{
struct passwd *pass;
- pass = Get_Pwnam_alloc(talloc_tos(), lp_guestaccount());
+ pass = Get_Pwnam_alloc(talloc_tos(), lp_guest_account());
if (!pass) {
return false;
}
for (i = 0; i < VUID_CACHE_SIZE; i++) {
struct vuid_cache_entry *ent;
- ent = &conn->vuid_cache.array[i];
+ ent = &conn->vuid_cache->array[i];
if (ent->vuid != UID_FIELD_INVALID &&
conn->session_info == ent->session_info) {
return;
TALLOC_FREE(conn->session_info);
}
-/*******************************************************************
- Check if a username is OK.
+/****************************************************************************
+ Setup the share access mask for a connection.
+****************************************************************************/
- This sets up conn->session_info with a copy related to this vuser that
- later code can then mess with.
+static uint32_t create_share_access_mask(int snum,
+ bool readonly_share,
+ const struct security_token *token)
+{
+ uint32_t share_access = 0;
+
+ share_access_check(token,
+ lp_servicename(talloc_tos(), snum),
+ MAXIMUM_ALLOWED_ACCESS,
+ &share_access);
+
+ if (readonly_share) {
+ share_access &=
+ ~(SEC_FILE_WRITE_DATA | SEC_FILE_APPEND_DATA |
+ SEC_FILE_WRITE_EA | SEC_FILE_WRITE_ATTRIBUTE |
+ SEC_DIR_DELETE_CHILD );
+ }
+
+ if (security_token_has_privilege(token, SEC_PRIV_SECURITY)) {
+ share_access |= SEC_FLAG_SYSTEM_SECURITY;
+ }
+ if (security_token_has_privilege(token, SEC_PRIV_RESTORE)) {
+ share_access |= SEC_RIGHTS_PRIV_RESTORE;
+ }
+ if (security_token_has_privilege(token, SEC_PRIV_BACKUP)) {
+ share_access |= SEC_RIGHTS_PRIV_BACKUP;
+ }
+ if (security_token_has_privilege(token, SEC_PRIV_TAKE_OWNERSHIP)) {
+ share_access |= SEC_STD_WRITE_OWNER;
+ }
+
+ return share_access;
+}
+
+/*******************************************************************
+ Calculate access mask and if this user can access this share.
********************************************************************/
-static bool check_user_ok(connection_struct *conn,
- uint16_t vuid,
- const struct auth_serversupplied_info *session_info,
- int snum)
+NTSTATUS check_user_share_access(connection_struct *conn,
+ const struct auth_session_info *session_info,
+ uint32_t *p_share_access,
+ bool *p_readonly_share)
{
- bool valid_vuid = (vuid != UID_FIELD_INVALID);
- unsigned int i;
- bool readonly_share;
- bool admin_user;
-
- if (valid_vuid) {
- struct vuid_cache_entry *ent;
+ int snum = SNUM(conn);
+ uint32_t share_access = 0;
+ bool readonly_share = false;
- for (i=0; i<VUID_CACHE_SIZE; i++) {
- ent = &conn->vuid_cache.array[i];
- if (ent->vuid == vuid) {
- free_conn_session_info_if_unused(conn);
- conn->session_info = ent->session_info;
- conn->read_only = ent->read_only;
- return(True);
- }
- }
+ if (!user_ok_token(session_info->unix_info->unix_name,
+ session_info->info->domain_name,
+ session_info->security_token, snum)) {
+ return NT_STATUS_ACCESS_DENIED;
}
- if (!user_ok_token(session_info->unix_name,
- session_info->info3->base.domain.string,
- session_info->security_token, snum))
- return(False);
-
readonly_share = is_share_read_only_for_token(
- session_info->unix_name,
- session_info->info3->base.domain.string,
+ session_info->unix_info->unix_name,
+ session_info->info->domain_name,
session_info->security_token,
conn);
+ share_access = create_share_access_mask(snum,
+ readonly_share,
+ session_info->security_token);
+
+ if ((share_access & (FILE_READ_DATA|FILE_WRITE_DATA)) == 0) {
+ /* No access, read or write. */
+ DEBUG(3,("user %s connection to %s denied due to share "
+ "security descriptor.\n",
+ session_info->unix_info->unix_name,
+ lp_servicename(talloc_tos(), snum)));
+ return NT_STATUS_ACCESS_DENIED;
+ }
+
if (!readonly_share &&
- !share_access_check(session_info->security_token, lp_servicename(snum),
- FILE_WRITE_DATA)) {
+ !(share_access & FILE_WRITE_DATA)) {
/* smb.conf allows r/w, but the security descriptor denies
* write. Fall back to looking at readonly. */
readonly_share = True;
"security descriptor\n"));
}
- if (!share_access_check(session_info->security_token, lp_servicename(snum),
- readonly_share ?
- FILE_READ_DATA : FILE_WRITE_DATA)) {
- return False;
+ *p_share_access = share_access;
+ *p_readonly_share = readonly_share;
+
+ return NT_STATUS_OK;
+}
+
+/*******************************************************************
+ Check if a username is OK.
+
+ This sets up conn->session_info with a copy related to this vuser that
+ later code can then mess with.
+********************************************************************/
+
+static bool check_user_ok(connection_struct *conn,
+ uint64_t vuid,
+ const struct auth_session_info *session_info,
+ int snum)
+{
+ unsigned int i;
+ bool readonly_share = false;
+ bool admin_user = false;
+ struct vuid_cache_entry *ent = NULL;
+ uint32_t share_access = 0;
+ NTSTATUS status;
+
+ for (i=0; i<VUID_CACHE_SIZE; i++) {
+ ent = &conn->vuid_cache->array[i];
+ if (ent->vuid == vuid) {
+ if (vuid == UID_FIELD_INVALID) {
+ /*
+ * Slow path, we don't care
+ * about the array traversal.
+ */
+ continue;
+ }
+ free_conn_session_info_if_unused(conn);
+ conn->session_info = ent->session_info;
+ conn->read_only = ent->read_only;
+ conn->share_access = ent->share_access;
+ return(True);
+ }
+ }
+
+ status = check_user_share_access(conn,
+ session_info,
+ &share_access,
+ &readonly_share);
+ if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(status)) {
+ return false;
}
admin_user = token_contains_name_in_list(
- session_info->unix_name,
- session_info->info3->base.domain.string,
+ session_info->unix_info->unix_name,
+ session_info->info->domain_name,
NULL, session_info->security_token, lp_admin_users(snum));
- if (valid_vuid) {
- struct vuid_cache_entry *ent =
- &conn->vuid_cache.array[conn->vuid_cache.next_entry];
+ ent = &conn->vuid_cache->array[conn->vuid_cache->next_entry];
- conn->vuid_cache.next_entry =
- (conn->vuid_cache.next_entry + 1) % VUID_CACHE_SIZE;
+ conn->vuid_cache->next_entry =
+ (conn->vuid_cache->next_entry + 1) % VUID_CACHE_SIZE;
- TALLOC_FREE(ent->session_info);
+ TALLOC_FREE(ent->session_info);
- /*
- * If force_user was set, all session_info's are based on the same
- * username-based faked one.
- */
+ /*
+ * If force_user was set, all session_info's are based on the same
+ * username-based faked one.
+ */
- ent->session_info = copy_serverinfo(
- conn, conn->force_user ? conn->session_info : session_info);
+ ent->session_info = copy_session_info(
+ conn, conn->force_user ? conn->session_info : session_info);
- if (ent->session_info == NULL) {
- ent->vuid = UID_FIELD_INVALID;
- return false;
- }
+ if (ent->session_info == NULL) {
+ ent->vuid = UID_FIELD_INVALID;
+ return false;
+ }
- ent->vuid = vuid;
- ent->read_only = readonly_share;
- free_conn_session_info_if_unused(conn);
- conn->session_info = ent->session_info;
+ /*
+ * It's actually OK to call check_user_ok() with
+ * vuid == UID_FIELD_INVALID as called from change_to_user_by_session().
+ * All this will do is throw away one entry in the cache.
+ */
+
+ ent->vuid = vuid;
+ ent->read_only = readonly_share;
+ ent->share_access = share_access;
+ free_conn_session_info_if_unused(conn);
+ conn->session_info = ent->session_info;
+ if (vuid == UID_FIELD_INVALID) {
+ /*
+ * Not strictly needed, just make it really
+ * clear this entry is actually an unused one.
+ */
+ ent->read_only = false;
+ ent->share_access = 0;
+ ent->session_info = NULL;
}
conn->read_only = readonly_share;
+ conn->share_access = share_access;
+
if (admin_user) {
DEBUG(2,("check_user_ok: user %s is an admin user. "
"Setting uid as %d\n",
- conn->session_info->unix_name,
+ conn->session_info->unix_info->unix_name,
sec_initial_uid() ));
- conn->session_info->utok.uid = sec_initial_uid();
+ conn->session_info->unix_token->uid = sec_initial_uid();
}
return(True);
}
-/****************************************************************************
- Clear a vuid out of the connection's vuid cache
- This is only called on SMBulogoff.
-****************************************************************************/
-
-void conn_clear_vuid_cache(connection_struct *conn, uint16_t vuid)
-{
- int i;
-
- for (i=0; i<VUID_CACHE_SIZE; i++) {
- struct vuid_cache_entry *ent;
-
- ent = &conn->vuid_cache.array[i];
-
- if (ent->vuid == vuid) {
- ent->vuid = UID_FIELD_INVALID;
- /*
- * We need to keep conn->session_info around
- * if it's equal to ent->session_info as a SMBulogoff
- * is often followed by a SMBtdis (with an invalid
- * vuid). The debug code (or regular code in
- * vfs_full_audit) wants to refer to the
- * conn->session_info pointer to print debug
- * statements. Theoretically this is a bug,
- * as once the vuid is gone the session_info
- * on the conn struct isn't valid any more,
- * but there's enough code that assumes
- * conn->session_info is never null that
- * it's easier to hold onto the old pointer
- * until we get a new sessionsetupX.
- * As everything is hung off the
- * conn pointer as a talloc context we're not
- * leaking memory here. See bug #6315. JRA.
- */
- if (conn->session_info == ent->session_info) {
- ent->session_info = NULL;
- } else {
- TALLOC_FREE(ent->session_info);
- }
- ent->read_only = False;
- }
- }
-}
-
/****************************************************************************
Become the user of a connection number without changing the security context
stack, but modify the current_user entries.
****************************************************************************/
static bool change_to_user_internal(connection_struct *conn,
- const struct auth_serversupplied_info *session_info,
- uint16_t vuid)
+ const struct auth_session_info *session_info,
+ uint64_t vuid)
{
int snum;
gid_t gid;
if (!ok) {
DEBUG(2,("SMB user %s (unix user %s) "
"not permitted access to share %s.\n",
- session_info->sanitized_username,
- session_info->unix_name,
- lp_servicename(snum)));
+ session_info->unix_info->sanitized_username,
+ session_info->unix_info->unix_name,
+ lp_servicename(talloc_tos(), snum)));
return false;
}
- uid = conn->session_info->utok.uid;
- gid = conn->session_info->utok.gid;
- num_groups = conn->session_info->utok.ngroups;
- group_list = conn->session_info->utok.groups;
+ uid = conn->session_info->unix_token->uid;
+ gid = conn->session_info->unix_token->gid;
+ num_groups = conn->session_info->unix_token->ngroups;
+ group_list = conn->session_info->unix_token->groups;
/*
* See if we should force group for this service. If so this overrides
* any group set in the force user code.
*/
- if((group_c = *lp_force_group(snum))) {
+ if((group_c = *lp_force_group(talloc_tos(), snum))) {
SMB_ASSERT(conn->force_group_gid != (gid_t)-1);
*/
for (i = 0; i < num_groups; i++) {
if (group_list[i] == conn->force_group_gid) {
- conn->session_info->utok.gid =
+ conn->session_info->unix_token->gid =
conn->force_group_gid;
gid = conn->force_group_gid;
gid_to_sid(&conn->session_info->security_token
}
}
} else {
- conn->session_info->utok.gid = conn->force_group_gid;
+ conn->session_info->unix_token->gid = conn->force_group_gid;
gid = conn->force_group_gid;
gid_to_sid(&conn->session_info->security_token->sids[1],
gid);
return true;
}
-bool change_to_user(connection_struct *conn, uint16_t vuid)
+bool change_to_user(connection_struct *conn, uint64_t vuid)
{
- const struct auth_serversupplied_info *session_info = NULL;
- user_struct *vuser;
+ struct user_struct *vuser;
int snum = SNUM(conn);
if (!conn) {
vuser = get_valid_user_struct(conn->sconn, vuid);
- /*
- * We need a separate check in security=share mode due to vuid
- * always being UID_FIELD_INVALID. If we don't do this then
- * in share mode security we are *always* changing uid's between
- * SMB's - this hurts performance - Badly.
- */
-
- if((lp_security() == SEC_SHARE) && (current_user.conn == conn) &&
- (current_user.ut.uid == conn->session_info->utok.uid)) {
- DEBUG(4,("Skipping user change - already "
- "user\n"));
- return(True);
- } else if ((current_user.conn == conn) &&
+ if ((current_user.conn == conn) &&
(vuser != NULL) && (current_user.vuid == vuid) &&
- (current_user.ut.uid == vuser->session_info->utok.uid)) {
+ (current_user.ut.uid == vuser->session_info->unix_token->uid)) {
DEBUG(4,("Skipping user change - already "
"user\n"));
return(True);
}
- session_info = vuser ? vuser->session_info : conn->session_info;
-
- if (session_info == NULL) {
- /* Invalid vuid sent - even with security = share. */
- DEBUG(2,("Invalid vuid %d used on "
- "share %s.\n", vuid, lp_servicename(snum) ));
+ if (vuser == NULL) {
+ /* Invalid vuid sent */
+ DEBUG(2,("Invalid vuid %llu used on share %s.\n",
+ (unsigned long long)vuid, lp_servicename(talloc_tos(),
+ snum)));
return false;
}
- /* security = share sets force_user. */
- if (!conn->force_user && vuser == NULL) {
- DEBUG(2,("Invalid vuid used %d in accessing "
- "share %s.\n", vuid, lp_servicename(snum) ));
- return False;
- }
-
- return change_to_user_internal(conn, session_info, vuid);
+ return change_to_user_internal(conn, vuser->session_info, vuid);
}
-bool change_to_user_by_session(connection_struct *conn,
- const struct auth_serversupplied_info *session_info)
+static bool change_to_user_by_session(connection_struct *conn,
+ const struct auth_session_info *session_info)
{
SMB_ASSERT(conn != NULL);
SMB_ASSERT(session_info != NULL);
if ((current_user.conn == conn) &&
- (current_user.ut.uid == session_info->utok.uid)) {
+ (current_user.ut.uid == session_info->unix_token->uid)) {
DEBUG(7, ("Skipping user change - already user\n"));
return true;
but modify the current_user entries.
****************************************************************************/
-bool change_to_root_user(void)
+bool smbd_change_to_root_user(void)
{
set_root_sec_ctx();
user. Doesn't modify current_user.
****************************************************************************/
-bool become_authenticated_pipe_user(struct auth_serversupplied_info *session_info)
+bool smbd_become_authenticated_pipe_user(struct auth_session_info *session_info)
{
if (!push_sec_ctx())
return False;
- set_sec_ctx(session_info->utok.uid, session_info->utok.gid,
- session_info->utok.ngroups, session_info->utok.groups,
+ set_sec_ctx(session_info->unix_token->uid, session_info->unix_token->gid,
+ session_info->unix_token->ngroups, session_info->unix_token->groups,
session_info->security_token);
+ DEBUG(5, ("Impersonated user: uid=(%d,%d), gid=(%d,%d)\n",
+ (int)getuid(),
+ (int)geteuid(),
+ (int)getgid(),
+ (int)getegid()));
+
return True;
}
current_user.
****************************************************************************/
-bool unbecome_authenticated_pipe_user(void)
+bool smbd_unbecome_authenticated_pipe_user(void)
{
return pop_sec_ctx();
}
ctx_p->conn = current_user.conn;
ctx_p->vuid = current_user.vuid;
- DEBUG(4, ("push_conn_ctx(%u) : conn_ctx_stack_ndx = %d\n",
- (unsigned int)ctx_p->vuid, conn_ctx_stack_ndx ));
+ DEBUG(4, ("push_conn_ctx(%llu) : conn_ctx_stack_ndx = %d\n",
+ (unsigned long long)ctx_p->vuid, conn_ctx_stack_ndx));
conn_ctx_stack_ndx++;
}
restores the connection context.
****************************************************************************/
-void become_root(void)
+void smbd_become_root(void)
{
/*
* no good way to handle push_sec_ctx() failing without changing
/* Unbecome the root user */
-void unbecome_root(void)
+void smbd_unbecome_root(void)
{
pop_sec_ctx();
pop_conn_ctx();
Saves and restores the connection context.
****************************************************************************/
-bool become_user(connection_struct *conn, uint16 vuid)
+bool become_user(connection_struct *conn, uint64_t vuid)
{
if (!push_sec_ctx())
return False;
}
bool become_user_by_session(connection_struct *conn,
- const struct auth_serversupplied_info *session_info)
+ const struct auth_session_info *session_info)
{
if (!push_sec_ctx())
return false;
/****************************************************************************
Return the current user we are running effectively as on this connection.
- I'd like to make this return conn->session_info->utok.uid, but become_root()
+ I'd like to make this return conn->session_info->unix_token->uid, but become_root()
doesn't alter this value.
****************************************************************************/
/****************************************************************************
Return the current group we are running effectively as on this connection.
- I'd like to make this return conn->session_info->utok.gid, but become_root()
+ I'd like to make this return conn->session_info->unix_token->gid, but become_root()
doesn't alter this value.
****************************************************************************/
/****************************************************************************
Return the UNIX token we are running effectively as on this connection.
- I'd like to make this return &conn->session_info->utok, but become_root()
+ I'd like to make this return &conn->session_info->unix_token-> but become_root()
doesn't alter this value.
****************************************************************************/
return ¤t_user.ut;
}
+/****************************************************************************
+ Return the Windows token we are running effectively as on this connection.
+ If this is currently a NULL token as we're inside become_root() - a temporary
+ UNIX security override, then we search up the stack for the previous active
+ token.
+****************************************************************************/
+
const struct security_token *get_current_nttok(connection_struct *conn)
{
- return current_user.nt_user_token;
+ if (current_user.nt_user_token) {
+ return current_user.nt_user_token;
+ }
+ return sec_ctx_active_token();
}
-uint16_t get_current_vuid(connection_struct *conn)
+uint64_t get_current_vuid(connection_struct *conn)
{
return current_user.vuid;
}
git.samba.org / amitay / samba.git / blobdiff