#include "auth/auth.h"
#include "auth/auth_sam_reply.h"
#include "kdc/kdc-glue.h"
+#include "kdc/pac-glue.h"
#include "param/param.h"
#include "librpc/gen_ndr/ndr_krb5pac.h"
+#include "libcli/security/security.h"
+#include "dsdb/samdb/samdb.h"
+#include "auth/kerberos/pac_utils.h"
static
NTSTATUS samba_get_logon_info_pac_blob(TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx,
}
pac_info.logon_info.info = talloc_zero(mem_ctx, struct PAC_LOGON_INFO);
- if (!mem_ctx) {
+ if (!pac_info.logon_info.info) {
return NT_STATUS_NO_MEMORY;
}
krb5_error_code samba_make_krb5_pac(krb5_context context,
DATA_BLOB *pac_blob,
+ DATA_BLOB *deleg_blob,
krb5_pac *pac)
{
krb5_data pac_data;
+ krb5_data deleg_data;
krb5_error_code ret;
/* The user account may be set not to want the PAC */
return ret;
}
+ ZERO_STRUCT(deleg_data);
+ if (deleg_blob) {
+ ret = krb5_data_copy(&deleg_data,
+ deleg_blob->data,
+ deleg_blob->length);
+ if (ret != 0) {
+ krb5_data_free(&pac_data);
+ return ret;
+ }
+ }
+
ret = krb5_pac_init(context, pac);
if (ret != 0) {
krb5_data_free(&pac_data);
+ krb5_data_free(&deleg_data);
return ret;
}
ret = krb5_pac_add_buffer(context, *pac, PAC_TYPE_LOGON_INFO, &pac_data);
krb5_data_free(&pac_data);
if (ret != 0) {
+ krb5_data_free(&deleg_data);
return ret;
}
+ if (deleg_blob) {
+ ret = krb5_pac_add_buffer(context, *pac,
+ PAC_TYPE_CONSTRAINED_DELEGATION,
+ &deleg_data);
+ krb5_data_free(&deleg_data);
+ if (ret != 0) {
+ return ret;
+ }
+ }
+
return ret;
}
return true;
}
-/* Was the krbtgt an RODC (and we are not) */
-bool samba_krbtgt_was_untrusted_rodc(struct hdb_entry_ex *princ)
+/* Was the krbtgt in this DB (ie, should we check the incoming signature) and was it an RODC */
+int samba_krbtgt_is_in_db(struct hdb_entry_ex *princ, bool *is_in_db, bool *is_untrusted)
{
-
+ NTSTATUS status;
struct samba_kdc_entry *p = talloc_get_type(princ->ctx, struct samba_kdc_entry);
- int rodc_krbtgt_number;
+ int rodc_krbtgt_number, trust_direction;
+ uint32_t rid;
+
+ TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx = talloc_new(NULL);
+ if (!mem_ctx) {
+ return ENOMEM;
+ }
+
+ trust_direction = ldb_msg_find_attr_as_int(p->msg, "trustDirection", 0);
+
+ if (trust_direction != 0) {
+ /* Domain trust - we cannot check the sig, but we trust it for a correct PAC
+
+ This is exactly where we should flag for SID
+ validation when we do inter-foreest trusts
+ */
+ talloc_free(mem_ctx);
+ *is_untrusted = false;
+ *is_in_db = false;
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ /* The lack of password controls etc applies to krbtgt by
+ * virtue of being that particular RID */
+ status = dom_sid_split_rid(NULL, samdb_result_dom_sid(mem_ctx, p->msg, "objectSid"), NULL, &rid);
+
+ if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(status)) {
+ talloc_free(mem_ctx);
+ return EINVAL;
+ }
- /* Determine if this was printed by an RODC */
rodc_krbtgt_number = ldb_msg_find_attr_as_int(p->msg, "msDS-SecondaryKrbTgtNumber", -1);
- if (rodc_krbtgt_number == -1) {
- return false;
- } else if (rodc_krbtgt_number != p->kdc_db_ctx->my_krbtgt_number) {
- return true;
+
+ if (p->kdc_db_ctx->my_krbtgt_number == 0) {
+ if (rid == DOMAIN_RID_KRBTGT) {
+ *is_untrusted = false;
+ *is_in_db = true;
+ talloc_free(mem_ctx);
+ return 0;
+ } else if (rodc_krbtgt_number != -1) {
+ *is_in_db = true;
+ *is_untrusted = true;
+ talloc_free(mem_ctx);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ } else if ((rid != DOMAIN_RID_KRBTGT) && (rodc_krbtgt_number == p->kdc_db_ctx->my_krbtgt_number)) {
+ talloc_free(mem_ctx);
+ *is_untrusted = false;
+ *is_in_db = true;
+ return 0;
+ } else if (rid == DOMAIN_RID_KRBTGT) {
+ /* krbtgt viewed from an RODC */
+ talloc_free(mem_ctx);
+ *is_untrusted = false;
+ *is_in_db = false;
+ return 0;
}
- return false;
+ /* Another RODC */
+ talloc_free(mem_ctx);
+ *is_untrusted = true;
+ *is_in_db = false;
+ return 0;
}
NTSTATUS samba_kdc_get_pac_blob(TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx,
NTSTATUS samba_kdc_update_pac_blob(TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx,
krb5_context context,
- krb5_pac *pac, DATA_BLOB *pac_blob)
+ const krb5_pac pac, DATA_BLOB *pac_blob,
+ struct PAC_SIGNATURE_DATA *pac_srv_sig,
+ struct PAC_SIGNATURE_DATA *pac_kdc_sig)
{
struct auth_user_info_dc *user_info_dc;
krb5_error_code ret;
NTSTATUS nt_status;
- ret = kerberos_pac_to_user_info_dc(mem_ctx, *pac,
- context, &user_info_dc, NULL, NULL);
+ ret = kerberos_pac_to_user_info_dc(mem_ctx, pac,
+ context, &user_info_dc, pac_srv_sig, pac_kdc_sig);
if (ret) {
return NT_STATUS_UNSUCCESSFUL;
}
return nt_status;
}
+NTSTATUS samba_kdc_update_delegation_info_blob(TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx,
+ krb5_context context,
+ const krb5_pac pac,
+ const krb5_principal server_principal,
+ const krb5_principal proxy_principal,
+ DATA_BLOB *new_blob)
+{
+ krb5_data old_data;
+ DATA_BLOB old_blob;
+ krb5_error_code ret;
+ NTSTATUS nt_status;
+ enum ndr_err_code ndr_err;
+ union PAC_INFO info;
+ struct PAC_CONSTRAINED_DELEGATION _d;
+ struct PAC_CONSTRAINED_DELEGATION *d = NULL;
+ char *server = NULL;
+ char *proxy = NULL;
+ uint32_t i;
+ TALLOC_CTX *tmp_ctx = talloc_new(mem_ctx);
+
+ if (tmp_ctx == NULL) {
+ return NT_STATUS_NO_MEMORY;
+ }
+
+ ret = krb5_pac_get_buffer(context, pac, PAC_TYPE_CONSTRAINED_DELEGATION, &old_data);
+ if (ret == ENOENT) {
+ ZERO_STRUCT(old_data);
+ } else if (ret) {
+ talloc_free(tmp_ctx);
+ return NT_STATUS_UNSUCCESSFUL;
+ }
+
+ old_blob.length = old_data.length;
+ old_blob.data = (uint8_t *)old_data.data;
+
+ ZERO_STRUCT(info);
+ if (old_blob.length > 0) {
+ ndr_err = ndr_pull_union_blob(&old_blob, mem_ctx,
+ &info, PAC_TYPE_CONSTRAINED_DELEGATION,
+ (ndr_pull_flags_fn_t)ndr_pull_PAC_INFO);
+ if (!NDR_ERR_CODE_IS_SUCCESS(ndr_err)) {
+ krb5_data_free(&old_data);
+ nt_status = ndr_map_error2ntstatus(ndr_err);
+ DEBUG(0,("can't parse the PAC LOGON_INFO: %s\n", nt_errstr(nt_status)));
+ talloc_free(tmp_ctx);
+ return nt_status;
+ }
+ } else {
+ ZERO_STRUCT(_d);
+ info.constrained_delegation.info = &_d;
+ }
+ krb5_data_free(&old_data);
+
+ ret = krb5_unparse_name(context, server_principal, &server);
+ if (ret) {
+ talloc_free(tmp_ctx);
+ return NT_STATUS_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+ }
+
+ ret = krb5_unparse_name_flags(context, proxy_principal,
+ KRB5_PRINCIPAL_UNPARSE_NO_REALM, &proxy);
+ if (ret) {
+ SAFE_FREE(server);
+ talloc_free(tmp_ctx);
+ return NT_STATUS_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+ }
+
+ d = info.constrained_delegation.info;
+ i = d->num_transited_services;
+ d->proxy_target.string = server;
+ d->transited_services = talloc_realloc(mem_ctx, d->transited_services,
+ struct lsa_String, i + 1);
+ d->transited_services[i].string = proxy;
+ d->num_transited_services = i + 1;
+
+ ndr_err = ndr_push_union_blob(new_blob, mem_ctx,
+ &info, PAC_TYPE_CONSTRAINED_DELEGATION,
+ (ndr_push_flags_fn_t)ndr_push_PAC_INFO);
+ SAFE_FREE(server);
+ SAFE_FREE(proxy);
+ if (!NDR_ERR_CODE_IS_SUCCESS(ndr_err)) {
+ krb5_data_free(&old_data);
+ nt_status = ndr_map_error2ntstatus(ndr_err);
+ DEBUG(0,("can't parse the PAC LOGON_INFO: %s\n", nt_errstr(nt_status)));
+ talloc_free(tmp_ctx);
+ return nt_status;
+ }
+
+ talloc_free(tmp_ctx);
+ return NT_STATUS_OK;
+}
+
/* this function allocates 'data' using malloc.
* The caller is responsible for freeing it */
void samba_kdc_build_edata_reply(NTSTATUS nt_status, DATA_BLOB *e_data)
return nt_status;
}
+int kdc_check_pac(krb5_context context,
+ DATA_BLOB srv_sig,
+ struct PAC_SIGNATURE_DATA *kdc_sig,
+ hdb_entry_ex *ent)
+{
+ krb5_enctype etype;
+ int ret;
+ krb5_keyblock keyblock;
+ Key *key;
+ if (kdc_sig->type == CKSUMTYPE_HMAC_MD5) {
+ etype = ETYPE_ARCFOUR_HMAC_MD5;
+ } else {
+ ret = krb5_cksumtype_to_enctype(context,
+ kdc_sig->type,
+ &etype);
+ if (ret != 0) {
+ return ret;
+ }
+ }
+
+#if HDB_ENCTYPE2KEY_TAKES_KEYSET
+ ret = hdb_enctype2key(context, &ent->entry, NULL, etype, &key);
+#else
+ ret = hdb_enctype2key(context, &ent->entry, etype, &key);
+#endif
+
+ if (ret != 0) {
+ return ret;
+ }
+
+ keyblock = key->key;
+
+ return check_pac_checksum(srv_sig, kdc_sig,
+ context, &keyblock);
+}
+
+
+