2 Unix SMB/CIFS implementation.
4 Database Glue between Samba and the KDC
6 Copyright (C) Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org> 2005-2009
7 Copyright (C) Simo Sorce <idra@samba.org> 2010
9 This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
10 it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
11 the Free Software Foundation; either version 3 of the License, or
12 (at your option) any later version.
14 This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
15 but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
16 MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the
17 GNU General Public License for more details.
20 You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
21 along with this program. If not, see <http://www.gnu.org/licenses/>.
25 #include "libcli/security/security.h"
26 #include "auth/auth.h"
27 #include "auth/auth_sam.h"
28 #include "dsdb/samdb/samdb.h"
29 #include "dsdb/common/util.h"
30 #include "librpc/gen_ndr/ndr_drsblobs.h"
31 #include "param/param.h"
32 #include "../lib/crypto/md4.h"
33 #include "system/kerberos.h"
34 #include "auth/kerberos/kerberos.h"
36 #include "kdc/samba_kdc.h"
37 #include "kdc/db-glue.h"
39 #define SAMBA_KVNO_GET_KRBTGT(kvno) \
40 ((uint16_t)(((uint32_t)kvno) >> 16))
42 #define SAMBA_KVNO_AND_KRBTGT(kvno, krbtgt) \
43 ((krb5_kvno)((((uint32_t)kvno) & 0xFFFF) | \
44 ((((uint32_t)krbtgt) << 16) & 0xFFFF0000)))
46 enum samba_kdc_ent_type
47 { SAMBA_KDC_ENT_TYPE_CLIENT, SAMBA_KDC_ENT_TYPE_SERVER,
48 SAMBA_KDC_ENT_TYPE_KRBTGT, SAMBA_KDC_ENT_TYPE_TRUST, SAMBA_KDC_ENT_TYPE_ANY };
50 enum trust_direction {
52 INBOUND = LSA_TRUST_DIRECTION_INBOUND,
53 OUTBOUND = LSA_TRUST_DIRECTION_OUTBOUND
56 static const char *trust_attrs[] = {
61 "msDS-SupportedEncryptionTypes",
69 static time_t ldb_msg_find_krb5time_ldap_time(struct ldb_message *msg, const char *attr, time_t default_val)
75 gentime = ldb_msg_find_attr_as_string(msg, attr, NULL);
79 tmp = strptime(gentime, "%Y%m%d%H%M%SZ", &tm);
87 static HDBFlags uf2HDBFlags(krb5_context context, uint32_t userAccountControl, enum samba_kdc_ent_type ent_type)
89 HDBFlags flags = int2HDBFlags(0);
91 /* we don't allow kadmin deletes */
94 /* mark the principal as invalid to start with */
99 /* All accounts are servers, but this may be disabled again in the caller */
102 /* Account types - clear the invalid bit if it turns out to be valid */
103 if (userAccountControl & UF_NORMAL_ACCOUNT) {
104 if (ent_type == SAMBA_KDC_ENT_TYPE_CLIENT || ent_type == SAMBA_KDC_ENT_TYPE_ANY) {
110 if (userAccountControl & UF_INTERDOMAIN_TRUST_ACCOUNT) {
111 if (ent_type == SAMBA_KDC_ENT_TYPE_CLIENT || ent_type == SAMBA_KDC_ENT_TYPE_ANY) {
116 if (userAccountControl & UF_WORKSTATION_TRUST_ACCOUNT) {
117 if (ent_type == SAMBA_KDC_ENT_TYPE_CLIENT || ent_type == SAMBA_KDC_ENT_TYPE_ANY) {
122 if (userAccountControl & UF_SERVER_TRUST_ACCOUNT) {
123 if (ent_type == SAMBA_KDC_ENT_TYPE_CLIENT || ent_type == SAMBA_KDC_ENT_TYPE_ANY) {
129 /* Not permitted to act as a client if disabled */
130 if (userAccountControl & UF_ACCOUNTDISABLE) {
133 if (userAccountControl & UF_LOCKOUT) {
134 flags.locked_out = 1;
137 if (userAccountControl & UF_PASSWORD_NOTREQD) {
142 UF_PASSWORD_CANT_CHANGE and UF_ENCRYPTED_TEXT_PASSWORD_ALLOWED are irrelevent
144 if (userAccountControl & UF_TEMP_DUPLICATE_ACCOUNT) {
148 /* UF_DONT_EXPIRE_PASSWD and UF_USE_DES_KEY_ONLY handled in samba_kdc_message2entry() */
151 if (userAccountControl & UF_MNS_LOGON_ACCOUNT) {
155 if (userAccountControl & UF_SMARTCARD_REQUIRED) {
156 flags.require_hwauth = 1;
158 if (userAccountControl & UF_TRUSTED_FOR_DELEGATION) {
159 flags.ok_as_delegate = 1;
161 if (userAccountControl & UF_TRUSTED_TO_AUTHENTICATE_FOR_DELEGATION) {
163 * this is confusing...
165 * UF_TRUSTED_FOR_DELEGATION
170 * UF_TRUSTED_TO_AUTHENTICATE_FOR_DELEGATION
171 * => trusted_for_delegation
173 flags.trusted_for_delegation = 1;
175 if (!(userAccountControl & UF_NOT_DELEGATED)) {
176 flags.forwardable = 1;
180 if (userAccountControl & UF_DONT_REQUIRE_PREAUTH) {
181 flags.require_preauth = 0;
183 flags.require_preauth = 1;
189 static int samba_kdc_entry_destructor(struct samba_kdc_entry *p)
191 if (p->entry_ex != NULL) {
192 hdb_entry_ex *entry_ex = p->entry_ex;
193 free_hdb_entry(&entry_ex->entry);
199 static void samba_kdc_free_entry(krb5_context context, hdb_entry_ex *entry_ex)
201 /* this function is called only from hdb_free_entry().
202 * Make sure we neutralize the destructor or we will
203 * get a double free later when hdb_free_entry() will
204 * try to call free_hdb_entry() */
205 talloc_set_destructor(entry_ex->ctx, NULL);
207 /* now proceed to free the talloc part */
208 talloc_free(entry_ex->ctx);
211 static krb5_error_code samba_kdc_message2entry_keys(krb5_context context,
212 struct samba_kdc_db_context *kdc_db_ctx,
214 struct ldb_message *msg,
217 uint32_t userAccountControl,
218 enum samba_kdc_ent_type ent_type,
219 hdb_entry_ex *entry_ex)
221 krb5_error_code ret = 0;
222 enum ndr_err_code ndr_err;
223 struct samr_Password *hash;
224 const struct ldb_val *sc_val;
225 struct supplementalCredentialsBlob scb;
226 struct supplementalCredentialsPackage *scpk = NULL;
227 bool newer_keys = false;
228 struct package_PrimaryKerberosBlob _pkb;
229 struct package_PrimaryKerberosCtr3 *pkb3 = NULL;
230 struct package_PrimaryKerberosCtr4 *pkb4 = NULL;
232 uint16_t allocated_keys = 0;
233 int rodc_krbtgt_number = 0;
235 uint32_t supported_enctypes
236 = ldb_msg_find_attr_as_uint(msg,
237 "msDS-SupportedEncryptionTypes",
240 if (rid == DOMAIN_RID_KRBTGT || is_rodc) {
241 /* KDCs (and KDCs on RODCs) use AES */
242 supported_enctypes |= ENC_HMAC_SHA1_96_AES128 | ENC_HMAC_SHA1_96_AES256;
243 } else if (userAccountControl & (UF_PARTIAL_SECRETS_ACCOUNT|UF_SERVER_TRUST_ACCOUNT)) {
244 /* DCs and RODCs comptuer accounts use AES */
245 supported_enctypes |= ENC_HMAC_SHA1_96_AES128 | ENC_HMAC_SHA1_96_AES256;
246 } else if (ent_type == SAMBA_KDC_ENT_TYPE_CLIENT ||
247 (ent_type == SAMBA_KDC_ENT_TYPE_ANY)) {
248 /* for AS-REQ the client chooses the enc types it
249 * supports, and this will vary between computers a
252 * likewise for 'any' return as much as is supported,
253 * to export into a keytab */
254 supported_enctypes = ENC_ALL_TYPES;
257 /* If UF_USE_DES_KEY_ONLY has been set, then don't allow use of the newer enc types */
258 if (userAccountControl & UF_USE_DES_KEY_ONLY) {
259 supported_enctypes = ENC_CRC32|ENC_RSA_MD5;
261 /* Otherwise, add in the default enc types */
262 supported_enctypes |= ENC_CRC32 | ENC_RSA_MD5 | ENC_RC4_HMAC_MD5;
265 /* Is this the krbtgt or a RODC krbtgt */
267 rodc_krbtgt_number = ldb_msg_find_attr_as_int(msg, "msDS-SecondaryKrbTgtNumber", -1);
269 if (rodc_krbtgt_number == -1) {
274 entry_ex->entry.keys.val = NULL;
275 entry_ex->entry.keys.len = 0;
277 kvno = ldb_msg_find_attr_as_int(msg, "msDS-KeyVersionNumber", 0);
279 kvno = SAMBA_KVNO_AND_KRBTGT(kvno, rodc_krbtgt_number);
281 entry_ex->entry.kvno = kvno;
283 /* Get keys from the db */
285 hash = samdb_result_hash(mem_ctx, msg, "unicodePwd");
286 sc_val = ldb_msg_find_ldb_val(msg, "supplementalCredentials");
288 /* unicodePwd for enctype 0x17 (23) if present */
293 /* supplementalCredentials if present */
295 ndr_err = ndr_pull_struct_blob_all(sc_val, mem_ctx, &scb,
296 (ndr_pull_flags_fn_t)ndr_pull_supplementalCredentialsBlob);
297 if (!NDR_ERR_CODE_IS_SUCCESS(ndr_err)) {
298 dump_data(0, sc_val->data, sc_val->length);
303 if (scb.sub.signature != SUPPLEMENTAL_CREDENTIALS_SIGNATURE) {
304 NDR_PRINT_DEBUG(supplementalCredentialsBlob, &scb);
309 for (i=0; i < scb.sub.num_packages; i++) {
310 if (strcmp("Primary:Kerberos-Newer-Keys", scb.sub.packages[i].name) == 0) {
311 scpk = &scb.sub.packages[i];
312 if (!scpk->data || !scpk->data[0]) {
318 } else if (strcmp("Primary:Kerberos", scb.sub.packages[i].name) == 0) {
319 scpk = &scb.sub.packages[i];
320 if (!scpk->data || !scpk->data[0]) {
324 * we don't break here in hope to find
325 * a Kerberos-Newer-Keys package
331 * Primary:Kerberos-Newer-Keys or Primary:Kerberos element
332 * of supplementalCredentials
337 blob = strhex_to_data_blob(mem_ctx, scpk->data);
343 /* we cannot use ndr_pull_struct_blob_all() here, as w2k and w2k3 add padding bytes */
344 ndr_err = ndr_pull_struct_blob(&blob, mem_ctx, &_pkb,
345 (ndr_pull_flags_fn_t)ndr_pull_package_PrimaryKerberosBlob);
346 if (!NDR_ERR_CODE_IS_SUCCESS(ndr_err)) {
348 krb5_set_error_message(context, ret, "samba_kdc_message2entry_keys: could not parse package_PrimaryKerberosBlob");
349 krb5_warnx(context, "samba_kdc_message2entry_keys: could not parse package_PrimaryKerberosBlob");
353 if (newer_keys && _pkb.version != 4) {
355 krb5_set_error_message(context, ret, "samba_kdc_message2entry_keys: Primary:Kerberos-Newer-Keys not version 4");
356 krb5_warnx(context, "samba_kdc_message2entry_keys: Primary:Kerberos-Newer-Keys not version 4");
360 if (!newer_keys && _pkb.version != 3) {
362 krb5_set_error_message(context, ret, "samba_kdc_message2entry_keys: could not parse Primary:Kerberos not version 3");
363 krb5_warnx(context, "samba_kdc_message2entry_keys: could not parse Primary:Kerberos not version 3");
367 if (_pkb.version == 4) {
368 pkb4 = &_pkb.ctr.ctr4;
369 allocated_keys += pkb4->num_keys;
370 } else if (_pkb.version == 3) {
371 pkb3 = &_pkb.ctr.ctr3;
372 allocated_keys += pkb3->num_keys;
376 if (allocated_keys == 0) {
377 if (kdc_db_ctx->rodc) {
378 /* We are on an RODC, but don't have keys for this account. Signal this to the caller */
379 /* TODO: We need to call a generalised version of auth_sam_trigger_repl_secret from here */
380 return HDB_ERR_NOT_FOUND_HERE;
383 /* oh, no password. Apparently (comment in
384 * hdb-ldap.c) this violates the ASN.1, but this
385 * allows an entry with no keys (yet). */
389 /* allocate space to decode into */
390 entry_ex->entry.keys.len = 0;
391 entry_ex->entry.keys.val = calloc(allocated_keys, sizeof(Key));
392 if (entry_ex->entry.keys.val == NULL) {
397 if (hash && (supported_enctypes & ENC_RC4_HMAC_MD5)) {
401 key.salt = NULL; /* No salt for this enc type */
403 ret = smb_krb5_keyblock_init_contents(context,
404 ENCTYPE_ARCFOUR_HMAC,
412 entry_ex->entry.keys.val[entry_ex->entry.keys.len] = key;
413 entry_ex->entry.keys.len++;
417 for (i=0; i < pkb4->num_keys; i++) {
420 if (!pkb4->keys[i].value) continue;
422 if (!(kerberos_enctype_to_bitmap(pkb4->keys[i].keytype) & supported_enctypes)) {
429 if (pkb4->salt.string) {
432 salt = data_blob_string_const(pkb4->salt.string);
434 key.salt = calloc(1, sizeof(*key.salt));
435 if (key.salt == NULL) {
440 key.salt->type = KRB5_PW_SALT;
442 ret = krb5_copy_data_contents(&key.salt->salt,
452 /* TODO: maybe pass the iteration_count somehow... */
454 ret = smb_krb5_keyblock_init_contents(context,
455 pkb4->keys[i].keytype,
456 pkb4->keys[i].value->data,
457 pkb4->keys[i].value->length,
459 if (ret == KRB5_PROG_ETYPE_NOSUPP) {
460 DEBUG(2,("Unsupported keytype ignored - type %u\n",
461 pkb4->keys[i].keytype));
474 entry_ex->entry.keys.val[entry_ex->entry.keys.len] = key;
475 entry_ex->entry.keys.len++;
478 for (i=0; i < pkb3->num_keys; i++) {
481 if (!pkb3->keys[i].value) continue;
483 if (!(kerberos_enctype_to_bitmap(pkb3->keys[i].keytype) & supported_enctypes)) {
490 if (pkb3->salt.string) {
493 salt = data_blob_string_const(pkb3->salt.string);
495 key.salt = calloc(1, sizeof(*key.salt));
496 if (key.salt == NULL) {
501 key.salt->type = KRB5_PW_SALT;
503 ret = krb5_copy_data_contents(&key.salt->salt,
513 ret = smb_krb5_keyblock_init_contents(context,
514 pkb3->keys[i].keytype,
515 pkb3->keys[i].value->data,
516 pkb3->keys[i].value->length,
527 entry_ex->entry.keys.val[entry_ex->entry.keys.len] = key;
528 entry_ex->entry.keys.len++;
534 entry_ex->entry.keys.len = 0;
536 if (entry_ex->entry.keys.len == 0 && entry_ex->entry.keys.val) {
537 free(entry_ex->entry.keys.val);
538 entry_ex->entry.keys.val = NULL;
544 * Construct an hdb_entry from a directory entry.
546 static krb5_error_code samba_kdc_message2entry(krb5_context context,
547 struct samba_kdc_db_context *kdc_db_ctx,
549 krb5_const_principal principal,
550 enum samba_kdc_ent_type ent_type,
552 struct ldb_dn *realm_dn,
553 struct ldb_message *msg,
554 hdb_entry_ex *entry_ex)
556 struct loadparm_context *lp_ctx = kdc_db_ctx->lp_ctx;
557 uint32_t userAccountControl;
558 uint32_t msDS_User_Account_Control_Computed;
560 krb5_error_code ret = 0;
561 krb5_boolean is_computer = FALSE;
563 struct samba_kdc_entry *p;
568 bool is_rodc = false;
569 struct ldb_message_element *objectclasses;
570 struct ldb_val computer_val;
571 const char *samAccountName = ldb_msg_find_attr_as_string(msg, "samAccountName", NULL);
572 computer_val.data = discard_const_p(uint8_t,"computer");
573 computer_val.length = strlen((const char *)computer_val.data);
575 if (ldb_msg_find_element(msg, "msDS-SecondaryKrbTgtNumber")) {
579 if (!samAccountName) {
581 krb5_set_error_message(context, ret, "samba_kdc_message2entry: no samAccountName present");
585 objectclasses = ldb_msg_find_element(msg, "objectClass");
587 if (objectclasses && ldb_msg_find_val(objectclasses, &computer_val)) {
591 ZERO_STRUCTP(entry_ex);
593 p = talloc_zero(mem_ctx, struct samba_kdc_entry);
599 p->kdc_db_ctx = kdc_db_ctx;
600 p->entry_ex = entry_ex;
601 p->realm_dn = talloc_reference(p, realm_dn);
607 talloc_set_destructor(p, samba_kdc_entry_destructor);
609 /* make sure we do not have bogus data in there */
610 memset(&entry_ex->entry, 0, sizeof(hdb_entry));
613 entry_ex->free_entry = samba_kdc_free_entry;
615 userAccountControl = ldb_msg_find_attr_as_uint(msg, "userAccountControl", 0);
617 msDS_User_Account_Control_Computed
618 = ldb_msg_find_attr_as_uint(msg,
619 "msDS-User-Account-Control-Computed",
623 * This brings in the lockout flag, block the account if not
624 * found. We need the weird UF_ACCOUNTDISABLE check because
625 * we do not want to fail open if the value is not returned,
626 * but 0 is a valid value (all OK)
628 if (msDS_User_Account_Control_Computed == UF_ACCOUNTDISABLE) {
630 krb5_set_error_message(context, ret, "samba_kdc_message2entry: "
631 "no msDS-User-Account-Control-Computed present");
634 userAccountControl |= msDS_User_Account_Control_Computed;
638 * If we are set to canonicalize, we get back the fixed UPPER
639 * case realm, and the real username (ie matching LDAP
642 * Otherwise, if we are set to enterprise, we
643 * get back the whole principal as-sent
645 * Finally, if we are not set to canonicalize, we get back the
646 * fixed UPPER case realm, but the as-sent username
649 if (ent_type == SAMBA_KDC_ENT_TYPE_KRBTGT) {
650 if (flags & (HDB_F_CANON)) {
652 * When requested to do so, ensure that the
653 * both realm values in the principal are set
654 * to the upper case, canonical realm
656 ret = smb_krb5_make_principal(context, &entry_ex->entry.principal,
657 lpcfg_realm(lp_ctx), "krbtgt",
658 lpcfg_realm(lp_ctx), NULL);
660 krb5_clear_error_message(context);
663 krb5_principal_set_type(context, entry_ex->entry.principal, KRB5_NT_SRV_INST);
665 ret = krb5_copy_principal(context, principal, &entry_ex->entry.principal);
667 krb5_clear_error_message(context);
671 * this appears to be required regardless of
672 * the canonicalize flag from the client
674 ret = smb_krb5_principal_set_realm(context, entry_ex->entry.principal, lpcfg_realm(lp_ctx));
676 krb5_clear_error_message(context);
681 } else if (ent_type == SAMBA_KDC_ENT_TYPE_ANY && principal == NULL) {
682 ret = smb_krb5_make_principal(context, &entry_ex->entry.principal, lpcfg_realm(lp_ctx), samAccountName, NULL);
684 krb5_clear_error_message(context);
687 } else if (flags & HDB_F_CANON && flags & HDB_F_FOR_AS_REQ) {
689 * HDB_F_CANON maps from the canonicalize flag in the
690 * packet, and has a different meaning between AS-REQ
691 * and TGS-REQ. We only change the principal in the AS-REQ case
693 ret = smb_krb5_make_principal(context, &entry_ex->entry.principal, lpcfg_realm(lp_ctx), samAccountName, NULL);
695 krb5_clear_error_message(context);
699 ret = krb5_copy_principal(context, principal, &entry_ex->entry.principal);
701 krb5_clear_error_message(context);
705 if (smb_krb5_principal_get_type(context, principal) != KRB5_NT_ENTERPRISE_PRINCIPAL) {
706 /* While we have copied the client principal, tests
707 * show that Win2k3 returns the 'corrected' realm, not
708 * the client-specified realm. This code attempts to
709 * replace the client principal's realm with the one
710 * we determine from our records */
712 /* this has to be with malloc() */
713 ret = smb_krb5_principal_set_realm(context, entry_ex->entry.principal, lpcfg_realm(lp_ctx));
715 krb5_clear_error_message(context);
721 /* First try and figure out the flags based on the userAccountControl */
722 entry_ex->entry.flags = uf2HDBFlags(context, userAccountControl, ent_type);
724 /* Windows 2008 seems to enforce this (very sensible) rule by
725 * default - don't allow offline attacks on a user's password
726 * by asking for a ticket to them as a service (encrypted with
727 * their probably patheticly insecure password) */
729 if (entry_ex->entry.flags.server
730 && lpcfg_parm_bool(lp_ctx, NULL, "kdc", "require spn for service", true)) {
731 if (!is_computer && !ldb_msg_find_attr_as_string(msg, "servicePrincipalName", NULL)) {
732 entry_ex->entry.flags.server = 0;
736 * To give the correct type of error to the client, we must
737 * not just return the entry without .server set, we must
738 * pretend the principal does not exist. Otherwise we may
739 * return ERR_POLICY instead of
740 * KRB5KDC_ERR_S_PRINCIPAL_UNKNOWN
742 if (ent_type == SAMBA_KDC_ENT_TYPE_SERVER && entry_ex->entry.flags.server == 0) {
743 ret = HDB_ERR_NOENTRY;
744 krb5_set_error_message(context, ret, "samba_kdc_message2entry: no servicePrincipalName present for this server, refusing with no-such-entry");
747 if (flags & HDB_F_ADMIN_DATA) {
748 /* These (created_by, modified_by) parts of the entry are not relevant for Samba4's use
749 * of the Heimdal KDC. They are stored in a the traditional
750 * DB for audit purposes, and still form part of the structure
753 /* use 'whenCreated' */
754 entry_ex->entry.created_by.time = ldb_msg_find_krb5time_ldap_time(msg, "whenCreated", 0);
755 /* use 'kadmin' for now (needed by mit_samba) */
757 ret = smb_krb5_make_principal(context,
758 &entry_ex->entry.created_by.principal,
759 lpcfg_realm(lp_ctx), "kadmin", NULL);
761 krb5_clear_error_message(context);
765 entry_ex->entry.modified_by = (Event *) malloc(sizeof(Event));
766 if (entry_ex->entry.modified_by == NULL) {
768 krb5_set_error_message(context, ret, "malloc: out of memory");
772 /* use 'whenChanged' */
773 entry_ex->entry.modified_by->time = ldb_msg_find_krb5time_ldap_time(msg, "whenChanged", 0);
774 /* use 'kadmin' for now (needed by mit_samba) */
775 ret = smb_krb5_make_principal(context,
776 &entry_ex->entry.modified_by->principal,
777 lpcfg_realm(lp_ctx), "kadmin", NULL);
779 krb5_clear_error_message(context);
785 /* The lack of password controls etc applies to krbtgt by
786 * virtue of being that particular RID */
787 status = dom_sid_split_rid(NULL, samdb_result_dom_sid(mem_ctx, msg, "objectSid"), NULL, &rid);
789 if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(status)) {
794 if (rid == DOMAIN_RID_KRBTGT) {
797 entry_ex->entry.valid_end = NULL;
798 entry_ex->entry.pw_end = NULL;
800 entry_ex->entry.flags.invalid = 0;
801 entry_ex->entry.flags.server = 1;
803 realm = smb_krb5_principal_get_realm(context, principal);
809 /* Don't mark all requests for the krbtgt/realm as
810 * 'change password', as otherwise we could get into
811 * trouble, and not enforce the password expirty.
812 * Instead, only do it when request is for the kpasswd service */
813 if (ent_type == SAMBA_KDC_ENT_TYPE_SERVER
814 && krb5_princ_size(context, principal) == 2
815 && (strcmp(krb5_principal_get_comp_string(context, principal, 0), "kadmin") == 0)
816 && (strcmp(krb5_principal_get_comp_string(context, principal, 1), "changepw") == 0)
817 && lpcfg_is_my_domain_or_realm(lp_ctx, realm)) {
818 entry_ex->entry.flags.change_pw = 1;
823 entry_ex->entry.flags.client = 0;
824 entry_ex->entry.flags.forwardable = 1;
825 entry_ex->entry.flags.ok_as_delegate = 1;
826 } else if (is_rodc) {
827 /* The RODC krbtgt account is like the main krbtgt,
828 * but it does not have a changepw or kadmin
831 entry_ex->entry.valid_end = NULL;
832 entry_ex->entry.pw_end = NULL;
834 /* Also don't allow the RODC krbtgt to be a client (it should not be needed) */
835 entry_ex->entry.flags.client = 0;
836 entry_ex->entry.flags.invalid = 0;
837 entry_ex->entry.flags.server = 1;
839 entry_ex->entry.flags.client = 0;
840 entry_ex->entry.flags.forwardable = 1;
841 entry_ex->entry.flags.ok_as_delegate = 0;
842 } else if (entry_ex->entry.flags.server && ent_type == SAMBA_KDC_ENT_TYPE_SERVER) {
843 /* The account/password expiry only applies when the account is used as a
844 * client (ie password login), not when used as a server */
846 /* Make very well sure we don't use this for a client,
847 * it could bypass the password restrictions */
848 entry_ex->entry.flags.client = 0;
850 entry_ex->entry.valid_end = NULL;
851 entry_ex->entry.pw_end = NULL;
854 NTTIME must_change_time
855 = samdb_result_force_password_change(kdc_db_ctx->samdb, mem_ctx,
857 if (must_change_time == 0x7FFFFFFFFFFFFFFFULL) {
858 entry_ex->entry.pw_end = NULL;
860 entry_ex->entry.pw_end = malloc(sizeof(*entry_ex->entry.pw_end));
861 if (entry_ex->entry.pw_end == NULL) {
865 *entry_ex->entry.pw_end = nt_time_to_unix(must_change_time);
868 acct_expiry = samdb_result_account_expires(msg);
869 if (acct_expiry == 0x7FFFFFFFFFFFFFFFULL) {
870 entry_ex->entry.valid_end = NULL;
872 entry_ex->entry.valid_end = malloc(sizeof(*entry_ex->entry.valid_end));
873 if (entry_ex->entry.valid_end == NULL) {
877 *entry_ex->entry.valid_end = nt_time_to_unix(acct_expiry);
881 entry_ex->entry.valid_start = NULL;
883 entry_ex->entry.max_life = malloc(sizeof(*entry_ex->entry.max_life));
884 if (entry_ex->entry.max_life == NULL) {
889 if (ent_type == SAMBA_KDC_ENT_TYPE_SERVER) {
890 *entry_ex->entry.max_life = kdc_db_ctx->policy.svc_tkt_lifetime;
891 } else if (ent_type == SAMBA_KDC_ENT_TYPE_KRBTGT || ent_type == SAMBA_KDC_ENT_TYPE_CLIENT) {
892 *entry_ex->entry.max_life = kdc_db_ctx->policy.usr_tkt_lifetime;
894 *entry_ex->entry.max_life = MIN(kdc_db_ctx->policy.svc_tkt_lifetime,
895 kdc_db_ctx->policy.usr_tkt_lifetime);
898 entry_ex->entry.max_renew = malloc(sizeof(*entry_ex->entry.max_life));
899 if (entry_ex->entry.max_renew == NULL) {
904 *entry_ex->entry.max_renew = kdc_db_ctx->policy.renewal_lifetime;
906 /* Get keys from the db */
907 ret = samba_kdc_message2entry_keys(context, kdc_db_ctx, p, msg,
908 rid, is_rodc, userAccountControl,
911 /* Could be bougus data in the entry, or out of memory */
915 entry_ex->entry.etypes = malloc(sizeof(*(entry_ex->entry.etypes)));
916 if (entry_ex->entry.etypes == NULL) {
917 krb5_clear_error_message(context);
921 entry_ex->entry.etypes->len = entry_ex->entry.keys.len;
922 entry_ex->entry.etypes->val = calloc(entry_ex->entry.etypes->len, sizeof(int));
923 if (entry_ex->entry.etypes->val == NULL) {
924 krb5_clear_error_message(context);
928 for (i=0; i < entry_ex->entry.etypes->len; i++) {
929 entry_ex->entry.etypes->val[i] = KRB5_KEY_TYPE(&entry_ex->entry.keys.val[i].key);
933 p->msg = talloc_steal(p, msg);
937 /* This doesn't free ent itself, that is for the eventual caller to do */
938 hdb_free_entry(context, entry_ex);
939 ZERO_STRUCTP(entry_ex);
941 talloc_steal(kdc_db_ctx, entry_ex->ctx);
948 * Construct an hdb_entry from a directory entry.
949 * The kvno is what the remote client asked for
951 static krb5_error_code samba_kdc_trust_message2entry(krb5_context context,
952 struct samba_kdc_db_context *kdc_db_ctx,
953 TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx, krb5_const_principal principal,
954 enum trust_direction direction,
955 struct ldb_dn *realm_dn,
958 struct ldb_message *msg,
959 hdb_entry_ex *entry_ex)
961 struct loadparm_context *lp_ctx = kdc_db_ctx->lp_ctx;
962 const char *dnsdomain;
963 const char *realm = lpcfg_realm(lp_ctx);
964 DATA_BLOB password_utf16 = data_blob_null;
965 DATA_BLOB password_utf8 = data_blob_null;
966 struct samr_Password _password_hash;
967 const struct samr_Password *password_hash = NULL;
968 const struct ldb_val *password_val;
969 struct trustAuthInOutBlob password_blob;
970 struct samba_kdc_entry *p;
972 uint32_t current_kvno;
973 uint32_t num_keys = 0;
974 enum ndr_err_code ndr_err;
975 int ret, trust_direction_flags;
977 struct AuthenticationInformationArray *auth_array;
978 uint32_t supported_enctypes = ENC_RC4_HMAC_MD5;
980 if (dsdb_functional_level(kdc_db_ctx->samdb) >= DS_DOMAIN_FUNCTION_2008) {
981 supported_enctypes = ldb_msg_find_attr_as_uint(msg,
982 "msDS-SupportedEncryptionTypes",
986 trust_direction_flags = ldb_msg_find_attr_as_int(msg, "trustDirection", 0);
988 if (direction == INBOUND) {
989 password_val = ldb_msg_find_ldb_val(msg, "trustAuthIncoming");
991 } else { /* OUTBOUND */
992 dnsdomain = ldb_msg_find_attr_as_string(msg, "trustPartner", NULL);
994 realm = strupper_talloc(mem_ctx, dnsdomain);
995 password_val = ldb_msg_find_ldb_val(msg, "trustAuthOutgoing");
998 if (!password_val || !(trust_direction_flags & direction)) {
999 krb5_clear_error_message(context);
1000 ret = HDB_ERR_NOENTRY;
1004 ndr_err = ndr_pull_struct_blob(password_val, mem_ctx, &password_blob,
1005 (ndr_pull_flags_fn_t)ndr_pull_trustAuthInOutBlob);
1006 if (!NDR_ERR_CODE_IS_SUCCESS(ndr_err)) {
1007 krb5_clear_error_message(context);
1012 p = talloc(mem_ctx, struct samba_kdc_entry);
1018 p->kdc_db_ctx = kdc_db_ctx;
1019 p->entry_ex = entry_ex;
1020 p->realm_dn = realm_dn;
1022 talloc_set_destructor(p, samba_kdc_entry_destructor);
1024 /* make sure we do not have bogus data in there */
1025 memset(&entry_ex->entry, 0, sizeof(hdb_entry));
1028 entry_ex->free_entry = samba_kdc_free_entry;
1030 /* use 'whenCreated' */
1031 entry_ex->entry.created_by.time = ldb_msg_find_krb5time_ldap_time(msg, "whenCreated", 0);
1032 /* use 'kadmin' for now (needed by mit_samba) */
1033 ret = smb_krb5_make_principal(context,
1034 &entry_ex->entry.created_by.principal,
1035 realm, "kadmin", NULL);
1037 krb5_clear_error_message(context);
1041 ret = krb5_copy_principal(context, principal, &entry_ex->entry.principal);
1043 krb5_clear_error_message(context);
1048 * While we have copied the client principal, tests
1049 * show that Win2k3 returns the 'corrected' realm, not
1050 * the client-specified realm. This code attempts to
1051 * replace the client principal's realm with the one
1052 * we determine from our records
1055 ret = smb_krb5_principal_set_realm(context, entry_ex->entry.principal, realm);
1057 krb5_clear_error_message(context);
1061 entry_ex->entry.valid_start = NULL;
1063 /* we need to work out if we are going to use the current or
1064 * the previous password hash.
1065 * We base this on the kvno the client passes in. If the kvno
1066 * passed in is equal to the current kvno in our database then
1067 * we use the current structure. If it is the current kvno-1,
1068 * then we use the previous substrucure.
1071 /* first work out the current kvno */
1073 for (i=0; i < password_blob.count; i++) {
1074 if (password_blob.current.array[i].AuthType == TRUST_AUTH_TYPE_VERSION) {
1075 current_kvno = password_blob.current.array[i].AuthInfo.version.version;
1079 /* work out whether we will use the previous or current
1081 if (password_blob.previous.count == 0) {
1082 /* there is no previous password */
1083 use_previous = false;
1084 } else if (!(flags & HDB_F_KVNO_SPECIFIED) ||
1085 kvno == current_kvno) {
1086 use_previous = false;
1087 } else if ((kvno+1 == current_kvno) ||
1088 (kvno == 255 && current_kvno == 0)) {
1089 use_previous = true;
1091 DEBUG(1,(__location__ ": Request for unknown kvno %u - current kvno is %u\n",
1092 kvno, current_kvno));
1093 krb5_clear_error_message(context);
1094 ret = HDB_ERR_NOENTRY;
1099 auth_array = &password_blob.previous;
1101 auth_array = &password_blob.current;
1104 /* use the kvno the client specified, if available */
1105 if (flags & HDB_F_KVNO_SPECIFIED) {
1106 entry_ex->entry.kvno = kvno;
1108 entry_ex->entry.kvno = current_kvno;
1111 for (i=0; i < auth_array->count; i++) {
1112 if (auth_array->array[i].AuthType == TRUST_AUTH_TYPE_CLEAR) {
1115 password_utf16 = data_blob_const(auth_array->array[i].AuthInfo.clear.password,
1116 auth_array->array[i].AuthInfo.clear.size);
1117 if (password_utf16.length == 0) {
1121 if (supported_enctypes & ENC_RC4_HMAC_MD5) {
1122 mdfour(_password_hash.hash, password_utf16.data, password_utf16.length);
1123 if (password_hash == NULL) {
1126 password_hash = &_password_hash;
1129 if (!(supported_enctypes & (ENC_HMAC_SHA1_96_AES128|ENC_HMAC_SHA1_96_AES256))) {
1133 ok = convert_string_talloc(mem_ctx,
1134 CH_UTF16MUNGED, CH_UTF8,
1135 password_utf16.data,
1136 password_utf16.length,
1137 (void *)&password_utf8.data,
1138 &password_utf8.length);
1140 krb5_clear_error_message(context);
1145 if (supported_enctypes & ENC_HMAC_SHA1_96_AES128) {
1148 if (supported_enctypes & ENC_HMAC_SHA1_96_AES256) {
1152 } else if (auth_array->array[i].AuthType == TRUST_AUTH_TYPE_NT4OWF) {
1153 if (supported_enctypes & ENC_RC4_HMAC_MD5) {
1154 password_hash = &auth_array->array[i].AuthInfo.nt4owf.password;
1160 /* Must have found a cleartext or MD4 password */
1161 if (num_keys == 0) {
1162 DEBUG(1,(__location__ ": no usable key found\n"));
1163 krb5_clear_error_message(context);
1164 ret = HDB_ERR_NOENTRY;
1168 entry_ex->entry.keys.val = calloc(num_keys, sizeof(Key));
1169 if (entry_ex->entry.keys.val == NULL) {
1170 krb5_clear_error_message(context);
1175 if (password_utf8.length != 0) {
1177 krb5_const_principal salt_principal = principal;
1179 krb5_data cleartext_data;
1181 cleartext_data.data = password_utf8.data;
1182 cleartext_data.length = password_utf8.length;
1184 ret = krb5_get_pw_salt(context,
1191 if (supported_enctypes & ENC_HMAC_SHA1_96_AES256) {
1192 ret = krb5_string_to_key_data_salt(context,
1193 ENCTYPE_AES256_CTS_HMAC_SHA1_96,
1198 krb5_free_salt(context, salt);
1202 entry_ex->entry.keys.val[entry_ex->entry.keys.len] = key;
1203 entry_ex->entry.keys.len++;
1206 if (supported_enctypes & ENC_HMAC_SHA1_96_AES128) {
1207 ret = krb5_string_to_key_data_salt(context,
1208 ENCTYPE_AES128_CTS_HMAC_SHA1_96,
1213 krb5_free_salt(context, salt);
1217 entry_ex->entry.keys.val[entry_ex->entry.keys.len] = key;
1218 entry_ex->entry.keys.len++;
1221 krb5_free_salt(context, salt);
1224 if (password_hash != NULL) {
1227 ret = smb_krb5_keyblock_init_contents(context,
1228 ENCTYPE_ARCFOUR_HMAC,
1229 password_hash->hash,
1230 sizeof(password_hash->hash),
1236 entry_ex->entry.keys.val[entry_ex->entry.keys.len] = key;
1237 entry_ex->entry.keys.len++;
1240 entry_ex->entry.flags = int2HDBFlags(0);
1241 entry_ex->entry.flags.immutable = 1;
1242 entry_ex->entry.flags.invalid = 0;
1243 entry_ex->entry.flags.server = 1;
1244 entry_ex->entry.flags.require_preauth = 1;
1246 entry_ex->entry.pw_end = NULL;
1248 entry_ex->entry.max_life = NULL;
1250 entry_ex->entry.max_renew = NULL;
1252 entry_ex->entry.etypes = malloc(sizeof(*(entry_ex->entry.etypes)));
1253 if (entry_ex->entry.etypes == NULL) {
1254 krb5_clear_error_message(context);
1258 entry_ex->entry.etypes->len = entry_ex->entry.keys.len;
1259 entry_ex->entry.etypes->val = calloc(entry_ex->entry.etypes->len, sizeof(int));
1260 if (entry_ex->entry.etypes->val == NULL) {
1261 krb5_clear_error_message(context);
1265 for (i=0; i < entry_ex->entry.etypes->len; i++) {
1266 entry_ex->entry.etypes->val[i] = KRB5_KEY_TYPE(&entry_ex->entry.keys.val[i].key);
1270 p->msg = talloc_steal(p, msg);
1274 /* This doesn't free ent itself, that is for the eventual caller to do */
1275 hdb_free_entry(context, entry_ex);
1277 talloc_steal(kdc_db_ctx, entry_ex->ctx);
1284 static krb5_error_code samba_kdc_lookup_trust(krb5_context context, struct ldb_context *ldb_ctx,
1285 TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx,
1287 struct ldb_dn *realm_dn,
1288 struct ldb_message **pmsg)
1291 const char * const *attrs = trust_attrs;
1293 status = sam_get_results_trust(ldb_ctx,
1294 mem_ctx, realm, realm, attrs,
1296 if (NT_STATUS_IS_OK(status)) {
1298 } else if (NT_STATUS_EQUAL(status, NT_STATUS_NOT_FOUND)) {
1299 return HDB_ERR_NOENTRY;
1300 } else if (NT_STATUS_EQUAL(status, NT_STATUS_NO_MEMORY)) {
1302 krb5_set_error_message(context, ret, "get_sam_result_trust: out of memory");
1306 krb5_set_error_message(context, ret, "get_sam_result_trust: %s", nt_errstr(status));
1311 static krb5_error_code samba_kdc_lookup_client(krb5_context context,
1312 struct samba_kdc_db_context *kdc_db_ctx,
1313 TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx,
1314 krb5_const_principal principal,
1316 struct ldb_dn **realm_dn,
1317 struct ldb_message **msg) {
1319 char *principal_string;
1321 if (smb_krb5_principal_get_type(context, principal) == KRB5_NT_ENTERPRISE_PRINCIPAL) {
1322 principal_string = smb_krb5_principal_get_comp_string(mem_ctx, context,
1324 if (principal_string == NULL) {
1327 nt_status = sam_get_results_principal(kdc_db_ctx->samdb,
1328 mem_ctx, principal_string, attrs,
1330 TALLOC_FREE(principal_string);
1332 krb5_error_code ret;
1333 ret = krb5_unparse_name(context, principal, &principal_string);
1337 nt_status = sam_get_results_principal(kdc_db_ctx->samdb,
1338 mem_ctx, principal_string, attrs,
1340 free(principal_string);
1343 if (NT_STATUS_EQUAL(nt_status, NT_STATUS_NO_SUCH_USER)) {
1344 return HDB_ERR_NOENTRY;
1345 } else if (NT_STATUS_EQUAL(nt_status, NT_STATUS_NO_MEMORY)) {
1347 } else if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(nt_status)) {
1354 static krb5_error_code samba_kdc_fetch_client(krb5_context context,
1355 struct samba_kdc_db_context *kdc_db_ctx,
1356 TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx,
1357 krb5_const_principal principal,
1359 hdb_entry_ex *entry_ex) {
1360 struct ldb_dn *realm_dn;
1361 krb5_error_code ret;
1362 struct ldb_message *msg = NULL;
1364 ret = samba_kdc_lookup_client(context, kdc_db_ctx,
1365 mem_ctx, principal, user_attrs,
1371 ret = samba_kdc_message2entry(context, kdc_db_ctx, mem_ctx,
1372 principal, SAMBA_KDC_ENT_TYPE_CLIENT,
1374 realm_dn, msg, entry_ex);
1378 static krb5_error_code samba_kdc_fetch_krbtgt(krb5_context context,
1379 struct samba_kdc_db_context *kdc_db_ctx,
1380 TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx,
1381 krb5_const_principal principal,
1384 hdb_entry_ex *entry_ex)
1386 struct loadparm_context *lp_ctx = kdc_db_ctx->lp_ctx;
1387 krb5_error_code ret;
1388 struct ldb_message *msg = NULL;
1389 struct ldb_dn *realm_dn = ldb_get_default_basedn(kdc_db_ctx->samdb);
1390 char *realm_from_princ, *realm_from_princ_malloc;
1392 realm_from_princ_malloc = smb_krb5_principal_get_realm(context, principal);
1393 if (realm_from_princ_malloc == NULL) {
1395 return HDB_ERR_NOENTRY;
1397 realm_from_princ = talloc_strdup(mem_ctx, realm_from_princ_malloc);
1398 free(realm_from_princ_malloc);
1399 if (realm_from_princ == NULL) {
1400 return HDB_ERR_NOENTRY;
1403 if (krb5_princ_size(context, principal) != 2
1404 || (strcmp(krb5_principal_get_comp_string(context, principal, 0), KRB5_TGS_NAME) != 0)) {
1406 return HDB_ERR_NOENTRY;
1409 /* krbtgt case. Either us or a trusted realm */
1411 if (lpcfg_is_my_domain_or_realm(lp_ctx, realm_from_princ)
1412 && lpcfg_is_my_domain_or_realm(lp_ctx, krb5_principal_get_comp_string(context, principal, 1))) {
1413 /* us, or someone quite like us */
1414 /* Cludge, cludge cludge. If the realm part of krbtgt/realm,
1415 * is in our db, then direct the caller at our primary
1419 unsigned int krbtgt_number;
1420 /* w2k8r2 sometimes gives us a kvno of 255 for inter-domain
1421 trust tickets. We don't yet know what this means, but we do
1422 seem to need to treat it as unspecified */
1423 if (flags & HDB_F_KVNO_SPECIFIED) {
1424 krbtgt_number = SAMBA_KVNO_GET_KRBTGT(kvno);
1425 if (kdc_db_ctx->rodc) {
1426 if (krbtgt_number != kdc_db_ctx->my_krbtgt_number) {
1427 return HDB_ERR_NOT_FOUND_HERE;
1431 krbtgt_number = kdc_db_ctx->my_krbtgt_number;
1434 if (krbtgt_number == kdc_db_ctx->my_krbtgt_number) {
1435 lret = dsdb_search_one(kdc_db_ctx->samdb, mem_ctx,
1436 &msg, kdc_db_ctx->krbtgt_dn, LDB_SCOPE_BASE,
1437 krbtgt_attrs, DSDB_SEARCH_NO_GLOBAL_CATALOG,
1438 "(objectClass=user)");
1440 /* We need to look up an RODC krbtgt (perhaps
1441 * ours, if we are an RODC, perhaps another
1442 * RODC if we are a read-write DC */
1443 lret = dsdb_search_one(kdc_db_ctx->samdb, mem_ctx,
1444 &msg, realm_dn, LDB_SCOPE_SUBTREE,
1446 DSDB_SEARCH_SHOW_EXTENDED_DN | DSDB_SEARCH_NO_GLOBAL_CATALOG,
1447 "(&(objectClass=user)(msDS-SecondaryKrbTgtNumber=%u))", (unsigned)(krbtgt_number));
1450 if (lret == LDB_ERR_NO_SUCH_OBJECT) {
1451 krb5_warnx(context, "samba_kdc_fetch: could not find KRBTGT number %u in DB!",
1452 (unsigned)(krbtgt_number));
1453 krb5_set_error_message(context, HDB_ERR_NOENTRY,
1454 "samba_kdc_fetch: could not find KRBTGT number %u in DB!",
1455 (unsigned)(krbtgt_number));
1456 return HDB_ERR_NOENTRY;
1457 } else if (lret != LDB_SUCCESS) {
1458 krb5_warnx(context, "samba_kdc_fetch: could not find KRBTGT number %u in DB!",
1459 (unsigned)(krbtgt_number));
1460 krb5_set_error_message(context, HDB_ERR_NOENTRY,
1461 "samba_kdc_fetch: could not find KRBTGT number %u in DB!",
1462 (unsigned)(krbtgt_number));
1463 return HDB_ERR_NOENTRY;
1466 ret = samba_kdc_message2entry(context, kdc_db_ctx, mem_ctx,
1467 principal, SAMBA_KDC_ENT_TYPE_KRBTGT,
1468 flags, realm_dn, msg, entry_ex);
1470 krb5_warnx(context, "samba_kdc_fetch: self krbtgt message2entry failed");
1475 enum trust_direction direction = UNKNOWN;
1476 const char *realm = NULL;
1478 /* Either an inbound or outbound trust */
1480 if (strcasecmp(lpcfg_realm(lp_ctx), realm_from_princ) == 0) {
1481 /* look for inbound trust */
1482 direction = INBOUND;
1483 realm = krb5_principal_get_comp_string(context, principal, 1);
1484 } else if (strcasecmp(lpcfg_realm(lp_ctx), krb5_principal_get_comp_string(context, principal, 1)) == 0) {
1485 /* look for outbound trust */
1486 direction = OUTBOUND;
1487 realm = realm_from_princ;
1489 krb5_warnx(context, "samba_kdc_fetch: not our realm for trusts ('%s', '%s')",
1491 krb5_principal_get_comp_string(context, principal, 1));
1492 krb5_set_error_message(context, HDB_ERR_NOENTRY, "samba_kdc_fetch: not our realm for trusts ('%s', '%s')",
1494 krb5_principal_get_comp_string(context, principal, 1));
1495 return HDB_ERR_NOENTRY;
1498 /* Trusted domains are under CN=system */
1500 ret = samba_kdc_lookup_trust(context, kdc_db_ctx->samdb,
1502 realm, realm_dn, &msg);
1505 krb5_warnx(context, "samba_kdc_fetch: could not find principal in DB");
1506 krb5_set_error_message(context, ret, "samba_kdc_fetch: could not find principal in DB");
1510 ret = samba_kdc_trust_message2entry(context, kdc_db_ctx, mem_ctx,
1511 principal, direction,
1512 realm_dn, flags, kvno, msg, entry_ex);
1514 krb5_warnx(context, "samba_kdc_fetch: trust_message2entry failed for %s",
1515 ldb_dn_get_linearized(msg->dn));
1516 krb5_set_error_message(context, ret, "samba_kdc_fetch: "
1517 "trust_message2entry failed for %s",
1518 ldb_dn_get_linearized(msg->dn));
1525 static krb5_error_code samba_kdc_lookup_server(krb5_context context,
1526 struct samba_kdc_db_context *kdc_db_ctx,
1527 TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx,
1528 krb5_const_principal principal,
1531 struct ldb_dn **realm_dn,
1532 struct ldb_message **msg)
1534 krb5_error_code ret;
1535 if ((smb_krb5_principal_get_type(context, principal) != KRB5_NT_ENTERPRISE_PRINCIPAL)
1536 && krb5_princ_size(context, principal) >= 2) {
1537 /* 'normal server' case */
1540 struct ldb_dn *user_dn;
1541 char *principal_string;
1543 ret = krb5_unparse_name_flags(context, principal,
1544 KRB5_PRINCIPAL_UNPARSE_NO_REALM,
1550 /* At this point we may find the host is known to be
1551 * in a different realm, so we should generate a
1552 * referral instead */
1553 nt_status = crack_service_principal_name(kdc_db_ctx->samdb,
1554 mem_ctx, principal_string,
1555 &user_dn, realm_dn);
1556 free(principal_string);
1558 if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(nt_status)) {
1559 return HDB_ERR_NOENTRY;
1562 ldb_ret = dsdb_search_one(kdc_db_ctx->samdb,
1564 msg, user_dn, LDB_SCOPE_BASE,
1566 DSDB_SEARCH_SHOW_EXTENDED_DN | DSDB_SEARCH_NO_GLOBAL_CATALOG,
1568 if (ldb_ret != LDB_SUCCESS) {
1569 return HDB_ERR_NOENTRY;
1572 } else if (!(flags & HDB_F_FOR_AS_REQ)
1573 && smb_krb5_principal_get_type(context, principal) == KRB5_NT_ENTERPRISE_PRINCIPAL) {
1575 * The behaviour of accepting an
1576 * KRB5_NT_ENTERPRISE_PRINCIPAL server principal
1577 * containing a UPN only applies to TGS-REQ packets,
1578 * not AS-REQ packets.
1580 return samba_kdc_lookup_client(context, kdc_db_ctx,
1581 mem_ctx, principal, attrs,
1586 * - the AS-REQ, where we only accept
1587 * samAccountName based lookups for the server, no
1588 * matter if the name is an
1589 * KRB5_NT_ENTERPRISE_PRINCIPAL or not
1590 * - for the TGS-REQ when we are not given an
1591 * KRB5_NT_ENTERPRISE_PRINCIPAL, which also must
1592 * only lookup samAccountName based names.
1596 krb5_principal enterprise_prinicpal = NULL;
1598 if (smb_krb5_principal_get_type(context, principal) == KRB5_NT_ENTERPRISE_PRINCIPAL) {
1599 /* Need to reparse the enterprise principal to find the real target */
1600 if (krb5_princ_size(context, principal) != 1) {
1601 ret = KRB5_PARSE_MALFORMED;
1602 krb5_set_error_message(context, ret, "samba_kdc_lookup_server: request for an "
1603 "enterprise principal with wrong (%d) number of components",
1604 krb5_princ_size(context, principal));
1607 ret = krb5_parse_name(context,
1608 krb5_principal_get_comp_string(context, principal, 0),
1609 &enterprise_prinicpal);
1613 principal = enterprise_prinicpal;
1616 /* server as client principal case, but we must not lookup userPrincipalNames */
1617 *realm_dn = ldb_get_default_basedn(kdc_db_ctx->samdb);
1619 /* TODO: Check if it is our realm, otherwise give referral */
1621 ret = krb5_unparse_name_flags(context, principal,
1622 KRB5_PRINCIPAL_UNPARSE_NO_REALM |
1623 KRB5_PRINCIPAL_UNPARSE_DISPLAY,
1627 krb5_set_error_message(context, ret, "samba_kdc_lookup_principal: could not parse principal");
1628 krb5_warnx(context, "samba_kdc_lookup_principal: could not parse principal");
1632 lret = dsdb_search_one(kdc_db_ctx->samdb, mem_ctx, msg,
1633 *realm_dn, LDB_SCOPE_SUBTREE,
1635 DSDB_SEARCH_SHOW_EXTENDED_DN | DSDB_SEARCH_NO_GLOBAL_CATALOG,
1636 "(&(objectClass=user)(samAccountName=%s))",
1637 ldb_binary_encode_string(mem_ctx, short_princ));
1638 if (lret == LDB_ERR_NO_SUCH_OBJECT) {
1639 DEBUG(3, ("Failed to find an entry for %s\n", short_princ));
1641 return HDB_ERR_NOENTRY;
1643 if (lret != LDB_SUCCESS) {
1644 DEBUG(3, ("Failed single search for %s - %s\n",
1645 short_princ, ldb_errstring(kdc_db_ctx->samdb)));
1647 return HDB_ERR_NOENTRY;
1652 return HDB_ERR_NOENTRY;
1657 static krb5_error_code samba_kdc_fetch_server(krb5_context context,
1658 struct samba_kdc_db_context *kdc_db_ctx,
1659 TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx,
1660 krb5_const_principal principal,
1662 hdb_entry_ex *entry_ex)
1664 krb5_error_code ret;
1665 struct ldb_dn *realm_dn;
1666 struct ldb_message *msg;
1668 ret = samba_kdc_lookup_server(context, kdc_db_ctx, mem_ctx, principal,
1669 flags, server_attrs, &realm_dn, &msg);
1674 ret = samba_kdc_message2entry(context, kdc_db_ctx, mem_ctx,
1675 principal, SAMBA_KDC_ENT_TYPE_SERVER,
1677 realm_dn, msg, entry_ex);
1679 krb5_warnx(context, "samba_kdc_fetch: message2entry failed");
1685 krb5_error_code samba_kdc_fetch(krb5_context context,
1686 struct samba_kdc_db_context *kdc_db_ctx,
1687 krb5_const_principal principal,
1690 hdb_entry_ex *entry_ex)
1692 krb5_error_code ret = HDB_ERR_NOENTRY;
1693 TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx;
1695 mem_ctx = talloc_named(kdc_db_ctx, 0, "samba_kdc_fetch context");
1698 krb5_set_error_message(context, ret, "samba_kdc_fetch: talloc_named() failed!");
1702 if (flags & HDB_F_GET_CLIENT) {
1703 ret = samba_kdc_fetch_client(context, kdc_db_ctx, mem_ctx, principal, flags, entry_ex);
1704 if (ret != HDB_ERR_NOENTRY) goto done;
1706 if (flags & HDB_F_GET_SERVER) {
1707 /* krbtgt fits into this situation for trusted realms, and for resolving different versions of our own realm name */
1708 ret = samba_kdc_fetch_krbtgt(context, kdc_db_ctx, mem_ctx, principal, flags, kvno, entry_ex);
1709 if (ret != HDB_ERR_NOENTRY) goto done;
1711 /* We return 'no entry' if it does not start with krbtgt/, so move to the common case quickly */
1712 ret = samba_kdc_fetch_server(context, kdc_db_ctx, mem_ctx, principal, flags, entry_ex);
1713 if (ret != HDB_ERR_NOENTRY) goto done;
1715 if (flags & HDB_F_GET_KRBTGT) {
1716 ret = samba_kdc_fetch_krbtgt(context, kdc_db_ctx, mem_ctx, principal, flags, kvno, entry_ex);
1717 if (ret != HDB_ERR_NOENTRY) goto done;
1721 talloc_free(mem_ctx);
1725 struct samba_kdc_seq {
1728 struct ldb_message **msgs;
1729 struct ldb_dn *realm_dn;
1732 static krb5_error_code samba_kdc_seq(krb5_context context,
1733 struct samba_kdc_db_context *kdc_db_ctx,
1734 hdb_entry_ex *entry)
1736 krb5_error_code ret;
1737 struct samba_kdc_seq *priv = kdc_db_ctx->seq_ctx;
1738 const char *realm = lpcfg_realm(kdc_db_ctx->lp_ctx);
1739 struct ldb_message *msg = NULL;
1740 const char *sAMAccountName = NULL;
1741 krb5_principal principal = NULL;
1742 TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx;
1745 return HDB_ERR_NOENTRY;
1748 mem_ctx = talloc_named(priv, 0, "samba_kdc_seq context");
1752 krb5_set_error_message(context, ret, "samba_kdc_seq: talloc_named() failed!");
1756 while (priv->index < priv->count) {
1757 msg = priv->msgs[priv->index++];
1759 sAMAccountName = ldb_msg_find_attr_as_string(msg, "sAMAccountName", NULL);
1760 if (sAMAccountName != NULL) {
1765 if (sAMAccountName == NULL) {
1766 ret = HDB_ERR_NOENTRY;
1770 ret = smb_krb5_make_principal(context, &principal,
1771 realm, sAMAccountName, NULL);
1776 ret = samba_kdc_message2entry(context, kdc_db_ctx, mem_ctx,
1777 principal, SAMBA_KDC_ENT_TYPE_ANY,
1778 HDB_F_ADMIN_DATA|HDB_F_GET_ANY,
1779 priv->realm_dn, msg, entry);
1782 if (principal != NULL) {
1783 krb5_free_principal(context, principal);
1788 kdc_db_ctx->seq_ctx = NULL;
1790 talloc_free(mem_ctx);
1796 krb5_error_code samba_kdc_firstkey(krb5_context context,
1797 struct samba_kdc_db_context *kdc_db_ctx,
1798 hdb_entry_ex *entry)
1800 struct ldb_context *ldb_ctx = kdc_db_ctx->samdb;
1801 struct samba_kdc_seq *priv = kdc_db_ctx->seq_ctx;
1803 struct ldb_result *res = NULL;
1804 krb5_error_code ret;
1805 TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx;
1810 kdc_db_ctx->seq_ctx = NULL;
1813 priv = (struct samba_kdc_seq *) talloc(kdc_db_ctx, struct samba_kdc_seq);
1816 krb5_set_error_message(context, ret, "talloc: out of memory");
1822 priv->realm_dn = ldb_get_default_basedn(ldb_ctx);
1825 mem_ctx = talloc_named(priv, 0, "samba_kdc_firstkey context");
1829 krb5_set_error_message(context, ret, "samba_kdc_firstkey: talloc_named() failed!");
1833 ret = krb5_get_default_realm(context, &realm);
1838 krb5_free_default_realm(context, realm);
1840 lret = dsdb_search(ldb_ctx, priv, &res,
1841 priv->realm_dn, LDB_SCOPE_SUBTREE, user_attrs,
1842 DSDB_SEARCH_NO_GLOBAL_CATALOG,
1843 "(objectClass=user)");
1845 if (lret != LDB_SUCCESS) {
1847 return HDB_ERR_NOENTRY;
1850 priv->count = res->count;
1851 priv->msgs = talloc_steal(priv, res->msgs);
1854 kdc_db_ctx->seq_ctx = priv;
1856 ret = samba_kdc_seq(context, kdc_db_ctx, entry);
1860 kdc_db_ctx->seq_ctx = NULL;
1862 talloc_free(mem_ctx);
1867 krb5_error_code samba_kdc_nextkey(krb5_context context,
1868 struct samba_kdc_db_context *kdc_db_ctx,
1869 hdb_entry_ex *entry)
1871 return samba_kdc_seq(context, kdc_db_ctx, entry);
1874 /* Check if a given entry may delegate or do s4u2self to this target principal
1876 * This is currently a very nasty hack - allowing only delegation to itself.
1879 samba_kdc_check_s4u2self(krb5_context context,
1880 struct samba_kdc_db_context *kdc_db_ctx,
1881 hdb_entry_ex *entry,
1882 krb5_const_principal target_principal)
1884 krb5_error_code ret;
1885 struct ldb_dn *realm_dn;
1886 struct ldb_message *msg;
1887 struct dom_sid *orig_sid;
1888 struct dom_sid *target_sid;
1889 struct samba_kdc_entry *p = talloc_get_type(entry->ctx, struct samba_kdc_entry);
1890 const char *delegation_check_attrs[] = {
1894 TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx = talloc_named(kdc_db_ctx, 0, "samba_kdc_check_s4u2self");
1898 krb5_set_error_message(context, ret, "samba_kdc_check_s4u2self: talloc_named() failed!");
1902 ret = samba_kdc_lookup_server(context, kdc_db_ctx, mem_ctx, target_principal,
1903 HDB_F_GET_CLIENT|HDB_F_GET_SERVER,
1904 delegation_check_attrs, &realm_dn, &msg);
1907 talloc_free(mem_ctx);
1911 orig_sid = samdb_result_dom_sid(mem_ctx, p->msg, "objectSid");
1912 target_sid = samdb_result_dom_sid(mem_ctx, msg, "objectSid");
1914 /* Allow delegation to the same principal, even if by a different
1915 * name. The easy and safe way to prove this is by SID
1917 if (!(orig_sid && target_sid && dom_sid_equal(orig_sid, target_sid))) {
1918 talloc_free(mem_ctx);
1919 return KRB5KDC_ERR_BADOPTION;
1922 talloc_free(mem_ctx);
1926 /* Certificates printed by a the Certificate Authority might have a
1927 * slightly different form of the user principal name to that in the
1928 * database. Allow a mismatch where they both refer to the same
1932 samba_kdc_check_pkinit_ms_upn_match(krb5_context context,
1933 struct samba_kdc_db_context *kdc_db_ctx,
1934 hdb_entry_ex *entry,
1935 krb5_const_principal certificate_principal)
1937 krb5_error_code ret;
1938 struct ldb_dn *realm_dn;
1939 struct ldb_message *msg;
1940 struct dom_sid *orig_sid;
1941 struct dom_sid *target_sid;
1942 struct samba_kdc_entry *p = talloc_get_type(entry->ctx, struct samba_kdc_entry);
1943 const char *ms_upn_check_attrs[] = {
1947 TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx = talloc_named(kdc_db_ctx, 0, "samba_kdc_check_pkinit_ms_upn_match");
1951 krb5_set_error_message(context, ret, "samba_kdc_fetch: talloc_named() failed!");
1955 ret = samba_kdc_lookup_client(context, kdc_db_ctx,
1956 mem_ctx, certificate_principal,
1957 ms_upn_check_attrs, &realm_dn, &msg);
1960 talloc_free(mem_ctx);
1964 orig_sid = samdb_result_dom_sid(mem_ctx, p->msg, "objectSid");
1965 target_sid = samdb_result_dom_sid(mem_ctx, msg, "objectSid");
1967 /* Consider these to be the same principal, even if by a different
1968 * name. The easy and safe way to prove this is by SID
1970 if (!(orig_sid && target_sid && dom_sid_equal(orig_sid, target_sid))) {
1971 talloc_free(mem_ctx);
1972 #ifdef KRB5_KDC_ERR_CLIENT_NAME_MISMATCH /* Heimdal */
1973 return KRB5_KDC_ERR_CLIENT_NAME_MISMATCH;
1974 #elif defined(KRB5KDC_ERR_CLIENT_NAME_MISMATCH) /* MIT */
1975 return KRB5KDC_ERR_CLIENT_NAME_MISMATCH;
1979 talloc_free(mem_ctx);
1984 * Check if a given entry may delegate to this target principal
1988 samba_kdc_check_s4u2proxy(krb5_context context,
1989 struct samba_kdc_db_context *kdc_db_ctx,
1990 hdb_entry_ex *entry,
1991 krb5_const_principal target_principal)
1993 krb5_error_code ret;
1995 const char *client_dn = NULL;
1996 const char *target_principal_name = NULL;
1997 struct ldb_message_element *el;
2001 struct samba_kdc_entry *p = talloc_get_type(entry->ctx, struct samba_kdc_entry);
2003 TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx = talloc_named(kdc_db_ctx, 0, "samba_kdc_check_s4u2proxy");
2007 krb5_set_error_message(context, ret,
2008 "samba_kdc_check_s4u2proxy:"
2009 " talloc_named() failed!");
2013 client_dn = ldb_dn_get_linearized(p->msg->dn);
2019 krb5_set_error_message(context, ret,
2020 "samba_kdc_check_s4u2proxy:"
2021 " ldb_dn_get_linearized() failed!");
2026 * The main heimdal code already checked that the target_principal
2027 * belongs to the same realm as the client.
2029 * So we just need the principal without the realm,
2030 * as that is what is configured in the "msDS-AllowedToDelegateTo"
2033 ret = krb5_unparse_name_flags(context, target_principal,
2034 KRB5_PRINCIPAL_UNPARSE_NO_REALM, &tmp);
2036 talloc_free(mem_ctx);
2037 krb5_set_error_message(context, ret,
2038 "samba_kdc_check_s4u2proxy:"
2039 " krb5_unparse_name() failed!");
2042 DEBUG(10,("samba_kdc_check_s4u2proxy: client[%s] for target[%s]\n",
2045 target_principal_name = talloc_strdup(mem_ctx, tmp);
2047 if (target_principal_name == NULL) {
2049 krb5_set_error_message(context, ret,
2050 "samba_kdc_check_s4u2proxy:"
2051 " talloc_strdup() failed!");
2055 el = ldb_msg_find_element(p->msg, "msDS-AllowedToDelegateTo");
2060 val = data_blob_string_const(target_principal_name);
2062 for (i=0; i<el->num_values; i++) {
2063 struct ldb_val *val1 = &val;
2064 struct ldb_val *val2 = &el->values[i];
2067 if (val1->length != val2->length) {
2071 cmp = strncasecmp((const char *)val1->data,
2072 (const char *)val2->data,
2086 DEBUG(10,("samba_kdc_check_s4u2proxy: client[%s] allowed target[%s]\n",
2088 talloc_free(mem_ctx);
2092 krb5_set_error_message(context, ret,
2093 "samba_kdc_check_s4u2proxy: client[%s] "
2094 "not allowed for delegation to target[%s]",
2096 target_principal_name);
2097 talloc_free(mem_ctx);
2098 return KRB5KDC_ERR_BADOPTION;
2101 NTSTATUS samba_kdc_setup_db_ctx(TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx, struct samba_kdc_base_context *base_ctx,
2102 struct samba_kdc_db_context **kdc_db_ctx_out)
2105 struct ldb_message *msg;
2106 struct auth_session_info *session_info;
2107 struct samba_kdc_db_context *kdc_db_ctx;
2108 /* The idea here is very simple. Using Kerberos to
2109 * authenticate the KDC to the LDAP server is higly likely to
2112 * In future we may set this up to use EXERNAL and SSL
2113 * certificates, for now it will almost certainly be NTLMSSP_SET_USERNAME
2116 kdc_db_ctx = talloc_zero(mem_ctx, struct samba_kdc_db_context);
2117 if (kdc_db_ctx == NULL) {
2118 return NT_STATUS_NO_MEMORY;
2120 kdc_db_ctx->ev_ctx = base_ctx->ev_ctx;
2121 kdc_db_ctx->lp_ctx = base_ctx->lp_ctx;
2123 /* get default kdc policy */
2124 lpcfg_default_kdc_policy(base_ctx->lp_ctx,
2125 &kdc_db_ctx->policy.svc_tkt_lifetime,
2126 &kdc_db_ctx->policy.usr_tkt_lifetime,
2127 &kdc_db_ctx->policy.renewal_lifetime);
2129 session_info = system_session(kdc_db_ctx->lp_ctx);
2130 if (session_info == NULL) {
2131 return NT_STATUS_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2134 /* Setup the link to LDB */
2135 kdc_db_ctx->samdb = samdb_connect(kdc_db_ctx, base_ctx->ev_ctx,
2136 base_ctx->lp_ctx, session_info, 0);
2137 if (kdc_db_ctx->samdb == NULL) {
2138 DEBUG(1, ("samba_kdc_setup_db_ctx: Cannot open samdb for KDC backend!"));
2139 talloc_free(kdc_db_ctx);
2140 return NT_STATUS_CANT_ACCESS_DOMAIN_INFO;
2143 /* Find out our own krbtgt kvno */
2144 ldb_ret = samdb_rodc(kdc_db_ctx->samdb, &kdc_db_ctx->rodc);
2145 if (ldb_ret != LDB_SUCCESS) {
2146 DEBUG(1, ("samba_kdc_setup_db_ctx: Cannot determine if we are an RODC in KDC backend: %s\n",
2147 ldb_errstring(kdc_db_ctx->samdb)));
2148 talloc_free(kdc_db_ctx);
2149 return NT_STATUS_CANT_ACCESS_DOMAIN_INFO;
2151 if (kdc_db_ctx->rodc) {
2152 int my_krbtgt_number;
2153 const char *secondary_keytab[] = { "msDS-SecondaryKrbTgtNumber", NULL };
2154 struct ldb_dn *account_dn;
2155 struct ldb_dn *server_dn = samdb_server_dn(kdc_db_ctx->samdb, kdc_db_ctx);
2157 DEBUG(1, ("samba_kdc_setup_db_ctx: Cannot determine server DN in KDC backend: %s\n",
2158 ldb_errstring(kdc_db_ctx->samdb)));
2159 talloc_free(kdc_db_ctx);
2160 return NT_STATUS_CANT_ACCESS_DOMAIN_INFO;
2163 ldb_ret = samdb_reference_dn(kdc_db_ctx->samdb, kdc_db_ctx, server_dn,
2164 "serverReference", &account_dn);
2165 if (ldb_ret != LDB_SUCCESS) {
2166 DEBUG(1, ("samba_kdc_setup_db_ctx: Cannot determine server account in KDC backend: %s\n",
2167 ldb_errstring(kdc_db_ctx->samdb)));
2168 talloc_free(kdc_db_ctx);
2169 return NT_STATUS_CANT_ACCESS_DOMAIN_INFO;
2172 ldb_ret = samdb_reference_dn(kdc_db_ctx->samdb, kdc_db_ctx, account_dn,
2173 "msDS-KrbTgtLink", &kdc_db_ctx->krbtgt_dn);
2174 talloc_free(account_dn);
2175 if (ldb_ret != LDB_SUCCESS) {
2176 DEBUG(1, ("samba_kdc_setup_db_ctx: Cannot determine RODC krbtgt account in KDC backend: %s\n",
2177 ldb_errstring(kdc_db_ctx->samdb)));
2178 talloc_free(kdc_db_ctx);
2179 return NT_STATUS_CANT_ACCESS_DOMAIN_INFO;
2182 ldb_ret = dsdb_search_one(kdc_db_ctx->samdb, kdc_db_ctx,
2183 &msg, kdc_db_ctx->krbtgt_dn, LDB_SCOPE_BASE,
2185 DSDB_SEARCH_NO_GLOBAL_CATALOG,
2186 "(&(objectClass=user)(msDS-SecondaryKrbTgtNumber=*))");
2187 if (ldb_ret != LDB_SUCCESS) {
2188 DEBUG(1, ("samba_kdc_setup_db_ctx: Cannot read krbtgt account %s in KDC backend to get msDS-SecondaryKrbTgtNumber: %s: %s\n",
2189 ldb_dn_get_linearized(kdc_db_ctx->krbtgt_dn),
2190 ldb_errstring(kdc_db_ctx->samdb),
2191 ldb_strerror(ldb_ret)));
2192 talloc_free(kdc_db_ctx);
2193 return NT_STATUS_CANT_ACCESS_DOMAIN_INFO;
2195 my_krbtgt_number = ldb_msg_find_attr_as_int(msg, "msDS-SecondaryKrbTgtNumber", -1);
2196 if (my_krbtgt_number == -1) {
2197 DEBUG(1, ("samba_kdc_setup_db_ctx: Cannot read msDS-SecondaryKrbTgtNumber from krbtgt account %s in KDC backend: got %d\n",
2198 ldb_dn_get_linearized(kdc_db_ctx->krbtgt_dn),
2200 talloc_free(kdc_db_ctx);
2201 return NT_STATUS_CANT_ACCESS_DOMAIN_INFO;
2203 kdc_db_ctx->my_krbtgt_number = my_krbtgt_number;
2206 kdc_db_ctx->my_krbtgt_number = 0;
2207 ldb_ret = dsdb_search_one(kdc_db_ctx->samdb, kdc_db_ctx,
2209 ldb_get_default_basedn(kdc_db_ctx->samdb),
2212 DSDB_SEARCH_NO_GLOBAL_CATALOG,
2213 "(&(objectClass=user)(samAccountName=krbtgt))");
2215 if (ldb_ret != LDB_SUCCESS) {
2216 DEBUG(1, ("samba_kdc_fetch: could not find own KRBTGT in DB: %s\n", ldb_errstring(kdc_db_ctx->samdb)));
2217 talloc_free(kdc_db_ctx);
2218 return NT_STATUS_CANT_ACCESS_DOMAIN_INFO;
2220 kdc_db_ctx->krbtgt_dn = talloc_steal(kdc_db_ctx, msg->dn);
2221 kdc_db_ctx->my_krbtgt_number = 0;
2224 *kdc_db_ctx_out = kdc_db_ctx;
2225 return NT_STATUS_OK;