4 Copyright (C) Simo Sorce 2004
5 Copyright (C) Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org> 2005
6 Copyright (C) Andrew Tridgell 2004
8 This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
9 it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
10 the Free Software Foundation; either version 2 of the License, or
11 (at your option) any later version.
13 This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
14 but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
15 MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the
16 GNU General Public License for more details.
18 You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
19 along with this program; if not, write to the Free Software
20 Foundation, Inc., 675 Mass Ave, Cambridge, MA 02139, USA.
26 * Component: ldb password_hash module
28 * Description: correctly update hash values based on changes to sambaPassword and friends
30 * Author: Andrew Bartlett
34 #include "libcli/ldap/ldap.h"
35 #include "ldb/include/ldb_errors.h"
36 #include "ldb/include/ldb_private.h"
37 #include "librpc/gen_ndr/ndr_misc.h"
38 #include "librpc/gen_ndr/ndr_samr.h"
39 #include "system/kerberos.h"
40 #include "auth/kerberos/kerberos.h"
41 #include "system/time.h"
42 #include "dsdb/samdb/samdb.h"
46 /* If we have decided there is reason to work on this request, then
47 * setup all the password hash types correctly.
49 * If the administrator doesn't want the sambaPassword stored (set in the
50 * domain and per-account policies) then we must strip that out before
51 * we do the first operation.
53 * Once this is done (which could update anything at all), we
54 * calculate the password hashes.
56 * This function must not only update the ntPwdHash, lmPwdHash and
57 * krb5Key fields, it must also atomicly increment the
58 * msDS-KeyVersionNumber. We should be in a transaction, so all this
59 * should be quite safe...
61 * Finally, if the administrator has requested that a password history
62 * be maintained, then this should also be written out.
67 static int password_hash_handle(struct ldb_module *module, struct ldb_request *req,
68 const struct ldb_message *msg)
70 int ret, old_ret = -1;
71 uint_t pwdProperties, pwdHistoryLength;
72 uint_t userAccountControl;
73 const char *dnsDomain, *realm;
74 const char *sambaPassword;
75 struct samr_Password *sambaLMPwdHistory, *sambaNTPwdHistory;
76 struct samr_Password *lmPwdHash, *ntPwdHash;
77 struct samr_Password *lmOldHash = NULL, *ntOldHash = NULL;
78 struct samr_Password *new_sambaLMPwdHistory, *new_sambaNTPwdHistory;
79 struct samr_Password local_lmNewHash, local_ntNewHash;
80 int sambaLMPwdHistory_len, sambaNTPwdHistory_len;
82 struct dom_sid *domain_sid;
83 time_t now = time(NULL);
86 krb5_error_code krb5_ret;
88 struct smb_krb5_context *smb_krb5_context;
90 struct ldb_message_element *attribute;
91 struct ldb_dn *dn = msg->dn;
92 struct ldb_message *msg2;
94 struct ldb_request *search_request = NULL;
95 struct ldb_request *modify_request;
96 struct ldb_request *modified_orig_request;
97 struct ldb_result *res, *dom_res, *old_res;
99 struct ldb_message_element *objectclasses;
100 struct ldb_val computer_val;
101 struct ldb_val person_val;
104 struct ldb_message *modify_msg;
106 const char *domain_expression;
107 const char *old_user_attrs[] = { "lmPwdHash", "ntPwdHash", NULL };
108 const char *user_attrs[] = { "userAccountControl", "sambaLMPwdHistory",
111 "objectSid", "msDS-KeyVersionNumber",
112 "objectClass", "userPrincipalName",
115 const char * const domain_attrs[] = { "pwdProperties", "pwdHistoryLength",
120 /* Do the original action */
122 /* If no part of this touches the sambaPassword, then we don't
123 * need to make any changes. For password changes/set there should
124 * be a 'delete' or a 'modify' on this attribute. */
125 if ((attribute = ldb_msg_find_element(msg, "sambaPassword")) == NULL ) {
126 return ldb_next_request(module, req);
129 mem_ctx = talloc_new(module);
131 return LDB_ERR_OPERATIONS_ERROR;
134 if (req->operation == LDB_REQ_MODIFY) {
135 search_request = talloc(mem_ctx, struct ldb_request);
136 if (!search_request) {
137 talloc_free(mem_ctx);
138 return LDB_ERR_OPERATIONS_ERROR;
141 /* Look up the old ntPwdHash and lmPwdHash values, so
142 * we can later place these into the password
145 search_request->operation = LDB_REQ_SEARCH;
146 search_request->op.search.base = dn;
147 search_request->op.search.scope = LDB_SCOPE_BASE;
148 search_request->op.search.tree = ldb_parse_tree(module->ldb, NULL);
149 search_request->op.search.attrs = old_user_attrs;
150 search_request->controls = NULL;
152 old_ret = ldb_next_request(module, search_request);
155 /* we can't change things untill we copy it */
156 msg2 = ldb_msg_copy_shallow(mem_ctx, msg);
158 /* look again, this time at the copied attribute */
159 if (!msg2 || (attribute = ldb_msg_find_element(msg2, "sambaPassword")) == NULL ) {
160 /* Gah? where did it go? Oh well... */
161 return LDB_ERR_OPERATIONS_ERROR;
164 /* Wipe out the sambaPassword attribute set, we will handle it in
165 * the second modify. We might not want it written to disk */
167 if (req->operation == LDB_REQ_ADD) {
168 if (attribute->num_values != 1) {
169 ldb_set_errstring(module,
170 talloc_asprintf(mem_ctx, "sambaPassword_handle: "
171 "attempted set of multiple sambaPassword attributes on %s rejected",
172 ldb_dn_linearize(mem_ctx, dn)));
173 return LDB_ERR_CONSTRAINT_VIOLAION;
176 sambaPassword = (const char *)attribute->values[0].data;
177 ldb_msg_remove_attr(msg2, "sambaPassword");
178 } else if (((attribute->flags & LDB_FLAG_MOD_MASK) == LDB_FLAG_MOD_ADD)
179 || ((attribute->flags & LDB_FLAG_MOD_MASK) == LDB_FLAG_MOD_REPLACE)) {
180 if (attribute->num_values != 1) {
181 return LDB_ERR_CONSTRAINT_VIOLAION;
184 sambaPassword = (const char *)attribute->values[0].data;
185 ldb_msg_remove_attr(msg2, "sambaPassword");
187 sambaPassword = NULL;
190 modified_orig_request = talloc(mem_ctx, struct ldb_request);
191 if (!modified_orig_request) {
192 talloc_free(mem_ctx);
193 return LDB_ERR_OPERATIONS_ERROR;
196 *modified_orig_request = *req;
197 switch (modified_orig_request->operation) {
199 modified_orig_request->op.add.message = msg2;
202 modified_orig_request->op.mod.message = msg2;
206 /* Send the (modified) request of the original caller down to the database */
207 ret = ldb_next_request(module, modified_orig_request);
212 /* While we do the search first (for the old password hashes),
213 * we don't want to override any error that the modify may
214 * have returned. Now check the error */
215 if (req->operation == LDB_REQ_MODIFY) {
217 talloc_free(mem_ctx);
221 /* Find out the old passwords details of the user */
222 old_res = search_request->op.search.res;
224 if (old_res->count != 1) {
225 ldb_set_errstring(module,
226 talloc_asprintf(mem_ctx, "password_hash_handle: "
227 "(pre) search for %s found %d != 1 objects, for entry we just modified",
228 ldb_dn_linearize(mem_ctx, dn),
230 /* What happend? The above add/modify worked... */
231 talloc_free(mem_ctx);
232 return LDB_ERR_NO_SUCH_OBJECT;
235 lmOldHash = samdb_result_hash(mem_ctx, old_res->msgs[0], "lmPwdHash");
236 ntOldHash = samdb_result_hash(mem_ctx, old_res->msgs[0], "ntPwdHash");
239 /* Start finding out details we need for the second modify.
240 * We do this after the first add/modify because other modules
241 * will have filled in the templates, and we may have had
242 * things like the username (affecting the salt) changed along
243 * with the password. */
245 /* Now find out what is on the entry after the above add/modify */
246 search_request = talloc(mem_ctx, struct ldb_request);
247 if (!search_request) {
248 talloc_free(mem_ctx);
249 return LDB_ERR_OPERATIONS_ERROR;
252 search_request->operation = LDB_REQ_SEARCH;
253 search_request->op.search.base = dn;
254 search_request->op.search.scope = LDB_SCOPE_BASE;
255 search_request->op.search.tree = ldb_parse_tree(module->ldb, NULL);
256 search_request->op.search.attrs = user_attrs;
257 search_request->controls = NULL;
259 ret = ldb_next_request(module, search_request);
261 talloc_free(mem_ctx);
265 /* Find out the full details of the user */
266 res = search_request->op.search.res;
267 if (res->count != 1) {
268 ldb_set_errstring(module,
269 talloc_asprintf(mem_ctx, "password_hash_handle: "
270 "search for %s found %d != 1 objects, for entry we just added/modified",
271 ldb_dn_linearize(mem_ctx, dn),
273 /* What happend? The above add/modify worked... */
274 talloc_free(mem_ctx);
275 return LDB_ERR_NO_SUCH_OBJECT;
278 userAccountControl = samdb_result_uint(res->msgs[0], "userAccountControl", 0);
279 sambaLMPwdHistory_len = samdb_result_hashes(mem_ctx, res->msgs[0],
280 "sambaLMPwdHistory", &sambaLMPwdHistory);
281 sambaNTPwdHistory_len = samdb_result_hashes(mem_ctx, res->msgs[0],
282 "sambaNTPwdHistory", &sambaNTPwdHistory);
283 ntPwdHash = samdb_result_hash(mem_ctx, res->msgs[0], "ntPwdHash");
284 kvno = samdb_result_uint(res->msgs[0], "msDS-KeyVersionNumber", 0);
286 domain_sid = samdb_result_sid_prefix(mem_ctx, res->msgs[0], "objectSid");
289 objectclasses = ldb_msg_find_element(res->msgs[0], "objectClass");
290 person_val = data_blob_string_const("person");
292 if (!objectclasses || !ldb_msg_find_val(objectclasses, &person_val)) {
293 /* Not a 'person', so the rest of this doesn't make
294 * sense. How we got a sambaPassword this far I don't
296 ldb_set_errstring(module,
297 talloc_asprintf(mem_ctx, "password_hash_handle: "
298 "attempted set of sambaPassword on non-'person' object %s rejected",
299 ldb_dn_linearize(mem_ctx, dn)));
300 talloc_free(mem_ctx);
301 return LDB_ERR_CONSTRAINT_VIOLAION;
304 computer_val = data_blob_string_const("computer");
306 if (ldb_msg_find_val(objectclasses, &computer_val)) {
312 domain_expression = talloc_asprintf(mem_ctx, "(&(objectSid=%s)(objectClass=domain))",
313 ldap_encode_ndr_dom_sid(mem_ctx, domain_sid));
315 /* Find the user's domain, then find out the domain password
317 ret = ldb_search(module->ldb, NULL, LDB_SCOPE_SUBTREE, domain_expression,
318 domain_attrs, &dom_res);
320 talloc_free(mem_ctx);
324 if (dom_res->count != 1) {
325 /* What happend? The user we are modifying must be odd... */
326 ldb_set_errstring(module,
327 talloc_asprintf(mem_ctx, "password_hash_handle: "
328 "search for domain %s found %d != 1 objects",
329 dom_sid_string(mem_ctx, domain_sid),
331 talloc_free(mem_ctx);
332 return LDB_ERR_NO_SUCH_OBJECT;
335 pwdProperties = samdb_result_uint(dom_res->msgs[0], "pwdProperties", 0);
336 pwdHistoryLength = samdb_result_uint(dom_res->msgs[0], "pwdHistoryLength", 0);
337 dnsDomain = ldb_msg_find_string(dom_res->msgs[0], "dnsDomain", NULL);
338 realm = strupper_talloc(mem_ctx, dnsDomain);
340 /* Some operations below require kerberos contexts */
341 if (smb_krb5_init_context(mem_ctx, &smb_krb5_context) != 0) {
342 talloc_free(mem_ctx);
343 return LDB_ERR_OPERATIONS_ERROR;
346 /* Prepare the modifications to set all the hash/key types */
347 modify_msg = ldb_msg_new(req);
348 modify_msg->dn = talloc_reference(modify_msg, dn);
350 #define CHECK_RET(x) \
353 if (check_ret != LDB_SUCCESS) { \
354 talloc_free(mem_ctx); \
359 /* Setup krb5Key (we want to either delete an existing value,
360 * or replace with a new one). Both the unicode and NT hash
361 * only branches append keys to this multivalued entry. */
362 CHECK_RET(ldb_msg_add_empty(modify_msg, "krb5Key", LDB_FLAG_MOD_REPLACE));
363 /* Yay, we can compute new password hashes from the unicode
366 Principal *salt_principal;
367 const char *user_principal_name = ldb_msg_find_string(res->msgs[0], "userPrincipalName", NULL);
372 /* compute the new nt and lm hashes */
373 if (E_deshash(sambaPassword, local_lmNewHash.hash)) {
374 lmPwdHash = &local_lmNewHash;
378 E_md4hash(sambaPassword, local_ntNewHash.hash);
379 ntPwdHash = &local_ntNewHash;
380 CHECK_RET(ldb_msg_add_empty(modify_msg, "ntPwdHash",
381 LDB_FLAG_MOD_REPLACE));
382 CHECK_RET(samdb_msg_add_hash(module->ldb, req,
383 modify_msg, "ntPwdHash",
385 CHECK_RET(ldb_msg_add_empty(modify_msg, "lmPwdHash",
386 LDB_FLAG_MOD_REPLACE));
388 CHECK_RET(samdb_msg_add_hash(module->ldb, req,
389 modify_msg, "lmPwdHash",
393 /* Many, many thanks to lukeh@padl.com for this
394 * algorithm, described in his Nov 10 2004 mail to
395 * samba-technical@samba.org */
398 /* Determine a salting principal */
399 char *samAccountName = talloc_strdup(mem_ctx, ldb_msg_find_string(res->msgs[0], "samAccountName", NULL));
401 if (!samAccountName) {
402 ldb_set_errstring(module,
403 talloc_asprintf(mem_ctx, "password_hash_handle: "
404 "generation of new kerberos keys failed: %s is a computer without a samAccountName",
405 ldb_dn_linearize(mem_ctx, dn)));
406 talloc_free(mem_ctx);
407 return LDB_ERR_OPERATIONS_ERROR;
409 if (samAccountName[strlen(samAccountName)-1] == '$') {
410 samAccountName[strlen(samAccountName)-1] = '\0';
412 saltbody = talloc_asprintf(mem_ctx, "%s.%s", samAccountName, dnsDomain);
414 krb5_ret = krb5_make_principal(smb_krb5_context->krb5_context, &salt_principal, realm, "host", saltbody, NULL);
415 } else if (user_principal_name) {
417 user_principal_name = talloc_strdup(mem_ctx, user_principal_name);
418 if (!user_principal_name) {
419 talloc_free(mem_ctx);
420 return LDB_ERR_OPERATIONS_ERROR;
422 p = strchr(user_principal_name, '@');
426 krb5_ret = krb5_make_principal(smb_krb5_context->krb5_context, &salt_principal, realm, user_principal_name, NULL);
429 const char *samAccountName = ldb_msg_find_string(res->msgs[0], "samAccountName", NULL);
430 if (!samAccountName) {
431 ldb_set_errstring(module,
432 talloc_asprintf(mem_ctx, "password_hash_handle: "
433 "generation of new kerberos keys failed: %s has no samAccountName",
434 ldb_dn_linearize(mem_ctx, dn)));
435 talloc_free(mem_ctx);
436 return LDB_ERR_OPERATIONS_ERROR;
438 krb5_ret = krb5_make_principal(smb_krb5_context->krb5_context, &salt_principal, realm, samAccountName, NULL);
443 ldb_set_errstring(module,
444 talloc_asprintf(mem_ctx, "password_hash_handle: "
445 "generation of a saltking principal failed: %s",
446 smb_get_krb5_error_message(smb_krb5_context->krb5_context,
447 krb5_ret, mem_ctx)));
448 talloc_free(mem_ctx);
449 return LDB_ERR_OPERATIONS_ERROR;
452 /* TODO: We may wish to control the encryption types chosen in future */
453 krb5_ret = hdb_generate_key_set_password(smb_krb5_context->krb5_context,
454 salt_principal, sambaPassword, &keys, &num_keys);
455 krb5_free_principal(smb_krb5_context->krb5_context, salt_principal);
458 ldb_set_errstring(module,
459 talloc_asprintf(mem_ctx, "password_hash_handle: "
460 "generation of new kerberos keys failed: %s",
461 smb_get_krb5_error_message(smb_krb5_context->krb5_context,
462 krb5_ret, mem_ctx)));
463 talloc_free(mem_ctx);
464 return LDB_ERR_OPERATIONS_ERROR;
469 for (i=0; i < num_keys; i++) {
475 if (keys[i].key.keytype == ENCTYPE_ARCFOUR_HMAC) {
476 /* We might end up doing this below:
477 * This ensures we get the unicode
478 * conversion right. This should also
479 * be fixed in the Heimdal libs */
482 ASN1_MALLOC_ENCODE(Key, buf, buf_size, &keys[i], &len, krb5_ret);
484 val.data = talloc_memdup(req, buf, len);
487 if (!val.data || krb5_ret) {
488 hdb_free_keys (smb_krb5_context->krb5_context, num_keys, keys);
489 talloc_free(mem_ctx);
490 return LDB_ERR_OPERATIONS_ERROR;
492 ret = ldb_msg_add_value(modify_msg, "krb5Key", &val);
493 if (ret != LDB_SUCCESS) {
494 hdb_free_keys (smb_krb5_context->krb5_context, num_keys, keys);
495 talloc_free(mem_ctx);
500 hdb_free_keys (smb_krb5_context->krb5_context, num_keys, keys);
503 /* Possibly kill off the cleartext or store it */
504 CHECK_RET(ldb_msg_add_empty(modify_msg, "sambaPassword", LDB_FLAG_MOD_REPLACE));
506 if (sambaPassword && (pwdProperties & DOMAIN_PASSWORD_STORE_CLEARTEXT) &&
507 (userAccountControl & UF_ENCRYPTED_TEXT_PASSWORD_ALLOWED)) {
508 CHECK_RET(ldb_msg_add_string(modify_msg, "sambaPassword", sambaPassword));
511 /* Even if we didn't get a sambaPassword, we can still setup
512 * krb5Key from the NT hash.
514 * This is an append, so it works with the 'continue' in the
515 * unicode loop above, to use Samba's NT hash function, which
516 * is more correct than Heimdal's
526 key.salt = NULL; /* No salt for this enc type */
528 krb5_ret = krb5_keyblock_init(smb_krb5_context->krb5_context,
529 ENCTYPE_ARCFOUR_HMAC,
530 ntPwdHash->hash, sizeof(ntPwdHash->hash),
533 return LDB_ERR_OPERATIONS_ERROR;
535 ASN1_MALLOC_ENCODE(Key, buf, buf_size, &key, &len, krb5_ret);
536 krb5_free_keyblock_contents(smb_krb5_context->krb5_context,
539 val.data = talloc_memdup(req, buf, len);
542 if (!val.data || ret) {
543 return LDB_ERR_OPERATIONS_ERROR;
545 CHECK_RET(ldb_msg_add_value(modify_msg, "krb5Key", &val));
548 /* If the original caller did anything with pwdLastSet then skip this. It could be an incoming samsync */
549 if ((attribute = ldb_msg_find_element(msg, "pwdLastSet")) == NULL ) {
550 /* Update the password last set time */
551 unix_to_nt_time(&now_nt, now);
552 CHECK_RET(ldb_msg_add_empty(modify_msg, "pwdLastSet", LDB_FLAG_MOD_REPLACE));
553 CHECK_RET(samdb_msg_add_uint64(module->ldb, mem_ctx, modify_msg, "pwdLastSet", now_nt));
556 /* If the original caller did anything with "msDS-KeyVersionNumber" then skip this. It could be an incoming samsync */
557 if ((attribute = ldb_msg_find_element(msg, "msDS-KeyVersionNumber")) == NULL ) {
559 CHECK_RET(ldb_msg_add_empty(modify_msg, "msDS-KeyVersionNumber",
560 LDB_FLAG_MOD_REPLACE));
561 CHECK_RET(samdb_msg_add_uint(module->ldb, mem_ctx, modify_msg, "msDS-KeyVersionNumber", kvno + 1));
563 /* While we should be in a transaction, go one extra
564 * step in the dance for an 'atomic' increment. This
565 * may be of value against remote LDAP servers. (Note
566 * however that Mulitmaster replication stil offers no
569 struct ldb_val old_kvno, new_kvno;
570 old_kvno.data = (uint8_t *)talloc_asprintf(mem_ctx, "%u", kvno);
571 if (!old_kvno.data) {
574 old_kvno.length = strlen((char *)old_kvno.data);
576 new_kvno.data = (uint8_t *)talloc_asprintf(mem_ctx, "%u", kvno + 1);
577 if (!new_kvno.data) {
580 new_kvno.length = strlen((char *)new_kvno.data);
582 CHECK_RET(ldb_msg_add_empty(modify_msg, "msDS-KeyVersionNumber",
583 LDB_FLAG_MOD_DELETE));
584 CHECK_RET(ldb_msg_add_empty(modify_msg, "msDS-KeyVersionNumber",
586 modify_msg->elements[modify_msg->num_elements - 2].num_values = 1;
587 modify_msg->elements[modify_msg->num_elements - 2].values = &old_kvno;
588 modify_msg->elements[modify_msg->num_elements - 1].num_values = 1;
589 modify_msg->elements[modify_msg->num_elements - 1].values = &new_kvno;
593 CHECK_RET(ldb_msg_add_empty(modify_msg, "sambaLMPwdHistory",
594 LDB_FLAG_MOD_REPLACE));
595 CHECK_RET(ldb_msg_add_empty(modify_msg, "sambaNTPwdHistory",
596 LDB_FLAG_MOD_REPLACE));
598 /* If we have something to put into the history, or an old
599 * history element to expire, update the history */
600 if (pwdHistoryLength > 0 &&
601 ((sambaNTPwdHistory_len > 0) || (sambaLMPwdHistory_len > 0)
602 || lmOldHash || ntOldHash)) {
603 /* store the password history */
604 new_sambaLMPwdHistory = talloc_array(mem_ctx, struct samr_Password,
606 if (!new_sambaLMPwdHistory) {
607 return LDB_ERR_OPERATIONS_ERROR;
609 new_sambaNTPwdHistory = talloc_array(mem_ctx, struct samr_Password,
611 if (!new_sambaNTPwdHistory) {
612 return LDB_ERR_OPERATIONS_ERROR;
614 for (i=0;i<MIN(pwdHistoryLength-1, sambaLMPwdHistory_len);i++) {
615 new_sambaLMPwdHistory[i+1] = sambaLMPwdHistory[i];
617 for (i=0;i<MIN(pwdHistoryLength-1, sambaNTPwdHistory_len);i++) {
618 new_sambaNTPwdHistory[i+1] = sambaNTPwdHistory[i];
621 /* Don't store 'long' passwords in the LM history,
622 but make sure to 'expire' one password off the other end */
624 new_sambaLMPwdHistory[0] = *lmOldHash;
626 ZERO_STRUCT(new_sambaLMPwdHistory[0]);
628 sambaLMPwdHistory_len = MIN(sambaLMPwdHistory_len + 1, pwdHistoryLength);
630 /* Likewise, we might not have a new NT password (lm
631 * only password change function) */
633 new_sambaNTPwdHistory[0] = *ntOldHash;
635 ZERO_STRUCT(new_sambaNTPwdHistory[0]);
637 sambaNTPwdHistory_len = MIN(sambaNTPwdHistory_len + 1, pwdHistoryLength);
639 CHECK_RET(samdb_msg_add_hashes(module->ldb, mem_ctx, modify_msg,
641 new_sambaLMPwdHistory,
642 sambaLMPwdHistory_len));
644 CHECK_RET(samdb_msg_add_hashes(module->ldb, mem_ctx, modify_msg,
646 new_sambaNTPwdHistory,
647 sambaNTPwdHistory_len));
650 /* Too much code above, we should check we got it close to reasonable */
651 CHECK_RET(ldb_msg_sanity_check(modify_msg));
653 modify_request = talloc(mem_ctx, struct ldb_request);
654 if (!modify_request) {
655 talloc_free(mem_ctx);
656 return LDB_ERR_OPERATIONS_ERROR;
659 modify_request->operation = LDB_REQ_MODIFY;
660 modify_request->op.mod.message = modify_msg;
661 modify_request->controls = NULL;
663 ret = ldb_next_request(module, modify_request);
665 talloc_free(mem_ctx);
669 /* add_record: do things with the sambaPassword attribute */
670 static int password_hash_add(struct ldb_module *module, struct ldb_request *req)
672 const struct ldb_message *msg = req->op.add.message;
674 ldb_debug(module->ldb, LDB_DEBUG_TRACE, "password_hash_add_record\n");
676 if (ldb_dn_is_special(msg->dn)) { /* do not manipulate our control entries */
677 return ldb_next_request(module, req);
680 return password_hash_handle(module, req, msg);
683 /* modify_record: do things with the sambaPassword attribute */
684 static int password_hash_modify(struct ldb_module *module, struct ldb_request *req)
686 const struct ldb_message *msg = req->op.mod.message;
688 ldb_debug(module->ldb, LDB_DEBUG_TRACE, "password_hash_modify_record\n");
690 if (ldb_dn_is_special(msg->dn)) { /* do not manipulate our control entries */
691 return ldb_next_request(module, req);
694 return password_hash_handle(module, req, msg);
697 static int password_hash_request(struct ldb_module *module, struct ldb_request *req)
699 switch (req->operation) {
702 return password_hash_add(module, req);
705 return password_hash_modify(module, req);
708 return ldb_next_request(module, req);
713 static const struct ldb_module_ops password_hash_ops = {
714 .name = "password_hash",
715 .request = password_hash_request
719 /* the init function */
720 struct ldb_module *password_hash_module_init(struct ldb_context *ldb, const char *options[])
722 struct ldb_module *ctx;
724 ctx = talloc(ldb, struct ldb_module);
728 ctx->private_data = NULL;
730 ctx->prev = ctx->next = NULL;
731 ctx->ops = &password_hash_ops;