/*
- * Copyright (c) 1997-2007 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan
- * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden).
- * All rights reserved.
+ * Copyright (c) 1997-2007 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan
+ * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden).
+ * All rights reserved.
*
- * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
- * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
- * are met:
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
*
- * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
- * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
*
- * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
- * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
- * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
*
- * 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors
- * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software
- * without specific prior written permission.
+ * 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors
+ * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software
+ * without specific prior written permission.
*
- * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND
- * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
- * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
- * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
- * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
- * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
- * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
- * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
- * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
- * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
- * SUCH DAMAGE.
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND
+ * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
+ * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
+ * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
+ * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
+ * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
+ * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
+ * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
+ * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
+ * SUCH DAMAGE.
*/
#include "kdc_locl.h"
-RCSID("$Id: kerberos5.c 23316 2008-06-23 04:32:32Z lha $");
-
#define MAX_TIME ((time_t)((1U << 31) - 1))
void
}
static void
-set_salt_padata (METHOD_DATA *md, Salt *salt)
+set_salt_padata(METHOD_DATA *md, Salt *salt)
{
if (salt) {
- realloc_method_data(md);
- md->val[md->len - 1].padata_type = salt->type;
- der_copy_octet_string(&salt->salt,
- &md->val[md->len - 1].padata_value);
+ realloc_method_data(md);
+ md->val[md->len - 1].padata_type = salt->type;
+ der_copy_octet_string(&salt->salt,
+ &md->val[md->len - 1].padata_value);
}
}
if (req->padata == NULL)
return NULL;
- while(*start < req->padata->len){
+ while((size_t)*start < req->padata->len){
(*start)++;
- if(req->padata->val[*start - 1].padata_type == type)
+ if(req->padata->val[*start - 1].padata_type == (unsigned)type)
return &req->padata->val[*start - 1];
}
return NULL;
}
+/*
+ * This is a hack to allow predefined weak services, like afs to
+ * still use weak types
+ */
+
+krb5_boolean
+_kdc_is_weak_exception(krb5_principal principal, krb5_enctype etype)
+{
+ if (principal->name.name_string.len > 0 &&
+ strcmp(principal->name.name_string.val[0], "afs") == 0 &&
+ (etype == ETYPE_DES_CBC_CRC
+ || etype == ETYPE_DES_CBC_MD4
+ || etype == ETYPE_DES_CBC_MD5))
+ return TRUE;
+ return FALSE;
+}
+
+
/*
* Detect if `key' is the using the the precomputed `default_salt'.
*/
*/
krb5_error_code
-_kdc_find_etype(krb5_context context, const hdb_entry_ex *princ,
- krb5_enctype *etypes, unsigned len,
- Key **ret_key, krb5_enctype *ret_etype)
+_kdc_find_etype(krb5_context context, krb5_boolean use_strongest_session_key,
+ krb5_boolean is_preauth, hdb_entry_ex *princ,
+ krb5_enctype *etypes, unsigned len,
+ krb5_enctype *ret_enctype, Key **ret_key)
{
- int i;
- krb5_error_code ret = KRB5KDC_ERR_ETYPE_NOSUPP;
+ krb5_error_code ret;
krb5_salt def_salt;
+ krb5_enctype enctype = ETYPE_NULL;
+ Key *key;
+ int i;
- krb5_get_pw_salt (context, princ->entry.principal, &def_salt);
+ /* We'll want to avoid keys with v4 salted keys in the pre-auth case... */
+ ret = krb5_get_pw_salt(context, princ->entry.principal, &def_salt);
+ if (ret)
+ return ret;
- for(i = 0; ret != 0 && i < len ; i++) {
- Key *key = NULL;
+ ret = KRB5KDC_ERR_ETYPE_NOSUPP;
- if (krb5_enctype_valid(context, etypes[i]) != 0)
- continue;
+ if (use_strongest_session_key) {
+ const krb5_enctype *p;
+ krb5_enctype clientbest = ETYPE_NULL;
+ int j;
+
+ /*
+ * Pick the strongest key that the KDC, target service, and
+ * client all support, using the local cryptosystem enctype
+ * list in strongest-to-weakest order to drive the search.
+ *
+ * This is not what RFC4120 says to do, but it encourages
+ * adoption of stronger enctypes. This doesn't play well with
+ * clients that have multiple Kerberos client implementations
+ * available with different supported enctype lists.
+ */
- while (hdb_next_enctype2key(context, &princ->entry, etypes[i], &key) == 0) {
- if (key->key.keyvalue.length == 0) {
- ret = KRB5KDC_ERR_NULL_KEY;
+ /* drive the search with local supported enctypes list */
+ p = krb5_kerberos_enctypes(context);
+ for (i = 0; p[i] != ETYPE_NULL && enctype == ETYPE_NULL; i++) {
+ if (krb5_enctype_valid(context, p[i]) != 0)
continue;
+
+ /* check that the client supports it too */
+ for (j = 0; j < len && enctype == ETYPE_NULL; j++) {
+ if (p[i] != etypes[j])
+ continue;
+ /* save best of union of { client, crypto system } */
+ if (clientbest == ETYPE_NULL)
+ clientbest = p[i];
+ /* check target princ support */
+ ret = hdb_enctype2key(context, &princ->entry, p[i], &key);
+ if (ret)
+ continue;
+ if (is_preauth && !is_default_salt_p(&def_salt, key))
+ continue;
+ enctype = p[i];
}
- *ret_key = key;
- *ret_etype = etypes[i];
- ret = 0;
- if (is_default_salt_p(&def_salt, key)) {
- krb5_free_salt (context, def_salt);
- return ret;
+ }
+ if (clientbest != ETYPE_NULL && enctype == ETYPE_NULL)
+ enctype = clientbest;
+ else if (enctype == ETYPE_NULL)
+ ret = KRB5KDC_ERR_ETYPE_NOSUPP;
+ if (ret == 0 && ret_enctype != NULL)
+ *ret_enctype = enctype;
+ if (ret == 0 && ret_key != NULL)
+ *ret_key = key;
+ } else {
+ /*
+ * Pick the first key from the client's enctype list that is
+ * supported by the cryptosystem and by the given principal.
+ *
+ * RFC4120 says we SHOULD pick the first _strong_ key from the
+ * client's list... not the first key... If the admin disallows
+ * weak enctypes in krb5.conf and selects this key selection
+ * algorithm, then we get exactly what RFC4120 says.
+ */
+ for(key = NULL, i = 0; ret != 0 && i < len; i++, key = NULL) {
+
+ if (krb5_enctype_valid(context, etypes[i]) != 0 &&
+ !_kdc_is_weak_exception(princ->entry.principal, etypes[i]))
+ continue;
+
+ while (hdb_next_enctype2key(context, &princ->entry, etypes[i], &key) == 0) {
+ if (key->key.keyvalue.length == 0) {
+ ret = KRB5KDC_ERR_NULL_KEY;
+ continue;
+ }
+ if (ret_key != NULL)
+ *ret_key = key;
+ if (ret_enctype != NULL)
+ *ret_enctype = etypes[i];
+ ret = 0;
+ if (is_preauth && is_default_salt_p(&def_salt, key))
+ goto out;
}
}
}
+
+out:
krb5_free_salt (context, def_salt);
return ret;
}
}
void
-_kdc_log_timestamp(krb5_context context,
+_kdc_log_timestamp(krb5_context context,
krb5_kdc_configuration *config,
const char *type,
- KerberosTime authtime, KerberosTime *starttime,
+ KerberosTime authtime, KerberosTime *starttime,
KerberosTime endtime, KerberosTime *renew_till)
{
- char authtime_str[100], starttime_str[100],
+ char authtime_str[100], starttime_str[100],
endtime_str[100], renewtime_str[100];
-
- krb5_format_time(context, authtime,
- authtime_str, sizeof(authtime_str), TRUE);
+
+ krb5_format_time(context, authtime,
+ authtime_str, sizeof(authtime_str), TRUE);
if (starttime)
- krb5_format_time(context, *starttime,
- starttime_str, sizeof(starttime_str), TRUE);
+ krb5_format_time(context, *starttime,
+ starttime_str, sizeof(starttime_str), TRUE);
else
strlcpy(starttime_str, "unset", sizeof(starttime_str));
- krb5_format_time(context, endtime,
- endtime_str, sizeof(endtime_str), TRUE);
+ krb5_format_time(context, endtime,
+ endtime_str, sizeof(endtime_str), TRUE);
if (renew_till)
- krb5_format_time(context, *renew_till,
- renewtime_str, sizeof(renewtime_str), TRUE);
+ krb5_format_time(context, *renew_till,
+ renewtime_str, sizeof(renewtime_str), TRUE);
else
strlcpy(renewtime_str, "unset", sizeof(renewtime_str));
-
+
kdc_log(context, config, 5,
"%s authtime: %s starttime: %s endtime: %s renew till: %s",
type, authtime_str, starttime_str, endtime_str, renewtime_str);
}
static void
-log_patypes(krb5_context context,
+log_patypes(krb5_context context,
krb5_kdc_configuration *config,
METHOD_DATA *padata)
{
struct rk_strpool *p = NULL;
char *str;
- int i;
-
+ size_t i;
+
for (i = 0; i < padata->len; i++) {
switch(padata->val[i].padata_type) {
case KRB5_PADATA_PK_AS_REQ:
}
if (p == NULL)
p = rk_strpoolprintf(p, "none");
-
+
str = rk_strpoolcollect(p);
kdc_log(context, config, 0, "Client sent patypes: %s", str);
free(str);
krb5_error_code
_kdc_encode_reply(krb5_context context,
krb5_kdc_configuration *config,
- KDC_REP *rep, const EncTicketPart *et, EncKDCRepPart *ek,
- krb5_enctype etype,
+ KDC_REP *rep, const EncTicketPart *et, EncKDCRepPart *ek,
+ krb5_enctype etype,
int skvno, const EncryptionKey *skey,
- int ckvno, const EncryptionKey *ckey,
+ int ckvno, const EncryptionKey *reply_key,
+ int rk_is_subkey,
const char **e_text,
krb5_data *reply)
{
unsigned char *buf;
size_t buf_size;
- size_t len;
+ size_t len = 0;
krb5_error_code ret;
krb5_crypto crypto;
ASN1_MALLOC_ENCODE(EncTicketPart, buf, buf_size, et, &len, ret);
if(ret) {
- kdc_log(context, config, 0, "Failed to encode ticket: %s",
- krb5_get_err_text(context, ret));
+ const char *msg = krb5_get_error_message(context, ret);
+ kdc_log(context, config, 0, "Failed to encode ticket: %s", msg);
+ krb5_free_error_message(context, msg);
return ret;
}
if(buf_size != len) {
ret = krb5_crypto_init(context, skey, etype, &crypto);
if (ret) {
+ const char *msg;
free(buf);
- kdc_log(context, config, 0, "krb5_crypto_init failed: %s",
- krb5_get_err_text(context, ret));
+ msg = krb5_get_error_message(context, ret);
+ kdc_log(context, config, 0, "krb5_crypto_init failed: %s", msg);
+ krb5_free_error_message(context, msg);
return ret;
}
- ret = krb5_encrypt_EncryptedData(context,
+ ret = krb5_encrypt_EncryptedData(context,
crypto,
KRB5_KU_TICKET,
buf,
free(buf);
krb5_crypto_destroy(context, crypto);
if(ret) {
- kdc_log(context, config, 0, "Failed to encrypt data: %s",
- krb5_get_err_text(context, ret));
+ const char *msg = krb5_get_error_message(context, ret);
+ kdc_log(context, config, 0, "Failed to encrypt data: %s", msg);
+ krb5_free_error_message(context, msg);
return ret;
}
-
+
if(rep->msg_type == krb_as_rep && !config->encode_as_rep_as_tgs_rep)
ASN1_MALLOC_ENCODE(EncASRepPart, buf, buf_size, ek, &len, ret);
else
ASN1_MALLOC_ENCODE(EncTGSRepPart, buf, buf_size, ek, &len, ret);
if(ret) {
- kdc_log(context, config, 0, "Failed to encode KDC-REP: %s",
- krb5_get_err_text(context, ret));
+ const char *msg = krb5_get_error_message(context, ret);
+ kdc_log(context, config, 0, "Failed to encode KDC-REP: %s", msg);
+ krb5_free_error_message(context, msg);
return ret;
}
if(buf_size != len) {
*e_text = "KDC internal error";
return KRB5KRB_ERR_GENERIC;
}
- ret = krb5_crypto_init(context, ckey, 0, &crypto);
+ ret = krb5_crypto_init(context, reply_key, 0, &crypto);
if (ret) {
+ const char *msg = krb5_get_error_message(context, ret);
free(buf);
- kdc_log(context, config, 0, "krb5_crypto_init failed: %s",
- krb5_get_err_text(context, ret));
+ kdc_log(context, config, 0, "krb5_crypto_init failed: %s", msg);
+ krb5_free_error_message(context, msg);
return ret;
}
if(rep->msg_type == krb_as_rep) {
} else {
krb5_encrypt_EncryptedData(context,
crypto,
- KRB5_KU_TGS_REP_ENC_PART_SESSION,
+ rk_is_subkey ? KRB5_KU_TGS_REP_ENC_PART_SUB_KEY : KRB5_KU_TGS_REP_ENC_PART_SESSION,
buf,
len,
ckvno,
}
krb5_crypto_destroy(context, crypto);
if(ret) {
- kdc_log(context, config, 0, "Failed to encode KDC-REP: %s",
- krb5_get_err_text(context, ret));
+ const char *msg = krb5_get_error_message(context, ret);
+ kdc_log(context, config, 0, "Failed to encode KDC-REP: %s", msg);
+ krb5_free_error_message(context, msg);
return ret;
}
if(buf_size != len) {
case ETYPE_DES3_CBC_SHA1:
case ETYPE_ARCFOUR_HMAC_MD5:
case ETYPE_ARCFOUR_HMAC_MD5_56:
- /*
+ /*
* The following three is "old" windows enctypes and is needed for
* windows 2000 hosts.
*/
}
}
-static int
-only_older_enctype_p(const KDC_REQ *req)
-{
- int i;
-
- for(i = 0; i < req->req_body.etype.len; i++) {
- if (!older_enctype(req->req_body.etype.val[i]))
- return 0;
- }
- return 1;
-}
-
/*
*
*/
else if(key->salt->type == hdb_afs3_salt)
*ent->salttype = 2;
else {
- kdc_log(context, config, 0, "unknown salt-type: %d",
+ kdc_log(context, config, 0, "unknown salt-type: %d",
key->salt->type);
return KRB5KRB_ERR_GENERIC;
}
ALLOC(ent->salttype);
*ent->salttype = key->salt->type;
#else
- /*
+ /*
* We shouldn't sent salttype since it is incompatible with the
* specification and it breaks windows clients. The afs
* salting problem is solved by using KRB5-PADATA-AFS3-SALT
}
static krb5_error_code
-get_pa_etype_info(krb5_context context,
+get_pa_etype_info(krb5_context context,
krb5_kdc_configuration *config,
- METHOD_DATA *md, hdb_entry *client,
- ENCTYPE *etypes, unsigned int etypes_len)
+ METHOD_DATA *md, Key *ckey)
{
krb5_error_code ret = 0;
- int i, j;
- unsigned int n = 0;
ETYPE_INFO pa;
unsigned char *buf;
size_t len;
-
- pa.len = client->keys.len;
- if(pa.len > UINT_MAX/sizeof(*pa.val))
- return ERANGE;
- pa.val = malloc(pa.len * sizeof(*pa.val));
+
+ pa.len = 1;
+ pa.val = calloc(1, sizeof(pa.val[0]));
if(pa.val == NULL)
return ENOMEM;
- memset(pa.val, 0, pa.len * sizeof(*pa.val));
-
- for(i = 0; i < client->keys.len; i++) {
- for (j = 0; j < n; j++)
- if (pa.val[j].etype == client->keys.val[i].key.keytype)
- goto skip1;
- for(j = 0; j < etypes_len; j++) {
- if(client->keys.val[i].key.keytype == etypes[j]) {
- if (krb5_enctype_valid(context, etypes[j]) != 0)
- continue;
- if (!older_enctype(etypes[j]))
- continue;
- if (n >= pa.len)
- krb5_abortx(context, "internal error: n >= p.len");
- if((ret = make_etype_info_entry(context,
- &pa.val[n++],
- &client->keys.val[i])) != 0) {
- free_ETYPE_INFO(&pa);
- return ret;
- }
- break;
- }
- }
- skip1:;
- }
- for(i = 0; i < client->keys.len; i++) {
- /* already added? */
- for(j = 0; j < etypes_len; j++) {
- if(client->keys.val[i].key.keytype == etypes[j])
- goto skip2;
- }
- if (krb5_enctype_valid(context, client->keys.val[i].key.keytype) != 0)
- continue;
- if (!older_enctype(etypes[j]))
- continue;
- if (n >= pa.len)
- krb5_abortx(context, "internal error: n >= p.len");
- if((ret = make_etype_info_entry(context,
- &pa.val[n++],
- &client->keys.val[i])) != 0) {
- free_ETYPE_INFO(&pa);
- return ret;
- }
- skip2:;
- }
-
- if(n < pa.len) {
- /* stripped out dups, newer enctypes, and not valid enctypes */
- pa.len = n;
+
+ ret = make_etype_info_entry(context, &pa.val[0], ckey);
+ if (ret) {
+ free_ETYPE_INFO(&pa);
+ return ret;
}
ASN1_MALLOC_ENCODE(ETYPE_INFO, buf, len, &pa, &len, ret);
ent->s2kparams = NULL;
return ENOMEM;
}
- _krb5_put_int(ent->s2kparams->data,
- _krb5_AES_string_to_default_iterator,
+ _krb5_put_int(ent->s2kparams->data,
+ _krb5_AES_string_to_default_iterator,
ent->s2kparams->length);
break;
case ETYPE_DES_CBC_CRC:
ent->s2kparams = NULL;
return ENOMEM;
}
- _krb5_put_int(ent->s2kparams->data,
+ _krb5_put_int(ent->s2kparams->data,
1,
ent->s2kparams->length);
}
*/
static krb5_error_code
-get_pa_etype_info2(krb5_context context,
+get_pa_etype_info2(krb5_context context,
krb5_kdc_configuration *config,
- METHOD_DATA *md, hdb_entry *client,
- ENCTYPE *etypes, unsigned int etypes_len)
+ METHOD_DATA *md, Key *ckey)
{
krb5_error_code ret = 0;
- int i, j;
- unsigned int n = 0;
ETYPE_INFO2 pa;
unsigned char *buf;
size_t len;
- pa.len = client->keys.len;
- if(pa.len > UINT_MAX/sizeof(*pa.val))
- return ERANGE;
- pa.val = malloc(pa.len * sizeof(*pa.val));
+ pa.len = 1;
+ pa.val = calloc(1, sizeof(pa.val[0]));
if(pa.val == NULL)
return ENOMEM;
- memset(pa.val, 0, pa.len * sizeof(*pa.val));
-
- for(i = 0; i < client->keys.len; i++) {
- for (j = 0; j < n; j++)
- if (pa.val[j].etype == client->keys.val[i].key.keytype)
- goto skip1;
- for(j = 0; j < etypes_len; j++) {
- if(client->keys.val[i].key.keytype == etypes[j]) {
- if (krb5_enctype_valid(context, etypes[j]) != 0)
- continue;
- if (n >= pa.len)
- krb5_abortx(context, "internal error: n >= p.len");
- if((ret = make_etype_info2_entry(&pa.val[n++],
- &client->keys.val[i])) != 0) {
- free_ETYPE_INFO2(&pa);
- return ret;
- }
- break;
- }
- }
- skip1:;
- }
- /* send enctypes that the client doesn't know about too */
- for(i = 0; i < client->keys.len; i++) {
- /* already added? */
- for(j = 0; j < etypes_len; j++) {
- if(client->keys.val[i].key.keytype == etypes[j])
- goto skip2;
- }
- if (krb5_enctype_valid(context, client->keys.val[i].key.keytype) != 0)
- continue;
- if (n >= pa.len)
- krb5_abortx(context, "internal error: n >= p.len");
- if((ret = make_etype_info2_entry(&pa.val[n++],
- &client->keys.val[i])) != 0) {
- free_ETYPE_INFO2(&pa);
- return ret;
- }
- skip2:;
- }
-
- if(n < pa.len) {
- /* stripped out dups, and not valid enctypes */
- pa.len = n;
+
+ ret = make_etype_info2_entry(&pa.val[0], ckey);
+ if (ret) {
+ free_ETYPE_INFO2(&pa);
+ return ret;
}
ASN1_MALLOC_ENCODE(ETYPE_INFO2, buf, len, &pa, &len, ret);
const KDC_REQ_BODY *b)
{
krb5_error_code ret;
- struct rk_strpool *p = NULL;
+ struct rk_strpool *p;
char *str;
- int i;
-
+ size_t i;
+
+ p = rk_strpoolprintf(NULL, "%s", "Client supported enctypes: ");
+
for (i = 0; i < b->etype.len; i++) {
ret = krb5_enctype_to_string(context, b->etype.val[i], &str);
if (ret == 0) {
}
if (p == NULL)
p = rk_strpoolprintf(p, "no encryption types");
-
- str = rk_strpoolcollect(p);
- kdc_log(context, config, 0, "Client supported enctypes: %s", str);
- free(str);
{
char *cet;
if(ret == 0) {
ret = krb5_enctype_to_string(context, setype, &set);
if (ret == 0) {
- kdc_log(context, config, 5, "Using %s/%s", cet, set);
+ p = rk_strpoolprintf(p, ", using %s/%s", cet, set);
free(set);
}
free(cet);
}
if (ret != 0)
- kdc_log(context, config, 5, "Using e-types %d/%d", cetype, setype);
+ p = rk_strpoolprintf(p, ", using enctypes %d/%d",
+ cetype, setype);
}
-
+
+ str = rk_strpoolcollect(p);
+ kdc_log(context, config, 0, "%s", str);
+ free(str);
+
{
char fixedstr[128];
- unparse_flags(KDCOptions2int(b->kdc_options), asn1_KDCOptions_units(),
+ unparse_flags(KDCOptions2int(b->kdc_options), asn1_KDCOptions_units(),
fixedstr, sizeof(fixedstr));
if(*fixedstr)
- kdc_log(context, config, 2, "Requested flags: %s", fixedstr);
+ kdc_log(context, config, 0, "Requested flags: %s", fixedstr);
}
}
*/
krb5_error_code
-_kdc_check_flags(krb5_context context,
- krb5_kdc_configuration *config,
- hdb_entry_ex *client_ex, const char *client_name,
- hdb_entry_ex *server_ex, const char *server_name,
- krb5_boolean is_as_req)
+kdc_check_flags(krb5_context context,
+ krb5_kdc_configuration *config,
+ hdb_entry_ex *client_ex, const char *client_name,
+ hdb_entry_ex *server_ex, const char *server_name,
+ krb5_boolean is_as_req)
{
if(client_ex != NULL) {
hdb_entry *client = &client_ex->entry;
/* check client */
+ if (client->flags.locked_out) {
+ kdc_log(context, config, 0,
+ "Client (%s) is locked out", client_name);
+ return KRB5KDC_ERR_CLIENT_REVOKED;
+ }
+
if (client->flags.invalid) {
- kdc_log(context, config, 0,
+ kdc_log(context, config, 0,
"Client (%s) has invalid bit set", client_name);
return KRB5KDC_ERR_POLICY;
}
-
- if(!client->flags.client){
+
+ if (!is_as_req && !client->flags.client){
kdc_log(context, config, 0,
- "Principal may not act as client -- %s", client_name);
+ "Principal may only act as client in AS-REQ -- %s", client_name);
return KRB5KDC_ERR_POLICY;
}
-
+
if (client->valid_start && *client->valid_start > kdc_time) {
char starttime_str[100];
- krb5_format_time(context, *client->valid_start,
- starttime_str, sizeof(starttime_str), TRUE);
+ krb5_format_time(context, *client->valid_start,
+ starttime_str, sizeof(starttime_str), TRUE);
kdc_log(context, config, 0,
- "Client not yet valid until %s -- %s",
+ "Client not yet valid until %s -- %s",
starttime_str, client_name);
return KRB5KDC_ERR_CLIENT_NOTYET;
}
-
+
if (client->valid_end && *client->valid_end < kdc_time) {
char endtime_str[100];
- krb5_format_time(context, *client->valid_end,
- endtime_str, sizeof(endtime_str), TRUE);
+ krb5_format_time(context, *client->valid_end,
+ endtime_str, sizeof(endtime_str), TRUE);
kdc_log(context, config, 0,
"Client expired at %s -- %s",
endtime_str, client_name);
return KRB5KDC_ERR_NAME_EXP;
}
-
- if (client->pw_end && *client->pw_end < kdc_time
+
+ if (client->pw_end && *client->pw_end < kdc_time
&& (server_ex == NULL || !server_ex->entry.flags.change_pw)) {
char pwend_str[100];
- krb5_format_time(context, *client->pw_end,
- pwend_str, sizeof(pwend_str), TRUE);
+ krb5_format_time(context, *client->pw_end,
+ pwend_str, sizeof(pwend_str), TRUE);
kdc_log(context, config, 0,
- "Client's key has expired at %s -- %s",
+ "Client's key has expired at %s -- %s",
pwend_str, client_name);
return KRB5KDC_ERR_KEY_EXPIRED;
}
}
/* check server */
-
+
if (server_ex != NULL) {
hdb_entry *server = &server_ex->entry;
+ if (server->flags.locked_out) {
+ kdc_log(context, config, 0,
+ "Client server locked out -- %s", server_name);
+ return KRB5KDC_ERR_POLICY;
+ }
if (server->flags.invalid) {
kdc_log(context, config, 0,
"Server has invalid flag set -- %s", server_name);
if (server->valid_start && *server->valid_start > kdc_time) {
char starttime_str[100];
- krb5_format_time(context, *server->valid_start,
- starttime_str, sizeof(starttime_str), TRUE);
+ krb5_format_time(context, *server->valid_start,
+ starttime_str, sizeof(starttime_str), TRUE);
kdc_log(context, config, 0,
"Server not yet valid until %s -- %s",
starttime_str, server_name);
if (server->valid_end && *server->valid_end < kdc_time) {
char endtime_str[100];
- krb5_format_time(context, *server->valid_end,
- endtime_str, sizeof(endtime_str), TRUE);
+ krb5_format_time(context, *server->valid_end,
+ endtime_str, sizeof(endtime_str), TRUE);
kdc_log(context, config, 0,
- "Server expired at %s -- %s",
+ "Server expired at %s -- %s",
endtime_str, server_name);
return KRB5KDC_ERR_SERVICE_EXP;
}
if (server->pw_end && *server->pw_end < kdc_time) {
char pwend_str[100];
- krb5_format_time(context, *server->pw_end,
- pwend_str, sizeof(pwend_str), TRUE);
+ krb5_format_time(context, *server->pw_end,
+ pwend_str, sizeof(pwend_str), TRUE);
kdc_log(context, config, 0,
- "Server's key has expired at -- %s",
+ "Server's key has expired at -- %s",
pwend_str, server_name);
return KRB5KDC_ERR_KEY_EXPIRED;
}
*/
krb5_boolean
-_kdc_check_addresses(krb5_context context,
+_kdc_check_addresses(krb5_context context,
krb5_kdc_configuration *config,
HostAddresses *addresses, const struct sockaddr *from)
{
krb5_address addr;
krb5_boolean result;
krb5_boolean only_netbios = TRUE;
- int i;
-
+ size_t i;
+
if(config->check_ticket_addresses == 0)
return TRUE;
if(addresses == NULL)
return config->allow_null_ticket_addresses;
-
+
for (i = 0; i < addresses->len; ++i) {
if (addresses->val[i].addr_type != KRB5_ADDRESS_NETBIOS) {
only_netbios = FALSE;
PA_PAC_REQUEST pacreq;
const PA_DATA *pa;
int i = 0;
-
+
pa = _kdc_find_padata(req, &i, KRB5_PADATA_PA_PAC_REQUEST);
if (pa == NULL)
return TRUE;
return TRUE;
}
+krb5_boolean
+_kdc_is_anonymous(krb5_context context, krb5_principal principal)
+{
+ if (principal->name.name_type != KRB5_NT_WELLKNOWN ||
+ principal->name.name_string.len != 2 ||
+ strcmp(principal->name.name_string.val[0], KRB5_WELLKNOWN_NAME) != 0 ||
+ strcmp(principal->name.name_string.val[1], KRB5_ANON_NAME) != 0)
+ return 0;
+ return 1;
+}
+
/*
*
*/
krb5_error_code
-_kdc_as_rep(krb5_context context,
+_kdc_as_rep(krb5_context context,
krb5_kdc_configuration *config,
- KDC_REQ *req,
- const krb5_data *req_buffer,
+ KDC_REQ *req,
+ const krb5_data *req_buffer,
krb5_data *reply,
const char *from,
struct sockaddr *from_addr,
AS_REP rep;
KDCOptions f = b->kdc_options;
hdb_entry_ex *client = NULL, *server = NULL;
- krb5_enctype cetype, setype, sessionetype;
+ HDB *clientdb = NULL;
+ krb5_enctype setype, sessionetype;
krb5_data e_data;
EncTicketPart et;
EncKDCRepPart ek;
krb5_error_code ret = 0;
const char *e_text = NULL;
krb5_crypto crypto;
- Key *ckey, *skey;
- EncryptionKey *reply_key;
- int flags = 0;
+ Key *skey = NULL;
+ EncryptionKey *reply_key = NULL, session_key;
+ int flags = HDB_F_FOR_AS_REQ;
#ifdef PKINIT
pk_client_params *pkp = NULL;
#endif
+ const EncryptionKey *pk_reply_key = NULL;
memset(&rep, 0, sizeof(rep));
+ memset(&session_key, 0, sizeof(session_key));
krb5_data_zero(&e_data);
+ ALLOC(rep.padata);
+ rep.padata->len = 0;
+ rep.padata->val = NULL;
+
if (f.canonicalize)
flags |= HDB_F_CANON;
ret = krb5_unparse_name(context, server_princ, &server_name);
}
if (ret) {
- kdc_log(context, config, 0,
+ kdc_log(context, config, 0,
"AS-REQ malformed server name from %s", from);
goto out;
}
-
if(b->cname == NULL){
ret = KRB5KRB_ERR_GENERIC;
e_text = "No client in request";
} else {
+ ret = _krb5_principalname2krb5_principal (context,
+ &client_princ,
+ *(b->cname),
+ b->realm);
+ if (ret)
+ goto out;
- if (b->cname->name_type == KRB5_NT_ENTERPRISE_PRINCIPAL) {
- if (b->cname->name_string.len != 1) {
- kdc_log(context, config, 0,
- "AS-REQ malformed canon request from %s, "
- "enterprise name with %d name components",
- from, b->cname->name_string.len);
- ret = KRB5_PARSE_MALFORMED;
- goto out;
- }
- ret = krb5_parse_name(context, b->cname->name_string.val[0],
- &client_princ);
- if (ret)
- goto out;
- } else {
- ret = _krb5_principalname2krb5_principal (context,
- &client_princ,
- *(b->cname),
- b->realm);
- if (ret)
- goto out;
- }
ret = krb5_unparse_name(context, client_princ, &client_name);
}
if (ret) {
goto out;
}
- kdc_log(context, config, 0, "AS-REQ %s from %s for %s",
+ kdc_log(context, config, 0, "AS-REQ %s from %s for %s",
client_name, from, server_name);
- ret = _kdc_db_fetch(context, config, client_princ,
- HDB_F_GET_CLIENT | flags, NULL, &client);
- if(ret){
- kdc_log(context, config, 0, "UNKNOWN -- %s: %s", client_name,
- krb5_get_err_text(context, ret));
+ /*
+ *
+ */
+
+ if (_kdc_is_anonymous(context, client_princ)) {
+ if (!b->kdc_options.request_anonymous) {
+ kdc_log(context, config, 0, "Anonymous ticket w/o anonymous flag");
+ ret = KRB5KDC_ERR_C_PRINCIPAL_UNKNOWN;
+ goto out;
+ }
+ } else if (b->kdc_options.request_anonymous) {
+ kdc_log(context, config, 0,
+ "Request for a anonymous ticket with non "
+ "anonymous client name: %s", client_name);
ret = KRB5KDC_ERR_C_PRINCIPAL_UNKNOWN;
goto out;
}
- ret = _kdc_db_fetch(context, config, server_princ,
- HDB_F_GET_SERVER|HDB_F_GET_KRBTGT,
- NULL, &server);
- if(ret){
- kdc_log(context, config, 0, "UNKNOWN -- %s: %s", server_name,
- krb5_get_err_text(context, ret));
- ret = KRB5KDC_ERR_S_PRINCIPAL_UNKNOWN;
+ /*
+ *
+ */
+
+ ret = _kdc_db_fetch(context, config, client_princ,
+ HDB_F_GET_ANY | flags, NULL,
+ &clientdb, &client);
+ if(ret == HDB_ERR_NOT_FOUND_HERE) {
+ kdc_log(context, config, 5, "client %s does not have secrets at this KDC, need to proxy", client_name);
goto out;
- }
+ } else if (ret == HDB_ERR_WRONG_REALM) {
+ char *fixed_client_name = NULL;
- ret = _kdc_windc_client_access(context, client, req, &e_data);
- if(ret)
+ ret = krb5_unparse_name(context, client->entry.principal,
+ &fixed_client_name);
+ if (ret) {
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ kdc_log(context, config, 0, "WRONG_REALM - %s -> %s",
+ client_name, fixed_client_name);
+ free(fixed_client_name);
+
+ ret = krb5_mk_error_ext(context,
+ KRB5_KDC_ERR_WRONG_REALM,
+ NULL, /* e_text */
+ NULL, /* e_data */
+ server_princ,
+ NULL, /* client_name */
+ &client->entry.principal->realm,
+ NULL, /* client_time */
+ NULL, /* client_usec */
+ reply);
goto out;
+ } else if(ret){
+ const char *msg = krb5_get_error_message(context, ret);
+ kdc_log(context, config, 0, "UNKNOWN -- %s: %s", client_name, msg);
+ krb5_free_error_message(context, msg);
+ ret = KRB5KDC_ERR_C_PRINCIPAL_UNKNOWN;
- ret = _kdc_check_flags(context, config,
- client, client_name,
- server, server_name,
- TRUE);
- if(ret)
+ if (config->db[0] && config->db[0]->hdb_auth_status)
+ (config->db[0]->hdb_auth_status)(context, config->db[0], NULL,
+ from_addr,
+ &_kdc_now,
+ client_name,
+ NULL,
+ HDB_AUTH_CLIENT_UNKNOWN);
+ goto out;
+ }
+ ret = _kdc_db_fetch(context, config, server_princ,
+ HDB_F_GET_SERVER|HDB_F_GET_KRBTGT | flags,
+ NULL, NULL, &server);
+ if(ret == HDB_ERR_NOT_FOUND_HERE) {
+ kdc_log(context, config, 5, "target %s does not have secrets at this KDC, need to proxy", server_name);
+ goto out;
+ } else if(ret){
+ const char *msg = krb5_get_error_message(context, ret);
+ kdc_log(context, config, 0, "UNKNOWN -- %s: %s", server_name, msg);
+ krb5_free_error_message(context, msg);
+ ret = KRB5KDC_ERR_S_PRINCIPAL_UNKNOWN;
goto out;
+ }
memset(&et, 0, sizeof(et));
memset(&ek, 0, sizeof(ek));
+ /*
+ * Select a session enctype from the list of the crypto system
+ * supported enctypes that is supported by the client and is one of
+ * the enctype of the enctype of the service (likely krbtgt).
+ *
+ * The latter is used as a hint of what enctypes all KDC support,
+ * to make sure a newer version of KDC won't generate a session
+ * enctype that an older version of a KDC in the same realm can't
+ * decrypt.
+ */
+ ret = _kdc_find_etype(context, config->as_use_strongest_session_key, FALSE,
+ client, b->etype.val, b->etype.len, &sessionetype,
+ NULL);
+ if (ret) {
+ kdc_log(context, config, 0,
+ "Client (%s) from %s has no common enctypes with KDC "
+ "to use for the session key",
+ client_name, from);
+ goto out;
+ }
+ /*
+ * But if the KDC admin is paranoid and doesn't want to have "not
+ * the best" enctypes on the krbtgt, lets save the best pick from
+ * the client list and hope that that will work for any other
+ * KDCs.
+ */
+
+ /*
+ * Pre-auth processing
+ */
+
if(req->padata){
int i;
const PA_DATA *pa;
log_patypes(context, config, req->padata);
#ifdef PKINIT
- kdc_log(context, config, 5,
+ kdc_log(context, config, 5,
"Looking for PKINIT pa-data -- %s", client_name);
e_text = "No PKINIT PA found";
i = 0;
- if ((pa = _kdc_find_padata(req, &i, KRB5_PADATA_PK_AS_REQ)))
- ;
+ pa = _kdc_find_padata(req, &i, KRB5_PADATA_PK_AS_REQ);
if (pa == NULL) {
i = 0;
- if((pa = _kdc_find_padata(req, &i, KRB5_PADATA_PK_AS_REQ_WIN)))
- ;
+ pa = _kdc_find_padata(req, &i, KRB5_PADATA_PK_AS_REQ_WIN);
}
if (pa) {
char *client_cert = NULL;
- ret = _kdc_pk_rd_padata(context, config, req, pa, &pkp);
+ ret = _kdc_pk_rd_padata(context, config, req, pa, client, &pkp);
if (ret) {
ret = KRB5KRB_AP_ERR_BAD_INTEGRITY;
- kdc_log(context, config, 5,
- "Failed to decode PKINIT PA-DATA -- %s",
+ kdc_log(context, config, 5,
+ "Failed to decode PKINIT PA-DATA -- %s",
client_name);
goto ts_enc;
}
ret = _kdc_pk_check_client(context,
config,
+ clientdb,
client,
pkp,
&client_cert);
pkp = NULL;
goto out;
}
+
found_pa = 1;
et.flags.pre_authent = 1;
kdc_log(context, config, 0,
- "PKINIT pre-authentication succeeded -- %s using %s",
+ "PKINIT pre-authentication succeeded -- %s using %s",
client_name, client_cert);
+ if (clientdb->hdb_auth_status)
+ (clientdb->hdb_auth_status)(context, clientdb, client,
+ from_addr,
+ &_kdc_now,
+ client_name,
+ "PKINIT",
+ HDB_AUTH_PKINIT_SUCCESS);
free(client_cert);
if (pkp)
goto preauth_done;
}
ts_enc:
#endif
- kdc_log(context, config, 5, "Looking for ENC-TS pa-data -- %s",
+
+ if (client->entry.flags.locked_out) {
+ ret = KRB5KDC_ERR_CLIENT_REVOKED;
+ kdc_log(context, config, 0,
+ "Client (%s) is locked out", client_name);
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ kdc_log(context, config, 5, "Looking for ENC-TS pa-data -- %s",
client_name);
i = 0;
EncryptedData enc_data;
Key *pa_key;
char *str;
-
+
found_pa = 1;
-
+
+ if (b->kdc_options.request_anonymous) {
+ ret = KRB5KRB_AP_ERR_BAD_INTEGRITY;
+ kdc_log(context, config, 0, "ENC-TS doesn't support anon");
+ goto out;
+ }
+
ret = decode_EncryptedData(pa->padata_value.data,
pa->padata_value.length,
&enc_data,
&len);
if (ret) {
ret = KRB5KRB_AP_ERR_BAD_INTEGRITY;
- kdc_log(context, config, 5, "Failed to decode PA-DATA -- %s",
+ kdc_log(context, config, 5, "Failed to decode PA-DATA -- %s",
client_name);
goto out;
}
-
- ret = hdb_enctype2key(context, &client->entry,
+
+ ret = hdb_enctype2key(context, &client->entry,
enc_data.etype, &pa_key);
if(ret){
char *estr;
if(krb5_enctype_to_string(context, enc_data.etype, &estr))
estr = NULL;
if(estr == NULL)
- kdc_log(context, config, 5,
- "No client key matching pa-data (%d) -- %s",
+ kdc_log(context, config, 5,
+ "No client key matching pa-data (%d) -- %s",
enc_data.etype, client_name);
else
kdc_log(context, config, 5,
- "No client key matching pa-data (%s) -- %s",
+ "No client key matching pa-data (%s) -- %s",
estr, client_name);
free(estr);
-
free_EncryptedData(&enc_data);
+
continue;
}
try_next_key:
ret = krb5_crypto_init(context, &pa_key->key, 0, &crypto);
if (ret) {
- kdc_log(context, config, 0, "krb5_crypto_init failed: %s",
- krb5_get_err_text(context, ret));
+ const char *msg = krb5_get_error_message(context, ret);
+ kdc_log(context, config, 0, "krb5_crypto_init failed: %s", msg);
+ krb5_free_error_message(context, msg);
free_EncryptedData(&enc_data);
continue;
}
&enc_data,
&ts_data);
krb5_crypto_destroy(context, crypto);
+ /*
+ * Since the user might have several keys with the same
+ * enctype but with diffrent salting, we need to try all
+ * the keys with the same enctype.
+ */
if(ret){
krb5_error_code ret2;
- ret2 = krb5_enctype_to_string(context,
+ const char *msg = krb5_get_error_message(context, ret);
+
+ ret2 = krb5_enctype_to_string(context,
pa_key->key.keytype, &str);
if (ret2)
str = NULL;
- kdc_log(context, config, 5,
+
+ kdc_log(context, config, 5,
"Failed to decrypt PA-DATA -- %s "
"(enctype %s) error %s",
- client_name,
- str ? str : "unknown enctype",
- krb5_get_err_text(context, ret));
- free(str);
+ client_name, str ? str : "unknown enctype", msg);
+ krb5_free_error_message(context, msg);
- if(hdb_next_enctype2key(context, &client->entry,
- enc_data.etype, &pa_key) == 0)
+ if(hdb_next_enctype2key(context, &client->entry,
+ enc_data.etype, &pa_key) == 0) {
+ free(str);
goto try_next_key;
+ }
e_text = "Failed to decrypt PA-DATA";
free_EncryptedData(&enc_data);
+
+ if (clientdb->hdb_auth_status)
+ (clientdb->hdb_auth_status)(context, clientdb, client,
+ from_addr,
+ &_kdc_now,
+ client_name,
+ str ? str : "unknown enctype",
+ HDB_AUTH_WRONG_PASSWORD);
+
+ free(str);
+
ret = KRB5KDC_ERR_PREAUTH_FAILED;
continue;
}
if(ret){
e_text = "Failed to decode PA-ENC-TS-ENC";
ret = KRB5KDC_ERR_PREAUTH_FAILED;
- kdc_log(context, config,
+ kdc_log(context, config,
5, "Failed to decode PA-ENC-TS_ENC -- %s",
client_name);
continue;
free_PA_ENC_TS_ENC(&p);
if (abs(kdc_time - p.patimestamp) > context->max_skew) {
char client_time[100];
-
- krb5_format_time(context, p.patimestamp,
- client_time, sizeof(client_time), TRUE);
+
+ krb5_format_time(context, p.patimestamp,
+ client_time, sizeof(client_time), TRUE);
ret = KRB5KRB_AP_ERR_SKEW;
kdc_log(context, config, 0,
"Too large time skew, "
- "client time %s is out by %u > %u seconds -- %s",
- client_time,
- (unsigned)abs(kdc_time - p.patimestamp),
+ "client time %s is out by %u > %u seconds -- %s",
+ client_time,
+ (unsigned)abs(kdc_time - p.patimestamp),
context->max_skew,
client_name);
-#if 1
- /* This code is from samba, needs testing */
- /*
- * the following is needed to make windows clients
- * to retry using the timestamp in the error message
- *
- * this is maybe a bug in windows to not trying when e_text
- * is present...
+
+ /*
+ * The following is needed to make windows clients to
+ * retry using the timestamp in the error message, if
+ * there is a e_text, they become unhappy.
*/
e_text = NULL;
-#else
- e_text = "Too large time skew";
-#endif
goto out;
}
et.flags.pre_authent = 1;
- ret = krb5_enctype_to_string(context,pa_key->key.keytype, &str);
+ set_salt_padata(rep.padata, pa_key->salt);
+
+ reply_key = &pa_key->key;
+
+ ret = krb5_enctype_to_string(context, pa_key->key.keytype, &str);
if (ret)
str = NULL;
kdc_log(context, config, 2,
- "ENC-TS Pre-authentication succeeded -- %s using %s",
+ "ENC-TS Pre-authentication succeeded -- %s using %s",
client_name, str ? str : "unknown enctype");
+ if (clientdb->hdb_auth_status)
+ (clientdb->hdb_auth_status)(context, clientdb, client,
+ from_addr,
+ &_kdc_now,
+ client_name,
+ str ? str : "unknown enctype",
+ HDB_AUTH_CORRECT_PASSWORD);
+
free(str);
break;
}
was some problem with it, other than too large skew */
if(found_pa && et.flags.pre_authent == 0){
kdc_log(context, config, 0, "%s -- %s", e_text, client_name);
+ if (!prepare_enc_data(context, config, &e_data, b, client)) {
+ goto out;
+ }
e_text = NULL;
goto out;
}
}else if (config->require_preauth
+ || b->kdc_options.request_anonymous /* hack to force anon */
|| client->entry.flags.require_preauth
|| server->entry.flags.require_preauth) {
- METHOD_DATA method_data;
- PA_DATA *pa;
- unsigned char *buf;
- size_t len;
-
- use_pa:
- method_data.len = 0;
- method_data.val = NULL;
-
- ret = realloc_method_data(&method_data);
- pa = &method_data.val[method_data.len-1];
- pa->padata_type = KRB5_PADATA_ENC_TIMESTAMP;
- pa->padata_value.length = 0;
- pa->padata_value.data = NULL;
-
-#ifdef PKINIT
- ret = realloc_method_data(&method_data);
- pa = &method_data.val[method_data.len-1];
- pa->padata_type = KRB5_PADATA_PK_AS_REQ;
- pa->padata_value.length = 0;
- pa->padata_value.data = NULL;
-
- ret = realloc_method_data(&method_data);
- pa = &method_data.val[method_data.len-1];
- pa->padata_type = KRB5_PADATA_PK_AS_REQ_WIN;
- pa->padata_value.length = 0;
- pa->padata_value.data = NULL;
-#endif
-
- /*
- * RFC4120 requires:
- * - If the client only knows about old enctypes, then send
- * both info replies (we send 'info' first in the list).
- * - If the client is 'modern', because it knows about 'new'
- * enctype types, then only send the 'info2' reply.
- */
-
- /* XXX check ret */
- if (only_older_enctype_p(req))
- ret = get_pa_etype_info(context, config,
- &method_data, &client->entry,
- b->etype.val, b->etype.len);
- /* XXX check ret */
- ret = get_pa_etype_info2(context, config, &method_data,
- &client->entry, b->etype.val, b->etype.len);
-
-
- ASN1_MALLOC_ENCODE(METHOD_DATA, buf, len, &method_data, &len, ret);
- free_METHOD_DATA(&method_data);
+ use_pa:
+ if (!prepare_enc_data(context, config, &e_data, b, client)) {
+ goto out;
+ }
- e_data.data = buf;
- e_data.length = len;
e_text ="Need to use PA-ENC-TIMESTAMP/PA-PK-AS-REQ",
ret = KRB5KDC_ERR_PREAUTH_REQUIRED;
client_name);
goto out;
}
-
+
+ e_text = NULL;
+
/*
- * Find the client key (for preauth ENC-TS verification and reply
- * encryption). Then the best encryption type for the KDC and
- * last the best session key that shared between the client and
- * KDC runtime enctypes.
+ * Verify flags after the user been required to prove its identity
+ * with in a preauth mech.
*/
- ret = _kdc_find_etype(context, client, b->etype.val, b->etype.len,
- &ckey, &cetype);
- if (ret) {
- kdc_log(context, config, 0,
- "Client (%s) has no support for etypes", client_name);
+ ret = _kdc_check_access(context, config, client, client_name,
+ server, server_name,
+ req, &e_data);
+ if(ret)
goto out;
- }
-
+
+ if (clientdb->hdb_auth_status)
+ (clientdb->hdb_auth_status)(context, clientdb, client,
+ from_addr,
+ &_kdc_now,
+ client_name,
+ NULL,
+ HDB_AUTHZ_SUCCESS);
+
+ /*
+ * Selelct the best encryption type for the KDC with out regard to
+ * the client since the client never needs to read that data.
+ */
+
ret = _kdc_get_preferred_key(context, config,
server, server_name,
&setype, &skey);
if(ret)
goto out;
- /*
- * Select a session enctype from the list of the crypto systems
- * supported enctype, is supported by the client and is one of the
- * enctype of the enctype of the krbtgt.
- *
- * The later is used as a hint what enctype all KDC are supporting
- * to make sure a newer version of KDC wont generate a session
- * enctype that and older version of a KDC in the same realm can't
- * decrypt.
- *
- * But if the KDC admin is paranoid and doesn't want to have "no
- * the best" enctypes on the krbtgt, lets save the best pick from
- * the client list and hope that that will work for any other
- * KDCs.
- */
- {
- const krb5_enctype *p;
- krb5_enctype clientbest = ETYPE_NULL;
- int i, j;
-
- p = krb5_kerberos_enctypes(context);
-
- sessionetype = ETYPE_NULL;
-
- for (i = 0; p[i] != ETYPE_NULL && sessionetype == ETYPE_NULL; i++) {
- if (krb5_enctype_valid(context, p[i]) != 0)
- continue;
-
- for (j = 0; j < b->etype.len && sessionetype == ETYPE_NULL; j++) {
- Key *dummy;
- /* check with client */
- if (p[i] != b->etype.val[j])
- continue;
- /* save best of union of { client, crypto system } */
- if (clientbest == ETYPE_NULL)
- clientbest = p[i];
- /* check with krbtgt */
- ret = hdb_enctype2key(context, &server->entry, p[i], &dummy);
- if (ret)
- continue;
- sessionetype = p[i];
- }
- }
- /* if krbtgt had no shared keys with client, pick clients best */
- if (clientbest != ETYPE_NULL && sessionetype == ETYPE_NULL) {
- sessionetype = clientbest;
- } else if (sessionetype == ETYPE_NULL) {
- kdc_log(context, config, 0,
- "Client (%s) from %s has no common enctypes with KDC"
- "to use for the session key",
- client_name, from);
- goto out;
- }
- }
-
- log_as_req(context, config, cetype, setype, b);
-
if(f.renew || f.validate || f.proxy || f.forwarded || f.enc_tkt_in_skey
|| (f.request_anonymous && !config->allow_anonymous)) {
ret = KRB5KDC_ERR_BADOPTION;
+ e_text = "Bad KDC options";
kdc_log(context, config, 0, "Bad KDC options -- %s", client_name);
goto out;
}
-
+
rep.pvno = 5;
rep.msg_type = krb_as_rep;
- copy_Realm(&client->entry.principal->realm, &rep.crealm);
- if (f.request_anonymous)
- _kdc_make_anonymous_principalname (&rep.cname);
- else
- _krb5_principal2principalname(&rep.cname,
- client->entry.principal);
+
+ ret = copy_Realm(&client->entry.principal->realm, &rep.crealm);
+ if (ret)
+ goto out;
+ ret = _krb5_principal2principalname(&rep.cname, client->entry.principal);
+ if (ret)
+ goto out;
+
rep.ticket.tkt_vno = 5;
copy_Realm(&server->entry.principal->realm, &rep.ticket.realm);
- _krb5_principal2principalname(&rep.ticket.sname,
+ _krb5_principal2principalname(&rep.ticket.sname,
server->entry.principal);
/* java 1.6 expects the name to be the same type, lets allow that
* uncomplicated name-types. */
if(client->entry.flags.forwardable && server->entry.flags.forwardable)
et.flags.forwardable = f.forwardable;
else if (f.forwardable) {
+ e_text = "Ticket may not be forwardable";
ret = KRB5KDC_ERR_POLICY;
kdc_log(context, config, 0,
"Ticket may not be forwardable -- %s", client_name);
if(client->entry.flags.proxiable && server->entry.flags.proxiable)
et.flags.proxiable = f.proxiable;
else if (f.proxiable) {
+ e_text = "Ticket may not be proxiable";
ret = KRB5KDC_ERR_POLICY;
- kdc_log(context, config, 0,
+ kdc_log(context, config, 0,
"Ticket may not be proxiable -- %s", client_name);
goto out;
}
if(client->entry.flags.postdate && server->entry.flags.postdate)
et.flags.may_postdate = f.allow_postdate;
else if (f.allow_postdate){
+ e_text = "Ticket may not be postdate";
ret = KRB5KDC_ERR_POLICY;
kdc_log(context, config, 0,
"Ticket may not be postdatable -- %s", client_name);
/* check for valid set of addresses */
if(!_kdc_check_addresses(context, config, b->addresses, from_addr)) {
+ e_text = "Bad address list in requested";
ret = KRB5KRB_AP_ERR_BADADDR;
kdc_log(context, config, 0,
"Bad address list requested -- %s", client_name);
goto out;
}
- ret = krb5_generate_random_keyblock(context, sessionetype, &et.key);
+ ret = copy_PrincipalName(&rep.cname, &et.cname);
if (ret)
goto out;
- copy_PrincipalName(&rep.cname, &et.cname);
- copy_Realm(&rep.crealm, &et.crealm);
-
+ ret = copy_Realm(&rep.crealm, &et.crealm);
+ if (ret)
+ goto out;
+
{
time_t start;
time_t t;
-
+
start = et.authtime = kdc_time;
-
+
if(f.postdated && req->req_body.from){
ALLOC(et.starttime);
start = *et.starttime = *req->req_body.from;
if (f.request_anonymous)
et.flags.anonymous = 1;
-
+
if(b->addresses){
ALLOC(et.caddr);
copy_HostAddresses(b->addresses, et.caddr);
}
-
+
et.transited.tr_type = DOMAIN_X500_COMPRESS;
- krb5_data_zero(&et.transited.contents);
-
- copy_EncryptionKey(&et.key, &ek.key);
+ krb5_data_zero(&et.transited.contents);
/* The MIT ASN.1 library (obviously) doesn't tell lengths encoded
* as 0 and as 0x80 (meaning indefinite length) apart, and is thus
ALLOC(ek.key_expiration);
if (client->entry.valid_end) {
if (client->entry.pw_end)
- *ek.key_expiration = min(*client->entry.valid_end,
+ *ek.key_expiration = min(*client->entry.valid_end,
*client->entry.pw_end);
else
*ek.key_expiration = *client->entry.valid_end;
copy_HostAddresses(et.caddr, ek.caddr);
}
- ALLOC(rep.padata);
- rep.padata->len = 0;
- rep.padata->val = NULL;
-
- reply_key = &ckey->key;
-#if PKINIT
+#ifdef PKINIT
if (pkp) {
- ret = _kdc_pk_mk_pa_reply(context, config, pkp, client,
- req, req_buffer,
- &reply_key, rep.padata);
+ e_text = "Failed to build PK-INIT reply";
+ ret = _kdc_pk_mk_pa_reply(context, config, pkp, client,
+ sessionetype, req, req_buffer,
+ &reply_key, &et.key, rep.padata);
if (ret)
goto out;
ret = _kdc_add_inital_verified_cas(context,
&et);
if (ret)
goto out;
- }
-#endif
-
- set_salt_padata (rep.padata, ckey->salt);
-
- /* Add signing of alias referral */
- if (f.canonicalize) {
- PA_ClientCanonicalized canon;
- krb5_data data;
- PA_DATA pa;
- krb5_crypto crypto;
- size_t len;
- memset(&canon, 0, sizeof(canon));
-
- canon.names.requested_name = *b->cname;
- canon.names.mapped_name = client->entry.principal->name;
-
- ASN1_MALLOC_ENCODE(PA_ClientCanonicalizedNames, data.data, data.length,
- &canon.names, &len, ret);
- if (ret)
- goto out;
- if (data.length != len)
- krb5_abortx(context, "internal asn.1 error");
-
- /* sign using "returned session key" */
- ret = krb5_crypto_init(context, &et.key, 0, &crypto);
- if (ret) {
- free(data.data);
- goto out;
- }
-
- ret = krb5_create_checksum(context, crypto,
- KRB5_KU_CANONICALIZED_NAMES, 0,
- data.data, data.length,
- &canon.canon_checksum);
- free(data.data);
- krb5_crypto_destroy(context, crypto);
+ /*
+ * Send reply key as constant value to pac generate which allows
+ * parts of the buffer to be encrypted (i.e., PAC_CREDENTIAL_DATA).
+ */
+ pk_reply_key = reply_key;
+ } else
+#endif
+ {
+ ret = krb5_generate_random_keyblock(context, sessionetype, &et.key);
if (ret)
goto out;
-
- ASN1_MALLOC_ENCODE(PA_ClientCanonicalized, data.data, data.length,
- &canon, &len, ret);
- free_Checksum(&canon.canon_checksum);
- if (ret)
- goto out;
- if (data.length != len)
- krb5_abortx(context, "internal asn.1 error");
+ }
- pa.padata_type = KRB5_PADATA_CLIENT_CANONICALIZED;
- pa.padata_value = data;
- ret = add_METHOD_DATA(rep.padata, &pa);
- free(data.data);
- if (ret)
- goto out;
+ if (reply_key == NULL) {
+ e_text = "Client have no reply key";
+ ret = KRB5KDC_ERR_CLIENT_NOTYET;
+ goto out;
}
+ ret = copy_EncryptionKey(&et.key, &ek.key);
+ if (ret)
+ goto out;
+
if (rep.padata->len == 0) {
free(rep.padata);
rep.padata = NULL;
krb5_pac p = NULL;
krb5_data data;
- ret = _kdc_pac_generate(context, client, &p);
+ ret = _kdc_pac_generate(context, client, pk_reply_key, &p);
if (ret) {
- kdc_log(context, config, 0, "PAC generation failed for -- %s",
+ kdc_log(context, config, 0, "PAC generation failed for -- %s",
client_name);
goto out;
}
if (p != NULL) {
ret = _krb5_pac_sign(context, p, et.authtime,
client->entry.principal,
- &skey->key, /* Server key */
+ &skey->key, /* Server key */
&skey->key, /* FIXME: should be krbtgt key */
&data);
krb5_pac_free(context, p);
if (ret) {
- kdc_log(context, config, 0, "PAC signing failed for -- %s",
+ kdc_log(context, config, 0, "PAC signing failed for -- %s",
client_name);
goto out;
}
}
}
- _kdc_log_timestamp(context, config, "AS-REQ", et.authtime, et.starttime,
+ _kdc_log_timestamp(context, config, "AS-REQ", et.authtime, et.starttime,
et.endtime, et.renew_till);
/* do this as the last thing since this signs the EncTicketPart */
config,
server,
setype,
+ client->entry.principal,
NULL,
NULL,
&et);
if (ret)
goto out;
- ret = _kdc_encode_reply(context, config,
- &rep, &et, &ek, setype, server->entry.kvno,
- &skey->key, client->entry.kvno,
- reply_key, &e_text, reply);
+ log_as_req(context, config, reply_key->keytype, setype, b);
+
+ ret = _kdc_encode_reply(context, config,
+ &rep, &et, &ek, setype, server->entry.kvno,
+ &skey->key, client->entry.kvno,
+ reply_key, 0, &e_text, reply);
free_EncTicketPart(&et);
free_EncKDCRepPart(&ek);
if (ret)
out:
free_AS_REP(&rep);
- if(ret){
+ if(ret != 0 && ret != HDB_ERR_NOT_FOUND_HERE && reply->length == 0) {
krb5_mk_error(context,
ret,
e_text,
return ret;
}
+krb5_boolean
+prepare_enc_data(krb5_context context,
+ krb5_kdc_configuration *config,
+ krb5_data *e_data,
+ KDC_REQ_BODY *b,
+ hdb_entry_ex *client)
+{
+ METHOD_DATA method_data;
+ PA_DATA *pa;
+ unsigned char *buf;
+ size_t len;
+ Key *ckey;
+ krb5_error_code ret;
+
+ method_data.len = 0;
+ method_data.val = NULL;
+
+ ret = realloc_method_data(&method_data);
+ if (ret) {
+ free_METHOD_DATA(&method_data);
+ return FALSE;
+ }
+ pa = &method_data.val[method_data.len-1];
+ pa->padata_type = KRB5_PADATA_ENC_TIMESTAMP;
+ pa->padata_value.length = 0;
+ pa->padata_value.data = NULL;
+
+#ifdef PKINIT
+ ret = realloc_method_data(&method_data);
+ if (ret) {
+ free_METHOD_DATA(&method_data);
+ return FALSE;
+ }
+ pa = &method_data.val[method_data.len-1];
+ pa->padata_type = KRB5_PADATA_PK_AS_REQ;
+ pa->padata_value.length = 0;
+ pa->padata_value.data = NULL;
+
+ ret = realloc_method_data(&method_data);
+ if (ret) {
+ free_METHOD_DATA(&method_data);
+ return FALSE;
+ }
+ pa = &method_data.val[method_data.len-1];
+ pa->padata_type = KRB5_PADATA_PK_AS_REQ_WIN;
+ pa->padata_value.length = 0;
+ pa->padata_value.data = NULL;
+#endif
+
+ /*
+ * If there is a client key, send ETYPE_INFO{,2}
+ */
+ ret = _kdc_find_etype(context,
+ config->preauth_use_strongest_session_key, TRUE,
+ client, b->etype.val, b->etype.len, NULL, &ckey);
+ if (ret == 0) {
+
+ /*
+ * RFC4120 requires:
+ * - If the client only knows about old enctypes, then send
+ * both info replies (we send 'info' first in the list).
+ * - If the client is 'modern', because it knows about 'new'
+ * enctype types, then only send the 'info2' reply.
+ *
+ * Before we send the full list of etype-info data, we pick
+ * the client key we would have used anyway below, just pick
+ * that instead.
+ */
+
+ if (older_enctype(ckey->key.keytype)) {
+ ret = get_pa_etype_info(context, config,
+ &method_data, ckey);
+ if (ret) {
+ free_METHOD_DATA(&method_data);
+ return FALSE;
+ }
+ }
+ ret = get_pa_etype_info2(context, config,
+ &method_data, ckey);
+ if (ret) {
+ free_METHOD_DATA(&method_data);
+ return FALSE;
+ }
+ }
+
+ ASN1_MALLOC_ENCODE(METHOD_DATA, buf, len, &method_data, &len, ret);
+ free_METHOD_DATA(&method_data);
+
+ e_data->data = buf;
+ e_data->length = len;
+
+ return TRUE;
+}
+
/*
- * Add the AuthorizationData `data´ of `type´ to the last element in
- * the sequence of authorization_data in `tkt´ wrapped in an IF_RELEVANT
+ * Add the AuthorizationData `data´ of `type´ to the last element in
+ * the sequence of authorization_data in `tkt´ wrapped in an IF_RELEVANT
*/
krb5_error_code
const krb5_data *data)
{
krb5_error_code ret;
- size_t size;
+ size_t size = 0;
if (tkt->authorization_data == NULL) {
tkt->authorization_data = calloc(1, sizeof(*tkt->authorization_data));
return ENOMEM;
}
}
-
+
/* add the entry to the last element */
{
AuthorizationData ad = { 0, NULL };
ade.ad_type = KRB5_AUTHDATA_IF_RELEVANT;
- ASN1_MALLOC_ENCODE(AuthorizationData,
- ade.ad_data.data, ade.ad_data.length,
+ ASN1_MALLOC_ENCODE(AuthorizationData,
+ ade.ad_data.data, ade.ad_data.length,
&ad, &size, ret);
free_AuthorizationData(&ad);
if (ret) {
}
if (ade.ad_data.length != size)
krb5_abortx(context, "internal asn.1 encoder error");
-
+
ret = add_AuthorizationData(tkt->authorization_data, &ade);
der_free_octet_string(&ade.ad_data);
if (ret) {
git.samba.org / samba.git / blobdiff