/* airpdcap.c
*
- * $Id$
* Copyright (c) 2006 CACE Technologies, Davis (California)
* All rights reserved.
*
* may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software
* without specific prior written permission.
*
+ * Alternatively, this software may be distributed under the terms of the
+ * GNU General Public License ("GPL") version 2 as published by the Free
+ * Software Foundation.
+ *
* THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE PROJECT AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND
* ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
* IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
* SUCH DAMAGE.
*/
+/*
+ * The files matching airpcap*.[ch] were originally developed as part of
+ * Wireshark's support for AirPcap adapters. However, they've been used
+ * for general 802.11 decryption for quite some time. It might make sense
+ * to rename them accordingly.
+ */
+
/****************************************************************************/
-/* File includes */
+/* File includes */
+
+#include "config.h"
+
+#include <glib.h>
+
+#include <wsutil/crc32.h>
+#include <wsutil/rc4.h>
+#include <wsutil/sha1.h>
+#include <wsutil/md5.h>
+#include <wsutil/pint.h>
#include <epan/tvbuff.h>
-#include <epan/crc32.h>
+#include <epan/to_str.h>
#include <epan/strutil.h>
-#include <epan/ws_strsplit.h>
-#include <epan/emem.h>
-#include <epan/pint.h>
+#include <epan/crypt/airpdcap_rijndael.h>
#include "airpdcap_system.h"
#include "airpdcap_int.h"
-#include "crypt-sha1.h"
-#include "crypt-md5.h"
-
#include "airpdcap_debug.h"
#include "wep-wpadefs.h"
-/****************************************************************************/
/****************************************************************************/
-/* Constant definitions */
-#define AIRPDCAP_SHA_DIGEST_LEN 20
+/****************************************************************************/
+/* Constant definitions */
-/* EAPOL definitions */
+/* EAPOL definitions */
/**
* Length of the EAPOL-Key key confirmation key (KCK) used to calculate
* MIC over EAPOL frame and validate an EAPOL packet (128 bits)
*/
-#define AIRPDCAP_WPA_KCK_LEN 16
+#define AIRPDCAP_WPA_KCK_LEN 16
/**
*Offset of the Key MIC in the EAPOL packet body
*/
-#define AIRPDCAP_WPA_MICKEY_OFFSET 77
+#define AIRPDCAP_WPA_MICKEY_OFFSET 77
/**
* Maximum length of the EAPOL packet (it depends on the maximum MAC
* frame size)
*/
-#define AIRPDCAP_WPA_MAX_EAPOL_LEN 4095
+#define AIRPDCAP_WPA_MAX_EAPOL_LEN 4095
/**
* EAPOL Key Descriptor Version 1, used for all EAPOL-Key frames to and
* from a STA when neither the group nor pairwise ciphers are CCMP for
* @note
* Defined in 802.11i-2004, page 78
*/
-#define AIRPDCAP_WPA_KEY_VER_CCMP 1
+#define AIRPDCAP_WPA_KEY_VER_NOT_CCMP 1
/**
* EAPOL Key Descriptor Version 2, used for all EAPOL-Key frames to and
* from a STA when either the pairwise or the group cipher is AES-CCMP
* /note
* Defined in 802.11i-2004, page 78
*/
-#define AIRPDCAP_WPA_KEY_VER_AES_CCMP 2
+#define AIRPDCAP_WPA_KEY_VER_AES_CCMP 2
+
+/** Define EAPOL Key Descriptor type values: use 254 for WPA and 2 for WPA2 **/
+#define AIRPDCAP_RSN_WPA_KEY_DESCRIPTOR 254
+#define AIRPDCAP_RSN_WPA2_KEY_DESCRIPTOR 2
/****************************************************************************/
+
+
/****************************************************************************/
-/* Macro definitions */
+/* Macro definitions */
extern const UINT32 crc32_table[256];
-#define CRC(crc, ch) (crc = (crc >> 8) ^ crc32_table[(crc ^ (ch)) & 0xff])
+#define CRC(crc, ch) (crc = (crc >> 8) ^ crc32_table[(crc ^ (ch)) & 0xff])
-#define AIRPDCAP_GET_TK(ptk) (ptk + 32)
+#define AIRPDCAP_GET_TK(ptk) (ptk + 32)
/****************************************************************************/
/****************************************************************************/
-/* Type definitions */
+/* Type definitions */
-/* Internal function prototype declarations */
+/* Internal function prototype declarations */
-#ifdef __cplusplus
+#ifdef __cplusplus
extern "C" {
#endif
/**
* It is a step of the PBKDF2 (specifically the PKCS #5 v2.0) defined in
* the RFC 2898 to derive a key (used as PMK in WPA)
- * @param password [IN] pointer to a password (sequence of between 8 and
+ * @param ppbytes [IN] pointer to a password (sequence of between 8 and
* 63 ASCII encoded characters)
* @param ssid [IN] pointer to the SSID string encoded in max 32 ASCII
* encoded characters
* @param iterations [IN] times to hash the password (4096 for WPA)
* @param count [IN] ???
* @param output [OUT] pointer to a preallocated buffer of
- * AIRPDCAP_SHA_DIGEST_LEN characters that will contain a part of the key
+ * SHA1_DIGEST_LEN characters that will contain a part of the key
*/
static INT AirPDcapRsnaPwd2PskStep(
const guint8 *ppbytes,
* It calculates the passphrase-to-PSK mapping reccomanded for use with
* RSNAs. This implementation uses the PBKDF2 method defined in the RFC
* 2898.
- * @param password [IN] pointer to a password (sequence of between 8 and
+ * @param passphrase [IN] pointer to a password (sequence of between 8 and
* 63 ASCII encoded characters)
* @param ssid [IN] pointer to the SSID string encoded in max 32 ASCII
* encoded characters
PAIRPDCAP_CONTEXT ctx,
const UCHAR *data,
AIRPDCAP_SEC_ASSOCIATION *sa,
- PAIRPDCAP_KEY_ITEM key,
INT offset)
;
/**
AIRPDCAP_SEC_ASSOCIATION *sa,
const UCHAR pmk[32],
const UCHAR snonce[32],
- const INT x, /* for TKIP 512, for CCMP 384 */
+ const INT x, /* for TKIP 512, for CCMP 384 */
UCHAR *ptk)
;
-#ifdef __cplusplus
+#ifdef __cplusplus
}
#endif
/****************************************************************************/
/****************************************************************************/
-/* Exported function definitions */
+/* Exported function definitions */
-#ifdef __cplusplus
+#ifdef __cplusplus
extern "C" {
#endif
-INT AirPDcapPacketProcess(
+const guint8 broadcast_mac[] = { 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF };
+
+
+/* NOTE : this assumes the WPA RSN IE format. If it were to be a generic RSN IE, then
+ we would need to change the structure since it could be variable length depending on the number
+ of unicast OUI and auth OUI. */
+typedef struct {
+ guint8 bElementID;
+ guint8 bLength;
+ guint8 OUI[4];
+ guint16 iVersion;
+ guint8 multicastOUI[4];
+ guint16 iUnicastCount; /* this should always be 1 for WPA client */
+ guint8 unicastOUI[4];
+ guint16 iAuthCount; /* this should always be 1 for WPA client */
+ guint8 authOUI[4];
+ guint16 iWPAcap;
+} RSN_IE;
+
+#define EAPKEY_MIC_LEN 16 /* length of the MIC key for EAPoL_Key packet's MIC using MD5 */
+#define NONCE_LEN 32
+
+#define TKIP_GROUP_KEY_LEN 32
+#define CCMP_GROUP_KEY_LEN 16
+/* Minimum size of the key bytes payload for a TKIP group key in an M3 message*/
+#define TKIP_GROUP_KEYBYTES_LEN ( sizeof(RSN_IE) + 8 + TKIP_GROUP_KEY_LEN + 6 ) /* 72 */
+/* arbitrary upper limit */
+#define TKIP_GROUP_KEYBYTES_LEN_MAX ( TKIP_GROUP_KEYBYTES_LEN + 28 )
+/* Minimum size of the key bytes payload for a TKIP group key in a group key message */
+#define TKIP_GROUP_KEYBYTES_LEN_GKEY (8 + 8 + TKIP_GROUP_KEY_LEN ) /* 48 */
+/* size of CCMP key bytes payload */
+#define CCMP_GROUP_KEYBYTES_LEN ( sizeof(RSN_IE) + 8 + CCMP_GROUP_KEY_LEN + 6 ) /* 56 */
+typedef struct {
+ guint8 type;
+ guint8 key_information[2]; /* Make this an array to avoid alignment issues */
+ guint8 key_length[2]; /* Make this an array to avoid alignment issues */
+ guint8 replay_counter[8];
+ guint8 key_nonce[NONCE_LEN];
+ guint8 key_iv[16];
+ guint8 key_sequence_counter[8]; /* also called the RSC */
+ guint8 key_id[8];
+ guint8 key_mic[EAPKEY_MIC_LEN];
+ guint8 key_data_len[2]; /* Make this an array rather than a U16 to avoid alignment shifting */
+ guint8 ie[TKIP_GROUP_KEYBYTES_LEN_MAX]; /* Make this an array to avoid alignment issues */
+} EAPOL_RSN_KEY, * P_EAPOL_RSN_KEY;
+#define RSN_KEY_WITHOUT_KEYBYTES_LEN sizeof(EAPOL_RSN_KEY)-TKIP_GROUP_KEYBYTES_LEN_MAX
+/* Minimum possible group key msg size (group key msg using CCMP as cipher)*/
+#define GROUP_KEY_PAYLOAD_LEN_MIN RSN_KEY_WITHOUT_KEYBYTES_LEN+CCMP_GROUP_KEY_LEN
+
+/* XXX - what if this doesn't get the key? */
+static INT
+AirPDcapDecryptWPABroadcastKey(const EAPOL_RSN_KEY *pEAPKey, guint8 *decryption_key, PAIRPDCAP_SEC_ASSOCIATION sa, gboolean group_hshake)
+{
+ guint8 key_version;
+ guint8 *szEncryptedKey;
+ guint16 key_bytes_len = 0; /* Length of the total key data field */
+ guint16 key_len; /* Actual group key length */
+ static AIRPDCAP_KEY_ITEM dummy_key; /* needed in case AirPDcapRsnaMng() wants the key structure */
+ AIRPDCAP_SEC_ASSOCIATION *tmp_sa;
+
+ /* We skip verifying the MIC of the key. If we were implementing a WPA supplicant we'd want to verify, but for a sniffer it's not needed. */
+
+ /* Preparation for decrypting the group key - determine group key data length */
+ /* depending on whether the pairwise key is TKIP or AES encryption key */
+ key_version = AIRPDCAP_EAP_KEY_DESCR_VER(pEAPKey->key_information[1]);
+ if (key_version == AIRPDCAP_WPA_KEY_VER_NOT_CCMP){
+ /* TKIP */
+ key_bytes_len = pntoh16(pEAPKey->key_length);
+ }else if (key_version == AIRPDCAP_WPA_KEY_VER_AES_CCMP){
+ /* AES */
+ key_bytes_len = pntoh16(pEAPKey->key_data_len);
+
+ /* AES keys must be at least 128 bits = 16 bytes. */
+ if (key_bytes_len < 16) {
+ return AIRPDCAP_RET_NO_VALID_HANDSHAKE;
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (key_bytes_len > TKIP_GROUP_KEYBYTES_LEN_MAX || key_bytes_len == 0) { /* Don't read past the end of pEAPKey->ie */
+ return AIRPDCAP_RET_NO_VALID_HANDSHAKE;
+ }
+
+ /* Encrypted key is in the information element field of the EAPOL key packet */
+ szEncryptedKey = (guint8 *)g_memdup(pEAPKey->ie, key_bytes_len);
+
+ DEBUG_DUMP("Encrypted Broadcast key:", szEncryptedKey, key_bytes_len);
+ DEBUG_DUMP("KeyIV:", pEAPKey->key_iv, 16);
+ DEBUG_DUMP("decryption_key:", decryption_key, 16);
+
+ /* We are rekeying, save old sa */
+ tmp_sa=(AIRPDCAP_SEC_ASSOCIATION *)g_malloc(sizeof(AIRPDCAP_SEC_ASSOCIATION));
+ memcpy(tmp_sa, sa, sizeof(AIRPDCAP_SEC_ASSOCIATION));
+ sa->next=tmp_sa;
+
+ /* As we have no concept of the prior association request at this point, we need to deduce the */
+ /* group key cipher from the length of the key bytes. In WPA this is straightforward as the */
+ /* keybytes just contain the GTK, and the GTK is only in the group handshake, NOT the M3. */
+ /* In WPA2 its a little more tricky as the M3 keybytes contain an RSN_IE, but the group handshake */
+ /* does not. Also there are other (variable length) items in the keybytes which we need to account */
+ /* for to determine the true key length, and thus the group cipher. */
+
+ if (key_version == AIRPDCAP_WPA_KEY_VER_NOT_CCMP){
+ guint8 new_key[32];
+ guint8 dummy[256];
+ /* TKIP key */
+ /* Per 802.11i, Draft 3.0 spec, section 8.5.2, p. 97, line 4-8, */
+ /* group key is decrypted using RC4. Concatenate the IV with the 16 byte EK (PTK+16) to get the decryption key */
+
+ rc4_state_struct rc4_state;
+
+ /* The WPA group key just contains the GTK bytes so deducing the type is straightforward */
+ /* Note - WPA M3 doesn't contain a group key so we'll only be here for the group handshake */
+ sa->wpa.key_ver = (key_bytes_len >=TKIP_GROUP_KEY_LEN)?AIRPDCAP_WPA_KEY_VER_NOT_CCMP:AIRPDCAP_WPA_KEY_VER_AES_CCMP;
+
+ /* Build the full decryption key based on the IV and part of the pairwise key */
+ memcpy(new_key, pEAPKey->key_iv, 16);
+ memcpy(new_key+16, decryption_key, 16);
+ DEBUG_DUMP("FullDecrKey:", new_key, 32);
+
+ crypt_rc4_init(&rc4_state, new_key, sizeof(new_key));
+
+ /* Do dummy 256 iterations of the RC4 algorithm (per 802.11i, Draft 3.0, p. 97 line 6) */
+ crypt_rc4(&rc4_state, dummy, 256);
+ crypt_rc4(&rc4_state, szEncryptedKey, key_bytes_len);
+
+ } else if (key_version == AIRPDCAP_WPA_KEY_VER_AES_CCMP){
+ /* AES CCMP key */
+
+ guint8 key_found;
+ guint16 key_index;
+ guint8 *decrypted_data;
+
+ /* If this EAPOL frame is part of a separate group key handshake then this contains no */
+ /* RSN IE, so we can deduct that from the calculation. */
+ if (group_hshake)
+ sa->wpa.key_ver = (key_bytes_len >= (TKIP_GROUP_KEYBYTES_LEN_GKEY))?AIRPDCAP_WPA_KEY_VER_NOT_CCMP:AIRPDCAP_WPA_KEY_VER_AES_CCMP;
+ else
+ sa->wpa.key_ver = (key_bytes_len >= (TKIP_GROUP_KEYBYTES_LEN))?AIRPDCAP_WPA_KEY_VER_NOT_CCMP:AIRPDCAP_WPA_KEY_VER_AES_CCMP;
+
+ /* Unwrap the key; the result is key_bytes_len in length */
+ decrypted_data = AES_unwrap(decryption_key, 16, szEncryptedKey, key_bytes_len);
+
+ /* With WPA2 what we get after Broadcast Key decryption is an actual RSN structure.
+ The key itself is stored as a GTK KDE
+ WPA2 IE (1 byte) id = 0xdd, length (1 byte), GTK OUI (4 bytes), key index (1 byte) and 1 reserved byte. Thus we have to
+ pass pointer to the actual key with 8 bytes offset */
+
+ key_found = FALSE;
+ key_index = 0;
+ while(key_index < key_bytes_len && !key_found){
+ guint8 rsn_id;
+
+ /* Get RSN ID */
+ rsn_id = decrypted_data[key_index];
+
+ if (rsn_id != 0xdd){
+ if (key_index+1 >= key_bytes_len){
+ return AIRPDCAP_RET_NO_VALID_HANDSHAKE;
+ }
+ key_index += decrypted_data[key_index+1]+2;
+ }else{
+ key_found = TRUE;
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (key_found){
+ if (key_index+8 >= key_bytes_len)
+ return AIRPDCAP_RET_NO_VALID_HANDSHAKE;
+
+ /* Skip over the GTK header info, and don't copy past the end of the encrypted data */
+ memcpy(szEncryptedKey, decrypted_data+key_index+8, key_bytes_len-key_index-8);
+ }
+
+ g_free(decrypted_data);
+ }
+
+ key_len = (sa->wpa.key_ver==AIRPDCAP_WPA_KEY_VER_NOT_CCMP)?TKIP_GROUP_KEY_LEN:CCMP_GROUP_KEY_LEN;
+
+ /* Decrypted key is now in szEncryptedKey with len of key_len */
+ DEBUG_DUMP("Broadcast key:", szEncryptedKey, key_len);
+
+ /* Load the proper key material info into the SA */
+ sa->key = &dummy_key; /* we just need key to be not null because it is checked in AirPDcapRsnaMng(). The WPA key materials are actually in the .wpa structure */
+ sa->validKey = TRUE;
+
+ /* Since this is a GTK and its size is only 32 bytes (vs. the 64 byte size of a PTK), we fake it and put it in at a 32-byte offset so the */
+ /* AirPDcapRsnaMng() function will extract the right piece of the GTK for decryption. (The first 16 bytes of the GTK are used for decryption.) */
+ memset(sa->wpa.ptk, 0, sizeof(sa->wpa.ptk));
+ memcpy(sa->wpa.ptk+32, szEncryptedKey, key_len);
+ g_free(szEncryptedKey);
+ return AIRPDCAP_RET_SUCCESS_HANDSHAKE;
+}
+
+
+/* Return a pointer the the requested SA. If it doesn't exist create it. */
+static PAIRPDCAP_SEC_ASSOCIATION
+AirPDcapGetSaPtr(
+ PAIRPDCAP_CONTEXT ctx,
+ AIRPDCAP_SEC_ASSOCIATION_ID *id)
+{
+ int sa_index;
+
+ /* search for a cached Security Association for supplied BSSID and STA MAC */
+ if ((sa_index=AirPDcapGetSa(ctx, id))==-1) {
+ /* create a new Security Association if it doesn't currently exist */
+ if ((sa_index=AirPDcapStoreSa(ctx, id))==-1) {
+ return NULL;
+ }
+ }
+ /* get the Security Association structure */
+ return &ctx->sa[sa_index];
+}
+
+static INT AirPDcapScanForKeys(
PAIRPDCAP_CONTEXT ctx,
const guint8 *data,
const guint mac_header_len,
const guint tot_len,
- UCHAR *decrypt_data,
- guint *decrypt_len,
- PAIRPDCAP_KEY_ITEM key,
- gboolean mngHandshake,
- gboolean mngDecrypt)
+ AIRPDCAP_SEC_ASSOCIATION_ID id
+)
{
- const UCHAR *address;
- AIRPDCAP_SEC_ASSOCIATION_ID id;
- int index;
+ const UCHAR *addr;
+ guint bodyLength;
+ PAIRPDCAP_SEC_ASSOCIATION sta_sa;
PAIRPDCAP_SEC_ASSOCIATION sa;
int offset = 0;
- guint bodyLength;
const guint8 dot1x_header[] = {
0xAA, /* DSAP=SNAP */
0xAA, /* SSAP=SNAP */
0x00, 0x00, 0x00, /* Org. code=encaps. Ethernet */
0x88, 0x8E /* Type: 802.1X authentication */
};
+ const guint8 bt_dot1x_header[] = {
+ 0xAA, /* DSAP=SNAP */
+ 0xAA, /* SSAP=SNAP */
+ 0x03, /* Control field=Unnumbered frame */
+ 0x00, 0x19, 0x58, /* Org. code=Bluetooth SIG */
+ 0x00, 0x03 /* Type: Bluetooth Security */
+ };
+
+ const EAPOL_RSN_KEY *pEAPKey;
+#ifdef _DEBUG
+#define MSGBUF_LEN 255
+ CHAR msgbuf[MSGBUF_LEN];
+#endif
+ AIRPDCAP_DEBUG_TRACE_START("AirPDcapScanForKeys");
+
+ /* cache offset in the packet data */
+ offset = mac_header_len;
+
+ /* check if the packet has an LLC header and the packet is 802.1X authentication (IEEE 802.1X-2004, pg. 24) */
+ if (memcmp(data+offset, dot1x_header, 8) == 0 || memcmp(data+offset, bt_dot1x_header, 8) == 0) {
+
+ AIRPDCAP_DEBUG_PRINT_LINE("AirPDcapScanForKeys", "Authentication: EAPOL packet", AIRPDCAP_DEBUG_LEVEL_3);
+
+ /* skip LLC header */
+ offset+=8;
+
+ /* check if the packet is a EAPOL-Key (0x03) (IEEE 802.1X-2004, pg. 25) */
+ if (data[offset+1]!=3) {
+ AIRPDCAP_DEBUG_PRINT_LINE("AirPDcapScanForKeys", "Not EAPOL-Key", AIRPDCAP_DEBUG_LEVEL_3);
+ return AIRPDCAP_RET_NO_VALID_HANDSHAKE;
+ }
+
+ /* get and check the body length (IEEE 802.1X-2004, pg. 25) */
+ bodyLength=pntoh16(data+offset+2);
+ if ((tot_len-offset-4) < bodyLength) { /* Only check if frame is long enough for eapol header, ignore tailing garbage, see bug 9065 */
+ AIRPDCAP_DEBUG_PRINT_LINE("AirPDcapScanForKeys", "EAPOL body too short", AIRPDCAP_DEBUG_LEVEL_3);
+ return AIRPDCAP_RET_NO_VALID_HANDSHAKE;
+ }
+
+ /* skip EAPOL MPDU and go to the first byte of the body */
+ offset+=4;
+
+ pEAPKey = (const EAPOL_RSN_KEY *) (data+offset);
+
+ /* check if the key descriptor type is valid (IEEE 802.1X-2004, pg. 27) */
+ if (/*pEAPKey->type!=0x1 &&*/ /* RC4 Key Descriptor Type (deprecated) */
+ pEAPKey->type != AIRPDCAP_RSN_WPA2_KEY_DESCRIPTOR && /* IEEE 802.11 Key Descriptor Type (WPA2) */
+ pEAPKey->type != AIRPDCAP_RSN_WPA_KEY_DESCRIPTOR) /* 254 = RSN_KEY_DESCRIPTOR - WPA, */
+ {
+ AIRPDCAP_DEBUG_PRINT_LINE("AirPDcapScanForKeys", "Not valid key descriptor type", AIRPDCAP_DEBUG_LEVEL_3);
+ return AIRPDCAP_RET_NO_VALID_HANDSHAKE;
+ }
+
+ /* start with descriptor body */
+ offset+=1;
+
+ /* search for a cached Security Association for current BSSID and AP */
+ sa = AirPDcapGetSaPtr(ctx, &id);
+ if (sa == NULL){
+ AIRPDCAP_DEBUG_PRINT_LINE("AirPDcapScanForKeys", "No SA for BSSID found", AIRPDCAP_DEBUG_LEVEL_3);
+ return AIRPDCAP_RET_REQ_DATA;
+ }
+
+ /* It could be a Pairwise Key exchange, check */
+ if (AirPDcapRsna4WHandshake(ctx, data, sa, offset) == AIRPDCAP_RET_SUCCESS_HANDSHAKE)
+ return AIRPDCAP_RET_SUCCESS_HANDSHAKE;
+
+ if (mac_header_len + GROUP_KEY_PAYLOAD_LEN_MIN > tot_len) {
+ AIRPDCAP_DEBUG_PRINT_LINE("AirPDcapScanForKeys", "Message too short for Group Key", AIRPDCAP_DEBUG_LEVEL_3);
+ return AIRPDCAP_RET_NO_VALID_HANDSHAKE;
+ }
+
+ /* Verify the bitfields: Key = 0(groupwise) Mic = 1 Ack = 1 Secure = 1 */
+ if (AIRPDCAP_EAP_KEY(data[offset+1])!=0 ||
+ AIRPDCAP_EAP_ACK(data[offset+1])!=1 ||
+ AIRPDCAP_EAP_MIC(data[offset]) != 1 ||
+ AIRPDCAP_EAP_SEC(data[offset]) != 1){
+
+ AIRPDCAP_DEBUG_PRINT_LINE("AirPDcapScanForKeys", "Key bitfields not correct for Group Key", AIRPDCAP_DEBUG_LEVEL_3);
+ return AIRPDCAP_RET_NO_VALID_HANDSHAKE;
+ }
+
+ /* force STA address to be the broadcast MAC so we create an SA for the groupkey */
+ memcpy(id.sta, broadcast_mac, AIRPDCAP_MAC_LEN);
+
+ /* get the Security Association structure for the broadcast MAC and AP */
+ sa = AirPDcapGetSaPtr(ctx, &id);
+ if (sa == NULL){
+ return AIRPDCAP_RET_REQ_DATA;
+ }
+
+ /* Get the SA for the STA, since we need its pairwise key to decrpyt the group key */
+
+ /* get STA address */
+ if ( (addr=AirPDcapGetStaAddress((const AIRPDCAP_MAC_FRAME_ADDR4 *)(data))) != NULL) {
+ memcpy(id.sta, addr, AIRPDCAP_MAC_LEN);
+#ifdef _DEBUG
+ g_snprintf(msgbuf, MSGBUF_LEN, "ST_MAC: %2X.%2X.%2X.%2X.%2X.%2X\t", id.sta[0],id.sta[1],id.sta[2],id.sta[3],id.sta[4],id.sta[5]);
+#endif
+ AIRPDCAP_DEBUG_PRINT_LINE("AirPDcapScanForKeys", msgbuf, AIRPDCAP_DEBUG_LEVEL_3);
+ } else {
+ AIRPDCAP_DEBUG_PRINT_LINE("AirPDcapScanForKeys", "SA not found", AIRPDCAP_DEBUG_LEVEL_5);
+ return AIRPDCAP_RET_REQ_DATA;
+ }
+
+ sta_sa = AirPDcapGetSaPtr(ctx, &id);
+ if (sta_sa == NULL){
+ return AIRPDCAP_RET_REQ_DATA;
+ }
+
+ /* Try to extract the group key and install it in the SA */
+ return (AirPDcapDecryptWPABroadcastKey(pEAPKey, sta_sa->wpa.ptk+16, sa, TRUE));
+
+ }else{
+ AIRPDCAP_DEBUG_PRINT_LINE("AirPDcapScanForKeys", "Skipping: not an EAPOL packet", AIRPDCAP_DEBUG_LEVEL_3);
+ }
+
+ AIRPDCAP_DEBUG_TRACE_END("AirPDcapScanForKeys");
+ return AIRPDCAP_RET_NO_VALID_HANDSHAKE;;
+}
+
+
+INT AirPDcapPacketProcess(
+ PAIRPDCAP_CONTEXT ctx,
+ const guint8 *data,
+ const guint mac_header_len,
+ const guint tot_len,
+ UCHAR *decrypt_data,
+ guint *decrypt_len,
+ PAIRPDCAP_KEY_ITEM key,
+ gboolean scanHandshake)
+{
+ const UCHAR *addr;
+ AIRPDCAP_SEC_ASSOCIATION_ID id;
+ UCHAR tmp_data[AIRPDCAP_MAX_CAPLEN];
+ guint tmp_len;
#ifdef _DEBUG
- CHAR msgbuf[255];
+#define MSGBUF_LEN 255
+ CHAR msgbuf[MSGBUF_LEN];
#endif
AIRPDCAP_DEBUG_TRACE_START("AirPDcapPacketProcess");
if (ctx==NULL) {
AIRPDCAP_DEBUG_PRINT_LINE("AirPDcapPacketProcess", "NULL context", AIRPDCAP_DEBUG_LEVEL_5);
AIRPDCAP_DEBUG_TRACE_END("AirPDcapPacketProcess");
- return AIRPDCAP_RET_UNSUCCESS;
+ return AIRPDCAP_RET_REQ_DATA;
}
if (data==NULL || tot_len==0) {
AIRPDCAP_DEBUG_PRINT_LINE("AirPDcapPacketProcess", "NULL data or length=0", AIRPDCAP_DEBUG_LEVEL_5);
AIRPDCAP_DEBUG_TRACE_END("AirPDcapPacketProcess");
- return AIRPDCAP_RET_UNSUCCESS;
+ return AIRPDCAP_RET_REQ_DATA;
}
- /* check if the packet is of data type */
+ /* check if the packet is of data type */
if (AIRPDCAP_TYPE(data[0])!=AIRPDCAP_TYPE_DATA) {
AIRPDCAP_DEBUG_PRINT_LINE("AirPDcapPacketProcess", "not data packet", AIRPDCAP_DEBUG_LEVEL_5);
return AIRPDCAP_RET_NO_DATA;
}
- /* check correct packet size, to avoid wrong elaboration of encryption algorithms */
+ /* check correct packet size, to avoid wrong elaboration of encryption algorithms */
if (tot_len < (UINT)(mac_header_len+AIRPDCAP_CRYPTED_DATA_MINLEN)) {
AIRPDCAP_DEBUG_PRINT_LINE("AirPDcapPacketProcess", "minimum length violated", AIRPDCAP_DEBUG_LEVEL_5);
return AIRPDCAP_RET_WRONG_DATA_SIZE;
}
+ /* Assume that the decrypt_data field is at least this size. */
+ if (tot_len > AIRPDCAP_MAX_CAPLEN) {
+ AIRPDCAP_DEBUG_PRINT_LINE("AirPDcapPacketProcess", "length too large", AIRPDCAP_DEBUG_LEVEL_3);
+ return AIRPDCAP_RET_UNSUCCESS;
+ }
+
/* get BSSID */
- if ( (address=AirPDcapGetBssidAddress((const AIRPDCAP_MAC_FRAME_ADDR4 *)(data))) != NULL) {
- memcpy(id.bssid, address, AIRPDCAP_MAC_LEN);
-#ifdef _DEBUG
- sprintf(msgbuf, "BSSID: %2X.%2X.%2X.%2X.%2X.%2X\t", id.bssid[0],id.bssid[1],id.bssid[2],id.bssid[3],id.bssid[4],id.bssid[5]);
-#endif
+ if ( (addr=AirPDcapGetBssidAddress((const AIRPDCAP_MAC_FRAME_ADDR4 *)(data))) != NULL) {
+ memcpy(id.bssid, addr, AIRPDCAP_MAC_LEN);
AIRPDCAP_DEBUG_PRINT_LINE("AirPDcapPacketProcess", msgbuf, AIRPDCAP_DEBUG_LEVEL_3);
} else {
AIRPDCAP_DEBUG_PRINT_LINE("AirPDcapPacketProcess", "BSSID not found", AIRPDCAP_DEBUG_LEVEL_5);
return AIRPDCAP_RET_REQ_DATA;
}
- /* get STA address */
- if ( (address=AirPDcapGetStaAddress((const AIRPDCAP_MAC_FRAME_ADDR4 *)(data))) != NULL) {
- memcpy(id.sta, address, AIRPDCAP_MAC_LEN);
-#ifdef _DEBUG
- sprintf(msgbuf, "ST_MAC: %2X.%2X.%2X.%2X.%2X.%2X\t", id.sta[0],id.sta[1],id.sta[2],id.sta[3],id.sta[4],id.sta[5]);
-#endif
+ /* get STA address */
+ if ( (addr=AirPDcapGetStaAddress((const AIRPDCAP_MAC_FRAME_ADDR4 *)(data))) != NULL) {
+ memcpy(id.sta, addr, AIRPDCAP_MAC_LEN);
AIRPDCAP_DEBUG_PRINT_LINE("AirPDcapPacketProcess", msgbuf, AIRPDCAP_DEBUG_LEVEL_3);
} else {
AIRPDCAP_DEBUG_PRINT_LINE("AirPDcapPacketProcess", "SA not found", AIRPDCAP_DEBUG_LEVEL_5);
return AIRPDCAP_RET_REQ_DATA;
}
- /* search for a cached Security Association for current BSSID and station MAC */
- if ((index=AirPDcapGetSa(ctx, &id))==-1) {
- /* create a new Security Association */
- if ((index=AirPDcapStoreSa(ctx, &id))==-1) {
- return AIRPDCAP_RET_UNSUCCESS;
+ /* check if data is encrypted (use the WEP bit in the Frame Control field) */
+ if (AIRPDCAP_WEP(data[1])==0) {
+ if (scanHandshake) {
+ /* data is sent in cleartext, check if is an authentication message or end the process */
+ AIRPDCAP_DEBUG_PRINT_LINE("AirPDcapPacketProcess", "Unencrypted data", AIRPDCAP_DEBUG_LEVEL_3);
+ return (AirPDcapScanForKeys(ctx, data, mac_header_len, tot_len, id));
}
- }
-
- /* get the Security Association structure */
- sa=&ctx->sa[index];
+ return AIRPDCAP_RET_NO_DATA_ENCRYPTED;
+ } else {
+ PAIRPDCAP_SEC_ASSOCIATION sa;
+ int offset = 0;
- /* cache offset in the packet data (to scan encryption data) */
- offset = mac_header_len;
+ /* get the Security Association structure for the STA and AP */
+ sa = AirPDcapGetSaPtr(ctx, &id);
+ if (sa == NULL){
+ return AIRPDCAP_RET_REQ_DATA;
+ }
- /* check if data is encrypted (use the WEP bit in the Frame Control field) */
- if (AIRPDCAP_WEP(data[1])==0)
- {
- if (mngHandshake) {
- /* data is sent in cleartext, check if is an authentication message or end the process */
- AIRPDCAP_DEBUG_PRINT_LINE("AirPDcapPacketProcess", "Unencrypted data", AIRPDCAP_DEBUG_LEVEL_3);
+ /* cache offset in the packet data (to scan encryption data) */
+ offset = mac_header_len;
- /* check if the packet as an LLC header and the packet is 802.1X authentication (IEEE 802.1X-2004, pg. 24) */
- if (memcmp(data+offset, dot1x_header, 8) == 0) {
- AIRPDCAP_DEBUG_PRINT_LINE("AirPDcapPacketProcess", "Authentication: EAPOL packet", AIRPDCAP_DEBUG_LEVEL_3);
+ if (decrypt_data==NULL) {
+ AIRPDCAP_DEBUG_PRINT_LINE("AirPDcapPacketProcess", "no decrypt buffer, use local", AIRPDCAP_DEBUG_LEVEL_3);
+ decrypt_data=tmp_data;
+ decrypt_len=&tmp_len;
+ }
- /* skip LLC header */
- offset+=8;
+ /* create new header and data to modify */
+ *decrypt_len = tot_len;
+ memcpy(decrypt_data, data, *decrypt_len);
- /* check the version of the EAPOL protocol used (IEEE 802.1X-2004, pg. 24) */
- /* TODO EAPOL protocol version to check? */
- /*if (data[offset]!=2) {
- AIRPDCAP_DEBUG_PRINT_LINE("EAPOL protocol version not recognized", AIRPDCAP_DEBUG_LEVEL_5);
- return AIRPDCAP_RET_NO_VALID_HANDSHAKE;
- }*/
+ /* encrypted data */
+ AIRPDCAP_DEBUG_PRINT_LINE("AirPDcapPacketProcess", "Encrypted data", AIRPDCAP_DEBUG_LEVEL_3);
- /* check if the packet is a EAPOL-Key (0x03) (IEEE 802.1X-2004, pg. 25) */
- if (data[offset+1]!=3) {
- AIRPDCAP_DEBUG_PRINT_LINE("AirPDcapPacketProcess", "Not EAPOL-Key", AIRPDCAP_DEBUG_LEVEL_5);
- return AIRPDCAP_RET_NO_VALID_HANDSHAKE;
- }
+ /* check the Extension IV to distinguish between WEP encryption and WPA encryption */
+ /* refer to IEEE 802.11i-2004, 8.2.1.2, pag.35 for WEP, */
+ /* IEEE 802.11i-2004, 8.3.2.2, pag. 45 for TKIP, */
+ /* IEEE 802.11i-2004, 8.3.3.2, pag. 57 for CCMP */
+ if (AIRPDCAP_EXTIV(data[offset+3])==0) {
+ AIRPDCAP_DEBUG_PRINT_LINE("AirPDcapPacketProcess", "WEP encryption", AIRPDCAP_DEBUG_LEVEL_3);
+ return AirPDcapWepMng(ctx, decrypt_data, mac_header_len, decrypt_len, key, sa, offset);
+ } else {
+ AIRPDCAP_DEBUG_PRINT_LINE("AirPDcapPacketProcess", "TKIP or CCMP encryption", AIRPDCAP_DEBUG_LEVEL_3);
- /* get and check the body length (IEEE 802.1X-2004, pg. 25) */
- bodyLength=pntohs(data+offset+2);
- if ((tot_len-offset-4) < bodyLength) {
- AIRPDCAP_DEBUG_PRINT_LINE("AirPDcapPacketProcess", "EAPOL body too short", AIRPDCAP_DEBUG_LEVEL_5);
- return AIRPDCAP_RET_NO_VALID_HANDSHAKE;
- }
+ /* If index >= 1, then use the group key. This will not work if the AP is using
+ more than one group key simultaneously. I've not seen this in practice, however.
+ Usually an AP will rotate between the two key index values of 1 and 2 whenever
+ it needs to change the group key to be used. */
+ if (AIRPDCAP_KEY_INDEX(data[offset+3])>=1){
- /* skip EAPOL MPDU and go to the first byte of the body */
- offset+=4;
+ AIRPDCAP_DEBUG_PRINT_LINE("AirPDcapPacketProcess", "The key index >= 1. This is encrypted with a group key.", AIRPDCAP_DEBUG_LEVEL_3);
- /* check if the key descriptor type is valid (IEEE 802.1X-2004, pg. 27) */
- if (/*data[offset]!=0x1 &&*/ /* RC4 Key Descriptor Type (deprecated) */
- data[offset]!=0x2 && /* IEEE 802.11 Key Descriptor Type */
- data[offset]!=0xFE) /* TODO what's this value??? */
- {
- AIRPDCAP_DEBUG_PRINT_LINE("AirPDcapPacketProcess", "Not valid key descriptor type", AIRPDCAP_DEBUG_LEVEL_5);
- return AIRPDCAP_RET_NO_VALID_HANDSHAKE;
- }
+ /* force STA address to broadcast MAC so we load the SA for the groupkey */
+ memcpy(id.sta, broadcast_mac, AIRPDCAP_MAC_LEN);
- /* start with descriptor body */
- offset+=1;
+#ifdef _DEBUG
+ g_snprintf(msgbuf, MSGBUF_LEN, "ST_MAC: %2X.%2X.%2X.%2X.%2X.%2X\t", id.sta[0],id.sta[1],id.sta[2],id.sta[3],id.sta[4],id.sta[5]);
+ AIRPDCAP_DEBUG_PRINT_LINE("AirPDcapPacketProcess", msgbuf, AIRPDCAP_DEBUG_LEVEL_3);
+#endif
- /* manage the 4-way handshake to define the key */
- return AirPDcapRsna4WHandshake(ctx, data, sa, key, offset);
- } else {
- /* cleartext message, not authentication */
- AIRPDCAP_DEBUG_PRINT_LINE("AirPDcapPacketProcess", "No authentication data", AIRPDCAP_DEBUG_LEVEL_5);
- return AIRPDCAP_RET_NO_DATA_ENCRYPTED;
+ /* search for a cached Security Association for current BSSID and broadcast MAC */
+ sa = AirPDcapGetSaPtr(ctx, &id);
+ if (sa == NULL)
+ return AIRPDCAP_RET_REQ_DATA;
}
- }
- } else {
- if (mngDecrypt) {
-
- if (decrypt_data==NULL)
- return AIRPDCAP_RET_UNSUCCESS;
-
- /* create new header and data to modify */
- *decrypt_len = tot_len;
- memcpy(decrypt_data, data, *decrypt_len);
-
- /* encrypted data */
- AIRPDCAP_DEBUG_PRINT_LINE("AirPDcapPacketProcess", "Encrypted data", AIRPDCAP_DEBUG_LEVEL_3);
- /* check the Extension IV to distinguish between WEP encryption and WPA encryption */
- /* refer to IEEE 802.11i-2004, 8.2.1.2, pag.35 for WEP, */
- /* IEEE 802.11i-2004, 8.3.2.2, pag. 45 for TKIP, */
- /* IEEE 802.11i-2004, 8.3.3.2, pag. 57 for CCMP */
- if (AIRPDCAP_EXTIV(data[offset+3])==0) {
- AIRPDCAP_DEBUG_PRINT_LINE("AirPDcapPacketProcess", "WEP encryption", AIRPDCAP_DEBUG_LEVEL_3);
- return AirPDcapWepMng(ctx, decrypt_data, mac_header_len, decrypt_len, key, sa, offset);
- } else {
- AIRPDCAP_DEBUG_PRINT_LINE("AirPDcapPacketProcess", "TKIP or CCMP encryption", AIRPDCAP_DEBUG_LEVEL_3);
- return AirPDcapRsnaMng(decrypt_data, mac_header_len, decrypt_len, key, sa, offset);
+ /* Decrypt the packet using the appropriate SA */
+ if (AirPDcapRsnaMng(decrypt_data, mac_header_len, decrypt_len, key, sa, offset) == AIRPDCAP_RET_SUCCESS) {
+ /* If we successfully decrypted a packet, scan it to see if it contains a key handshake.
+ The group key handshake could be sent at any time the AP wants to change the key (such as when
+ it is using key rotation) and it also could be a rekey for the Pairwise key. So we must scan every packet. */
+ if (scanHandshake) {
+ return (AirPDcapScanForKeys(ctx, decrypt_data, mac_header_len, *decrypt_len, id));
+ } else {
+ return AIRPDCAP_RET_SUCCESS;
+ }
}
}
}
-
return AIRPDCAP_RET_UNSUCCESS;
}
return 0;
}
- /* clean keys collection before setting new ones */
- AirPDcapCleanKeys(ctx);
+ /* clean key and SA collections before setting new ones */
+ AirPDcapInitContext(ctx);
- /* check and insert keys */
+ /* check and insert keys */
for (i=0, success=0; i<(INT)keys_nr; i++) {
if (AirPDcapValidateKey(keys+i)==TRUE) {
if (keys[i].KeyType==AIRPDCAP_KEY_TYPE_WPA_PWD) {
AIRPDCAP_DEBUG_PRINT_LINE("AirPDcapSetKeys", "Set a WPA-PWD key", AIRPDCAP_DEBUG_LEVEL_4);
AirPDcapRsnaPwd2Psk(keys[i].UserPwd.Passphrase, keys[i].UserPwd.Ssid, keys[i].UserPwd.SsidLen, keys[i].KeyData.Wpa.Psk);
}
-#ifdef _DEBUG
+#ifdef _DEBUG
else if (keys[i].KeyType==AIRPDCAP_KEY_TYPE_WPA_PMK) {
AIRPDCAP_DEBUG_PRINT_LINE("AirPDcapSetKeys", "Set a WPA-PMK key", AIRPDCAP_DEBUG_LEVEL_4);
} else if (keys[i].KeyType==AIRPDCAP_KEY_TYPE_WEP) {
return success;
}
-INT AirPDcapCleanKeys(
+static void
+AirPDcapCleanKeys(
PAIRPDCAP_CONTEXT ctx)
{
- INT i;
AIRPDCAP_DEBUG_TRACE_START("AirPDcapCleanKeys");
if (ctx==NULL) {
AIRPDCAP_DEBUG_PRINT_LINE("AirPDcapCleanKeys", "NULL context", AIRPDCAP_DEBUG_LEVEL_5);
AIRPDCAP_DEBUG_TRACE_END("AirPDcapCleanKeys");
- return 0;
+ return;
}
- for (i=0; i<AIRPDCAP_MAX_KEYS_NR; i++) {
- memset(&ctx->keys[i], 0, sizeof(AIRPDCAP_KEY_ITEM));
- }
+ memset(ctx->keys, 0, sizeof(AIRPDCAP_KEY_ITEM) * AIRPDCAP_MAX_KEYS_NR);
ctx->keys_nr=0;
AIRPDCAP_DEBUG_PRINT_LINE("AirPDcapCleanKeys", "Keys collection cleaned!", AIRPDCAP_DEBUG_LEVEL_5);
AIRPDCAP_DEBUG_TRACE_END("AirPDcapCleanKeys");
+}
+
+static void
+AirPDcapRecurseCleanSA(
+ PAIRPDCAP_SEC_ASSOCIATION sa)
+{
+ if (sa->next != NULL) {
+ AirPDcapRecurseCleanSA(sa->next);
+ g_free(sa->next);
+ sa->next = NULL;
+ }
+}
+
+static void
+AirPDcapCleanSecAssoc(
+ PAIRPDCAP_CONTEXT ctx)
+{
+ PAIRPDCAP_SEC_ASSOCIATION psa;
+ int i;
- return i;
+ for (psa = ctx->sa, i = 0; i < AIRPDCAP_MAX_SEC_ASSOCIATIONS_NR; i++, psa++) {
+ /* To iterate is human, to recurse, divine */
+ AirPDcapRecurseCleanSA(psa);
+ }
}
INT AirPDcapGetKeys(
ctx->first_free_index=0;
ctx->index=-1;
- ctx->last_stored_index=-1;
+ ctx->sa_index=-1;
ctx->pkt_ssid_len = 0;
+ memset(ctx->sa, 0, AIRPDCAP_MAX_SEC_ASSOCIATIONS_NR * sizeof(AIRPDCAP_SEC_ASSOCIATION));
+
AIRPDCAP_DEBUG_PRINT_LINE("AirPDcapInitContext", "Context initialized!", AIRPDCAP_DEBUG_LEVEL_5);
AIRPDCAP_DEBUG_TRACE_END("AirPDcapInitContext");
return AIRPDCAP_RET_SUCCESS;
}
AirPDcapCleanKeys(ctx);
+ AirPDcapCleanSecAssoc(ctx);
ctx->first_free_index=0;
ctx->index=-1;
- ctx->last_stored_index=-1;
+ ctx->sa_index=-1;
AIRPDCAP_DEBUG_PRINT_LINE("AirPDcapDestroyContext", "Context destroyed!", AIRPDCAP_DEBUG_LEVEL_5);
AIRPDCAP_DEBUG_TRACE_END("AirPDcapDestroyContext");
return AIRPDCAP_RET_SUCCESS;
}
-#ifdef __cplusplus
+#ifdef __cplusplus
}
#endif
/****************************************************************************/
/****************************************************************************/
-/* Internal function definitions */
+/* Internal function definitions */
-#ifdef __cplusplus
+#ifdef __cplusplus
extern "C" {
#endif
AIRPDCAP_SEC_ASSOCIATION *sa,
INT offset)
{
- INT ret_value;
+ INT ret_value=1;
+ UCHAR *try_data;
+ guint try_data_len = *decrypt_len;
if (sa->key==NULL) {
AIRPDCAP_DEBUG_PRINT_LINE("AirPDcapRsnaMng", "No key associated", AIRPDCAP_DEBUG_LEVEL_3);
return AIRPDCAP_RET_REQ_DATA;
}
- if (sa->validKey==FALSE) {
- AIRPDCAP_DEBUG_PRINT_LINE("AirPDcapRsnaMng", "Key not yet valid", AIRPDCAP_DEBUG_LEVEL_3);
+
+ if (*decrypt_len > try_data_len) {
+ AIRPDCAP_DEBUG_PRINT_LINE("AirPDcapRsnaMng", "Invalid decryption length", AIRPDCAP_DEBUG_LEVEL_3);
return AIRPDCAP_RET_UNSUCCESS;
}
- if (sa->wpa.key_ver==1) {
- /* CCMP -> HMAC-MD5 is the EAPOL-Key MIC, RC4 is the EAPOL-Key encryption algorithm */
- AIRPDCAP_DEBUG_PRINT_LINE("AirPDcapRsnaMng", "TKIP", AIRPDCAP_DEBUG_LEVEL_3);
-
- ret_value=AirPDcapTkipDecrypt(decrypt_data+offset, *decrypt_len-offset, decrypt_data+AIRPDCAP_TA_OFFSET, AIRPDCAP_GET_TK(sa->wpa.ptk));
- if (ret_value)
- return ret_value;
- AIRPDCAP_DEBUG_PRINT_LINE("AirPDcapRsnaMng", "TKIP DECRYPTED!!!", AIRPDCAP_DEBUG_LEVEL_3);
- /* remove MIC (8bytes) and ICV (4bytes) from the end of packet */
- *decrypt_len-=12;
- } else {
- /* AES-CCMP -> HMAC-SHA1-128 is the EAPOL-Key MIC, AES wep_key wrap is the EAPOL-Key encryption algorithm */
- AIRPDCAP_DEBUG_PRINT_LINE("AirPDcapRsnaMng", "CCMP", AIRPDCAP_DEBUG_LEVEL_3);
+ /* allocate a temp buffer for the decryption loop */
+ try_data=(UCHAR *)g_malloc(try_data_len);
+
+ /* start of loop added by GCS */
+ for(/* sa */; sa != NULL ;sa=sa->next) {
+
+ if (sa->validKey==FALSE) {
+ AIRPDCAP_DEBUG_PRINT_LINE("AirPDcapRsnaMng", "Key not yet valid", AIRPDCAP_DEBUG_LEVEL_3);
+ continue;
+ }
+
+ /* copy the encrypted data into a temp buffer */
+ memcpy(try_data, decrypt_data, *decrypt_len);
+
+ if (sa->wpa.key_ver==1) {
+ /* CCMP -> HMAC-MD5 is the EAPOL-Key MIC, RC4 is the EAPOL-Key encryption algorithm */
+ AIRPDCAP_DEBUG_PRINT_LINE("AirPDcapRsnaMng", "TKIP", AIRPDCAP_DEBUG_LEVEL_3);
+ DEBUG_DUMP("ptk", sa->wpa.ptk, 64);
+ DEBUG_DUMP("ptk portion used", AIRPDCAP_GET_TK(sa->wpa.ptk), 16);
+
+ ret_value=AirPDcapTkipDecrypt(try_data+offset, *decrypt_len-offset, try_data+AIRPDCAP_TA_OFFSET, AIRPDCAP_GET_TK(sa->wpa.ptk));
+ if (ret_value){
+ AIRPDCAP_DEBUG_PRINT_LINE("AirPDcapRsnaMng", "TKIP failed!", AIRPDCAP_DEBUG_LEVEL_3);
+ continue;
+ }
+
+ AIRPDCAP_DEBUG_PRINT_LINE("AirPDcapRsnaMng", "TKIP DECRYPTED!!!", AIRPDCAP_DEBUG_LEVEL_3);
+ /* remove MIC (8bytes) and ICV (4bytes) from the end of packet */
+ *decrypt_len-=12;
+ break;
+ } else {
+ /* AES-CCMP -> HMAC-SHA1-128 is the EAPOL-Key MIC, AES wep_key wrap is the EAPOL-Key encryption algorithm */
+ AIRPDCAP_DEBUG_PRINT_LINE("AirPDcapRsnaMng", "CCMP", AIRPDCAP_DEBUG_LEVEL_3);
+
+ ret_value=AirPDcapCcmpDecrypt(try_data, mac_header_len, (INT)*decrypt_len, AIRPDCAP_GET_TK(sa->wpa.ptk));
+ if (ret_value)
+ continue;
+
+ AIRPDCAP_DEBUG_PRINT_LINE("AirPDcapRsnaMng", "CCMP DECRYPTED!!!", AIRPDCAP_DEBUG_LEVEL_3);
+ /* remove MIC (8bytes) from the end of packet */
+ *decrypt_len-=8;
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+ /* end of loop */
- ret_value=AirPDcapCcmpDecrypt(decrypt_data, mac_header_len, (INT)*decrypt_len, AIRPDCAP_GET_TK(sa->wpa.ptk));
- if (ret_value)
- return ret_value;
+ /* none of the keys worked */
+ if(sa == NULL) {
+ g_free(try_data);
+ return ret_value;
+ }
- AIRPDCAP_DEBUG_PRINT_LINE("AirPDcapRsnaMng", "CCMP DECRYPTED!!!", AIRPDCAP_DEBUG_LEVEL_3);
- /* remove MIC (8bytes) from the end of packet */
- *decrypt_len-=8;
+ if (*decrypt_len > try_data_len || *decrypt_len < 8) {
+ AIRPDCAP_DEBUG_PRINT_LINE("AirPDcapRsnaMng", "Invalid decryption length", AIRPDCAP_DEBUG_LEVEL_3);
+ g_free(try_data);
+ return AIRPDCAP_RET_UNSUCCESS;
}
- /* remove protection bit */
+ /* copy the decrypted data into the decrypt buffer GCS*/
+ memcpy(decrypt_data, try_data, *decrypt_len);
+ g_free(try_data);
+
+ /* remove protection bit */
decrypt_data[1]&=0xBF;
- /* remove TKIP/CCMP header */
+ /* remove TKIP/CCMP header */
offset = mac_header_len;
*decrypt_len-=8;
- memcpy(decrypt_data+offset, decrypt_data+offset+8, *decrypt_len-offset);
+ memmove(decrypt_data+offset, decrypt_data+offset+8, *decrypt_len-offset);
if (key!=NULL) {
memcpy(key, sa->key, sizeof(AIRPDCAP_KEY_ITEM));
-
- if (sa->wpa.key_ver==AIRPDCAP_WPA_KEY_VER_CCMP)
+ memcpy(key->KeyData.Wpa.Ptk, sa->wpa.ptk, AIRPDCAP_WPA_PTK_LEN); /* copy the PTK to the key structure for future use by wireshark */
+ if (sa->wpa.key_ver==AIRPDCAP_WPA_KEY_VER_NOT_CCMP)
key->KeyType=AIRPDCAP_KEY_TYPE_TKIP;
else if (sa->wpa.key_ver==AIRPDCAP_WPA_KEY_VER_AES_CCMP)
key->KeyType=AIRPDCAP_KEY_TYPE_CCMP;
INT key_index;
AIRPDCAP_KEY_ITEM *tmp_key;
UINT8 useCache=FALSE;
- UCHAR *try_data = ep_alloc(*decrypt_len);
+ UCHAR *try_data;
+ guint try_data_len = *decrypt_len;
+
+ try_data = (UCHAR *)g_malloc(try_data_len);
if (sa->key!=NULL)
useCache=TRUE;
for (key_index=0; key_index<(INT)ctx->keys_nr; key_index++) {
- /* use the cached one, or try all keys */
+ /* use the cached one, or try all keys */
if (!useCache) {
tmp_key=&ctx->keys[key_index];
} else {
}
}
- /* obviously, try only WEP keys... */
- if (tmp_key->KeyType==AIRPDCAP_KEY_TYPE_WEP)
- {
+ /* obviously, try only WEP keys... */
+ if (tmp_key->KeyType==AIRPDCAP_KEY_TYPE_WEP) {
AIRPDCAP_DEBUG_PRINT_LINE("AirPDcapWepMng", "Try WEP key...", AIRPDCAP_DEBUG_LEVEL_3);
memset(wep_key, 0, sizeof(wep_key));
memcpy(try_data, decrypt_data, *decrypt_len);
- /* Costruct the WEP seed: copy the IV in first 3 bytes and then the WEP key (refer to 802-11i-2004, 8.2.1.4.3, pag. 36) */
+ /* Costruct the WEP seed: copy the IV in first 3 bytes and then the WEP key (refer to 802-11i-2004, 8.2.1.4.3, pag. 36) */
memcpy(wep_key, try_data+mac_header_len, AIRPDCAP_WEP_IVLEN);
keylen=tmp_key->KeyData.Wep.WepKeyLen;
memcpy(wep_key+AIRPDCAP_WEP_IVLEN, tmp_key->KeyData.Wep.WepKey, keylen);
}
if (!ret_value && tmp_key->KeyType==AIRPDCAP_KEY_TYPE_WEP) {
- /* the tried key is the correct one, cached in the Security Association */
+ /* the tried key is the correct one, cached in the Security Association */
sa->key=tmp_key;
if (key!=NULL) {
- memcpy(key, &sa->key, sizeof(AIRPDCAP_KEY_ITEM));
+ memcpy(key, sa->key, sizeof(AIRPDCAP_KEY_ITEM));
key->KeyType=AIRPDCAP_KEY_TYPE_WEP;
}
break;
} else {
- /* the cached key was not valid, try other keys */
+ /* the cached key was not valid, try other keys */
if (useCache==TRUE) {
useCache=FALSE;
}
}
+ g_free(try_data);
if (ret_value)
- return ret_value;
+ return AIRPDCAP_RET_UNSUCCESS;
AIRPDCAP_DEBUG_PRINT_LINE("AirPDcapWepMng", "WEP DECRYPTED!!!", AIRPDCAP_DEBUG_LEVEL_3);
- /* remove ICV (4bytes) from the end of packet */
+ /* remove ICV (4bytes) from the end of packet */
*decrypt_len-=4;
- /* remove protection bit */
+ if (*decrypt_len < 4) {
+ AIRPDCAP_DEBUG_PRINT_LINE("AirPDcapWepMng", "Decryption length too short", AIRPDCAP_DEBUG_LEVEL_3);
+ return AIRPDCAP_RET_UNSUCCESS;
+ }
+
+ /* remove protection bit */
decrypt_data[1]&=0xBF;
- /* remove IC header */
+ /* remove IC header */
offset = mac_header_len;
*decrypt_len-=4;
- memcpy(decrypt_data+offset, decrypt_data+offset+AIRPDCAP_WEP_IVLEN+AIRPDCAP_WEP_KIDLEN, *decrypt_len-offset);
+ memmove(decrypt_data+offset, decrypt_data+offset+AIRPDCAP_WEP_IVLEN+AIRPDCAP_WEP_KIDLEN, *decrypt_len-offset);
return AIRPDCAP_RET_SUCCESS;
}
-/* Refer to IEEE 802.11i-2004, 8.5.3, pag. 85 */
+/* Refer to IEEE 802.11i-2004, 8.5.3, pag. 85 */
static INT
AirPDcapRsna4WHandshake(
PAIRPDCAP_CONTEXT ctx,
const UCHAR *data,
AIRPDCAP_SEC_ASSOCIATION *sa,
- PAIRPDCAP_KEY_ITEM key,
INT offset)
{
- AIRPDCAP_KEY_ITEM *tmp_key, pkt_key;
+ AIRPDCAP_KEY_ITEM *tmp_key, *tmp_pkt_key, pkt_key;
+ AIRPDCAP_SEC_ASSOCIATION *tmp_sa;
INT key_index;
INT ret_value=1;
UCHAR useCache=FALSE;
if (sa->key!=NULL)
useCache=TRUE;
- /* a 4-way handshake packet use a Pairwise key type (IEEE 802.11i-2004, pg. 79) */
+ /* a 4-way handshake packet use a Pairwise key type (IEEE 802.11i-2004, pg. 79) */
if (AIRPDCAP_EAP_KEY(data[offset+1])!=1) {
AIRPDCAP_DEBUG_PRINT_LINE("AirPDcapRsna4WHandshake", "Group/STAKey message (not used)", AIRPDCAP_DEBUG_LEVEL_5);
return AIRPDCAP_RET_NO_VALID_HANDSHAKE;
}
- /* TODO timeouts? reauthentication? */
+ /* TODO timeouts? */
- /* TODO consider key-index */
+ /* TODO consider key-index */
- /* TODO considera Deauthentications */
+ /* TODO considera Deauthentications */
AIRPDCAP_DEBUG_PRINT_LINE("AirPDcapRsna4WHandshake", "4-way handshake...", AIRPDCAP_DEBUG_LEVEL_5);
- /* manage 4-way handshake packets; this step completes the 802.1X authentication process (IEEE 802.11i-2004, pag. 85) */
+ /* manage 4-way handshake packets; this step completes the 802.1X authentication process (IEEE 802.11i-2004, pag. 85) */
- /* message 1: Authenticator->Supplicant (Sec=0, Mic=0, Ack=1, Inst=0, Key=1(pairwise), KeyRSC=0, Nonce=ANonce, MIC=0) */
+ /* message 1: Authenticator->Supplicant (Sec=0, Mic=0, Ack=1, Inst=0, Key=1(pairwise), KeyRSC=0, Nonce=ANonce, MIC=0) */
if (AIRPDCAP_EAP_INST(data[offset+1])==0 &&
AIRPDCAP_EAP_ACK(data[offset+1])==1 &&
AIRPDCAP_EAP_MIC(data[offset])==0)
{
AIRPDCAP_DEBUG_PRINT_LINE("AirPDcapRsna4WHandshake", "4-way handshake message 1", AIRPDCAP_DEBUG_LEVEL_3);
- /* On reception of Message 1, the Supplicant determines whether the Key Replay Counter field value has been */
- /* used before with the current PMKSA. If the Key Replay Counter field value is less than or equal to the current */
- /* local value, the Supplicant discards the message. */
- /* -> not checked, the Authenticator will be send another Message 1 (hopefully!) */
+ /* On reception of Message 1, the Supplicant determines whether the Key Replay Counter field value has been */
+ /* used before with the current PMKSA. If the Key Replay Counter field value is less than or equal to the current */
+ /* local value, the Supplicant discards the message. */
+ /* -> not checked, the Authenticator will be send another Message 1 (hopefully!) */
+
+ /* This saves the sa since we are reauthenticating which will overwrite our current sa GCS*/
+ if( sa->handshake >= 2) {
+ tmp_sa= g_new(AIRPDCAP_SEC_ASSOCIATION, 1);
+ memcpy(tmp_sa, sa, sizeof(AIRPDCAP_SEC_ASSOCIATION));
+ sa->validKey=FALSE;
+ sa->next=tmp_sa;
+ }
- /* save ANonce (from authenticator) to derive the PTK with the SNonce (from the 2 message) */
+ /* save ANonce (from authenticator) to derive the PTK with the SNonce (from the 2 message) */
memcpy(sa->wpa.nonce, data+offset+12, 32);
- /* get the Key Descriptor Version (to select algorithm used in decryption -CCMP or TKIP-) */
+ /* get the Key Descriptor Version (to select algorithm used in decryption -CCMP or TKIP-) */
sa->wpa.key_ver=AIRPDCAP_EAP_KEY_DESCR_VER(data[offset+1]);
sa->handshake=1;
return AIRPDCAP_RET_SUCCESS_HANDSHAKE;
}
- /* message 2|4: Supplicant->Authenticator (Sec=0|1, Mic=1, Ack=0, Inst=0, Key=1(pairwise), KeyRSC=0, Nonce=SNonce|0, MIC=MIC(KCK,EAPOL)) */
+ /* message 2|4: Supplicant->Authenticator (Sec=0|1, Mic=1, Ack=0, Inst=0, Key=1(pairwise), KeyRSC=0, Nonce=SNonce|0, MIC=MIC(KCK,EAPOL)) */
if (AIRPDCAP_EAP_INST(data[offset+1])==0 &&
AIRPDCAP_EAP_ACK(data[offset+1])==0 &&
AIRPDCAP_EAP_MIC(data[offset])==1)
{
- if (AIRPDCAP_EAP_SEC(data[offset])==0) {
-
- /* PATCH: some implementations set secure bit to 0 also in the 4th message */
- /* to recognize which message is this check if wep_key data length is 0 */
- /* in the 4th message */
- if (data[offset+92]!=0 || data[offset+93]!=0) {
- /* message 2 */
- AIRPDCAP_DEBUG_PRINT_LINE("AirPDcapRsna4WHandshake", "4-way handshake message 2", AIRPDCAP_DEBUG_LEVEL_3);
-
- /* On reception of Message 2, the Authenticator checks that the key replay counter corresponds to the */
- /* outstanding Message 1. If not, it silently discards the message. */
- /* If the calculated MIC does not match the MIC that the Supplicant included in the EAPOL-Key frame, */
- /* the Authenticator silently discards Message 2. */
- /* -> not checked; the Supplicant will send another message 2 (hopefully!) */
-
- /* now you can derive the PTK */
- for (key_index=0; key_index<(INT)ctx->keys_nr || useCache; key_index++) {
- /* use the cached one, or try all keys */
- if (!useCache) {
- AIRPDCAP_DEBUG_PRINT_LINE("AirPDcapRsna4WHandshake", "Try WPA key...", AIRPDCAP_DEBUG_LEVEL_3);
- tmp_key=&ctx->keys[key_index];
+ /* Check nonce to differentiate between message 2 or 4
+ * nonce will be non zero for message 2 and zero for message 4.
+ * At least needed for Windows, since it is setting the secure bit on message 2 when rekeying */
+ if (!memiszero(data+offset+12, 32)) {
+ /* message 2 */
+ AIRPDCAP_DEBUG_PRINT_LINE("AirPDcapRsna4WHandshake", "4-way handshake message 2", AIRPDCAP_DEBUG_LEVEL_3);
+
+ /* On reception of Message 2, the Authenticator checks that the key replay counter corresponds to the */
+ /* outstanding Message 1. If not, it silently discards the message. */
+ /* If the calculated MIC does not match the MIC that the Supplicant included in the EAPOL-Key frame, */
+ /* the Authenticator silently discards Message 2. */
+ /* -> not checked; the Supplicant will send another message 2 (hopefully!) */
+
+ /* now you can derive the PTK */
+ for (key_index=0; key_index<(INT)ctx->keys_nr || useCache; key_index++) {
+ /* use the cached one, or try all keys */
+ if (!useCache) {
+ AIRPDCAP_DEBUG_PRINT_LINE("AirPDcapRsna4WHandshake", "Try WPA key...", AIRPDCAP_DEBUG_LEVEL_3);
+ tmp_key=&ctx->keys[key_index];
+ } else {
+ /* there is a cached key in the security association, if it's a WPA key try it... */
+ if (sa->key!=NULL &&
+ (sa->key->KeyType==AIRPDCAP_KEY_TYPE_WPA_PWD ||
+ sa->key->KeyType==AIRPDCAP_KEY_TYPE_WPA_PSK ||
+ sa->key->KeyType==AIRPDCAP_KEY_TYPE_WPA_PMK)) {
+ AIRPDCAP_DEBUG_PRINT_LINE("AirPDcapRsna4WHandshake", "Try cached WPA key...", AIRPDCAP_DEBUG_LEVEL_3);
+ tmp_key=sa->key;
} else {
- /* there is a cached key in the security association, if it's a WPA key try it... */
- if (sa->key!=NULL &&
- (sa->key->KeyType==AIRPDCAP_KEY_TYPE_WPA_PWD ||
- sa->key->KeyType==AIRPDCAP_KEY_TYPE_WPA_PSK ||
- sa->key->KeyType==AIRPDCAP_KEY_TYPE_WPA_PMK)) {
- AIRPDCAP_DEBUG_PRINT_LINE("AirPDcapRsna4WHandshake", "Try cached WPA key...", AIRPDCAP_DEBUG_LEVEL_3);
- tmp_key=sa->key;
- } else {
- AIRPDCAP_DEBUG_PRINT_LINE("AirPDcapRsna4WHandshake", "Cached key is of a wrong type, try WPA key...", AIRPDCAP_DEBUG_LEVEL_3);
- tmp_key=&ctx->keys[key_index];
- }
- }
-
- /* obviously, try only WPA keys... */
- if (tmp_key->KeyType==AIRPDCAP_KEY_TYPE_WPA_PWD ||
- tmp_key->KeyType==AIRPDCAP_KEY_TYPE_WPA_PSK ||
- tmp_key->KeyType==AIRPDCAP_KEY_TYPE_WPA_PMK)
- {
- if (tmp_key->KeyType == AIRPDCAP_KEY_TYPE_WPA_PWD && tmp_key->UserPwd.SsidLen == 0 && ctx->pkt_ssid_len > 0 && ctx->pkt_ssid_len <= AIRPDCAP_WPA_SSID_MAX_LEN) {
- /* We have a "wildcard" SSID. Use the one from the packet. */
- memcpy(&pkt_key, tmp_key, sizeof(pkt_key));
- memcpy(&pkt_key.UserPwd.Ssid, ctx->pkt_ssid, ctx->pkt_ssid_len);
- pkt_key.UserPwd.SsidLen = ctx->pkt_ssid_len;
- AirPDcapRsnaPwd2Psk(pkt_key.UserPwd.Passphrase, pkt_key.UserPwd.Ssid,
- pkt_key.UserPwd.SsidLen, pkt_key.KeyData.Wpa.Psk);
- tmp_key = &pkt_key;
- }
-
- /* derive the PTK from the BSSID, STA MAC, PMK, SNonce, ANonce */
- AirPDcapRsnaPrfX(sa, /* authenticator nonce, bssid, station mac */
- tmp_key->KeyData.Wpa.Pmk, /* PMK */
- data+offset+12, /* supplicant nonce */
- 512,
- sa->wpa.ptk);
-
- /* verify the MIC (compare the MIC in the packet included in this message with a MIC calculated with the PTK) */
- eapol_len=pntohs(data+offset-3)+4;
- memcpy(eapol, &data[offset-5], (eapol_len<AIRPDCAP_EAPOL_MAX_LEN?eapol_len:AIRPDCAP_EAPOL_MAX_LEN));
- ret_value=AirPDcapRsnaMicCheck(eapol, /* eapol frame (header also) */
- eapol_len, /* eapol frame length */
- sa->wpa.ptk, /* Key Confirmation Key */
- AIRPDCAP_EAP_KEY_DESCR_VER(data[offset+1])); /* EAPOL-Key description version */
-
- /* If the MIC is valid, the Authenticator checks that the RSN information element bit-wise matches */
- /* that from the (Re)Association Request message. */
- /* i) TODO If these are not exactly the same, the Authenticator uses MLME-DEAUTHENTICATE.request */
- /* primitive to terminate the association. */
- /* ii) If they do match bit-wise, the Authenticator constructs Message 3. */
+ AIRPDCAP_DEBUG_PRINT_LINE("AirPDcapRsna4WHandshake", "Cached key is of a wrong type, try WPA key...", AIRPDCAP_DEBUG_LEVEL_3);
+ tmp_key=&ctx->keys[key_index];
}
+ }
- if (!ret_value &&
- (tmp_key->KeyType==AIRPDCAP_KEY_TYPE_WPA_PWD ||
- tmp_key->KeyType==AIRPDCAP_KEY_TYPE_WPA_PSK ||
- tmp_key->KeyType==AIRPDCAP_KEY_TYPE_WPA_PMK))
- {
- /* the temporary key is the correct one, cached in the Security Association */
-
- sa->key=tmp_key;
-
- if (key!=NULL) {
- memcpy(key, &tmp_key, sizeof(AIRPDCAP_KEY_ITEM));
- if (AIRPDCAP_EAP_KEY_DESCR_VER(data[offset+1])==AIRPDCAP_WPA_KEY_VER_CCMP)
- key->KeyType=AIRPDCAP_KEY_TYPE_TKIP;
- else if (AIRPDCAP_EAP_KEY_DESCR_VER(data[offset+1])==AIRPDCAP_WPA_KEY_VER_AES_CCMP)
- key->KeyType=AIRPDCAP_KEY_TYPE_CCMP;
- }
-
- break;
+ /* obviously, try only WPA keys... */
+ if (tmp_key->KeyType==AIRPDCAP_KEY_TYPE_WPA_PWD ||
+ tmp_key->KeyType==AIRPDCAP_KEY_TYPE_WPA_PSK ||
+ tmp_key->KeyType==AIRPDCAP_KEY_TYPE_WPA_PMK)
+ {
+ if (tmp_key->KeyType == AIRPDCAP_KEY_TYPE_WPA_PWD && tmp_key->UserPwd.SsidLen == 0 && ctx->pkt_ssid_len > 0 && ctx->pkt_ssid_len <= AIRPDCAP_WPA_SSID_MAX_LEN) {
+ /* We have a "wildcard" SSID. Use the one from the packet. */
+ memcpy(&pkt_key, tmp_key, sizeof(pkt_key));
+ memcpy(&pkt_key.UserPwd.Ssid, ctx->pkt_ssid, ctx->pkt_ssid_len);
+ pkt_key.UserPwd.SsidLen = ctx->pkt_ssid_len;
+ AirPDcapRsnaPwd2Psk(pkt_key.UserPwd.Passphrase, pkt_key.UserPwd.Ssid,
+ pkt_key.UserPwd.SsidLen, pkt_key.KeyData.Wpa.Psk);
+ tmp_pkt_key = &pkt_key;
} else {
- /* the cached key was not valid, try other keys */
-
- if (useCache==TRUE) {
- useCache=FALSE;
- key_index--;
- }
+ tmp_pkt_key = tmp_key;
}
- }
- if (ret_value) {
- AIRPDCAP_DEBUG_PRINT_LINE("AirPDcapRsna4WHandshake", "handshake step failed", AIRPDCAP_DEBUG_LEVEL_3);
- return ret_value;
+ /* derive the PTK from the BSSID, STA MAC, PMK, SNonce, ANonce */
+ AirPDcapRsnaPrfX(sa, /* authenticator nonce, bssid, station mac */
+ tmp_pkt_key->KeyData.Wpa.Psk, /* PSK == PMK */
+ data+offset+12, /* supplicant nonce */
+ 512,
+ sa->wpa.ptk);
+
+ /* verify the MIC (compare the MIC in the packet included in this message with a MIC calculated with the PTK) */
+ eapol_len=pntoh16(data+offset-3)+4;
+ memcpy(eapol, &data[offset-5], (eapol_len<AIRPDCAP_EAPOL_MAX_LEN?eapol_len:AIRPDCAP_EAPOL_MAX_LEN));
+ ret_value=AirPDcapRsnaMicCheck(eapol, /* eapol frame (header also) */
+ eapol_len, /* eapol frame length */
+ sa->wpa.ptk, /* Key Confirmation Key */
+ AIRPDCAP_EAP_KEY_DESCR_VER(data[offset+1])); /* EAPOL-Key description version */
+
+ /* If the MIC is valid, the Authenticator checks that the RSN information element bit-wise matches */
+ /* that from the (Re)Association Request message. */
+ /* i) TODO If these are not exactly the same, the Authenticator uses MLME-DEAUTHENTICATE.request */
+ /* primitive to terminate the association. */
+ /* ii) If they do match bit-wise, the Authenticator constructs Message 3. */
}
- sa->handshake=2;
-
- return AIRPDCAP_RET_SUCCESS_HANDSHAKE;
- } else {
- /* message 4 */
-
- /* TODO "Note that when the 4-Way Handshake is first used Message 4 is sent in the clear." */
+ if (!ret_value &&
+ (tmp_key->KeyType==AIRPDCAP_KEY_TYPE_WPA_PWD ||
+ tmp_key->KeyType==AIRPDCAP_KEY_TYPE_WPA_PSK ||
+ tmp_key->KeyType==AIRPDCAP_KEY_TYPE_WPA_PMK))
+ {
+ /* the temporary key is the correct one, cached in the Security Association */
- /* TODO check MIC and Replay Counter */
- /* On reception of Message 4, the Authenticator verifies that the Key Replay Counter field value is one */
- /* that it used on this 4-Way Handshake; if it is not, it silently discards the message. */
- /* If the calculated MIC does not match the MIC that the Supplicant included in the EAPOL-Key frame, the */
- /* Authenticator silently discards Message 4. */
+ sa->key=tmp_key;
+ break;
+ } else {
+ /* the cached key was not valid, try other keys */
- AIRPDCAP_DEBUG_PRINT_LINE("AirPDcapRsna4WHandshake", "4-way handshake message 4 (patched)", AIRPDCAP_DEBUG_LEVEL_3);
+ if (useCache==TRUE) {
+ useCache=FALSE;
+ key_index--;
+ }
+ }
+ }
- sa->handshake=4;
+ if (ret_value) {
+ AIRPDCAP_DEBUG_PRINT_LINE("AirPDcapRsna4WHandshake", "handshake step failed", AIRPDCAP_DEBUG_LEVEL_3);
+ return AIRPDCAP_RET_NO_VALID_HANDSHAKE;
+ }
- sa->validKey=TRUE;
+ sa->handshake=2;
+ sa->validKey=TRUE; /* we can use the key to decode, even if we have not captured the other eapol packets */
- return AIRPDCAP_RET_SUCCESS_HANDSHAKE;
- }
- /* END OF PATCH */
- /* */
+ return AIRPDCAP_RET_SUCCESS_HANDSHAKE;
} else {
- /* message 4 */
+ /* message 4 */
- /* TODO "Note that when the 4-Way Handshake is first used Message 4 is sent in the clear." */
+ /* TODO "Note that when the 4-Way Handshake is first used Message 4 is sent in the clear." */
- /* TODO check MIC and Replay Counter */
- /* On reception of Message 4, the Authenticator verifies that the Key Replay Counter field value is one */
- /* that it used on this 4-Way Handshake; if it is not, it silently discards the message. */
- /* If the calculated MIC does not match the MIC that the Supplicant included in the EAPOL-Key frame, the */
- /* Authenticator silently discards Message 4. */
+ /* TODO check MIC and Replay Counter */
+ /* On reception of Message 4, the Authenticator verifies that the Key Replay Counter field value is one */
+ /* that it used on this 4-Way Handshake; if it is not, it silently discards the message. */
+ /* If the calculated MIC does not match the MIC that the Supplicant included in the EAPOL-Key frame, the */
+ /* Authenticator silently discards Message 4. */
AIRPDCAP_DEBUG_PRINT_LINE("AirPDcapRsna4WHandshake", "4-way handshake message 4", AIRPDCAP_DEBUG_LEVEL_3);
sa->handshake=4;
- sa->validKey=TRUE;
-
return AIRPDCAP_RET_SUCCESS_HANDSHAKE;
}
}
- /* message 3: Authenticator->Supplicant (Sec=1, Mic=1, Ack=1, Inst=0/1, Key=1(pairwise), KeyRSC=???, Nonce=ANonce, MIC=1) */
+ /* message 3: Authenticator->Supplicant (Sec=1, Mic=1, Ack=1, Inst=0/1, Key=1(pairwise), KeyRSC=???, Nonce=ANonce, MIC=1) */
if (AIRPDCAP_EAP_ACK(data[offset+1])==1 &&
AIRPDCAP_EAP_MIC(data[offset])==1)
{
+ const EAPOL_RSN_KEY *pEAPKey;
AIRPDCAP_DEBUG_PRINT_LINE("AirPDcapRsna4WHandshake", "4-way handshake message 3", AIRPDCAP_DEBUG_LEVEL_3);
- /* On reception of Message 3, the Supplicant silently discards the message if the Key Replay Counter field */
- /* value has already been used or if the ANonce value in Message 3 differs from the ANonce value in Message 1. */
- /* -> not checked, the Authenticator will send another message 3 (hopefully!) */
+ /* On reception of Message 3, the Supplicant silently discards the message if the Key Replay Counter field */
+ /* value has already been used or if the ANonce value in Message 3 differs from the ANonce value in Message 1. */
+ /* -> not checked, the Authenticator will send another message 3 (hopefully!) */
- /* TODO check page 88 (RNS) */
+ /* TODO check page 88 (RNS) */
- return AIRPDCAP_RET_SUCCESS_HANDSHAKE;
+ /* If using WPA2 PSK, message 3 will contain an RSN for the group key (GTK KDE).
+ In order to properly support decrypting WPA2-PSK packets, we need to parse this to get the group key. */
+ pEAPKey = (const EAPOL_RSN_KEY *)(&(data[offset-1]));
+ if (pEAPKey->type == AIRPDCAP_RSN_WPA2_KEY_DESCRIPTOR){
+ PAIRPDCAP_SEC_ASSOCIATION broadcast_sa;
+ AIRPDCAP_SEC_ASSOCIATION_ID id;
+
+ /* Get broadcacst SA for the current BSSID */
+ memcpy(id.sta, broadcast_mac, AIRPDCAP_MAC_LEN);
+ memcpy(id.bssid, sa->saId.bssid, AIRPDCAP_MAC_LEN);
+ broadcast_sa = AirPDcapGetSaPtr(ctx, &id);
+
+ if (broadcast_sa == NULL){
+ return AIRPDCAP_RET_REQ_DATA;
+ }
+ return (AirPDcapDecryptWPABroadcastKey(pEAPKey, sa->wpa.ptk+16, broadcast_sa, FALSE));
+ }
}
- return AIRPDCAP_RET_UNSUCCESS;
+ return AIRPDCAP_RET_NO_VALID_HANDSHAKE;
}
static INT
USHORT key_ver)
{
UCHAR mic[AIRPDCAP_WPA_MICKEY_LEN];
- UCHAR c_mic[20]; /* MIC 16 byte, the HMAC-SHA1 use a buffer of 20 bytes */
+ UCHAR c_mic[20]; /* MIC 16 byte, the HMAC-SHA1 use a buffer of 20 bytes */
- /* copy the MIC from the EAPOL packet */
+ /* copy the MIC from the EAPOL packet */
memcpy(mic, eapol+AIRPDCAP_WPA_MICKEY_OFFSET+4, AIRPDCAP_WPA_MICKEY_LEN);
/* set to 0 the MIC in the EAPOL packet (to calculate the MIC) */
memset(eapol+AIRPDCAP_WPA_MICKEY_OFFSET+4, 0, AIRPDCAP_WPA_MICKEY_LEN);
- if (key_ver==AIRPDCAP_WPA_KEY_VER_CCMP) {
- /* use HMAC-MD5 for the EAPOL-Key MIC */
+ if (key_ver==AIRPDCAP_WPA_KEY_VER_NOT_CCMP) {
+ /* use HMAC-MD5 for the EAPOL-Key MIC */
md5_hmac(eapol, eapol_len, KCK, AIRPDCAP_WPA_KCK_LEN, c_mic);
} else if (key_ver==AIRPDCAP_WPA_KEY_VER_AES_CCMP) {
/* use HMAC-SHA1-128 for the EAPOL-Key MIC */
switch (key->KeyType) {
case AIRPDCAP_KEY_TYPE_WEP:
- /* check key size limits */
+ /* check key size limits */
len=key->KeyData.Wep.WepKeyLen;
if (len<AIRPDCAP_WEP_KEY_MINLEN || len>AIRPDCAP_WEP_KEY_MAXLEN) {
AIRPDCAP_DEBUG_PRINT_LINE("AirPDcapValidateKey", "WEP key: key length not accepted", AIRPDCAP_DEBUG_LEVEL_5);
break;
case AIRPDCAP_KEY_TYPE_WEP_40:
- /* set the standard length and use a generic WEP key type */
+ /* set the standard length and use a generic WEP key type */
key->KeyData.Wep.WepKeyLen=AIRPDCAP_WEP_40_KEY_LEN;
key->KeyType=AIRPDCAP_KEY_TYPE_WEP;
break;
case AIRPDCAP_KEY_TYPE_WEP_104:
- /* set the standard length and use a generic WEP key type */
+ /* set the standard length and use a generic WEP key type */
key->KeyData.Wep.WepKeyLen=AIRPDCAP_WEP_104_KEY_LEN;
key->KeyType=AIRPDCAP_KEY_TYPE_WEP;
break;
case AIRPDCAP_KEY_TYPE_WPA_PWD:
- /* check passphrase and SSID size limits */
+ /* check passphrase and SSID size limits */
len=strlen(key->UserPwd.Passphrase);
if (len<AIRPDCAP_WPA_PASSPHRASE_MIN_LEN || len>AIRPDCAP_WPA_PASSPHRASE_MAX_LEN) {
AIRPDCAP_DEBUG_PRINT_LINE("AirPDcapValidateKey", "WPA-PWD key: passphrase length not accepted", AIRPDCAP_DEBUG_LEVEL_5);
PAIRPDCAP_CONTEXT ctx,
AIRPDCAP_SEC_ASSOCIATION_ID *id)
{
- INT index;
-
- if (ctx->last_stored_index!=-1) {
- /* at least one association was stored */
- /* search for the association from last_stored_index to 0 (most recent added) */
- for (index=ctx->last_stored_index; index>=0; index--) {
- if (ctx->sa[index].used) {
- if (memcmp(id, &(ctx->sa[index].saId), sizeof(AIRPDCAP_SEC_ASSOCIATION_ID))==0) {
- ctx->index=index;
- return index;
+ INT sa_index;
+ if (ctx->sa_index!=-1) {
+ /* at least one association was stored */
+ /* search for the association from sa_index to 0 (most recent added) */
+ for (sa_index=ctx->sa_index; sa_index>=0; sa_index--) {
+ if (ctx->sa[sa_index].used) {
+ if (memcmp(id, &(ctx->sa[sa_index].saId), sizeof(AIRPDCAP_SEC_ASSOCIATION_ID))==0) {
+ ctx->index=sa_index;
+ return sa_index;
}
}
}
AIRPDCAP_SEC_ASSOCIATION_ID *id)
{
INT last_free;
-
+ if (ctx->first_free_index>=AIRPDCAP_MAX_SEC_ASSOCIATIONS_NR) {
+ /* there is no empty space available. FAILURE */
+ return -1;
+ }
if (ctx->sa[ctx->first_free_index].used) {
- /* last addition was in the middle of the array (and the first_free_index was just incremented by 1) */
- /* search for a free space from the first_free_index to AIRPDCAP_STA_INFOS_NR (to avoid free blocks in */
- /* the middle) */
+ /* last addition was in the middle of the array (and the first_free_index was just incremented by 1) */
+ /* search for a free space from the first_free_index to AIRPDCAP_STA_INFOS_NR (to avoid free blocks in */
+ /* the middle) */
for (last_free=ctx->first_free_index; last_free<AIRPDCAP_MAX_SEC_ASSOCIATIONS_NR; last_free++)
if (!ctx->sa[last_free].used)
break;
if (last_free>=AIRPDCAP_MAX_SEC_ASSOCIATIONS_NR) {
- /* there is no empty space available. FAILURE */
+ /* there is no empty space available. FAILURE */
return -1;
}
- /* store first free space index */
+ /* store first free space index */
ctx->first_free_index=last_free;
}
- /* use this info */
+ /* use this info */
ctx->index=ctx->first_free_index;
- /* reset the info structure */
+ /* reset the info structure */
memset(ctx->sa+ctx->index, 0, sizeof(AIRPDCAP_SEC_ASSOCIATION));
ctx->sa[ctx->index].used=1;
- /* set the info structure */
+ /* set the info structure */
memcpy(&(ctx->sa[ctx->index].saId), id, sizeof(AIRPDCAP_SEC_ASSOCIATION_ID));
- /* increment by 1 the first_free_index (heuristic) */
+ /* increment by 1 the first_free_index (heuristic) */
ctx->first_free_index++;
- /* set the last_stored_index if the added index is greater the the last_stored_index */
- if (ctx->index > ctx->last_stored_index)
- ctx->last_stored_index=ctx->index;
+ /* set the sa_index if the added index is greater the the sa_index */
+ if (ctx->index > ctx->sa_index)
+ ctx->sa_index=ctx->index;
return ctx->index;
}
switch(AIRPDCAP_DS_BITS(frame->fc[1])) { /* Bit 1 = FromDS, bit 0 = ToDS */
case 0:
case 1:
- case 3:
return frame->addr2;
case 2:
return frame->addr1;
+ case 3:
+ if (memcmp(frame->addr1, frame->addr2, AIRPDCAP_MAC_LEN) < 0)
+ return frame->addr1;
+ else
+ return frame->addr2;
+
default:
return NULL;
}
case 0:
return frame->addr3;
case 1:
- case 3:
return frame->addr1;
case 2:
return frame->addr2;
+ case 3:
+ if (memcmp(frame->addr1, frame->addr2, AIRPDCAP_MAC_LEN) > 0)
+ return frame->addr1;
+ else
+ return frame->addr2;
+
default:
return NULL;
}
}
-/* Function used to derive the PTK. Refer to IEEE 802.11I-2004, pag. 74 */
+/* Function used to derive the PTK. Refer to IEEE 802.11I-2004, pag. 74
+ * and IEEE 802.11i-2004, pag. 164 */
static void
AirPDcapRsnaPrfX(
AIRPDCAP_SEC_ASSOCIATION *sa,
const UCHAR pmk[32],
const UCHAR snonce[32],
- const INT x, /* for TKIP 512, for CCMP 384 */
+ const INT x, /* for TKIP 512, for CCMP 384 */
UCHAR *ptk)
{
UINT8 i;
UCHAR R[100];
INT offset=sizeof("Pairwise key expansion");
+ UCHAR output[80]; /* allow for sha1 overflow. */
memset(R, 0, 100);
memcpy(R, "Pairwise key expansion", offset);
- /* Min(AA, SPA) || Max(AA, SPA) */
+ /* Min(AA, SPA) || Max(AA, SPA) */
if (memcmp(sa->saId.sta, sa->saId.bssid, AIRPDCAP_MAC_LEN) < 0)
{
memcpy(R + offset, sa->saId.sta, AIRPDCAP_MAC_LEN);
offset+=AIRPDCAP_MAC_LEN*2;
- /* Min(ANonce,SNonce) || Max(ANonce,SNonce) */
+ /* Min(ANonce,SNonce) || Max(ANonce,SNonce) */
if( memcmp(snonce, sa->wpa.nonce, 32) < 0 )
{
memcpy(R + offset, snonce, 32);
for(i = 0; i < (x+159)/160; i++)
{
R[offset] = i;
- sha1_hmac(pmk, 32, R, 100, ptk + i * 20);
+ sha1_hmac(pmk, 32, R, 100, &output[20 * i]);
}
+ memcpy(ptk, output, x/8);
}
+#define MAX_SSID_LENGTH 32 /* maximum SSID length */
+
static INT
AirPDcapRsnaPwd2PskStep(
const guint8 *ppBytes,
const INT count,
UCHAR *output)
{
- UCHAR digest[36], digest1[AIRPDCAP_SHA_DIGEST_LEN];
+ UCHAR digest[MAX_SSID_LENGTH+4]; /* SSID plus 4 bytes of count */
+ UCHAR digest1[SHA1_DIGEST_LEN];
INT i, j;
+ if (ssidLength > MAX_SSID_LENGTH) {
+ /* This "should not happen" */
+ return AIRPDCAP_RET_UNSUCCESS;
+ }
+
+ memset(digest, 0, sizeof digest);
+ memset(digest1, 0, sizeof digest1);
+
/* U1 = PRF(P, S || INT(i)) */
memcpy(digest, ssid, ssidLength);
digest[ssidLength] = (UCHAR)((count>>24) & 0xff);
digest[ssidLength+1] = (UCHAR)((count>>16) & 0xff);
digest[ssidLength+2] = (UCHAR)((count>>8) & 0xff);
digest[ssidLength+3] = (UCHAR)(count & 0xff);
- sha1_hmac(ppBytes, ppLength, digest, ssidLength+4, digest1);
+ sha1_hmac(ppBytes, ppLength, digest, (guint32) ssidLength+4, digest1);
/* output = U1 */
- memcpy(output, digest1, AIRPDCAP_SHA_DIGEST_LEN);
+ memcpy(output, digest1, SHA1_DIGEST_LEN);
for (i = 1; i < iterations; i++) {
/* Un = PRF(P, Un-1) */
- sha1_hmac(ppBytes, ppLength, digest1, AIRPDCAP_SHA_DIGEST_LEN, digest);
+ sha1_hmac(ppBytes, ppLength, digest1, SHA1_DIGEST_LEN, digest);
- memcpy(digest1, digest, AIRPDCAP_SHA_DIGEST_LEN);
+ memcpy(digest1, digest, SHA1_DIGEST_LEN);
/* output = output xor Un */
- for (j = 0; j < AIRPDCAP_SHA_DIGEST_LEN; j++) {
+ for (j = 0; j < SHA1_DIGEST_LEN; j++) {
output[j] ^= digest[j];
}
}
const size_t ssidLength,
UCHAR *output)
{
- UCHAR m_output[AIRPDCAP_WPA_PSK_LEN];
+ UCHAR m_output[2*SHA1_DIGEST_LEN];
GByteArray *pp_ba = g_byte_array_new();
- memset(m_output, 0, AIRPDCAP_WPA_PSK_LEN);
+ memset(m_output, 0, 2*SHA1_DIGEST_LEN);
if (!uri_str_to_bytes(passphrase, pp_ba)) {
g_byte_array_free(pp_ba, TRUE);
}
AirPDcapRsnaPwd2PskStep(pp_ba->data, pp_ba->len, ssid, ssidLength, 4096, 1, m_output);
- AirPDcapRsnaPwd2PskStep(pp_ba->data, pp_ba->len, ssid, ssidLength, 4096, 2, &m_output[AIRPDCAP_SHA_DIGEST_LEN]);
+ AirPDcapRsnaPwd2PskStep(pp_ba->data, pp_ba->len, ssid, ssidLength, 4096, 2, &m_output[SHA1_DIGEST_LEN]);
memcpy(output, m_output, AIRPDCAP_WPA_PSK_LEN);
g_byte_array_free(pp_ba, TRUE);
/*
* Returns the decryption_key_t struct given a string describing the key.
- * Returns NULL if the key_string cannot be parsed.
+ * Returns NULL if the input_string cannot be parsed.
*/
decryption_key_t*
-parse_key_string(gchar* input_string)
+parse_key_string(gchar* input_string, guint8 key_type)
{
- gchar *type;
- gchar *key;
+ gchar *key, *tmp_str;
gchar *ssid;
GString *key_string = NULL;
gchar **tokens;
guint n = 0;
decryption_key_t *dk;
- gchar *first_nibble = input_string;
if(input_string == NULL)
return NULL;
/*
- * Parse the input_string. It should be in the form
- * <key type>:<key data>[:<ssid>]
- * XXX - For backward compatibility, the a WEP key can be just a string
- * of hexadecimal characters (if WEP key is wrong, null will be
+ * Parse the input_string. WEP and WPA will be just a string
+ * of hexadecimal characters (if key is wrong, null will be
* returned...).
+ * WPA-PWD should be in the form
+ * <key data>[:<ssid>]
*/
- /* First, check for a WEP string */
- /* XXX - This duplicates code in packet-ieee80211.c */
- if (g_strncasecmp(input_string, STRING_KEY_TYPE_WEP ":", 4) == 0) {
- first_nibble += 4;
- }
-
- key_ba = g_byte_array_new();
- res = hex_str_to_bytes(first_nibble, key_ba, FALSE);
-
- if (res && key_ba->len > 0) {
- /* Key is correct! It was probably an 'old style' WEP key */
- /* Create the decryption_key_t structure, fill it and return it*/
- dk = g_malloc(sizeof(decryption_key_t));
-
- dk->type = AIRPDCAP_KEY_TYPE_WEP;
- /* XXX - The current key handling code in the GUI requires
- * no separators and lower case */
- dk->key = g_string_new(bytes_to_str(key_ba->data, key_ba->len));
- g_string_down(dk->key);
- dk->bits = key_ba->len * 8;
- dk->ssid = NULL;
-
- g_byte_array_free(key_ba, TRUE);
- return dk;
- }
- g_byte_array_free(key_ba, TRUE);
-
+ switch(key_type)
+ {
+ case AIRPDCAP_KEY_TYPE_WEP:
+ case AIRPDCAP_KEY_TYPE_WEP_40:
+ case AIRPDCAP_KEY_TYPE_WEP_104:
- tokens = g_strsplit(input_string,":",0);
+ key_ba = g_byte_array_new();
+ res = hex_str_to_bytes(input_string, key_ba, FALSE);
- /* Tokens is a null termiated array of strings ... */
- while(tokens[n] != NULL)
- n++;
+ if (res && key_ba->len > 0) {
+ /* Key is correct! It was probably an 'old style' WEP key */
+ /* Create the decryption_key_t structure, fill it and return it*/
+ dk = (decryption_key_t *)g_malloc(sizeof(decryption_key_t));
- if(n < 2)
- {
- /* Free the array of strings */
- g_strfreev(tokens);
- return NULL;
- }
+ dk->type = AIRPDCAP_KEY_TYPE_WEP;
+ /* XXX - The current key handling code in the GUI requires
+ * no separators and lower case */
+ tmp_str = bytes_to_str(NULL, key_ba->data, key_ba->len);
+ dk->key = g_string_new(tmp_str);
+ g_string_ascii_down(dk->key);
+ dk->bits = key_ba->len * 8;
+ dk->ssid = NULL;
- type = g_strdup(tokens[0]);
+ wmem_free(NULL, tmp_str);
+ g_byte_array_free(key_ba, TRUE);
+ return dk;
+ }
- /*
- * The second token is the key (right now it doesn't matter
- * if it is a passphrase[+ssid] or an hexadecimal one)
- */
- key = g_strdup(tokens[1]);
+ /* Key doesn't work */
+ g_byte_array_free(key_ba, TRUE);
+ return NULL;
- ssid = NULL;
- /* Maybe there is a third token (an ssid, if everything else is ok) */
- if(n >= 3)
- {
- ssid = g_strdup(tokens[2]);
- }
+ case AIRPDCAP_KEY_TYPE_WPA_PWD:
- if (g_strcasecmp(type,STRING_KEY_TYPE_WPA_PSK) == 0) /* WPA key */
- {
- /* Create a new string */
- key_string = g_string_new(key);
+ tokens = g_strsplit(input_string,":",0);
- key_ba = g_byte_array_new();
- res = hex_str_to_bytes(key, key_ba, FALSE);
+ /* Tokens is a null termiated array of strings ... */
+ while(tokens[n] != NULL)
+ n++;
- /* Two tokens means that the user should have entered a WPA-BIN key ... */
- if(!res || ((key_string->len) != WPA_PSK_KEY_CHAR_SIZE))
+ if(n < 1)
{
- g_string_free(key_string, TRUE);
- g_byte_array_free(key_ba, TRUE);
-
- g_free(type);
- g_free(key);
- /* No ssid has been created ... */
/* Free the array of strings */
g_strfreev(tokens);
return NULL;
}
- /* Key was correct!!! Create the new decryption_key_t ... */
- dk = (decryption_key_t*)g_malloc(sizeof(decryption_key_t));
-
- dk->type = AIRPDCAP_KEY_TYPE_WPA_PMK;
- dk->key = g_string_new(key);
- dk->bits = dk->key->len * 4;
- dk->ssid = NULL;
+ /*
+ * The first token is the key
+ */
+ key = g_strdup(tokens[0]);
- g_string_free(key_string, TRUE);
- g_byte_array_free(key_ba, TRUE);
- g_free(key);
- g_free(type);
+ ssid = NULL;
+ /* Maybe there is a second token (an ssid, if everything else is ok) */
+ if(n >= 2)
+ {
+ ssid = g_strdup(tokens[1]);
+ }
- /* Free the array of strings */
- g_strfreev(tokens);
- return dk;
- }
- else if(g_strcasecmp(type,STRING_KEY_TYPE_WPA_PWD) == 0) /* WPA key *//* If the number of tokens is more than three, we accept the string... if the first three tokens are correct... */
- {
/* Create a new string */
key_string = g_string_new(key);
ssid_ba = NULL;
- /* Three (or more) tokens mean that the user entered a WPA-PWD key ... */
+ /* Two (or more) tokens mean that the user entered a WPA-PWD key ... */
if( ((key_string->len) > WPA_KEY_MAX_CHAR_SIZE) || ((key_string->len) < WPA_KEY_MIN_CHAR_SIZE))
{
g_string_free(key_string, TRUE);
- g_free(type);
g_free(key);
g_free(ssid);
return NULL;
}
- if(ssid != NULL) /* more than three tokens found, means that the user specified the ssid */
+ if(ssid != NULL) /* more than two tokens found, means that the user specified the ssid */
{
ssid_ba = g_byte_array_new();
if (! uri_str_to_bytes(ssid, ssid_ba)) {
g_string_free(key_string, TRUE);
g_byte_array_free(ssid_ba, TRUE);
- g_free(type);
g_free(key);
g_free(ssid);
/* Free the array of strings */
g_string_free(key_string, TRUE);
g_byte_array_free(ssid_ba, TRUE);
- g_free(type);
g_free(key);
g_free(ssid);
if (ssid_ba != NULL)
g_byte_array_free(ssid_ba, TRUE);
- g_free(type);
g_free(key);
if(ssid != NULL)
g_free(ssid);
/* Free the array of strings */
g_strfreev(tokens);
return dk;
- }
- /* Something was wrong ... free everything */
+ case AIRPDCAP_KEY_TYPE_WPA_PSK:
- g_free(type);
- g_free(key);
- if(ssid != NULL)
- g_free(ssid); /* It is not always present */
- if (ssid_ba != NULL)
- g_byte_array_free(ssid_ba, TRUE);
+ key_ba = g_byte_array_new();
+ res = hex_str_to_bytes(input_string, key_ba, FALSE);
- /* Free the array of strings */
- g_strfreev(tokens);
+ /* Two tokens means that the user should have entered a WPA-BIN key ... */
+ if(!res || ((key_ba->len) != WPA_PSK_KEY_SIZE))
+ {
+ g_byte_array_free(key_ba, TRUE);
+
+ /* No ssid has been created ... */
+ return NULL;
+ }
+
+ /* Key was correct!!! Create the new decryption_key_t ... */
+ dk = (decryption_key_t*)g_malloc(sizeof(decryption_key_t));
+
+ dk->type = AIRPDCAP_KEY_TYPE_WPA_PSK;
+ dk->key = g_string_new(input_string);
+ dk->bits = (guint) dk->key->len * 4;
+ dk->ssid = NULL;
+
+ g_byte_array_free(key_ba, TRUE);
+ return dk;
+ }
+ /* Type not supported */
return NULL;
}
+void
+free_key_string(decryption_key_t *dk)
+{
+ if (dk->key)
+ g_string_free(dk->key, TRUE);
+ if (dk->ssid)
+ g_byte_array_free(dk->ssid, TRUE);
+ g_free(dk);
+}
+
/*
* Returns a newly allocated string representing the given decryption_key_t
* struct, or NULL if something is wrong...
switch(dk->type) {
case AIRPDCAP_KEY_TYPE_WEP:
- output_string = g_strdup_printf("%s:%s",STRING_KEY_TYPE_WEP,dk->key->str);
+ output_string = g_strdup(dk->key->str);
break;
case AIRPDCAP_KEY_TYPE_WPA_PWD:
if(dk->ssid == NULL)
- output_string = g_strdup_printf("%s:%s",STRING_KEY_TYPE_WPA_PWD,dk->key->str);
+ output_string = g_strdup(dk->key->str);
else
- output_string = g_strdup_printf("%s:%s:%s",
- STRING_KEY_TYPE_WPA_PWD, dk->key->str,
- format_uri(dk->ssid, ":"));
+ output_string = g_strdup_printf("%s:%s",
+ dk->key->str, format_uri(dk->ssid, ":"));
break;
case AIRPDCAP_KEY_TYPE_WPA_PMK:
- output_string = g_strdup_printf("%s:%s",STRING_KEY_TYPE_WPA_PSK,dk->key->str);
+ output_string = g_strdup(dk->key->str);
break;
default:
return NULL;
- break;
}
return output_string;
}
-#ifdef __cplusplus
+#ifdef __cplusplus
}
#endif
* Local Variables:
* c-basic-offset: 4
* tab-width: 8
- * set-tabs-mode: nil
+ * indent-tabs-mode: nil
* End:
*
- * ex: set shiftwidth=4 tabstop=8 expandtab
+ * ex: set shiftwidth=4 tabstop=8 expandtab:
* :indentSize=4:tabSize=8:noTabs=true:
*/
git.samba.org / metze / wireshark / wip.git / blobdiff