RT_DEBUG_TRACE, ("===> PeerGroupMsg1Action \n"));
+
+ if ((!pEntry) || ((!pEntry->ValidAsCLI) && (!pEntry->ValidAsApCli)))
+ return;
+
+ {
+ pCurrentAddr = pAd->CurrentAddress;
+ group_cipher = pAd->StaCfg.GroupCipher;
+ default_key = pAd->StaCfg.DefaultKeyId;
+ }
+
+ // Process Group Message 1 frame. skip 802.11 header(24) & LLC_SNAP header(8)
+ pGroup = (PEAPOL_PACKET) & Elem->Msg[LENGTH_802_11 + LENGTH_802_1_H];
+ MsgLen = Elem->MsgLen - LENGTH_802_11 - LENGTH_802_1_H;
+
+ // Sanity Check peer group message 1 - Replay Counter, MIC, RSNIE
+ if (PeerWpaMessageSanity(pAd, pGroup, MsgLen, EAPOL_GROUP_MSG_1, pEntry)
+ == FALSE)
+ return;
+
+ // delete retry timer
+ RTMPCancelTimer(&pEntry->RetryTimer, &Cancelled);
+
+ // Save Replay counter, it will use to construct message 2
+ NdisMoveMemory(pEntry->R_Counter, pGroup->KeyDesc.ReplayCounter,
+ LEN_KEY_DESC_REPLAY);
+
+ // Construct EAPoL message - Group Msg 2
+ NdisZeroMemory(&EAPOLPKT, sizeof(EAPOL_PACKET));
+ ConstructEapolMsg(pEntry, group_cipher, EAPOL_GROUP_MSG_2, default_key, NULL, // Nonce not used
+ NULL, // TxRSC not used
+ NULL, // GTK not used
+ NULL, // RSN IE not used
+ 0, &EAPOLPKT);
+
+ // open 802.1x port control and privacy filter
+ pEntry->PortSecured = WPA_802_1X_PORT_SECURED;
+ pEntry->PrivacyFilter = Ndis802_11PrivFilterAcceptAll;
+
+ STA_PORT_SECURED(pAd);
+ // Indicate Connected for GUI
+ pAd->IndicateMediaState = NdisMediaStateConnected;
+
+ DBGPRINT(RT_DEBUG_TRACE,
+ ("PeerGroupMsg1Action: AuthMode(%s) PairwiseCipher(%s) GroupCipher(%s) \n",
+ GetAuthMode(pEntry->AuthMode),
+ GetEncryptType(pEntry->WepStatus),
+ GetEncryptType(group_cipher)));
+
+ // init header and Fill Packet and send Msg 2 to authenticator
+ MAKE_802_3_HEADER(Header802_3, pEntry->Addr, pCurrentAddr, EAPOL);
+ RTMPToWirelessSta(pAd, pEntry,
+ Header802_3, sizeof(Header802_3),
+ (PUCHAR) & EAPOLPKT,
+ CONV_ARRARY_TO_UINT16(EAPOLPKT.Body_Len) + 4, FALSE);
+
+ DBGPRINT(RT_DEBUG_TRACE,
+ ("<=== PeerGroupMsg1Action: sned group message 2\n"));
+}
+
+/*
+ ==========================================================================
+ Description:
+ When receiving the last packet of 2-way groupkey handshake.
+ Return:
+ ==========================================================================
+*/
+VOID PeerGroupMsg2Action(IN PRTMP_ADAPTER pAd,
+ IN MAC_TABLE_ENTRY * pEntry,
+ IN VOID * Msg, IN UINT MsgLen)
+{
+ UINT Len;
+ PUCHAR pData;
+ BOOLEAN Cancelled;
+ PEAPOL_PACKET pMsg2;
+ UCHAR group_cipher = Ndis802_11WEPDisabled;
+
+ DBGPRINT(RT_DEBUG_TRACE, ("===> PeerGroupMsg2Action \n"));
+
+ do {
+ if ((!pEntry) || (!pEntry->ValidAsCLI))
+ break;
+
+ if (MsgLen <
+ (LENGTH_802_1_H + LENGTH_EAPOL_H + sizeof(KEY_DESCRIPTER) -
+ MAX_LEN_OF_RSNIE - 2))
+ break;
+
+ if (pEntry->WpaState != AS_PTKINITDONE)
+ break;
+
+ pData = (PUCHAR) Msg;
+ pMsg2 = (PEAPOL_PACKET) (pData + LENGTH_802_1_H);
+ Len = MsgLen - LENGTH_802_1_H;
+
+ // Sanity Check peer group message 2 - Replay Counter, MIC
+ if (PeerWpaMessageSanity
+ (pAd, pMsg2, Len, EAPOL_GROUP_MSG_2, pEntry) == FALSE)
+ break;
+
+ // 3. upgrade state
+
+ RTMPCancelTimer(&pEntry->RetryTimer, &Cancelled);
+ pEntry->GTKState = REKEY_ESTABLISHED;
+
+ if ((pEntry->AuthMode == Ndis802_11AuthModeWPA2)
+ || (pEntry->AuthMode == Ndis802_11AuthModeWPA2PSK)) {
+ // send wireless event - for set key done WPA2
+ if (pAd->CommonCfg.bWirelessEvent)
+ RTMPSendWirelessEvent(pAd,
+ IW_SET_KEY_DONE_WPA2_EVENT_FLAG,
+ pEntry->Addr,
+ pEntry->apidx, 0);
+
+ DBGPRINT(RT_DEBUG_OFF,
+ ("AP SETKEYS DONE - WPA2, AuthMode(%d)=%s, WepStatus(%d)=%s, GroupWepStatus(%d)=%s\n\n",
+ pEntry->AuthMode,
+ GetAuthMode(pEntry->AuthMode),
+ pEntry->WepStatus,
+ GetEncryptType(pEntry->WepStatus),
+ group_cipher, GetEncryptType(group_cipher)));
+ } else {
+ // send wireless event - for set key done WPA
+ if (pAd->CommonCfg.bWirelessEvent)
+ RTMPSendWirelessEvent(pAd,
+ IW_SET_KEY_DONE_WPA1_EVENT_FLAG,
+ pEntry->Addr,
+ pEntry->apidx, 0);
+
+ DBGPRINT(RT_DEBUG_OFF,
+ ("AP SETKEYS DONE - WPA1, AuthMode(%d)=%s, WepStatus(%d)=%s, GroupWepStatus(%d)=%s\n\n",
+ pEntry->AuthMode,
+ GetAuthMode(pEntry->AuthMode),
+ pEntry->WepStatus,
+ GetEncryptType(pEntry->WepStatus),
+ group_cipher, GetEncryptType(group_cipher)));
+ }
+ } while (FALSE);
+}
+
+/*
+ ========================================================================
+
+ Routine Description:
+ Classify WPA EAP message type
+
+ Arguments:
+ EAPType Value of EAP message type
+ MsgType Internal Message definition for MLME state machine
+
+ Return Value:
+ TRUE Found appropriate message type
+ FALSE No appropriate message type
+
+ IRQL = DISPATCH_LEVEL
+
+ Note:
+ All these constants are defined in wpa.h
+ For supplicant, there is only EAPOL Key message avaliable
+
+ ========================================================================
+*/
+BOOLEAN WpaMsgTypeSubst(IN UCHAR EAPType, OUT INT * MsgType)
+{
+ switch (EAPType) {
+ case EAPPacket:
+ *MsgType = MT2_EAPPacket;
+ break;
+ case EAPOLStart:
+ *MsgType = MT2_EAPOLStart;
+ break;
+ case EAPOLLogoff:
+ *MsgType = MT2_EAPOLLogoff;
+ break;
+ case EAPOLKey:
+ *MsgType = MT2_EAPOLKey;
+ break;
+ case EAPOLASFAlert:
+ *MsgType = MT2_EAPOLASFAlert;
+ break;
+ default:
+ return FALSE;
+ }
+ return TRUE;
+}
/*
========================================================================
========================================================================
*/
-VOID PRF(
- IN UCHAR *key,
- IN INT key_len,
- IN UCHAR *prefix,
- IN INT prefix_len,
- IN UCHAR *data,
- IN INT data_len,
- OUT UCHAR *output,
- IN INT len)
-{
- INT i;
- UCHAR *input;
- INT currentindex = 0;
- INT total_len;
+VOID PRF(IN UCHAR * key,
+ IN INT key_len,
+ IN UCHAR * prefix,
+ IN INT prefix_len,
+ IN UCHAR * data, IN INT data_len, OUT UCHAR * output, IN INT len)
+{
+ INT i;
+ UCHAR *input;
+ INT currentindex = 0;
+ INT total_len;
// Allocate memory for input
- os_alloc_mem(NULL, (PUCHAR *)&input, 1024);
-
- if (input == NULL)
- {
- DBGPRINT(RT_DEBUG_ERROR, ("!!!PRF: no memory!!!\n"));
- return;
- }
+ os_alloc_mem(NULL, (PUCHAR *) & input, 1024);
+ if (input == NULL) {
+ DBGPRINT(RT_DEBUG_ERROR, ("!!!PRF: no memory!!!\n"));
+ return;
+ }
// Generate concatenation input
NdisMoveMemory(input, prefix, prefix_len);
// Concatenate a single octet containing 0
- input[prefix_len] = 0;
+ input[prefix_len] = 0;
// Concatenate specific data
NdisMoveMemory(&input[prefix_len + 1], data, data_len);
- total_len = prefix_len + 1 + data_len;
+ total_len = prefix_len + 1 + data_len;
// Concatenate a single octet containing 0
// This octet shall be update later
// Iterate to calculate the result by hmac-sha-1
// Then concatenate to last result
- for (i = 0; i < (len + 19) / 20; i++)
- {
- HMAC_SHA1(input, total_len, key, key_len, &output[currentindex]);
- currentindex += 20;
+ for (i = 0; i < (len + 19) / 20; i++) {
+ HMAC_SHA1(key, key_len, input, total_len, &output[currentindex],
+ SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE);
+ currentindex += 20;
// update the last octet
input[total_len - 1]++;
}
- os_free_mem(NULL, input);
+ os_free_mem(NULL, input);
+}
+
+/*
+* F(P, S, c, i) = U1 xor U2 xor ... Uc
+* U1 = PRF(P, S || Int(i))
+* U2 = PRF(P, U1)
+* Uc = PRF(P, Uc-1)
+*/
+
+static void F(char *password, unsigned char *ssid, int ssidlength,
+ int iterations, int count, unsigned char *output)
+{
+ unsigned char digest[36], digest1[SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE];
+ int i, j;
+
+ /* U1 = PRF(P, S || int(i)) */
+ memcpy(digest, ssid, ssidlength);
+ digest[ssidlength] = (unsigned char)((count >> 24) & 0xff);
+ digest[ssidlength + 1] = (unsigned char)((count >> 16) & 0xff);
+ digest[ssidlength + 2] = (unsigned char)((count >> 8) & 0xff);
+ digest[ssidlength + 3] = (unsigned char)(count & 0xff);
+ HMAC_SHA1((unsigned char *)password, (int)strlen(password), digest, ssidlength + 4, digest1, SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE); // for WPA update
+
+ /* output = U1 */
+ memcpy(output, digest1, SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE);
+
+ for (i = 1; i < iterations; i++) {
+ /* Un = PRF(P, Un-1) */
+ HMAC_SHA1((unsigned char *)password, (int)strlen(password), digest1, SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE, digest, SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE); // for WPA update
+ memcpy(digest1, digest, SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE);
+
+ /* output = output xor Un */
+ for (j = 0; j < SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE; j++) {
+ output[j] ^= digest[j];
+ }
+ }
+}
+
+/*
+* password - ascii string up to 63 characters in length
+* ssid - octet string up to 32 octets
+* ssidlength - length of ssid in octets
+* output must be 40 octets in length and outputs 256 bits of key
+*/
+int PasswordHash(PSTRING password, PUCHAR ssid, INT ssidlength, PUCHAR output)
+{
+ if ((strlen(password) > 63) || (ssidlength > 32))
+ return 0;
+
+ F(password, ssid, ssidlength, 4096, 1, output);
+ F(password, ssid, ssidlength, 4096, 2, &output[SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE]);
+ return 1;
}
/*
It shall be called by 4-way handshake processing.
Arguments:
- pAd - pointer to our pAdapter context
+ pAd - pointer to our pAdapter context
PMK - pointer to PMK
ANonce - pointer to ANonce
AA - pointer to Authenticator Address
========================================================================
*/
-VOID WpaCountPTK(
- IN PRTMP_ADAPTER pAd,
- IN UCHAR *PMK,
- IN UCHAR *ANonce,
- IN UCHAR *AA,
- IN UCHAR *SNonce,
- IN UCHAR *SA,
- OUT UCHAR *output,
- IN UINT len)
-{
- UCHAR concatenation[76];
- UINT CurrPos = 0;
- UCHAR temp[32];
- UCHAR Prefix[] = {'P', 'a', 'i', 'r', 'w', 'i', 's', 'e', ' ', 'k', 'e', 'y', ' ',
- 'e', 'x', 'p', 'a', 'n', 's', 'i', 'o', 'n'};
+VOID WpaDerivePTK(IN PRTMP_ADAPTER pAd,
+ IN UCHAR * PMK,
+ IN UCHAR * ANonce,
+ IN UCHAR * AA,
+ IN UCHAR * SNonce,
+ IN UCHAR * SA, OUT UCHAR * output, IN UINT len)
+{
+ UCHAR concatenation[76];
+ UINT CurrPos = 0;
+ UCHAR temp[32];
+ UCHAR Prefix[] =
+ { 'P', 'a', 'i', 'r', 'w', 'i', 's', 'e', ' ', 'k', 'e', 'y', ' ',
+ 'e', 'x', 'p', 'a', 'n', 's', 'i', 'o', 'n'
+ };
// initiate the concatenation input
NdisZeroMemory(temp, sizeof(temp));
========================================================================
*/
-VOID GenRandom(
- IN PRTMP_ADAPTER pAd,
- IN UCHAR *macAddr,
- OUT UCHAR *random)
+VOID GenRandom(IN PRTMP_ADAPTER pAd, IN UCHAR * macAddr, OUT UCHAR * random)
{
- INT i, curr;
- UCHAR local[80], KeyCounter[32];
- UCHAR result[80];
- ULONG CurrentTime;
- UCHAR prefix[] = {'I', 'n', 'i', 't', ' ', 'C', 'o', 'u', 'n', 't', 'e', 'r'};
+ INT i, curr;
+ UCHAR local[80], KeyCounter[32];
+ UCHAR result[80];
+ ULONG CurrentTime;
+ UCHAR prefix[] =
+ { 'I', 'n', 'i', 't', ' ', 'C', 'o', 'u', 'n', 't', 'e', 'r' };
// Zero the related information
NdisZeroMemory(result, 80);
NdisZeroMemory(local, 80);
NdisZeroMemory(KeyCounter, 32);
- for (i = 0; i < 32; i++)
- {
+ for (i = 0; i < 32; i++) {
// copy the local MAC address
COPY_MAC_ADDR(local, macAddr);
- curr = MAC_ADDR_LEN;
+ curr = MAC_ADDR_LEN;
// concatenate the current time
NdisGetSystemUpTime(&CurrentTime);
- NdisMoveMemory(&local[curr], &CurrentTime, sizeof(CurrentTime));
- curr += sizeof(CurrentTime);
+ NdisMoveMemory(&local[curr], &CurrentTime, sizeof(CurrentTime));
+ curr += sizeof(CurrentTime);
// concatenate the last result
- NdisMoveMemory(&local[curr], result, 32);
- curr += 32;
+ NdisMoveMemory(&local[curr], result, 32);
+ curr += 32;
// concatenate a variable
- NdisMoveMemory(&local[curr], &i, 2);
- curr += 2;
+ NdisMoveMemory(&local[curr], &i, 2);
+ curr += 2;
// calculate the result
- PRF(KeyCounter, 32, prefix,12, local, curr, result, 32);
+ PRF(KeyCounter, 32, prefix, 12, local, curr, result, 32);
}
- NdisMoveMemory(random, result, 32);
+ NdisMoveMemory(random, result, 32);
}
/*
Arguments:
pAd - pointer to our pAdapter context
- ElementID - indicate the WPA1 or WPA2
- WepStatus - indicate the encryption type
+ ElementID - indicate the WPA1 or WPA2
+ WepStatus - indicate the encryption type
bMixCipher - a boolean to indicate the pairwise cipher and group
cipher are the same or not
========================================================================
*/
-static VOID RTMPInsertRsnIeCipher(
- IN PRTMP_ADAPTER pAd,
- IN UCHAR ElementID,
- IN UINT WepStatus,
- IN BOOLEAN bMixCipher,
- IN UCHAR FlexibleCipher,
- OUT PUCHAR pRsnIe,
- OUT UCHAR *rsn_len)
+static VOID RTMPMakeRsnIeCipher(IN PRTMP_ADAPTER pAd,
+ IN UCHAR ElementID,
+ IN UINT WepStatus,
+ IN BOOLEAN bMixCipher,
+ IN UCHAR FlexibleCipher,
+ OUT PUCHAR pRsnIe, OUT UCHAR * rsn_len)
{
- UCHAR PairwiseCnt;
+ UCHAR PairwiseCnt;
*rsn_len = 0;
// decide WPA2 or WPA1
- if (ElementID == Wpa2Ie)
- {
- RSNIE2 *pRsnie_cipher = (RSNIE2*)pRsnIe;
+ if (ElementID == Wpa2Ie) {
+ RSNIE2 *pRsnie_cipher = (RSNIE2 *) pRsnIe;
// Assign the verson as 1
pRsnie_cipher->version = 1;
- switch (WepStatus)
- {
- // TKIP mode
- case Ndis802_11Encryption2Enabled:
- NdisMoveMemory(pRsnie_cipher->mcast, OUI_WPA2_TKIP, 4);
- pRsnie_cipher->ucount = 1;
- NdisMoveMemory(pRsnie_cipher->ucast[0].oui, OUI_WPA2_TKIP, 4);
- *rsn_len = sizeof(RSNIE2);
- break;
+ switch (WepStatus) {
+ // TKIP mode
+ case Ndis802_11Encryption2Enabled:
+ NdisMoveMemory(pRsnie_cipher->mcast, OUI_WPA2_TKIP, 4);
+ pRsnie_cipher->ucount = 1;
+ NdisMoveMemory(pRsnie_cipher->ucast[0].oui,
+ OUI_WPA2_TKIP, 4);
+ *rsn_len = sizeof(RSNIE2);
+ break;
// AES mode
- case Ndis802_11Encryption3Enabled:
- if (bMixCipher)
- NdisMoveMemory(pRsnie_cipher->mcast, OUI_WPA2_TKIP, 4);
- else
- NdisMoveMemory(pRsnie_cipher->mcast, OUI_WPA2_CCMP, 4);
- pRsnie_cipher->ucount = 1;
- NdisMoveMemory(pRsnie_cipher->ucast[0].oui, OUI_WPA2_CCMP, 4);
- *rsn_len = sizeof(RSNIE2);
- break;
+ case Ndis802_11Encryption3Enabled:
+ if (bMixCipher)
+ NdisMoveMemory(pRsnie_cipher->mcast,
+ OUI_WPA2_TKIP, 4);
+ else
+ NdisMoveMemory(pRsnie_cipher->mcast,
+ OUI_WPA2_CCMP, 4);
+ pRsnie_cipher->ucount = 1;
+ NdisMoveMemory(pRsnie_cipher->ucast[0].oui,
+ OUI_WPA2_CCMP, 4);
+ *rsn_len = sizeof(RSNIE2);
+ break;
// TKIP-AES mix mode
- case Ndis802_11Encryption4Enabled:
- NdisMoveMemory(pRsnie_cipher->mcast, OUI_WPA2_TKIP, 4);
-
- PairwiseCnt = 1;
- // Insert WPA2 TKIP as the first pairwise cipher
- if (MIX_CIPHER_WPA2_TKIP_ON(FlexibleCipher))
- {
- NdisMoveMemory(pRsnie_cipher->ucast[0].oui, OUI_WPA2_TKIP, 4);
- // Insert WPA2 AES as the secondary pairwise cipher
- if (MIX_CIPHER_WPA2_AES_ON(FlexibleCipher))
- {
- NdisMoveMemory(pRsnie_cipher->ucast[0].oui + 4, OUI_WPA2_CCMP, 4);
- PairwiseCnt = 2;
- }
- }
- else
- {
- // Insert WPA2 AES as the first pairwise cipher
- NdisMoveMemory(pRsnie_cipher->ucast[0].oui, OUI_WPA2_CCMP, 4);
+ case Ndis802_11Encryption4Enabled:
+ NdisMoveMemory(pRsnie_cipher->mcast, OUI_WPA2_TKIP, 4);
+
+ PairwiseCnt = 1;
+ // Insert WPA2 TKIP as the first pairwise cipher
+ if (MIX_CIPHER_WPA2_TKIP_ON(FlexibleCipher)) {
+ NdisMoveMemory(pRsnie_cipher->ucast[0].oui,
+ OUI_WPA2_TKIP, 4);
+ // Insert WPA2 AES as the secondary pairwise cipher
+ if (MIX_CIPHER_WPA2_AES_ON(FlexibleCipher)) {
+ NdisMoveMemory(pRsnie_cipher->ucast[0].
+ oui + 4, OUI_WPA2_CCMP,
+ 4);
+ PairwiseCnt = 2;
}
+ } else {
+ // Insert WPA2 AES as the first pairwise cipher
+ NdisMoveMemory(pRsnie_cipher->ucast[0].oui,
+ OUI_WPA2_CCMP, 4);
+ }
- pRsnie_cipher->ucount = PairwiseCnt;
- *rsn_len = sizeof(RSNIE2) + (4 * (PairwiseCnt - 1));
- break;
- }
+ pRsnie_cipher->ucount = PairwiseCnt;
+ *rsn_len = sizeof(RSNIE2) + (4 * (PairwiseCnt - 1));
+ break;
+ }
if ((pAd->OpMode == OPMODE_STA) &&
- (pAd->StaCfg.GroupCipher != Ndis802_11Encryption2Enabled) &&
- (pAd->StaCfg.GroupCipher != Ndis802_11Encryption3Enabled))
- {
+ (pAd->StaCfg.GroupCipher != Ndis802_11Encryption2Enabled) &&
+ (pAd->StaCfg.GroupCipher != Ndis802_11Encryption3Enabled)) {
UINT GroupCipher = pAd->StaCfg.GroupCipher;
- switch(GroupCipher)
- {
- case Ndis802_11GroupWEP40Enabled:
- NdisMoveMemory(pRsnie_cipher->mcast, OUI_WPA2_WEP40, 4);
- break;
- case Ndis802_11GroupWEP104Enabled:
- NdisMoveMemory(pRsnie_cipher->mcast, OUI_WPA2_WEP104, 4);
- break;
+ switch (GroupCipher) {
+ case Ndis802_11GroupWEP40Enabled:
+ NdisMoveMemory(pRsnie_cipher->mcast,
+ OUI_WPA2_WEP40, 4);
+ break;
+ case Ndis802_11GroupWEP104Enabled:
+ NdisMoveMemory(pRsnie_cipher->mcast,
+ OUI_WPA2_WEP104, 4);
+ break;
}
}
-
// swap for big-endian platform
pRsnie_cipher->version = cpu2le16(pRsnie_cipher->version);
- pRsnie_cipher->ucount = cpu2le16(pRsnie_cipher->ucount);
- }
- else
- {
- RSNIE *pRsnie_cipher = (RSNIE*)pRsnIe;
+ pRsnie_cipher->ucount = cpu2le16(pRsnie_cipher->ucount);
+ } else {
+ RSNIE *pRsnie_cipher = (RSNIE *) pRsnIe;
// Assign OUI and version
NdisMoveMemory(pRsnie_cipher->oui, OUI_WPA_VERSION, 4);
- pRsnie_cipher->version = 1;
+ pRsnie_cipher->version = 1;
- switch (WepStatus)
- {
+ switch (WepStatus) {
// TKIP mode
- case Ndis802_11Encryption2Enabled:
- NdisMoveMemory(pRsnie_cipher->mcast, OUI_WPA_TKIP, 4);
- pRsnie_cipher->ucount = 1;
- NdisMoveMemory(pRsnie_cipher->ucast[0].oui, OUI_WPA_TKIP, 4);
- *rsn_len = sizeof(RSNIE);
- break;
+ case Ndis802_11Encryption2Enabled:
+ NdisMoveMemory(pRsnie_cipher->mcast, OUI_WPA_TKIP, 4);
+ pRsnie_cipher->ucount = 1;
+ NdisMoveMemory(pRsnie_cipher->ucast[0].oui,
+ OUI_WPA_TKIP, 4);
+ *rsn_len = sizeof(RSNIE);
+ break;
// AES mode
- case Ndis802_11Encryption3Enabled:
- if (bMixCipher)
- NdisMoveMemory(pRsnie_cipher->mcast, OUI_WPA_TKIP, 4);
- else
- NdisMoveMemory(pRsnie_cipher->mcast, OUI_WPA_CCMP, 4);
- pRsnie_cipher->ucount = 1;
- NdisMoveMemory(pRsnie_cipher->ucast[0].oui, OUI_WPA_CCMP, 4);
- *rsn_len = sizeof(RSNIE);
- break;
+ case Ndis802_11Encryption3Enabled:
+ if (bMixCipher)
+ NdisMoveMemory(pRsnie_cipher->mcast,
+ OUI_WPA_TKIP, 4);
+ else
+ NdisMoveMemory(pRsnie_cipher->mcast,
+ OUI_WPA_CCMP, 4);
+ pRsnie_cipher->ucount = 1;
+ NdisMoveMemory(pRsnie_cipher->ucast[0].oui,
+ OUI_WPA_CCMP, 4);
+ *rsn_len = sizeof(RSNIE);
+ break;
// TKIP-AES mix mode
- case Ndis802_11Encryption4Enabled:
- NdisMoveMemory(pRsnie_cipher->mcast, OUI_WPA_TKIP, 4);
-
- PairwiseCnt = 1;
- // Insert WPA TKIP as the first pairwise cipher
- if (MIX_CIPHER_WPA_TKIP_ON(FlexibleCipher))
- {
- NdisMoveMemory(pRsnie_cipher->ucast[0].oui, OUI_WPA_TKIP, 4);
- // Insert WPA AES as the secondary pairwise cipher
- if (MIX_CIPHER_WPA_AES_ON(FlexibleCipher))
- {
- NdisMoveMemory(pRsnie_cipher->ucast[0].oui + 4, OUI_WPA_CCMP, 4);
- PairwiseCnt = 2;
- }
- }
- else
- {
- // Insert WPA AES as the first pairwise cipher
- NdisMoveMemory(pRsnie_cipher->ucast[0].oui, OUI_WPA_CCMP, 4);
+ case Ndis802_11Encryption4Enabled:
+ NdisMoveMemory(pRsnie_cipher->mcast, OUI_WPA_TKIP, 4);
+
+ PairwiseCnt = 1;
+ // Insert WPA TKIP as the first pairwise cipher
+ if (MIX_CIPHER_WPA_TKIP_ON(FlexibleCipher)) {
+ NdisMoveMemory(pRsnie_cipher->ucast[0].oui,
+ OUI_WPA_TKIP, 4);
+ // Insert WPA AES as the secondary pairwise cipher
+ if (MIX_CIPHER_WPA_AES_ON(FlexibleCipher)) {
+ NdisMoveMemory(pRsnie_cipher->ucast[0].
+ oui + 4, OUI_WPA_CCMP,
+ 4);
+ PairwiseCnt = 2;
}
+ } else {
+ // Insert WPA AES as the first pairwise cipher
+ NdisMoveMemory(pRsnie_cipher->ucast[0].oui,
+ OUI_WPA_CCMP, 4);
+ }
- pRsnie_cipher->ucount = PairwiseCnt;
- *rsn_len = sizeof(RSNIE) + (4 * (PairwiseCnt - 1));
- break;
- }
+ pRsnie_cipher->ucount = PairwiseCnt;
+ *rsn_len = sizeof(RSNIE) + (4 * (PairwiseCnt - 1));
+ break;
+ }
if ((pAd->OpMode == OPMODE_STA) &&
- (pAd->StaCfg.GroupCipher != Ndis802_11Encryption2Enabled) &&
- (pAd->StaCfg.GroupCipher != Ndis802_11Encryption3Enabled))
- {
+ (pAd->StaCfg.GroupCipher != Ndis802_11Encryption2Enabled) &&
+ (pAd->StaCfg.GroupCipher != Ndis802_11Encryption3Enabled)) {
UINT GroupCipher = pAd->StaCfg.GroupCipher;
- switch(GroupCipher)
- {
- case Ndis802_11GroupWEP40Enabled:
- NdisMoveMemory(pRsnie_cipher->mcast, OUI_WPA_WEP40, 4);
- break;
- case Ndis802_11GroupWEP104Enabled:
- NdisMoveMemory(pRsnie_cipher->mcast, OUI_WPA_WEP104, 4);
- break;
+ switch (GroupCipher) {
+ case Ndis802_11GroupWEP40Enabled:
+ NdisMoveMemory(pRsnie_cipher->mcast,
+ OUI_WPA_WEP40, 4);
+ break;
+ case Ndis802_11GroupWEP104Enabled:
+ NdisMoveMemory(pRsnie_cipher->mcast,
+ OUI_WPA_WEP104, 4);
+ break;
}
}
-
// swap for big-endian platform
pRsnie_cipher->version = cpu2le16(pRsnie_cipher->version);
- pRsnie_cipher->ucount = cpu2le16(pRsnie_cipher->ucount);
+ pRsnie_cipher->ucount = cpu2le16(pRsnie_cipher->ucount);
}
}
Arguments:
pAd - pointer to our pAdapter context
- ElementID - indicate the WPA1 or WPA2
- AuthMode - indicate the authentication mode
+ ElementID - indicate the WPA1 or WPA2
+ AuthMode - indicate the authentication mode
apidx - indicate the interface index
Return Value:
========================================================================
*/
-static VOID RTMPInsertRsnIeAKM(
- IN PRTMP_ADAPTER pAd,
- IN UCHAR ElementID,
- IN UINT AuthMode,
- IN UCHAR apidx,
- OUT PUCHAR pRsnIe,
- OUT UCHAR *rsn_len)
+static VOID RTMPMakeRsnIeAKM(IN PRTMP_ADAPTER pAd,
+ IN UCHAR ElementID,
+ IN UINT AuthMode,
+ IN UCHAR apidx,
+ OUT PUCHAR pRsnIe, OUT UCHAR * rsn_len)
{
- RSNIE_AUTH *pRsnie_auth;
+ RSNIE_AUTH *pRsnie_auth;
+ UCHAR AkmCnt = 1; // default as 1
- pRsnie_auth = (RSNIE_AUTH*)(pRsnIe + (*rsn_len));
+ pRsnie_auth = (RSNIE_AUTH *) (pRsnIe + (*rsn_len));
// decide WPA2 or WPA1
- if (ElementID == Wpa2Ie)
- {
- switch (AuthMode)
- {
- case Ndis802_11AuthModeWPA2:
- case Ndis802_11AuthModeWPA1WPA2:
- pRsnie_auth->acount = 1;
- NdisMoveMemory(pRsnie_auth->auth[0].oui, OUI_WPA2_8021X_AKM, 4);
- break;
-
- case Ndis802_11AuthModeWPA2PSK:
- case Ndis802_11AuthModeWPA1PSKWPA2PSK:
- pRsnie_auth->acount = 1;
- NdisMoveMemory(pRsnie_auth->auth[0].oui, OUI_WPA2_PSK_AKM, 4);
- break;
- }
- }
- else
- {
- switch (AuthMode)
- {
- case Ndis802_11AuthModeWPA:
- case Ndis802_11AuthModeWPA1WPA2:
- pRsnie_auth->acount = 1;
- NdisMoveMemory(pRsnie_auth->auth[0].oui, OUI_WPA_8021X_AKM, 4);
- break;
-
- case Ndis802_11AuthModeWPAPSK:
- case Ndis802_11AuthModeWPA1PSKWPA2PSK:
- pRsnie_auth->acount = 1;
- NdisMoveMemory(pRsnie_auth->auth[0].oui, OUI_WPA_PSK_AKM, 4);
- break;
-
- case Ndis802_11AuthModeWPANone:
- pRsnie_auth->acount = 1;
- NdisMoveMemory(pRsnie_auth->auth[0].oui, OUI_WPA_NONE_AKM, 4);
- break;
- }
+ if (ElementID == Wpa2Ie) {
+
+ switch (AuthMode) {
+ case Ndis802_11AuthModeWPA2:
+ case Ndis802_11AuthModeWPA1WPA2:
+ NdisMoveMemory(pRsnie_auth->auth[0].oui,
+ OUI_WPA2_8021X_AKM, 4);
+ break;
+
+ case Ndis802_11AuthModeWPA2PSK:
+ case Ndis802_11AuthModeWPA1PSKWPA2PSK:
+ NdisMoveMemory(pRsnie_auth->auth[0].oui,
+ OUI_WPA2_PSK_AKM, 4);
+ break;
+ default:
+ AkmCnt = 0;
+ break;
+
+ }
+ } else {
+ switch (AuthMode) {
+ case Ndis802_11AuthModeWPA:
+ case Ndis802_11AuthModeWPA1WPA2:
+ NdisMoveMemory(pRsnie_auth->auth[0].oui,
+ OUI_WPA_8021X_AKM, 4);
+ break;
+
+ case Ndis802_11AuthModeWPAPSK:
+ case Ndis802_11AuthModeWPA1PSKWPA2PSK:
+ NdisMoveMemory(pRsnie_auth->auth[0].oui,
+ OUI_WPA_PSK_AKM, 4);
+ break;
+
+ case Ndis802_11AuthModeWPANone:
+ NdisMoveMemory(pRsnie_auth->auth[0].oui,
+ OUI_WPA_NONE_AKM, 4);
+ break;
+ default:
+ AkmCnt = 0;
+ break;
+ }
}
+ pRsnie_auth->acount = AkmCnt;
pRsnie_auth->acount = cpu2le16(pRsnie_auth->acount);
- (*rsn_len) += sizeof(RSNIE_AUTH); // update current RSNIE length
+ // update current RSNIE length
+ (*rsn_len) += (sizeof(RSNIE_AUTH) + (4 * (AkmCnt - 1)));
}
Arguments:
pAd - pointer to our pAdapter context
- ElementID - indicate the WPA1 or WPA2
+ ElementID - indicate the WPA1 or WPA2
apidx - indicate the interface index
Return Value:
========================================================================
*/
-static VOID RTMPInsertRsnIeCap(
- IN PRTMP_ADAPTER pAd,
- IN UCHAR ElementID,
- IN UCHAR apidx,
- OUT PUCHAR pRsnIe,
- OUT UCHAR *rsn_len)
+static VOID RTMPMakeRsnIeCap(IN PRTMP_ADAPTER pAd,
+ IN UCHAR ElementID,
+ IN UCHAR apidx,
+ OUT PUCHAR pRsnIe, OUT UCHAR * rsn_len)
{
- RSN_CAPABILITIES *pRSN_Cap;
+ RSN_CAPABILITIES *pRSN_Cap;
// it could be ignored in WPA1 mode
if (ElementID == WpaIe)
return;
- pRSN_Cap = (RSN_CAPABILITIES*)(pRsnIe + (*rsn_len));
-
+ pRSN_Cap = (RSN_CAPABILITIES *) (pRsnIe + (*rsn_len));
pRSN_Cap->word = cpu2le16(pRSN_Cap->word);
}
-
/*
========================================================================
Arguments:
pAd - pointer to our pAdapter context
- AuthMode - indicate the authentication mode
- WepStatus - indicate the encryption type
+ AuthMode - indicate the authentication mode
+ WepStatus - indicate the encryption type
apidx - indicate the interface index
Return Value:
========================================================================
*/
-VOID RTMPMakeRSNIE(
- IN PRTMP_ADAPTER pAd,
- IN UINT AuthMode,
- IN UINT WepStatus,
- IN UCHAR apidx)
-{
- PUCHAR pRsnIe = NULL; // primary RSNIE
- UCHAR *rsnielen_cur_p = 0; // the length of the primary RSNIE
- UCHAR *rsnielen_ex_cur_p = 0; // the length of the secondary RSNIE
- UCHAR PrimaryRsnie;
- BOOLEAN bMixCipher = FALSE; // indicate the pairwise and group cipher are different
- UCHAR p_offset;
- WPA_MIX_PAIR_CIPHER FlexibleCipher = WPA_TKIPAES_WPA2_TKIPAES; // it provide the more flexible cipher combination in WPA-WPA2 and TKIPAES mode
+VOID RTMPMakeRSNIE(IN PRTMP_ADAPTER pAd,
+ IN UINT AuthMode, IN UINT WepStatus, IN UCHAR apidx)
+{
+ PUCHAR pRsnIe = NULL; // primary RSNIE
+ UCHAR *rsnielen_cur_p = 0; // the length of the primary RSNIE
+ UCHAR *rsnielen_ex_cur_p = 0; // the length of the secondary RSNIE
+ UCHAR PrimaryRsnie;
+ BOOLEAN bMixCipher = FALSE; // indicate the pairwise and group cipher are different
+ UCHAR p_offset;
+ WPA_MIX_PAIR_CIPHER FlexibleCipher = WPA_TKIPAES_WPA2_TKIPAES; // it provide the more flexible cipher combination in WPA-WPA2 and TKIPAES mode
rsnielen_cur_p = NULL;
rsnielen_ex_cur_p = NULL;
{
{
- if (pAd->StaCfg.WpaSupplicantUP != WPA_SUPPLICANT_DISABLE)
- {
+ if (pAd->StaCfg.WpaSupplicantUP !=
+ WPA_SUPPLICANT_DISABLE) {
if (AuthMode < Ndis802_11AuthModeWPA)
return;
- }
- else
- {
+ } else {
// Support WPAPSK or WPA2PSK in STA-Infra mode
// Support WPANone in STA-Adhoc mode
if ((AuthMode != Ndis802_11AuthModeWPAPSK) &&
- (AuthMode != Ndis802_11AuthModeWPA2PSK) &&
- (AuthMode != Ndis802_11AuthModeWPANone)
- )
+ (AuthMode != Ndis802_11AuthModeWPA2PSK) &&
+ (AuthMode != Ndis802_11AuthModeWPANone)
+ )
return;
}
- DBGPRINT(RT_DEBUG_TRACE,("==> RTMPMakeRSNIE(STA)\n"));
+ DBGPRINT(RT_DEBUG_TRACE, ("==> RTMPMakeRSNIE(STA)\n"));
// Zero RSNIE context
pAd->StaCfg.RSNIE_Len = 0;
// indicate primary RSNIE as WPA or WPA2
if ((AuthMode == Ndis802_11AuthModeWPA) ||
- (AuthMode == Ndis802_11AuthModeWPAPSK) ||
- (AuthMode == Ndis802_11AuthModeWPANone) ||
- (AuthMode == Ndis802_11AuthModeWPA1WPA2) ||
- (AuthMode == Ndis802_11AuthModeWPA1PSKWPA2PSK))
+ (AuthMode == Ndis802_11AuthModeWPAPSK) ||
+ (AuthMode == Ndis802_11AuthModeWPANone) ||
+ (AuthMode == Ndis802_11AuthModeWPA1WPA2) ||
+ (AuthMode == Ndis802_11AuthModeWPA1PSKWPA2PSK))
PrimaryRsnie = WpaIe;
else
PrimaryRsnie = Wpa2Ie;
{
// Build the primary RSNIE
// 1. insert cipher suite
- RTMPInsertRsnIeCipher(pAd, PrimaryRsnie, WepStatus, bMixCipher, FlexibleCipher, pRsnIe, &p_offset);
+ RTMPMakeRsnIeCipher(pAd, PrimaryRsnie, WepStatus, bMixCipher,
+ FlexibleCipher, pRsnIe, &p_offset);
// 2. insert AKM
- RTMPInsertRsnIeAKM(pAd, PrimaryRsnie, AuthMode, apidx, pRsnIe, &p_offset);
+ RTMPMakeRsnIeAKM(pAd, PrimaryRsnie, AuthMode, apidx, pRsnIe,
+ &p_offset);
// 3. insert capability
- RTMPInsertRsnIeCap(pAd, PrimaryRsnie, apidx, pRsnIe, &p_offset);
+ RTMPMakeRsnIeCap(pAd, PrimaryRsnie, apidx, pRsnIe, &p_offset);
}
// 4. update the RSNIE length
hex_dump("The primary RSNIE", pRsnIe, (*rsnielen_cur_p));
-
}
/*
pAd - pointer to our pAdapter context
pEntry - pointer to active entry
pData - the received frame
- DataByteCount - the received frame's length
+ DataByteCount - the received frame's length
FromWhichBSSID - indicate the interface index
Return:
- TRUE - This frame is EAP frame
- FALSE - otherwise
+ TRUE - This frame is EAP frame
+ FALSE - otherwise
==========================================================================
*/
-BOOLEAN RTMPCheckWPAframe(
- IN PRTMP_ADAPTER pAd,
- IN PMAC_TABLE_ENTRY pEntry,
- IN PUCHAR pData,
- IN ULONG DataByteCount,
- IN UCHAR FromWhichBSSID)
-{
- ULONG Body_len;
+BOOLEAN RTMPCheckWPAframe(IN PRTMP_ADAPTER pAd,
+ IN PMAC_TABLE_ENTRY pEntry,
+ IN PUCHAR pData,
+ IN ULONG DataByteCount, IN UCHAR FromWhichBSSID)
+{
+ ULONG Body_len;
BOOLEAN Cancelled;
-
- if(DataByteCount < (LENGTH_802_1_H + LENGTH_EAPOL_H))
- return FALSE;
-
+ if (DataByteCount < (LENGTH_802_1_H + LENGTH_EAPOL_H))
+ return FALSE;
// Skip LLC header
- if (NdisEqualMemory(SNAP_802_1H, pData, 6) ||
- // Cisco 1200 AP may send packet with SNAP_BRIDGE_TUNNEL
- NdisEqualMemory(SNAP_BRIDGE_TUNNEL, pData, 6))
- {
- pData += 6;
- }
+ if (NdisEqualMemory(SNAP_802_1H, pData, 6) ||
+ // Cisco 1200 AP may send packet with SNAP_BRIDGE_TUNNEL
+ NdisEqualMemory(SNAP_BRIDGE_TUNNEL, pData, 6)) {
+ pData += 6;
+ }
// Skip 2-bytes EAPoL type
- if (NdisEqualMemory(EAPOL, pData, 2))
- {
- pData += 2;
- }
- else
- return FALSE;
-
- switch (*(pData+1))
- {
- case EAPPacket:
- Body_len = (*(pData+2)<<8) | (*(pData+3));
- DBGPRINT(RT_DEBUG_TRACE, ("Receive EAP-Packet frame, TYPE = 0, Length = %ld\n", Body_len));
- break;
- case EAPOLStart:
- DBGPRINT(RT_DEBUG_TRACE, ("Receive EAPOL-Start frame, TYPE = 1 \n"));
- if (pEntry->EnqueueEapolStartTimerRunning != EAPOL_START_DISABLE)
- {
- DBGPRINT(RT_DEBUG_TRACE, ("Cancel the EnqueueEapolStartTimerRunning \n"));
- RTMPCancelTimer(&pEntry->EnqueueStartForPSKTimer, &Cancelled);
- pEntry->EnqueueEapolStartTimerRunning = EAPOL_START_DISABLE;
- }
- break;
- case EAPOLLogoff:
- DBGPRINT(RT_DEBUG_TRACE, ("Receive EAPOLLogoff frame, TYPE = 2 \n"));
- break;
- case EAPOLKey:
- Body_len = (*(pData+2)<<8) | (*(pData+3));
- DBGPRINT(RT_DEBUG_TRACE, ("Receive EAPOL-Key frame, TYPE = 3, Length = %ld\n", Body_len));
- break;
- case EAPOLASFAlert:
- DBGPRINT(RT_DEBUG_TRACE, ("Receive EAPOLASFAlert frame, TYPE = 4 \n"));
- break;
- default:
- return FALSE;
-
- }
- return TRUE;
+ if (NdisEqualMemory(EAPOL, pData, 2)) {
+ pData += 2;
+ } else
+ return FALSE;
+
+ switch (*(pData + 1)) {
+ case EAPPacket:
+ Body_len = (*(pData + 2) << 8) | (*(pData + 3));
+ DBGPRINT(RT_DEBUG_TRACE,
+ ("Receive EAP-Packet frame, TYPE = 0, Length = %ld\n",
+ Body_len));
+ break;
+ case EAPOLStart:
+ DBGPRINT(RT_DEBUG_TRACE,
+ ("Receive EAPOL-Start frame, TYPE = 1 \n"));
+ if (pEntry->EnqueueEapolStartTimerRunning !=
+ EAPOL_START_DISABLE) {
+ DBGPRINT(RT_DEBUG_TRACE,
+ ("Cancel the EnqueueEapolStartTimerRunning \n"));
+ RTMPCancelTimer(&pEntry->EnqueueStartForPSKTimer,
+ &Cancelled);
+ pEntry->EnqueueEapolStartTimerRunning =
+ EAPOL_START_DISABLE;
+ }
+ break;
+ case EAPOLLogoff:
+ DBGPRINT(RT_DEBUG_TRACE,
+ ("Receive EAPOLLogoff frame, TYPE = 2 \n"));
+ break;
+ case EAPOLKey:
+ Body_len = (*(pData + 2) << 8) | (*(pData + 3));
+ DBGPRINT(RT_DEBUG_TRACE,
+ ("Receive EAPOL-Key frame, TYPE = 3, Length = %ld\n",
+ Body_len));
+ break;
+ case EAPOLASFAlert:
+ DBGPRINT(RT_DEBUG_TRACE,
+ ("Receive EAPOLASFAlert frame, TYPE = 4 \n"));
+ break;
+ default:
+ return FALSE;
+
+ }
+ return TRUE;
+}
+
+/*
+ ==========================================================================
+ Description:
+ Report the EAP message type
+
+ Arguments:
+ msg - EAPOL_PAIR_MSG_1
+ EAPOL_PAIR_MSG_2
+ EAPOL_PAIR_MSG_3
+ EAPOL_PAIR_MSG_4
+ EAPOL_GROUP_MSG_1
+ EAPOL_GROUP_MSG_2
+
+ Return:
+ message type string
+
+ ==========================================================================
+*/
+PSTRING GetEapolMsgType(CHAR msg)
+{
+ if (msg == EAPOL_PAIR_MSG_1)
+ return "Pairwise Message 1";
+ else if (msg == EAPOL_PAIR_MSG_2)
+ return "Pairwise Message 2";
+ else if (msg == EAPOL_PAIR_MSG_3)
+ return "Pairwise Message 3";
+ else if (msg == EAPOL_PAIR_MSG_4)
+ return "Pairwise Message 4";
+ else if (msg == EAPOL_GROUP_MSG_1)
+ return "Group Message 1";
+ else if (msg == EAPOL_GROUP_MSG_2)
+ return "Group Message 2";
+ else
+ return "Invalid Message";
+}
+
+/*
+ ========================================================================
+
+ Routine Description:
+ Check Sanity RSN IE of EAPoL message
+
+ Arguments:
+
+ Return Value:
+
+ ========================================================================
+*/
+BOOLEAN RTMPCheckRSNIE(IN PRTMP_ADAPTER pAd,
+ IN PUCHAR pData,
+ IN UCHAR DataLen,
+ IN MAC_TABLE_ENTRY * pEntry, OUT UCHAR * Offset)
+{
+ PUCHAR pVIE;
+ UCHAR len;
+ PEID_STRUCT pEid;
+ BOOLEAN result = FALSE;
+
+ pVIE = pData;
+ len = DataLen;
+ *Offset = 0;
+
+ while (len > sizeof(RSNIE2)) {
+ pEid = (PEID_STRUCT) pVIE;
+ // WPA RSN IE
+ if ((pEid->Eid == IE_WPA)
+ && (NdisEqualMemory(pEid->Octet, WPA_OUI, 4))) {
+ if ((pEntry->AuthMode == Ndis802_11AuthModeWPA
+ || pEntry->AuthMode == Ndis802_11AuthModeWPAPSK)
+ &&
+ (NdisEqualMemory
+ (pVIE, pEntry->RSN_IE, pEntry->RSNIE_Len))
+ && (pEntry->RSNIE_Len == (pEid->Len + 2))) {
+ result = TRUE;
+ }
+
+ *Offset += (pEid->Len + 2);
+ }
+ // WPA2 RSN IE
+ else if ((pEid->Eid == IE_RSN)
+ && (NdisEqualMemory(pEid->Octet + 2, RSN_OUI, 3))) {
+ if ((pEntry->AuthMode == Ndis802_11AuthModeWPA2
+ || pEntry->AuthMode == Ndis802_11AuthModeWPA2PSK)
+ && (pEid->Eid == pEntry->RSN_IE[0])
+ && ((pEid->Len + 2) >= pEntry->RSNIE_Len)
+ &&
+ (NdisEqualMemory
+ (pEid->Octet, &pEntry->RSN_IE[2],
+ pEntry->RSNIE_Len - 2))) {
+
+ result = TRUE;
+ }
+
+ *Offset += (pEid->Len + 2);
+ } else {
+ break;
+ }
+
+ pVIE += (pEid->Len + 2);
+ len -= (pEid->Len + 2);
+ }
+
+ return result;
+
}
/*
========================================================================
Routine Description:
- Misc function to decrypt AES body
+ Parse KEYDATA field. KEYDATA[] May contain 2 RSN IE and optionally GTK.
+ GTK is encaptulated in KDE format at p.83 802.11i D10
Arguments:
Return Value:
Note:
- This function references to RFC 3394 for aes key unwrap algorithm.
+ 802.11i D10
========================================================================
*/
-VOID AES_GTK_KEY_UNWRAP(
- IN UCHAR *key,
- OUT UCHAR *plaintext,
- IN UCHAR c_len,
- IN UCHAR *ciphertext)
+BOOLEAN RTMPParseEapolKeyData(IN PRTMP_ADAPTER pAd,
+ IN PUCHAR pKeyData,
+ IN UCHAR KeyDataLen,
+ IN UCHAR GroupKeyIndex,
+ IN UCHAR MsgType,
+ IN BOOLEAN bWPA2, IN MAC_TABLE_ENTRY * pEntry)
+{
+ PKDE_ENCAP pKDE = NULL;
+ PUCHAR pMyKeyData = pKeyData;
+ UCHAR KeyDataLength = KeyDataLen;
+ UCHAR GTKLEN = 0;
+ UCHAR DefaultIdx = 0;
+ UCHAR skip_offset;
+
+ // Verify The RSN IE contained in pairewise_msg_2 && pairewise_msg_3 and skip it
+ if (MsgType == EAPOL_PAIR_MSG_2 || MsgType == EAPOL_PAIR_MSG_3) {
+ // Check RSN IE whether it is WPA2/WPA2PSK
+ if (!RTMPCheckRSNIE
+ (pAd, pKeyData, KeyDataLen, pEntry, &skip_offset)) {
+ // send wireless event - for RSN IE different
+ if (pAd->CommonCfg.bWirelessEvent)
+ RTMPSendWirelessEvent(pAd,
+ IW_RSNIE_DIFF_EVENT_FLAG,
+ pEntry->Addr,
+ pEntry->apidx, 0);
+
+ DBGPRINT(RT_DEBUG_ERROR,
+ ("RSN_IE Different in msg %d of 4-way handshake!\n",
+ MsgType));
+ hex_dump("Receive RSN_IE ", pKeyData, KeyDataLen);
+ hex_dump("Desired RSN_IE ", pEntry->RSN_IE,
+ pEntry->RSNIE_Len);
+
+ return FALSE;
+ } else {
+ if (bWPA2 && MsgType == EAPOL_PAIR_MSG_3) {
+ WpaShowAllsuite(pMyKeyData, skip_offset);
+
+ // skip RSN IE
+ pMyKeyData += skip_offset;
+ KeyDataLength -= skip_offset;
+ DBGPRINT(RT_DEBUG_TRACE,
+ ("RTMPParseEapolKeyData ==> WPA2/WPA2PSK RSN IE matched in Msg 3, Length(%d) \n",
+ skip_offset));
+ } else
+ return TRUE;
+ }
+ }
+
+ DBGPRINT(RT_DEBUG_TRACE,
+ ("RTMPParseEapolKeyData ==> KeyDataLength %d without RSN_IE \n",
+ KeyDataLength));
+ //hex_dump("remain data", pMyKeyData, KeyDataLength);
+ // Parse EKD format in pairwise_msg_3_WPA2 && group_msg_1_WPA2
+ if (bWPA2
+ && (MsgType == EAPOL_PAIR_MSG_3 || MsgType == EAPOL_GROUP_MSG_1)) {
+ if (KeyDataLength >= 8) // KDE format exclude GTK length
+ {
+ pKDE = (PKDE_ENCAP) pMyKeyData;
+
+ DefaultIdx = pKDE->GTKEncap.Kid;
+
+ // Sanity check - KED length
+ if (KeyDataLength < (pKDE->Len + 2)) {
+ DBGPRINT(RT_DEBUG_ERROR,
+ ("ERROR: The len from KDE is too short \n"));
+ return FALSE;
+ }
+ // Get GTK length - refer to IEEE 802.11i-2004 p.82
+ GTKLEN = pKDE->Len - 6;
+ if (GTKLEN < LEN_AES_KEY) {
+ DBGPRINT(RT_DEBUG_ERROR,
+ ("ERROR: GTK Key length is too short (%d) \n",
+ GTKLEN));
+ return FALSE;
+ }
+
+ } else {
+ DBGPRINT(RT_DEBUG_ERROR,
+ ("ERROR: KDE format length is too short \n"));
+ return FALSE;
+ }
+
+ DBGPRINT(RT_DEBUG_TRACE,
+ ("GTK in KDE format ,DefaultKeyID=%d, KeyLen=%d \n",
+ DefaultIdx, GTKLEN));
+ // skip it
+ pMyKeyData += 8;
+ KeyDataLength -= 8;
+
+ } else if (!bWPA2 && MsgType == EAPOL_GROUP_MSG_1) {
+ DefaultIdx = GroupKeyIndex;
+ DBGPRINT(RT_DEBUG_TRACE,
+ ("GTK DefaultKeyID=%d \n", DefaultIdx));
+ }
+ // Sanity check - shared key index must be 1 ~ 3
+ if (DefaultIdx < 1 || DefaultIdx > 3) {
+ DBGPRINT(RT_DEBUG_ERROR,
+ ("ERROR: GTK Key index(%d) is invalid in %s %s \n",
+ DefaultIdx, ((bWPA2) ? "WPA2" : "WPA"),
+ GetEapolMsgType(MsgType)));
+ return FALSE;
+ }
+
+ {
+ PCIPHER_KEY pSharedKey;
+
+ // set key material, TxMic and RxMic
+ NdisMoveMemory(pAd->StaCfg.GTK, pMyKeyData, 32);
+ pAd->StaCfg.DefaultKeyId = DefaultIdx;
+
+ pSharedKey = &pAd->SharedKey[BSS0][pAd->StaCfg.DefaultKeyId];
+
+ // Prepare pair-wise key information into shared key table
+ NdisZeroMemory(pSharedKey, sizeof(CIPHER_KEY));
+ pSharedKey->KeyLen = LEN_TKIP_EK;
+ NdisMoveMemory(pSharedKey->Key, pAd->StaCfg.GTK, LEN_TKIP_EK);
+ NdisMoveMemory(pSharedKey->RxMic, &pAd->StaCfg.GTK[16],
+ LEN_TKIP_RXMICK);
+ NdisMoveMemory(pSharedKey->TxMic, &pAd->StaCfg.GTK[24],
+ LEN_TKIP_TXMICK);
+
+ // Update Shared Key CipherAlg
+ pSharedKey->CipherAlg = CIPHER_NONE;
+ if (pAd->StaCfg.GroupCipher == Ndis802_11Encryption2Enabled)
+ pSharedKey->CipherAlg = CIPHER_TKIP;
+ else if (pAd->StaCfg.GroupCipher ==
+ Ndis802_11Encryption3Enabled)
+ pSharedKey->CipherAlg = CIPHER_AES;
+ else if (pAd->StaCfg.GroupCipher == Ndis802_11GroupWEP40Enabled)
+ pSharedKey->CipherAlg = CIPHER_WEP64;
+ else if (pAd->StaCfg.GroupCipher ==
+ Ndis802_11GroupWEP104Enabled)
+ pSharedKey->CipherAlg = CIPHER_WEP128;
+
+ // Update group key information to ASIC Shared Key Table
+ AsicAddSharedKeyEntry(pAd,
+ BSS0,
+ pAd->StaCfg.DefaultKeyId,
+ pSharedKey->CipherAlg,
+ pSharedKey->Key,
+ pSharedKey->TxMic, pSharedKey->RxMic);
+
+ // Update ASIC WCID attribute table and IVEIV table
+ RTMPAddWcidAttributeEntry(pAd,
+ BSS0,
+ pAd->StaCfg.DefaultKeyId,
+ pSharedKey->CipherAlg, NULL);
+ }
+
+ return TRUE;
+
+}
+
+/*
+ ========================================================================
+
+ Routine Description:
+ Construct EAPoL message for WPA handshaking
+ Its format is below,
+
+ +--------------------+
+ | Protocol Version | 1 octet
+ +--------------------+
+ | Protocol Type | 1 octet
+ +--------------------+
+ | Body Length | 2 octets
+ +--------------------+
+ | Descriptor Type | 1 octet
+ +--------------------+
+ | Key Information | 2 octets
+ +--------------------+
+ | Key Length | 1 octet
+ +--------------------+
+ | Key Repaly Counter | 8 octets
+ +--------------------+
+ | Key Nonce | 32 octets
+ +--------------------+
+ | Key IV | 16 octets
+ +--------------------+
+ | Key RSC | 8 octets
+ +--------------------+
+ | Key ID or Reserved | 8 octets
+ +--------------------+
+ | Key MIC | 16 octets
+ +--------------------+
+ | Key Data Length | 2 octets
+ +--------------------+
+ | Key Data | n octets
+ +--------------------+
+
+ Arguments:
+ pAd Pointer to our adapter
+
+ Return Value:
+ None
+
+ Note:
+
+ ========================================================================
+*/
+VOID ConstructEapolMsg(IN PMAC_TABLE_ENTRY pEntry,
+ IN UCHAR GroupKeyWepStatus,
+ IN UCHAR MsgType,
+ IN UCHAR DefaultKeyIdx,
+ IN UCHAR * KeyNonce,
+ IN UCHAR * TxRSC,
+ IN UCHAR * GTK,
+ IN UCHAR * RSNIE,
+ IN UCHAR RSNIE_Len, OUT PEAPOL_PACKET pMsg)
{
- UCHAR A[8], BIN[16], BOUT[16];
- UCHAR xor;
- INT i, j;
- aes_context aesctx;
- UCHAR *R;
- INT num_blocks = c_len/8; // unit:64bits
+ BOOLEAN bWPA2 = FALSE;
+ UCHAR KeyDescVer;
+ // Choose WPA2 or not
+ if ((pEntry->AuthMode == Ndis802_11AuthModeWPA2) ||
+ (pEntry->AuthMode == Ndis802_11AuthModeWPA2PSK))
+ bWPA2 = TRUE;
- os_alloc_mem(NULL, (PUCHAR *)&R, 512);
+ // Init Packet and Fill header
+ pMsg->ProVer = EAPOL_VER;
+ pMsg->ProType = EAPOLKey;
- if (R == NULL)
- {
- DBGPRINT(RT_DEBUG_ERROR, ("!!!AES_GTK_KEY_UNWRAP: no memory!!!\n"));
- return;
- } /* End of if */
+ // Default 95 bytes, the EAPoL-Key descriptor exclude Key-data field
+ SET_UINT16_TO_ARRARY(pMsg->Body_Len, LEN_EAPOL_KEY_MSG);
+
+ // Fill in EAPoL descriptor
+ if (bWPA2)
+ pMsg->KeyDesc.Type = WPA2_KEY_DESC;
+ else
+ pMsg->KeyDesc.Type = WPA1_KEY_DESC;
- // Initialize
- NdisMoveMemory(A, ciphertext, 8);
- //Input plaintext
- for(i = 0; i < (c_len-8); i++)
+ // Key Descriptor Version (bits 0-2) specifies the key descriptor version type
{
- R[ i] = ciphertext[i + 8];
+ // Fill in Key information, refer to IEEE Std 802.11i-2004 page 78
+ // When either the pairwise or the group cipher is AES, the DESC_TYPE_AES(2) shall be used.
+ KeyDescVer =
+ (((pEntry->WepStatus == Ndis802_11Encryption3Enabled)
+ || (GroupKeyWepStatus ==
+ Ndis802_11Encryption3Enabled)) ? (DESC_TYPE_AES)
+ : (DESC_TYPE_TKIP));
}
- rtmp_aes_set_key(&aesctx, key, 128);
+ pMsg->KeyDesc.KeyInfo.KeyDescVer = KeyDescVer;
- for(j = 5; j >= 0; j--)
+ // Specify Key Type as Group(0) or Pairwise(1)
+ if (MsgType >= EAPOL_GROUP_MSG_1)
+ pMsg->KeyDesc.KeyInfo.KeyType = GROUPKEY;
+ else
+ pMsg->KeyDesc.KeyInfo.KeyType = PAIRWISEKEY;
+
+ // Specify Key Index, only group_msg1_WPA1
+ if (!bWPA2 && (MsgType >= EAPOL_GROUP_MSG_1))
+ pMsg->KeyDesc.KeyInfo.KeyIndex = DefaultKeyIdx;
+
+ if (MsgType == EAPOL_PAIR_MSG_3)
+ pMsg->KeyDesc.KeyInfo.Install = 1;
+
+ if ((MsgType == EAPOL_PAIR_MSG_1) || (MsgType == EAPOL_PAIR_MSG_3)
+ || (MsgType == EAPOL_GROUP_MSG_1))
+ pMsg->KeyDesc.KeyInfo.KeyAck = 1;
+
+ if (MsgType != EAPOL_PAIR_MSG_1)
+ pMsg->KeyDesc.KeyInfo.KeyMic = 1;
+
+ if ((bWPA2 && (MsgType >= EAPOL_PAIR_MSG_3)) ||
+ (!bWPA2 && (MsgType >= EAPOL_GROUP_MSG_1))) {
+ pMsg->KeyDesc.KeyInfo.Secure = 1;
+ }
+
+ if (bWPA2 && ((MsgType == EAPOL_PAIR_MSG_3) ||
+ (MsgType == EAPOL_GROUP_MSG_1))) {
+ pMsg->KeyDesc.KeyInfo.EKD_DL = 1;
+ }
+ // key Information element has done.
+ *(USHORT *) (&pMsg->KeyDesc.KeyInfo) =
+ cpu2le16(*(USHORT *) (&pMsg->KeyDesc.KeyInfo));
+
+ // Fill in Key Length
{
- for(i = (num_blocks-1); i > 0; i--)
- {
- xor = (num_blocks -1 )* j + i;
- NdisMoveMemory(BIN, A, 8);
- BIN[7] = A[7] ^ xor;
- NdisMoveMemory(&BIN[8], &R[(i-1)*8], 8);
- rtmp_aes_decrypt(&aesctx, BIN, BOUT);
- NdisMoveMemory(A, &BOUT[0], 8);
- NdisMoveMemory(&R[(i-1)*8], &BOUT[8], 8);
+ if (MsgType >= EAPOL_GROUP_MSG_1) {
+ // the length of group key cipher
+ pMsg->KeyDesc.KeyLength[1] =
+ ((GroupKeyWepStatus ==
+ Ndis802_11Encryption2Enabled) ? TKIP_GTK_LENGTH :
+ LEN_AES_KEY);
+ } else {
+ // the length of pairwise key cipher
+ pMsg->KeyDesc.KeyLength[1] =
+ ((pEntry->WepStatus ==
+ Ndis802_11Encryption2Enabled) ? LEN_TKIP_KEY :
+ LEN_AES_KEY);
}
}
- // OUTPUT
- for(i = 0; i < c_len; i++)
- {
- plaintext[i] = R[i];
+ // Fill in replay counter
+ NdisMoveMemory(pMsg->KeyDesc.ReplayCounter, pEntry->R_Counter,
+ LEN_KEY_DESC_REPLAY);
+
+ // Fill Key Nonce field
+ // ANonce : pairwise_msg1 & pairwise_msg3
+ // SNonce : pairwise_msg2
+ // GNonce : group_msg1_wpa1
+ if ((MsgType <= EAPOL_PAIR_MSG_3)
+ || ((!bWPA2 && (MsgType == EAPOL_GROUP_MSG_1))))
+ NdisMoveMemory(pMsg->KeyDesc.KeyNonce, KeyNonce,
+ LEN_KEY_DESC_NONCE);
+
+ // Fill key IV - WPA2 as 0, WPA1 as random
+ if (!bWPA2 && (MsgType == EAPOL_GROUP_MSG_1)) {
+ // Suggest IV be random number plus some number,
+ NdisMoveMemory(pMsg->KeyDesc.KeyIv, &KeyNonce[16],
+ LEN_KEY_DESC_IV);
+ pMsg->KeyDesc.KeyIv[15] += 2;
+ }
+ // Fill Key RSC field
+ // It contains the RSC for the GTK being installed.
+ if ((MsgType == EAPOL_PAIR_MSG_3 && bWPA2)
+ || (MsgType == EAPOL_GROUP_MSG_1)) {
+ NdisMoveMemory(pMsg->KeyDesc.KeyRsc, TxRSC, 6);
+ }
+ // Clear Key MIC field for MIC calculation later
+ NdisZeroMemory(pMsg->KeyDesc.KeyMic, LEN_KEY_DESC_MIC);
+
+ ConstructEapolKeyData(pEntry,
+ GroupKeyWepStatus,
+ KeyDescVer,
+ MsgType,
+ DefaultKeyIdx, GTK, RSNIE, RSNIE_Len, pMsg);
+
+ // Calculate MIC and fill in KeyMic Field except Pairwise Msg 1.
+ if (MsgType != EAPOL_PAIR_MSG_1) {
+ CalculateMIC(KeyDescVer, pEntry->PTK, pMsg);
+ }
+
+ DBGPRINT(RT_DEBUG_TRACE,
+ ("===> ConstructEapolMsg for %s %s\n",
+ ((bWPA2) ? "WPA2" : "WPA"), GetEapolMsgType(MsgType)));
+ DBGPRINT(RT_DEBUG_TRACE,
+ (" Body length = %d \n",
+ CONV_ARRARY_TO_UINT16(pMsg->Body_Len)));
+ DBGPRINT(RT_DEBUG_TRACE,
+ (" Key length = %d \n",
+ CONV_ARRARY_TO_UINT16(pMsg->KeyDesc.KeyLength)));
+
+}
+
+/*
+ ========================================================================
+
+ Routine Description:
+ Construct the Key Data field of EAPoL message
+
+ Arguments:
+ pAd Pointer to our adapter
+ Elem Message body
+
+ Return Value:
+ None
+
+ Note:
+
+ ========================================================================
+*/
+VOID ConstructEapolKeyData(IN PMAC_TABLE_ENTRY pEntry,
+ IN UCHAR GroupKeyWepStatus,
+ IN UCHAR keyDescVer,
+ IN UCHAR MsgType,
+ IN UCHAR DefaultKeyIdx,
+ IN UCHAR * GTK,
+ IN UCHAR * RSNIE,
+ IN UCHAR RSNIE_LEN, OUT PEAPOL_PACKET pMsg)
+{
+ UCHAR *mpool, *Key_Data, *Rc4GTK;
+ UCHAR ekey[(LEN_KEY_DESC_IV + LEN_EAP_EK)];
+ ULONG data_offset;
+ BOOLEAN bWPA2Capable = FALSE;
+ PRTMP_ADAPTER pAd = pEntry->pAd;
+ BOOLEAN GTK_Included = FALSE;
+
+ // Choose WPA2 or not
+ if ((pEntry->AuthMode == Ndis802_11AuthModeWPA2) ||
+ (pEntry->AuthMode == Ndis802_11AuthModeWPA2PSK))
+ bWPA2Capable = TRUE;
+
+ if (MsgType == EAPOL_PAIR_MSG_1 ||
+ MsgType == EAPOL_PAIR_MSG_4 || MsgType == EAPOL_GROUP_MSG_2)
+ return;
+
+ // allocate memory pool
+ os_alloc_mem(NULL, (PUCHAR *) & mpool, 1500);
+
+ if (mpool == NULL)
+ return;
+
+ /* Rc4GTK Len = 512 */
+ Rc4GTK = (UCHAR *) ROUND_UP(mpool, 4);
+ /* Key_Data Len = 512 */
+ Key_Data = (UCHAR *) ROUND_UP(Rc4GTK + 512, 4);
+
+ NdisZeroMemory(Key_Data, 512);
+ SET_UINT16_TO_ARRARY(pMsg->KeyDesc.KeyDataLen, 0);
+ data_offset = 0;
+
+ // Encapsulate RSNIE in pairwise_msg2 & pairwise_msg3
+ if (RSNIE_LEN
+ && ((MsgType == EAPOL_PAIR_MSG_2)
+ || (MsgType == EAPOL_PAIR_MSG_3))) {
+ PUINT8 pmkid_ptr = NULL;
+ UINT8 pmkid_len = 0;
+
+ RTMPInsertRSNIE(&Key_Data[data_offset],
+ &data_offset,
+ RSNIE, RSNIE_LEN, pmkid_ptr, pmkid_len);
+ }
+
+ // Encapsulate KDE format in pairwise_msg3_WPA2 & group_msg1_WPA2
+ if (bWPA2Capable
+ && ((MsgType == EAPOL_PAIR_MSG_3)
+ || (MsgType == EAPOL_GROUP_MSG_1))) {
+ // Key Data Encapsulation (KDE) format - 802.11i-2004 Figure-43w and Table-20h
+ Key_Data[data_offset + 0] = 0xDD;
+
+ if (GroupKeyWepStatus == Ndis802_11Encryption3Enabled) {
+ Key_Data[data_offset + 1] = 0x16; // 4+2+16(OUI+DataType+DataField)
+ } else {
+ Key_Data[data_offset + 1] = 0x26; // 4+2+32(OUI+DataType+DataField)
+ }
+
+ Key_Data[data_offset + 2] = 0x00;
+ Key_Data[data_offset + 3] = 0x0F;
+ Key_Data[data_offset + 4] = 0xAC;
+ Key_Data[data_offset + 5] = 0x01;
+
+ // GTK KDE format - 802.11i-2004 Figure-43x
+ Key_Data[data_offset + 6] = (DefaultKeyIdx & 0x03);
+ Key_Data[data_offset + 7] = 0x00; // Reserved Byte
+
+ data_offset += 8;
+ }
+
+ // Encapsulate GTK
+ // Only for pairwise_msg3_WPA2 and group_msg1
+ if ((MsgType == EAPOL_PAIR_MSG_3 && bWPA2Capable)
+ || (MsgType == EAPOL_GROUP_MSG_1)) {
+ // Fill in GTK
+ if (GroupKeyWepStatus == Ndis802_11Encryption3Enabled) {
+ NdisMoveMemory(&Key_Data[data_offset], GTK,
+ LEN_AES_KEY);
+ data_offset += LEN_AES_KEY;
+ } else {
+ NdisMoveMemory(&Key_Data[data_offset], GTK,
+ TKIP_GTK_LENGTH);
+ data_offset += TKIP_GTK_LENGTH;
+ }
+
+ GTK_Included = TRUE;
+ }
+
+ // This whole key-data field shall be encrypted if a GTK is included.
+ // Encrypt the data material in key data field with KEK
+ if (GTK_Included) {
+ //hex_dump("GTK_Included", Key_Data, data_offset);
+
+ if ((keyDescVer == DESC_TYPE_AES)) {
+ UCHAR remainder = 0;
+ UCHAR pad_len = 0;
+
+ // Key Descriptor Version 2 or 3: AES key wrap, defined in IETF RFC 3394,
+ // shall be used to encrypt the Key Data field using the KEK field from
+ // the derived PTK.
+
+ // If the Key Data field uses the NIST AES key wrap, then the Key Data field
+ // shall be padded before encrypting if the key data length is less than 16
+ // octets or if it is not a multiple of 8. The padding consists of appending
+ // a single octet 0xdd followed by zero or more 0x00 octets.
+ if ((remainder = data_offset & 0x07) != 0) {
+ INT i;
+
+ pad_len = (8 - remainder);
+ Key_Data[data_offset] = 0xDD;
+ for (i = 1; i < pad_len; i++)
+ Key_Data[data_offset + i] = 0;
+
+ data_offset += pad_len;
+ }
+
+ AES_GTK_KEY_WRAP(&pEntry->PTK[16], Key_Data,
+ data_offset, Rc4GTK);
+ // AES wrap function will grow 8 bytes in length
+ data_offset += 8;
+ } else {
+ /* Key Descriptor Version 1: ARC4 is used to encrypt the Key Data field
+ using the KEK field from the derived PTK. */
+
+ // PREPARE Encrypted "Key DATA" field. (Encrypt GTK with RC4, usinf PTK[16]->[31] as Key, IV-field as IV)
+ // put TxTsc in Key RSC field
+ pAd->PrivateInfo.FCSCRC32 = PPPINITFCS32; //Init crc32.
+
+ // ekey is the contanetion of IV-field, and PTK[16]->PTK[31]
+ NdisMoveMemory(ekey, pMsg->KeyDesc.KeyIv,
+ LEN_KEY_DESC_IV);
+ NdisMoveMemory(&ekey[LEN_KEY_DESC_IV], &pEntry->PTK[16],
+ LEN_EAP_EK);
+ ARCFOUR_INIT(&pAd->PrivateInfo.WEPCONTEXT, ekey, sizeof(ekey)); //INIT SBOX, KEYLEN+3(IV)
+ pAd->PrivateInfo.FCSCRC32 =
+ RTMP_CALC_FCS32(pAd->PrivateInfo.FCSCRC32, Key_Data,
+ data_offset);
+ WPAARCFOUR_ENCRYPT(&pAd->PrivateInfo.WEPCONTEXT, Rc4GTK,
+ Key_Data, data_offset);
+ }
+
+ NdisMoveMemory(pMsg->KeyDesc.KeyData, Rc4GTK, data_offset);
+ } else {
+ NdisMoveMemory(pMsg->KeyDesc.KeyData, Key_Data, data_offset);
+ }
+
+ // Update key data length field and total body length
+ SET_UINT16_TO_ARRARY(pMsg->KeyDesc.KeyDataLen, data_offset);
+ INC_UINT16_TO_ARRARY(pMsg->Body_Len, data_offset);
+
+ os_free_mem(NULL, mpool);
+
+}
+
+/*
+ ========================================================================
+
+ Routine Description:
+ Calcaulate MIC. It is used during 4-ways handsharking.
+
+ Arguments:
+ pAd - pointer to our pAdapter context
+ PeerWepStatus - indicate the encryption type
+
+ Return Value:
+
+ Note:
+
+ ========================================================================
+*/
+static VOID CalculateMIC(IN UCHAR KeyDescVer,
+ IN UCHAR * PTK, OUT PEAPOL_PACKET pMsg)
+{
+ UCHAR *OutBuffer;
+ ULONG FrameLen = 0;
+ UCHAR mic[LEN_KEY_DESC_MIC];
+ UCHAR digest[80];
+
+ // allocate memory for MIC calculation
+ os_alloc_mem(NULL, (PUCHAR *) & OutBuffer, 512);
+
+ if (OutBuffer == NULL) {
+ DBGPRINT(RT_DEBUG_ERROR, ("!!!CalculateMIC: no memory!!!\n"));
+ return;
+ }
+ // make a frame for calculating MIC.
+ MakeOutgoingFrame(OutBuffer, &FrameLen,
+ CONV_ARRARY_TO_UINT16(pMsg->Body_Len) + 4, pMsg,
+ END_OF_ARGS);
+
+ NdisZeroMemory(mic, sizeof(mic));
+
+ // Calculate MIC
+ if (KeyDescVer == DESC_TYPE_AES) {
+ HMAC_SHA1(PTK, LEN_EAP_MICK, OutBuffer, FrameLen, digest,
+ SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE);
+ NdisMoveMemory(mic, digest, LEN_KEY_DESC_MIC);
+ } else {
+ HMAC_MD5(PTK, LEN_EAP_MICK, OutBuffer, FrameLen, mic,
+ MD5_DIGEST_SIZE);
+ }
+
+ // store the calculated MIC
+ NdisMoveMemory(pMsg->KeyDesc.KeyMic, mic, LEN_KEY_DESC_MIC);
+
+ os_free_mem(NULL, OutBuffer);
+}
+
+/*
+ ========================================================================
+
+ Routine Description:
+ Some received frames can't decrypt by Asic, so decrypt them by software.
+
+ Arguments:
+ pAd - pointer to our pAdapter context
+ PeerWepStatus - indicate the encryption type
+
+ Return Value:
+ NDIS_STATUS_SUCCESS - decryption successful
+ NDIS_STATUS_FAILURE - decryption failure
+
+ ========================================================================
+*/
+NDIS_STATUS RTMPSoftDecryptBroadCastData(IN PRTMP_ADAPTER pAd,
+ IN RX_BLK * pRxBlk,
+ IN NDIS_802_11_ENCRYPTION_STATUS
+ GroupCipher, IN PCIPHER_KEY pShard_key)
+{
+ PRXWI_STRUC pRxWI = pRxBlk->pRxWI;
+
+ // handle WEP decryption
+ if (GroupCipher == Ndis802_11Encryption1Enabled) {
+ if (RTMPSoftDecryptWEP
+ (pAd, pRxBlk->pData, pRxWI->MPDUtotalByteCount,
+ pShard_key)) {
+
+ //Minus IV[4] & ICV[4]
+ pRxWI->MPDUtotalByteCount -= 8;
+ } else {
+ DBGPRINT(RT_DEBUG_ERROR,
+ ("ERROR : Software decrypt WEP data fails.\n"));
+ // give up this frame
+ return NDIS_STATUS_FAILURE;
+ }
+ }
+ // handle TKIP decryption
+ else if (GroupCipher == Ndis802_11Encryption2Enabled) {
+ if (RTMPSoftDecryptTKIP
+ (pAd, pRxBlk->pData, pRxWI->MPDUtotalByteCount, 0,
+ pShard_key)) {
+
+ //Minus 8 bytes MIC, 8 bytes IV/EIV, 4 bytes ICV
+ pRxWI->MPDUtotalByteCount -= 20;
+ } else {
+ DBGPRINT(RT_DEBUG_ERROR,
+ ("ERROR : RTMPSoftDecryptTKIP Failed\n"));
+ // give up this frame
+ return NDIS_STATUS_FAILURE;
+ }
+ }
+ // handle AES decryption
+ else if (GroupCipher == Ndis802_11Encryption3Enabled) {
+ if (RTMPSoftDecryptAES
+ (pAd, pRxBlk->pData, pRxWI->MPDUtotalByteCount,
+ pShard_key)) {
+
+ //8 bytes MIC, 8 bytes IV/EIV (CCMP Header)
+ pRxWI->MPDUtotalByteCount -= 16;
+ } else {
+ DBGPRINT(RT_DEBUG_ERROR,
+ ("ERROR : RTMPSoftDecryptAES Failed\n"));
+ // give up this frame
+ return NDIS_STATUS_FAILURE;
+ }
+ } else {
+ // give up this frame
+ return NDIS_STATUS_FAILURE;
+ }
+
+ return NDIS_STATUS_SUCCESS;
+
+}
+
+PUINT8 GetSuiteFromRSNIE(IN PUINT8 rsnie,
+ IN UINT rsnie_len, IN UINT8 type, OUT UINT8 * count)
+{
+ PEID_STRUCT pEid;
+ INT len;
+ PUINT8 pBuf;
+ INT offset = 0;
+ PRSNIE_AUTH pAkm;
+ UINT16 acount;
+ BOOLEAN isWPA2 = FALSE;
+
+ pEid = (PEID_STRUCT) rsnie;
+ len = rsnie_len - 2; // exclude IE and length
+ pBuf = (PUINT8) & pEid->Octet[0];
+
+ // set default value
+ *count = 0;
+
+ // Check length
+ if ((len <= 0) || (pEid->Len != len)) {
+ DBGPRINT_ERR(("%s : The length is invalid\n", __func__));
+ return NULL;
+ }
+ // Check WPA or WPA2
+ if (pEid->Eid == IE_WPA) {
+ PRSNIE pRsnie = (PRSNIE) pBuf;
+ UINT16 ucount;
+
+ if (len < sizeof(RSNIE)) {
+ DBGPRINT_ERR(("%s : The length is too short for WPA\n",
+ __func__));
+ return NULL;
+ }
+ // Get the count of pairwise cipher
+ ucount = cpu2le16(pRsnie->ucount);
+ if (ucount > 2) {
+ DBGPRINT_ERR(("%s : The count(%d) of pairwise cipher is invlaid\n", __func__, ucount));
+ return NULL;
+ }
+ // Get the group cipher
+ if (type == GROUP_SUITE) {
+ *count = 1;
+ return pRsnie->mcast;
+ }
+ // Get the pairwise cipher suite
+ else if (type == PAIRWISE_SUITE) {
+ DBGPRINT(RT_DEBUG_TRACE,
+ ("%s : The count of pairwise cipher is %d\n",
+ __func__, ucount));
+ *count = ucount;
+ return pRsnie->ucast[0].oui;
+ }
+
+ offset = sizeof(RSNIE) + (4 * (ucount - 1));
+
+ } else if (pEid->Eid == IE_RSN) {
+ PRSNIE2 pRsnie = (PRSNIE2) pBuf;
+ UINT16 ucount;
+
+ isWPA2 = TRUE;
+
+ if (len < sizeof(RSNIE2)) {
+ DBGPRINT_ERR(("%s : The length is too short for WPA2\n",
+ __func__));
+ return NULL;
+ }
+ // Get the count of pairwise cipher
+ ucount = cpu2le16(pRsnie->ucount);
+ if (ucount > 2) {
+ DBGPRINT_ERR(("%s : The count(%d) of pairwise cipher is invlaid\n", __func__, ucount));
+ return NULL;
+ }
+ // Get the group cipher
+ if (type == GROUP_SUITE) {
+ *count = 1;
+ return pRsnie->mcast;
+ }
+ // Get the pairwise cipher suite
+ else if (type == PAIRWISE_SUITE) {
+ DBGPRINT(RT_DEBUG_TRACE,
+ ("%s : The count of pairwise cipher is %d\n",
+ __func__, ucount));
+ *count = ucount;
+ return pRsnie->ucast[0].oui;
+ }
+
+ offset = sizeof(RSNIE2) + (4 * (ucount - 1));
+
+ } else {
+ DBGPRINT_ERR(("%s : Unknown IE (%d)\n", __func__, pEid->Eid));
+ return NULL;
}
+ // skip group cipher and pairwise cipher suite
+ pBuf += offset;
+ len -= offset;
+
+ if (len < sizeof(RSNIE_AUTH)) {
+ DBGPRINT_ERR(("%s : The length of RSNIE is too short\n",
+ __func__));
+ return NULL;
+ }
+ // pointer to AKM count
+ pAkm = (PRSNIE_AUTH) pBuf;
+
+ // Get the count of pairwise cipher
+ acount = cpu2le16(pAkm->acount);
+ if (acount > 2) {
+ DBGPRINT_ERR(("%s : The count(%d) of AKM is invlaid\n",
+ __func__, acount));
+ return NULL;
+ }
+ // Get the AKM suite
+ if (type == AKM_SUITE) {
+ DBGPRINT(RT_DEBUG_TRACE, ("%s : The count of AKM is %d\n",
+ __func__, acount));
+ *count = acount;
+ return pAkm->auth[0].oui;
+ }
+ offset = sizeof(RSNIE_AUTH) + (4 * (acount - 1));
+
+ pBuf += offset;
+ len -= offset;
+
+ // The remaining length must larger than (RSN-Capability(2) + PMKID-Count(2) + PMKID(16~))
+ if (len >= (sizeof(RSN_CAPABILITIES) + 2 + LEN_PMKID)) {
+ // Skip RSN capability and PMKID-Count
+ pBuf += (sizeof(RSN_CAPABILITIES) + 2);
+ len -= (sizeof(RSN_CAPABILITIES) + 2);
+
+ // Get PMKID
+ if (type == PMKID_LIST) {
+ *count = 1;
+ return pBuf;
+ }
+ } else {
+ DBGPRINT_ERR(("%s : it can't get any more information beyond AKM \n", __func__));
+ return NULL;
+ }
+
+ *count = 0;
+ //DBGPRINT_ERR(("%s : The type(%d) doesn't support \n", __func__, type));
+ return NULL;
+
+}
+
+VOID WpaShowAllsuite(IN PUINT8 rsnie, IN UINT rsnie_len)
+{
+ PUINT8 pSuite = NULL;
+ UINT8 count;
+
+ hex_dump("RSNIE", rsnie, rsnie_len);
+
+ // group cipher
+ if ((pSuite =
+ GetSuiteFromRSNIE(rsnie, rsnie_len, GROUP_SUITE,
+ &count)) != NULL) {
+ hex_dump("group cipher", pSuite, 4 * count);
+ }
+ // pairwise cipher
+ if ((pSuite =
+ GetSuiteFromRSNIE(rsnie, rsnie_len, PAIRWISE_SUITE,
+ &count)) != NULL) {
+ hex_dump("pairwise cipher", pSuite, 4 * count);
+ }
+ // AKM
+ if ((pSuite =
+ GetSuiteFromRSNIE(rsnie, rsnie_len, AKM_SUITE, &count)) != NULL) {
+ hex_dump("AKM suite", pSuite, 4 * count);
+ }
+ // PMKID
+ if ((pSuite =
+ GetSuiteFromRSNIE(rsnie, rsnie_len, PMKID_LIST, &count)) != NULL) {
+ hex_dump("PMKID", pSuite, LEN_PMKID);
+ }
+
+}
+
+VOID RTMPInsertRSNIE(IN PUCHAR pFrameBuf,
+ OUT PULONG pFrameLen,
+ IN PUINT8 rsnie_ptr,
+ IN UINT8 rsnie_len,
+ IN PUINT8 pmkid_ptr, IN UINT8 pmkid_len)
+{
+ PUCHAR pTmpBuf;
+ ULONG TempLen = 0;
+ UINT8 extra_len = 0;
+ UINT16 pmk_count = 0;
+ UCHAR ie_num;
+ UINT8 total_len = 0;
+ UCHAR WPA2_OUI[3] = { 0x00, 0x0F, 0xAC };
+
+ pTmpBuf = pFrameBuf;
+
+ /* PMKID-List Must larger than 0 and the multiple of 16. */
+ if (pmkid_len > 0 && ((pmkid_len & 0x0f) == 0)) {
+ extra_len = sizeof(UINT16) + pmkid_len;
+
+ pmk_count = (pmkid_len >> 4);
+ pmk_count = cpu2le16(pmk_count);
+ } else {
+ DBGPRINT(RT_DEBUG_WARN,
+ ("%s : The length is PMKID-List is invalid (%d), so don't insert it.\n",
+ __func__, pmkid_len));
+ }
+
+ if (rsnie_len != 0) {
+ ie_num = IE_WPA;
+ total_len = rsnie_len;
+
+ if (NdisEqualMemory(rsnie_ptr + 2, WPA2_OUI, sizeof(WPA2_OUI))) {
+ ie_num = IE_RSN;
+ total_len += extra_len;
+ }
+
+ /* construct RSNIE body */
+ MakeOutgoingFrame(pTmpBuf, &TempLen,
+ 1, &ie_num,
+ 1, &total_len,
+ rsnie_len, rsnie_ptr, END_OF_ARGS);
+
+ pTmpBuf += TempLen;
+ *pFrameLen = *pFrameLen + TempLen;
+
+ if (ie_num == IE_RSN) {
+ /* Insert PMKID-List field */
+ if (extra_len > 0) {
+ MakeOutgoingFrame(pTmpBuf, &TempLen,
+ 2, &pmk_count,
+ pmkid_len, pmkid_ptr,
+ END_OF_ARGS);
+
+ pTmpBuf += TempLen;
+ *pFrameLen = *pFrameLen + TempLen;
+ }
+ }
+ }
- os_free_mem(NULL, R);
+ return;
}
git.samba.org / sfrench / cifs-2.6.git / blobdiff