Pull audit updates from Paul Moore:
"This pull request is a bit early, but with some vacation time coming
up I wanted to send this out now just in case the remote Internet Gods
decide not to smile on me once the merge window opens. The patchset
for v5.3 is pretty minor this time, the highlights include:
- When the audit daemon is sent a signal, ensure we deliver
information about the sender even when syscall auditing is not
enabled/supported.
- Add the ability to filter audit records based on network address
family.
- Tighten the audit field filtering restrictions on string based
fields.
- Cleanup the audit field filtering verification code.
- Remove a few BUG() calls from the audit code"
* tag 'audit-pr-
20190702' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/pcmoore/audit:
audit: remove the BUG() calls in the audit rule comparison functions
audit: enforce op for string fields
audit: add saddr_fam filter field
audit: re-structure audit field valid checks
audit: deliver signal_info regarless of syscall
}
extern u32 audit_enabled;
+
+extern int audit_signal_info(int sig, struct task_struct *t);
+
#else /* CONFIG_AUDIT */
static inline __printf(4, 5)
void audit_log(struct audit_context *ctx, gfp_t gfp_mask, int type,
}
#define audit_enabled AUDIT_OFF
+
+static inline int audit_signal_info(int sig, struct task_struct *t)
+{
+ return 0;
+}
+
#endif /* CONFIG_AUDIT */
#ifdef CONFIG_AUDIT_COMPAT_GENERIC
#define AUDIT_OBJ_GID 110
#define AUDIT_FIELD_COMPARE 111
#define AUDIT_EXE 112
+#define AUDIT_SADDR_FAM 113
#define AUDIT_ARG0 200
#define AUDIT_ARG1 (AUDIT_ARG0+1)
return rc;
}
+/**
+ * audit_signal_info - record signal info for shutting down audit subsystem
+ * @sig: signal value
+ * @t: task being signaled
+ *
+ * If the audit subsystem is being terminated, record the task (pid)
+ * and uid that is doing that.
+ */
+int audit_signal_info(int sig, struct task_struct *t)
+{
+ kuid_t uid = current_uid(), auid;
+
+ if (auditd_test_task(t) &&
+ (sig == SIGTERM || sig == SIGHUP ||
+ sig == SIGUSR1 || sig == SIGUSR2)) {
+ audit_sig_pid = task_tgid_nr(current);
+ auid = audit_get_loginuid(current);
+ if (uid_valid(auid))
+ audit_sig_uid = auid;
+ else
+ audit_sig_uid = uid;
+ security_task_getsecid(current, &audit_sig_sid);
+ }
+
+ return audit_signal_info_syscall(t);
+}
+
/**
* audit_log_end - end one audit record
* @ab: the audit_buffer
extern void audit_put_tree(struct audit_tree *tree);
extern void audit_kill_trees(struct audit_context *context);
-extern int audit_signal_info(int sig, struct task_struct *t);
+extern int audit_signal_info_syscall(struct task_struct *t);
extern void audit_filter_inodes(struct task_struct *tsk,
struct audit_context *ctx);
extern struct list_head *audit_killed_trees(void);
#define audit_tree_path(rule) "" /* never called */
#define audit_kill_trees(context) BUG()
-#define audit_signal_info(s, t) AUDIT_DISABLED
+static inline int audit_signal_info_syscall(struct task_struct *t)
+{
+ return 0;
+}
+
#define audit_filter_inodes(t, c) AUDIT_DISABLED
#endif /* CONFIG_AUDITSYSCALL */
/* check if an audit field is valid */
static int audit_field_valid(struct audit_entry *entry, struct audit_field *f)
{
- switch(f->type) {
+ switch (f->type) {
case AUDIT_MSGTYPE:
if (entry->rule.listnr != AUDIT_FILTER_EXCLUDE &&
entry->rule.listnr != AUDIT_FILTER_USER)
break;
}
- switch(entry->rule.listnr) {
+ switch (entry->rule.listnr) {
case AUDIT_FILTER_FS:
switch(f->type) {
case AUDIT_FSTYPE:
}
}
- switch(f->type) {
- default:
- return -EINVAL;
+ /* Check for valid field type and op */
+ switch (f->type) {
+ case AUDIT_ARG0:
+ case AUDIT_ARG1:
+ case AUDIT_ARG2:
+ case AUDIT_ARG3:
+ case AUDIT_PERS: /* <uapi/linux/personality.h> */
+ case AUDIT_DEVMINOR:
+ /* all ops are valid */
+ break;
case AUDIT_UID:
case AUDIT_EUID:
case AUDIT_SUID:
case AUDIT_FSGID:
case AUDIT_OBJ_GID:
case AUDIT_PID:
- case AUDIT_PERS:
case AUDIT_MSGTYPE:
case AUDIT_PPID:
case AUDIT_DEVMAJOR:
- case AUDIT_DEVMINOR:
case AUDIT_EXIT:
case AUDIT_SUCCESS:
case AUDIT_INODE:
case AUDIT_SESSIONID:
+ case AUDIT_SUBJ_SEN:
+ case AUDIT_SUBJ_CLR:
+ case AUDIT_OBJ_LEV_LOW:
+ case AUDIT_OBJ_LEV_HIGH:
+ case AUDIT_SADDR_FAM:
/* bit ops are only useful on syscall args */
if (f->op == Audit_bitmask || f->op == Audit_bittest)
return -EINVAL;
break;
- case AUDIT_ARG0:
- case AUDIT_ARG1:
- case AUDIT_ARG2:
- case AUDIT_ARG3:
case AUDIT_SUBJ_USER:
case AUDIT_SUBJ_ROLE:
case AUDIT_SUBJ_TYPE:
- case AUDIT_SUBJ_SEN:
- case AUDIT_SUBJ_CLR:
case AUDIT_OBJ_USER:
case AUDIT_OBJ_ROLE:
case AUDIT_OBJ_TYPE:
- case AUDIT_OBJ_LEV_LOW:
- case AUDIT_OBJ_LEV_HIGH:
case AUDIT_WATCH:
case AUDIT_DIR:
case AUDIT_FILTERKEY:
- break;
case AUDIT_LOGINUID_SET:
- if ((f->val != 0) && (f->val != 1))
- return -EINVAL;
- /* FALL THROUGH */
case AUDIT_ARCH:
case AUDIT_FSTYPE:
+ case AUDIT_PERM:
+ case AUDIT_FILETYPE:
+ case AUDIT_FIELD_COMPARE:
+ case AUDIT_EXE:
+ /* only equal and not equal valid ops */
if (f->op != Audit_not_equal && f->op != Audit_equal)
return -EINVAL;
break;
+ default:
+ /* field not recognized */
+ return -EINVAL;
+ }
+
+ /* Check for select valid field values */
+ switch (f->type) {
+ case AUDIT_LOGINUID_SET:
+ if ((f->val != 0) && (f->val != 1))
+ return -EINVAL;
+ break;
case AUDIT_PERM:
if (f->val & ~15)
return -EINVAL;
if (f->val > AUDIT_MAX_FIELD_COMPARE)
return -EINVAL;
break;
- case AUDIT_EXE:
- if (f->op != Audit_not_equal && f->op != Audit_equal)
+ case AUDIT_SADDR_FAM:
+ if (f->val >= AF_MAX)
return -EINVAL;
break;
+ default:
+ break;
}
+
return 0;
}
case Audit_bittest:
return ((left & right) == right);
default:
- BUG();
return 0;
}
}
case Audit_bitmask:
case Audit_bittest:
default:
- BUG();
return 0;
}
}
case Audit_bitmask:
case Audit_bittest:
default:
- BUG();
return 0;
}
}
}
break;
case AUDIT_WATCH:
- if (name)
- result = audit_watch_compare(rule->watch, name->ino, name->dev);
+ if (name) {
+ result = audit_watch_compare(rule->watch,
+ name->ino,
+ name->dev);
+ if (f->op == Audit_not_equal)
+ result = !result;
+ }
break;
case AUDIT_DIR:
- if (ctx)
+ if (ctx) {
result = match_tree_refs(ctx, rule->tree);
+ if (f->op == Audit_not_equal)
+ result = !result;
+ }
break;
case AUDIT_LOGINUID:
result = audit_uid_comparator(audit_get_loginuid(tsk),
case AUDIT_LOGINUID_SET:
result = audit_comparator(audit_loginuid_set(tsk), f->op, f->val);
break;
+ case AUDIT_SADDR_FAM:
+ if (ctx->sockaddr)
+ result = audit_comparator(ctx->sockaddr->ss_family,
+ f->op, f->val);
+ break;
case AUDIT_SUBJ_USER:
case AUDIT_SUBJ_ROLE:
case AUDIT_SUBJ_TYPE:
break;
case AUDIT_PERM:
result = audit_match_perm(ctx, f->val);
+ if (f->op == Audit_not_equal)
+ result = !result;
break;
case AUDIT_FILETYPE:
result = audit_match_filetype(ctx, f->val);
+ if (f->op == Audit_not_equal)
+ result = !result;
break;
case AUDIT_FIELD_COMPARE:
result = audit_field_compare(tsk, cred, f, ctx, name);
}
/**
- * audit_signal_info - record signal info for shutting down audit subsystem
- * @sig: signal value
+ * audit_signal_info_syscall - record signal info for syscalls
* @t: task being signaled
*
* If the audit subsystem is being terminated, record the task (pid)
* and uid that is doing that.
*/
-int audit_signal_info(int sig, struct task_struct *t)
+int audit_signal_info_syscall(struct task_struct *t)
{
struct audit_aux_data_pids *axp;
struct audit_context *ctx = audit_context();
- kuid_t uid = current_uid(), auid, t_uid = task_uid(t);
-
- if (auditd_test_task(t) &&
- (sig == SIGTERM || sig == SIGHUP ||
- sig == SIGUSR1 || sig == SIGUSR2)) {
- audit_sig_pid = task_tgid_nr(current);
- auid = audit_get_loginuid(current);
- if (uid_valid(auid))
- audit_sig_uid = auid;
- else
- audit_sig_uid = uid;
- security_task_getsecid(current, &audit_sig_sid);
- }
+ kuid_t t_uid = task_uid(t);
if (!audit_signals || audit_dummy_context())
return 0;
#include <linux/posix-timers.h>
#include <linux/livepatch.h>
#include <linux/cgroup.h>
+#include <linux/audit.h>
#define CREATE_TRACE_POINTS
#include <trace/events/signal.h>
#include <asm/unistd.h>
#include <asm/siginfo.h>
#include <asm/cacheflush.h>
-#include "audit.h" /* audit_signal_info() */
/*
* SLAB caches for signal bits.