Merge tag 'v5.7-rc7' into perf/core, to pick up fixes
[sfrench/cifs-2.6.git] / security / selinux / hooks.c
index 0b4e32161b7775df189e59624dd43923d8df1019..4c037c2545c1613b2b517d583f8d696ae00452bf 100644 (file)
@@ -5842,40 +5842,60 @@ static unsigned int selinux_ipv6_postroute(void *priv,
 
 static int selinux_netlink_send(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
 {
-       int err = 0;
-       u32 perm;
+       int rc = 0;
+       unsigned int msg_len;
+       unsigned int data_len = skb->len;
+       unsigned char *data = skb->data;
        struct nlmsghdr *nlh;
        struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
+       u16 sclass = sksec->sclass;
+       u32 perm;
 
-       if (skb->len < NLMSG_HDRLEN) {
-               err = -EINVAL;
-               goto out;
-       }
-       nlh = nlmsg_hdr(skb);
+       while (data_len >= nlmsg_total_size(0)) {
+               nlh = (struct nlmsghdr *)data;
+
+               /* NOTE: the nlmsg_len field isn't reliably set by some netlink
+                *       users which means we can't reject skb's with bogus
+                *       length fields; our solution is to follow what
+                *       netlink_rcv_skb() does and simply skip processing at
+                *       messages with length fields that are clearly junk
+                */
+               if (nlh->nlmsg_len < NLMSG_HDRLEN || nlh->nlmsg_len > data_len)
+                       return 0;
 
-       err = selinux_nlmsg_lookup(sksec->sclass, nlh->nlmsg_type, &perm);
-       if (err) {
-               if (err == -EINVAL) {
+               rc = selinux_nlmsg_lookup(sclass, nlh->nlmsg_type, &perm);
+               if (rc == 0) {
+                       rc = sock_has_perm(sk, perm);
+                       if (rc)
+                               return rc;
+               } else if (rc == -EINVAL) {
+                       /* -EINVAL is a missing msg/perm mapping */
                        pr_warn_ratelimited("SELinux: unrecognized netlink"
-                              " message: protocol=%hu nlmsg_type=%hu sclass=%s"
-                              " pid=%d comm=%s\n",
-                              sk->sk_protocol, nlh->nlmsg_type,
-                              secclass_map[sksec->sclass - 1].name,
-                              task_pid_nr(current), current->comm);
-                       if (!enforcing_enabled(&selinux_state) ||
-                           security_get_allow_unknown(&selinux_state))
-                               err = 0;
+                               " message: protocol=%hu nlmsg_type=%hu sclass=%s"
+                               " pid=%d comm=%s\n",
+                               sk->sk_protocol, nlh->nlmsg_type,
+                               secclass_map[sclass - 1].name,
+                               task_pid_nr(current), current->comm);
+                       if (enforcing_enabled(&selinux_state) &&
+                           !security_get_allow_unknown(&selinux_state))
+                               return rc;
+                       rc = 0;
+               } else if (rc == -ENOENT) {
+                       /* -ENOENT is a missing socket/class mapping, ignore */
+                       rc = 0;
+               } else {
+                       return rc;
                }
 
-               /* Ignore */
-               if (err == -ENOENT)
-                       err = 0;
-               goto out;
+               /* move to the next message after applying netlink padding */
+               msg_len = NLMSG_ALIGN(nlh->nlmsg_len);
+               if (msg_len >= data_len)
+                       return 0;
+               data_len -= msg_len;
+               data += msg_len;
        }
 
-       err = sock_has_perm(sk, perm);
-out:
-       return err;
+       return rc;
 }
 
 static void ipc_init_security(struct ipc_security_struct *isec, u16 sclass)