-/*
+/*
Unix SMB/CIFS implementation.
Copyright (C) Andrew Tridgell 1992-2001
Copyright (C) Andrew Bartlett 2002
Copyright (C) Rafal Szczesniak 2002
-
+ Copyright (C) Tim Potter 2001
+
This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
- the Free Software Foundation; either version 2 of the License, or
+ the Free Software Foundation; either version 3 of the License, or
(at your option) any later version.
-
+
This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the
GNU General Public License for more details.
-
+
You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
- along with this program; if not, write to the Free Software
- Foundation, Inc., 675 Mass Ave, Cambridge, MA 02139, USA.
+ along with this program. If not, see <http://www.gnu.org/licenses/>.
*/
/* the Samba secrets database stores any generated, private information
static TDB_CONTEXT *tdb;
+/* Urrrg. global.... */
+BOOL global_machine_password_needs_changing;
+
+/**
+ * Use a TDB to store an incrementing random seed.
+ *
+ * Initialised to the current pid, the very first time Samba starts,
+ * and incremented by one each time it is needed.
+ *
+ * @note Not called by systems with a working /dev/urandom.
+ */
+static void get_rand_seed(int *new_seed)
+{
+ *new_seed = sys_getpid();
+ if (tdb) {
+ tdb_change_int32_atomic(tdb, "INFO/random_seed", new_seed, 1);
+ }
+}
+
/* open up the secrets database */
BOOL secrets_init(void)
{
pstring fname;
+ unsigned char dummy;
if (tdb)
return True;
DEBUG(0,("Failed to open %s\n", fname));
return False;
}
+
+ /**
+ * Set a reseed function for the crypto random generator
+ *
+ * This avoids a problem where systems without /dev/urandom
+ * could send the same challenge to multiple clients
+ */
+ set_rand_reseed_callback(get_rand_seed);
+
+ /* Ensure that the reseed is done now, while we are root, etc */
+ generate_random_buffer(&dummy, sizeof(dummy));
+
return True;
}
*/
void *secrets_fetch(const char *key, size_t *size)
{
- TDB_DATA kbuf, dbuf;
+ TDB_DATA dbuf;
secrets_init();
if (!tdb)
return NULL;
- kbuf.dptr = key;
- kbuf.dsize = strlen(key);
- dbuf = tdb_fetch(tdb, kbuf);
+ dbuf = tdb_fetch(tdb, string_tdb_data(key));
if (size)
*size = dbuf.dsize;
return dbuf.dptr;
}
-/* store a secrets entry
+/* store a secrets entry
*/
BOOL secrets_store(const char *key, const void *data, size_t size)
{
- TDB_DATA kbuf, dbuf;
secrets_init();
if (!tdb)
return False;
- kbuf.dptr = key;
- kbuf.dsize = strlen(key);
- dbuf.dptr = data;
- dbuf.dsize = size;
- return tdb_store(tdb, kbuf, dbuf, TDB_REPLACE) == 0;
+ return tdb_trans_store(tdb, string_tdb_data(key),
+ make_tdb_data((const uint8 *)data, size),
+ TDB_REPLACE) == 0;
}
*/
BOOL secrets_delete(const char *key)
{
- TDB_DATA kbuf;
secrets_init();
if (!tdb)
return False;
- kbuf.dptr = key;
- kbuf.dsize = strlen(key);
- return tdb_delete(tdb, kbuf) == 0;
+ return tdb_trans_delete(tdb, string_tdb_data(key)) == 0;
}
BOOL secrets_store_domain_sid(const char *domain, const DOM_SID *sid)
{
fstring key;
+ BOOL ret;
slprintf(key, sizeof(key)-1, "%s/%s", SECRETS_DOMAIN_SID, domain);
- strupper(key);
- return secrets_store(key, sid, sizeof(DOM_SID));
+ strupper_m(key);
+ ret = secrets_store(key, sid, sizeof(DOM_SID));
+
+ /* Force a re-query, in case we modified our domain */
+ if (ret)
+ reset_global_sam_sid();
+ return ret;
}
BOOL secrets_fetch_domain_sid(const char *domain, DOM_SID *sid)
{
DOM_SID *dyn_sid;
fstring key;
- size_t size;
+ size_t size = 0;
slprintf(key, sizeof(key)-1, "%s/%s", SECRETS_DOMAIN_SID, domain);
- strupper(key);
+ strupper_m(key);
dyn_sid = (DOM_SID *)secrets_fetch(key, &size);
if (dyn_sid == NULL)
return False;
- if (size != sizeof(DOM_SID))
- {
+ if (size != sizeof(DOM_SID)) {
SAFE_FREE(dyn_sid);
return False;
}
return True;
}
-BOOL secrets_store_domain_guid(const char *domain, GUID *guid)
+BOOL secrets_store_domain_guid(const char *domain, struct GUID *guid)
{
fstring key;
slprintf(key, sizeof(key)-1, "%s/%s", SECRETS_DOMAIN_GUID, domain);
- strupper(key);
- return secrets_store(key, guid, sizeof(GUID));
+ strupper_m(key);
+ return secrets_store(key, guid, sizeof(struct GUID));
}
-BOOL secrets_fetch_domain_guid(const char *domain, GUID *guid)
+BOOL secrets_fetch_domain_guid(const char *domain, struct GUID *guid)
{
- GUID *dyn_guid;
+ struct GUID *dyn_guid;
fstring key;
- size_t size;
- GUID new_guid;
+ size_t size = 0;
+ struct GUID new_guid;
slprintf(key, sizeof(key)-1, "%s/%s", SECRETS_DOMAIN_GUID, domain);
- strupper(key);
- dyn_guid = (GUID *)secrets_fetch(key, &size);
-
- DEBUG(6,("key is %s, size is %d\n", key, (int)size));
-
- if ((NULL == dyn_guid) && (ROLE_DOMAIN_PDC == lp_server_role())) {
- uuid_generate_random(&new_guid);
- if (!secrets_store_domain_guid(domain, &new_guid))
- return False;
- dyn_guid = (GUID *)secrets_fetch(key, &size);
- if (dyn_guid == NULL)
+ strupper_m(key);
+ dyn_guid = (struct GUID *)secrets_fetch(key, &size);
+
+ if (!dyn_guid) {
+ if (lp_server_role() == ROLE_DOMAIN_PDC) {
+ smb_uuid_generate_random(&new_guid);
+ if (!secrets_store_domain_guid(domain, &new_guid))
+ return False;
+ dyn_guid = (struct GUID *)secrets_fetch(key, &size);
+ }
+ if (dyn_guid == NULL) {
return False;
+ }
}
- if (size != sizeof(GUID))
- {
+ if (size != sizeof(struct GUID)) {
+ DEBUG(1,("UUID size %d is wrong!\n", (int)size));
SAFE_FREE(dyn_guid);
return False;
}
*
* @return stored password's key
**/
-const char *trust_keystr(const char *domain)
+static const char *trust_keystr(const char *domain)
{
static fstring keystr;
- slprintf(keystr,sizeof(keystr)-1,"%s/%s",
+ slprintf(keystr,sizeof(keystr)-1,"%s/%s",
SECRETS_MACHINE_ACCT_PASS, domain);
- strupper(keystr);
+ strupper_m(keystr);
return keystr;
}
*
* @return stored password's key
**/
-char *trustdom_keystr(const char *domain)
+static char *trustdom_keystr(const char *domain)
{
- static char* keystr;
+ static pstring keystr;
+
+ pstr_sprintf(keystr, "%s/%s", SECRETS_DOMTRUST_ACCT_PASS, domain);
+ strupper_m(keystr);
- asprintf(&keystr, "%s/%s", SECRETS_DOMTRUST_ACCT_PASS, domain);
- strupper(keystr);
-
return keystr;
}
return False;
if (dolock)
- return (tdb_lock_bystring(tdb, trust_keystr(domain),0) == 0);
+ return (tdb_lock_bystring(tdb, trust_keystr(domain)) == 0);
else
tdb_unlock_bystring(tdb, trust_keystr(domain));
return True;
}
+/************************************************************************
+ Routine to get the default secure channel type for trust accounts
+************************************************************************/
+
+uint32 get_default_sec_channel(void)
+{
+ if (lp_server_role() == ROLE_DOMAIN_BDC ||
+ lp_server_role() == ROLE_DOMAIN_PDC) {
+ return SEC_CHAN_BDC;
+ } else {
+ return SEC_CHAN_WKSTA;
+ }
+}
+
/************************************************************************
Routine to get the trust account password for a domain.
The user of this function must have locked the trust password file using
- the above call.
+ the above secrets_lock_trust_account_password().
************************************************************************/
BOOL secrets_fetch_trust_account_password(const char *domain, uint8 ret_pwd[16],
- time_t *pass_last_set_time)
+ time_t *pass_last_set_time,
+ uint32 *channel)
{
struct machine_acct_pass *pass;
char *plaintext;
- size_t size;
+ size_t size = 0;
- plaintext = secrets_fetch_machine_password();
+ plaintext = secrets_fetch_machine_password(domain, pass_last_set_time,
+ channel);
if (plaintext) {
- /* we have an ADS password - use that */
- DEBUG(4,("Using ADS machine password\n"));
+ DEBUG(4,("Using cleartext machine password\n"));
E_md4hash(plaintext, ret_pwd);
SAFE_FREE(plaintext);
- pass_last_set_time = 0;
return True;
}
- if (!(pass = secrets_fetch(trust_keystr(domain), &size))) {
+ if (!(pass = (struct machine_acct_pass *)secrets_fetch(
+ trust_keystr(domain), &size))) {
DEBUG(5, ("secrets_fetch failed!\n"));
return False;
}
-
+
if (size != sizeof(*pass)) {
DEBUG(0, ("secrets were of incorrect size!\n"));
return False;
}
- if (pass_last_set_time) *pass_last_set_time = pass->mod_time;
+ if (pass_last_set_time) {
+ *pass_last_set_time = pass->mod_time;
+ }
memcpy(ret_pwd, pass->hash, 16);
+
+ if (channel) {
+ *channel = get_default_sec_channel();
+ }
+
+ /* Test if machine password has expired and needs to be changed */
+ if (lp_machine_password_timeout()) {
+ if (pass->mod_time > 0 && time(NULL) > (pass->mod_time +
+ (time_t)lp_machine_password_timeout())) {
+ global_machine_password_needs_changing = True;
+ }
+ }
+
SAFE_FREE(pass);
return True;
}
+/**
+ * Pack SID passed by pointer
+ *
+ * @param pack_buf pointer to buffer which is to be filled with packed data
+ * @param bufsize size of packing buffer
+ * @param sid pointer to sid to be packed
+ *
+ * @return length of the packed representation of the whole structure
+ **/
+static size_t tdb_sid_pack(uint8 *pack_buf, int bufsize, DOM_SID* sid)
+{
+ int idx;
+ size_t len = 0;
+
+ if (!sid || !pack_buf) return -1;
+
+ len += tdb_pack(pack_buf + len, bufsize - len, "bb", sid->sid_rev_num,
+ sid->num_auths);
+
+ for (idx = 0; idx < 6; idx++) {
+ len += tdb_pack(pack_buf + len, bufsize - len, "b",
+ sid->id_auth[idx]);
+ }
+
+ for (idx = 0; idx < MAXSUBAUTHS; idx++) {
+ len += tdb_pack(pack_buf + len, bufsize - len, "d",
+ sid->sub_auths[idx]);
+ }
+
+ return len;
+}
+
+/**
+ * Unpack SID into a pointer
+ *
+ * @param pack_buf pointer to buffer with packed representation
+ * @param bufsize size of the buffer
+ * @param sid pointer to sid structure to be filled with unpacked data
+ *
+ * @return size of structure unpacked from buffer
+ **/
+static size_t tdb_sid_unpack(uint8 *pack_buf, int bufsize, DOM_SID* sid)
+{
+ int idx, len = 0;
+
+ if (!sid || !pack_buf) return -1;
+
+ len += tdb_unpack(pack_buf + len, bufsize - len, "bb",
+ &sid->sid_rev_num, &sid->num_auths);
+
+ for (idx = 0; idx < 6; idx++) {
+ len += tdb_unpack(pack_buf + len, bufsize - len, "b",
+ &sid->id_auth[idx]);
+ }
+
+ for (idx = 0; idx < MAXSUBAUTHS; idx++) {
+ len += tdb_unpack(pack_buf + len, bufsize - len, "d",
+ &sid->sub_auths[idx]);
+ }
+
+ return len;
+}
+
+/**
+ * Pack TRUSTED_DOM_PASS passed by pointer
+ *
+ * @param pack_buf pointer to buffer which is to be filled with packed data
+ * @param bufsize size of the buffer
+ * @param pass pointer to trusted domain password to be packed
+ *
+ * @return length of the packed representation of the whole structure
+ **/
+static size_t tdb_trusted_dom_pass_pack(uint8 *pack_buf, int bufsize,
+ TRUSTED_DOM_PASS* pass)
+{
+ int idx, len = 0;
+
+ if (!pack_buf || !pass) return -1;
+
+ /* packing unicode domain name and password */
+ len += tdb_pack(pack_buf + len, bufsize - len, "d",
+ pass->uni_name_len);
+
+ for (idx = 0; idx < 32; idx++)
+ len += tdb_pack(pack_buf + len, bufsize - len, "w",
+ pass->uni_name[idx]);
+
+ len += tdb_pack(pack_buf + len, bufsize - len, "dPd", pass->pass_len,
+ pass->pass, pass->mod_time);
+
+ /* packing SID structure */
+ len += tdb_sid_pack(pack_buf + len, bufsize - len, &pass->domain_sid);
+
+ return len;
+}
+
+
+/**
+ * Unpack TRUSTED_DOM_PASS passed by pointer
+ *
+ * @param pack_buf pointer to buffer with packed representation
+ * @param bufsize size of the buffer
+ * @param pass pointer to trusted domain password to be filled with unpacked data
+ *
+ * @return size of structure unpacked from buffer
+ **/
+static size_t tdb_trusted_dom_pass_unpack(uint8 *pack_buf, int bufsize,
+ TRUSTED_DOM_PASS* pass)
+{
+ int idx, len = 0;
+
+ if (!pack_buf || !pass) return -1;
+
+ /* unpack unicode domain name and plaintext password */
+ len += tdb_unpack(pack_buf, bufsize - len, "d", &pass->uni_name_len);
+
+ for (idx = 0; idx < 32; idx++)
+ len += tdb_unpack(pack_buf + len, bufsize - len, "w",
+ &pass->uni_name[idx]);
+
+ len += tdb_unpack(pack_buf + len, bufsize - len, "dPd",
+ &pass->pass_len, &pass->pass, &pass->mod_time);
+
+ /* unpack domain sid */
+ len += tdb_sid_unpack(pack_buf + len, bufsize - len,
+ &pass->domain_sid);
+
+ return len;
+}
+
/************************************************************************
Routine to get account password to trusted domain
************************************************************************/
BOOL secrets_fetch_trusted_domain_password(const char *domain, char** pwd,
- DOM_SID *sid, time_t *pass_last_set_time)
+ DOM_SID *sid, time_t *pass_last_set_time)
{
- struct trusted_dom_pass *pass;
- size_t size;
+ struct trusted_dom_pass pass;
+ size_t size = 0;
+
+ /* unpacking structures */
+ uint8 *pass_buf;
+ int pass_len = 0;
+
+ ZERO_STRUCT(pass);
/* fetching trusted domain password structure */
- if (!(pass = secrets_fetch(trustdom_keystr(domain), &size))) {
+ if (!(pass_buf = (uint8 *)secrets_fetch(trustdom_keystr(domain),
+ &size))) {
DEBUG(5, ("secrets_fetch failed!\n"));
return False;
}
- if (size != sizeof(*pass)) {
- DEBUG(0, ("secrets were of incorrect size!\n"));
+ /* unpack trusted domain password */
+ pass_len = tdb_trusted_dom_pass_unpack(pass_buf, size, &pass);
+ SAFE_FREE(pass_buf);
+
+ if (pass_len != size) {
+ DEBUG(5, ("Invalid secrets size. Unpacked data doesn't match trusted_dom_pass structure.\n"));
return False;
}
- /* the trust's password */
+ /* the trust's password */
if (pwd) {
- *pwd = strdup(pass->pass);
+ *pwd = SMB_STRDUP(pass.pass);
if (!*pwd) {
return False;
}
}
/* last change time */
- if (pass_last_set_time) *pass_last_set_time = pass->mod_time;
+ if (pass_last_set_time) *pass_last_set_time = pass.mod_time;
/* domain sid */
- memcpy(&sid, &(pass->domain_sid), sizeof(sid));
-
- SAFE_FREE(pass);
-
+ if (sid != NULL) sid_copy(sid, &pass.domain_sid);
+
return True;
}
}
/**
- * Routine to set the password for trusted domain
+ * Routine to store the password for trusted domain
*
* @param domain remote domain name
* @param pwd plain text password of trust relationship
* @return true if succeeded
**/
-BOOL secrets_store_trusted_domain_password(const char* domain, smb_ucs2_t *uni_dom_name,
- size_t uni_name_len, const char* pwd,
- DOM_SID sid)
+BOOL secrets_store_trusted_domain_password(const char* domain, const char* pwd,
+ const DOM_SID *sid)
{
+ smb_ucs2_t *uni_dom_name;
+
+ /* packing structures */
+ pstring pass_buf;
+ int pass_len = 0;
+ int pass_buf_len = sizeof(pass_buf);
+
struct trusted_dom_pass pass;
ZERO_STRUCT(pass);
- /* unicode domain name and its length */
- if (!uni_dom_name)
+ if (push_ucs2_allocate(&uni_dom_name, domain) == (size_t)-1) {
+ DEBUG(0, ("Could not convert domain name %s to unicode\n",
+ domain));
return False;
-
+ }
+
strncpy_w(pass.uni_name, uni_dom_name, sizeof(pass.uni_name) - 1);
- pass.uni_name_len = uni_name_len;
+ pass.uni_name_len = strlen_w(uni_dom_name)+1;
+ SAFE_FREE(uni_dom_name);
/* last change time */
pass.mod_time = time(NULL);
fstrcpy(pass.pass, pwd);
/* domain sid */
- memcpy(&(pass.domain_sid), &sid, sizeof(sid));
+ sid_copy(&pass.domain_sid, sid);
- return secrets_store(trustdom_keystr(domain), (void *)&pass, sizeof(pass));
+ pass_len = tdb_trusted_dom_pass_pack((uint8 *)pass_buf, pass_buf_len, &pass);
+
+ return secrets_store(trustdom_keystr(domain), (void *)&pass_buf, pass_len);
}
/************************************************************************
the password is assumed to be a null terminated ascii string
************************************************************************/
-BOOL secrets_store_machine_password(const char *pass)
+BOOL secrets_store_machine_password(const char *pass, const char *domain, uint32 sec_channel)
{
- char *key;
+ char *key = NULL;
BOOL ret;
- asprintf(&key, "%s/%s", SECRETS_MACHINE_PASSWORD, lp_workgroup());
- strupper(key);
+ uint32 last_change_time;
+ uint32 sec_channel_type;
+
+ asprintf(&key, "%s/%s", SECRETS_MACHINE_PASSWORD, domain);
+ if (!key)
+ return False;
+ strupper_m(key);
+
ret = secrets_store(key, pass, strlen(pass)+1);
- free(key);
+ SAFE_FREE(key);
+
+ if (!ret)
+ return ret;
+
+ asprintf(&key, "%s/%s", SECRETS_MACHINE_LAST_CHANGE_TIME, domain);
+ if (!key)
+ return False;
+ strupper_m(key);
+
+ SIVAL(&last_change_time, 0, time(NULL));
+ ret = secrets_store(key, &last_change_time, sizeof(last_change_time));
+ SAFE_FREE(key);
+
+ asprintf(&key, "%s/%s", SECRETS_MACHINE_SEC_CHANNEL_TYPE, domain);
+ if (!key)
+ return False;
+ strupper_m(key);
+
+ SIVAL(&sec_channel_type, 0, sec_channel);
+ ret = secrets_store(key, &sec_channel_type, sizeof(sec_channel_type));
+ SAFE_FREE(key);
+
return ret;
}
-
/************************************************************************
Routine to fetch the plaintext machine account password for a realm
-the password is assumed to be a null terminated ascii string
+ the password is assumed to be a null terminated ascii string.
************************************************************************/
-char *secrets_fetch_machine_password(void)
+
+char *secrets_fetch_machine_password(const char *domain,
+ time_t *pass_last_set_time,
+ uint32 *channel)
{
- char *key;
+ char *key = NULL;
char *ret;
- asprintf(&key, "%s/%s", SECRETS_MACHINE_PASSWORD, lp_workgroup());
- strupper(key);
+ asprintf(&key, "%s/%s", SECRETS_MACHINE_PASSWORD, domain);
+ strupper_m(key);
ret = (char *)secrets_fetch(key, NULL);
- free(key);
- return ret;
-}
+ SAFE_FREE(key);
+ if (pass_last_set_time) {
+ size_t size;
+ uint32 *last_set_time;
+ asprintf(&key, "%s/%s", SECRETS_MACHINE_LAST_CHANGE_TIME, domain);
+ strupper_m(key);
+ last_set_time = (unsigned int *)secrets_fetch(key, &size);
+ if (last_set_time) {
+ *pass_last_set_time = IVAL(last_set_time,0);
+ SAFE_FREE(last_set_time);
+ } else {
+ *pass_last_set_time = 0;
+ }
+ SAFE_FREE(key);
+ }
+ if (channel) {
+ size_t size;
+ uint32 *channel_type;
+ asprintf(&key, "%s/%s", SECRETS_MACHINE_SEC_CHANNEL_TYPE, domain);
+ strupper_m(key);
+ channel_type = (unsigned int *)secrets_fetch(key, &size);
+ if (channel_type) {
+ *channel = IVAL(channel_type,0);
+ SAFE_FREE(channel_type);
+ } else {
+ *channel = get_default_sec_channel();
+ }
+ SAFE_FREE(key);
+ }
+
+ return ret;
+}
/************************************************************************
Routine to delete the machine trust account password file for a domain.
return secrets_delete(trustdom_keystr(domain));
}
-
-/*******************************************************************
- Reset the 'done' variables so after a client process is created
- from a fork call these calls will be re-done. This should be
- expanded if more variables need reseting.
- ******************************************************************/
-
-void reset_globals_after_fork(void)
-{
- unsigned char dummy;
-
- secrets_init();
-
- /*
- * Increment the global seed value to ensure every smbd starts
- * with a new random seed.
- */
-
- if (tdb) {
- uint32 initial_val = sys_getpid();
- tdb_change_int32_atomic(tdb, "INFO/random_seed", (int *)&initial_val, 1);
- set_rand_reseed_data((unsigned char *)&initial_val, sizeof(initial_val));
- }
-
- /*
- * Re-seed the random crypto generator, so all smbd's
- * started from the same parent won't generate the same
- * sequence.
- */
- generate_random_buffer( &dummy, 1, True);
-}
-
BOOL secrets_store_ldap_pw(const char* dn, char* pw)
{
char *key = NULL;
BOOL ret;
-
+
if (asprintf(&key, "%s/%s", SECRETS_LDAP_BIND_PW, dn) < 0) {
DEBUG(0, ("secrets_store_ldap_pw: asprintf failed!\n"));
return False;
}
-
+
ret = secrets_store(key, pw, strlen(pw)+1);
-
+
SAFE_FREE(key);
return ret;
}
+/*******************************************************************
+ Find the ldap password.
+******************************************************************/
+
+BOOL fetch_ldap_pw(char **dn, char** pw)
+{
+ char *key = NULL;
+ size_t size = 0;
+
+ *dn = smb_xstrdup(lp_ldap_admin_dn());
+
+ if (asprintf(&key, "%s/%s", SECRETS_LDAP_BIND_PW, *dn) < 0) {
+ SAFE_FREE(*dn);
+ DEBUG(0, ("fetch_ldap_pw: asprintf failed!\n"));
+ }
+
+ *pw=(char *)secrets_fetch(key, &size);
+ SAFE_FREE(key);
+
+ if (!size) {
+ /* Upgrade 2.2 style entry */
+ char *p;
+ char* old_style_key = SMB_STRDUP(*dn);
+ char *data;
+ fstring old_style_pw;
+
+ if (!old_style_key) {
+ DEBUG(0, ("fetch_ldap_pw: strdup failed!\n"));
+ return False;
+ }
+
+ for (p=old_style_key; *p; p++)
+ if (*p == ',') *p = '/';
+
+ data=(char *)secrets_fetch(old_style_key, &size);
+ if (!size && size < sizeof(old_style_pw)) {
+ DEBUG(0,("fetch_ldap_pw: neither ldap secret retrieved!\n"));
+ SAFE_FREE(old_style_key);
+ SAFE_FREE(*dn);
+ return False;
+ }
+
+ size = MIN(size, sizeof(fstring)-1);
+ strncpy(old_style_pw, data, size);
+ old_style_pw[size] = 0;
+
+ SAFE_FREE(data);
+
+ if (!secrets_store_ldap_pw(*dn, old_style_pw)) {
+ DEBUG(0,("fetch_ldap_pw: ldap secret could not be upgraded!\n"));
+ SAFE_FREE(old_style_key);
+ SAFE_FREE(*dn);
+ return False;
+ }
+ if (!secrets_delete(old_style_key)) {
+ DEBUG(0,("fetch_ldap_pw: old ldap secret could not be deleted!\n"));
+ }
+
+ SAFE_FREE(old_style_key);
+
+ *pw = smb_xstrdup(old_style_pw);
+ }
+
+ return True;
+}
/**
* Get trusted domains info from secrets.tdb.
- *
- * The linked list is allocated on the supplied talloc context, caller gets to destroy
- * when done.
- *
- * @param ctx Allocation context
- * @param enum_ctx Starting index, eg. we can start fetching at third
- * or sixth trusted domain entry. Zero is the first index.
- * Value it is set to is the enum context for the next enumeration.
- * @param num_domains Number of domain entries to fetch at one call
- * @param domains Pointer to array of trusted domain structs to be filled up
- *
- * @return nt status code of rpc response
- **/
+ **/
-NTSTATUS secrets_get_trusted_domains(TALLOC_CTX* ctx, int* enum_ctx, unsigned int max_num_domains, int *num_domains, TRUSTDOM ***domains)
+NTSTATUS secrets_trusted_domains(TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx, uint32 *num_domains,
+ struct trustdom_info ***domains)
{
TDB_LIST_NODE *keys, *k;
- TRUSTDOM *dom = NULL;
char *pattern;
- unsigned int start_idx;
- uint32 idx = 0;
- size_t size;
- fstring dom_name;
- struct trusted_dom_pass *pass;
- NTSTATUS status;
+ TALLOC_CTX *tmp_ctx;
- if (!secrets_init()) return NT_STATUS_ACCESS_DENIED;
+ if (!(tmp_ctx = talloc_new(mem_ctx))) {
+ return NT_STATUS_NO_MEMORY;
+ }
- *num_domains = 0;
- start_idx = *enum_ctx;
+ if (!secrets_init()) return NT_STATUS_ACCESS_DENIED;
/* generate searching pattern */
- if (!(pattern = talloc_asprintf(ctx, "%s/*", SECRETS_DOMTRUST_ACCT_PASS))) {
- DEBUG(0, ("secrets_get_trusted_domains: talloc_asprintf() failed!\n"));
+ pattern = talloc_asprintf(tmp_ctx, "%s/*", SECRETS_DOMTRUST_ACCT_PASS);
+ if (pattern == NULL) {
+ DEBUG(0, ("secrets_trusted_domains: talloc_asprintf() "
+ "failed!\n"));
+ TALLOC_FREE(tmp_ctx);
return NT_STATUS_NO_MEMORY;
}
- DEBUG(5, ("secrets_get_trusted_domains: looking for %d domains, starting at index %d\n",
- max_num_domains, *enum_ctx));
+ *num_domains = 0;
- *domains = talloc_zero(ctx, sizeof(**domains)*max_num_domains);
+ /*
+ * Make sure that a talloc context for the trustdom_info structs
+ * exists
+ */
+
+ if (!(*domains = TALLOC_ARRAY(mem_ctx, struct trustdom_info *, 1))) {
+ TALLOC_FREE(tmp_ctx);
+ return NT_STATUS_NO_MEMORY;
+ }
/* fetching trusted domains' data and collecting them in a list */
keys = tdb_search_keys(tdb, pattern);
- /*
- * if there's no keys returned ie. no trusted domain,
- * return "no more entries" code
- */
- status = NT_STATUS_NO_MORE_ENTRIES;
-
- /* searching for keys in sectrets db -- way to go ... */
+ /* searching for keys in secrets db -- way to go ... */
for (k = keys; k; k = k->next) {
+ uint8 *packed_pass;
+ size_t size = 0, packed_size = 0;
+ struct trusted_dom_pass pass;
char *secrets_key;
-
+ struct trustdom_info *dom_info;
+
/* important: ensure null-termination of the key string */
- secrets_key = strndup(k->node_key.dptr, k->node_key.dsize);
+ secrets_key = talloc_strndup(tmp_ctx,
+ (const char *)k->node_key.dptr,
+ k->node_key.dsize);
if (!secrets_key) {
DEBUG(0, ("strndup failed!\n"));
+ tdb_search_list_free(keys);
+ TALLOC_FREE(tmp_ctx);
return NT_STATUS_NO_MEMORY;
}
-
- pass = secrets_fetch(secrets_key, &size);
-
- if (size != sizeof(*pass)) {
- DEBUG(2, ("Secrets record %s is invalid!\n", secrets_key));
- SAFE_FREE(pass);
+
+ packed_pass = (uint8 *)secrets_fetch(secrets_key, &size);
+ packed_size = tdb_trusted_dom_pass_unpack(packed_pass, size,
+ &pass);
+ /* packed representation isn't needed anymore */
+ SAFE_FREE(packed_pass);
+
+ if (size != packed_size) {
+ DEBUG(2, ("Secrets record %s is invalid!\n",
+ secrets_key));
continue;
}
-
- pull_ucs2_fstring(dom_name, pass->uni_name);
- DEBUG(18, ("Fetched secret record num %d.\nDomain name: %s, SID: %s\n",
- idx, dom_name, sid_string_static(&pass->domain_sid)));
-
- SAFE_FREE(secrets_key);
-
- if (idx >= start_idx && idx < start_idx + max_num_domains) {
- dom = talloc_zero(ctx, sizeof(*dom));
- if (!dom) {
- /* free returned tdb record */
- SAFE_FREE(pass);
-
- return NT_STATUS_NO_MEMORY;
- }
-
- /* copy domain sid */
- SMB_ASSERT(sizeof(dom->sid) == sizeof(pass->domain_sid));
- memcpy(&(dom->sid), &(pass->domain_sid), sizeof(dom->sid));
-
- /* copy unicode domain name */
- dom->name = talloc_strdup_w(ctx, pass->uni_name);
-
- (*domains)[idx - start_idx] = dom;
-
- DEBUG(18, ("Secret record is in required range.\n \
- start_idx = %d, max_num_domains = %d. Added to returned array.\n",
- start_idx, max_num_domains));
-
- *enum_ctx = idx + 1;
- (*num_domains)++;
-
- /* set proper status code to return */
- if (k->next) {
- /* there are yet some entries to enumerate */
- status = STATUS_MORE_ENTRIES;
- } else {
- /* this is the last entry in the whole enumeration */
- status = NT_STATUS_OK;
- }
- } else {
- DEBUG(18, ("Secret is outside the required range.\n \
- start_idx = %d, max_num_domains = %d. Not added to returned array\n",
- start_idx, max_num_domains));
+
+ if (pass.domain_sid.num_auths != 4) {
+ DEBUG(0, ("SID %s is not a domain sid, has %d "
+ "auths instead of 4\n",
+ sid_string_static(&pass.domain_sid),
+ pass.domain_sid.num_auths));
+ continue;
+ }
+
+ if (!(dom_info = TALLOC_P(*domains, struct trustdom_info))) {
+ DEBUG(0, ("talloc failed\n"));
+ tdb_search_list_free(keys);
+ TALLOC_FREE(tmp_ctx);
+ return NT_STATUS_NO_MEMORY;
+ }
+
+ if (pull_ucs2_talloc(dom_info, &dom_info->name,
+ pass.uni_name) == (size_t)-1) {
+ DEBUG(2, ("pull_ucs2_talloc failed\n"));
+ tdb_search_list_free(keys);
+ TALLOC_FREE(tmp_ctx);
+ return NT_STATUS_NO_MEMORY;
+ }
+
+ sid_copy(&dom_info->sid, &pass.domain_sid);
+
+ ADD_TO_ARRAY(*domains, struct trustdom_info *, dom_info,
+ domains, num_domains);
+
+ if (*domains == NULL) {
+ tdb_search_list_free(keys);
+ TALLOC_FREE(tmp_ctx);
+ return NT_STATUS_NO_MEMORY;
}
-
- idx++;
-
- /* free returned tdb record */
- SAFE_FREE(pass);
}
-
- DEBUG(5, ("secrets_get_trusted_domains: got %d domains\n", *num_domains));
+
+ DEBUG(5, ("secrets_get_trusted_domains: got %d domains\n",
+ *num_domains));
/* free the results of searching the keys */
tdb_search_list_free(keys);
+ TALLOC_FREE(tmp_ctx);
- return status;
+ return NT_STATUS_OK;
}
/*******************************************************************************
{
int ret = 0;
- if (!message_init())
+ if (!secrets_init())
return False;
- ret = tdb_lock_bystring(tdb, name, timeout);
- if (ret == 0)
- DEBUG(10,("secrets_named_mutex: got mutex for %s\n", name ));
+ ret = tdb_lock_bystring_with_timeout(tdb, name, timeout);
+ if (ret == 0)
+ DEBUG(10,("secrets_named_mutex: got mutex for %s\n", name ));
return (ret == 0);
}
void secrets_named_mutex_release(const char *name)
{
- tdb_unlock_bystring(tdb, name);
- DEBUG(10,("secrets_named_mutex: released mutex for %s\n", name ));
+ tdb_unlock_bystring(tdb, name);
+ DEBUG(10,("secrets_named_mutex: released mutex for %s\n", name ));
}
-/*********************************************************
- Check to see if we must talk to the PDC to avoid sam
- sync delays
- ********************************************************/
-
-BOOL must_use_pdc( const char *domain )
+/*******************************************************************************
+ Store a complete AFS keyfile into secrets.tdb.
+*******************************************************************************/
+
+BOOL secrets_store_afs_keyfile(const char *cell, const struct afs_keyfile *keyfile)
{
- time_t now = time(NULL);
- time_t last_change_time;
- unsigned char passwd[16];
-
- if ( !secrets_fetch_trust_account_password(domain, passwd, &last_change_time) )
+ fstring key;
+
+ if ((cell == NULL) || (keyfile == NULL))
return False;
-
- /*
- * If the time the machine password has changed
- * was less than about 15 minutes then we need to contact
- * the PDC only, as we cannot be sure domain replication
- * has yet taken place. Bug found by Gerald (way to go
- * Gerald !). JRA.
- */
-
- if ( now - last_change_time < SAM_SYNC_WINDOW )
- return True;
-
- return False;
+ if (ntohl(keyfile->nkeys) > SECRETS_AFS_MAXKEYS)
+ return False;
+
+ slprintf(key, sizeof(key)-1, "%s/%s", SECRETS_AFS_KEYFILE, cell);
+ return secrets_store(key, keyfile, sizeof(struct afs_keyfile));
+}
+
+/*******************************************************************************
+ Fetch the current (highest) AFS key from secrets.tdb
+*******************************************************************************/
+BOOL secrets_fetch_afs_key(const char *cell, struct afs_key *result)
+{
+ fstring key;
+ struct afs_keyfile *keyfile;
+ size_t size = 0;
+ uint32 i;
+
+ slprintf(key, sizeof(key)-1, "%s/%s", SECRETS_AFS_KEYFILE, cell);
+
+ keyfile = (struct afs_keyfile *)secrets_fetch(key, &size);
+
+ if (keyfile == NULL)
+ return False;
+
+ if (size != sizeof(struct afs_keyfile)) {
+ SAFE_FREE(keyfile);
+ return False;
+ }
+
+ i = ntohl(keyfile->nkeys);
+
+ if (i > SECRETS_AFS_MAXKEYS) {
+ SAFE_FREE(keyfile);
+ return False;
+ }
+
+ *result = keyfile->entry[i-1];
+
+ result->kvno = ntohl(result->kvno);
+
+ return True;
+}
+
+/******************************************************************************
+ When kerberos is not available, choose between anonymous or
+ authenticated connections.
+
+ We need to use an authenticated connection if DCs have the
+ RestrictAnonymous registry entry set > 0, or the "Additional
+ restrictions for anonymous connections" set in the win2k Local
+ Security Policy.
+
+ Caller to free() result in domain, username, password
+*******************************************************************************/
+void secrets_fetch_ipc_userpass(char **username, char **domain, char **password)
+{
+ *username = (char *)secrets_fetch(SECRETS_AUTH_USER, NULL);
+ *domain = (char *)secrets_fetch(SECRETS_AUTH_DOMAIN, NULL);
+ *password = (char *)secrets_fetch(SECRETS_AUTH_PASSWORD, NULL);
+
+ if (*username && **username) {
+
+ if (!*domain || !**domain)
+ *domain = smb_xstrdup(lp_workgroup());
+
+ if (!*password || !**password)
+ *password = smb_xstrdup("");
+
+ DEBUG(3, ("IPC$ connections done by user %s\\%s\n",
+ *domain, *username));
+
+ } else {
+ DEBUG(3, ("IPC$ connections done anonymously\n"));
+ *username = smb_xstrdup("");
+ *domain = smb_xstrdup("");
+ *password = smb_xstrdup("");
+ }
+}
+
+/******************************************************************************
+ Open or create the schannel session store tdb.
+*******************************************************************************/
+
+static TDB_CONTEXT *open_schannel_session_store(TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx)
+{
+ TDB_DATA vers;
+ uint32 ver;
+ TDB_CONTEXT *tdb_sc = NULL;
+ char *fname = talloc_asprintf(mem_ctx, "%s/schannel_store.tdb", lp_private_dir());
+
+ if (!fname) {
+ return NULL;
+ }
+
+ tdb_sc = tdb_open_log(fname, 0, TDB_DEFAULT, O_RDWR|O_CREAT, 0600);
+
+ if (!tdb_sc) {
+ DEBUG(0,("open_schannel_session_store: Failed to open %s\n", fname));
+ TALLOC_FREE(fname);
+ return NULL;
+ }
+
+ vers = tdb_fetch_bystring(tdb_sc, "SCHANNEL_STORE_VERSION");
+ if (vers.dptr == NULL) {
+ /* First opener, no version. */
+ SIVAL(&ver,0,1);
+ vers.dptr = (uint8 *)&ver;
+ vers.dsize = 4;
+ tdb_store_bystring(tdb_sc, "SCHANNEL_STORE_VERSION", vers, TDB_REPLACE);
+ vers.dptr = NULL;
+ } else if (vers.dsize == 4) {
+ ver = IVAL(vers.dptr,0);
+ if (ver != 1) {
+ tdb_close(tdb_sc);
+ tdb_sc = NULL;
+ DEBUG(0,("open_schannel_session_store: wrong version number %d in %s\n",
+ (int)ver, fname ));
+ }
+ } else {
+ tdb_close(tdb_sc);
+ tdb_sc = NULL;
+ DEBUG(0,("open_schannel_session_store: wrong version number size %d in %s\n",
+ (int)vers.dsize, fname ));
+ }
+
+ SAFE_FREE(vers.dptr);
+ TALLOC_FREE(fname);
+
+ return tdb_sc;
+}
+
+/******************************************************************************
+ Store the schannel state after an AUTH2 call.
+ Note we must be root here.
+*******************************************************************************/
+
+BOOL secrets_store_schannel_session_info(TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx,
+ const char *remote_machine,
+ const struct dcinfo *pdc)
+{
+ TDB_CONTEXT *tdb_sc = NULL;
+ TDB_DATA value;
+ BOOL ret;
+ char *keystr = talloc_asprintf(mem_ctx, "%s/%s", SECRETS_SCHANNEL_STATE,
+ remote_machine);
+ if (!keystr) {
+ return False;
+ }
+
+ strupper_m(keystr);
+
+ /* Work out how large the record is. */
+ value.dsize = tdb_pack(NULL, 0, "dBBBBBfff",
+ pdc->sequence,
+ 8, pdc->seed_chal.data,
+ 8, pdc->clnt_chal.data,
+ 8, pdc->srv_chal.data,
+ 16, pdc->sess_key,
+ 16, pdc->mach_pw,
+ pdc->mach_acct,
+ pdc->remote_machine,
+ pdc->domain);
+
+ value.dptr = TALLOC_ARRAY(mem_ctx, uint8, value.dsize);
+ if (!value.dptr) {
+ TALLOC_FREE(keystr);
+ return False;
+ }
+
+ value.dsize = tdb_pack(value.dptr, value.dsize, "dBBBBBfff",
+ pdc->sequence,
+ 8, pdc->seed_chal.data,
+ 8, pdc->clnt_chal.data,
+ 8, pdc->srv_chal.data,
+ 16, pdc->sess_key,
+ 16, pdc->mach_pw,
+ pdc->mach_acct,
+ pdc->remote_machine,
+ pdc->domain);
+
+ tdb_sc = open_schannel_session_store(mem_ctx);
+ if (!tdb_sc) {
+ TALLOC_FREE(keystr);
+ TALLOC_FREE(value.dptr);
+ return False;
+ }
+
+ ret = (tdb_store_bystring(tdb_sc, keystr, value, TDB_REPLACE) == 0 ? True : False);
+
+ DEBUG(3,("secrets_store_schannel_session_info: stored schannel info with key %s\n",
+ keystr ));
+
+ tdb_close(tdb_sc);
+ TALLOC_FREE(keystr);
+ TALLOC_FREE(value.dptr);
+ return ret;
+}
+
+/******************************************************************************
+ Restore the schannel state on a client reconnect.
+ Note we must be root here.
+*******************************************************************************/
+
+BOOL secrets_restore_schannel_session_info(TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx,
+ const char *remote_machine,
+ struct dcinfo **ppdc)
+{
+ TDB_CONTEXT *tdb_sc = NULL;
+ TDB_DATA value;
+ unsigned char *pseed_chal = NULL;
+ unsigned char *pclnt_chal = NULL;
+ unsigned char *psrv_chal = NULL;
+ unsigned char *psess_key = NULL;
+ unsigned char *pmach_pw = NULL;
+ uint32 l1, l2, l3, l4, l5;
+ int ret;
+ struct dcinfo *pdc = NULL;
+ char *keystr = talloc_asprintf(mem_ctx, "%s/%s", SECRETS_SCHANNEL_STATE,
+ remote_machine);
+
+ *ppdc = NULL;
+
+ if (!keystr) {
+ return False;
+ }
+
+ strupper_m(keystr);
+
+ tdb_sc = open_schannel_session_store(mem_ctx);
+ if (!tdb_sc) {
+ TALLOC_FREE(keystr);
+ return False;
+ }
+
+ value = tdb_fetch_bystring(tdb_sc, keystr);
+ if (!value.dptr) {
+ DEBUG(0,("secrets_restore_schannel_session_info: Failed to find entry with key %s\n",
+ keystr ));
+ tdb_close(tdb_sc);
+ return False;
+ }
+
+ pdc = TALLOC_ZERO_P(mem_ctx, struct dcinfo);
+
+ /* Retrieve the record. */
+ ret = tdb_unpack(value.dptr, value.dsize, "dBBBBBfff",
+ &pdc->sequence,
+ &l1, &pseed_chal,
+ &l2, &pclnt_chal,
+ &l3, &psrv_chal,
+ &l4, &psess_key,
+ &l5, &pmach_pw,
+ &pdc->mach_acct,
+ &pdc->remote_machine,
+ &pdc->domain);
+
+ if (ret == -1 || l1 != 8 || l2 != 8 || l3 != 8 || l4 != 16 || l5 != 16) {
+ /* Bad record - delete it. */
+ tdb_delete_bystring(tdb_sc, keystr);
+ tdb_close(tdb_sc);
+ TALLOC_FREE(keystr);
+ TALLOC_FREE(pdc);
+ SAFE_FREE(pseed_chal);
+ SAFE_FREE(pclnt_chal);
+ SAFE_FREE(psrv_chal);
+ SAFE_FREE(psess_key);
+ SAFE_FREE(pmach_pw);
+ SAFE_FREE(value.dptr);
+ return False;
+ }
+
+ tdb_close(tdb_sc);
+
+ memcpy(pdc->seed_chal.data, pseed_chal, 8);
+ memcpy(pdc->clnt_chal.data, pclnt_chal, 8);
+ memcpy(pdc->srv_chal.data, psrv_chal, 8);
+ memcpy(pdc->sess_key, psess_key, 16);
+ memcpy(pdc->mach_pw, pmach_pw, 16);
+
+ /* We know these are true so didn't bother to store them. */
+ pdc->challenge_sent = True;
+ pdc->authenticated = True;
+
+ DEBUG(3,("secrets_restore_schannel_session_info: restored schannel info key %s\n",
+ keystr ));
+
+ SAFE_FREE(pseed_chal);
+ SAFE_FREE(pclnt_chal);
+ SAFE_FREE(psrv_chal);
+ SAFE_FREE(psess_key);
+ SAFE_FREE(pmach_pw);
+
+ TALLOC_FREE(keystr);
+ SAFE_FREE(value.dptr);
+
+ *ppdc = pdc;
+
+ return True;
+}
+
+BOOL secrets_store_generic(const char *owner, const char *key, const char *secret)
+{
+ char *tdbkey = NULL;
+ BOOL ret;
+
+ if (asprintf(&tdbkey, "SECRETS/GENERIC/%s/%s", owner, key) < 0) {
+ DEBUG(0, ("asprintf failed!\n"));
+ return False;
+ }
+
+ ret = secrets_store(tdbkey, secret, strlen(secret)+1);
+
+ SAFE_FREE(tdbkey);
+ return ret;
+}
+
+/*******************************************************************
+ Find the ldap password.
+******************************************************************/
+
+char *secrets_fetch_generic(const char *owner, const char *key)
+{
+ char *secret = NULL;
+ char *tdbkey = NULL;
+
+ if (( ! owner) || ( ! key)) {
+ DEBUG(1, ("Invalid Paramters"));
+ return NULL;
+ }
+
+ if (asprintf(&tdbkey, "SECRETS/GENERIC/%s/%s", owner, key) < 0) {
+ DEBUG(0, ("Out of memory!\n"));
+ return NULL;
+ }
+
+ secret = (char *)secrets_fetch(tdbkey, NULL);
+ SAFE_FREE(tdbkey);
+
+ return secret;
}
git.samba.org / jpeach / samba.git / blobdiff