bool should_sign;
bool should_encrypt;
+ uint64_t encryption_session_id;
bool signing_skipped;
bool notify_async;
struct tevent_req *subreq;
struct iovec *iov;
int i, num_iov, nbt_len;
+ int tf_iov = -1;
+ const DATA_BLOB *encryption_key = NULL;
+ uint64_t encryption_session_id = 0;
/*
- * 1 for the nbt length
- * per request: TRANSFORM, HDR, fixed, dyn, padding
+ * 1 for the nbt length, optional TRANSFORM
+ * per request: HDR, fixed, dyn, padding
* -1 because the last one does not need padding
*/
- iov = talloc_array(reqs[0], struct iovec, 1 + 5*num_reqs - 1);
+ iov = talloc_array(reqs[0], struct iovec, 1 + 1 + 4*num_reqs - 1);
if (iov == NULL) {
return NT_STATUS_NO_MEMORY;
}
num_iov = 1;
nbt_len = 0;
+ /*
+ * the session of the first request that requires encryption
+ * specifies the encryption key.
+ */
+ for (i=0; i<num_reqs; i++) {
+ if (!tevent_req_is_in_progress(reqs[i])) {
+ return NT_STATUS_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+ }
+
+ state = tevent_req_data(reqs[i], struct smbXcli_req_state);
+
+ if (!smbXcli_conn_is_connected(state->conn)) {
+ return NT_STATUS_CONNECTION_DISCONNECTED;
+ }
+
+ if ((state->conn->protocol != PROTOCOL_NONE) &&
+ (state->conn->protocol < PROTOCOL_SMB2_02)) {
+ return NT_STATUS_REVISION_MISMATCH;
+ }
+
+ if (state->session == NULL) {
+ continue;
+ }
+
+ if (!state->smb2.should_encrypt) {
+ continue;
+ }
+
+ encryption_key = &state->session->smb2->encryption_key;
+ if (encryption_key->length == 0) {
+ return NT_STATUS_INVALID_PARAMETER_MIX;
+ }
+
+ encryption_session_id = state->session->smb2->session_id;
+
+ tf_iov = num_iov;
+ iov[num_iov].iov_base = state->smb2.transform;
+ iov[num_iov].iov_len = sizeof(state->smb2.transform);
+ num_iov += 1;
+
+ SBVAL(state->smb2.transform, SMB2_TF_PROTOCOL_ID, SMB2_TF_MAGIC);
+ SBVAL(state->smb2.transform, SMB2_TF_NONCE,
+ state->session->smb2->nonce_low);
+ SBVAL(state->smb2.transform, SMB2_TF_NONCE+8,
+ state->session->smb2->nonce_high);
+ SBVAL(state->smb2.transform, SMB2_TF_SESSION_ID,
+ encryption_session_id);
+
+ state->session->smb2->nonce_low += 1;
+ if (state->session->smb2->nonce_low == 0) {
+ state->session->smb2->nonce_high += 1;
+ state->session->smb2->nonce_low += 1;
+ }
+
+ nbt_len += SMB2_TF_HDR_SIZE;
+ break;
+ }
+
for (i=0; i<num_reqs; i++) {
- int tf_iov;
int hdr_iov;
size_t reqlen;
bool ret;
uint16_t credits;
uint64_t mid;
const DATA_BLOB *signing_key = NULL;
- const DATA_BLOB *encryption_key = NULL;
if (!tevent_req_is_in_progress(reqs[i])) {
return NT_STATUS_INTERNAL_ERROR;
SBVAL(state->smb2.hdr, SMB2_HDR_MESSAGE_ID, mid);
skip_credits:
- if (state->session) {
+ if (state->session && encryption_key == NULL) {
/*
* We prefer the channel signing key if it is
* already there.
if (signing_key && signing_key->length == 0) {
signing_key = NULL;
}
-
- if (state->smb2.should_encrypt) {
- encryption_key = &state->session->smb2->encryption_key;
- }
- }
-
- if (encryption_key) {
- tf_iov = num_iov;
- iov[num_iov].iov_base = state->smb2.transform;
- iov[num_iov].iov_len = sizeof(state->smb2.transform);
- num_iov += 1;
}
hdr_iov = num_iov;
SIVAL(state->smb2.hdr, SMB2_HDR_NEXT_COMMAND, reqlen);
}
- if (encryption_key) {
- NTSTATUS status;
- uint8_t *buf;
- int vi;
-
- SBVAL(state->smb2.transform, SMB2_TF_NONCE,
- state->session->smb2->nonce_low);
- SBVAL(state->smb2.transform, SMB2_TF_NONCE+8,
- state->session->smb2->nonce_high);
-
- state->session->smb2->nonce_low += 1;
- if (state->session->smb2->nonce_low == 0) {
- state->session->smb2->nonce_high += 1;
- state->session->smb2->nonce_low += 1;
- }
-
- buf = talloc_array(iov, uint8_t, reqlen);
- if (buf == NULL) {
- return NT_STATUS_NO_MEMORY;
- }
+ state->smb2.encryption_session_id = encryption_session_id;
- reqlen += SMB2_TF_HDR_SIZE;
-
- /*
- * We copy the buffers before encrypting them,
- * this is at least currently needed for the
- * to keep state->smb2.hdr.
- *
- * Also the callers may expect there buffers
- * to be const.
- */
- for (vi = hdr_iov; vi < num_iov; vi++) {
- struct iovec *v = &iov[vi];
- const uint8_t *o = (const uint8_t *)v->iov_base;
-
- memcpy(buf, o, v->iov_len);
- v->iov_base = (void *)buf;
- buf += v->iov_len;
- }
-
- status = smb2_signing_encrypt_pdu(*encryption_key,
- state->session->conn->protocol,
- &iov[tf_iov], num_iov - tf_iov);
- if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(status)) {
- return status;
- }
- } else if (signing_key) {
+ if (signing_key != NULL) {
NTSTATUS status;
status = smb2_signing_sign_pdu(*signing_key,
iov[0].iov_base = state->length_hdr;
iov[0].iov_len = sizeof(state->length_hdr);
+ if (encryption_key != NULL) {
+ NTSTATUS status;
+ size_t buflen = nbt_len - SMB2_TF_HDR_SIZE;
+ uint8_t *buf;
+ int vi;
+
+ buf = talloc_array(iov, uint8_t, buflen);
+ if (buf == NULL) {
+ return NT_STATUS_NO_MEMORY;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * We copy the buffers before encrypting them,
+ * this is at least currently needed for the
+ * to keep state->smb2.hdr.
+ *
+ * Also the callers may expect there buffers
+ * to be const.
+ */
+ for (vi = tf_iov + 1; vi < num_iov; vi++) {
+ struct iovec *v = &iov[vi];
+ const uint8_t *o = (const uint8_t *)v->iov_base;
+
+ memcpy(buf, o, v->iov_len);
+ v->iov_base = (void *)buf;
+ buf += v->iov_len;
+ }
+
+ status = smb2_signing_encrypt_pdu(*encryption_key,
+ state->conn->protocol,
+ &iov[tf_iov], num_iov - tf_iov);
+ if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(status)) {
+ return status;
+ }
+ }
+
if (state->conn->dispatch_incoming == NULL) {
state->conn->dispatch_incoming = smb2cli_conn_dispatch_incoming;
}
git.samba.org / kai / samba.git / blobdiff