it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
the Free Software Foundation; either version 3 of the License, or
(at your option) any later version.
-
+
This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the
GNU General Public License for more details.
-
+
You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
along with this program. If not, see <http://www.gnu.org/licenses/>.
*/
#include "includes.h"
+#include "system/passwd.h"
#undef DBGC_CLASS
#define DBGC_CLASS DBGC_AUTH
static struct cli_state *server_cryptkey(TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx)
{
struct cli_state *cli = NULL;
- fstring desthost;
- struct in_addr dest_ip;
+ char *desthost = NULL;
+ struct sockaddr_storage dest_ss;
const char *p;
- char *pserver;
- BOOL connected_ok = False;
+ char *pserver = NULL;
+ bool connected_ok = False;
+ struct named_mutex *mutex = NULL;
+ NTSTATUS status;
if (!(cli = cli_initialise()))
return NULL;
pserver = talloc_strdup(mem_ctx, lp_passwordserver());
p = pserver;
- while(next_token( &p, desthost, LIST_SEP, sizeof(desthost))) {
- NTSTATUS status;
+ while(next_token_talloc(mem_ctx, &p, &desthost, LIST_SEP)) {
- standard_sub_basic(current_user_info.smb_name, current_user_info.domain,
- desthost, sizeof(desthost));
+ desthost = talloc_sub_basic(mem_ctx,
+ current_user_info.smb_name,
+ current_user_info.domain,
+ desthost);
+ if (!desthost) {
+ return NULL;
+ }
strupper_m(desthost);
- if(!resolve_name( desthost, &dest_ip, 0x20)) {
+ if(!resolve_name( desthost, &dest_ss, 0x20, false)) {
DEBUG(1,("server_cryptkey: Can't resolve address for %s\n",desthost));
continue;
}
- if (ismyip(dest_ip)) {
+ if (ismyaddr((struct sockaddr *)&dest_ss)) {
DEBUG(1,("Password server loop - disabling password server %s\n",desthost));
continue;
}
- /* we use a mutex to prevent two connections at once - when a
- Win2k PDC get two connections where one hasn't completed a
- session setup yet it will send a TCP reset to the first
+ /* we use a mutex to prevent two connections at once - when a
+ Win2k PDC get two connections where one hasn't completed a
+ session setup yet it will send a TCP reset to the first
connection (tridge) */
- if (!grab_server_mutex(desthost)) {
+ mutex = grab_named_mutex(talloc_tos(), desthost, 10);
+ if (mutex == NULL) {
+ cli_shutdown(cli);
return NULL;
}
- status = cli_connect(cli, desthost, &dest_ip);
+ status = cli_connect(cli, desthost, &dest_ss);
if (NT_STATUS_IS_OK(status)) {
DEBUG(3,("connected to password server %s\n",desthost));
connected_ok = True;
}
DEBUG(10,("server_cryptkey: failed to connect to server %s. Error %s\n",
desthost, nt_errstr(status) ));
+ TALLOC_FREE(mutex);
}
if (!connected_ok) {
- release_server_mutex();
DEBUG(0,("password server not available\n"));
cli_shutdown(cli);
return NULL;
}
-
- if (!attempt_netbios_session_request(&cli, global_myname(),
- desthost, &dest_ip)) {
- release_server_mutex();
+
+ if (!attempt_netbios_session_request(&cli, global_myname(),
+ desthost, &dest_ss)) {
+ TALLOC_FREE(mutex);
DEBUG(1,("password server fails session request\n"));
cli_shutdown(cli);
return NULL;
}
-
+
if (strequal(desthost,myhostname())) {
exit_server_cleanly("Password server loop!");
}
-
+
DEBUG(3,("got session\n"));
- if (!cli_negprot(cli)) {
- DEBUG(1,("%s rejected the negprot\n",desthost));
- release_server_mutex();
+ status = cli_negprot(cli);
+
+ if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(status)) {
+ TALLOC_FREE(mutex);
+ DEBUG(1, ("%s rejected the negprot: %s\n",
+ desthost, nt_errstr(status)));
cli_shutdown(cli);
return NULL;
}
if (cli->protocol < PROTOCOL_LANMAN2 ||
!(cli->sec_mode & NEGOTIATE_SECURITY_USER_LEVEL)) {
+ TALLOC_FREE(mutex);
DEBUG(1,("%s isn't in user level security mode\n",desthost));
- release_server_mutex();
cli_shutdown(cli);
return NULL;
}
- /* Get the first session setup done quickly, to avoid silly
+ /* Get the first session setup done quickly, to avoid silly
Win2k bugs. (The next connection to the server will kill
- this one...
+ this one...
*/
- if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(cli_session_setup(cli, "", "", 0, "", 0,
- ""))) {
+ status = cli_session_setup(cli, "", "", 0, "", 0, "");
+ if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(status)) {
+ TALLOC_FREE(mutex);
DEBUG(0,("%s rejected the initial session setup (%s)\n",
- desthost, cli_errstr(cli)));
- release_server_mutex();
+ desthost, nt_errstr(status)));
cli_shutdown(cli);
return NULL;
}
-
- release_server_mutex();
+
+ TALLOC_FREE(mutex);
DEBUG(3,("password server OK\n"));
-
+
return cli;
}
Send a 'keepalive' packet down the cli pipe.
****************************************************************************/
-static BOOL send_server_keepalive(const struct timeval *now,
+static bool send_server_keepalive(const struct timeval *now,
void *private_data)
{
struct server_security_state *state = talloc_get_type_abort(
interval.tv_sec = lp_keepalive();
interval.tv_usec = 0;
- if (event_add_idle(smbd_event_context(), result, interval,
+ if (event_add_idle(server_event_context(), result, interval,
"server_security_keepalive",
send_server_keepalive,
result) == NULL) {
TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx)
{
struct cli_state *cli = server_cryptkey(mem_ctx);
-
+
if (cli) {
DEBUG(3,("using password server validation\n"));
/* We can't work with unencrypted password servers
unless 'encrypt passwords = no' */
DEBUG(5,("make_auth_info_server: Server is unencrypted, no challenge available..\n"));
-
+
/* However, it is still a perfectly fine connection
to pass that unencrypted password over */
*my_private_data =
/* The return must be allocated on the caller's mem_ctx, as our own will be
destoyed just after the call. */
- return data_blob_talloc(auth_context->mem_ctx, cli->secblob.data,8);
+ return data_blob_talloc((TALLOC_CTX *)auth_context, cli->secblob.data,8);
} else {
return data_blob_null;
}
static NTSTATUS check_smbserver_security(const struct auth_context *auth_context,
void *my_private_data,
TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx,
- const auth_usersupplied_info *user_info,
- auth_serversupplied_info **server_info)
+ const struct auth_usersupplied_info *user_info,
+ struct auth_serversupplied_info **server_info)
{
+ struct server_security_state *state = talloc_get_type_abort(
+ my_private_data, struct server_security_state);
struct cli_state *cli;
- static unsigned char badpass[24];
- static fstring baduser;
- static BOOL tested_password_server = False;
- static BOOL bad_password_server = False;
+ static bool tested_password_server = False;
+ static bool bad_password_server = False;
NTSTATUS nt_status = NT_STATUS_NOT_IMPLEMENTED;
- BOOL locally_made_cli = False;
+ bool locally_made_cli = False;
+
+ DEBUG(10, ("Check auth for: [%s]\n", user_info->mapped.account_name));
+
+ cli = state->cli;
- cli = (struct cli_state *)my_private_data;
-
if (cli) {
} else {
cli = server_cryptkey(mem_ctx);
}
if (!cli || !cli->initialised) {
- DEBUG(1,("password server is not connected (cli not initilised)\n"));
+ DEBUG(1,("password server is not connected (cli not initialised)\n"));
return NT_STATUS_LOGON_FAILURE;
}
-
+
if ((cli->sec_mode & NEGOTIATE_SECURITY_CHALLENGE_RESPONSE) == 0) {
- if (user_info->encrypted) {
+ if (user_info->password_state != AUTH_PASSWORD_PLAIN) {
DEBUG(1,("password server %s is plaintext, but we are encrypted. This just can't work :-(\n", cli->desthost));
return NT_STATUS_LOGON_FAILURE;
}
}
}
- if(badpass[0] == 0)
- memset(badpass, 0x1f, sizeof(badpass));
-
- if((user_info->nt_resp.length == sizeof(badpass)) &&
- !memcmp(badpass, user_info->nt_resp.data, sizeof(badpass))) {
- /*
- * Very unlikely, our random bad password is the same as the users
- * password.
- */
- memset(badpass, badpass[0]+1, sizeof(badpass));
- }
-
- if(baduser[0] == 0) {
- fstrcpy(baduser, INVALID_USER_PREFIX);
- fstrcat(baduser, global_myname());
- }
-
/*
* Attempt a session setup with a totally incorrect password.
* If this succeeds with the guest bit *NOT* set then the password
*/
if ((!tested_password_server) && (lp_paranoid_server_security())) {
+ unsigned char badpass[24];
+ char *baduser = NULL;
+
+ memset(badpass, 0x1f, sizeof(badpass));
+
+ if((user_info->password.response.nt.length == sizeof(badpass)) &&
+ !memcmp(badpass, user_info->password.response.nt.data, sizeof(badpass))) {
+ /*
+ * Very unlikely, our random bad password is the same as the users
+ * password.
+ */
+ memset(badpass, badpass[0]+1, sizeof(badpass));
+ }
+
+ baduser = talloc_asprintf(mem_ctx,
+ "%s%s",
+ INVALID_USER_PREFIX,
+ global_myname());
+ if (!baduser) {
+ return NT_STATUS_NO_MEMORY;
+ }
+
if (NT_STATUS_IS_OK(cli_session_setup(cli, baduser,
(char *)badpass,
sizeof(badpass),
(char *)badpass,
sizeof(badpass),
- user_info->domain))) {
+ user_info->mapped.domain_name))) {
/*
* We connected to the password server so we
* Now we know the password server will correctly set the guest bit, or is
* not guest enabled, we can try with the real password.
*/
-
- if (!user_info->encrypted) {
+ switch (user_info->password_state) {
+ case AUTH_PASSWORD_PLAIN:
/* Plaintext available */
nt_status = cli_session_setup(
- cli, user_info->smb_name,
- (char *)user_info->plaintext_password.data,
- user_info->plaintext_password.length,
- NULL, 0, user_info->domain);
-
- } else {
+ cli, user_info->client.account_name,
+ user_info->password.plaintext,
+ strlen(user_info->password.plaintext),
+ NULL, 0, user_info->mapped.domain_name);
+ break;
+
+ /* currently the hash values include a challenge-response as well */
+ case AUTH_PASSWORD_HASH:
+ case AUTH_PASSWORD_RESPONSE:
nt_status = cli_session_setup(
- cli, user_info->smb_name,
- (char *)user_info->lm_resp.data,
- user_info->lm_resp.length,
- (char *)user_info->nt_resp.data,
- user_info->nt_resp.length,
- user_info->domain);
+ cli, user_info->client.account_name,
+ (char *)user_info->password.response.lanman.data,
+ user_info->password.response.lanman.length,
+ (char *)user_info->password.response.nt.data,
+ user_info->password.response.nt.length,
+ user_info->mapped.domain_name);
+ break;
+ default:
+ DEBUG(0,("user_info constructed for user '%s' was invalid - password_state=%u invalid.\n",user_info->mapped.account_name, user_info->password_state));
+ nt_status = NT_STATUS_INTERNAL_ERROR;
}
if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(nt_status)) {
cli_ulogoff(cli);
if (NT_STATUS_IS_OK(nt_status)) {
- fstring real_username;
- struct passwd *pass;
+ char *real_username = NULL;
+ struct passwd *pass = NULL;
- if ( (pass = smb_getpwnam( NULL, user_info->internal_username,
- real_username, True )) != NULL )
+ if ( (pass = smb_getpwnam(talloc_tos(), user_info->mapped.account_name,
+ &real_username, True )) != NULL )
{
- /* if a real user check pam account restrictions */
- /* only really perfomed if "obey pam restriction" is true */
- nt_status = smb_pam_accountcheck(pass->pw_name);
- if ( !NT_STATUS_IS_OK(nt_status)) {
- DEBUG(1, ("PAM account restriction prevents user login\n"));
- } else {
-
- nt_status = make_server_info_pw(server_info, pass->pw_name, pass);
- }
+ nt_status = make_server_info_pw(server_info, pass->pw_name, pass);
TALLOC_FREE(pass);
+ TALLOC_FREE(real_username);
}
else
{
static NTSTATUS auth_init_smbserver(struct auth_context *auth_context, const char* param, auth_methods **auth_method)
{
- if (!make_auth_methods(auth_context, auth_method)) {
+ struct auth_methods *result;
+
+ result = TALLOC_ZERO_P(auth_context, struct auth_methods);
+ if (result == NULL) {
return NT_STATUS_NO_MEMORY;
}
- (*auth_method)->name = "smbserver";
- (*auth_method)->auth = check_smbserver_security;
- (*auth_method)->get_chal = auth_get_challenge_server;
+ result->name = "smbserver";
+ result->auth = check_smbserver_security;
+ result->get_chal = auth_get_challenge_server;
+
+ *auth_method = result;
return NT_STATUS_OK;
}
git.samba.org / kai / samba.git / blobdiff