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+
+
+
+
+
+
+Network Working Group D. Eastlake, 3rd
+Request for Comments: 2930 Motorola
+Category: Standards Track September 2000
+
+
+ Secret Key Establishment for DNS (TKEY RR)
+
+Status of this Memo
+
+ This document specifies an Internet standards track protocol for the
+ Internet community, and requests discussion and suggestions for
+ improvements. Please refer to the current edition of the "Internet
+ Official Protocol Standards" (STD 1) for the standardization state
+ and status of this protocol. Distribution of this memo is unlimited.
+
+Copyright Notice
+
+ Copyright (C) The Internet Society (2000). All Rights Reserved.
+
+Abstract
+
+ [RFC 2845] provides a means of authenticating Domain Name System
+ (DNS) queries and responses using shared secret keys via the
+ Transaction Signature (TSIG) resource record (RR). However, it
+ provides no mechanism for setting up such keys other than manual
+ exchange. This document describes a Transaction Key (TKEY) RR that
+ can be used in a number of different modes to establish shared secret
+ keys between a DNS resolver and server.
+
+Acknowledgments
+
+ The comments and ideas of the following persons (listed in alphabetic
+ order) have been incorporated herein and are gratefully acknowledged:
+
+ Olafur Gudmundsson (TIS)
+
+ Stuart Kwan (Microsoft)
+
+ Ed Lewis (TIS)
+
+ Erik Nordmark (SUN)
+
+ Brian Wellington (Nominum)
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+Eastlake Standards Track [Page 1]
+\f
+RFC 2930 The DNS TKEY RR September 2000
+
+
+Table of Contents
+
+ 1. Introduction............................................... 2
+ 1.1 Overview of Contents...................................... 3
+ 2. The TKEY Resource Record................................... 4
+ 2.1 The Name Field............................................ 4
+ 2.2 The TTL Field............................................. 5
+ 2.3 The Algorithm Field....................................... 5
+ 2.4 The Inception and Expiration Fields....................... 5
+ 2.5 The Mode Field............................................ 5
+ 2.6 The Error Field........................................... 6
+ 2.7 The Key Size and Data Fields.............................. 6
+ 2.8 The Other Size and Data Fields............................ 6
+ 3. General TKEY Considerations................................ 7
+ 4. Exchange via Resolver Query................................ 8
+ 4.1 Query for Diffie-Hellman Exchanged Keying................. 8
+ 4.2 Query for TKEY Deletion................................... 9
+ 4.3 Query for GSS-API Establishment........................... 10
+ 4.4 Query for Server Assigned Keying.......................... 10
+ 4.5 Query for Resolver Assigned Keying........................ 11
+ 5. Spontaneous Server Inclusion............................... 12
+ 5.1 Spontaneous Server Key Deletion........................... 12
+ 6. Methods of Encryption...................................... 12
+ 7. IANA Considerations........................................ 13
+ 8. Security Considerations.................................... 13
+ References.................................................... 14
+ Author's Address.............................................. 15
+ Full Copyright Statement...................................... 16
+
+1. Introduction
+
+ The Domain Name System (DNS) is a hierarchical, distributed, highly
+ available database used for bi-directional mapping between domain
+ names and addresses, for email routing, and for other information
+ [RFC 1034, 1035]. It has been extended to provide for public key
+ security and dynamic update [RFC 2535, RFC 2136]. Familiarity with
+ these RFCs is assumed.
+
+ [RFC 2845] provides a means of efficiently authenticating DNS
+ messages using shared secret keys via the TSIG resource record (RR)
+ but provides no mechanism for setting up such keys other than manual
+ exchange. This document specifies a TKEY RR that can be used in a
+ number of different modes to establish and delete such shared secret
+ keys between a DNS resolver and server.
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+Eastlake Standards Track [Page 2]
+\f
+RFC 2930 The DNS TKEY RR September 2000
+
+
+ Note that TKEY established keying material and TSIGs that use it are
+ associated with DNS servers or resolvers. They are not associated
+ with zones. They may be used to authenticate queries and responses
+ but they do not provide zone based DNS data origin or denial
+ authentication [RFC 2535].
+
+ Certain modes of TKEY perform encryption which may affect their
+ export or import status for some countries. The affected modes
+ specified in this document are the server assigned mode and the
+ resolver assigned mode.
+
+ The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
+ "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this
+ document are to be interpreted as described in [RFC 2119].
+
+ In all cases herein, the term "resolver" includes that part of a
+ server which may make full and incremental [RFC 1995] zone transfer
+ queries, forwards recursive queries, etc.
+
+1.1 Overview of Contents
+
+ Section 2 below specifies the TKEY RR and provides a description of
+ and considerations for its constituent fields.
+
+ Section 3 describes general principles of operations with TKEY.
+
+ Section 4 discusses key agreement and deletion via DNS requests with
+ the Query opcode for RR type TKEY. This method is applicable to all
+ currently defined TKEY modes, although in some cases it is not what
+ would intuitively be called a "query".
+
+ Section 5 discusses spontaneous inclusion of TKEY RRs in responses by
+ servers which is currently used only for key deletion.
+
+ Section 6 describes encryption methods for transmitting secret key
+ information. In this document these are used only for the server
+ assigned mode and the resolver assigned mode.
+
+ Section 7 covers IANA considerations in assignment of TKEY modes.
+
+ Finally, Section 8 provides the required security considerations
+ section.
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+Eastlake Standards Track [Page 3]
+\f
+RFC 2930 The DNS TKEY RR September 2000
+
+
+2. The TKEY Resource Record
+
+ The TKEY resource record (RR) has the structure given below. Its RR
+ type code is 249.
+
+ Field Type Comment
+ ----- ---- -------
+
+ NAME domain see description below
+ TTYPE u_int16_t TKEY = 249
+ CLASS u_int16_t ignored, SHOULD be 255 (ANY)
+ TTL u_int32_t ignored, SHOULD be zero
+ RDLEN u_int16_t size of RDATA
+ RDATA:
+ Algorithm: domain
+ Inception: u_int32_t
+ Expiration: u_int32_t
+ Mode: u_int16_t
+ Error: u_int16_t
+ Key Size: u_int16_t
+ Key Data: octet-stream
+ Other Size: u_int16_t
+ Other Data: octet-stream undefined by this specification
+
+2.1 The Name Field
+
+ The Name field relates to naming keys. Its meaning differs somewhat
+ with mode and context as explained in subsequent sections.
+
+ At any DNS server or resolver only one octet string of keying
+ material may be in place for any particular key name. An attempt to
+ establish another set of keying material at a server for an existing
+ name returns a BADNAME error.
+
+ For a TKEY with a non-root name appearing in a query, the TKEY RR
+ name SHOULD be a domain locally unique at the resolver, less than 128
+ octets long in wire encoding, and meaningful to the resolver to
+ assist in distinguishing keys and/or key agreement sessions. For
+ TKEY(s) appearing in a response to a query, the TKEY RR name SHOULD
+ be a globally unique server assigned domain.
+
+ A reasonable key naming strategy is as follows:
+
+ If the key is generated as the result of a query with root as its
+ owner name, then the server SHOULD create a globally unique domain
+ name, to be the key name, by suffixing a pseudo-random [RFC 1750]
+ label with a domain name of the server. For example
+ 89n3mDgX072pp.server1.example.com. If generation of a new
+
+
+
+Eastlake Standards Track [Page 4]
+\f
+RFC 2930 The DNS TKEY RR September 2000
+
+
+ pseudo-random name in each case is an excessive computation load
+ or entropy drain, a serial number prefix can be added to a fixed
+ pseudo-random name generated an DNS server start time, such as
+ 1001.89n3mDgX072pp.server1.example.com.
+
+ If the key is generated as the result of a query with a non-root
+ name, say 789.resolver.example.net, then use the concatenation of
+ that with a name of the server. For example
+ 789.resolver.example.net.server1.example.com.
+
+2.2 The TTL Field
+
+ The TTL field is meaningless in TKEY RRs. It SHOULD always be zero to
+ be sure that older DNS implementations do not cache TKEY RRs.
+
+2.3 The Algorithm Field
+
+ The algorithm name is in the form of a domain name with the same
+ meaning as in [RFC 2845]. The algorithm determines how the secret
+ keying material agreed to using the TKEY RR is actually used to
+ derive the algorithm specific key.
+
+2.4 The Inception and Expiration Fields
+
+ The inception time and expiration times are in number of seconds
+ since the beginning of 1 January 1970 GMT ignoring leap seconds
+ treated as modulo 2**32 using ring arithmetic [RFC 1982]. In messages
+ between a DNS resolver and a DNS server where these fields are
+ meaningful, they are either the requested validity interval for the
+ keying material asked for or specify the validity interval of keying
+ material provided.
+
+ To avoid different interpretations of the inception and expiration
+ times in TKEY RRs, resolvers and servers exchanging them must have
+ the same idea of what time it is. One way of doing this is with the
+ NTP protocol [RFC 2030] but that or any other time synchronization
+ used for this purpose MUST be done securely.
+
+2.5 The Mode Field
+
+ The mode field specifies the general scheme for key agreement or the
+ purpose of the TKEY DNS message. Servers and resolvers supporting
+ this specification MUST implement the Diffie-Hellman key agreement
+ mode and the key deletion mode for queries. All other modes are
+ OPTIONAL. A server supporting TKEY that receives a TKEY request with
+ a mode it does not support returns the BADMODE error. The following
+ values of the Mode octet are defined, available, or reserved:
+
+
+
+
+Eastlake Standards Track [Page 5]
+\f
+RFC 2930 The DNS TKEY RR September 2000
+
+
+ Value Description
+ ----- -----------
+ 0 - reserved, see section 7
+ 1 server assignment
+ 2 Diffie-Hellman exchange
+ 3 GSS-API negotiation
+ 4 resolver assignment
+ 5 key deletion
+ 6-65534 - available, see section 7
+ 65535 - reserved, see section 7
+
+2.6 The Error Field
+
+ The error code field is an extended RCODE. The following values are
+ defined:
+
+ Value Description
+ ----- -----------
+ 0 - no error
+ 1-15 a non-extended RCODE
+ 16 BADSIG (TSIG)
+ 17 BADKEY (TSIG)
+ 18 BADTIME (TSIG)
+ 19 BADMODE
+ 20 BADNAME
+ 21 BADALG
+
+ When the TKEY Error Field is non-zero in a response to a TKEY query,
+ the DNS header RCODE field indicates no error. However, it is
+ possible if a TKEY is spontaneously included in a response the TKEY
+ RR and DNS header error field could have unrelated non-zero error
+ codes.
+
+2.7 The Key Size and Data Fields
+
+ The key data size field is an unsigned 16 bit integer in network
+ order which specifies the size of the key exchange data field in
+ octets. The meaning of this data depends on the mode.
+
+2.8 The Other Size and Data Fields
+
+ The Other Size and Other Data fields are not used in this
+ specification but may be used in future extensions. The RDLEN field
+ MUST equal the length of the RDATA section through the end of Other
+ Data or the RR is to be considered malformed and rejected.
+
+
+
+
+
+
+Eastlake Standards Track [Page 6]
+\f
+RFC 2930 The DNS TKEY RR September 2000
+
+
+3. General TKEY Considerations
+
+ TKEY is a meta-RR that is not stored or cached in the DNS and does
+ not appear in zone files. It supports a variety of modes for the
+ establishment and deletion of shared secret keys information between
+ DNS resolvers and servers. The establishment of such a shared key
+ requires that state be maintained at both ends and the allocation of
+ the resources to maintain such state may require mutual agreement. In
+ the absence of willingness to provide such state, servers MUST return
+ errors such as NOTIMP or REFUSED for an attempt to use TKEY and
+ resolvers are free to ignore any TKEY RRs they receive.
+
+ The shared secret keying material developed by using TKEY is a plain
+ octet sequence. The means by which this shared secret keying
+ material, exchanged via TKEY, is actually used in any particular TSIG
+ algorithm is algorithm dependent and is defined in connection with
+ that algorithm. For example, see [RFC 2104] for how TKEY agreed
+ shared secret keying material is used in the HMAC-MD5 algorithm or
+ other HMAC algorithms.
+
+ There MUST NOT be more than one TKEY RR in a DNS query or response.
+
+ Except for GSS-API mode, TKEY responses MUST always have DNS
+ transaction authentication to protect the integrity of any keying
+ data, error codes, etc. This authentication MUST use a previously
+ established secret (TSIG) or public (SIG(0) [RFC 2931]) key and MUST
+ NOT use any key that the response to be verified is itself providing.
+
+ TKEY queries MUST be authenticated for all modes except GSS-API and,
+ under some circumstances, server assignment mode. In particular, if
+ the query for a server assigned key is for a key to assert some
+ privilege, such as update authority, then the query must be
+ authenticated to avoid spoofing. However, if the key is just to be
+ used for transaction security, then spoofing will lead at worst to
+ denial of service. Query authentication SHOULD use an established
+ secret (TSIG) key authenticator if available. Otherwise, it must use
+ a public (SIG(0)) key signature. It MUST NOT use any key that the
+ query is itself providing.
+
+ In the absence of required TKEY authentication, a NOTAUTH error MUST
+ be returned.
+
+ To avoid replay attacks, it is necessary that a TKEY response or
+ query not be valid if replayed on the order of 2**32 second (about
+ 136 years), or a multiple thereof, later. To accomplish this, the
+ keying material used in any TSIG or SIG(0) RR that authenticates a
+ TKEY message MUST NOT have a lifetime of more then 2**31 - 1 seconds
+
+
+
+
+Eastlake Standards Track [Page 7]
+\f
+RFC 2930 The DNS TKEY RR September 2000
+
+
+ (about 68 years). Thus, on attempted replay, the authenticating TSIG
+ or SIG(0) RR will not be verifiable due to key expiration and the
+ replay will fail.
+
+4. Exchange via Resolver Query
+
+ One method for a resolver and a server to agree about shared secret
+ keying material for use in TSIG is through DNS requests from the
+ resolver which are syntactically DNS queries for type TKEY. Such
+ queries MUST be accompanied by a TKEY RR in the additional
+ information section to indicate the mode in use and accompanied by
+ other information where required.
+
+ Type TKEY queries SHOULD NOT be flagged as recursive and servers MAY
+ ignore the recursive header bit in TKEY queries they receive.
+
+4.1 Query for Diffie-Hellman Exchanged Keying
+
+ Diffie-Hellman (DH) key exchange is a means whereby two parties can
+ derive some shared secret information without requiring any secrecy
+ of the messages they exchange [Schneier]. Provisions have been made
+ for the storage of DH public keys in the DNS [RFC 2539].
+
+ A resolver sends a query for type TKEY accompanied by a TKEY RR in
+ the additional information section specifying the Diffie-Hellman mode
+ and accompanied by a KEY RR also in the additional information
+ section specifying a resolver Diffie-Hellman key. The TKEY RR
+ algorithm field is set to the authentication algorithm the resolver
+ plans to use. The "key data" provided in the TKEY is used as a random
+ [RFC 1750] nonce to avoid always deriving the same keying material
+ for the same pair of DH KEYs.
+
+ The server response contains a TKEY in its answer section with the
+ Diffie-Hellman mode. The "key data" provided in this TKEY is used as
+ an additional nonce to avoid always deriving the same keying material
+ for the same pair of DH KEYs. If the TKEY error field is non-zero,
+ the query failed for the reason given. FORMERR is given if the query
+ included no DH KEY and BADKEY is given if the query included an
+ incompatible DH KEY.
+
+ If the TKEY error field is zero, the resolver supplied Diffie-Hellman
+ KEY RR SHOULD be echoed in the additional information section and a
+ server Diffie-Hellman KEY RR will also be present in the answer
+ section of the response. Both parties can then calculate the same
+ shared secret quantity from the pair of Diffie-Hellman (DH) keys used
+ [Schneier] (provided these DH keys use the same generator and
+ modulus) and the data in the TKEY RRs. The TKEY RR data is mixed
+ with the DH result as follows:
+
+
+
+Eastlake Standards Track [Page 8]
+\f
+RFC 2930 The DNS TKEY RR September 2000
+
+
+ keying material =
+ XOR ( DH value, MD5 ( query data | DH value ) |
+ MD5 ( server data | DH value ) )
+
+ Where XOR is an exclusive-OR operation and "|" is byte-stream
+ concatenation. The shorter of the two operands to XOR is byte-wise
+ left justified and padded with zero-valued bytes to match the length
+ of the other operand. "DH value" is the Diffie-Hellman value derived
+ from the KEY RRs. Query data and server data are the values sent in
+ the TKEY RR data fields. These "query data" and "server data" nonces
+ are suffixed by the DH value, digested by MD5, the results
+ concatenated, and then XORed with the DH value.
+
+ The inception and expiry times in the query TKEY RR are those
+ requested for the keying material. The inception and expiry times in
+ the response TKEY RR are the maximum period the server will consider
+ the keying material valid. Servers may pre-expire keys so this is
+ not a guarantee.
+
+4.2 Query for TKEY Deletion
+
+ Keys established via TKEY can be treated as soft state. Since DNS
+ transactions are originated by the resolver, the resolver can simply
+ toss keys, although it may have to go through another key exchange if
+ it later needs one. Similarly, the server can discard keys although
+ that will result in an error on receiving a query with a TSIG using
+ the discarded key.
+
+ To avoid attempted reliance in requests on keys no longer in effect,
+ servers MUST implement key deletion whereby the server "discards" a
+ key on receipt from a resolver of an authenticated delete request for
+ a TKEY RR with the key's name. If the server has no record of a key
+ with that name, it returns BADNAME.
+
+ Key deletion TKEY queries MUST be authenticated. This authentication
+ MAY be a TSIG RR using the key to be deleted.
+
+ For querier assigned and Diffie-Hellman keys, the server MUST truly
+ "discard" all active state associated with the key. For server
+ assigned keys, the server MAY simply mark the key as no longer
+ retained by the client and may re-send it in response to a future
+ query for server assigned keying material.
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+Eastlake Standards Track [Page 9]
+\f
+RFC 2930 The DNS TKEY RR September 2000
+
+
+4.3 Query for GSS-API Establishment
+
+ This mode is described in a separate document under preparation which
+ should be seen for the full description. Basically the resolver and
+ server can exchange queries and responses for type TKEY with a TKEY
+ RR specifying the GSS-API mode in the additional information section
+ and a GSS-API token in the key data portion of the TKEY RR.
+
+ Any issues of possible encryption of parts the GSS-API token data
+ being transmitted are handled by the GSS-API level. In addition, the
+ GSS-API level provides its own authentication so that this mode of
+ TKEY query and response MAY be, but do not need to be, authenticated
+ with TSIG RR or SIG(0) RR [RFC 2931].
+
+ The inception and expiry times in a GSS-API mode TKEY RR are ignored.
+
+4.4 Query for Server Assigned Keying
+
+ Optionally, the server can assign keying for the resolver. It is
+ sent to the resolver encrypted under a resolver public key. See
+ section 6 for description of encryption methods.
+
+ A resolver sends a query for type TKEY accompanied by a TKEY RR
+ specifying the "server assignment" mode and a resolver KEY RR to be
+ used in encrypting the response, both in the additional information
+ section. The TKEY algorithm field is set to the authentication
+ algorithm the resolver plans to use. It is RECOMMENDED that any "key
+ data" provided in the query TKEY RR by the resolver be strongly mixed
+ by the server with server generated randomness [RFC 1750] to derive
+ the keying material to be used. The KEY RR that appears in the query
+ need not be accompanied by a SIG(KEY) RR. If the query is
+ authenticated by the resolver with a TSIG RR [RFC 2845] or SIG(0) RR
+ and that authentication is verified, then any SIG(KEY) provided in
+ the query SHOULD be ignored. The KEY RR in such a query SHOULD have
+ a name that corresponds to the resolver but it is only essential that
+ it be a public key for which the resolver has the corresponding
+ private key so it can decrypt the response data.
+
+ The server response contains a TKEY RR in its answer section with the
+ server assigned mode and echoes the KEY RR provided in the query in
+ its additional information section.
+
+ If the response TKEY error field is zero, the key data portion of the
+ response TKEY RR will be the server assigned keying data encrypted
+ under the public key in the resolver provided KEY RR. In this case,
+ the owner name of the answer TKEY RR will be the server assigned name
+ of the key.
+
+
+
+
+Eastlake Standards Track [Page 10]
+\f
+RFC 2930 The DNS TKEY RR September 2000
+
+
+ If the error field of the response TKEY is non-zero, the query failed
+ for the reason given. FORMERR is given if the query specified no
+ encryption key.
+
+ The inception and expiry times in the query TKEY RR are those
+ requested for the keying material. The inception and expiry times in
+ the response TKEY are the maximum period the server will consider the
+ keying material valid. Servers may pre-expire keys so this is not a
+ guarantee.
+
+ The resolver KEY RR MUST be authenticated, through the authentication
+ of this query with a TSIG or SIG(0) or the signing of the resolver
+ KEY with a SIG(KEY). Otherwise, an attacker can forge a resolver KEY
+ for which they know the private key, and thereby the attacker could
+ obtain a valid shared secret key from the server.
+
+4.5 Query for Resolver Assigned Keying
+
+ Optionally, a server can accept resolver assigned keys. The keying
+ material MUST be encrypted under a server key for protection in
+ transmission as described in Section 6.
+
+ The resolver sends a TKEY query with a TKEY RR that specifies the
+ encrypted keying material and a KEY RR specifying the server public
+ key used to encrypt the data, both in the additional information
+ section. The name of the key and the keying data are completely
+ controlled by the sending resolver so a globally unique key name
+ SHOULD be used. The KEY RR used MUST be one for which the server has
+ the corresponding private key, or it will not be able to decrypt the
+ keying material and will return a FORMERR. It is also important that
+ no untrusted party (preferably no other party than the server) has
+ the private key corresponding to the KEY RR because, if they do, they
+ can capture the messages to the server, learn the shared secret, and
+ spoof valid TSIGs.
+
+ The query TKEY RR inception and expiry give the time period the
+ querier intends to consider the keying material valid. The server
+ can return a lesser time interval to advise that it will not maintain
+ state for that long and can pre-expire keys in any case.
+
+ This mode of query MUST be authenticated with a TSIG or SIG(0).
+ Otherwise, an attacker can forge a resolver assigned TKEY query, and
+ thereby the attacker could specify a shared secret key that would be
+ accepted, used, and honored by the server.
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+Eastlake Standards Track [Page 11]
+\f
+RFC 2930 The DNS TKEY RR September 2000
+
+
+5. Spontaneous Server Inclusion
+
+ A DNS server may include a TKEY RR spontaneously as additional
+ information in responses. This SHOULD only be done if the server
+ knows the querier understands TKEY and has this option implemented.
+ This technique can be used to delete a key and may be specified for
+ modes defined in the future. A disadvantage of this technique is
+ that there is no way for the server to get any error or success
+ indication back and, in the case of UDP, no way to even know if the
+ DNS response reached the resolver.
+
+5.1 Spontaneous Server Key Deletion
+
+ A server can optionally tell a client that it has deleted a secret
+ key by spontaneously including a TKEY RR in the additional
+ information section of a response with the key's name and specifying
+ the key deletion mode. Such a response SHOULD be authenticated. If
+ authenticated, it "deletes" the key with the given name. The
+ inception and expiry times of the delete TKEY RR are ignored. Failure
+ by a client to receive or properly process such additional
+ information in a response would mean that the client might use a key
+ that the server had discarded and would then get an error indication.
+
+ For server assigned and Diffie-Hellman keys, the client MUST
+ "discard" active state associated with the key. For querier assigned
+ keys, the querier MAY simply mark the key as no longer retained by
+ the server and may re-send it in a future query specifying querier
+ assigned keying material.
+
+6. Methods of Encryption
+
+ For the server assigned and resolver assigned key agreement modes,
+ the keying material is sent within the key data field of a TKEY RR
+ encrypted under the public key in an accompanying KEY RR [RFC 2535].
+ This KEY RR MUST be for a public key algorithm where the public and
+ private keys can be used for encryption and the corresponding
+ decryption which recovers the originally encrypted data. The KEY RR
+ SHOULD correspond to a name for the decrypting resolver/server such
+ that the decrypting process has access to the corresponding private
+ key to decrypt the data. The secret keying material being sent will
+ generally be fairly short, usually less than 256 bits, because that
+ is adequate for very strong protection with modern keyed hash or
+ symmetric algorithms.
+
+ If the KEY RR specifies the RSA algorithm, then the keying material
+ is encrypted as per the description of RSAES-PKCS1-v1_5 encryption in
+ PKCS#1 [RFC 2437]. (Note, the secret keying material being sent is
+ directly RSA encrypted in PKCS#1 format. It is not "enveloped" under
+
+
+
+Eastlake Standards Track [Page 12]
+\f
+RFC 2930 The DNS TKEY RR September 2000
+
+
+ some other symmetric algorithm.) In the unlikely event that the
+ keying material will not fit within one RSA modulus of the chosen
+ public key, additional RSA encryption blocks are included. The
+ length of each block is clear from the public RSA key specified and
+ the RSAES-PKCS1-v1_5 padding makes it clear what part of the
+ encrypted data is actually keying material and what part is
+ formatting or the required at least eight bytes of random [RFC 1750]
+ padding.
+
+7. IANA Considerations
+
+ This section is to be interpreted as provided in [RFC 2434].
+
+ Mode field values 0x0000 and 0xFFFF are reserved.
+
+ Mode field values 0x0001 through 0x00FF, and 0XFF00 through 0XFFFE
+ can only be assigned by an IETF Standards Action.
+
+ Mode field values 0x0100 through 0x0FFF and 0xF0000 through 0xFEFF
+ are allocated by IESG approval or IETF consensus.
+
+ Mode field values 0x1000 through 0xEFFF are allocated based on
+ Specification Required as defined in [RFC 2434].
+
+ Mode values should not be changed when the status of their use
+ changes. For example, a mode value assigned based just on providing
+ a specification should not be changed later just because that use's
+ status is changed to standards track.
+
+ The following assignments are documented herein:
+
+ RR Type 249 for TKEY.
+
+ TKEY Modes 1 through 5 as listed in section 2.5.
+
+ Extended RCODE Error values of 19, 20, and 21 as listed in section
+ 2.6.
+
+8. Security Considerations
+
+ The entirety of this specification is concerned with the secure
+ establishment of a shared secret between DNS clients and servers in
+ support of TSIG [RFC 2845].
+
+ Protection against denial of service via the use of TKEY is not
+ provided.
+
+
+
+
+
+Eastlake Standards Track [Page 13]
+\f
+RFC 2930 The DNS TKEY RR September 2000
+
+
+References
+
+ [Schneier] Bruce Schneier, "Applied Cryptography: Protocols,
+ Algorithms, and Source Code in C", 1996, John Wiley and
+ Sons
+
+ [RFC 1034] Mockapetris, P., "Domain Names - Concepts and Facilities",
+ STD 13, RFC 1034, November 1987.
+
+ [RFC 1035] Mockapetris, P., "Domain Names - Implementation and
+ Specifications", STD 13, RFC 1035, November 1987.
+
+ [RFC 1750] Eastlake, D., Crocker, S. and J. Schiller, "Randomness
+ Recommendations for Security", RFC 1750, December 1994.
+
+ [RFC 1982] Elz, R. and R. Bush, "Serial Number Arithmetic", RFC 1982,
+ September 1996.
+
+ [RFC 1995] Ohta, M., "Incremental Zone Transfer in DNS", RFC 1995,
+ August 1996.
+
+ [RFC 2030] Mills, D., "Simple Network Time Protocol (SNTP) Version 4
+ for IPv4, IPv6 and OSI", RFC 2030, October 1996.
+
+ [RFC 2104] Krawczyk, H., Bellare, M. and R. Canetti, "HMAC: Keyed-
+ Hashing for Message Authentication", RFC 2104, February
+ 1997.
+
+ [RFC 2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
+ Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997.
+
+ [RFC 2136] Vixie, P., Thomson, S., Rekhter, Y. and J. Bound, "Dynamic
+ Updates in the Domain Name System (DNS UPDATE)", RFC 2136,
+ April 1997.
+
+ [RFC 2434] Narten, T. and H. Alvestrand, "Guidelines for Writing an
+ IANA Considerations Section in RFCs", BCP 26, RFC 2434,
+ October 1998.
+
+ [RFC 2437] Kaliski, B. and J. Staddon, "PKCS #1: RSA Cryptography
+ Specifications Version 2.0", RFC 2437, October 1998.
+
+ [RFC 2535] Eastlake, D., "Domain Name System Security Extensions",
+ RFC 2535, March 1999.
+
+ [RFC 2539] Eastlake, D., "Storage of Diffie-Hellman Keys in the
+ Domain Name System (DNS)", RFC 2539, March 1999.
+
+
+
+
+Eastlake Standards Track [Page 14]
+\f
+RFC 2930 The DNS TKEY RR September 2000
+
+
+ [RFC 2845] Vixie, P., Gudmundsson, O., Eastlake, D. and B.
+ Wellington, "Secret Key Transaction Authentication for DNS
+ (TSIG)", RFC 2845, May 2000.
+
+ [RFC 2931] Eastlake, D., "DNS Request and Transaction Signatures
+ (SIG(0)s )", RFC 2931, September 2000.
+
+Author's Address
+
+ Donald E. Eastlake 3rd
+ Motorola
+ 140 Forest Avenue
+ Hudson, MA 01749 USA
+
+ Phone: +1 978-562-2827 (h)
+ +1 508-261-5434 (w)
+ Fax: +1 508-261-4447 (w)
+ EMail: Donald.Eastlake@motorola.com
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
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+
+
+
+
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+
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+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+Eastlake Standards Track [Page 15]
+\f
+RFC 2930 The DNS TKEY RR September 2000
+
+
+Full Copyright Statement
+
+ Copyright (C) The Internet Society (2000). All Rights Reserved.
+
+ This document and translations of it may be copied and furnished to
+ others, and derivative works that comment on or otherwise explain it
+ or assist in its implementation may be prepared, copied, published
+ and distributed, in whole or in part, without restriction of any
+ kind, provided that the above copyright notice and this paragraph are
+ included on all such copies and derivative works. However, this
+ document itself may not be modified in any way, such as by removing
+ the copyright notice or references to the Internet Society or other
+ Internet organizations, except as needed for the purpose of
+ developing Internet standards in which case the procedures for
+ copyrights defined in the Internet Standards process must be
+ followed, or as required to translate it into languages other than
+ English.
+
+ The limited permissions granted above are perpetual and will not be
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+
+ This document and the information contained herein is provided on an
+ "AS IS" basis and THE INTERNET SOCIETY AND THE INTERNET ENGINEERING
+ TASK FORCE DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES, EXPRESS OR IMPLIED, INCLUDING
+ BUT NOT LIMITED TO ANY WARRANTY THAT THE USE OF THE INFORMATION
+ HEREIN WILL NOT INFRINGE ANY RIGHTS OR ANY IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF
+ MERCHANTABILITY OR FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.
+
+Acknowledgement
+
+ Funding for the RFC Editor function is currently provided by the
+ Internet Society.
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+Eastlake Standards Track [Page 16]
+\f
git.samba.org / tridge / bind9.git / blobdiff