/*
Unix SMB/CIFS implementation.
Copyright (C) Andrew Tridgell 1992-2001
-
+ Copyright (C) Andrew Bartlett 2002
+ Copyright (C) Rafal Szczesniak 2002
+ Copyright (C) Tim Potter 2001
+
This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
the Free Software Foundation; either version 2 of the License, or
#include "includes.h"
+#undef DBGC_CLASS
+#define DBGC_CLASS DBGC_PASSDB
+
static TDB_CONTEXT *tdb;
+/**
+ * Use a TDB to store an incrementing random seed.
+ *
+ * Initialised to the current pid, the very first time Samba starts,
+ * and incremented by one each time it is needed.
+ *
+ * @note Not called by systems with a working /dev/urandom.
+ */
+static void get_rand_seed(int *new_seed)
+{
+ *new_seed = sys_getpid();
+ if (tdb) {
+ tdb_change_int32_atomic(tdb, "INFO/random_seed", new_seed, 1);
+ }
+}
+
/* open up the secrets database */
BOOL secrets_init(void)
{
pstring fname;
+ unsigned char dummy;
if (tdb)
return True;
DEBUG(0,("Failed to open %s\n", fname));
return False;
}
+
+ /**
+ * Set a reseed function for the crypto random generator
+ *
+ * This avoids a problem where systems without /dev/urandom
+ * could send the same challenge to multiple clients
+ */
+ set_rand_reseed_callback(get_rand_seed);
+
+ /* Ensure that the reseed is done now, while we are root, etc */
+ generate_random_buffer(&dummy, sizeof(dummy));
+
return True;
}
/* read a entry from the secrets database - the caller must free the result
if size is non-null then the size of the entry is put in there
*/
-void *secrets_fetch(char *key, size_t *size)
+void *secrets_fetch(const char *key, size_t *size)
{
TDB_DATA kbuf, dbuf;
secrets_init();
if (!tdb)
return NULL;
- kbuf.dptr = key;
+ kbuf.dptr = (char *)key;
kbuf.dsize = strlen(key);
dbuf = tdb_fetch(tdb, kbuf);
if (size)
/* store a secrets entry
*/
-BOOL secrets_store(char *key, void *data, size_t size)
+BOOL secrets_store(const char *key, const void *data, size_t size)
{
TDB_DATA kbuf, dbuf;
secrets_init();
if (!tdb)
return False;
- kbuf.dptr = key;
+ kbuf.dptr = (char *)key;
kbuf.dsize = strlen(key);
- dbuf.dptr = data;
+ dbuf.dptr = (char *)data;
dbuf.dsize = size;
return tdb_store(tdb, kbuf, dbuf, TDB_REPLACE) == 0;
}
/* delete a secets database entry
*/
-BOOL secrets_delete(char *key)
+BOOL secrets_delete(const char *key)
{
TDB_DATA kbuf;
secrets_init();
if (!tdb)
return False;
- kbuf.dptr = key;
+ kbuf.dptr = (char *)key;
kbuf.dsize = strlen(key);
return tdb_delete(tdb, kbuf) == 0;
}
-BOOL secrets_store_domain_sid(char *domain, DOM_SID *sid)
+BOOL secrets_store_domain_sid(const char *domain, const DOM_SID *sid)
{
fstring key;
+ BOOL ret;
slprintf(key, sizeof(key)-1, "%s/%s", SECRETS_DOMAIN_SID, domain);
- strupper(key);
- return secrets_store(key, sid, sizeof(DOM_SID));
+ strupper_m(key);
+ ret = secrets_store(key, sid, sizeof(DOM_SID));
+
+ /* Force a re-query, in case we modified our domain */
+ if (ret)
+ reset_global_sam_sid();
+ return ret;
}
-BOOL secrets_fetch_domain_sid(char *domain, DOM_SID *sid)
+BOOL secrets_fetch_domain_sid(const char *domain, DOM_SID *sid)
{
DOM_SID *dyn_sid;
fstring key;
size_t size;
slprintf(key, sizeof(key)-1, "%s/%s", SECRETS_DOMAIN_SID, domain);
- strupper(key);
+ strupper_m(key);
dyn_sid = (DOM_SID *)secrets_fetch(key, &size);
if (dyn_sid == NULL)
return True;
}
+BOOL secrets_store_domain_guid(const char *domain, struct uuid *guid)
+{
+ fstring key;
-/************************************************************************
-form a key for fetching the machine trust account password
-************************************************************************/
-char *trust_keystr(char *domain)
+ slprintf(key, sizeof(key)-1, "%s/%s", SECRETS_DOMAIN_GUID, domain);
+ strupper_m(key);
+ return secrets_store(key, guid, sizeof(struct uuid));
+}
+
+BOOL secrets_fetch_domain_guid(const char *domain, struct uuid *guid)
+{
+ struct uuid *dyn_guid;
+ fstring key;
+ size_t size;
+ struct uuid new_guid;
+
+ slprintf(key, sizeof(key)-1, "%s/%s", SECRETS_DOMAIN_GUID, domain);
+ strupper_m(key);
+ dyn_guid = (struct uuid *)secrets_fetch(key, &size);
+
+ if ((!dyn_guid) && (lp_server_role() == ROLE_DOMAIN_PDC)) {
+ smb_uuid_generate_random(&new_guid);
+ if (!secrets_store_domain_guid(domain, &new_guid))
+ return False;
+ dyn_guid = (struct uuid *)secrets_fetch(key, &size);
+ if (dyn_guid == NULL)
+ return False;
+ }
+
+ if (size != sizeof(struct uuid))
+ {
+ DEBUG(1,("UUID size %d is wrong!\n", (int)size));
+ SAFE_FREE(dyn_guid);
+ return False;
+ }
+
+ *guid = *dyn_guid;
+ SAFE_FREE(dyn_guid);
+ return True;
+}
+
+/**
+ * Form a key for fetching the machine trust account password
+ *
+ * @param domain domain name
+ *
+ * @return stored password's key
+ **/
+const char *trust_keystr(const char *domain)
{
static fstring keystr;
slprintf(keystr,sizeof(keystr)-1,"%s/%s",
SECRETS_MACHINE_ACCT_PASS, domain);
- strupper(keystr);
+ strupper_m(keystr);
return keystr;
}
/**
* Form a key for fetching a trusted domain password
*
- * @param domain domain name
+ * @param domain trusted domain name
*
* @return stored password's key
**/
-char *trustdom_keystr(char *domain)
+static char *trustdom_keystr(const char *domain)
{
- static char* keystr;
+ static pstring keystr;
- asprintf(&keystr, "%s/%s", SECRETS_DOMTRUST_ACCT_PASS, domain);
- strupper(keystr);
+ pstr_sprintf(keystr, "%s/%s", SECRETS_DOMTRUST_ACCT_PASS, domain);
+ strupper_m(keystr);
return keystr;
}
/************************************************************************
- Routine to get the machine trust account password for a domain.
+ Lock the trust password entry.
+************************************************************************/
+
+BOOL secrets_lock_trust_account_password(const char *domain, BOOL dolock)
+{
+ if (!tdb)
+ return False;
+
+ if (dolock)
+ return (tdb_lock_bystring(tdb, trust_keystr(domain),0) == 0);
+ else
+ tdb_unlock_bystring(tdb, trust_keystr(domain));
+ return True;
+}
+
+/************************************************************************
+ Routine to get the default secure channel type for trust accounts
+************************************************************************/
+
+uint32 get_default_sec_channel(void)
+{
+ if (lp_server_role() == ROLE_DOMAIN_BDC ||
+ lp_server_role() == ROLE_DOMAIN_PDC) {
+ return SEC_CHAN_BDC;
+ } else {
+ return SEC_CHAN_WKSTA;
+ }
+}
+
+/************************************************************************
+ Routine to get the trust account password for a domain.
+ The user of this function must have locked the trust password file using
+ the above secrets_lock_trust_account_password().
************************************************************************/
-BOOL secrets_fetch_trust_account_password(char *domain, uint8 ret_pwd[16],
- time_t *pass_last_set_time)
+
+BOOL secrets_fetch_trust_account_password(const char *domain, uint8 ret_pwd[16],
+ time_t *pass_last_set_time,
+ uint32 *channel)
{
struct machine_acct_pass *pass;
char *plaintext;
size_t size;
- plaintext = secrets_fetch_machine_password();
+ plaintext = secrets_fetch_machine_password(domain, pass_last_set_time,
+ channel);
if (plaintext) {
- /* we have an ADS password - use that */
- DEBUG(4,("Using ADS machine password\n"));
- E_md4hash((uchar *)plaintext, ret_pwd);
+ DEBUG(4,("Using cleartext machine password\n"));
+ E_md4hash(plaintext, ret_pwd);
SAFE_FREE(plaintext);
return True;
}
if (pass_last_set_time) *pass_last_set_time = pass->mod_time;
memcpy(ret_pwd, pass->hash, 16);
SAFE_FREE(pass);
+
+ if (channel)
+ *channel = get_default_sec_channel();
+
return True;
}
/************************************************************************
Routine to get account password to trusted domain
************************************************************************/
-BOOL secrets_fetch_trusted_domain_password(char *domain, char** pwd,
- DOM_SID *sid, time_t *pass_last_set_time)
+
+BOOL secrets_fetch_trusted_domain_password(const char *domain, char** pwd,
+ DOM_SID *sid, time_t *pass_last_set_time)
{
- struct trusted_dom_pass *pass;
+ struct trusted_dom_pass pass;
size_t size;
+
+ /* unpacking structures */
+ char* pass_buf;
+ int pass_len = 0;
- if (!(pass = secrets_fetch(trustdom_keystr(domain), &size))) {
+ ZERO_STRUCT(pass);
+
+ /* fetching trusted domain password structure */
+ if (!(pass_buf = secrets_fetch(trustdom_keystr(domain), &size))) {
DEBUG(5, ("secrets_fetch failed!\n"));
return False;
}
-
- if (size != sizeof(*pass)) {
- DEBUG(0, ("secrets were of incorrect size!\n"));
+
+ /* unpack trusted domain password */
+ pass_len = tdb_trusted_dom_pass_unpack(pass_buf, size, &pass);
+ SAFE_FREE(pass_buf);
+
+ if (pass_len != size) {
+ DEBUG(5, ("Invalid secrets size. Unpacked data doesn't match trusted_dom_pass structure.\n"));
return False;
}
-
+
+ /* the trust's password */
if (pwd) {
- *pwd = strdup(pass->pass);
+ *pwd = SMB_STRDUP(pass.pass);
if (!*pwd) {
return False;
}
}
- if (pass_last_set_time) *pass_last_set_time = pass->mod_time;
+ /* last change time */
+ if (pass_last_set_time) *pass_last_set_time = pass.mod_time;
- memcpy(&sid, &(pass->domain_sid), sizeof(sid));
- SAFE_FREE(pass);
-
+ /* domain sid */
+ sid_copy(sid, &pass.domain_sid);
+
return True;
}
/************************************************************************
Routine to set the trust account password for a domain.
************************************************************************/
-BOOL secrets_store_trust_account_password(char *domain, uint8 new_pwd[16])
+
+BOOL secrets_store_trust_account_password(const char *domain, uint8 new_pwd[16])
{
struct machine_acct_pass pass;
}
/**
- * Routine to set the password for trusted domain
+ * Routine to store the password for trusted domain
*
* @param domain remote domain name
* @param pwd plain text password of trust relationship
* @return true if succeeded
**/
-BOOL secrets_store_trusted_domain_password(char* domain, char* pwd,
- DOM_SID sid)
-{
+BOOL secrets_store_trusted_domain_password(const char* domain, smb_ucs2_t *uni_dom_name,
+ size_t uni_name_len, const char* pwd,
+ DOM_SID sid)
+{
+ /* packing structures */
+ pstring pass_buf;
+ int pass_len = 0;
+ int pass_buf_len = sizeof(pass_buf);
+
struct trusted_dom_pass pass;
ZERO_STRUCT(pass);
+
+ /* unicode domain name and its length */
+ if (!uni_dom_name)
+ return False;
+
+ strncpy_w(pass.uni_name, uni_dom_name, sizeof(pass.uni_name) - 1);
+ pass.uni_name_len = uni_name_len;
+ /* last change time */
pass.mod_time = time(NULL);
+ /* password of the trust */
pass.pass_len = strlen(pwd);
fstrcpy(pass.pass, pwd);
- memcpy(&(pass.domain_sid), &sid, sizeof(sid));
+ /* domain sid */
+ sid_copy(&pass.domain_sid, &sid);
- return secrets_store(trustdom_keystr(domain), (void *)&pass, sizeof(pass));
+ pass_len = tdb_trusted_dom_pass_pack(pass_buf, pass_buf_len, &pass);
+
+ return secrets_store(trustdom_keystr(domain), (void *)&pass_buf, pass_len);
}
/************************************************************************
Routine to set the plaintext machine account password for a realm
the password is assumed to be a null terminated ascii string
************************************************************************/
-BOOL secrets_store_machine_password(char *pass)
+
+BOOL secrets_store_machine_password(const char *pass, const char *domain, uint32 sec_channel)
{
- char *key;
+ char *key = NULL;
BOOL ret;
- asprintf(&key, "%s/%s", SECRETS_MACHINE_PASSWORD, lp_workgroup());
- strupper(key);
+ uint32 last_change_time;
+ uint32 sec_channel_type;
+
+ asprintf(&key, "%s/%s", SECRETS_MACHINE_PASSWORD, domain);
+ if (!key)
+ return False;
+ strupper_m(key);
+
ret = secrets_store(key, pass, strlen(pass)+1);
- free(key);
+ SAFE_FREE(key);
+
+ if (!ret)
+ return ret;
+
+ asprintf(&key, "%s/%s", SECRETS_MACHINE_LAST_CHANGE_TIME, domain);
+ if (!key)
+ return False;
+ strupper_m(key);
+
+ SIVAL(&last_change_time, 0, time(NULL));
+ ret = secrets_store(key, &last_change_time, sizeof(last_change_time));
+ SAFE_FREE(key);
+
+ asprintf(&key, "%s/%s", SECRETS_MACHINE_SEC_CHANNEL_TYPE, domain);
+ if (!key)
+ return False;
+ strupper_m(key);
+
+ SIVAL(&sec_channel_type, 0, sec_channel);
+ ret = secrets_store(key, &sec_channel_type, sizeof(sec_channel_type));
+ SAFE_FREE(key);
+
return ret;
}
Routine to fetch the plaintext machine account password for a realm
the password is assumed to be a null terminated ascii string
************************************************************************/
-char *secrets_fetch_machine_password(void)
+char *secrets_fetch_machine_password(const char *domain,
+ time_t *pass_last_set_time,
+ uint32 *channel)
{
- char *key;
+ char *key = NULL;
char *ret;
- asprintf(&key, "%s/%s", SECRETS_MACHINE_PASSWORD, lp_workgroup());
- strupper(key);
+ asprintf(&key, "%s/%s", SECRETS_MACHINE_PASSWORD, domain);
+ strupper_m(key);
ret = (char *)secrets_fetch(key, NULL);
- free(key);
+ SAFE_FREE(key);
+
+ if (pass_last_set_time) {
+ size_t size;
+ uint32 *last_set_time;
+ asprintf(&key, "%s/%s", SECRETS_MACHINE_LAST_CHANGE_TIME, domain);
+ strupper_m(key);
+ last_set_time = secrets_fetch(key, &size);
+ if (last_set_time) {
+ *pass_last_set_time = IVAL(last_set_time,0);
+ SAFE_FREE(last_set_time);
+ } else {
+ *pass_last_set_time = 0;
+ }
+ SAFE_FREE(key);
+ }
+
+ if (channel) {
+ size_t size;
+ uint32 *channel_type;
+ asprintf(&key, "%s/%s", SECRETS_MACHINE_SEC_CHANNEL_TYPE, domain);
+ strupper_m(key);
+ channel_type = secrets_fetch(key, &size);
+ if (channel_type) {
+ *channel = IVAL(channel_type,0);
+ SAFE_FREE(channel_type);
+ } else {
+ *channel = get_default_sec_channel();
+ }
+ SAFE_FREE(key);
+ }
+
return ret;
}
Routine to delete the machine trust account password file for a domain.
************************************************************************/
-BOOL trust_password_delete(char *domain)
+BOOL trust_password_delete(const char *domain)
{
return secrets_delete(trust_keystr(domain));
}
/************************************************************************
Routine to delete the password for trusted domain
************************************************************************/
-BOOL trusted_domain_password_delete(char *domain)
+
+BOOL trusted_domain_password_delete(const char *domain)
{
return secrets_delete(trustdom_keystr(domain));
}
-/*******************************************************************
- Reset the 'done' variables so after a client process is created
- from a fork call these calls will be re-done. This should be
- expanded if more variables need reseting.
- ******************************************************************/
+BOOL secrets_store_ldap_pw(const char* dn, char* pw)
+{
+ char *key = NULL;
+ BOOL ret;
+
+ if (asprintf(&key, "%s/%s", SECRETS_LDAP_BIND_PW, dn) < 0) {
+ DEBUG(0, ("secrets_store_ldap_pw: asprintf failed!\n"));
+ return False;
+ }
+
+ ret = secrets_store(key, pw, strlen(pw)+1);
+
+ SAFE_FREE(key);
+ return ret;
+}
+
+
+/**
+ * Get trusted domains info from secrets.tdb.
+ *
+ * The linked list is allocated on the supplied talloc context, caller gets to destroy
+ * when done.
+ *
+ * @param ctx Allocation context
+ * @param enum_ctx Starting index, eg. we can start fetching at third
+ * or sixth trusted domain entry. Zero is the first index.
+ * Value it is set to is the enum context for the next enumeration.
+ * @param num_domains Number of domain entries to fetch at one call
+ * @param domains Pointer to array of trusted domain structs to be filled up
+ *
+ * @return nt status code of rpc response
+ **/
-void reset_globals_after_fork(void)
+NTSTATUS secrets_get_trusted_domains(TALLOC_CTX* ctx, int* enum_ctx, unsigned int max_num_domains,
+ int *num_domains, TRUSTDOM ***domains)
{
- unsigned char dummy;
+ TDB_LIST_NODE *keys, *k;
+ TRUSTDOM *dom = NULL;
+ char *pattern;
+ unsigned int start_idx;
+ uint32 idx = 0;
+ size_t size, packed_size = 0;
+ fstring dom_name;
+ char *packed_pass;
+ struct trusted_dom_pass *pass = TALLOC_ZERO_P(ctx, struct trusted_dom_pass);
+ NTSTATUS status;
+
+ if (!secrets_init()) return NT_STATUS_ACCESS_DENIED;
+
+ if (!pass) {
+ DEBUG(0, ("talloc_zero failed!\n"));
+ return NT_STATUS_NO_MEMORY;
+ }
+
+ *num_domains = 0;
+ start_idx = *enum_ctx;
+
+ /* generate searching pattern */
+ if (!(pattern = talloc_asprintf(ctx, "%s/*", SECRETS_DOMTRUST_ACCT_PASS))) {
+ DEBUG(0, ("secrets_get_trusted_domains: talloc_asprintf() failed!\n"));
+ return NT_STATUS_NO_MEMORY;
+ }
- secrets_init();
+ DEBUG(5, ("secrets_get_trusted_domains: looking for %d domains, starting at index %d\n",
+ max_num_domains, *enum_ctx));
- /*
- * Increment the global seed value to ensure every smbd starts
- * with a new random seed.
+ *domains = TALLOC_ZERO_ARRAY(ctx, TRUSTDOM *, max_num_domains);
+
+ /* fetching trusted domains' data and collecting them in a list */
+ keys = tdb_search_keys(tdb, pattern);
+
+ /*
+ * if there's no keys returned ie. no trusted domain,
+ * return "no more entries" code
*/
+ status = NT_STATUS_NO_MORE_ENTRIES;
- if (tdb) {
- uint32 initial_val = sys_getpid();
- tdb_change_int32_atomic(tdb, "INFO/random_seed", (int *)&initial_val, 1);
- set_rand_reseed_data((unsigned char *)&initial_val, sizeof(initial_val));
+ /* searching for keys in secrets db -- way to go ... */
+ for (k = keys; k; k = k->next) {
+ char *secrets_key;
+
+ /* important: ensure null-termination of the key string */
+ secrets_key = SMB_STRNDUP(k->node_key.dptr, k->node_key.dsize);
+ if (!secrets_key) {
+ DEBUG(0, ("strndup failed!\n"));
+ return NT_STATUS_NO_MEMORY;
+ }
+
+ packed_pass = secrets_fetch(secrets_key, &size);
+ packed_size = tdb_trusted_dom_pass_unpack(packed_pass, size, pass);
+ /* packed representation isn't needed anymore */
+ SAFE_FREE(packed_pass);
+
+ if (size != packed_size) {
+ DEBUG(2, ("Secrets record %s is invalid!\n", secrets_key));
+ continue;
+ }
+
+ pull_ucs2_fstring(dom_name, pass->uni_name);
+ DEBUG(18, ("Fetched secret record num %d.\nDomain name: %s, SID: %s\n",
+ idx, dom_name, sid_string_static(&pass->domain_sid)));
+
+ SAFE_FREE(secrets_key);
+
+ if (idx >= start_idx && idx < start_idx + max_num_domains) {
+ dom = TALLOC_ZERO_P(ctx, TRUSTDOM);
+ if (!dom) {
+ /* free returned tdb record */
+ return NT_STATUS_NO_MEMORY;
+ }
+
+ /* copy domain sid */
+ SMB_ASSERT(sizeof(dom->sid) == sizeof(pass->domain_sid));
+ memcpy(&(dom->sid), &(pass->domain_sid), sizeof(dom->sid));
+
+ /* copy unicode domain name */
+ dom->name = talloc_strdup_w(ctx, pass->uni_name);
+
+ (*domains)[idx - start_idx] = dom;
+
+ DEBUG(18, ("Secret record is in required range.\n \
+ start_idx = %d, max_num_domains = %d. Added to returned array.\n",
+ start_idx, max_num_domains));
+
+ *enum_ctx = idx + 1;
+ (*num_domains)++;
+
+ /* set proper status code to return */
+ if (k->next) {
+ /* there are yet some entries to enumerate */
+ status = STATUS_MORE_ENTRIES;
+ } else {
+ /* this is the last entry in the whole enumeration */
+ status = NT_STATUS_OK;
+ }
+ } else {
+ DEBUG(18, ("Secret is outside the required range.\n \
+ start_idx = %d, max_num_domains = %d. Not added to returned array\n",
+ start_idx, max_num_domains));
+ }
+
+ idx++;
}
+
+ DEBUG(5, ("secrets_get_trusted_domains: got %d domains\n", *num_domains));
+
+ /* free the results of searching the keys */
+ tdb_search_list_free(keys);
+
+ return status;
+}
+
+/*******************************************************************************
+ Lock the secrets tdb based on a string - this is used as a primitive form of mutex
+ between smbd instances.
+*******************************************************************************/
+
+BOOL secrets_named_mutex(const char *name, unsigned int timeout)
+{
+ int ret = 0;
+
+ if (!message_init())
+ return False;
+
+ ret = tdb_lock_bystring(tdb, name, timeout);
+ if (ret == 0)
+ DEBUG(10,("secrets_named_mutex: got mutex for %s\n", name ));
+ return (ret == 0);
+}
+
+/*******************************************************************************
+ Unlock a named mutex.
+*******************************************************************************/
+
+void secrets_named_mutex_release(const char *name)
+{
+ tdb_unlock_bystring(tdb, name);
+ DEBUG(10,("secrets_named_mutex: released mutex for %s\n", name ));
+}
+
+/*********************************************************
+ Check to see if we must talk to the PDC to avoid sam
+ sync delays
+ ********************************************************/
+
+BOOL must_use_pdc( const char *domain )
+{
+ time_t now = time(NULL);
+ time_t last_change_time;
+ unsigned char passwd[16];
+
+ if ( !secrets_fetch_trust_account_password(domain, passwd, &last_change_time, NULL) )
+ return False;
+
/*
- * Re-seed the random crypto generator, so all smbd's
- * started from the same parent won't generate the same
- * sequence.
+ * If the time the machine password has changed
+ * was less than about 15 minutes then we need to contact
+ * the PDC only, as we cannot be sure domain replication
+ * has yet taken place. Bug found by Gerald (way to go
+ * Gerald !). JRA.
*/
- generate_random_buffer( &dummy, 1, True);
+
+ if ( now - last_change_time < SAM_SYNC_WINDOW )
+ return True;
+
+ return False;
+
}
-BOOL secrets_store_ldap_pw(char* dn, char* pw)
+/*******************************************************************************
+ Store a complete AFS keyfile into secrets.tdb.
+*******************************************************************************/
+
+BOOL secrets_store_afs_keyfile(const char *cell, const struct afs_keyfile *keyfile)
{
fstring key;
- char *p;
-
- pstrcpy(key, dn);
- for (p=key; *p; p++)
- if (*p == ',') *p = '/';
+
+ if ((cell == NULL) || (keyfile == NULL))
+ return False;
+
+ if (ntohl(keyfile->nkeys) > SECRETS_AFS_MAXKEYS)
+ return False;
+
+ slprintf(key, sizeof(key)-1, "%s/%s", SECRETS_AFS_KEYFILE, cell);
+ return secrets_store(key, keyfile, sizeof(struct afs_keyfile));
+}
+
+/*******************************************************************************
+ Fetch the current (highest) AFS key from secrets.tdb
+*******************************************************************************/
+BOOL secrets_fetch_afs_key(const char *cell, struct afs_key *result)
+{
+ fstring key;
+ struct afs_keyfile *keyfile;
+ size_t size;
+ uint32 i;
+
+ slprintf(key, sizeof(key)-1, "%s/%s", SECRETS_AFS_KEYFILE, cell);
+
+ keyfile = (struct afs_keyfile *)secrets_fetch(key, &size);
+
+ if (keyfile == NULL)
+ return False;
+
+ if (size != sizeof(struct afs_keyfile)) {
+ SAFE_FREE(keyfile);
+ return False;
+ }
+
+ i = ntohl(keyfile->nkeys);
+
+ if (i > SECRETS_AFS_MAXKEYS) {
+ SAFE_FREE(keyfile);
+ return False;
+ }
+
+ *result = keyfile->entry[i-1];
+
+ result->kvno = ntohl(result->kvno);
+
+ return True;
+}
+
+/******************************************************************************
+ When kerberos is not available, choose between anonymous or
+ authenticated connections.
+
+ We need to use an authenticated connection if DCs have the
+ RestrictAnonymous registry entry set > 0, or the "Additional
+ restrictions for anonymous connections" set in the win2k Local
+ Security Policy.
+
+ Caller to free() result in domain, username, password
+*******************************************************************************/
+void secrets_fetch_ipc_userpass(char **username, char **domain, char **password)
+{
+ *username = secrets_fetch(SECRETS_AUTH_USER, NULL);
+ *domain = secrets_fetch(SECRETS_AUTH_DOMAIN, NULL);
+ *password = secrets_fetch(SECRETS_AUTH_PASSWORD, NULL);
- return secrets_store(key, pw, strlen(pw));
+ if (*username && **username) {
+
+ if (!*domain || !**domain)
+ *domain = smb_xstrdup(lp_workgroup());
+
+ if (!*password || !**password)
+ *password = smb_xstrdup("");
+
+ DEBUG(3, ("IPC$ connections done by user %s\\%s\n",
+ *domain, *username));
+
+ } else {
+ DEBUG(3, ("IPC$ connections done anonymously\n"));
+ *username = smb_xstrdup("");
+ *domain = smb_xstrdup("");
+ *password = smb_xstrdup("");
+ }
}
git.samba.org / samba.git / blobdiff