CFLAGS = -Iheimdal/kdc -Iheimdal/lib/hdb
PRIVATE_DEPENDENCIES = \
LIBLDB auth_sam auth_sam_reply CREDENTIALS \
- HEIMDAL_HDB LIBSAMBA-HOSTCONFIG
+ HEIMDAL_HDB DB_GLUE LIBSAMBA-HOSTCONFIG
# End SUBSYSTEM HDB
#######################
#######################
PAC_GLUE_OBJ_FILES = $(addprefix $(kdcsrcdir)/, pac-glue.o)
+
+#######################
+# Start SUBSYSTEM KDC
+[SUBSYSTEM::DB_GLUE]
+CFLAGS = -Iheimdal/kdc -Iheimdal/lib/hdb
+PRIVATE_DEPENDENCIES = \
+ LIBLDB auth_sam auth_sam_reply CREDENTIALS \
+ HEIMDAL_HDB LIBSAMBA-HOSTCONFIG
+# End SUBSYSTEM KDC
+#######################
+
+DB_GLUE_OBJ_FILES = $(addprefix $(kdcsrcdir)/, db-glue.o)
--- /dev/null
+/*
+ Unix SMB/CIFS implementation.
+
+ Database Glue between Samba and the KDC
+
+ Copyright (C) Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org> 2005-2009
+ Copyright (C) Simo Sorce <idra@samba.org> 2010
+
+ This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
+ it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
+ the Free Software Foundation; either version 3 of the License, or
+ (at your option) any later version.
+
+ This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
+ but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
+ MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the
+ GNU General Public License for more details.
+
+
+ You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
+ along with this program. If not, see <http://www.gnu.org/licenses/>.
+*/
+
+#include "includes.h"
+#include "system/time.h"
+#include "../libds/common/flags.h"
+#include "lib/ldb/include/ldb.h"
+#include "librpc/gen_ndr/netlogon.h"
+#include "libcli/security/security.h"
+#include "auth/auth.h"
+#include "auth/credentials/credentials.h"
+#include "auth/auth_sam.h"
+#include "../lib/util/util_ldb.h"
+#include "dsdb/samdb/samdb.h"
+#include "librpc/ndr/libndr.h"
+#include "librpc/gen_ndr/ndr_drsblobs.h"
+#include "librpc/gen_ndr/lsa.h"
+#include "libcli/auth/libcli_auth.h"
+#include "param/param.h"
+#include "../lib/crypto/md4.h"
+#include "system/kerberos.h"
+#include <hdb.h>
+#include "kdc/samba_kdc.h"
+#include "kdc/db-glue.h"
+
+enum samba_kdc_ent_type
+{ SAMBA_KDC_ENT_TYPE_CLIENT, SAMBA_KDC_ENT_TYPE_SERVER,
+ SAMBA_KDC_ENT_TYPE_KRBTGT, SAMBA_KDC_ENT_TYPE_TRUST, SAMBA_KDC_ENT_TYPE_ANY };
+
+enum trust_direction {
+ UNKNOWN = 0,
+ INBOUND = LSA_TRUST_DIRECTION_INBOUND,
+ OUTBOUND = LSA_TRUST_DIRECTION_OUTBOUND
+};
+
+static const char *trust_attrs[] = {
+ "trustPartner",
+ "trustAuthIncoming",
+ "trustAuthOutgoing",
+ "whenCreated",
+ "msDS-SupportedEncryptionTypes",
+ "trustAttributes",
+ "trustDirection",
+ "trustType",
+ NULL
+};
+
+static KerberosTime ldb_msg_find_krb5time_ldap_time(struct ldb_message *msg, const char *attr, KerberosTime default_val)
+{
+ const char *tmp;
+ const char *gentime;
+ struct tm tm;
+
+ gentime = ldb_msg_find_attr_as_string(msg, attr, NULL);
+ if (!gentime)
+ return default_val;
+
+ tmp = strptime(gentime, "%Y%m%d%H%M%SZ", &tm);
+ if (tmp == NULL) {
+ return default_val;
+ }
+
+ return timegm(&tm);
+}
+
+static HDBFlags uf2HDBFlags(krb5_context context, int userAccountControl, enum samba_kdc_ent_type ent_type)
+{
+ HDBFlags flags = int2HDBFlags(0);
+
+ /* we don't allow kadmin deletes */
+ flags.immutable = 1;
+
+ /* mark the principal as invalid to start with */
+ flags.invalid = 1;
+
+ flags.renewable = 1;
+
+ /* All accounts are servers, but this may be disabled again in the caller */
+ flags.server = 1;
+
+ /* Account types - clear the invalid bit if it turns out to be valid */
+ if (userAccountControl & UF_NORMAL_ACCOUNT) {
+ if (ent_type == SAMBA_KDC_ENT_TYPE_CLIENT || ent_type == SAMBA_KDC_ENT_TYPE_ANY) {
+ flags.client = 1;
+ }
+ flags.invalid = 0;
+ }
+
+ if (userAccountControl & UF_INTERDOMAIN_TRUST_ACCOUNT) {
+ if (ent_type == SAMBA_KDC_ENT_TYPE_CLIENT || ent_type == SAMBA_KDC_ENT_TYPE_ANY) {
+ flags.client = 1;
+ }
+ flags.invalid = 0;
+ }
+ if (userAccountControl & UF_WORKSTATION_TRUST_ACCOUNT) {
+ if (ent_type == SAMBA_KDC_ENT_TYPE_CLIENT || ent_type == SAMBA_KDC_ENT_TYPE_ANY) {
+ flags.client = 1;
+ }
+ flags.invalid = 0;
+ }
+ if (userAccountControl & UF_SERVER_TRUST_ACCOUNT) {
+ if (ent_type == SAMBA_KDC_ENT_TYPE_CLIENT || ent_type == SAMBA_KDC_ENT_TYPE_ANY) {
+ flags.client = 1;
+ }
+ flags.invalid = 0;
+ }
+
+ /* Not permitted to act as a client if disabled */
+ if (userAccountControl & UF_ACCOUNTDISABLE) {
+ flags.client = 0;
+ }
+ if (userAccountControl & UF_LOCKOUT) {
+ flags.invalid = 1;
+ }
+/*
+ if (userAccountControl & UF_PASSWORD_NOTREQD) {
+ flags.invalid = 1;
+ }
+*/
+/*
+ UF_PASSWORD_CANT_CHANGE and UF_ENCRYPTED_TEXT_PASSWORD_ALLOWED are irrelevent
+*/
+ if (userAccountControl & UF_TEMP_DUPLICATE_ACCOUNT) {
+ flags.invalid = 1;
+ }
+
+/* UF_DONT_EXPIRE_PASSWD and UF_USE_DES_KEY_ONLY handled in samba_kdc_message2entry() */
+
+/*
+ if (userAccountControl & UF_MNS_LOGON_ACCOUNT) {
+ flags.invalid = 1;
+ }
+*/
+ if (userAccountControl & UF_SMARTCARD_REQUIRED) {
+ flags.require_hwauth = 1;
+ }
+ if (userAccountControl & UF_TRUSTED_FOR_DELEGATION) {
+ flags.ok_as_delegate = 1;
+ }
+ if (!(userAccountControl & UF_NOT_DELEGATED)) {
+ flags.forwardable = 1;
+ flags.proxiable = 1;
+ }
+
+ if (userAccountControl & UF_DONT_REQUIRE_PREAUTH) {
+ flags.require_preauth = 0;
+ } else {
+ flags.require_preauth = 1;
+
+ }
+ return flags;
+}
+
+static int samba_kdc_entry_destructor(struct samba_kdc_entry *p)
+{
+ hdb_entry_ex *entry_ex = p->entry_ex;
+ free_hdb_entry(&entry_ex->entry);
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static void samba_kdc_free_entry(krb5_context context, hdb_entry_ex *entry_ex)
+{
+ talloc_free(entry_ex->ctx);
+}
+
+static krb5_error_code samba_kdc_message2entry_keys(krb5_context context,
+ struct smb_iconv_convenience *iconv_convenience,
+ TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx,
+ struct ldb_message *msg,
+ unsigned int userAccountControl,
+ hdb_entry_ex *entry_ex)
+{
+ krb5_error_code ret = 0;
+ enum ndr_err_code ndr_err;
+ struct samr_Password *hash;
+ const struct ldb_val *sc_val;
+ struct supplementalCredentialsBlob scb;
+ struct supplementalCredentialsPackage *scpk = NULL;
+ bool newer_keys = false;
+ struct package_PrimaryKerberosBlob _pkb;
+ struct package_PrimaryKerberosCtr3 *pkb3 = NULL;
+ struct package_PrimaryKerberosCtr4 *pkb4 = NULL;
+ uint32_t i;
+ uint32_t allocated_keys = 0;
+
+ entry_ex->entry.keys.val = NULL;
+ entry_ex->entry.keys.len = 0;
+
+ entry_ex->entry.kvno = ldb_msg_find_attr_as_int(msg, "msDS-KeyVersionNumber", 0);
+
+ /* Get keys from the db */
+
+ hash = samdb_result_hash(mem_ctx, msg, "unicodePwd");
+ sc_val = ldb_msg_find_ldb_val(msg, "supplementalCredentials");
+
+ /* unicodePwd for enctype 0x17 (23) if present */
+ if (hash) {
+ allocated_keys++;
+ }
+
+ /* supplementalCredentials if present */
+ if (sc_val) {
+ ndr_err = ndr_pull_struct_blob_all(sc_val, mem_ctx, iconv_convenience, &scb,
+ (ndr_pull_flags_fn_t)ndr_pull_supplementalCredentialsBlob);
+ if (!NDR_ERR_CODE_IS_SUCCESS(ndr_err)) {
+ dump_data(0, sc_val->data, sc_val->length);
+ ret = EINVAL;
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ if (scb.sub.signature != SUPPLEMENTAL_CREDENTIALS_SIGNATURE) {
+ NDR_PRINT_DEBUG(supplementalCredentialsBlob, &scb);
+ ret = EINVAL;
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ for (i=0; i < scb.sub.num_packages; i++) {
+ if (strcmp("Primary:Kerberos-Newer-Keys", scb.sub.packages[i].name) == 0) {
+ scpk = &scb.sub.packages[i];
+ if (!scpk->data || !scpk->data[0]) {
+ scpk = NULL;
+ continue;
+ }
+ newer_keys = true;
+ break;
+ } else if (strcmp("Primary:Kerberos", scb.sub.packages[i].name) == 0) {
+ scpk = &scb.sub.packages[i];
+ if (!scpk->data || !scpk->data[0]) {
+ scpk = NULL;
+ }
+ /*
+ * we don't break here in hope to find
+ * a Kerberos-Newer-Keys package
+ */
+ }
+ }
+ }
+ /*
+ * Primary:Kerberos-Newer-Keys or Primary:Kerberos element
+ * of supplementalCredentials
+ */
+ if (scpk) {
+ DATA_BLOB blob;
+
+ blob = strhex_to_data_blob(mem_ctx, scpk->data);
+ if (!blob.data) {
+ ret = ENOMEM;
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ /* we cannot use ndr_pull_struct_blob_all() here, as w2k and w2k3 add padding bytes */
+ ndr_err = ndr_pull_struct_blob(&blob, mem_ctx, iconv_convenience, &_pkb,
+ (ndr_pull_flags_fn_t)ndr_pull_package_PrimaryKerberosBlob);
+ if (!NDR_ERR_CODE_IS_SUCCESS(ndr_err)) {
+ ret = EINVAL;
+ krb5_set_error_message(context, ret, "samba_kdc_message2entry_keys: could not parse package_PrimaryKerberosBlob");
+ krb5_warnx(context, "samba_kdc_message2entry_keys: could not parse package_PrimaryKerberosBlob");
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ if (newer_keys && _pkb.version != 4) {
+ ret = EINVAL;
+ krb5_set_error_message(context, ret, "samba_kdc_message2entry_keys: Primary:Kerberos-Newer-Keys not version 4");
+ krb5_warnx(context, "samba_kdc_message2entry_keys: Primary:Kerberos-Newer-Keys not version 4");
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ if (!newer_keys && _pkb.version != 3) {
+ ret = EINVAL;
+ krb5_set_error_message(context, ret, "samba_kdc_message2entry_keys: could not parse Primary:Kerberos not version 3");
+ krb5_warnx(context, "samba_kdc_message2entry_keys: could not parse Primary:Kerberos not version 3");
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ if (_pkb.version == 4) {
+ pkb4 = &_pkb.ctr.ctr4;
+ allocated_keys += pkb4->num_keys;
+ } else if (_pkb.version == 3) {
+ pkb3 = &_pkb.ctr.ctr3;
+ allocated_keys += pkb3->num_keys;
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (allocated_keys == 0) {
+ /* oh, no password. Apparently (comment in
+ * hdb-ldap.c) this violates the ASN.1, but this
+ * allows an entry with no keys (yet). */
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ /* allocate space to decode into */
+ entry_ex->entry.keys.len = 0;
+ entry_ex->entry.keys.val = calloc(allocated_keys, sizeof(Key));
+ if (entry_ex->entry.keys.val == NULL) {
+ ret = ENOMEM;
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ if (hash && !(userAccountControl & UF_USE_DES_KEY_ONLY)) {
+ Key key;
+
+ key.mkvno = 0;
+ key.salt = NULL; /* No salt for this enc type */
+
+ ret = krb5_keyblock_init(context,
+ ENCTYPE_ARCFOUR_HMAC,
+ hash->hash, sizeof(hash->hash),
+ &key.key);
+ if (ret) {
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ entry_ex->entry.keys.val[entry_ex->entry.keys.len] = key;
+ entry_ex->entry.keys.len++;
+ }
+
+ if (pkb4) {
+ for (i=0; i < pkb4->num_keys; i++) {
+ bool use = true;
+ Key key;
+
+ if (!pkb4->keys[i].value) continue;
+
+ if (userAccountControl & UF_USE_DES_KEY_ONLY) {
+ switch (pkb4->keys[i].keytype) {
+ case ENCTYPE_DES_CBC_CRC:
+ case ENCTYPE_DES_CBC_MD5:
+ break;
+ default:
+ use = false;
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (!use) continue;
+
+ key.mkvno = 0;
+ key.salt = NULL;
+
+ if (pkb4->salt.string) {
+ DATA_BLOB salt;
+
+ salt = data_blob_string_const(pkb4->salt.string);
+
+ key.salt = calloc(1, sizeof(*key.salt));
+ if (key.salt == NULL) {
+ ret = ENOMEM;
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ key.salt->type = hdb_pw_salt;
+
+ ret = krb5_data_copy(&key.salt->salt, salt.data, salt.length);
+ if (ret) {
+ free(key.salt);
+ key.salt = NULL;
+ goto out;
+ }
+ }
+
+ /* TODO: maybe pass the iteration_count somehow... */
+
+ ret = krb5_keyblock_init(context,
+ pkb4->keys[i].keytype,
+ pkb4->keys[i].value->data,
+ pkb4->keys[i].value->length,
+ &key.key);
+ if (ret == KRB5_PROG_ETYPE_NOSUPP) {
+ DEBUG(2,("Unsupported keytype ignored - type %u\n",
+ pkb4->keys[i].keytype));
+ ret = 0;
+ continue;
+ }
+ if (ret) {
+ if (key.salt) {
+ free_Salt(key.salt);
+ free(key.salt);
+ key.salt = NULL;
+ }
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ entry_ex->entry.keys.val[entry_ex->entry.keys.len] = key;
+ entry_ex->entry.keys.len++;
+ }
+ } else if (pkb3) {
+ for (i=0; i < pkb3->num_keys; i++) {
+ bool use = true;
+ Key key;
+
+ if (!pkb3->keys[i].value) continue;
+
+ if (userAccountControl & UF_USE_DES_KEY_ONLY) {
+ switch (pkb3->keys[i].keytype) {
+ case ENCTYPE_DES_CBC_CRC:
+ case ENCTYPE_DES_CBC_MD5:
+ break;
+ default:
+ use = false;
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (!use) continue;
+
+ key.mkvno = 0;
+ key.salt = NULL;
+
+ if (pkb3->salt.string) {
+ DATA_BLOB salt;
+
+ salt = data_blob_string_const(pkb3->salt.string);
+
+ key.salt = calloc(1, sizeof(*key.salt));
+ if (key.salt == NULL) {
+ ret = ENOMEM;
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ key.salt->type = hdb_pw_salt;
+
+ ret = krb5_data_copy(&key.salt->salt, salt.data, salt.length);
+ if (ret) {
+ free(key.salt);
+ key.salt = NULL;
+ goto out;
+ }
+ }
+
+ ret = krb5_keyblock_init(context,
+ pkb3->keys[i].keytype,
+ pkb3->keys[i].value->data,
+ pkb3->keys[i].value->length,
+ &key.key);
+ if (ret) {
+ if (key.salt) {
+ free_Salt(key.salt);
+ free(key.salt);
+ key.salt = NULL;
+ }
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ entry_ex->entry.keys.val[entry_ex->entry.keys.len] = key;
+ entry_ex->entry.keys.len++;
+ }
+ }
+
+out:
+ if (ret != 0) {
+ entry_ex->entry.keys.len = 0;
+ }
+ if (entry_ex->entry.keys.len == 0 && entry_ex->entry.keys.val) {
+ free(entry_ex->entry.keys.val);
+ entry_ex->entry.keys.val = NULL;
+ }
+ return ret;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Construct an hdb_entry from a directory entry.
+ */
+static krb5_error_code samba_kdc_message2entry(krb5_context context,
+ struct samba_kdc_db_context *kdc_db_ctx,
+ TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx, krb5_const_principal principal,
+ enum samba_kdc_ent_type ent_type,
+ struct ldb_dn *realm_dn,
+ struct ldb_message *msg,
+ hdb_entry_ex *entry_ex)
+{
+ struct loadparm_context *lp_ctx = kdc_db_ctx->lp_ctx;
+ unsigned int userAccountControl;
+ int i;
+ krb5_error_code ret = 0;
+ krb5_boolean is_computer = FALSE;
+ char *realm = strupper_talloc(mem_ctx, lp_realm(lp_ctx));
+
+ struct samba_kdc_entry *p;
+ NTTIME acct_expiry;
+ NTSTATUS status;
+
+ uint32_t rid;
+ struct ldb_message_element *objectclasses;
+ struct ldb_val computer_val;
+ const char *samAccountName = ldb_msg_find_attr_as_string(msg, "samAccountName", NULL);
+ computer_val.data = discard_const_p(uint8_t,"computer");
+ computer_val.length = strlen((const char *)computer_val.data);
+
+ if (!samAccountName) {
+ ret = ENOENT;
+ krb5_set_error_message(context, ret, "samba_kdc_message2entry: no samAccountName present");
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ objectclasses = ldb_msg_find_element(msg, "objectClass");
+
+ if (objectclasses && ldb_msg_find_val(objectclasses, &computer_val)) {
+ is_computer = TRUE;
+ }
+
+ memset(entry_ex, 0, sizeof(*entry_ex));
+
+ if (!realm) {
+ ret = ENOMEM;
+ krb5_set_error_message(context, ret, "talloc_strdup: out of memory");
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ p = talloc(mem_ctx, struct samba_kdc_entry);
+ if (!p) {
+ ret = ENOMEM;
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ p->kdc_db_ctx = kdc_db_ctx;
+ p->entry_ex = entry_ex;
+ p->realm_dn = talloc_reference(p, realm_dn);
+ if (!p->realm_dn) {
+ ret = ENOMEM;
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ talloc_set_destructor(p, samba_kdc_entry_destructor);
+
+ entry_ex->ctx = p;
+ entry_ex->free_entry = samba_kdc_free_entry;
+
+ userAccountControl = ldb_msg_find_attr_as_uint(msg, "userAccountControl", 0);
+
+
+ entry_ex->entry.principal = malloc(sizeof(*(entry_ex->entry.principal)));
+ if (ent_type == SAMBA_KDC_ENT_TYPE_ANY && principal == NULL) {
+ krb5_make_principal(context, &entry_ex->entry.principal, realm, samAccountName, NULL);
+ } else {
+ ret = copy_Principal(principal, entry_ex->entry.principal);
+ if (ret) {
+ krb5_clear_error_message(context);
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ /* While we have copied the client principal, tests
+ * show that Win2k3 returns the 'corrected' realm, not
+ * the client-specified realm. This code attempts to
+ * replace the client principal's realm with the one
+ * we determine from our records */
+
+ /* this has to be with malloc() */
+ krb5_principal_set_realm(context, entry_ex->entry.principal, realm);
+ }
+
+ /* First try and figure out the flags based on the userAccountControl */
+ entry_ex->entry.flags = uf2HDBFlags(context, userAccountControl, ent_type);
+
+ /* Windows 2008 seems to enforce this (very sensible) rule by
+ * default - don't allow offline attacks on a user's password
+ * by asking for a ticket to them as a service (encrypted with
+ * their probably patheticly insecure password) */
+
+ if (entry_ex->entry.flags.server
+ && lp_parm_bool(lp_ctx, NULL, "kdc", "require spn for service", true)) {
+ if (!is_computer && !ldb_msg_find_attr_as_string(msg, "servicePrincipalName", NULL)) {
+ entry_ex->entry.flags.server = 0;
+ }
+ }
+
+ {
+ /* These (created_by, modified_by) parts of the entry are not relevant for Samba4's use
+ * of the Heimdal KDC. They are stored in a the traditional
+ * DB for audit purposes, and still form part of the structure
+ * we must return */
+
+ /* use 'whenCreated' */
+ entry_ex->entry.created_by.time = ldb_msg_find_krb5time_ldap_time(msg, "whenCreated", 0);
+ /* use '???' */
+ entry_ex->entry.created_by.principal = NULL;
+
+ entry_ex->entry.modified_by = (Event *) malloc(sizeof(Event));
+ if (entry_ex->entry.modified_by == NULL) {
+ ret = ENOMEM;
+ krb5_set_error_message(context, ret, "malloc: out of memory");
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ /* use 'whenChanged' */
+ entry_ex->entry.modified_by->time = ldb_msg_find_krb5time_ldap_time(msg, "whenChanged", 0);
+ /* use '???' */
+ entry_ex->entry.modified_by->principal = NULL;
+ }
+
+
+ /* The lack of password controls etc applies to krbtgt by
+ * virtue of being that particular RID */
+ status = dom_sid_split_rid(NULL, samdb_result_dom_sid(mem_ctx, msg, "objectSid"), NULL, &rid);
+
+ if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(status)) {
+ ret = EINVAL;
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ if (rid == DOMAIN_RID_KRBTGT) {
+ entry_ex->entry.valid_end = NULL;
+ entry_ex->entry.pw_end = NULL;
+
+ entry_ex->entry.flags.invalid = 0;
+ entry_ex->entry.flags.server = 1;
+
+ /* Don't mark all requests for the krbtgt/realm as
+ * 'change password', as otherwise we could get into
+ * trouble, and not enforce the password expirty.
+ * Instead, only do it when request is for the kpasswd service */
+ if (ent_type == SAMBA_KDC_ENT_TYPE_SERVER
+ && principal->name.name_string.len == 2
+ && (strcmp(principal->name.name_string.val[0], "kadmin") == 0)
+ && (strcmp(principal->name.name_string.val[1], "changepw") == 0)
+ && lp_is_my_domain_or_realm(lp_ctx, principal->realm)) {
+ entry_ex->entry.flags.change_pw = 1;
+ }
+ entry_ex->entry.flags.client = 0;
+ entry_ex->entry.flags.forwardable = 1;
+ entry_ex->entry.flags.ok_as_delegate = 1;
+ } else if (entry_ex->entry.flags.server && ent_type == SAMBA_KDC_ENT_TYPE_SERVER) {
+ /* The account/password expiry only applies when the account is used as a
+ * client (ie password login), not when used as a server */
+
+ /* Make very well sure we don't use this for a client,
+ * it could bypass the password restrictions */
+ entry_ex->entry.flags.client = 0;
+
+ entry_ex->entry.valid_end = NULL;
+ entry_ex->entry.pw_end = NULL;
+
+ } else {
+ NTTIME must_change_time
+ = samdb_result_force_password_change(kdc_db_ctx->samdb, mem_ctx,
+ realm_dn, msg);
+ if (must_change_time == 0x7FFFFFFFFFFFFFFFULL) {
+ entry_ex->entry.pw_end = NULL;
+ } else {
+ entry_ex->entry.pw_end = malloc(sizeof(*entry_ex->entry.pw_end));
+ if (entry_ex->entry.pw_end == NULL) {
+ ret = ENOMEM;
+ goto out;
+ }
+ *entry_ex->entry.pw_end = nt_time_to_unix(must_change_time);
+ }
+
+ acct_expiry = samdb_result_account_expires(msg);
+ if (acct_expiry == 0x7FFFFFFFFFFFFFFFULL) {
+ entry_ex->entry.valid_end = NULL;
+ } else {
+ entry_ex->entry.valid_end = malloc(sizeof(*entry_ex->entry.valid_end));
+ if (entry_ex->entry.valid_end == NULL) {
+ ret = ENOMEM;
+ goto out;
+ }
+ *entry_ex->entry.valid_end = nt_time_to_unix(acct_expiry);
+ }
+ }
+
+ entry_ex->entry.valid_start = NULL;
+
+ entry_ex->entry.max_life = NULL;
+
+ entry_ex->entry.max_renew = NULL;
+
+ entry_ex->entry.generation = NULL;
+
+ /* Get keys from the db */
+ ret = samba_kdc_message2entry_keys(context, p->kdc_db_ctx->ic_ctx, p,
+ msg, userAccountControl, entry_ex);
+ if (ret) {
+ /* Could be bougus data in the entry, or out of memory */
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ entry_ex->entry.etypes = malloc(sizeof(*(entry_ex->entry.etypes)));
+ if (entry_ex->entry.etypes == NULL) {
+ krb5_clear_error_message(context);
+ ret = ENOMEM;
+ goto out;
+ }
+ entry_ex->entry.etypes->len = entry_ex->entry.keys.len;
+ entry_ex->entry.etypes->val = calloc(entry_ex->entry.etypes->len, sizeof(int));
+ if (entry_ex->entry.etypes->val == NULL) {
+ krb5_clear_error_message(context);
+ ret = ENOMEM;
+ goto out;
+ }
+ for (i=0; i < entry_ex->entry.etypes->len; i++) {
+ entry_ex->entry.etypes->val[i] = entry_ex->entry.keys.val[i].key.keytype;
+ }
+
+
+ p->msg = talloc_steal(p, msg);
+
+out:
+ if (ret != 0) {
+ /* This doesn't free ent itself, that is for the eventual caller to do */
+ hdb_free_entry(context, entry_ex);
+ } else {
+ talloc_steal(kdc_db_ctx, entry_ex->ctx);
+ }
+
+ return ret;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Construct an hdb_entry from a directory entry.
+ */
+static krb5_error_code samba_kdc_trust_message2entry(krb5_context context,
+ struct samba_kdc_db_context *kdc_db_ctx,
+ TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx, krb5_const_principal principal,
+ enum trust_direction direction,
+ struct ldb_dn *realm_dn,
+ struct ldb_message *msg,
+ hdb_entry_ex *entry_ex)
+{
+ struct loadparm_context *lp_ctx = kdc_db_ctx->lp_ctx;
+ const char *dnsdomain;
+ char *realm;
+ DATA_BLOB password_utf16;
+ struct samr_Password password_hash;
+ const struct ldb_val *password_val;
+ struct trustAuthInOutBlob password_blob;
+ struct samba_kdc_entry *p;
+
+ enum ndr_err_code ndr_err;
+ int i, ret, trust_direction_flags;
+
+ p = talloc(mem_ctx, struct samba_kdc_entry);
+ if (!p) {
+ ret = ENOMEM;
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ p->kdc_db_ctx = kdc_db_ctx;
+ p->entry_ex = entry_ex;
+ p->realm_dn = realm_dn;
+
+ talloc_set_destructor(p, samba_kdc_entry_destructor);
+
+ entry_ex->ctx = p;
+ entry_ex->free_entry = samba_kdc_free_entry;
+
+ /* use 'whenCreated' */
+ entry_ex->entry.created_by.time = ldb_msg_find_krb5time_ldap_time(msg, "whenCreated", 0);
+ /* use '???' */
+ entry_ex->entry.created_by.principal = NULL;
+
+ entry_ex->entry.valid_start = NULL;
+
+ trust_direction_flags = ldb_msg_find_attr_as_int(msg, "trustDirection", 0);
+
+ if (direction == INBOUND) {
+ realm = strupper_talloc(mem_ctx, lp_realm(lp_ctx));
+ password_val = ldb_msg_find_ldb_val(msg, "trustAuthIncoming");
+
+ } else { /* OUTBOUND */
+ dnsdomain = ldb_msg_find_attr_as_string(msg, "trustPartner", NULL);
+ realm = strupper_talloc(mem_ctx, dnsdomain);
+ password_val = ldb_msg_find_ldb_val(msg, "trustAuthOutgoing");
+ }
+
+ if (!password_val || !(trust_direction_flags & direction)) {
+ ret = ENOENT;
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ ndr_err = ndr_pull_struct_blob(password_val, mem_ctx, p->kdc_db_ctx->ic_ctx, &password_blob,
+ (ndr_pull_flags_fn_t)ndr_pull_trustAuthInOutBlob);
+ if (!NDR_ERR_CODE_IS_SUCCESS(ndr_err)) {
+ ret = EINVAL;
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ entry_ex->entry.kvno = -1;
+ for (i=0; i < password_blob.count; i++) {
+ if (password_blob.current->array[i].AuthType == TRUST_AUTH_TYPE_VERSION) {
+ entry_ex->entry.kvno = password_blob.current->array[i].AuthInfo.version.version;
+ }
+ }
+
+ for (i=0; i < password_blob.count; i++) {
+ if (password_blob.current->array[i].AuthType == TRUST_AUTH_TYPE_CLEAR) {
+ password_utf16 = data_blob_const(password_blob.current->array[i].AuthInfo.clear.password,
+ password_blob.current->array[i].AuthInfo.clear.size);
+ /* In the future, generate all sorts of
+ * hashes, but for now we can't safely convert
+ * the random strings windows uses into
+ * utf8 */
+
+ /* but as it is utf16 already, we can get the NT password/arcfour-hmac-md5 key */
+ mdfour(password_hash.hash, password_utf16.data, password_utf16.length);
+ break;
+ } else if (password_blob.current->array[i].AuthType == TRUST_AUTH_TYPE_NT4OWF) {
+ password_hash = password_blob.current->array[i].AuthInfo.nt4owf.password;
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+ entry_ex->entry.keys.len = 0;
+ entry_ex->entry.keys.val = NULL;
+
+ if (i < password_blob.count) {
+ Key key;
+ /* Must have found a cleartext or MD4 password */
+ entry_ex->entry.keys.val = calloc(1, sizeof(Key));
+
+ key.mkvno = 0;
+ key.salt = NULL; /* No salt for this enc type */
+
+ if (entry_ex->entry.keys.val == NULL) {
+ ret = ENOMEM;
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ ret = krb5_keyblock_init(context,
+ ENCTYPE_ARCFOUR_HMAC,
+ password_hash.hash, sizeof(password_hash.hash),
+ &key.key);
+
+ entry_ex->entry.keys.val[entry_ex->entry.keys.len] = key;
+ entry_ex->entry.keys.len++;
+ }
+
+ entry_ex->entry.principal = malloc(sizeof(*(entry_ex->entry.principal)));
+
+ ret = copy_Principal(principal, entry_ex->entry.principal);
+ if (ret) {
+ krb5_clear_error_message(context);
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ /* While we have copied the client principal, tests
+ * show that Win2k3 returns the 'corrected' realm, not
+ * the client-specified realm. This code attempts to
+ * replace the client principal's realm with the one
+ * we determine from our records */
+
+ krb5_principal_set_realm(context, entry_ex->entry.principal, realm);
+ entry_ex->entry.flags = int2HDBFlags(0);
+ entry_ex->entry.flags.immutable = 1;
+ entry_ex->entry.flags.invalid = 0;
+ entry_ex->entry.flags.server = 1;
+ entry_ex->entry.flags.require_preauth = 1;
+
+ entry_ex->entry.pw_end = NULL;
+
+ entry_ex->entry.max_life = NULL;
+
+ entry_ex->entry.max_renew = NULL;
+
+ entry_ex->entry.generation = NULL;
+
+ entry_ex->entry.etypes = malloc(sizeof(*(entry_ex->entry.etypes)));
+ if (entry_ex->entry.etypes == NULL) {
+ krb5_clear_error_message(context);
+ ret = ENOMEM;
+ goto out;
+ }
+ entry_ex->entry.etypes->len = entry_ex->entry.keys.len;
+ entry_ex->entry.etypes->val = calloc(entry_ex->entry.etypes->len, sizeof(int));
+ if (entry_ex->entry.etypes->val == NULL) {
+ krb5_clear_error_message(context);
+ ret = ENOMEM;
+ goto out;
+ }
+ for (i=0; i < entry_ex->entry.etypes->len; i++) {
+ entry_ex->entry.etypes->val[i] = entry_ex->entry.keys.val[i].key.keytype;
+ }
+
+
+ p->msg = talloc_steal(p, msg);
+
+out:
+ if (ret != 0) {
+ /* This doesn't free ent itself, that is for the eventual caller to do */
+ hdb_free_entry(context, entry_ex);
+ } else {
+ talloc_steal(kdc_db_ctx, entry_ex->ctx);
+ }
+
+ return ret;
+
+}
+
+static krb5_error_code samba_kdc_lookup_trust(krb5_context context, struct ldb_context *ldb_ctx,
+ TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx,
+ const char *realm,
+ struct ldb_dn *realm_dn,
+ struct ldb_message **pmsg)
+{
+ int lret;
+ krb5_error_code ret;
+ char *filter = NULL;
+ const char * const *attrs = trust_attrs;
+
+ struct ldb_result *res = NULL;
+ filter = talloc_asprintf(mem_ctx, "(&(objectClass=trustedDomain)(|(flatname=%s)(trustPartner=%s)))", realm, realm);
+
+ if (!filter) {
+ ret = ENOMEM;
+ krb5_set_error_message(context, ret, "talloc_asprintf: out of memory");
+ return ret;
+ }
+
+ lret = ldb_search(ldb_ctx, mem_ctx, &res,
+ ldb_get_default_basedn(ldb_ctx),
+ LDB_SCOPE_SUBTREE, attrs, "%s", filter);
+ if (lret != LDB_SUCCESS) {
+ DEBUG(3, ("Failed to search for %s: %s\n", filter, ldb_errstring(ldb_ctx)));
+ return HDB_ERR_NOENTRY;
+ } else if (res->count == 0 || res->count > 1) {
+ DEBUG(3, ("Failed find a single entry for %s: got %d\n", filter, res->count));
+ talloc_free(res);
+ return HDB_ERR_NOENTRY;
+ }
+ talloc_steal(mem_ctx, res->msgs);
+ *pmsg = res->msgs[0];
+ talloc_free(res);
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static krb5_error_code samba_kdc_lookup_client(krb5_context context,
+ struct samba_kdc_db_context *kdc_db_ctx,
+ TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx,
+ krb5_const_principal principal,
+ const char **attrs,
+ struct ldb_dn **realm_dn,
+ struct ldb_message **msg) {
+ NTSTATUS nt_status;
+ char *principal_string;
+ krb5_error_code ret;
+
+ ret = krb5_unparse_name(context, principal, &principal_string);
+
+ if (ret != 0) {
+ return ret;
+ }
+
+ nt_status = sam_get_results_principal(kdc_db_ctx->samdb,
+ mem_ctx, principal_string, attrs,
+ realm_dn, msg);
+ free(principal_string);
+ if (NT_STATUS_EQUAL(nt_status, NT_STATUS_NO_SUCH_USER)) {
+ return HDB_ERR_NOENTRY;
+ } else if (NT_STATUS_EQUAL(nt_status, NT_STATUS_NO_MEMORY)) {
+ return ENOMEM;
+ } else if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(nt_status)) {
+ return EINVAL;
+ }
+
+ return ret;
+}
+
+static krb5_error_code samba_kdc_fetch_client(krb5_context context,
+ struct samba_kdc_db_context *kdc_db_ctx,
+ TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx,
+ krb5_const_principal principal,
+ hdb_entry_ex *entry_ex) {
+ struct ldb_dn *realm_dn;
+ krb5_error_code ret;
+ struct ldb_message *msg = NULL;
+
+ ret = samba_kdc_lookup_client(context, kdc_db_ctx,
+ mem_ctx, principal, user_attrs,
+ &realm_dn, &msg);
+ if (ret != 0) {
+ return ret;
+ }
+
+ ret = samba_kdc_message2entry(context, kdc_db_ctx, mem_ctx,
+ principal, SAMBA_KDC_ENT_TYPE_CLIENT,
+ realm_dn, msg, entry_ex);
+ return ret;
+}
+
+static krb5_error_code samba_kdc_fetch_krbtgt(krb5_context context,
+ struct samba_kdc_db_context *kdc_db_ctx,
+ TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx,
+ krb5_const_principal principal,
+ hdb_entry_ex *entry_ex)
+{
+ struct loadparm_context *lp_ctx = kdc_db_ctx->lp_ctx;
+ krb5_error_code ret;
+ struct ldb_message *msg = NULL;
+ struct ldb_dn *realm_dn = ldb_get_default_basedn(kdc_db_ctx->samdb);
+ const char *realm;
+
+ krb5_principal alloc_principal = NULL;
+ if (principal->name.name_string.len != 2
+ || (strcmp(principal->name.name_string.val[0], KRB5_TGS_NAME) != 0)) {
+ /* Not a krbtgt */
+ return HDB_ERR_NOENTRY;
+ }
+
+ /* krbtgt case. Either us or a trusted realm */
+
+ if (lp_is_my_domain_or_realm(lp_ctx, principal->realm)
+ && lp_is_my_domain_or_realm(lp_ctx, principal->name.name_string.val[1])) {
+ /* us */
+ /* Cludge, cludge cludge. If the realm part of krbtgt/realm,
+ * is in our db, then direct the caller at our primary
+ * krbtgt */
+
+ int lret;
+ char *realm_fixed;
+
+ lret = gendb_search_single_extended_dn(kdc_db_ctx->samdb, mem_ctx,
+ realm_dn, LDB_SCOPE_SUBTREE,
+ &msg, krbtgt_attrs,
+ "(&(objectClass=user)(samAccountName=krbtgt))");
+ if (lret == LDB_ERR_NO_SUCH_OBJECT) {
+ krb5_warnx(context, "samba_kdc_fetch: could not find own KRBTGT in DB!");
+ krb5_set_error_message(context, HDB_ERR_NOENTRY, "samba_kdc_fetch: could not find own KRBTGT in DB!");
+ return HDB_ERR_NOENTRY;
+ } else if (lret != LDB_SUCCESS) {
+ krb5_warnx(context, "samba_kdc_fetch: could not find own KRBTGT in DB: %s", ldb_errstring(kdc_db_ctx->samdb));
+ krb5_set_error_message(context, HDB_ERR_NOENTRY, "samba_kdc_fetch: could not find own KRBTGT in DB: %s", ldb_errstring(kdc_db_ctx->samdb));
+ return HDB_ERR_NOENTRY;
+ }
+
+ realm_fixed = strupper_talloc(mem_ctx, lp_realm(lp_ctx));
+ if (!realm_fixed) {
+ ret = ENOMEM;
+ krb5_set_error_message(context, ret, "strupper_talloc: out of memory");
+ return ret;
+ }
+
+ ret = krb5_copy_principal(context, principal, &alloc_principal);
+ if (ret) {
+ return ret;
+ }
+
+ free(alloc_principal->name.name_string.val[1]);
+ alloc_principal->name.name_string.val[1] = strdup(realm_fixed);
+ talloc_free(realm_fixed);
+ if (!alloc_principal->name.name_string.val[1]) {
+ ret = ENOMEM;
+ krb5_set_error_message(context, ret, "samba_kdc_fetch: strdup() failed!");
+ return ret;
+ }
+ principal = alloc_principal;
+
+ ret = samba_kdc_message2entry(context, kdc_db_ctx, mem_ctx,
+ principal, SAMBA_KDC_ENT_TYPE_KRBTGT,
+ realm_dn, msg, entry_ex);
+ if (ret != 0) {
+ krb5_warnx(context, "samba_kdc_fetch: self krbtgt message2entry failed");
+ }
+ return ret;
+
+ } else {
+ enum trust_direction direction = UNKNOWN;
+
+ /* Either an inbound or outbound trust */
+
+ if (strcasecmp(lp_realm(lp_ctx), principal->realm) == 0) {
+ /* look for inbound trust */
+ direction = INBOUND;
+ realm = principal->name.name_string.val[1];
+ }
+
+ if (strcasecmp(lp_realm(lp_ctx), principal->name.name_string.val[1]) == 0) {
+ /* look for outbound trust */
+ direction = OUTBOUND;
+ realm = principal->realm;
+ }
+
+ /* Trusted domains are under CN=system */
+
+ ret = samba_kdc_lookup_trust(context, kdc_db_ctx->samdb,
+ mem_ctx,
+ realm, realm_dn, &msg);
+
+ if (ret != 0) {
+ krb5_warnx(context, "samba_kdc_fetch: could not find principal in DB");
+ krb5_set_error_message(context, ret, "samba_kdc_fetch: could not find principal in DB");
+ return ret;
+ }
+
+ ret = samba_kdc_trust_message2entry(context, kdc_db_ctx, mem_ctx,
+ principal, direction,
+ realm_dn, msg, entry_ex);
+ if (ret != 0) {
+ krb5_warnx(context, "samba_kdc_fetch: trust_message2entry failed");
+ }
+ return ret;
+
+
+ /* we should lookup trusted domains */
+ return HDB_ERR_NOENTRY;
+ }
+
+}
+
+static krb5_error_code samba_kdc_lookup_server(krb5_context context,
+ struct samba_kdc_db_context *kdc_db_ctx,
+ TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx,
+ krb5_const_principal principal,
+ const char **attrs,
+ struct ldb_dn **realm_dn,
+ struct ldb_message **msg)
+{
+ krb5_error_code ret;
+ const char *realm;
+ if (principal->name.name_string.len >= 2) {
+ /* 'normal server' case */
+ int ldb_ret;
+ NTSTATUS nt_status;
+ struct ldb_dn *user_dn;
+ char *principal_string;
+
+ ret = krb5_unparse_name_flags(context, principal,
+ KRB5_PRINCIPAL_UNPARSE_NO_REALM,
+ &principal_string);
+ if (ret != 0) {
+ return ret;
+ }
+
+ /* At this point we may find the host is known to be
+ * in a different realm, so we should generate a
+ * referral instead */
+ nt_status = crack_service_principal_name(kdc_db_ctx->samdb,
+ mem_ctx, principal_string,
+ &user_dn, realm_dn);
+ free(principal_string);
+
+ if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(nt_status)) {
+ return HDB_ERR_NOENTRY;
+ }
+
+ ldb_ret = gendb_search_single_extended_dn(kdc_db_ctx->samdb,
+ mem_ctx,
+ user_dn, LDB_SCOPE_BASE,
+ msg, attrs,
+ "(objectClass=*)");
+ if (ldb_ret != LDB_SUCCESS) {
+ return HDB_ERR_NOENTRY;
+ }
+
+ } else {
+ int lret;
+ char *filter = NULL;
+ char *short_princ;
+ /* server as client principal case, but we must not lookup userPrincipalNames */
+ *realm_dn = ldb_get_default_basedn(kdc_db_ctx->samdb);
+ realm = krb5_principal_get_realm(context, principal);
+
+ /* TODO: Check if it is our realm, otherwise give referall */
+
+ ret = krb5_unparse_name_flags(context, principal, KRB5_PRINCIPAL_UNPARSE_NO_REALM, &short_princ);
+
+ if (ret != 0) {
+ krb5_set_error_message(context, ret, "samba_kdc_lookup_principal: could not parse principal");
+ krb5_warnx(context, "samba_kdc_lookup_principal: could not parse principal");
+ return ret;
+ }
+
+ lret = gendb_search_single_extended_dn(kdc_db_ctx->samdb, mem_ctx,
+ *realm_dn, LDB_SCOPE_SUBTREE,
+ msg, attrs, "(&(objectClass=user)(samAccountName=%s))",
+ ldb_binary_encode_string(mem_ctx, short_princ));
+ free(short_princ);
+ if (lret == LDB_ERR_NO_SUCH_OBJECT) {
+ DEBUG(3, ("Failed find a entry for %s\n", filter));
+ return HDB_ERR_NOENTRY;
+ }
+ if (lret != LDB_SUCCESS) {
+ DEBUG(3, ("Failed single search for for %s - %s\n",
+ filter, ldb_errstring(kdc_db_ctx->samdb)));
+ return HDB_ERR_NOENTRY;
+ }
+ }
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static krb5_error_code samba_kdc_fetch_server(krb5_context context,
+ struct samba_kdc_db_context *kdc_db_ctx,
+ TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx,
+ krb5_const_principal principal,
+ hdb_entry_ex *entry_ex)
+{
+ krb5_error_code ret;
+ struct ldb_dn *realm_dn;
+ struct ldb_message *msg;
+
+ ret = samba_kdc_lookup_server(context, kdc_db_ctx, mem_ctx, principal,
+ server_attrs, &realm_dn, &msg);
+ if (ret != 0) {
+ return ret;
+ }
+
+ ret = samba_kdc_message2entry(context, kdc_db_ctx, mem_ctx,
+ principal, SAMBA_KDC_ENT_TYPE_SERVER,
+ realm_dn, msg, entry_ex);
+ if (ret != 0) {
+ krb5_warnx(context, "samba_kdc_fetch: message2entry failed");
+ }
+
+ return ret;
+}
+
+krb5_error_code samba_kdc_fetch(krb5_context context,
+ struct samba_kdc_db_context *kdc_db_ctx,
+ krb5_const_principal principal,
+ unsigned flags,
+ hdb_entry_ex *entry_ex)
+{
+ krb5_error_code ret = HDB_ERR_NOENTRY;
+ TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx = talloc_named(kdc_db_ctx, 0, "samba_kdc_fetch context");
+
+ if (!mem_ctx) {
+ ret = ENOMEM;
+ krb5_set_error_message(context, ret, "samba_kdc_fetch: talloc_named() failed!");
+ return ret;
+ }
+
+ if (flags & HDB_F_GET_CLIENT) {
+ ret = samba_kdc_fetch_client(context, kdc_db_ctx, mem_ctx, principal, entry_ex);
+ if (ret != HDB_ERR_NOENTRY) goto done;
+ }
+ if (flags & HDB_F_GET_SERVER) {
+ /* krbtgt fits into this situation for trusted realms, and for resolving different versions of our own realm name */
+ ret = samba_kdc_fetch_krbtgt(context, kdc_db_ctx, mem_ctx, principal, entry_ex);
+ if (ret != HDB_ERR_NOENTRY) goto done;
+
+ /* We return 'no entry' if it does not start with krbtgt/, so move to the common case quickly */
+ ret = samba_kdc_fetch_server(context, kdc_db_ctx, mem_ctx, principal, entry_ex);
+ if (ret != HDB_ERR_NOENTRY) goto done;
+ }
+ if (flags & HDB_F_GET_KRBTGT) {
+ ret = samba_kdc_fetch_krbtgt(context, kdc_db_ctx, mem_ctx, principal, entry_ex);
+ if (ret != HDB_ERR_NOENTRY) goto done;
+ }
+
+done:
+ talloc_free(mem_ctx);
+ return ret;
+}
+
+struct samba_kdc_seq {
+ int index;
+ int count;
+ struct ldb_message **msgs;
+ struct ldb_dn *realm_dn;
+};
+
+static krb5_error_code samba_kdc_seq(krb5_context context,
+ struct samba_kdc_db_context *kdc_db_ctx,
+ hdb_entry_ex *entry)
+{
+ krb5_error_code ret;
+ struct samba_kdc_seq *priv = kdc_db_ctx->seq_ctx;
+ TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx;
+ hdb_entry_ex entry_ex;
+ memset(&entry_ex, '\0', sizeof(entry_ex));
+
+ if (!priv) {
+ return HDB_ERR_NOENTRY;
+ }
+
+ mem_ctx = talloc_named(priv, 0, "samba_kdc_seq context");
+
+ if (!mem_ctx) {
+ ret = ENOMEM;
+ krb5_set_error_message(context, ret, "samba_kdc_seq: talloc_named() failed!");
+ return ret;
+ }
+
+ if (priv->index < priv->count) {
+ ret = samba_kdc_message2entry(context, kdc_db_ctx, mem_ctx,
+ NULL, SAMBA_KDC_ENT_TYPE_ANY,
+ priv->realm_dn, priv->msgs[priv->index++], entry);
+ } else {
+ ret = HDB_ERR_NOENTRY;
+ }
+
+ if (ret != 0) {
+ talloc_free(priv);
+ kdc_db_ctx->seq_ctx = NULL;
+ } else {
+ talloc_free(mem_ctx);
+ }
+
+ return ret;
+}
+
+krb5_error_code samba_kdc_firstkey(krb5_context context,
+ struct samba_kdc_db_context *kdc_db_ctx,
+ hdb_entry_ex *entry)
+{
+ struct ldb_context *ldb_ctx = kdc_db_ctx->samdb;
+ struct samba_kdc_seq *priv = kdc_db_ctx->seq_ctx;
+ char *realm;
+ struct ldb_result *res = NULL;
+ krb5_error_code ret;
+ TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx;
+ int lret;
+
+ if (priv) {
+ talloc_free(priv);
+ kdc_db_ctx->seq_ctx = NULL;
+ }
+
+ priv = (struct samba_kdc_seq *) talloc(kdc_db_ctx, struct samba_kdc_seq);
+ if (!priv) {
+ ret = ENOMEM;
+ krb5_set_error_message(context, ret, "talloc: out of memory");
+ return ret;
+ }
+
+ priv->index = 0;
+ priv->msgs = NULL;
+ priv->realm_dn = ldb_get_default_basedn(ldb_ctx);
+ priv->count = 0;
+
+ mem_ctx = talloc_named(priv, 0, "samba_kdc_firstkey context");
+
+ if (!mem_ctx) {
+ ret = ENOMEM;
+ krb5_set_error_message(context, ret, "samba_kdc_firstkey: talloc_named() failed!");
+ return ret;
+ }
+
+ ret = krb5_get_default_realm(context, &realm);
+ if (ret != 0) {
+ talloc_free(priv);
+ return ret;
+ }
+
+ lret = ldb_search(ldb_ctx, priv, &res,
+ priv->realm_dn, LDB_SCOPE_SUBTREE, user_attrs,
+ "(objectClass=user)");
+
+ if (lret != LDB_SUCCESS) {
+ talloc_free(priv);
+ return HDB_ERR_NOENTRY;
+ }
+
+ priv->count = res->count;
+ priv->msgs = talloc_steal(priv, res->msgs);
+ talloc_free(res);
+
+ kdc_db_ctx->seq_ctx = priv;
+
+ ret = samba_kdc_seq(context, kdc_db_ctx, entry);
+
+ if (ret != 0) {
+ talloc_free(priv);
+ kdc_db_ctx->seq_ctx = NULL;
+ } else {
+ talloc_free(mem_ctx);
+ }
+ return ret;
+}
+
+krb5_error_code samba_kdc_nextkey(krb5_context context,
+ struct samba_kdc_db_context *kdc_db_ctx,
+ hdb_entry_ex *entry)
+{
+ return samba_kdc_seq(context, kdc_db_ctx, entry);
+}
+
+/* Check if a given entry may delegate to this target principal
+ *
+ * This is currently a very nasty hack - allowing only delegation to itself.
+ */
+krb5_error_code
+samba_kdc_check_constrained_delegation(krb5_context context,
+ struct samba_kdc_db_context *kdc_db_ctx,
+ hdb_entry_ex *entry,
+ krb5_const_principal target_principal)
+{
+ krb5_error_code ret;
+ krb5_principal enterprise_prinicpal = NULL;
+ struct ldb_dn *realm_dn;
+ struct ldb_message *msg;
+ struct dom_sid *orig_sid;
+ struct dom_sid *target_sid;
+ struct samba_kdc_entry *p = talloc_get_type(entry->ctx, struct samba_kdc_entry);
+ const char *delegation_check_attrs[] = {
+ "objectSid", NULL
+ };
+
+ TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx = talloc_named(kdc_db_ctx, 0, "samba_kdc_check_constrained_delegation");
+
+ if (!mem_ctx) {
+ ret = ENOMEM;
+ krb5_set_error_message(context, ret, "samba_kdc_fetch: talloc_named() failed!");
+ return ret;
+ }
+
+ if (target_principal->name.name_type == KRB5_NT_ENTERPRISE_PRINCIPAL) {
+ /* Need to reparse the enterprise principal to find the real target */
+ if (target_principal->name.name_string.len != 1) {
+ ret = KRB5_PARSE_MALFORMED;
+ krb5_set_error_message(context, ret, "samba_kdc_check_constrained_delegation: request for delegation to enterprise principal with wrong (%d) number of components",
+ target_principal->name.name_string.len);
+ talloc_free(mem_ctx);
+ return ret;
+ }
+ ret = krb5_parse_name(context, target_principal->name.name_string.val[0],
+ &enterprise_prinicpal);
+ if (ret) {
+ talloc_free(mem_ctx);
+ return ret;
+ }
+ target_principal = enterprise_prinicpal;
+ }
+
+ ret = samba_kdc_lookup_server(context, kdc_db_ctx, mem_ctx, target_principal,
+ delegation_check_attrs, &realm_dn, &msg);
+
+ krb5_free_principal(context, enterprise_prinicpal);
+
+ if (ret != 0) {
+ talloc_free(mem_ctx);
+ return ret;
+ }
+
+ orig_sid = samdb_result_dom_sid(mem_ctx, p->msg, "objectSid");
+ target_sid = samdb_result_dom_sid(mem_ctx, msg, "objectSid");
+
+ /* Allow delegation to the same principal, even if by a different
+ * name. The easy and safe way to prove this is by SID
+ * comparison */
+ if (!(orig_sid && target_sid && dom_sid_equal(orig_sid, target_sid))) {
+ talloc_free(mem_ctx);
+ return KRB5KDC_ERR_BADOPTION;
+ }
+
+ talloc_free(mem_ctx);
+ return ret;
+}
+
+/* Certificates printed by a the Certificate Authority might have a
+ * slightly different form of the user principal name to that in the
+ * database. Allow a mismatch where they both refer to the same
+ * SID */
+
+krb5_error_code
+samba_kdc_check_pkinit_ms_upn_match(krb5_context context,
+ struct samba_kdc_db_context *kdc_db_ctx,
+ hdb_entry_ex *entry,
+ krb5_const_principal certificate_principal)
+{
+ krb5_error_code ret;
+ struct ldb_dn *realm_dn;
+ struct ldb_message *msg;
+ struct dom_sid *orig_sid;
+ struct dom_sid *target_sid;
+ struct samba_kdc_entry *p = talloc_get_type(entry->ctx, struct samba_kdc_entry);
+ const char *ms_upn_check_attrs[] = {
+ "objectSid", NULL
+ };
+
+ TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx = talloc_named(kdc_db_ctx, 0, "samba_kdc_check_pkinit_ms_upn_match");
+
+ if (!mem_ctx) {
+ ret = ENOMEM;
+ krb5_set_error_message(context, ret, "samba_kdc_fetch: talloc_named() failed!");
+ return ret;
+ }
+
+ ret = samba_kdc_lookup_client(context, kdc_db_ctx,
+ mem_ctx, certificate_principal,
+ ms_upn_check_attrs, &realm_dn, &msg);
+
+ if (ret != 0) {
+ talloc_free(mem_ctx);
+ return ret;
+ }
+
+ orig_sid = samdb_result_dom_sid(mem_ctx, p->msg, "objectSid");
+ target_sid = samdb_result_dom_sid(mem_ctx, msg, "objectSid");
+
+ /* Consider these to be the same principal, even if by a different
+ * name. The easy and safe way to prove this is by SID
+ * comparison */
+ if (!(orig_sid && target_sid && dom_sid_equal(orig_sid, target_sid))) {
+ talloc_free(mem_ctx);
+ return KRB5_KDC_ERR_CLIENT_NAME_MISMATCH;
+ }
+
+ talloc_free(mem_ctx);
+ return ret;
+}
+
--- /dev/null
+/*
+ Unix SMB/CIFS implementation.
+
+ Database Glue between Samba and the KDC
+
+ Copyright (C) Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org> 2005-2009
+ Copyright (C) Simo Sorce <idra@samba.org> 2010
+
+ This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
+ it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
+ the Free Software Foundation; either version 3 of the License, or
+ (at your option) any later version.
+
+ This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
+ but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
+ MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the
+ GNU General Public License for more details.
+
+
+ You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
+ along with this program. If not, see <http://www.gnu.org/licenses/>.
+*/
+
+krb5_error_code samba_kdc_fetch(krb5_context context,
+ struct samba_kdc_db_context *kdc_db_ctx,
+ krb5_const_principal principal,
+ unsigned flags,
+ hdb_entry_ex *entry_ex);
+
+krb5_error_code samba_kdc_firstkey(krb5_context context,
+ struct samba_kdc_db_context *kdc_db_ctx,
+ hdb_entry_ex *entry);
+
+krb5_error_code samba_kdc_nextkey(krb5_context context,
+ struct samba_kdc_db_context *kdc_db_ctx,
+ hdb_entry_ex *entry);
+
+krb5_error_code
+samba_kdc_check_constrained_delegation(krb5_context context,
+ struct samba_kdc_db_context *kdc_db_ctx,
+ hdb_entry_ex *entry,
+ krb5_const_principal target_principal);
+
+krb5_error_code
+samba_kdc_check_pkinit_ms_upn_match(krb5_context context,
+ struct samba_kdc_db_context *kdc_db_ctx,
+ hdb_entry_ex *entry,
+ krb5_const_principal certificate_principal);
*/
#include "includes.h"
-#include "system/time.h"
-#include "../libds/common/flags.h"
-#include "lib/ldb/include/ldb.h"
-#include "lib/ldb/include/ldb_errors.h"
-#include "librpc/gen_ndr/netlogon.h"
-#include "libcli/security/security.h"
#include "auth/auth.h"
#include "auth/credentials/credentials.h"
-#include "auth/auth_sam.h"
-#include "../lib/util/util_ldb.h"
#include "dsdb/samdb/samdb.h"
-#include "librpc/ndr/libndr.h"
-#include "librpc/gen_ndr/ndr_drsblobs.h"
-#include "librpc/gen_ndr/lsa.h"
-#include "libcli/auth/libcli_auth.h"
#include "param/param.h"
-#include "events/events.h"
#include "kdc/kdc.h"
-#include "../lib/crypto/md4.h"
-
-enum hdb_samba4_ent_type
-{ HDB_SAMBA4_ENT_TYPE_CLIENT, HDB_SAMBA4_ENT_TYPE_SERVER,
- HDB_SAMBA4_ENT_TYPE_KRBTGT, HDB_SAMBA4_ENT_TYPE_TRUST, HDB_SAMBA4_ENT_TYPE_ANY };
-
-enum trust_direction {
- UNKNOWN = 0,
- INBOUND = LSA_TRUST_DIRECTION_INBOUND,
- OUTBOUND = LSA_TRUST_DIRECTION_OUTBOUND
-};
-
-static const char *trust_attrs[] = {
- "trustPartner",
- "trustAuthIncoming",
- "trustAuthOutgoing",
- "whenCreated",
- "msDS-SupportedEncryptionTypes",
- "trustAttributes",
- "trustDirection",
- "trustType",
- NULL
-};
-
-static KerberosTime ldb_msg_find_krb5time_ldap_time(struct ldb_message *msg, const char *attr, KerberosTime default_val)
-{
- const char *tmp;
- const char *gentime;
- struct tm tm;
-
- gentime = ldb_msg_find_attr_as_string(msg, attr, NULL);
- if (!gentime)
- return default_val;
-
- tmp = strptime(gentime, "%Y%m%d%H%M%SZ", &tm);
- if (tmp == NULL) {
- return default_val;
- }
-
- return timegm(&tm);
-}
-
-static HDBFlags uf2HDBFlags(krb5_context context, int userAccountControl, enum hdb_samba4_ent_type ent_type)
-{
- HDBFlags flags = int2HDBFlags(0);
-
- /* we don't allow kadmin deletes */
- flags.immutable = 1;
-
- /* mark the principal as invalid to start with */
- flags.invalid = 1;
-
- flags.renewable = 1;
-
- /* All accounts are servers, but this may be disabled again in the caller */
- flags.server = 1;
-
- /* Account types - clear the invalid bit if it turns out to be valid */
- if (userAccountControl & UF_NORMAL_ACCOUNT) {
- if (ent_type == HDB_SAMBA4_ENT_TYPE_CLIENT || ent_type == HDB_SAMBA4_ENT_TYPE_ANY) {
- flags.client = 1;
- }
- flags.invalid = 0;
- }
-
- if (userAccountControl & UF_INTERDOMAIN_TRUST_ACCOUNT) {
- if (ent_type == HDB_SAMBA4_ENT_TYPE_CLIENT || ent_type == HDB_SAMBA4_ENT_TYPE_ANY) {
- flags.client = 1;
- }
- flags.invalid = 0;
- }
- if (userAccountControl & UF_WORKSTATION_TRUST_ACCOUNT) {
- if (ent_type == HDB_SAMBA4_ENT_TYPE_CLIENT || ent_type == HDB_SAMBA4_ENT_TYPE_ANY) {
- flags.client = 1;
- }
- flags.invalid = 0;
- }
- if (userAccountControl & UF_SERVER_TRUST_ACCOUNT) {
- if (ent_type == HDB_SAMBA4_ENT_TYPE_CLIENT || ent_type == HDB_SAMBA4_ENT_TYPE_ANY) {
- flags.client = 1;
- }
- flags.invalid = 0;
- }
-
- /* Not permitted to act as a client if disabled */
- if (userAccountControl & UF_ACCOUNTDISABLE) {
- flags.client = 0;
- }
- if (userAccountControl & UF_LOCKOUT) {
- flags.invalid = 1;
- }
-/*
- if (userAccountControl & UF_PASSWORD_NOTREQD) {
- flags.invalid = 1;
- }
-*/
-/*
- UF_PASSWORD_CANT_CHANGE and UF_ENCRYPTED_TEXT_PASSWORD_ALLOWED are irrelevent
-*/
- if (userAccountControl & UF_TEMP_DUPLICATE_ACCOUNT) {
- flags.invalid = 1;
- }
-
-/* UF_DONT_EXPIRE_PASSWD and UF_USE_DES_KEY_ONLY handled in hdb_samba4_message2entry() */
-
-/*
- if (userAccountControl & UF_MNS_LOGON_ACCOUNT) {
- flags.invalid = 1;
- }
-*/
- if (userAccountControl & UF_SMARTCARD_REQUIRED) {
- flags.require_hwauth = 1;
- }
- if (userAccountControl & UF_TRUSTED_FOR_DELEGATION) {
- flags.ok_as_delegate = 1;
- }
- if (!(userAccountControl & UF_NOT_DELEGATED)) {
- flags.forwardable = 1;
- flags.proxiable = 1;
- }
-
- if (userAccountControl & UF_DONT_REQUIRE_PREAUTH) {
- flags.require_preauth = 0;
- } else {
- flags.require_preauth = 1;
-
- }
- return flags;
-}
-
-static int samba_kdc_entry_destructor(struct samba_kdc_entry *p)
-{
- hdb_entry_ex *entry_ex = p->entry_ex;
- free_hdb_entry(&entry_ex->entry);
- return 0;
-}
-
-static void hdb_samba4_free_entry(krb5_context context, hdb_entry_ex *entry_ex)
-{
- talloc_free(entry_ex->ctx);
-}
-
-static krb5_error_code hdb_samba4_message2entry_keys(krb5_context context,
- struct smb_iconv_convenience *iconv_convenience,
- TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx,
- struct ldb_message *msg,
- unsigned int userAccountControl,
- hdb_entry_ex *entry_ex)
-{
- krb5_error_code ret = 0;
- enum ndr_err_code ndr_err;
- struct samr_Password *hash;
- const struct ldb_val *sc_val;
- struct supplementalCredentialsBlob scb;
- struct supplementalCredentialsPackage *scpk = NULL;
- bool newer_keys = false;
- struct package_PrimaryKerberosBlob _pkb;
- struct package_PrimaryKerberosCtr3 *pkb3 = NULL;
- struct package_PrimaryKerberosCtr4 *pkb4 = NULL;
- uint32_t i;
- uint32_t allocated_keys = 0;
-
- entry_ex->entry.keys.val = NULL;
- entry_ex->entry.keys.len = 0;
-
- entry_ex->entry.kvno = ldb_msg_find_attr_as_int(msg, "msDS-KeyVersionNumber", 0);
-
- /* Get keys from the db */
-
- hash = samdb_result_hash(mem_ctx, msg, "unicodePwd");
- sc_val = ldb_msg_find_ldb_val(msg, "supplementalCredentials");
-
- /* unicodePwd for enctype 0x17 (23) if present */
- if (hash) {
- allocated_keys++;
- }
-
- /* supplementalCredentials if present */
- if (sc_val) {
- ndr_err = ndr_pull_struct_blob_all(sc_val, mem_ctx, iconv_convenience, &scb,
- (ndr_pull_flags_fn_t)ndr_pull_supplementalCredentialsBlob);
- if (!NDR_ERR_CODE_IS_SUCCESS(ndr_err)) {
- dump_data(0, sc_val->data, sc_val->length);
- ret = EINVAL;
- goto out;
- }
-
- if (scb.sub.signature != SUPPLEMENTAL_CREDENTIALS_SIGNATURE) {
- NDR_PRINT_DEBUG(supplementalCredentialsBlob, &scb);
- ret = EINVAL;
- goto out;
- }
-
- for (i=0; i < scb.sub.num_packages; i++) {
- if (strcmp("Primary:Kerberos-Newer-Keys", scb.sub.packages[i].name) == 0) {
- scpk = &scb.sub.packages[i];
- if (!scpk->data || !scpk->data[0]) {
- scpk = NULL;
- continue;
- }
- newer_keys = true;
- break;
- } else if (strcmp("Primary:Kerberos", scb.sub.packages[i].name) == 0) {
- scpk = &scb.sub.packages[i];
- if (!scpk->data || !scpk->data[0]) {
- scpk = NULL;
- }
- /*
- * we don't break here in hope to find
- * a Kerberos-Newer-Keys package
- */
- }
- }
- }
- /*
- * Primary:Kerberos-Newer-Keys or Primary:Kerberos element
- * of supplementalCredentials
- */
- if (scpk) {
- DATA_BLOB blob;
-
- blob = strhex_to_data_blob(mem_ctx, scpk->data);
- if (!blob.data) {
- ret = ENOMEM;
- goto out;
- }
-
- /* we cannot use ndr_pull_struct_blob_all() here, as w2k and w2k3 add padding bytes */
- ndr_err = ndr_pull_struct_blob(&blob, mem_ctx, iconv_convenience, &_pkb,
- (ndr_pull_flags_fn_t)ndr_pull_package_PrimaryKerberosBlob);
- if (!NDR_ERR_CODE_IS_SUCCESS(ndr_err)) {
- ret = EINVAL;
- krb5_set_error_message(context, ret, "hdb_samba4_message2entry_keys: could not parse package_PrimaryKerberosBlob");
- krb5_warnx(context, "hdb_samba4_message2entry_keys: could not parse package_PrimaryKerberosBlob");
- goto out;
- }
-
- if (newer_keys && _pkb.version != 4) {
- ret = EINVAL;
- krb5_set_error_message(context, ret, "hdb_samba4_message2entry_keys: Primary:Kerberos-Newer-Keys not version 4");
- krb5_warnx(context, "hdb_samba4_message2entry_keys: Primary:Kerberos-Newer-Keys not version 4");
- goto out;
- }
-
- if (!newer_keys && _pkb.version != 3) {
- ret = EINVAL;
- krb5_set_error_message(context, ret, "hdb_samba4_message2entry_keys: could not parse Primary:Kerberos not version 3");
- krb5_warnx(context, "hdb_samba4_message2entry_keys: could not parse Primary:Kerberos not version 3");
- goto out;
- }
-
- if (_pkb.version == 4) {
- pkb4 = &_pkb.ctr.ctr4;
- allocated_keys += pkb4->num_keys;
- } else if (_pkb.version == 3) {
- pkb3 = &_pkb.ctr.ctr3;
- allocated_keys += pkb3->num_keys;
- }
- }
-
- if (allocated_keys == 0) {
- /* oh, no password. Apparently (comment in
- * hdb-ldap.c) this violates the ASN.1, but this
- * allows an entry with no keys (yet). */
- return 0;
- }
-
- /* allocate space to decode into */
- entry_ex->entry.keys.len = 0;
- entry_ex->entry.keys.val = calloc(allocated_keys, sizeof(Key));
- if (entry_ex->entry.keys.val == NULL) {
- ret = ENOMEM;
- goto out;
- }
-
- if (hash && !(userAccountControl & UF_USE_DES_KEY_ONLY)) {
- Key key;
-
- key.mkvno = 0;
- key.salt = NULL; /* No salt for this enc type */
-
- ret = krb5_keyblock_init(context,
- ENCTYPE_ARCFOUR_HMAC,
- hash->hash, sizeof(hash->hash),
- &key.key);
- if (ret) {
- goto out;
- }
-
- entry_ex->entry.keys.val[entry_ex->entry.keys.len] = key;
- entry_ex->entry.keys.len++;
- }
-
- if (pkb4) {
- for (i=0; i < pkb4->num_keys; i++) {
- bool use = true;
- Key key;
-
- if (!pkb4->keys[i].value) continue;
-
- if (userAccountControl & UF_USE_DES_KEY_ONLY) {
- switch (pkb4->keys[i].keytype) {
- case ENCTYPE_DES_CBC_CRC:
- case ENCTYPE_DES_CBC_MD5:
- break;
- default:
- use = false;
- break;
- }
- }
-
- if (!use) continue;
-
- key.mkvno = 0;
- key.salt = NULL;
-
- if (pkb4->salt.string) {
- DATA_BLOB salt;
-
- salt = data_blob_string_const(pkb4->salt.string);
-
- key.salt = calloc(1, sizeof(*key.salt));
- if (key.salt == NULL) {
- ret = ENOMEM;
- goto out;
- }
-
- key.salt->type = hdb_pw_salt;
-
- ret = krb5_data_copy(&key.salt->salt, salt.data, salt.length);
- if (ret) {
- free(key.salt);
- key.salt = NULL;
- goto out;
- }
- }
-
- /* TODO: maybe pass the iteration_count somehow... */
-
- ret = krb5_keyblock_init(context,
- pkb4->keys[i].keytype,
- pkb4->keys[i].value->data,
- pkb4->keys[i].value->length,
- &key.key);
- if (ret == KRB5_PROG_ETYPE_NOSUPP) {
- DEBUG(2,("Unsupported keytype ignored - type %u\n",
- pkb4->keys[i].keytype));
- ret = 0;
- continue;
- }
- if (ret) {
- if (key.salt) {
- free_Salt(key.salt);
- free(key.salt);
- key.salt = NULL;
- }
- goto out;
- }
-
- entry_ex->entry.keys.val[entry_ex->entry.keys.len] = key;
- entry_ex->entry.keys.len++;
- }
- } else if (pkb3) {
- for (i=0; i < pkb3->num_keys; i++) {
- bool use = true;
- Key key;
-
- if (!pkb3->keys[i].value) continue;
-
- if (userAccountControl & UF_USE_DES_KEY_ONLY) {
- switch (pkb3->keys[i].keytype) {
- case ENCTYPE_DES_CBC_CRC:
- case ENCTYPE_DES_CBC_MD5:
- break;
- default:
- use = false;
- break;
- }
- }
-
- if (!use) continue;
-
- key.mkvno = 0;
- key.salt = NULL;
-
- if (pkb3->salt.string) {
- DATA_BLOB salt;
-
- salt = data_blob_string_const(pkb3->salt.string);
-
- key.salt = calloc(1, sizeof(*key.salt));
- if (key.salt == NULL) {
- ret = ENOMEM;
- goto out;
- }
-
- key.salt->type = hdb_pw_salt;
-
- ret = krb5_data_copy(&key.salt->salt, salt.data, salt.length);
- if (ret) {
- free(key.salt);
- key.salt = NULL;
- goto out;
- }
- }
-
- ret = krb5_keyblock_init(context,
- pkb3->keys[i].keytype,
- pkb3->keys[i].value->data,
- pkb3->keys[i].value->length,
- &key.key);
- if (ret) {
- if (key.salt) {
- free_Salt(key.salt);
- free(key.salt);
- key.salt = NULL;
- }
- goto out;
- }
-
- entry_ex->entry.keys.val[entry_ex->entry.keys.len] = key;
- entry_ex->entry.keys.len++;
- }
- }
-
-out:
- if (ret != 0) {
- entry_ex->entry.keys.len = 0;
- }
- if (entry_ex->entry.keys.len == 0 && entry_ex->entry.keys.val) {
- free(entry_ex->entry.keys.val);
- entry_ex->entry.keys.val = NULL;
- }
- return ret;
-}
-
-/*
- * Construct an hdb_entry from a directory entry.
- */
-static krb5_error_code hdb_samba4_message2entry(krb5_context context,
- struct samba_kdc_db_context *kdc_db_ctx,
- struct loadparm_context *lp_ctx,
- TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx, krb5_const_principal principal,
- enum hdb_samba4_ent_type ent_type,
- struct ldb_dn *realm_dn,
- struct ldb_message *msg,
- hdb_entry_ex *entry_ex)
-{
- unsigned int userAccountControl;
- int i;
- krb5_error_code ret = 0;
- krb5_boolean is_computer = FALSE;
- char *realm = strupper_talloc(mem_ctx, lp_realm(lp_ctx));
-
- struct samba_kdc_entry *p;
- NTTIME acct_expiry;
- NTSTATUS status;
-
- uint32_t rid;
- struct ldb_message_element *objectclasses;
- struct ldb_val computer_val;
- const char *samAccountName = ldb_msg_find_attr_as_string(msg, "samAccountName", NULL);
- computer_val.data = discard_const_p(uint8_t,"computer");
- computer_val.length = strlen((const char *)computer_val.data);
-
- if (!samAccountName) {
- ret = ENOENT;
- krb5_set_error_message(context, ret, "hdb_samba4_message2entry: no samAccountName present");
- goto out;
- }
-
- objectclasses = ldb_msg_find_element(msg, "objectClass");
-
- if (objectclasses && ldb_msg_find_val(objectclasses, &computer_val)) {
- is_computer = TRUE;
- }
-
- memset(entry_ex, 0, sizeof(*entry_ex));
-
- if (!realm) {
- ret = ENOMEM;
- krb5_set_error_message(context, ret, "talloc_strdup: out of memory");
- goto out;
- }
-
- p = talloc(mem_ctx, struct samba_kdc_entry);
- if (!p) {
- ret = ENOMEM;
- goto out;
- }
-
- p->kdc_db_ctx = kdc_db_ctx;
- p->entry_ex = entry_ex;
- p->realm_dn = talloc_reference(p, realm_dn);
- if (!p->realm_dn) {
- ret = ENOMEM;
- goto out;
- }
-
- talloc_set_destructor(p, samba_kdc_entry_destructor);
-
- entry_ex->ctx = p;
- entry_ex->free_entry = hdb_samba4_free_entry;
-
- userAccountControl = ldb_msg_find_attr_as_uint(msg, "userAccountControl", 0);
-
-
- entry_ex->entry.principal = malloc(sizeof(*(entry_ex->entry.principal)));
- if (ent_type == HDB_SAMBA4_ENT_TYPE_ANY && principal == NULL) {
- krb5_make_principal(context, &entry_ex->entry.principal, realm, samAccountName, NULL);
- } else {
- ret = copy_Principal(principal, entry_ex->entry.principal);
- if (ret) {
- krb5_clear_error_message(context);
- goto out;
- }
-
- /* While we have copied the client principal, tests
- * show that Win2k3 returns the 'corrected' realm, not
- * the client-specified realm. This code attempts to
- * replace the client principal's realm with the one
- * we determine from our records */
-
- /* this has to be with malloc() */
- krb5_principal_set_realm(context, entry_ex->entry.principal, realm);
- }
-
- /* First try and figure out the flags based on the userAccountControl */
- entry_ex->entry.flags = uf2HDBFlags(context, userAccountControl, ent_type);
-
- /* Windows 2008 seems to enforce this (very sensible) rule by
- * default - don't allow offline attacks on a user's password
- * by asking for a ticket to them as a service (encrypted with
- * their probably patheticly insecure password) */
-
- if (entry_ex->entry.flags.server
- && lp_parm_bool(lp_ctx, NULL, "kdc", "require spn for service", true)) {
- if (!is_computer && !ldb_msg_find_attr_as_string(msg, "servicePrincipalName", NULL)) {
- entry_ex->entry.flags.server = 0;
- }
- }
-
- {
- /* These (created_by, modified_by) parts of the entry are not relevant for Samba4's use
- * of the Heimdal KDC. They are stored in a the traditional
- * DB for audit purposes, and still form part of the structure
- * we must return */
-
- /* use 'whenCreated' */
- entry_ex->entry.created_by.time = ldb_msg_find_krb5time_ldap_time(msg, "whenCreated", 0);
- /* use '???' */
- entry_ex->entry.created_by.principal = NULL;
-
- entry_ex->entry.modified_by = (Event *) malloc(sizeof(Event));
- if (entry_ex->entry.modified_by == NULL) {
- ret = ENOMEM;
- krb5_set_error_message(context, ret, "malloc: out of memory");
- goto out;
- }
-
- /* use 'whenChanged' */
- entry_ex->entry.modified_by->time = ldb_msg_find_krb5time_ldap_time(msg, "whenChanged", 0);
- /* use '???' */
- entry_ex->entry.modified_by->principal = NULL;
- }
-
-
- /* The lack of password controls etc applies to krbtgt by
- * virtue of being that particular RID */
- status = dom_sid_split_rid(NULL, samdb_result_dom_sid(mem_ctx, msg, "objectSid"), NULL, &rid);
-
- if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(status)) {
- ret = EINVAL;
- goto out;
- }
-
- if (rid == DOMAIN_RID_KRBTGT) {
- entry_ex->entry.valid_end = NULL;
- entry_ex->entry.pw_end = NULL;
-
- entry_ex->entry.flags.invalid = 0;
- entry_ex->entry.flags.server = 1;
-
- /* Don't mark all requests for the krbtgt/realm as
- * 'change password', as otherwise we could get into
- * trouble, and not enforce the password expirty.
- * Instead, only do it when request is for the kpasswd service */
- if (ent_type == HDB_SAMBA4_ENT_TYPE_SERVER
- && principal->name.name_string.len == 2
- && (strcmp(principal->name.name_string.val[0], "kadmin") == 0)
- && (strcmp(principal->name.name_string.val[1], "changepw") == 0)
- && lp_is_my_domain_or_realm(lp_ctx, principal->realm)) {
- entry_ex->entry.flags.change_pw = 1;
- }
- entry_ex->entry.flags.client = 0;
- entry_ex->entry.flags.forwardable = 1;
- entry_ex->entry.flags.ok_as_delegate = 1;
- } else if (entry_ex->entry.flags.server && ent_type == HDB_SAMBA4_ENT_TYPE_SERVER) {
- /* The account/password expiry only applies when the account is used as a
- * client (ie password login), not when used as a server */
-
- /* Make very well sure we don't use this for a client,
- * it could bypass the password restrictions */
- entry_ex->entry.flags.client = 0;
-
- entry_ex->entry.valid_end = NULL;
- entry_ex->entry.pw_end = NULL;
-
- } else {
- NTTIME must_change_time
- = samdb_result_force_password_change(kdc_db_ctx->samdb, mem_ctx,
- realm_dn, msg);
- if (must_change_time == 0x7FFFFFFFFFFFFFFFULL) {
- entry_ex->entry.pw_end = NULL;
- } else {
- entry_ex->entry.pw_end = malloc(sizeof(*entry_ex->entry.pw_end));
- if (entry_ex->entry.pw_end == NULL) {
- ret = ENOMEM;
- goto out;
- }
- *entry_ex->entry.pw_end = nt_time_to_unix(must_change_time);
- }
-
- acct_expiry = samdb_result_account_expires(msg);
- if (acct_expiry == 0x7FFFFFFFFFFFFFFFULL) {
- entry_ex->entry.valid_end = NULL;
- } else {
- entry_ex->entry.valid_end = malloc(sizeof(*entry_ex->entry.valid_end));
- if (entry_ex->entry.valid_end == NULL) {
- ret = ENOMEM;
- goto out;
- }
- *entry_ex->entry.valid_end = nt_time_to_unix(acct_expiry);
- }
- }
-
- entry_ex->entry.valid_start = NULL;
-
- entry_ex->entry.max_life = NULL;
-
- entry_ex->entry.max_renew = NULL;
-
- entry_ex->entry.generation = NULL;
-
- /* Get keys from the db */
- ret = hdb_samba4_message2entry_keys(context, p->kdc_db_ctx->ic_ctx, p,
- msg, userAccountControl, entry_ex);
- if (ret) {
- /* Could be bougus data in the entry, or out of memory */
- goto out;
- }
-
- entry_ex->entry.etypes = malloc(sizeof(*(entry_ex->entry.etypes)));
- if (entry_ex->entry.etypes == NULL) {
- krb5_clear_error_message(context);
- ret = ENOMEM;
- goto out;
- }
- entry_ex->entry.etypes->len = entry_ex->entry.keys.len;
- entry_ex->entry.etypes->val = calloc(entry_ex->entry.etypes->len, sizeof(int));
- if (entry_ex->entry.etypes->val == NULL) {
- krb5_clear_error_message(context);
- ret = ENOMEM;
- goto out;
- }
- for (i=0; i < entry_ex->entry.etypes->len; i++) {
- entry_ex->entry.etypes->val[i] = entry_ex->entry.keys.val[i].key.keytype;
- }
-
-
- p->msg = talloc_steal(p, msg);
-
-out:
- if (ret != 0) {
- /* This doesn't free ent itself, that is for the eventual caller to do */
- hdb_free_entry(context, entry_ex);
- } else {
- talloc_steal(kdc_db_ctx, entry_ex->ctx);
- }
-
- return ret;
-}
-
-/*
- * Construct an hdb_entry from a directory entry.
- */
-static krb5_error_code hdb_samba4_trust_message2entry(krb5_context context,
- struct samba_kdc_db_context *kdc_db_ctx,
- struct loadparm_context *lp_ctx,
- TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx, krb5_const_principal principal,
- enum trust_direction direction,
- struct ldb_dn *realm_dn,
- struct ldb_message *msg,
- hdb_entry_ex *entry_ex)
-{
-
- const char *dnsdomain;
- char *realm;
- DATA_BLOB password_utf16;
- struct samr_Password password_hash;
- const struct ldb_val *password_val;
- struct trustAuthInOutBlob password_blob;
- struct samba_kdc_entry *p;
-
- enum ndr_err_code ndr_err;
- int i, ret, trust_direction_flags;
-
- p = talloc(mem_ctx, struct samba_kdc_entry);
- if (!p) {
- ret = ENOMEM;
- goto out;
- }
-
- p->kdc_db_ctx = kdc_db_ctx;
- p->entry_ex = entry_ex;
- p->realm_dn = realm_dn;
-
- talloc_set_destructor(p, samba_kdc_entry_destructor);
-
- entry_ex->ctx = p;
- entry_ex->free_entry = hdb_samba4_free_entry;
-
- /* use 'whenCreated' */
- entry_ex->entry.created_by.time = ldb_msg_find_krb5time_ldap_time(msg, "whenCreated", 0);
- /* use '???' */
- entry_ex->entry.created_by.principal = NULL;
-
- entry_ex->entry.valid_start = NULL;
-
- trust_direction_flags = ldb_msg_find_attr_as_int(msg, "trustDirection", 0);
-
- if (direction == INBOUND) {
- realm = strupper_talloc(mem_ctx, lp_realm(lp_ctx));
- password_val = ldb_msg_find_ldb_val(msg, "trustAuthIncoming");
-
- } else { /* OUTBOUND */
- dnsdomain = ldb_msg_find_attr_as_string(msg, "trustPartner", NULL);
- realm = strupper_talloc(mem_ctx, dnsdomain);
- password_val = ldb_msg_find_ldb_val(msg, "trustAuthOutgoing");
- }
-
- if (!password_val || !(trust_direction_flags & direction)) {
- ret = ENOENT;
- goto out;
- }
-
- ndr_err = ndr_pull_struct_blob(password_val, mem_ctx, p->kdc_db_ctx->ic_ctx, &password_blob,
- (ndr_pull_flags_fn_t)ndr_pull_trustAuthInOutBlob);
- if (!NDR_ERR_CODE_IS_SUCCESS(ndr_err)) {
- ret = EINVAL;
- goto out;
- }
-
- entry_ex->entry.kvno = -1;
- for (i=0; i < password_blob.count; i++) {
- if (password_blob.current->array[i].AuthType == TRUST_AUTH_TYPE_VERSION) {
- entry_ex->entry.kvno = password_blob.current->array[i].AuthInfo.version.version;
- }
- }
-
- for (i=0; i < password_blob.count; i++) {
- if (password_blob.current->array[i].AuthType == TRUST_AUTH_TYPE_CLEAR) {
- password_utf16 = data_blob_const(password_blob.current->array[i].AuthInfo.clear.password,
- password_blob.current->array[i].AuthInfo.clear.size);
- /* In the future, generate all sorts of
- * hashes, but for now we can't safely convert
- * the random strings windows uses into
- * utf8 */
-
- /* but as it is utf16 already, we can get the NT password/arcfour-hmac-md5 key */
- mdfour(password_hash.hash, password_utf16.data, password_utf16.length);
- break;
- } else if (password_blob.current->array[i].AuthType == TRUST_AUTH_TYPE_NT4OWF) {
- password_hash = password_blob.current->array[i].AuthInfo.nt4owf.password;
- break;
- }
- }
- entry_ex->entry.keys.len = 0;
- entry_ex->entry.keys.val = NULL;
-
- if (i < password_blob.count) {
- Key key;
- /* Must have found a cleartext or MD4 password */
- entry_ex->entry.keys.val = calloc(1, sizeof(Key));
-
- key.mkvno = 0;
- key.salt = NULL; /* No salt for this enc type */
-
- if (entry_ex->entry.keys.val == NULL) {
- ret = ENOMEM;
- goto out;
- }
-
- ret = krb5_keyblock_init(context,
- ENCTYPE_ARCFOUR_HMAC,
- password_hash.hash, sizeof(password_hash.hash),
- &key.key);
-
- entry_ex->entry.keys.val[entry_ex->entry.keys.len] = key;
- entry_ex->entry.keys.len++;
- }
-
- entry_ex->entry.principal = malloc(sizeof(*(entry_ex->entry.principal)));
-
- ret = copy_Principal(principal, entry_ex->entry.principal);
- if (ret) {
- krb5_clear_error_message(context);
- goto out;
- }
-
- /* While we have copied the client principal, tests
- * show that Win2k3 returns the 'corrected' realm, not
- * the client-specified realm. This code attempts to
- * replace the client principal's realm with the one
- * we determine from our records */
-
- krb5_principal_set_realm(context, entry_ex->entry.principal, realm);
- entry_ex->entry.flags = int2HDBFlags(0);
- entry_ex->entry.flags.immutable = 1;
- entry_ex->entry.flags.invalid = 0;
- entry_ex->entry.flags.server = 1;
- entry_ex->entry.flags.require_preauth = 1;
-
- entry_ex->entry.pw_end = NULL;
-
- entry_ex->entry.max_life = NULL;
-
- entry_ex->entry.max_renew = NULL;
-
- entry_ex->entry.generation = NULL;
-
- entry_ex->entry.etypes = malloc(sizeof(*(entry_ex->entry.etypes)));
- if (entry_ex->entry.etypes == NULL) {
- krb5_clear_error_message(context);
- ret = ENOMEM;
- goto out;
- }
- entry_ex->entry.etypes->len = entry_ex->entry.keys.len;
- entry_ex->entry.etypes->val = calloc(entry_ex->entry.etypes->len, sizeof(int));
- if (entry_ex->entry.etypes->val == NULL) {
- krb5_clear_error_message(context);
- ret = ENOMEM;
- goto out;
- }
- for (i=0; i < entry_ex->entry.etypes->len; i++) {
- entry_ex->entry.etypes->val[i] = entry_ex->entry.keys.val[i].key.keytype;
- }
-
-
- p->msg = talloc_steal(p, msg);
-
-out:
- if (ret != 0) {
- /* This doesn't free ent itself, that is for the eventual caller to do */
- hdb_free_entry(context, entry_ex);
- } else {
- talloc_steal(kdc_db_ctx, entry_ex->ctx);
- }
-
- return ret;
-
-}
-
-static krb5_error_code hdb_samba4_lookup_trust(krb5_context context, struct ldb_context *ldb_ctx,
- TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx,
- const char *realm,
- struct ldb_dn *realm_dn,
- struct ldb_message **pmsg)
-{
- int lret;
- krb5_error_code ret;
- char *filter = NULL;
- const char * const *attrs = trust_attrs;
-
- struct ldb_result *res = NULL;
- filter = talloc_asprintf(mem_ctx, "(&(objectClass=trustedDomain)(|(flatname=%s)(trustPartner=%s)))", realm, realm);
-
- if (!filter) {
- ret = ENOMEM;
- krb5_set_error_message(context, ret, "talloc_asprintf: out of memory");
- return ret;
- }
-
- lret = ldb_search(ldb_ctx, mem_ctx, &res,
- ldb_get_default_basedn(ldb_ctx),
- LDB_SCOPE_SUBTREE, attrs, "%s", filter);
- if (lret != LDB_SUCCESS) {
- DEBUG(3, ("Failed to search for %s: %s\n", filter, ldb_errstring(ldb_ctx)));
- return HDB_ERR_NOENTRY;
- } else if (res->count == 0 || res->count > 1) {
- DEBUG(3, ("Failed find a single entry for %s: got %d\n", filter, res->count));
- talloc_free(res);
- return HDB_ERR_NOENTRY;
- }
- talloc_steal(mem_ctx, res->msgs);
- *pmsg = res->msgs[0];
- talloc_free(res);
- return 0;
-}
+#include "kdc/db-glue.h"
static krb5_error_code hdb_samba4_open(krb5_context context, HDB *db, int flags, mode_t mode)
{
return HDB_ERR_DB_INUSE;
}
-static krb5_error_code hdb_samba4_lookup_client(krb5_context context,
- struct samba_kdc_db_context *kdc_db_ctx,
- struct loadparm_context *lp_ctx,
- TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx,
- krb5_const_principal principal,
- const char **attrs,
- struct ldb_dn **realm_dn,
- struct ldb_message **msg) {
- NTSTATUS nt_status;
- char *principal_string;
- krb5_error_code ret;
-
- ret = krb5_unparse_name(context, principal, &principal_string);
-
- if (ret != 0) {
- return ret;
- }
-
- nt_status = sam_get_results_principal(kdc_db_ctx->samdb,
- mem_ctx, principal_string, attrs,
- realm_dn, msg);
- free(principal_string);
- if (NT_STATUS_EQUAL(nt_status, NT_STATUS_NO_SUCH_USER)) {
- return HDB_ERR_NOENTRY;
- } else if (NT_STATUS_EQUAL(nt_status, NT_STATUS_NO_MEMORY)) {
- return ENOMEM;
- } else if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(nt_status)) {
- return EINVAL;
- }
-
- return ret;
-}
-
-static krb5_error_code hdb_samba4_fetch_client(krb5_context context,
- struct samba_kdc_db_context *kdc_db_ctx,
- struct loadparm_context *lp_ctx,
- TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx,
- krb5_const_principal principal,
- unsigned flags,
- hdb_entry_ex *entry_ex) {
- struct ldb_dn *realm_dn;
- krb5_error_code ret;
- struct ldb_message *msg = NULL;
-
- ret = hdb_samba4_lookup_client(context, kdc_db_ctx, lp_ctx,
- mem_ctx, principal, user_attrs,
- &realm_dn, &msg);
- if (ret != 0) {
- return ret;
- }
-
- ret = hdb_samba4_message2entry(context, kdc_db_ctx, lp_ctx, mem_ctx,
- principal, HDB_SAMBA4_ENT_TYPE_CLIENT,
- realm_dn, msg, entry_ex);
- return ret;
-}
-
-static krb5_error_code hdb_samba4_fetch_krbtgt(krb5_context context,
- struct samba_kdc_db_context *kdc_db_ctx,
- struct loadparm_context *lp_ctx,
- TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx,
- krb5_const_principal principal,
- unsigned flags,
- hdb_entry_ex *entry_ex)
-{
- krb5_error_code ret;
- struct ldb_message *msg = NULL;
- struct ldb_dn *realm_dn = ldb_get_default_basedn(kdc_db_ctx->samdb);
- const char *realm;
-
- krb5_principal alloc_principal = NULL;
- if (principal->name.name_string.len != 2
- || (strcmp(principal->name.name_string.val[0], KRB5_TGS_NAME) != 0)) {
- /* Not a krbtgt */
- return HDB_ERR_NOENTRY;
- }
-
- /* krbtgt case. Either us or a trusted realm */
-
- if (lp_is_my_domain_or_realm(lp_ctx, principal->realm)
- && lp_is_my_domain_or_realm(lp_ctx, principal->name.name_string.val[1])) {
- /* us */
- /* Cludge, cludge cludge. If the realm part of krbtgt/realm,
- * is in our db, then direct the caller at our primary
- * krbtgt */
-
- int lret;
- char *realm_fixed;
-
- lret = gendb_search_single_extended_dn(kdc_db_ctx->samdb, mem_ctx,
- realm_dn, LDB_SCOPE_SUBTREE,
- &msg, krbtgt_attrs,
- "(&(objectClass=user)(samAccountName=krbtgt))");
- if (lret == LDB_ERR_NO_SUCH_OBJECT) {
- krb5_warnx(context, "hdb_samba4_fetch: could not find own KRBTGT in DB!");
- krb5_set_error_message(context, HDB_ERR_NOENTRY, "hdb_samba4_fetch: could not find own KRBTGT in DB!");
- return HDB_ERR_NOENTRY;
- } else if (lret != LDB_SUCCESS) {
- krb5_warnx(context, "hdb_samba4_fetch: could not find own KRBTGT in DB: %s", ldb_errstring(kdc_db_ctx->samdb));
- krb5_set_error_message(context, HDB_ERR_NOENTRY, "hdb_samba4_fetch: could not find own KRBTGT in DB: %s", ldb_errstring(kdc_db_ctx->samdb));
- return HDB_ERR_NOENTRY;
- }
-
- realm_fixed = strupper_talloc(mem_ctx, lp_realm(lp_ctx));
- if (!realm_fixed) {
- ret = ENOMEM;
- krb5_set_error_message(context, ret, "strupper_talloc: out of memory");
- return ret;
- }
-
- ret = krb5_copy_principal(context, principal, &alloc_principal);
- if (ret) {
- return ret;
- }
-
- free(alloc_principal->name.name_string.val[1]);
- alloc_principal->name.name_string.val[1] = strdup(realm_fixed);
- talloc_free(realm_fixed);
- if (!alloc_principal->name.name_string.val[1]) {
- ret = ENOMEM;
- krb5_set_error_message(context, ret, "hdb_samba4_fetch: strdup() failed!");
- return ret;
- }
- principal = alloc_principal;
-
- ret = hdb_samba4_message2entry(context, kdc_db_ctx, lp_ctx, mem_ctx,
- principal, HDB_SAMBA4_ENT_TYPE_KRBTGT,
- realm_dn, msg, entry_ex);
- if (ret != 0) {
- krb5_warnx(context, "hdb_samba4_fetch: self krbtgt message2entry failed");
- }
- return ret;
-
- } else {
- enum trust_direction direction = UNKNOWN;
-
- /* Either an inbound or outbound trust */
-
- if (strcasecmp(lp_realm(lp_ctx), principal->realm) == 0) {
- /* look for inbound trust */
- direction = INBOUND;
- realm = principal->name.name_string.val[1];
- }
-
- if (strcasecmp(lp_realm(lp_ctx), principal->name.name_string.val[1]) == 0) {
- /* look for outbound trust */
- direction = OUTBOUND;
- realm = principal->realm;
- }
-
- /* Trusted domains are under CN=system */
-
- ret = hdb_samba4_lookup_trust(context, kdc_db_ctx->samdb,
- mem_ctx,
- realm, realm_dn, &msg);
-
- if (ret != 0) {
- krb5_warnx(context, "hdb_samba4_fetch: could not find principal in DB");
- krb5_set_error_message(context, ret, "hdb_samba4_fetch: could not find principal in DB");
- return ret;
- }
-
- ret = hdb_samba4_trust_message2entry(context, kdc_db_ctx, lp_ctx, mem_ctx,
- principal, direction,
- realm_dn, msg, entry_ex);
- if (ret != 0) {
- krb5_warnx(context, "hdb_samba4_fetch: trust_message2entry failed");
- }
- return ret;
-
-
- /* we should lookup trusted domains */
- return HDB_ERR_NOENTRY;
- }
-
-}
-
-static krb5_error_code hdb_samba4_lookup_server(krb5_context context,
- struct samba_kdc_db_context *kdc_db_ctx,
- struct loadparm_context *lp_ctx,
- TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx,
- krb5_const_principal principal,
- const char **attrs,
- struct ldb_dn **realm_dn,
- struct ldb_message **msg)
-{
- krb5_error_code ret;
- const char *realm;
- if (principal->name.name_string.len >= 2) {
- /* 'normal server' case */
- int ldb_ret;
- NTSTATUS nt_status;
- struct ldb_dn *user_dn;
- char *principal_string;
-
- ret = krb5_unparse_name_flags(context, principal,
- KRB5_PRINCIPAL_UNPARSE_NO_REALM,
- &principal_string);
- if (ret != 0) {
- return ret;
- }
-
- /* At this point we may find the host is known to be
- * in a different realm, so we should generate a
- * referral instead */
- nt_status = crack_service_principal_name(kdc_db_ctx->samdb,
- mem_ctx, principal_string,
- &user_dn, realm_dn);
- free(principal_string);
-
- if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(nt_status)) {
- return HDB_ERR_NOENTRY;
- }
-
- ldb_ret = gendb_search_single_extended_dn(kdc_db_ctx->samdb,
- mem_ctx,
- user_dn, LDB_SCOPE_BASE,
- msg, attrs,
- "(objectClass=*)");
- if (ldb_ret != LDB_SUCCESS) {
- return HDB_ERR_NOENTRY;
- }
-
- } else {
- int lret;
- char *filter = NULL;
- char *short_princ;
- /* server as client principal case, but we must not lookup userPrincipalNames */
- *realm_dn = ldb_get_default_basedn(kdc_db_ctx->samdb);
- realm = krb5_principal_get_realm(context, principal);
-
- /* TODO: Check if it is our realm, otherwise give referall */
-
- ret = krb5_unparse_name_flags(context, principal, KRB5_PRINCIPAL_UNPARSE_NO_REALM, &short_princ);
-
- if (ret != 0) {
- krb5_set_error_message(context, ret, "hdb_samba4_lookup_principal: could not parse principal");
- krb5_warnx(context, "hdb_samba4_lookup_principal: could not parse principal");
- return ret;
- }
-
- lret = gendb_search_single_extended_dn(kdc_db_ctx->samdb, mem_ctx,
- *realm_dn, LDB_SCOPE_SUBTREE,
- msg, attrs, "(&(objectClass=user)(samAccountName=%s))",
- ldb_binary_encode_string(mem_ctx, short_princ));
- free(short_princ);
- if (lret == LDB_ERR_NO_SUCH_OBJECT) {
- DEBUG(3, ("Failed find a entry for %s\n", filter));
- return HDB_ERR_NOENTRY;
- }
- if (lret != LDB_SUCCESS) {
- DEBUG(3, ("Failed single search for for %s - %s\n",
- filter, ldb_errstring(kdc_db_ctx->samdb)));
- return HDB_ERR_NOENTRY;
- }
- }
-
- return 0;
-}
-
-static krb5_error_code hdb_samba4_fetch_server(krb5_context context,
- struct samba_kdc_db_context *kdc_db_ctx,
- struct loadparm_context *lp_ctx,
- TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx,
- krb5_const_principal principal,
- unsigned flags,
- hdb_entry_ex *entry_ex)
-{
- krb5_error_code ret;
- struct ldb_dn *realm_dn;
- struct ldb_message *msg;
-
- ret = hdb_samba4_lookup_server(context, kdc_db_ctx, lp_ctx, mem_ctx, principal,
- server_attrs, &realm_dn, &msg);
- if (ret != 0) {
- return ret;
- }
-
- ret = hdb_samba4_message2entry(context, kdc_db_ctx, lp_ctx, mem_ctx,
- principal, HDB_SAMBA4_ENT_TYPE_SERVER,
- realm_dn, msg, entry_ex);
- if (ret != 0) {
- krb5_warnx(context, "hdb_samba4_fetch: message2entry failed");
- }
-
- return ret;
-}
-
-static krb5_error_code hdb_samba4_fetch(krb5_context context, HDB *db,
- krb5_const_principal principal,
- unsigned flags,
- hdb_entry_ex *entry_ex)
-{
- struct samba_kdc_db_context *kdc_db_ctx = (struct samba_kdc_db_context *)db->hdb_db;
- krb5_error_code ret = HDB_ERR_NOENTRY;
- TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx = talloc_named(kdc_db_ctx, 0, "hdb_samba4_fetch context");
- struct loadparm_context *lp_ctx = kdc_db_ctx->lp_ctx;
-
- if (!mem_ctx) {
- ret = ENOMEM;
- krb5_set_error_message(context, ret, "hdb_samba4_fetch: talloc_named() failed!");
- return ret;
- }
-
- if (flags & HDB_F_GET_CLIENT) {
- ret = hdb_samba4_fetch_client(context, kdc_db_ctx, lp_ctx, mem_ctx, principal, flags, entry_ex);
- if (ret != HDB_ERR_NOENTRY) goto done;
- }
- if (flags & HDB_F_GET_SERVER) {
- /* krbtgt fits into this situation for trusted realms, and for resolving different versions of our own realm name */
- ret = hdb_samba4_fetch_krbtgt(context, kdc_db_ctx, lp_ctx, mem_ctx, principal, flags, entry_ex);
- if (ret != HDB_ERR_NOENTRY) goto done;
-
- /* We return 'no entry' if it does not start with krbtgt/, so move to the common case quickly */
- ret = hdb_samba4_fetch_server(context, kdc_db_ctx, lp_ctx, mem_ctx, principal, flags, entry_ex);
- if (ret != HDB_ERR_NOENTRY) goto done;
- }
- if (flags & HDB_F_GET_KRBTGT) {
- ret = hdb_samba4_fetch_krbtgt(context, kdc_db_ctx, lp_ctx, mem_ctx, principal, flags, entry_ex);
- if (ret != HDB_ERR_NOENTRY) goto done;
- }
-
-done:
- talloc_free(mem_ctx);
- return ret;
-}
-
static krb5_error_code hdb_samba4_store(krb5_context context, HDB *db, unsigned flags, hdb_entry_ex *entry)
{
return HDB_ERR_DB_INUSE;
return HDB_ERR_DB_INUSE;
}
-struct hdb_samba4_seq {
- struct ldb_context *ctx;
- struct loadparm_context *lp_ctx;
- int index;
- int count;
- struct ldb_message **msgs;
- struct ldb_dn *realm_dn;
-};
-
-static krb5_error_code hdb_samba4_seq(krb5_context context, HDB *db, unsigned flags, hdb_entry_ex *entry)
+static krb5_error_code hdb_samba4_fetch(krb5_context context, HDB *db,
+ krb5_const_principal principal,
+ unsigned flags,
+ hdb_entry_ex *entry_ex)
{
- struct samba_kdc_db_context *kdc_db_ctx = (struct samba_kdc_db_context *)db->hdb_db;
- krb5_error_code ret;
- struct hdb_samba4_seq *priv = (struct hdb_samba4_seq *)db->hdb_dbc;
- TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx;
- hdb_entry_ex entry_ex;
- memset(&entry_ex, '\0', sizeof(entry_ex));
-
- if (!priv) {
- return HDB_ERR_NOENTRY;
- }
-
- mem_ctx = talloc_named(priv, 0, "hdb_samba4_seq context");
-
- if (!mem_ctx) {
- ret = ENOMEM;
- krb5_set_error_message(context, ret, "hdb_samba4_seq: talloc_named() failed!");
- return ret;
- }
-
- if (priv->index < priv->count) {
- ret = hdb_samba4_message2entry(context, kdc_db_ctx, priv->lp_ctx,
- mem_ctx,
- NULL, HDB_SAMBA4_ENT_TYPE_ANY,
- priv->realm_dn, priv->msgs[priv->index++], entry);
- } else {
- ret = HDB_ERR_NOENTRY;
- }
+ struct samba_kdc_db_context *kdc_db_ctx;
- if (ret != 0) {
- db->hdb_dbc = NULL;
- } else {
- talloc_free(mem_ctx);
- }
+ kdc_db_ctx = talloc_get_type_abort(db->hdb_db,
+ struct samba_kdc_db_context);
- return ret;
+ return samba_kdc_fetch(context, kdc_db_ctx, principal, flags, entry_ex);
}
static krb5_error_code hdb_samba4_firstkey(krb5_context context, HDB *db, unsigned flags,
hdb_entry_ex *entry)
{
- struct samba_kdc_db_context *kdc_db_ctx = (struct samba_kdc_db_context *)db->hdb_db;
- struct ldb_context *ldb_ctx = kdc_db_ctx->samdb;
- struct loadparm_context *lp_ctx = talloc_get_type(ldb_get_opaque(ldb_ctx, "loadparm"),
- struct loadparm_context);
- struct hdb_samba4_seq *priv = (struct hdb_samba4_seq *)db->hdb_dbc;
- char *realm;
- struct ldb_result *res = NULL;
- krb5_error_code ret;
- TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx;
- int lret;
-
- if (priv) {
- talloc_free(priv);
- db->hdb_dbc = NULL;
- }
-
- priv = (struct hdb_samba4_seq *) talloc(db, struct hdb_samba4_seq);
- if (!priv) {
- ret = ENOMEM;
- krb5_set_error_message(context, ret, "talloc: out of memory");
- return ret;
- }
-
- priv->ctx = ldb_ctx;
- priv->lp_ctx = lp_ctx;
- priv->index = 0;
- priv->msgs = NULL;
- priv->realm_dn = ldb_get_default_basedn(ldb_ctx);
- priv->count = 0;
-
- mem_ctx = talloc_named(priv, 0, "hdb_samba4_firstkey context");
-
- if (!mem_ctx) {
- ret = ENOMEM;
- krb5_set_error_message(context, ret, "hdb_samba4_firstkey: talloc_named() failed!");
- return ret;
- }
-
- ret = krb5_get_default_realm(context, &realm);
- if (ret != 0) {
- talloc_free(priv);
- return ret;
- }
-
- lret = ldb_search(ldb_ctx, priv, &res,
- priv->realm_dn, LDB_SCOPE_SUBTREE, user_attrs,
- "(objectClass=user)");
-
- if (lret != LDB_SUCCESS) {
- talloc_free(priv);
- return HDB_ERR_NOENTRY;
- }
-
- priv->count = res->count;
- priv->msgs = talloc_steal(priv, res->msgs);
- talloc_free(res);
-
- db->hdb_dbc = priv;
+ struct samba_kdc_db_context *kdc_db_ctx;
- ret = hdb_samba4_seq(context, db, flags, entry);
+ kdc_db_ctx = talloc_get_type_abort(db->hdb_db,
+ struct samba_kdc_db_context);
- if (ret != 0) {
- talloc_free(priv);
- db->hdb_dbc = NULL;
- } else {
- talloc_free(mem_ctx);
- }
- return ret;
+ return samba_kdc_firstkey(context, kdc_db_ctx, entry);
}
static krb5_error_code hdb_samba4_nextkey(krb5_context context, HDB *db, unsigned flags,
hdb_entry_ex *entry)
{
- return hdb_samba4_seq(context, db, flags, entry);
+ struct samba_kdc_db_context *kdc_db_ctx;
+
+ kdc_db_ctx = talloc_get_type_abort(db->hdb_db,
+ struct samba_kdc_db_context);
+
+ return samba_kdc_nextkey(context, kdc_db_ctx, entry);
}
static krb5_error_code hdb_samba4_destroy(krb5_context context, HDB *db)
{
+ struct samba_kdc_db_context *kdc_db_ctx;
+
+ kdc_db_ctx = talloc_get_type_abort(db->hdb_db,
+ struct samba_kdc_db_context);
+
+ if (kdc_db_ctx) {
+ talloc_free(kdc_db_ctx->samdb);
+ kdc_db_ctx->samdb = NULL;
+ }
+
talloc_free(db);
return 0;
}
-
-/* Check if a given entry may delegate to this target principal
- *
- * This is currently a very nasty hack - allowing only delegation to itself.
- */
static krb5_error_code
hdb_samba4_check_constrained_delegation(krb5_context context, HDB *db,
hdb_entry_ex *entry,
krb5_const_principal target_principal)
{
- struct samba_kdc_db_context *kdc_db_ctx = (struct samba_kdc_db_context *)db->hdb_db;
- struct loadparm_context *lp_ctx = kdc_db_ctx->lp_ctx;
- krb5_error_code ret;
- krb5_principal enterprise_prinicpal = NULL;
- struct ldb_dn *realm_dn;
- struct ldb_message *msg;
- struct dom_sid *orig_sid;
- struct dom_sid *target_sid;
- struct samba_kdc_entry *p = talloc_get_type(entry->ctx, struct samba_kdc_entry);
- const char *delegation_check_attrs[] = {
- "objectSid", NULL
- };
-
- TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx = talloc_named(kdc_db_ctx, 0, "hdb_samba4_check_constrained_delegation");
-
- if (!mem_ctx) {
- ret = ENOMEM;
- krb5_set_error_message(context, ret, "hdb_samba4_fetch: talloc_named() failed!");
- return ret;
- }
-
- if (target_principal->name.name_type == KRB5_NT_ENTERPRISE_PRINCIPAL) {
- /* Need to reparse the enterprise principal to find the real target */
- if (target_principal->name.name_string.len != 1) {
- ret = KRB5_PARSE_MALFORMED;
- krb5_set_error_message(context, ret, "hdb_samba4_check_constrained_delegation: request for delegation to enterprise principal with wrong (%d) number of components",
- target_principal->name.name_string.len);
- talloc_free(mem_ctx);
- return ret;
- }
- ret = krb5_parse_name(context, target_principal->name.name_string.val[0],
- &enterprise_prinicpal);
- if (ret) {
- talloc_free(mem_ctx);
- return ret;
- }
- target_principal = enterprise_prinicpal;
- }
-
- ret = hdb_samba4_lookup_server(context, kdc_db_ctx, lp_ctx, mem_ctx, target_principal,
- delegation_check_attrs, &realm_dn, &msg);
-
- krb5_free_principal(context, enterprise_prinicpal);
-
- if (ret != 0) {
- talloc_free(mem_ctx);
- return ret;
- }
-
- orig_sid = samdb_result_dom_sid(mem_ctx, p->msg, "objectSid");
- target_sid = samdb_result_dom_sid(mem_ctx, msg, "objectSid");
+ struct samba_kdc_db_context *kdc_db_ctx;
- /* Allow delegation to the same principal, even if by a different
- * name. The easy and safe way to prove this is by SID
- * comparison */
- if (!(orig_sid && target_sid && dom_sid_equal(orig_sid, target_sid))) {
- talloc_free(mem_ctx);
- return KRB5KDC_ERR_BADOPTION;
- }
+ kdc_db_ctx = talloc_get_type_abort(db->hdb_db,
+ struct samba_kdc_db_context);
- talloc_free(mem_ctx);
- return ret;
+ return samba_kdc_check_constrained_delegation(context, kdc_db_ctx,
+ entry,
+ target_principal);
}
-/* Certificates printed by a the Certificate Authority might have a
- * slightly different form of the user principal name to that in the
- * database. Allow a mismatch where they both refer to the same
- * SID */
-
static krb5_error_code
hdb_samba4_check_pkinit_ms_upn_match(krb5_context context, HDB *db,
hdb_entry_ex *entry,
krb5_const_principal certificate_principal)
{
- struct samba_kdc_db_context *kdc_db_ctx = (struct samba_kdc_db_context *)db->hdb_db;
- struct loadparm_context *lp_ctx = kdc_db_ctx->lp_ctx;
- krb5_error_code ret;
- struct ldb_dn *realm_dn;
- struct ldb_message *msg;
- struct dom_sid *orig_sid;
- struct dom_sid *target_sid;
- struct samba_kdc_entry *p = talloc_get_type(entry->ctx, struct samba_kdc_entry);
- const char *ms_upn_check_attrs[] = {
- "objectSid", NULL
- };
-
- TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx = talloc_named(db, 0, "hdb_samba4_check_pkinit_ms_upn_match");
-
- if (!mem_ctx) {
- ret = ENOMEM;
- krb5_set_error_message(context, ret, "hdb_samba4_fetch: talloc_named() failed!");
- return ret;
- }
-
- ret = hdb_samba4_lookup_client(context, kdc_db_ctx, lp_ctx,
- mem_ctx, certificate_principal,
- ms_upn_check_attrs, &realm_dn, &msg);
-
- if (ret != 0) {
- talloc_free(mem_ctx);
- return ret;
- }
-
- orig_sid = samdb_result_dom_sid(mem_ctx, p->msg, "objectSid");
- target_sid = samdb_result_dom_sid(mem_ctx, msg, "objectSid");
+ struct samba_kdc_db_context *kdc_db_ctx;
- /* Consider these to be the same principal, even if by a different
- * name. The easy and safe way to prove this is by SID
- * comparison */
- if (!(orig_sid && target_sid && dom_sid_equal(orig_sid, target_sid))) {
- talloc_free(mem_ctx);
- return KRB5_KDC_ERR_CLIENT_NAME_MISMATCH;
- }
+ kdc_db_ctx = talloc_get_type_abort(db->hdb_db,
+ struct samba_kdc_db_context);
- talloc_free(mem_ctx);
- return ret;
+ return samba_kdc_check_pkinit_ms_upn_match(context, kdc_db_ctx,
+ entry,
+ certificate_principal);
}
-/* This interface is to be called by the KDC and libnet_keytab_dump, which is expecting Samba
- * calling conventions. It is also called by a wrapper
- * (hdb_samba4_create) from the kpasswdd -> krb5 -> keytab_hdb -> hdb
- * code */
+/* This interface is to be called by the KDC and libnet_keytab_dump,
+ * which is expecting Samba calling conventions.
+ * It is also called by a wrapper (hdb_samba4_create) from the
+ * kpasswdd -> krb5 -> keytab_hdb -> hdb code */
NTSTATUS hdb_samba4_create_kdc(struct samba_kdc_base_context *base_ctx,
krb5_context context, struct HDB **db)
struct tevent_context *hdb_samba4_ev_ctx;
struct loadparm_context *hdb_samba4_lp_ctx;
extern struct krb5plugin_windc_ftable windc_plugin_table;
+extern struct hdb_method hdb_samba4;
typedef bool (*kdc_process_fn_t)(struct kdc_server *kdc,
TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx,
#include <hdb.h>
#include <kdc.h>
#include <krb5/windc_plugin.h>
-#include "kdc/hdb-samba4.h"
+#include "kdc/samba_kdc.h"
struct tsocket_address;
struct loadparm_context *lp_ctx;
struct smb_iconv_convenience *ic_ctx;
struct ldb_context *samdb;
+ struct samba_kdc_seq *seq_ctx;
};
-extern struct hdb_method hdb_samba4;
-
struct samba_kdc_entry {
struct samba_kdc_db_context *kdc_db_ctx;
struct ldb_message *msg;
#include "system/kerberos.h"
#include "auth/kerberos/kerberos.h"
#include <hdb.h>
-#include "kdc/hdb-samba4.h"
+#include "kdc/samba_kdc.h"
#include "libnet/libnet.h"
+extern struct hdb_method hdb_samba4;
+
NTSTATUS libnet_export_keytab(struct libnet_context *ctx, TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx, struct libnet_export_keytab *r)
{
krb5_error_code ret;
git.samba.org / nivanova / samba.git / commitdiff