these capabilities are effective at for processes with any
label. The value is set by writing the desired label to the
file or cleared by writing "-" to the file.
+ptrace
+ This is used to define the current ptrace policy
+ 0 - default: this is the policy that relies on smack access rules.
+ For the PTRACE_READ a subject needs to have a read access on
+ object. For the PTRACE_ATTACH a read-write access is required.
+ 1 - exact: this is the policy that limits PTRACE_ATTACH. Attach is
+ only allowed when subject's and object's labels are equal.
+ PTRACE_READ is not affected. Can be overriden with CAP_SYS_PTRACE.
+ 2 - draconian: this policy behaves like the 'exact' above with an
+ exception that it can't be overriden with CAP_SYS_PTRACE.
revoke-subject
Writing a Smack label here sets the access to '-' for all access
rules with that subject label.
F: fs/ext4/
Extended Verification Module (EVM)
-M: Mimi Zohar <zohar@us.ibm.com>
+M: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
+L: linux-ima-devel@lists.sourceforge.net
+L: linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org
S: Supported
F: security/integrity/evm/
F: drivers/ipack/
INTEGRITY MEASUREMENT ARCHITECTURE (IMA)
-M: Mimi Zohar <zohar@us.ibm.com>
+M: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
M: Dmitry Kasatkin <d.kasatkin@samsung.com>
+L: linux-ima-devel@lists.sourceforge.net
+L: linux-ima-user@lists.sourceforge.net
+L: linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org
S: Supported
F: security/integrity/ima/
F: security/keys/
KEYS-TRUSTED
-M: David Safford <safford@watson.ibm.com>
-M: Mimi Zohar <zohar@us.ibm.com>
+M: David Safford <safford@us.ibm.com>
+M: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
L: linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org
L: keyrings@linux-nfs.org
S: Supported
F: security/keys/trusted.h
KEYS-ENCRYPTED
-M: Mimi Zohar <zohar@us.ibm.com>
-M: David Safford <safford@watson.ibm.com>
+M: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
+M: David Safford <safford@us.ibm.com>
L: linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org
L: keyrings@linux-nfs.org
S: Supported
atomic_t i_count;
atomic_t i_dio_count;
atomic_t i_writecount;
+#ifdef CONFIG_IMA
+ atomic_t i_readcount; /* struct files open RO */
+#endif
const struct file_operations *i_fop; /* former ->i_op->default_file_ops */
struct file_lock *i_flock;
struct address_space i_data;
struct hlist_head i_fsnotify_marks;
#endif
-#ifdef CONFIG_IMA
- atomic_t i_readcount; /* struct files open RO */
-#endif
void *i_private; /* fs or device private pointer */
};
extern void key_set_timeout(struct key *, unsigned);
+/*
+ * The permissions required on a key that we're looking up.
+ */
+#define KEY_NEED_VIEW 0x01 /* Require permission to view attributes */
+#define KEY_NEED_READ 0x02 /* Require permission to read content */
+#define KEY_NEED_WRITE 0x04 /* Require permission to update / modify */
+#define KEY_NEED_SEARCH 0x08 /* Require permission to search (keyring) or find (key) */
+#define KEY_NEED_LINK 0x10 /* Require permission to link */
+#define KEY_NEED_SETATTR 0x20 /* Require permission to change attributes */
+#define KEY_NEED_ALL 0x3f /* All the above permissions */
+
/**
* key_is_instantiated - Determine if a key has been positively instantiated
* @key: The key to check.
void (*key_free) (struct key *key);
int (*key_permission) (key_ref_t key_ref,
const struct cred *cred,
- key_perm_t perm);
+ unsigned perm);
int (*key_getsecurity)(struct key *key, char **_buffer);
#endif /* CONFIG_KEYS */
int security_key_alloc(struct key *key, const struct cred *cred, unsigned long flags);
void security_key_free(struct key *key);
int security_key_permission(key_ref_t key_ref,
- const struct cred *cred, key_perm_t perm);
+ const struct cred *cred, unsigned perm);
int security_key_getsecurity(struct key *key, char **_buffer);
#else
static inline int security_key_permission(key_ref_t key_ref,
const struct cred *cred,
- key_perm_t perm)
+ unsigned perm)
{
return 0;
}
* 30 May 2002: Cleanup, Robert M. Love <rml@tech9.net>
*/
+#define pr_fmt(fmt) KBUILD_MODNAME ": " fmt
+
#include <linux/audit.h>
#include <linux/capability.h>
#include <linux/mm.h>
static void warn_legacy_capability_use(void)
{
- static int warned;
- if (!warned) {
- char name[sizeof(current->comm)];
-
- printk(KERN_INFO "warning: `%s' uses 32-bit capabilities"
- " (legacy support in use)\n",
- get_task_comm(name, current));
- warned = 1;
- }
+ char name[sizeof(current->comm)];
+
+ pr_info_once("warning: `%s' uses 32-bit capabilities (legacy support in use)\n",
+ get_task_comm(name, current));
}
/*
static void warn_deprecated_v2(void)
{
- static int warned;
+ char name[sizeof(current->comm)];
- if (!warned) {
- char name[sizeof(current->comm)];
-
- printk(KERN_INFO "warning: `%s' uses deprecated v2"
- " capabilities in a way that may be insecure.\n",
- get_task_comm(name, current));
- warned = 1;
- }
+ pr_info_once("warning: `%s' uses deprecated v2 capabilities in a way that may be insecure\n",
+ get_task_comm(name, current));
}
/*
bool ns_capable(struct user_namespace *ns, int cap)
{
if (unlikely(!cap_valid(cap))) {
- printk(KERN_CRIT "capable() called with invalid cap=%u\n", cap);
+ pr_crit("capable() called with invalid cap=%u\n", cap);
BUG();
}
*
* Returns 0 on success and non-zero otherwise.
*/
-long seccomp_attach_user_filter(char __user *user_filter)
+static long seccomp_attach_user_filter(char __user *user_filter)
{
struct sock_fprog fprog;
long ret = -EFAULT;
# Object file lists
obj-$(CONFIG_SECURITY) += security.o capability.o
obj-$(CONFIG_SECURITYFS) += inode.o
-obj-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX) += selinux/built-in.o
-obj-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_SMACK) += smack/built-in.o
+obj-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX) += selinux/
+obj-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_SMACK) += smack/
obj-$(CONFIG_AUDIT) += lsm_audit.o
-obj-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_TOMOYO) += tomoyo/built-in.o
-obj-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_APPARMOR) += apparmor/built-in.o
-obj-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_YAMA) += yama/built-in.o
+obj-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_TOMOYO) += tomoyo/
+obj-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_APPARMOR) += apparmor/
+obj-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_YAMA) += yama/
obj-$(CONFIG_CGROUP_DEVICE) += device_cgroup.o
# Object integrity file lists
subdir-$(CONFIG_INTEGRITY) += integrity
-obj-$(CONFIG_INTEGRITY) += integrity/built-in.o
+obj-$(CONFIG_INTEGRITY) += integrity/
static int __init apparmor_enabled_setup(char *str)
{
unsigned long enabled;
- int error = strict_strtoul(str, 0, &enabled);
+ int error = kstrtoul(str, 0, &enabled);
if (!error)
apparmor_enabled = enabled ? 1 : 0;
return 1;
struct qstr *name, void **ctx,
u32 *ctxlen)
{
- return 0;
+ return -EOPNOTSUPP;
}
static int cap_inode_alloc_security(struct inode *inode)
}
static int cap_key_permission(key_ref_t key_ref, const struct cred *cred,
- key_perm_t perm)
+ unsigned perm)
{
return 0;
}
integrity-y := iint.o
subdir-$(CONFIG_IMA) += ima
-obj-$(CONFIG_IMA) += ima/built-in.o
+obj-$(CONFIG_IMA) += ima/
subdir-$(CONFIG_EVM) += evm
-obj-$(CONFIG_EVM) += evm/built-in.o
+obj-$(CONFIG_EVM) += evm/
config EVM
boolean "EVM support"
- depends on SECURITY && KEYS && (TRUSTED_KEYS=y || TRUSTED_KEYS=n)
+ depends on SECURITY
+ select KEYS
+ select ENCRYPTED_KEYS
select CRYPTO_HMAC
- select CRYPTO_MD5
select CRYPTO_SHA1
- select ENCRYPTED_KEYS
default n
help
EVM protects a file's security extended attributes against
/* List of EVM protected security xattrs */
extern char *evm_config_xattrnames[];
-extern int evm_init_key(void);
-extern int evm_update_evmxattr(struct dentry *dentry,
- const char *req_xattr_name,
- const char *req_xattr_value,
- size_t req_xattr_value_len);
-extern int evm_calc_hmac(struct dentry *dentry, const char *req_xattr_name,
- const char *req_xattr_value,
- size_t req_xattr_value_len, char *digest);
-extern int evm_calc_hash(struct dentry *dentry, const char *req_xattr_name,
- const char *req_xattr_value,
- size_t req_xattr_value_len, char *digest);
-extern int evm_init_hmac(struct inode *inode, const struct xattr *xattr,
- char *hmac_val);
-extern int evm_init_secfs(void);
+int evm_init_key(void);
+int evm_update_evmxattr(struct dentry *dentry,
+ const char *req_xattr_name,
+ const char *req_xattr_value,
+ size_t req_xattr_value_len);
+int evm_calc_hmac(struct dentry *dentry, const char *req_xattr_name,
+ const char *req_xattr_value,
+ size_t req_xattr_value_len, char *digest);
+int evm_calc_hash(struct dentry *dentry, const char *req_xattr_name,
+ const char *req_xattr_value,
+ size_t req_xattr_value_len, char *digest);
+int evm_init_hmac(struct inode *inode, const struct xattr *xattr,
+ char *hmac_val);
+int evm_init_secfs(void);
#endif
* Using root's kernel master key (kmk), calculate the HMAC
*/
+#define pr_fmt(fmt) KBUILD_MODNAME ": " fmt
+
#include <linux/module.h>
#include <linux/crypto.h>
#include <linux/xattr.h>
umode_t mode;
} hmac_misc;
- memset(&hmac_misc, 0, sizeof hmac_misc);
+ memset(&hmac_misc, 0, sizeof(hmac_misc));
hmac_misc.ino = inode->i_ino;
hmac_misc.generation = inode->i_generation;
hmac_misc.uid = from_kuid(&init_user_ns, inode->i_uid);
hmac_misc.gid = from_kgid(&init_user_ns, inode->i_gid);
hmac_misc.mode = inode->i_mode;
- crypto_shash_update(desc, (const u8 *)&hmac_misc, sizeof hmac_misc);
+ crypto_shash_update(desc, (const u8 *)&hmac_misc, sizeof(hmac_misc));
if (evm_hmac_version > 1)
crypto_shash_update(desc, inode->i_sb->s_uuid,
sizeof(inode->i_sb->s_uuid));
desc = init_desc(EVM_XATTR_HMAC);
if (IS_ERR(desc)) {
- printk(KERN_INFO "init_desc failed\n");
+ pr_info("init_desc failed\n");
return PTR_ERR(desc);
}
* evm_inode_removexattr, and evm_verifyxattr
*/
+#define pr_fmt(fmt) KBUILD_MODNAME ": " fmt
+
#include <linux/module.h>
#include <linux/crypto.h>
#include <linux/audit.h>
error = evm_init_secfs();
if (error < 0) {
- printk(KERN_INFO "EVM: Error registering secfs\n");
+ pr_info("Error registering secfs\n");
goto err;
}
char **xattrname;
for (xattrname = evm_config_xattrnames; *xattrname != NULL; xattrname++)
- printk(KERN_INFO "EVM: %s\n", *xattrname);
+ pr_info("%s\n", *xattrname);
return 0;
}
* - Get the key and enable EVM
*/
+#define pr_fmt(fmt) KBUILD_MODNAME ": " fmt
+
#include <linux/uaccess.h>
#include <linux/module.h>
#include "evm.h"
error = evm_init_key();
if (!error) {
evm_initialized = 1;
- pr_info("EVM: initialized\n");
+ pr_info("initialized\n");
} else
- pr_err("EVM: initialization failed\n");
+ pr_err("initialization failed\n");
return count;
}
{
struct integrity_iint_cache *iint = foo;
- memset(iint, 0, sizeof *iint);
+ memset(iint, 0, sizeof(*iint));
iint->version = 0;
iint->flags = 0UL;
iint->ima_file_status = INTEGRITY_UNKNOWN;
#include "../integrity.h"
enum ima_show_type { IMA_SHOW_BINARY, IMA_SHOW_BINARY_NO_FIELD_LEN,
- IMA_SHOW_ASCII };
+ IMA_SHOW_BINARY_OLD_STRING_FMT, IMA_SHOW_ASCII };
enum tpm_pcrs { TPM_PCR0 = 0, TPM_PCR8 = 8 };
/* digest size for IMA, fits SHA1 or MD5 */
int violation, struct inode *inode,
const unsigned char *filename)
{
- const char *op = "add_template_measure";
- const char *audit_cause = "hashing_error";
+ static const char op[] = "add_template_measure";
+ static const char audit_cause[] = "hashing_error";
char *template_name = entry->template_desc->name;
int result;
struct {
const char *op, const char *cause)
{
struct ima_template_entry *entry;
- struct inode *inode = file->f_dentry->d_inode;
+ struct inode *inode = file_inode(file);
int violation = 1;
int result;
* @function: calling function (FILE_CHECK, BPRM_CHECK, MMAP_CHECK, MODULE_CHECK)
*
* The policy is defined in terms of keypairs:
- * subj=, obj=, type=, func=, mask=, fsmagic=
+ * subj=, obj=, type=, func=, mask=, fsmagic=
* subj,obj, and type: are LSM specific.
- * func: FILE_CHECK | BPRM_CHECK | MMAP_CHECK | MODULE_CHECK
- * mask: contains the permission mask
+ * func: FILE_CHECK | BPRM_CHECK | MMAP_CHECK | MODULE_CHECK
+ * mask: contains the permission mask
* fsmagic: hex value
*
* Returns IMA_MEASURE, IMA_APPRAISE mask.
*
* We only get here if the inode has not already been measured,
* but the measurement could already exist:
- * - multiple copies of the same file on either the same or
+ * - multiple copies of the same file on either the same or
* different filesystems.
* - the inode was previously flushed as well as the iint info,
* containing the hashing info.
struct evm_ima_xattr_data *xattr_value,
int xattr_len)
{
- const char *op = "add_template_measure";
- const char *audit_cause = "ENOMEM";
+ static const char op[] = "add_template_measure";
+ static const char audit_cause[] = "ENOMEM";
int result = -ENOMEM;
struct inode *inode = file_inode(file);
struct ima_template_entry *entry;
pathname = NULL;
}
}
- return pathname;
+ return pathname ?: (const char *)path->dentry->d_name.name;
}
struct evm_ima_xattr_data *xattr_value,
int xattr_len)
{
+ static const char op[] = "appraise_data";
+ char *cause = "unknown";
struct dentry *dentry = file->f_dentry;
struct inode *inode = dentry->d_inode;
enum integrity_status status = INTEGRITY_UNKNOWN;
- const char *op = "appraise_data";
- char *cause = "unknown";
int rc = xattr_len, hash_start = 0;
if (!ima_appraise)
* the Free Software Foundation, version 2 of the License.
*
* File: ima_crypto.c
- * Calculates md5/sha1 file hash, template hash, boot-aggreate hash
+ * Calculates md5/sha1 file hash, template hash, boot-aggreate hash
*/
+#define pr_fmt(fmt) KBUILD_MODNAME ": " fmt
+
#include <linux/kernel.h>
#include <linux/file.h>
#include <linux/crypto.h>
if (rc != 0)
return rc;
- rbuf = kzalloc(PAGE_SIZE, GFP_KERNEL);
- if (!rbuf) {
- rc = -ENOMEM;
+ i_size = i_size_read(file_inode(file));
+
+ if (i_size == 0)
goto out;
- }
+
+ rbuf = kzalloc(PAGE_SIZE, GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!rbuf)
+ return -ENOMEM;
+
if (!(file->f_mode & FMODE_READ)) {
file->f_mode |= FMODE_READ;
read = 1;
}
- i_size = i_size_read(file_inode(file));
+
while (offset < i_size) {
int rbuf_len;
if (rc)
break;
}
- kfree(rbuf);
- if (!rc)
- rc = crypto_shash_final(&desc.shash, hash->digest);
if (read)
file->f_mode &= ~FMODE_READ;
+ kfree(rbuf);
out:
+ if (!rc)
+ rc = crypto_shash_final(&desc.shash, hash->digest);
return rc;
}
return rc;
for (i = 0; i < num_fields; i++) {
+ u8 buffer[IMA_EVENT_NAME_LEN_MAX + 1] = { 0 };
+ u8 *data_to_hash = field_data[i].data;
+ u32 datalen = field_data[i].len;
+
if (strcmp(td->name, IMA_TEMPLATE_IMA_NAME) != 0) {
rc = crypto_shash_update(&desc.shash,
(const u8 *) &field_data[i].len,
sizeof(field_data[i].len));
if (rc)
break;
+ } else if (strcmp(td->fields[i]->field_id, "n") == 0) {
+ memcpy(buffer, data_to_hash, datalen);
+ data_to_hash = buffer;
+ datalen = IMA_EVENT_NAME_LEN_MAX + 1;
}
- rc = crypto_shash_update(&desc.shash, field_data[i].data,
- field_data[i].len);
+ rc = crypto_shash_update(&desc.shash, data_to_hash, datalen);
if (rc)
break;
}
return;
if (tpm_pcr_read(TPM_ANY_NUM, idx, pcr) != 0)
- pr_err("IMA: Error Communicating to TPM chip\n");
+ pr_err("Error Communicating to TPM chip\n");
}
/*
* PCR used is always the same (config option) in
* little-endian format
*/
- ima_putc(m, &pcr, sizeof pcr);
+ ima_putc(m, &pcr, sizeof(pcr));
/* 2nd: template digest */
ima_putc(m, e->digest, TPM_DIGEST_SIZE);
/* 3rd: template name size */
namelen = strlen(e->template_desc->name);
- ima_putc(m, &namelen, sizeof namelen);
+ ima_putc(m, &namelen, sizeof(namelen));
/* 4th: template name */
ima_putc(m, e->template_desc->name, namelen);
if (is_ima_template && strcmp(field->field_id, "d") == 0)
show = IMA_SHOW_BINARY_NO_FIELD_LEN;
+ if (is_ima_template && strcmp(field->field_id, "n") == 0)
+ show = IMA_SHOW_BINARY_OLD_STRING_FMT;
field->field_show(m, show, &e->template_data[i]);
}
return 0;
/*
* ima_open_policy: sequentialize access to the policy file
*/
-static int ima_open_policy(struct inode * inode, struct file * filp)
+static int ima_open_policy(struct inode *inode, struct file *filp)
{
/* No point in being allowed to open it if you aren't going to write */
if (!(filp->f_flags & O_WRONLY))
* File: ima_init.c
* initialization and cleanup functions
*/
+
+#define pr_fmt(fmt) KBUILD_MODNAME ": " fmt
+
#include <linux/module.h>
#include <linux/scatterlist.h>
#include <linux/slab.h>
*/
static void __init ima_add_boot_aggregate(void)
{
+ static const char op[] = "add_boot_aggregate";
+ const char *audit_cause = "ENOMEM";
struct ima_template_entry *entry;
struct integrity_iint_cache tmp_iint, *iint = &tmp_iint;
- const char *op = "add_boot_aggregate";
- const char *audit_cause = "ENOMEM";
int result = -ENOMEM;
int violation = 0;
struct {
ima_used_chip = 1;
if (!ima_used_chip)
- pr_info("IMA: No TPM chip found, activating TPM-bypass!\n");
+ pr_info("No TPM chip found, activating TPM-bypass!\n");
rc = ima_init_crypto();
if (rc)
* ima_rdwr_violation_check
*
* Only invalidate the PCR for measured files:
- * - Opening a file for write when already open for read,
+ * - Opening a file for write when already open for read,
* results in a time of measure, time of use (ToMToU) error.
* - Opening a file for read when already open for write,
- * could result in a file measurement error.
+ * could result in a file measurement error.
*
*/
static void ima_rdwr_violation_check(struct file *file)
{
- struct dentry *dentry = file->f_path.dentry;
struct inode *inode = file_inode(file);
fmode_t mode = file->f_mode;
int must_measure;
return;
pathname = ima_d_path(&file->f_path, &pathbuf);
- if (!pathname || strlen(pathname) > IMA_EVENT_NAME_LEN_MAX)
- pathname = dentry->d_name.name;
if (send_tomtou)
ima_add_violation(file, pathname, "invalid_pcr", "ToMToU");
if (rc != 0)
goto out_digsig;
- pathname = !filename ? ima_d_path(&file->f_path, &pathbuf) : filename;
- if (!pathname)
- pathname = (const char *)file->f_dentry->d_name.name;
+ pathname = filename ?: ima_d_path(&file->f_path, &pathbuf);
if (action & IMA_MEASURE)
ima_store_measurement(iint, file, pathname,
* the Free Software Foundation, version 2 of the License.
*
* ima_policy.c
- * - initialize default measure policy rules
+ * - initialize default measure policy rules
*
*/
#include <linux/module.h>
#include "ima.h"
/* flags definitions */
-#define IMA_FUNC 0x0001
-#define IMA_MASK 0x0002
+#define IMA_FUNC 0x0001
+#define IMA_MASK 0x0002
#define IMA_FSMAGIC 0x0004
#define IMA_UID 0x0008
#define IMA_FOWNER 0x0010
* and running executables.
*/
static struct ima_rule_entry default_rules[] = {
- {.action = DONT_MEASURE,.fsmagic = PROC_SUPER_MAGIC,.flags = IMA_FSMAGIC},
- {.action = DONT_MEASURE,.fsmagic = SYSFS_MAGIC,.flags = IMA_FSMAGIC},
- {.action = DONT_MEASURE,.fsmagic = DEBUGFS_MAGIC,.flags = IMA_FSMAGIC},
- {.action = DONT_MEASURE,.fsmagic = TMPFS_MAGIC,.flags = IMA_FSMAGIC},
- {.action = DONT_MEASURE,.fsmagic = DEVPTS_SUPER_MAGIC,.flags = IMA_FSMAGIC},
- {.action = DONT_MEASURE,.fsmagic = BINFMTFS_MAGIC,.flags = IMA_FSMAGIC},
- {.action = DONT_MEASURE,.fsmagic = SECURITYFS_MAGIC,.flags = IMA_FSMAGIC},
- {.action = DONT_MEASURE,.fsmagic = SELINUX_MAGIC,.flags = IMA_FSMAGIC},
- {.action = MEASURE,.func = MMAP_CHECK,.mask = MAY_EXEC,
+ {.action = DONT_MEASURE, .fsmagic = PROC_SUPER_MAGIC, .flags = IMA_FSMAGIC},
+ {.action = DONT_MEASURE, .fsmagic = SYSFS_MAGIC, .flags = IMA_FSMAGIC},
+ {.action = DONT_MEASURE, .fsmagic = DEBUGFS_MAGIC, .flags = IMA_FSMAGIC},
+ {.action = DONT_MEASURE, .fsmagic = TMPFS_MAGIC, .flags = IMA_FSMAGIC},
+ {.action = DONT_MEASURE, .fsmagic = DEVPTS_SUPER_MAGIC, .flags = IMA_FSMAGIC},
+ {.action = DONT_MEASURE, .fsmagic = BINFMTFS_MAGIC, .flags = IMA_FSMAGIC},
+ {.action = DONT_MEASURE, .fsmagic = SECURITYFS_MAGIC, .flags = IMA_FSMAGIC},
+ {.action = DONT_MEASURE, .fsmagic = SELINUX_MAGIC, .flags = IMA_FSMAGIC},
+ {.action = MEASURE, .func = MMAP_CHECK, .mask = MAY_EXEC,
.flags = IMA_FUNC | IMA_MASK},
- {.action = MEASURE,.func = BPRM_CHECK,.mask = MAY_EXEC,
+ {.action = MEASURE, .func = BPRM_CHECK, .mask = MAY_EXEC,
.flags = IMA_FUNC | IMA_MASK},
- {.action = MEASURE,.func = FILE_CHECK,.mask = MAY_READ,.uid = GLOBAL_ROOT_UID,
+ {.action = MEASURE, .func = FILE_CHECK, .mask = MAY_READ, .uid = GLOBAL_ROOT_UID,
.flags = IMA_FUNC | IMA_MASK | IMA_UID},
- {.action = MEASURE,.func = MODULE_CHECK, .flags = IMA_FUNC},
+ {.action = MEASURE, .func = MODULE_CHECK, .flags = IMA_FUNC},
};
static struct ima_rule_entry default_appraise_rules[] = {
- {.action = DONT_APPRAISE,.fsmagic = PROC_SUPER_MAGIC,.flags = IMA_FSMAGIC},
- {.action = DONT_APPRAISE,.fsmagic = SYSFS_MAGIC,.flags = IMA_FSMAGIC},
- {.action = DONT_APPRAISE,.fsmagic = DEBUGFS_MAGIC,.flags = IMA_FSMAGIC},
- {.action = DONT_APPRAISE,.fsmagic = TMPFS_MAGIC,.flags = IMA_FSMAGIC},
- {.action = DONT_APPRAISE,.fsmagic = RAMFS_MAGIC,.flags = IMA_FSMAGIC},
- {.action = DONT_APPRAISE,.fsmagic = DEVPTS_SUPER_MAGIC,.flags = IMA_FSMAGIC},
- {.action = DONT_APPRAISE,.fsmagic = BINFMTFS_MAGIC,.flags = IMA_FSMAGIC},
- {.action = DONT_APPRAISE,.fsmagic = SECURITYFS_MAGIC,.flags = IMA_FSMAGIC},
- {.action = DONT_APPRAISE,.fsmagic = SELINUX_MAGIC,.flags = IMA_FSMAGIC},
- {.action = DONT_APPRAISE,.fsmagic = CGROUP_SUPER_MAGIC,.flags = IMA_FSMAGIC},
- {.action = APPRAISE,.fowner = GLOBAL_ROOT_UID,.flags = IMA_FOWNER},
+ {.action = DONT_APPRAISE, .fsmagic = PROC_SUPER_MAGIC, .flags = IMA_FSMAGIC},
+ {.action = DONT_APPRAISE, .fsmagic = SYSFS_MAGIC, .flags = IMA_FSMAGIC},
+ {.action = DONT_APPRAISE, .fsmagic = DEBUGFS_MAGIC, .flags = IMA_FSMAGIC},
+ {.action = DONT_APPRAISE, .fsmagic = TMPFS_MAGIC, .flags = IMA_FSMAGIC},
+ {.action = DONT_APPRAISE, .fsmagic = RAMFS_MAGIC, .flags = IMA_FSMAGIC},
+ {.action = DONT_APPRAISE, .fsmagic = DEVPTS_SUPER_MAGIC, .flags = IMA_FSMAGIC},
+ {.action = DONT_APPRAISE, .fsmagic = BINFMTFS_MAGIC, .flags = IMA_FSMAGIC},
+ {.action = DONT_APPRAISE, .fsmagic = SECURITYFS_MAGIC, .flags = IMA_FSMAGIC},
+ {.action = DONT_APPRAISE, .fsmagic = SELINUX_MAGIC, .flags = IMA_FSMAGIC},
+ {.action = DONT_APPRAISE, .fsmagic = CGROUP_SUPER_MAGIC, .flags = IMA_FSMAGIC},
+ {.action = APPRAISE, .fowner = GLOBAL_ROOT_UID, .flags = IMA_FOWNER},
};
static LIST_HEAD(ima_default_rules);
}
__setup("ima_appraise_tcb", default_appraise_policy_setup);
-/*
+/*
* Although the IMA policy does not change, the LSM policy can be
* reloaded, leaving the IMA LSM based rules referring to the old,
* stale LSM policy.
*
- * Update the IMA LSM based rules to reflect the reloaded LSM policy.
+ * Update the IMA LSM based rules to reflect the reloaded LSM policy.
* We assume the rules still exist; and BUG_ON() if they don't.
*/
static void ima_lsm_update_rules(void)
const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
int i;
- if ((rule->flags & IMA_FUNC) && rule->func != func)
+ if ((rule->flags & IMA_FUNC) &&
+ (rule->func != func && func != POST_SETATTR))
return false;
- if ((rule->flags & IMA_MASK) && rule->mask != mask)
+ if ((rule->flags & IMA_MASK) &&
+ (rule->mask != mask && func != POST_SETATTR))
return false;
if ((rule->flags & IMA_FSMAGIC)
&& rule->fsmagic != inode->i_sb->s_magic)
retried = 1;
ima_lsm_update_rules();
goto retry;
- }
+ }
if (!rc)
return false;
}
if (!(rule->flags & IMA_FUNC))
return IMA_FILE_APPRAISE;
- switch(func) {
+ switch (func) {
case MMAP_CHECK:
return IMA_MMAP_APPRAISE;
case BPRM_CHECK:
measure_entries = ima_use_tcb ? ARRAY_SIZE(default_rules) : 0;
appraise_entries = ima_use_appraise_tcb ?
ARRAY_SIZE(default_appraise_rules) : 0;
-
+
for (i = 0; i < measure_entries + appraise_entries; i++) {
if (i < measure_entries)
list_add_tail(&default_rules[i].list,
*/
void ima_update_policy(void)
{
- const char *op = "policy_update";
+ static const char op[] = "policy_update";
const char *cause = "already exists";
int result = 1;
int audit_info = 0;
break;
}
- result = strict_strtoul(args[0].from, 16,
- &entry->fsmagic);
+ result = kstrtoul(args[0].from, 16, &entry->fsmagic);
if (!result)
entry->flags |= IMA_FSMAGIC;
break;
break;
}
- result = strict_strtoul(args[0].from, 10, &lnum);
+ result = kstrtoul(args[0].from, 10, &lnum);
if (!result) {
entry->uid = make_kuid(current_user_ns(), (uid_t)lnum);
if (!uid_valid(entry->uid) || (((uid_t)lnum) != lnum))
break;
}
- result = strict_strtoul(args[0].from, 10, &lnum);
+ result = kstrtoul(args[0].from, 10, &lnum);
if (!result) {
entry->fowner = make_kuid(current_user_ns(), (uid_t)lnum);
if (!uid_valid(entry->fowner) || (((uid_t)lnum) != lnum))
*/
ssize_t ima_parse_add_rule(char *rule)
{
- const char *op = "update_policy";
+ static const char op[] = "update_policy";
char *p;
struct ima_rule_entry *entry;
ssize_t result, len;
* The measurement list is append-only. No entry is
* ever removed or changed during the boot-cycle.
*/
+
+#define pr_fmt(fmt) KBUILD_MODNAME ": " fmt
+
#include <linux/module.h>
#include <linux/rculist.h>
#include <linux/slab.h>
qe = kmalloc(sizeof(*qe), GFP_KERNEL);
if (qe == NULL) {
- pr_err("IMA: OUT OF MEMORY ERROR creating queue entry.\n");
+ pr_err("OUT OF MEMORY ERROR creating queue entry\n");
return -ENOMEM;
}
qe->entry = entry;
result = tpm_pcr_extend(TPM_ANY_NUM, CONFIG_IMA_MEASURE_PCR_IDX, hash);
if (result != 0)
- pr_err("IMA: Error Communicating to TPM chip, result: %d\n",
- result);
+ pr_err("Error Communicating to TPM chip, result: %d\n", result);
return result;
}
mutex_lock(&ima_extend_list_mutex);
if (!violation) {
- memcpy(digest, entry->digest, sizeof digest);
+ memcpy(digest, entry->digest, sizeof(digest));
if (ima_lookup_digest_entry(digest)) {
audit_cause = "hash_exists";
result = -EEXIST;
}
if (violation) /* invalidate pcr */
- memset(digest, 0xff, sizeof digest);
+ memset(digest, 0xff, sizeof(digest));
tpmresult = ima_pcr_extend(digest);
if (tpmresult != 0) {
* File: ima_template.c
* Helpers to manage template descriptors.
*/
+
+#define pr_fmt(fmt) KBUILD_MODNAME ": " fmt
+
#include <crypto/hash_info.h>
#include "ima.h"
static struct ima_template_desc defined_templates[] = {
{.name = IMA_TEMPLATE_IMA_NAME, .fmt = IMA_TEMPLATE_IMA_FMT},
- {.name = "ima-ng",.fmt = "d-ng|n-ng"},
- {.name = "ima-sig",.fmt = "d-ng|n-ng|sig"},
+ {.name = "ima-ng", .fmt = "d-ng|n-ng"},
+ {.name = "ima-sig", .fmt = "d-ng|n-ng|sig"},
};
static struct ima_template_field supported_fields[] = {
- {.field_id = "d",.field_init = ima_eventdigest_init,
+ {.field_id = "d", .field_init = ima_eventdigest_init,
.field_show = ima_show_template_digest},
- {.field_id = "n",.field_init = ima_eventname_init,
+ {.field_id = "n", .field_init = ima_eventname_init,
.field_show = ima_show_template_string},
- {.field_id = "d-ng",.field_init = ima_eventdigest_ng_init,
+ {.field_id = "d-ng", .field_init = ima_eventdigest_ng_init,
.field_show = ima_show_template_digest_ng},
- {.field_id = "n-ng",.field_init = ima_eventname_ng_init,
+ {.field_id = "n-ng", .field_init = ima_eventname_ng_init,
.field_show = ima_show_template_string},
- {.field_id = "sig",.field_init = ima_eventsig_init,
+ {.field_id = "sig", .field_init = ima_eventsig_init,
.field_show = ima_show_template_sig},
};
*/
if (template_len == 3 && strcmp(str, IMA_TEMPLATE_IMA_NAME) == 0 &&
ima_hash_algo != HASH_ALGO_SHA1 && ima_hash_algo != HASH_ALGO_MD5) {
- pr_err("IMA: template does not support hash alg\n");
+ pr_err("template does not support hash alg\n");
return 1;
}
enum data_formats {
DATA_FMT_DIGEST = 0,
DATA_FMT_DIGEST_WITH_ALGO,
- DATA_FMT_EVENT_NAME,
DATA_FMT_STRING,
DATA_FMT_HEX
};
struct ima_field_data *field_data)
{
u8 *buf, *buf_ptr;
- u32 buflen;
+ u32 buflen = datalen;
- switch (datafmt) {
- case DATA_FMT_EVENT_NAME:
- buflen = IMA_EVENT_NAME_LEN_MAX + 1;
- break;
- case DATA_FMT_STRING:
+ if (datafmt == DATA_FMT_STRING)
buflen = datalen + 1;
- break;
- default:
- buflen = datalen;
- }
buf = kzalloc(buflen, GFP_KERNEL);
if (!buf)
* split into multiple template fields (the space is the delimitator
* character for measurements lists in ASCII format).
*/
- if (datafmt == DATA_FMT_EVENT_NAME || datafmt == DATA_FMT_STRING) {
+ if (datafmt == DATA_FMT_STRING) {
for (buf_ptr = buf; buf_ptr - buf < datalen; buf_ptr++)
if (*buf_ptr == ' ')
*buf_ptr = '_';
enum data_formats datafmt,
struct ima_field_data *field_data)
{
+ u32 len = (show == IMA_SHOW_BINARY_OLD_STRING_FMT) ?
+ strlen(field_data->data) : field_data->len;
+
if (show != IMA_SHOW_BINARY_NO_FIELD_LEN)
- ima_putc(m, &field_data->len, sizeof(u32));
+ ima_putc(m, &len, sizeof(len));
- if (!field_data->len)
+ if (!len)
return;
- ima_putc(m, field_data->data, field_data->len);
+ ima_putc(m, field_data->data, len);
}
static void ima_show_template_field_data(struct seq_file *m,
break;
case IMA_SHOW_BINARY:
case IMA_SHOW_BINARY_NO_FIELD_LEN:
+ case IMA_SHOW_BINARY_OLD_STRING_FMT:
ima_show_template_data_binary(m, show, datafmt, field_data);
break;
default:
{
const char *cur_filename = NULL;
u32 cur_filename_len = 0;
- enum data_formats fmt = size_limit ?
- DATA_FMT_EVENT_NAME : DATA_FMT_STRING;
BUG_ON(filename == NULL && file == NULL);
cur_filename_len = IMA_EVENT_NAME_LEN_MAX;
out:
return ima_write_template_field_data(cur_filename, cur_filename_len,
- fmt, field_data);
+ DATA_FMT_STRING, field_data);
}
/*
* the Free Software Foundation, version 2 of the License.
*
* File: integrity_audit.c
- * Audit calls for the integrity subsystem
+ * Audit calls for the integrity subsystem
*/
#include <linux/fs.h>
{
unsigned long audit;
- if (!strict_strtoul(str, 0, &audit))
+ if (!kstrtoul(str, 0, &audit))
integrity_audit_info = audit ? 1 : 0;
return 1;
}
const char *cause, int result, int audit_info)
{
struct audit_buffer *ab;
+ char name[TASK_COMM_LEN];
if (!integrity_audit_info && audit_info == 1) /* Skip info messages */
return;
audit_log_format(ab, " cause=");
audit_log_string(ab, cause);
audit_log_format(ab, " comm=");
- audit_log_untrustedstring(ab, current->comm);
+ audit_log_untrustedstring(ab, get_task_comm(name, current));
if (fname) {
audit_log_format(ab, " name=");
audit_log_untrustedstring(ab, fname);
long dlen;
int ret;
- ret = strict_strtol(datalen, 10, &dlen);
+ ret = kstrtol(datalen, 10, &dlen);
if (ret < 0 || dlen < MIN_DATA_SIZE || dlen > MAX_DATA_SIZE)
return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL);
/*
* Check to see whether permission is granted to use a key in the desired way.
*/
-static inline int key_permission(const key_ref_t key_ref, key_perm_t perm)
+static inline int key_permission(const key_ref_t key_ref, unsigned perm)
{
return key_task_permission(key_ref, current_cred(), perm);
}
-/* required permissions */
-#define KEY_VIEW 0x01 /* require permission to view attributes */
-#define KEY_READ 0x02 /* require permission to read content */
-#define KEY_WRITE 0x04 /* require permission to update / modify */
-#define KEY_SEARCH 0x08 /* require permission to search (keyring) or find (key) */
-#define KEY_LINK 0x10 /* require permission to link */
-#define KEY_SETATTR 0x20 /* require permission to change attributes */
-#define KEY_ALL 0x3f /* all the above permissions */
-
/*
* Authorisation record for request_key().
*/
int ret;
/* need write permission on the key to update it */
- ret = key_permission(key_ref, KEY_WRITE);
+ ret = key_permission(key_ref, KEY_NEED_WRITE);
if (ret < 0)
goto error;
/* if we're going to allocate a new key, we're going to have
* to modify the keyring */
- ret = key_permission(keyring_ref, KEY_WRITE);
+ ret = key_permission(keyring_ref, KEY_NEED_WRITE);
if (ret < 0) {
key_ref = ERR_PTR(ret);
goto error_link_end;
key_check(key);
/* the key must be writable */
- ret = key_permission(key_ref, KEY_WRITE);
+ ret = key_permission(key_ref, KEY_NEED_WRITE);
if (ret < 0)
goto error;
}
/* find the target keyring (which must be writable) */
- keyring_ref = lookup_user_key(ringid, KEY_LOOKUP_CREATE, KEY_WRITE);
+ keyring_ref = lookup_user_key(ringid, KEY_LOOKUP_CREATE, KEY_NEED_WRITE);
if (IS_ERR(keyring_ref)) {
ret = PTR_ERR(keyring_ref);
goto error3;
dest_ref = NULL;
if (destringid) {
dest_ref = lookup_user_key(destringid, KEY_LOOKUP_CREATE,
- KEY_WRITE);
+ KEY_NEED_WRITE);
if (IS_ERR(dest_ref)) {
ret = PTR_ERR(dest_ref);
goto error3;
long ret;
lflags = create ? KEY_LOOKUP_CREATE : 0;
- key_ref = lookup_user_key(id, lflags, KEY_SEARCH);
+ key_ref = lookup_user_key(id, lflags, KEY_NEED_SEARCH);
if (IS_ERR(key_ref)) {
ret = PTR_ERR(key_ref);
goto error;
}
/* find the target key (which must be writable) */
- key_ref = lookup_user_key(id, 0, KEY_WRITE);
+ key_ref = lookup_user_key(id, 0, KEY_NEED_WRITE);
if (IS_ERR(key_ref)) {
ret = PTR_ERR(key_ref);
goto error2;
key_ref_t key_ref;
long ret;
- key_ref = lookup_user_key(id, 0, KEY_WRITE);
+ key_ref = lookup_user_key(id, 0, KEY_NEED_WRITE);
if (IS_ERR(key_ref)) {
ret = PTR_ERR(key_ref);
if (ret != -EACCES)
goto error;
- key_ref = lookup_user_key(id, 0, KEY_SETATTR);
+ key_ref = lookup_user_key(id, 0, KEY_NEED_SETATTR);
if (IS_ERR(key_ref)) {
ret = PTR_ERR(key_ref);
goto error;
kenter("%d", id);
- key_ref = lookup_user_key(id, 0, KEY_SEARCH);
+ key_ref = lookup_user_key(id, 0, KEY_NEED_SEARCH);
if (IS_ERR(key_ref)) {
ret = PTR_ERR(key_ref);
goto error;
key_ref_t keyring_ref;
long ret;
- keyring_ref = lookup_user_key(ringid, KEY_LOOKUP_CREATE, KEY_WRITE);
+ keyring_ref = lookup_user_key(ringid, KEY_LOOKUP_CREATE, KEY_NEED_WRITE);
if (IS_ERR(keyring_ref)) {
ret = PTR_ERR(keyring_ref);
key_ref_t keyring_ref, key_ref;
long ret;
- keyring_ref = lookup_user_key(ringid, KEY_LOOKUP_CREATE, KEY_WRITE);
+ keyring_ref = lookup_user_key(ringid, KEY_LOOKUP_CREATE, KEY_NEED_WRITE);
if (IS_ERR(keyring_ref)) {
ret = PTR_ERR(keyring_ref);
goto error;
}
- key_ref = lookup_user_key(id, KEY_LOOKUP_CREATE, KEY_LINK);
+ key_ref = lookup_user_key(id, KEY_LOOKUP_CREATE, KEY_NEED_LINK);
if (IS_ERR(key_ref)) {
ret = PTR_ERR(key_ref);
goto error2;
key_ref_t keyring_ref, key_ref;
long ret;
- keyring_ref = lookup_user_key(ringid, 0, KEY_WRITE);
+ keyring_ref = lookup_user_key(ringid, 0, KEY_NEED_WRITE);
if (IS_ERR(keyring_ref)) {
ret = PTR_ERR(keyring_ref);
goto error;
char *tmpbuf;
long ret;
- key_ref = lookup_user_key(keyid, KEY_LOOKUP_PARTIAL, KEY_VIEW);
+ key_ref = lookup_user_key(keyid, KEY_LOOKUP_PARTIAL, KEY_NEED_VIEW);
if (IS_ERR(key_ref)) {
/* viewing a key under construction is permitted if we have the
* authorisation token handy */
}
/* get the keyring at which to begin the search */
- keyring_ref = lookup_user_key(ringid, 0, KEY_SEARCH);
+ keyring_ref = lookup_user_key(ringid, 0, KEY_NEED_SEARCH);
if (IS_ERR(keyring_ref)) {
ret = PTR_ERR(keyring_ref);
goto error2;
dest_ref = NULL;
if (destringid) {
dest_ref = lookup_user_key(destringid, KEY_LOOKUP_CREATE,
- KEY_WRITE);
+ KEY_NEED_WRITE);
if (IS_ERR(dest_ref)) {
ret = PTR_ERR(dest_ref);
goto error3;
/* link the resulting key to the destination keyring if we can */
if (dest_ref) {
- ret = key_permission(key_ref, KEY_LINK);
+ ret = key_permission(key_ref, KEY_NEED_LINK);
if (ret < 0)
goto error6;
key = key_ref_to_ptr(key_ref);
/* see if we can read it directly */
- ret = key_permission(key_ref, KEY_READ);
+ ret = key_permission(key_ref, KEY_NEED_READ);
if (ret == 0)
goto can_read_key;
if (ret != -EACCES)
goto error;
key_ref = lookup_user_key(id, KEY_LOOKUP_CREATE | KEY_LOOKUP_PARTIAL,
- KEY_SETATTR);
+ KEY_NEED_SETATTR);
if (IS_ERR(key_ref)) {
ret = PTR_ERR(key_ref);
goto error;
goto error;
key_ref = lookup_user_key(id, KEY_LOOKUP_CREATE | KEY_LOOKUP_PARTIAL,
- KEY_SETATTR);
+ KEY_NEED_SETATTR);
if (IS_ERR(key_ref)) {
ret = PTR_ERR(key_ref);
goto error;
/* if a specific keyring is nominated by ID, then use that */
if (ringid > 0) {
- dkref = lookup_user_key(ringid, KEY_LOOKUP_CREATE, KEY_WRITE);
+ dkref = lookup_user_key(ringid, KEY_LOOKUP_CREATE, KEY_NEED_WRITE);
if (IS_ERR(dkref))
return PTR_ERR(dkref);
*_dest_keyring = key_ref_to_ptr(dkref);
long ret;
key_ref = lookup_user_key(id, KEY_LOOKUP_CREATE | KEY_LOOKUP_PARTIAL,
- KEY_SETATTR);
+ KEY_NEED_SETATTR);
if (IS_ERR(key_ref)) {
/* setting the timeout on a key under construction is permitted
* if we have the authorisation token handy */
char *context;
long ret;
- key_ref = lookup_user_key(keyid, KEY_LOOKUP_PARTIAL, KEY_VIEW);
+ key_ref = lookup_user_key(keyid, KEY_LOOKUP_PARTIAL, KEY_NEED_VIEW);
if (IS_ERR(key_ref)) {
if (PTR_ERR(key_ref) != -EACCES)
return PTR_ERR(key_ref);
struct cred *cred;
int ret;
- keyring_r = lookup_user_key(KEY_SPEC_SESSION_KEYRING, 0, KEY_LINK);
+ keyring_r = lookup_user_key(KEY_SPEC_SESSION_KEYRING, 0, KEY_NEED_LINK);
if (IS_ERR(keyring_r))
return PTR_ERR(keyring_r);
/* key must have search permissions */
if (!(ctx->flags & KEYRING_SEARCH_NO_CHECK_PERM) &&
key_task_permission(make_key_ref(key, ctx->possessed),
- ctx->cred, KEY_SEARCH) < 0) {
+ ctx->cred, KEY_NEED_SEARCH) < 0) {
ctx->result = ERR_PTR(-EACCES);
kleave(" = %d [!perm]", ctx->skipped_ret);
goto skipped;
/* Search a nested keyring */
if (!(ctx->flags & KEYRING_SEARCH_NO_CHECK_PERM) &&
key_task_permission(make_key_ref(key, ctx->possessed),
- ctx->cred, KEY_SEARCH) < 0)
+ ctx->cred, KEY_NEED_SEARCH) < 0)
continue;
/* stack the current position */
return ERR_PTR(-ENOTDIR);
if (!(ctx->flags & KEYRING_SEARCH_NO_CHECK_PERM)) {
- err = key_task_permission(keyring_ref, ctx->cred, KEY_SEARCH);
+ err = key_task_permission(keyring_ref, ctx->cred, KEY_NEED_SEARCH);
if (err < 0)
return ERR_PTR(err);
}
if (!skip_perm_check &&
key_permission(make_key_ref(keyring, 0),
- KEY_SEARCH) < 0)
+ KEY_NEED_SEARCH) < 0)
continue;
/* we've got a match but we might end up racing with
* permissions bits or the LSM check.
*/
int key_task_permission(const key_ref_t key_ref, const struct cred *cred,
- key_perm_t perm)
+ unsigned perm)
{
struct key *key;
key_perm_t kperm;
if (is_key_possessed(key_ref))
kperm |= key->perm >> 24;
- kperm = kperm & perm & KEY_ALL;
+ kperm = kperm & perm & KEY_NEED_ALL;
if (kperm != perm)
return -EACCES;
return PTR_ERR(persistent_ref);
found:
- ret = key_task_permission(persistent_ref, current_cred(), KEY_LINK);
+ ret = key_task_permission(persistent_ref, current_cred(), KEY_NEED_LINK);
if (ret == 0) {
persistent = key_ref_to_ptr(persistent_ref);
ret = key_link(key_ref_to_ptr(dest_ref), persistent);
}
/* There must be a destination keyring */
- dest_ref = lookup_user_key(destid, KEY_LOOKUP_CREATE, KEY_WRITE);
+ dest_ref = lookup_user_key(destid, KEY_LOOKUP_CREATE, KEY_NEED_WRITE);
if (IS_ERR(dest_ref))
return PTR_ERR(dest_ref);
if (key_ref_to_ptr(dest_ref)->type != &key_type_keyring) {
* - the caller holds a spinlock, and thus the RCU read lock, making our
* access to __current_cred() safe
*/
- rc = key_task_permission(key_ref, ctx.cred, KEY_VIEW);
+ rc = key_task_permission(key_ref, ctx.cred, KEY_NEED_VIEW);
if (rc < 0)
return 0;
static const int zero, one = 1, max = INT_MAX;
-ctl_table key_sysctls[] = {
+struct ctl_table key_sysctls[] = {
{
.procname = "maxkeys",
.data = &key_quota_maxkeys,
return -EINVAL;
break;
case Opt_keyhandle:
- res = strict_strtoul(args[0].from, 16, &handle);
+ res = kstrtoul(args[0].from, 16, &handle);
if (res < 0)
return -EINVAL;
opt->keytype = SEAL_keytype;
return -EINVAL;
break;
case Opt_pcrlock:
- res = strict_strtoul(args[0].from, 10, &lock);
+ res = kstrtoul(args[0].from, 10, &lock);
if (res < 0)
return -EINVAL;
opt->pcrlock = lock;
c = strsep(&datablob, " \t");
if (!c)
return -EINVAL;
- ret = strict_strtol(c, 10, &keylen);
+ ret = kstrtol(c, 10, &keylen);
if (ret < 0 || keylen < MIN_KEY_SIZE || keylen > MAX_KEY_SIZE)
return -EINVAL;
p->key_len = keylen;
}
int security_key_permission(key_ref_t key_ref,
- const struct cred *cred, key_perm_t perm)
+ const struct cred *cred, unsigned perm)
{
return security_ops->key_permission(key_ref, cred, perm);
}
static int __init enforcing_setup(char *str)
{
unsigned long enforcing;
- if (!strict_strtoul(str, 0, &enforcing))
+ if (!kstrtoul(str, 0, &enforcing))
selinux_enforcing = enforcing ? 1 : 0;
return 1;
}
static int __init selinux_enabled_setup(char *str)
{
unsigned long enabled;
- if (!strict_strtoul(str, 0, &enabled))
+ if (!kstrtoul(str, 0, &enabled))
selinux_enabled = enabled ? 1 : 0;
return 1;
}
static int selinux_key_permission(key_ref_t key_ref,
const struct cred *cred,
- key_perm_t perm)
+ unsigned perm)
{
struct key *key;
struct key_security_struct *ksec;
static int __init checkreqprot_setup(char *str)
{
unsigned long checkreqprot;
- if (!strict_strtoul(str, 0, &checkreqprot))
+ if (!kstrtoul(str, 0, &checkreqprot))
selinux_checkreqprot = checkreqprot ? 1 : 0;
return 1;
}
struct socket_smack {
struct smack_known *smk_out; /* outbound label */
- char *smk_in; /* inbound label */
- char *smk_packet; /* TCP peer label */
+ struct smack_known *smk_in; /* inbound label */
+ struct smack_known *smk_packet; /* TCP peer label */
};
/*
struct list_head list;
struct sock *smk_sock; /* socket initialized on */
unsigned short smk_port; /* the port number */
- char *smk_in; /* incoming label */
+ struct smack_known *smk_in; /* inbound label */
struct smack_known *smk_out; /* outgoing label */
};
*/
#define SMACK_CIPSO_MAXCATNUM 184 /* 23 * 8 */
+/*
+ * Ptrace rules
+ */
+#define SMACK_PTRACE_DEFAULT 0
+#define SMACK_PTRACE_EXACT 1
+#define SMACK_PTRACE_DRACONIAN 2
+#define SMACK_PTRACE_MAX SMACK_PTRACE_DRACONIAN
+
/*
* Flags for untraditional access modes.
* It shouldn't be necessary to avoid conflicts with definitions
*/
int smk_access_entry(char *, char *, struct list_head *);
int smk_access(struct smack_known *, char *, int, struct smk_audit_info *);
+int smk_tskacc(struct task_smack *, char *, u32, struct smk_audit_info *);
int smk_curacc(char *, u32, struct smk_audit_info *);
struct smack_known *smack_from_secid(const u32);
char *smk_parse_smack(const char *string, int len);
extern struct smack_known *smack_onlycap;
extern struct smack_known *smack_syslog_label;
extern const char *smack_cipso_option;
+extern int smack_ptrace_rule;
extern struct smack_known smack_known_floor;
extern struct smack_known smack_known_hat;
}
/**
- * smk_curacc - determine if current has a specific access to an object
+ * smk_tskacc - determine if a task has a specific access to an object
+ * @tsp: a pointer to the subject task
* @obj_label: a pointer to the object's Smack label
* @mode: the access requested, in "MAY" format
* @a : common audit data
*
- * This function checks the current subject label/object label pair
+ * This function checks the subject task's label/object label pair
* in the access rule list and returns 0 if the access is permitted,
- * non zero otherwise. It allows that current may have the capability
+ * non zero otherwise. It allows that the task may have the capability
* to override the rules.
*/
-int smk_curacc(char *obj_label, u32 mode, struct smk_audit_info *a)
+int smk_tskacc(struct task_smack *subject, char *obj_label,
+ u32 mode, struct smk_audit_info *a)
{
- struct task_smack *tsp = current_security();
- struct smack_known *skp = smk_of_task(tsp);
+ struct smack_known *skp = smk_of_task(subject);
int may;
int rc;
* it can further restrict access.
*/
may = smk_access_entry(skp->smk_known, obj_label,
- &tsp->smk_rules);
+ &subject->smk_rules);
if (may < 0)
goto out_audit;
if ((mode & may) == mode)
return rc;
}
+/**
+ * smk_curacc - determine if current has a specific access to an object
+ * @obj_label: a pointer to the object's Smack label
+ * @mode: the access requested, in "MAY" format
+ * @a : common audit data
+ *
+ * This function checks the current subject label/object label pair
+ * in the access rule list and returns 0 if the access is permitted,
+ * non zero otherwise. It allows that current may have the capability
+ * to override the rules.
+ */
+int smk_curacc(char *obj_label, u32 mode, struct smk_audit_info *a)
+{
+ struct task_smack *tsp = current_security();
+
+ return smk_tskacc(tsp, obj_label, mode, a);
+}
+
#ifdef CONFIG_AUDIT
/**
* smack_str_from_perm : helper to transalate an int to a
audit_log_untrustedstring(ab, sad->subject);
audit_log_format(ab, " object=");
audit_log_untrustedstring(ab, sad->object);
- audit_log_format(ab, " requested=%s", sad->request);
+ if (sad->request[0] == '\0')
+ audit_log_format(ab, " labels_differ");
+ else
+ audit_log_format(ab, " requested=%s", sad->request);
}
/**
return rc;
}
+/**
+ * smk_ptrace_mode - helper function for converting PTRACE_MODE_* into MAY_*
+ * @mode - input mode in form of PTRACE_MODE_*
+ *
+ * Returns a converted MAY_* mode usable by smack rules
+ */
+static inline unsigned int smk_ptrace_mode(unsigned int mode)
+{
+ switch (mode) {
+ case PTRACE_MODE_READ:
+ return MAY_READ;
+ case PTRACE_MODE_ATTACH:
+ return MAY_READWRITE;
+ }
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/**
+ * smk_ptrace_rule_check - helper for ptrace access
+ * @tracer: tracer process
+ * @tracee_label: label of the process that's about to be traced,
+ * the pointer must originate from smack structures
+ * @mode: ptrace attachment mode (PTRACE_MODE_*)
+ * @func: name of the function that called us, used for audit
+ *
+ * Returns 0 on access granted, -error on error
+ */
+static int smk_ptrace_rule_check(struct task_struct *tracer, char *tracee_label,
+ unsigned int mode, const char *func)
+{
+ int rc;
+ struct smk_audit_info ad, *saip = NULL;
+ struct task_smack *tsp;
+ struct smack_known *skp;
+
+ if ((mode & PTRACE_MODE_NOAUDIT) == 0) {
+ smk_ad_init(&ad, func, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_TASK);
+ smk_ad_setfield_u_tsk(&ad, tracer);
+ saip = &ad;
+ }
+
+ tsp = task_security(tracer);
+ skp = smk_of_task(tsp);
+
+ if ((mode & PTRACE_MODE_ATTACH) &&
+ (smack_ptrace_rule == SMACK_PTRACE_EXACT ||
+ smack_ptrace_rule == SMACK_PTRACE_DRACONIAN)) {
+ if (skp->smk_known == tracee_label)
+ rc = 0;
+ else if (smack_ptrace_rule == SMACK_PTRACE_DRACONIAN)
+ rc = -EACCES;
+ else if (capable(CAP_SYS_PTRACE))
+ rc = 0;
+ else
+ rc = -EACCES;
+
+ if (saip)
+ smack_log(skp->smk_known, tracee_label, 0, rc, saip);
+
+ return rc;
+ }
+
+ /* In case of rule==SMACK_PTRACE_DEFAULT or mode==PTRACE_MODE_READ */
+ rc = smk_tskacc(tsp, tracee_label, smk_ptrace_mode(mode), saip);
+ return rc;
+}
+
/*
* LSM hooks.
* We he, that is fun!
/**
* smack_ptrace_access_check - Smack approval on PTRACE_ATTACH
* @ctp: child task pointer
- * @mode: ptrace attachment mode
+ * @mode: ptrace attachment mode (PTRACE_MODE_*)
*
* Returns 0 if access is OK, an error code otherwise
*
- * Do the capability checks, and require read and write.
+ * Do the capability checks.
*/
static int smack_ptrace_access_check(struct task_struct *ctp, unsigned int mode)
{
int rc;
- struct smk_audit_info ad;
struct smack_known *skp;
rc = cap_ptrace_access_check(ctp, mode);
return rc;
skp = smk_of_task(task_security(ctp));
- smk_ad_init(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_TASK);
- smk_ad_setfield_u_tsk(&ad, ctp);
- rc = smk_curacc(skp->smk_known, mode, &ad);
+ rc = smk_ptrace_rule_check(current, skp->smk_known, mode, __func__);
return rc;
}
*
* Returns 0 if access is OK, an error code otherwise
*
- * Do the capability checks, and require read and write.
+ * Do the capability checks, and require PTRACE_MODE_ATTACH.
*/
static int smack_ptrace_traceme(struct task_struct *ptp)
{
int rc;
- struct smk_audit_info ad;
struct smack_known *skp;
rc = cap_ptrace_traceme(ptp);
if (rc != 0)
return rc;
- skp = smk_of_task(task_security(ptp));
- smk_ad_init(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_TASK);
- smk_ad_setfield_u_tsk(&ad, ptp);
+ skp = smk_of_task(current_security());
- rc = smk_curacc(skp->smk_known, MAY_READWRITE, &ad);
+ rc = smk_ptrace_rule_check(ptp, skp->smk_known,
+ PTRACE_MODE_ATTACH, __func__);
return rc;
}
* Initialize the root inode.
*/
isp = inode->i_security;
- if (inode->i_security == NULL) {
- inode->i_security = new_inode_smack(sp->smk_root);
- isp = inode->i_security;
+ if (isp == NULL) {
+ isp = new_inode_smack(sp->smk_root);
+ if (isp == NULL)
+ return -ENOMEM;
+ inode->i_security = isp;
} else
isp->smk_inode = sp->smk_root;
* smack_bprm_set_creds - set creds for exec
* @bprm: the exec information
*
- * Returns 0 if it gets a blob, -ENOMEM otherwise
+ * Returns 0 if it gets a blob, -EPERM if exec forbidden and -ENOMEM otherwise
*/
static int smack_bprm_set_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
{
if (isp->smk_task == NULL || isp->smk_task == bsp->smk_task)
return 0;
- if (bprm->unsafe)
+ if (bprm->unsafe & (LSM_UNSAFE_PTRACE | LSM_UNSAFE_PTRACE_CAP)) {
+ struct task_struct *tracer;
+ rc = 0;
+
+ rcu_read_lock();
+ tracer = ptrace_parent(current);
+ if (likely(tracer != NULL))
+ rc = smk_ptrace_rule_check(tracer,
+ isp->smk_task->smk_known,
+ PTRACE_MODE_ATTACH,
+ __func__);
+ rcu_read_unlock();
+
+ if (rc != 0)
+ return rc;
+ } else if (bprm->unsafe)
return -EPERM;
bsp->smk_task = isp->smk_task;
return;
}
- skp = smk_import_entry(value, size);
if (strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SMACK) == 0) {
+ skp = smk_import_entry(value, size);
if (skp != NULL)
isp->smk_inode = skp->smk_known;
else
isp->smk_inode = smack_known_invalid.smk_known;
} else if (strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SMACKEXEC) == 0) {
+ skp = smk_import_entry(value, size);
if (skp != NULL)
isp->smk_task = skp;
else
isp->smk_task = &smack_known_invalid;
} else if (strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SMACKMMAP) == 0) {
+ skp = smk_import_entry(value, size);
if (skp != NULL)
isp->smk_mmap = skp;
else
strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SMACKIPOUT) == 0 ||
strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SMACKEXEC) == 0 ||
strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SMACKTRANSMUTE) == 0 ||
- strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SMACKMMAP)) {
+ strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SMACKMMAP) == 0) {
if (!smack_privileged(CAP_MAC_ADMIN))
rc = -EPERM;
} else
rc = cap_inode_removexattr(dentry, name);
+ if (rc != 0)
+ return rc;
+
smk_ad_init(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_DENTRY);
smk_ad_setfield_u_fs_path_dentry(&ad, dentry);
- if (rc == 0)
- rc = smk_curacc(smk_of_inode(dentry->d_inode), MAY_WRITE, &ad);
- if (rc == 0) {
- isp = dentry->d_inode->i_security;
+ rc = smk_curacc(smk_of_inode(dentry->d_inode), MAY_WRITE, &ad);
+ if (rc != 0)
+ return rc;
+
+ isp = dentry->d_inode->i_security;
+ /*
+ * Don't do anything special for these.
+ * XATTR_NAME_SMACKIPIN
+ * XATTR_NAME_SMACKIPOUT
+ * XATTR_NAME_SMACKEXEC
+ */
+ if (strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SMACK) == 0)
isp->smk_task = NULL;
+ else if (strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SMACKMMAP) == 0)
isp->smk_mmap = NULL;
- }
+ else if (strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SMACKTRANSMUTE) == 0)
+ isp->smk_flags &= ~SMK_INODE_TRANSMUTE;
- return rc;
+ return 0;
}
/**
ssp = sock->sk->sk_security;
if (strcmp(name, XATTR_SMACK_IPIN) == 0)
- isp = ssp->smk_in;
+ isp = ssp->smk_in->smk_known;
else if (strcmp(name, XATTR_SMACK_IPOUT) == 0)
isp = ssp->smk_out->smk_known;
else
/**
* smack_file_open - Smack dentry open processing
* @file: the object
- * @cred: unused
+ * @cred: task credential
*
* Set the security blob in the file structure.
+ * Allow the open only if the task has read access. There are
+ * many read operations (e.g. fstat) that you can do with an
+ * fd even if you have the file open write-only.
*
* Returns 0
*/
static int smack_file_open(struct file *file, const struct cred *cred)
{
+ struct task_smack *tsp = cred->security;
struct inode_smack *isp = file_inode(file)->i_security;
+ struct smk_audit_info ad;
+ int rc;
- file->f_security = isp->smk_inode;
+ if (smack_privileged(CAP_MAC_OVERRIDE))
+ return 0;
- return 0;
+ smk_ad_init(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_PATH);
+ smk_ad_setfield_u_fs_path(&ad, file->f_path);
+ rc = smk_access(tsp->smk_task, isp->smk_inode, MAY_READ, &ad);
+ if (rc == 0)
+ file->f_security = isp->smk_inode;
+
+ return rc;
}
/*
if (ssp == NULL)
return -ENOMEM;
- ssp->smk_in = skp->smk_known;
+ ssp->smk_in = skp;
ssp->smk_out = skp;
ssp->smk_packet = NULL;
if (act == SMK_RECEIVING) {
skp = smack_net_ambient;
- object = ssp->smk_in;
+ object = ssp->smk_in->smk_known;
} else {
skp = ssp->smk_out;
object = smack_net_ambient->smk_known;
list_for_each_entry(spp, &smk_ipv6_port_list, list) {
if (spp->smk_port != port)
continue;
- object = spp->smk_in;
+ object = spp->smk_in->smk_known;
if (act == SMK_CONNECTING)
- ssp->smk_packet = spp->smk_out->smk_known;
+ ssp->smk_packet = spp->smk_out;
break;
}
int rc = 0;
if (value == NULL || size > SMK_LONGLABEL || size == 0)
- return -EACCES;
+ return -EINVAL;
skp = smk_import_entry(value, size);
if (skp == NULL)
ssp = sock->sk->sk_security;
if (strcmp(name, XATTR_SMACK_IPIN) == 0)
- ssp->smk_in = skp->smk_known;
+ ssp->smk_in = skp;
else if (strcmp(name, XATTR_SMACK_IPOUT) == 0) {
ssp->smk_out = skp;
if (sock->sk->sk_family == PF_INET) {
* of the superblock.
*/
if (opt_dentry->d_parent == opt_dentry) {
+ if (sbp->s_magic == CGROUP_SUPER_MAGIC) {
+ /*
+ * The cgroup filesystem is never mounted,
+ * so there's no opportunity to set the mount
+ * options.
+ */
+ sbsp->smk_root = smack_known_star.smk_known;
+ sbsp->smk_default = smack_known_star.smk_known;
+ }
isp->smk_inode = sbsp->smk_root;
isp->smk_flags |= SMK_INODE_INSTANT;
goto unlockandout;
*/
switch (sbp->s_magic) {
case SMACK_MAGIC:
+ case PIPEFS_MAGIC:
+ case SOCKFS_MAGIC:
+ case CGROUP_SUPER_MAGIC:
/*
* Casey says that it's a little embarrassing
* that the smack file system doesn't do
* extended attributes.
- */
- final = smack_known_star.smk_known;
- break;
- case PIPEFS_MAGIC:
- /*
+ *
* Casey says pipes are easy (?)
+ *
+ * Socket access is controlled by the socket
+ * structures associated with the task involved.
+ *
+ * Cgroupfs is special
*/
final = smack_known_star.smk_known;
break;
*/
final = ckp->smk_known;
break;
- case SOCKFS_MAGIC:
- /*
- * Socket access is controlled by the socket
- * structures associated with the task involved.
- */
- final = smack_known_star.smk_known;
- break;
case PROC_SUPER_MAGIC:
/*
* Casey says procfs appears not to care.
struct sock *other, struct sock *newsk)
{
struct smack_known *skp;
+ struct smack_known *okp;
struct socket_smack *ssp = sock->sk_security;
struct socket_smack *osp = other->sk_security;
struct socket_smack *nsp = newsk->sk_security;
struct smk_audit_info ad;
int rc = 0;
-
#ifdef CONFIG_AUDIT
struct lsm_network_audit net;
-
- smk_ad_init_net(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NET, &net);
- smk_ad_setfield_u_net_sk(&ad, other);
#endif
if (!smack_privileged(CAP_MAC_OVERRIDE)) {
skp = ssp->smk_out;
- rc = smk_access(skp, osp->smk_in, MAY_WRITE, &ad);
+ okp = osp->smk_out;
+#ifdef CONFIG_AUDIT
+ smk_ad_init_net(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NET, &net);
+ smk_ad_setfield_u_net_sk(&ad, other);
+#endif
+ rc = smk_access(skp, okp->smk_known, MAY_WRITE, &ad);
+ if (rc == 0)
+ rc = smk_access(okp, okp->smk_known, MAY_WRITE, NULL);
}
/*
* Cross reference the peer labels for SO_PEERSEC.
*/
if (rc == 0) {
- nsp->smk_packet = ssp->smk_out->smk_known;
- ssp->smk_packet = osp->smk_out->smk_known;
+ nsp->smk_packet = ssp->smk_out;
+ ssp->smk_packet = osp->smk_out;
}
return rc;
return 0;
skp = ssp->smk_out;
- return smk_access(skp, osp->smk_in, MAY_WRITE, &ad);
+ return smk_access(skp, osp->smk_in->smk_known, MAY_WRITE, &ad);
}
/**
if (found)
return skp;
- if (ssp != NULL && ssp->smk_in == smack_known_star.smk_known)
+ if (ssp != NULL && ssp->smk_in == &smack_known_star)
return &smack_known_web;
return &smack_known_star;
}
* This is the simplist possible security model
* for networking.
*/
- rc = smk_access(skp, ssp->smk_in, MAY_WRITE, &ad);
+ rc = smk_access(skp, ssp->smk_in->smk_known, MAY_WRITE, &ad);
if (rc != 0)
netlbl_skbuff_err(skb, rc, 0);
break;
ssp = sock->sk->sk_security;
if (ssp->smk_packet != NULL) {
- rcp = ssp->smk_packet;
+ rcp = ssp->smk_packet->smk_known;
slen = strlen(rcp) + 1;
}
return;
ssp = sk->sk_security;
- ssp->smk_in = skp->smk_known;
+ ssp->smk_in = skp;
ssp->smk_out = skp;
/* cssp->smk_packet is already set in smack_inet_csk_clone() */
}
* Receiving a packet requires that the other end be able to write
* here. Read access is not required.
*/
- rc = smk_access(skp, ssp->smk_in, MAY_WRITE, &ad);
+ rc = smk_access(skp, ssp->smk_in->smk_known, MAY_WRITE, &ad);
if (rc != 0)
return rc;
if (req->peer_secid != 0) {
skp = smack_from_secid(req->peer_secid);
- ssp->smk_packet = skp->smk_known;
+ ssp->smk_packet = skp;
} else
ssp->smk_packet = NULL;
}
* an error code otherwise
*/
static int smack_key_permission(key_ref_t key_ref,
- const struct cred *cred, key_perm_t perm)
+ const struct cred *cred, unsigned perm)
{
struct key *keyp;
struct smk_audit_info ad;
struct smack_known *tkp = smk_of_task(cred->security);
+ int request = 0;
keyp = key_ref_to_ptr(key_ref);
if (keyp == NULL)
ad.a.u.key_struct.key = keyp->serial;
ad.a.u.key_struct.key_desc = keyp->description;
#endif
- return smk_access(tkp, keyp->security, MAY_READWRITE, &ad);
+ if (perm & KEY_NEED_READ)
+ request = MAY_READ;
+ if (perm & (KEY_NEED_WRITE | KEY_NEED_LINK | KEY_NEED_SETATTR))
+ request = MAY_WRITE;
+ return smk_access(tkp, keyp->security, request, &ad);
}
#endif /* CONFIG_KEYS */
SMK_REVOKE_SUBJ = 18, /* set rules with subject label to '-' */
SMK_CHANGE_RULE = 19, /* change or add rules (long labels) */
SMK_SYSLOG = 20, /* change syslog label) */
+ SMK_PTRACE = 21, /* set ptrace rule */
};
/*
*/
struct smack_known *smack_syslog_label;
+/*
+ * Ptrace current rule
+ * SMACK_PTRACE_DEFAULT regular smack ptrace rules (/proc based)
+ * SMACK_PTRACE_EXACT labels must match, but can be overriden with
+ * CAP_SYS_PTRACE
+ * SMACK_PTRACE_DRACONIAN lables must match, CAP_SYS_PTRACE has no effect
+ */
+int smack_ptrace_rule = SMACK_PTRACE_DEFAULT;
+
/*
* Certain IP addresses may be designated as single label hosts.
* Packets are sent there unlabeled, but only from tasks that
data[count] = '\0';
- rc = sscanf(data, "%hhd.%hhd.%hhd.%hhd/%d %s",
+ rc = sscanf(data, "%hhd.%hhd.%hhd.%hhd/%u %s",
&host[0], &host[1], &host[2], &host[3], &m, smack);
if (rc != 6) {
rc = sscanf(data, "%hhd.%hhd.%hhd.%hhd %s",
};
+/**
+ * smk_read_ptrace - read() for /smack/ptrace
+ * @filp: file pointer, not actually used
+ * @buf: where to put the result
+ * @count: maximum to send along
+ * @ppos: where to start
+ *
+ * Returns number of bytes read or error code, as appropriate
+ */
+static ssize_t smk_read_ptrace(struct file *filp, char __user *buf,
+ size_t count, loff_t *ppos)
+{
+ char temp[32];
+ ssize_t rc;
+
+ if (*ppos != 0)
+ return 0;
+
+ sprintf(temp, "%d\n", smack_ptrace_rule);
+ rc = simple_read_from_buffer(buf, count, ppos, temp, strlen(temp));
+ return rc;
+}
+
+/**
+ * smk_write_ptrace - write() for /smack/ptrace
+ * @file: file pointer
+ * @buf: data from user space
+ * @count: bytes sent
+ * @ppos: where to start - must be 0
+ */
+static ssize_t smk_write_ptrace(struct file *file, const char __user *buf,
+ size_t count, loff_t *ppos)
+{
+ char temp[32];
+ int i;
+
+ if (!smack_privileged(CAP_MAC_ADMIN))
+ return -EPERM;
+
+ if (*ppos != 0 || count >= sizeof(temp) || count == 0)
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ if (copy_from_user(temp, buf, count) != 0)
+ return -EFAULT;
+
+ temp[count] = '\0';
+
+ if (sscanf(temp, "%d", &i) != 1)
+ return -EINVAL;
+ if (i < SMACK_PTRACE_DEFAULT || i > SMACK_PTRACE_MAX)
+ return -EINVAL;
+ smack_ptrace_rule = i;
+
+ return count;
+}
+
+static const struct file_operations smk_ptrace_ops = {
+ .write = smk_write_ptrace,
+ .read = smk_read_ptrace,
+ .llseek = default_llseek,
+};
+
/**
* smk_fill_super - fill the smackfs superblock
* @sb: the empty superblock
"change-rule", &smk_change_rule_ops, S_IRUGO|S_IWUSR},
[SMK_SYSLOG] = {
"syslog", &smk_syslog_ops, S_IRUGO|S_IWUSR},
+ [SMK_PTRACE] = {
+ "ptrace", &smk_ptrace_ops, S_IRUGO|S_IWUSR},
/* last one */
{""}
};