Copyright (C) Andrew Tridgell 1992-2001
Copyright (C) Andrew Bartlett 2002
Copyright (C) Rafal Szczesniak 2002
-
+ Copyright (C) Tim Potter 2001
+
This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
the Free Software Foundation; either version 2 of the License, or
static TDB_CONTEXT *tdb;
+/**
+ * Use a TDB to store an incrementing random seed.
+ *
+ * Initialised to the current pid, the very first time Samba starts,
+ * and incremented by one each time it is needed.
+ *
+ * @note Not called by systems with a working /dev/urandom.
+ */
+static void get_rand_seed(int *new_seed)
+{
+ *new_seed = sys_getpid();
+ if (tdb) {
+ tdb_change_int32_atomic(tdb, "INFO/random_seed", new_seed, 1);
+ }
+}
+
/* open up the secrets database */
BOOL secrets_init(void)
{
pstring fname;
+ unsigned char dummy;
if (tdb)
return True;
DEBUG(0,("Failed to open %s\n", fname));
return False;
}
+
+ /**
+ * Set a reseed function for the crypto random generator
+ *
+ * This avoids a problem where systems without /dev/urandom
+ * could send the same challenge to multiple clients
+ */
+ set_rand_reseed_callback(get_rand_seed);
+
+ /* Ensure that the reseed is done now, while we are root, etc */
+ generate_random_buffer(&dummy, sizeof(dummy));
+
return True;
}
secrets_init();
if (!tdb)
return NULL;
- kbuf.dptr = key;
+ kbuf.dptr = (char *)key;
kbuf.dsize = strlen(key);
dbuf = tdb_fetch(tdb, kbuf);
if (size)
secrets_init();
if (!tdb)
return False;
- kbuf.dptr = key;
+ kbuf.dptr = (char *)key;
kbuf.dsize = strlen(key);
- dbuf.dptr = data;
+ dbuf.dptr = (char *)data;
dbuf.dsize = size;
return tdb_store(tdb, kbuf, dbuf, TDB_REPLACE) == 0;
}
secrets_init();
if (!tdb)
return False;
- kbuf.dptr = key;
+ kbuf.dptr = (char *)key;
kbuf.dsize = strlen(key);
return tdb_delete(tdb, kbuf) == 0;
}
BOOL secrets_store_domain_sid(const char *domain, const DOM_SID *sid)
{
fstring key;
+ BOOL ret;
slprintf(key, sizeof(key)-1, "%s/%s", SECRETS_DOMAIN_SID, domain);
- strupper(key);
- return secrets_store(key, sid, sizeof(DOM_SID));
+ strupper_m(key);
+ ret = secrets_store(key, sid, sizeof(DOM_SID));
+
+ /* Force a re-query, in case we modified our domain */
+ if (ret)
+ reset_global_sam_sid();
+ return ret;
}
BOOL secrets_fetch_domain_sid(const char *domain, DOM_SID *sid)
size_t size;
slprintf(key, sizeof(key)-1, "%s/%s", SECRETS_DOMAIN_SID, domain);
- strupper(key);
+ strupper_m(key);
dyn_sid = (DOM_SID *)secrets_fetch(key, &size);
if (dyn_sid == NULL)
return True;
}
-BOOL secrets_store_domain_guid(const char *domain, GUID *guid)
+BOOL secrets_store_domain_guid(const char *domain, struct uuid *guid)
{
fstring key;
slprintf(key, sizeof(key)-1, "%s/%s", SECRETS_DOMAIN_GUID, domain);
- strupper(key);
- return secrets_store(key, guid, sizeof(GUID));
+ strupper_m(key);
+ return secrets_store(key, guid, sizeof(struct uuid));
}
-BOOL secrets_fetch_domain_guid(const char *domain, GUID *guid)
+BOOL secrets_fetch_domain_guid(const char *domain, struct uuid *guid)
{
- GUID *dyn_guid;
+ struct uuid *dyn_guid;
fstring key;
size_t size;
- GUID new_guid;
+ struct uuid new_guid;
slprintf(key, sizeof(key)-1, "%s/%s", SECRETS_DOMAIN_GUID, domain);
- strupper(key);
- dyn_guid = (GUID *)secrets_fetch(key, &size);
-
- DEBUG(6,("key is %s, size is %d\n", key, (int)size));
+ strupper_m(key);
+ dyn_guid = (struct uuid *)secrets_fetch(key, &size);
- if ((NULL == dyn_guid) && (ROLE_DOMAIN_PDC == lp_server_role())) {
- uuid_generate_random(&new_guid);
+ if ((!dyn_guid) && (lp_server_role() == ROLE_DOMAIN_PDC)) {
+ smb_uuid_generate_random(&new_guid);
if (!secrets_store_domain_guid(domain, &new_guid))
return False;
- dyn_guid = (GUID *)secrets_fetch(key, &size);
+ dyn_guid = (struct uuid *)secrets_fetch(key, &size);
if (dyn_guid == NULL)
return False;
}
- if (size != sizeof(GUID))
+ if (size != sizeof(struct uuid))
{
+ DEBUG(1,("UUID size %d is wrong!\n", (int)size));
SAFE_FREE(dyn_guid);
return False;
}
slprintf(keystr,sizeof(keystr)-1,"%s/%s",
SECRETS_MACHINE_ACCT_PASS, domain);
- strupper(keystr);
+ strupper_m(keystr);
return keystr;
}
*
* @return stored password's key
**/
-char *trustdom_keystr(const char *domain)
+static char *trustdom_keystr(const char *domain)
{
- static char* keystr;
+ static pstring keystr;
- asprintf(&keystr, "%s/%s", SECRETS_DOMTRUST_ACCT_PASS, domain);
- strupper(keystr);
+ pstr_sprintf(keystr, "%s/%s", SECRETS_DOMTRUST_ACCT_PASS, domain);
+ strupper_m(keystr);
return keystr;
}
/************************************************************************
Routine to get the trust account password for a domain.
The user of this function must have locked the trust password file using
- the above call.
+ the above secrets_lock_trust_account_password().
************************************************************************/
BOOL secrets_fetch_trust_account_password(const char *domain, uint8 ret_pwd[16],
plaintext = secrets_fetch_machine_password(domain, pass_last_set_time,
channel);
if (plaintext) {
- /* we have an ADS password - use that */
- DEBUG(4,("Using ADS machine password\n"));
+ DEBUG(4,("Using cleartext machine password\n"));
E_md4hash(plaintext, ret_pwd);
SAFE_FREE(plaintext);
return True;
/* the trust's password */
if (pwd) {
- *pwd = strdup(pass.pass);
+ *pwd = SMB_STRDUP(pass.pass);
if (!*pwd) {
return False;
}
asprintf(&key, "%s/%s", SECRETS_MACHINE_PASSWORD, domain);
if (!key)
return False;
- strupper(key);
+ strupper_m(key);
ret = secrets_store(key, pass, strlen(pass)+1);
SAFE_FREE(key);
asprintf(&key, "%s/%s", SECRETS_MACHINE_LAST_CHANGE_TIME, domain);
if (!key)
return False;
- strupper(key);
+ strupper_m(key);
SIVAL(&last_change_time, 0, time(NULL));
ret = secrets_store(key, &last_change_time, sizeof(last_change_time));
asprintf(&key, "%s/%s", SECRETS_MACHINE_SEC_CHANNEL_TYPE, domain);
if (!key)
return False;
- strupper(key);
+ strupper_m(key);
SIVAL(&sec_channel_type, 0, sec_channel);
ret = secrets_store(key, &sec_channel_type, sizeof(sec_channel_type));
char *key = NULL;
char *ret;
asprintf(&key, "%s/%s", SECRETS_MACHINE_PASSWORD, domain);
- strupper(key);
+ strupper_m(key);
ret = (char *)secrets_fetch(key, NULL);
SAFE_FREE(key);
size_t size;
uint32 *last_set_time;
asprintf(&key, "%s/%s", SECRETS_MACHINE_LAST_CHANGE_TIME, domain);
- strupper(key);
+ strupper_m(key);
last_set_time = secrets_fetch(key, &size);
if (last_set_time) {
*pass_last_set_time = IVAL(last_set_time,0);
+ SAFE_FREE(last_set_time);
} else {
*pass_last_set_time = 0;
}
size_t size;
uint32 *channel_type;
asprintf(&key, "%s/%s", SECRETS_MACHINE_SEC_CHANNEL_TYPE, domain);
- strupper(key);
+ strupper_m(key);
channel_type = secrets_fetch(key, &size);
if (channel_type) {
*channel = IVAL(channel_type,0);
+ SAFE_FREE(channel_type);
} else {
*channel = get_default_sec_channel();
}
}
-/*******************************************************************
- Reset the 'done' variables so after a client process is created
- from a fork call these calls will be re-done. This should be
- expanded if more variables need reseting.
- ******************************************************************/
-
-void reset_globals_after_fork(void)
-{
- unsigned char dummy;
-
- secrets_init();
-
- /*
- * Increment the global seed value to ensure every smbd starts
- * with a new random seed.
- */
-
- if (tdb) {
- uint32 initial_val = sys_getpid();
- tdb_change_int32_atomic(tdb, "INFO/random_seed", (int *)&initial_val, 1);
- set_rand_reseed_data((unsigned char *)&initial_val, sizeof(initial_val));
- }
-
- /*
- * Re-seed the random crypto generator, so all smbd's
- * started from the same parent won't generate the same
- * sequence.
- */
- generate_random_buffer( &dummy, 1, True);
-}
-
BOOL secrets_store_ldap_pw(const char* dn, char* pw)
{
char *key = NULL;
* @return nt status code of rpc response
**/
-NTSTATUS secrets_get_trusted_domains(TALLOC_CTX* ctx, int* enum_ctx, unsigned int max_num_domains, int *num_domains, TRUSTDOM ***domains)
+NTSTATUS secrets_get_trusted_domains(TALLOC_CTX* ctx, int* enum_ctx, unsigned int max_num_domains,
+ int *num_domains, TRUSTDOM ***domains)
{
TDB_LIST_NODE *keys, *k;
TRUSTDOM *dom = NULL;
size_t size, packed_size = 0;
fstring dom_name;
char *packed_pass;
- struct trusted_dom_pass *pass = talloc_zero(ctx, sizeof(struct trusted_dom_pass));
+ struct trusted_dom_pass *pass = TALLOC_ZERO_P(ctx, struct trusted_dom_pass);
NTSTATUS status;
if (!secrets_init()) return NT_STATUS_ACCESS_DENIED;
DEBUG(5, ("secrets_get_trusted_domains: looking for %d domains, starting at index %d\n",
max_num_domains, *enum_ctx));
- *domains = talloc_zero(ctx, sizeof(**domains)*max_num_domains);
+ *domains = TALLOC_ZERO_ARRAY(ctx, TRUSTDOM *, max_num_domains);
/* fetching trusted domains' data and collecting them in a list */
keys = tdb_search_keys(tdb, pattern);
char *secrets_key;
/* important: ensure null-termination of the key string */
- secrets_key = strndup(k->node_key.dptr, k->node_key.dsize);
+ secrets_key = SMB_STRNDUP(k->node_key.dptr, k->node_key.dsize);
if (!secrets_key) {
DEBUG(0, ("strndup failed!\n"));
return NT_STATUS_NO_MEMORY;
}
-
+
packed_pass = secrets_fetch(secrets_key, &size);
packed_size = tdb_trusted_dom_pass_unpack(packed_pass, size, pass);
/* packed representation isn't needed anymore */
SAFE_FREE(secrets_key);
if (idx >= start_idx && idx < start_idx + max_num_domains) {
- dom = talloc_zero(ctx, sizeof(*dom));
+ dom = TALLOC_ZERO_P(ctx, TRUSTDOM);
if (!dom) {
/* free returned tdb record */
return NT_STATUS_NO_MEMORY;
}
+/*******************************************************************************
+ Store a complete AFS keyfile into secrets.tdb.
+*******************************************************************************/
+
+BOOL secrets_store_afs_keyfile(const char *cell, const struct afs_keyfile *keyfile)
+{
+ fstring key;
+
+ if ((cell == NULL) || (keyfile == NULL))
+ return False;
+
+ if (ntohl(keyfile->nkeys) > SECRETS_AFS_MAXKEYS)
+ return False;
+
+ slprintf(key, sizeof(key)-1, "%s/%s", SECRETS_AFS_KEYFILE, cell);
+ return secrets_store(key, keyfile, sizeof(struct afs_keyfile));
+}
+
+/*******************************************************************************
+ Fetch the current (highest) AFS key from secrets.tdb
+*******************************************************************************/
+BOOL secrets_fetch_afs_key(const char *cell, struct afs_key *result)
+{
+ fstring key;
+ struct afs_keyfile *keyfile;
+ size_t size;
+ uint32 i;
+
+ slprintf(key, sizeof(key)-1, "%s/%s", SECRETS_AFS_KEYFILE, cell);
+
+ keyfile = (struct afs_keyfile *)secrets_fetch(key, &size);
+
+ if (keyfile == NULL)
+ return False;
+
+ if (size != sizeof(struct afs_keyfile)) {
+ SAFE_FREE(keyfile);
+ return False;
+ }
+
+ i = ntohl(keyfile->nkeys);
+
+ if (i > SECRETS_AFS_MAXKEYS) {
+ SAFE_FREE(keyfile);
+ return False;
+ }
+
+ *result = keyfile->entry[i-1];
+
+ result->kvno = ntohl(result->kvno);
+
+ return True;
+}
+
+/******************************************************************************
+ When kerberos is not available, choose between anonymous or
+ authenticated connections.
+
+ We need to use an authenticated connection if DCs have the
+ RestrictAnonymous registry entry set > 0, or the "Additional
+ restrictions for anonymous connections" set in the win2k Local
+ Security Policy.
+
+ Caller to free() result in domain, username, password
+*******************************************************************************/
+void secrets_fetch_ipc_userpass(char **username, char **domain, char **password)
+{
+ *username = secrets_fetch(SECRETS_AUTH_USER, NULL);
+ *domain = secrets_fetch(SECRETS_AUTH_DOMAIN, NULL);
+ *password = secrets_fetch(SECRETS_AUTH_PASSWORD, NULL);
+
+ if (*username && **username) {
+
+ if (!*domain || !**domain)
+ *domain = smb_xstrdup(lp_workgroup());
+
+ if (!*password || !**password)
+ *password = smb_xstrdup("");
+
+ DEBUG(3, ("IPC$ connections done by user %s\\%s\n",
+ *domain, *username));
+
+ } else {
+ DEBUG(3, ("IPC$ connections done anonymously\n"));
+ *username = smb_xstrdup("");
+ *domain = smb_xstrdup("");
+ *password = smb_xstrdup("");
+ }
+}
+
git.samba.org / samba.git / blobdiff