handle SMBsessionsetup
Copyright (C) Andrew Tridgell 1998-2001
Copyright (C) Andrew Bartlett 2001
- Copyright (C) Jim McDonough 2002
+ Copyright (C) Jim McDonough <jmcd@us.ibm.com> 2002
Copyright (C) Luke Howard 2003
This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
char *start = p;
fstring lanman;
- fstr_sprintf( lanman, "Samba %s", VERSION );
+ fstr_sprintf( lanman, "Samba %s", SAMBA_VERSION_STRING);
p += srvstr_push(outbuf, p, "Unix", -1, STR_TERMINATE);
p += srvstr_push(outbuf, p, lanman, -1, STR_TERMINATE);
DATA_BLOB *secblob)
{
DATA_BLOB ticket;
- char *client, *p;
- const struct passwd *pw;
+ char *client, *p, *domain;
+ fstring netbios_domain_name;
+ struct passwd *pw;
char *user;
int sess_vuid;
NTSTATUS ret;
DATA_BLOB auth_data;
DATA_BLOB ap_rep, ap_rep_wrapped, response;
auth_serversupplied_info *server_info = NULL;
- ADS_STRUCT *ads;
- uint8 session_key[16];
+ DATA_BLOB session_key = data_blob(NULL, 0);
uint8 tok_id[2];
- BOOL foreign = False;
DATA_BLOB nullblob = data_blob(NULL, 0);
+ fstring real_username;
ZERO_STRUCT(ticket);
ZERO_STRUCT(auth_data);
return ERROR_NT(NT_STATUS_LOGON_FAILURE);
}
- ads = ads_init_simple();
+ ret = ads_verify_ticket(lp_realm(), &ticket, &client, &auth_data, &ap_rep, &session_key);
- if (!ads) {
- return ERROR_NT(NT_STATUS_LOGON_FAILURE);
- }
-
- ads->auth.realm = strdup(lp_realm());
+ data_blob_free(&ticket);
- ret = ads_verify_ticket(ads, &ticket, &client, &auth_data, &ap_rep, session_key);
if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(ret)) {
DEBUG(1,("Failed to verify incoming ticket!\n"));
- ads_destroy(&ads);
return ERROR_NT(NT_STATUS_LOGON_FAILURE);
}
p = strchr_m(client, '@');
if (!p) {
DEBUG(3,("Doesn't look like a valid principal\n"));
- ads_destroy(&ads);
data_blob_free(&ap_rep);
+ data_blob_free(&session_key);
+ SAFE_FREE(client);
return ERROR_NT(NT_STATUS_LOGON_FAILURE);
}
*p = 0;
- if (strcasecmp(p+1, ads->auth.realm) != 0) {
+ if (!strequal(p+1, lp_realm())) {
DEBUG(3,("Ticket for foreign realm %s@%s\n", client, p+1));
if (!lp_allow_trusted_domains()) {
data_blob_free(&ap_rep);
+ data_blob_free(&session_key);
+ SAFE_FREE(client);
return ERROR_NT(NT_STATUS_LOGON_FAILURE);
}
- foreign = True;
}
/* this gives a fully qualified user name (ie. with full realm).
that leads to very long usernames, but what else can we do? */
- asprintf(&user, "%s%s%s", p+1, lp_winbind_separator(), client);
-
- pw = Get_Pwnam(user);
- if (!pw && !foreign) {
- pw = Get_Pwnam(client);
- SAFE_FREE(user);
- user = smb_xstrdup(client);
- }
- ads_destroy(&ads);
+ domain = p+1;
- /* setup the string used by %U */
- sub_set_smb_name(user);
+ {
+ /* If we have winbind running, we can (and must) shorten the
+ username by using the short netbios name. Otherwise we will
+ have inconsistent user names. With Kerberos, we get the
+ fully qualified realm, with ntlmssp we get the short
+ name. And even w2k3 does use ntlmssp if you for example
+ connect to an ip address. */
- reload_services(True);
+ struct winbindd_request wb_request;
+ struct winbindd_response wb_response;
+ NSS_STATUS wb_result;
+
+ ZERO_STRUCT(wb_request);
+ ZERO_STRUCT(wb_response);
+
+ DEBUG(10, ("Mapping [%s] to short name\n", domain));
+
+ fstrcpy(wb_request.domain_name, domain);
+
+ wb_result = winbindd_request(WINBINDD_DOMAIN_INFO,
+ &wb_request, &wb_response);
+
+ if (wb_result == NSS_STATUS_SUCCESS) {
+
+ fstrcpy(netbios_domain_name,
+ wb_response.data.domain_info.name);
+ domain = netbios_domain_name;
+
+ DEBUG(10, ("Mapped to [%s]\n", domain));
+ } else {
+ DEBUG(3, ("Could not find short name -- winbind "
+ "not running?\n"));
+ }
+ }
+
+ asprintf(&user, "%s%c%s", domain, *lp_winbind_separator(), client);
+
+ /* lookup the passwd struct, create a new user if necessary */
+ map_username( user );
+
+ pw = smb_getpwnam( user, real_username, True );
+
if (!pw) {
DEBUG(1,("Username %s is invalid on this system\n",user));
+ SAFE_FREE(user);
+ SAFE_FREE(client);
data_blob_free(&ap_rep);
- return ERROR_NT(NT_STATUS_NO_SUCH_USER);
+ data_blob_free(&session_key);
+ return ERROR_NT(NT_STATUS_LOGON_FAILURE);
}
- if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(ret = make_server_info_pw(&server_info,pw))) {
+ /* setup the string used by %U */
+
+ sub_set_smb_name( real_username );
+ reload_services(True);
+
+ if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(ret = make_server_info_pw(&server_info, real_username, pw)))
+ {
DEBUG(1,("make_server_info_from_pw failed!\n"));
+ SAFE_FREE(user);
+ SAFE_FREE(client);
data_blob_free(&ap_rep);
+ data_blob_free(&session_key);
return ERROR_NT(ret);
}
- /* Copy out the session key from the AP_REQ. */
- memcpy(server_info->session_key, session_key, sizeof(session_key));
+ /* make_server_info_pw does not set the domain. Without this we end up
+ * with the local netbios name in substitutions for %D. */
+
+ if (server_info->sam_account != NULL) {
+ pdb_set_domain(server_info->sam_account, domain, PDB_SET);
+ }
/* register_vuid keeps the server info */
- sess_vuid = register_vuid(server_info, nullblob, user);
+ /* register_vuid takes ownership of session_key, no need to free after this.
+ A better interface would copy it.... */
+ sess_vuid = register_vuid(server_info, session_key, nullblob, client);
- free(user);
+ SAFE_FREE(user);
+ SAFE_FREE(client);
if (sess_vuid == -1) {
ret = NT_STATUS_LOGON_FAILURE;
} else {
+ /* current_user_info is changed on new vuid */
+ reload_services( True );
+
set_message(outbuf,4,0,True);
SSVAL(outbuf, smb_vwv3, 0);
SSVAL(outbuf, smb_uid, sess_vuid);
- if (!server_info->guest && !srv_check_sign_mac(inbuf)) {
- exit_server("reply_spnego_kerberos: bad smb signature");
+ if (!server_info->guest && !srv_signing_started()) {
+ /* We need to start the signing engine
+ * here but a W2K client sends the old
+ * "BSRSPYL " signature instead of the
+ * correct one. Subsequent packets will
+ * be correct.
+ */
+ srv_check_sign_mac(inbuf, False);
}
}
/* wrap that up in a nice GSS-API wrapping */
if (NT_STATUS_IS_OK(ret)) {
- ap_rep_wrapped = spnego_gen_krb5_wrap(ap_rep, TOK_ID_KRB_AP_REP);
+ ap_rep_wrapped = spnego_gen_krb5_wrap(
+ ap_rep,
+ CONST_ADD(const uint8 *, TOK_ID_KRB_AP_REP));
} else {
ap_rep_wrapped = data_blob(NULL, 0);
}
if (NT_STATUS_IS_OK(nt_status)) {
int sess_vuid;
DATA_BLOB nullblob = data_blob(NULL, 0);
+ DATA_BLOB session_key = data_blob((*auth_ntlmssp_state)->ntlmssp_state->session_key.data, (*auth_ntlmssp_state)->ntlmssp_state->session_key.length);
/* register_vuid keeps the server info */
- sess_vuid = register_vuid(server_info, nullblob, (*auth_ntlmssp_state)->ntlmssp_state->user);
+ sess_vuid = register_vuid(server_info, session_key, nullblob, (*auth_ntlmssp_state)->ntlmssp_state->user);
(*auth_ntlmssp_state)->server_info = NULL;
if (sess_vuid == -1) {
nt_status = NT_STATUS_LOGON_FAILURE;
} else {
+ /* current_user_info is changed on new vuid */
+ reload_services( True );
+
set_message(outbuf,4,0,True);
SSVAL(outbuf, smb_vwv3, 0);
SSVAL(outbuf,smb_uid,sess_vuid);
- if (!server_info->guest) {
+ if (!server_info->guest && !srv_signing_started()) {
/* We need to start the signing engine
* here but a W2K client sends the old
* "BSRSPYL " signature instead of the
* correct one. Subsequent packets will
* be correct.
*/
- srv_check_sign_mac(inbuf);
- }
+ srv_check_sign_mac(inbuf, False);
+ }
}
}
DATA_BLOB secblob;
int i;
DATA_BLOB chal;
- BOOL got_kerberos = False;
+#ifdef HAVE_KRB5
+ BOOL got_kerberos_mechanism = False;
+#endif
NTSTATUS nt_status;
/* parse out the OIDs and the first sec blob */
if (!parse_negTokenTarg(blob1, OIDs, &secblob)) {
return ERROR_NT(NT_STATUS_LOGON_FAILURE);
}
-
+
+ /* only look at the first OID for determining the mechToken --
+ accoirding to RFC2478, we should choose the one we want
+ and renegotiate, but i smell a client bug here..
+
+ Problem observed when connecting to a member (samba box)
+ of an AD domain as a user in a Samba domain. Samba member
+ server sent back krb5/mskrb5/ntlmssp as mechtypes, but the
+ client (2ksp3) replied with ntlmssp/mskrb5/krb5 and an
+ NTLMSSP mechtoken. --jerry */
+
+#ifdef HAVE_KRB5
+ if (strcmp(OID_KERBEROS5, OIDs[0]) == 0 ||
+ strcmp(OID_KERBEROS5_OLD, OIDs[0]) == 0) {
+ got_kerberos_mechanism = True;
+ }
+#endif
+
for (i=0;OIDs[i];i++) {
DEBUG(3,("Got OID %s\n", OIDs[i]));
- if (strcmp(OID_KERBEROS5, OIDs[i]) == 0 ||
- strcmp(OID_KERBEROS5_OLD, OIDs[i]) == 0) {
- got_kerberos = True;
- }
free(OIDs[i]);
}
DEBUG(3,("Got secblob of size %lu\n", (unsigned long)secblob.length));
#ifdef HAVE_KRB5
- if (got_kerberos && (SEC_ADS == lp_security())) {
+ if (got_kerberos_mechanism && (SEC_ADS == lp_security())) {
int ret = reply_spnego_kerberos(conn, inbuf, outbuf,
length, bufsize, &secblob);
data_blob_free(&secblob);
DATA_BLOB blob1;
int ret;
size_t bufrem;
- fstring native_os, native_lanman;
+ fstring native_os, native_lanman, primary_domain;
char *p2;
uint16 data_blob_len = SVAL(inbuf, smb_vwv7);
enum remote_arch_types ra_type = get_remote_arch();
if (global_client_caps == 0) {
global_client_caps = IVAL(inbuf,smb_vwv10);
+
+ if (!(global_client_caps & CAP_STATUS32)) {
+ remove_from_common_flags2(FLAGS2_32_BIT_ERROR_CODES);
+ }
+
}
p = (uint8 *)smb_buf(inbuf);
p2 = inbuf + smb_vwv13 + data_blob_len;
p2 += srvstr_pull_buf(inbuf, native_os, p2, sizeof(native_os), STR_TERMINATE);
p2 += srvstr_pull_buf(inbuf, native_lanman, p2, sizeof(native_lanman), STR_TERMINATE);
- DEBUG(3,("NativeOS=[%s] NativeLanMan=[%s]\n", native_os, native_lanman));
-
- if ( ra_type == RA_WIN2K )
- ra_lanman_string( native_lanman );
+ p2 += srvstr_pull_buf(inbuf, primary_domain, p2, sizeof(primary_domain), STR_TERMINATE);
+ DEBUG(3,("NativeOS=[%s] NativeLanMan=[%s] PrimaryDomain=[%s]\n",
+ native_os, native_lanman, primary_domain));
+ if ( ra_type == RA_WIN2K ) {
+ /* Windows 2003 doesn't set the native lanman string,
+ but does set primary domain which is a bug I think */
+
+ if ( !strlen(native_lanman) )
+ ra_lanman_string( primary_domain );
+ else
+ ra_lanman_string( native_lanman );
+ }
+
if (blob1.data[0] == ASN1_APPLICATION(0)) {
/* its a negTokenTarg packet */
ret = reply_spnego_negotiate(conn, inbuf, outbuf, length, bufsize, blob1);
fstring domain;
fstring native_os;
fstring native_lanman;
+ fstring primary_domain;
static BOOL done_sesssetup = False;
extern BOOL global_encrypted_passwords_negotiated;
extern BOOL global_spnego_negotiated;
- extern int Protocol;
+ extern enum protocol_types Protocol;
extern int max_send;
auth_usersupplied_info *user_info = NULL;
NTSTATUS nt_status;
BOOL doencrypt = global_encrypted_passwords_negotiated;
+
+ DATA_BLOB session_key;
START_PROFILE(SMBsesssetupX);
if (Protocol < PROTOCOL_NT1) {
uint16 passlen1 = SVAL(inbuf,smb_vwv7);
+
+ /* Never do NT status codes with protocols before NT1 as we don't get client caps. */
+ remove_from_common_flags2(FLAGS2_32_BIT_ERROR_CODES);
+
if ((passlen1 > MAX_PASS_LEN) || (passlen1 > smb_bufrem(inbuf, smb_buf(inbuf)))) {
return ERROR_NT(NT_STATUS_INVALID_PARAMETER);
}
uint16 passlen2 = SVAL(inbuf,smb_vwv8);
enum remote_arch_types ra_type = get_remote_arch();
char *p = smb_buf(inbuf);
+ char *save_p = smb_buf(inbuf);
+ uint16 byte_count;
+
- if(global_client_caps == 0)
+ if(global_client_caps == 0) {
global_client_caps = IVAL(inbuf,smb_vwv11);
- /* client_caps is used as final determination if client is NT or Win95.
- This is needed to return the correct error codes in some
- circumstances.
- */
+ if (!(global_client_caps & CAP_STATUS32)) {
+ remove_from_common_flags2(FLAGS2_32_BIT_ERROR_CODES);
+ }
+
+ /* client_caps is used as final determination if client is NT or Win95.
+ This is needed to return the correct error codes in some
+ circumstances.
+ */
- if(ra_type == RA_WINNT || ra_type == RA_WIN2K || ra_type == RA_WIN95) {
- if(!(global_client_caps & (CAP_NT_SMBS | CAP_STATUS32))) {
- set_remote_arch( RA_WIN95);
+ if(ra_type == RA_WINNT || ra_type == RA_WIN2K || ra_type == RA_WIN95) {
+ if(!(global_client_caps & (CAP_NT_SMBS | CAP_STATUS32))) {
+ set_remote_arch( RA_WIN95);
+ }
}
}
nt_resp = data_blob(p+passlen1, passlen2);
} else {
pstring pass;
- BOOL unic;
- unic=SVAL(inbuf, smb_flg2) & FLAGS2_UNICODE_STRINGS;
- srvstr_pull(inbuf, pass, smb_buf(inbuf),
- sizeof(pass), unic ? passlen2 : passlen1,
- STR_TERMINATE);
+ BOOL unic=SVAL(inbuf, smb_flg2) & FLAGS2_UNICODE_STRINGS;
+
+#if 0
+ /* This was the previous fix. Not sure if it's still valid. JRA. */
+ if ((ra_type == RA_WINNT) && (passlen2 == 0) && unic && passlen1) {
+ /* NT4.0 stuffs up plaintext unicode password lengths... */
+ srvstr_pull(inbuf, pass, smb_buf(inbuf) + 1,
+ sizeof(pass), passlen1, STR_TERMINATE);
+#endif
+
+ if (unic && (passlen2 == 0) && passlen1) {
+ /* Only a ascii plaintext password was sent. */
+ srvstr_pull(inbuf, pass, smb_buf(inbuf), sizeof(pass),
+ passlen1, STR_TERMINATE|STR_ASCII);
+ } else {
+ srvstr_pull(inbuf, pass, smb_buf(inbuf),
+ sizeof(pass), unic ? passlen2 : passlen1,
+ STR_TERMINATE);
+ }
plaintext_password = data_blob(pass, strlen(pass)+1);
}
p += srvstr_pull_buf(inbuf, domain, p, sizeof(domain), STR_TERMINATE);
p += srvstr_pull_buf(inbuf, native_os, p, sizeof(native_os), STR_TERMINATE);
p += srvstr_pull_buf(inbuf, native_lanman, p, sizeof(native_lanman), STR_TERMINATE);
- DEBUG(3,("Domain=[%s] NativeOS=[%s] NativeLanMan=[%s]\n",
- domain,native_os,native_lanman));
- if ( ra_type == RA_WIN2K )
- ra_lanman_string( native_lanman );
+ /* not documented or decoded by Ethereal but there is one more string
+ in the extra bytes which is the same as the PrimaryDomain when using
+ extended security. Windows NT 4 and 2003 use this string to store
+ the native lanman string. Windows 9x does not include a string here
+ at all so we have to check if we have any extra bytes left */
+
+ byte_count = SVAL(inbuf, smb_vwv13);
+ if ( PTR_DIFF(p, save_p) < byte_count)
+ p += srvstr_pull_buf(inbuf, primary_domain, p, sizeof(primary_domain), STR_TERMINATE);
+ else
+ fstrcpy( primary_domain, "null" );
+
+ DEBUG(3,("Domain=[%s] NativeOS=[%s] NativeLanMan=[%s] PrimaryDomain=[%s]\n",
+ domain, native_os, native_lanman, primary_domain));
+
+ if ( ra_type == RA_WIN2K ) {
+ if ( strlen(native_lanman) == 0 )
+ ra_lanman_string( primary_domain );
+ else
+ ra_lanman_string( native_lanman );
+ }
}
-
+
if (SVAL(inbuf,smb_vwv4) == 0) {
setup_new_vc_session();
}
free_user_info(&user_info);
- data_blob_free(&lm_resp);
- data_blob_clear_free(&plaintext_password);
-
if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(nt_status)) {
nt_status = do_map_to_guest(nt_status, &server_info, user, domain);
}
if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(nt_status)) {
data_blob_free(&nt_resp);
+ data_blob_free(&lm_resp);
+ data_blob_clear_free(&plaintext_password);
return ERROR_NT(nt_status_squash(nt_status));
}
+ if (server_info->user_session_key.data) {
+ session_key = data_blob(server_info->user_session_key.data, server_info->user_session_key.length);
+ } else {
+ session_key = data_blob(NULL, 0);
+ }
+
+ data_blob_clear_free(&plaintext_password);
+
/* it's ok - setup a reply */
set_message(outbuf,3,0,True);
if (Protocol >= PROTOCOL_NT1) {
to a uid can get through without a password, on the same VC */
/* register_vuid keeps the server info */
- sess_vuid = register_vuid(server_info, nt_resp, sub_user);
+ sess_vuid = register_vuid(server_info, session_key, nt_resp.data ? nt_resp : lm_resp, sub_user);
data_blob_free(&nt_resp);
+ data_blob_free(&lm_resp);
if (sess_vuid == -1) {
return ERROR_NT(NT_STATUS_LOGON_FAILURE);
}
- if (!server_info->guest && !srv_check_sign_mac(inbuf)) {
+ /* current_user_info is changed on new vuid */
+ reload_services( True );
+
+ if (!server_info->guest && !srv_signing_started() && !srv_check_sign_mac(inbuf, True)) {
exit_server("reply_sesssetup_and_X: bad smb signature");
}
git.samba.org / samba.git / blobdiff