X-Git-Url: http://git.samba.org/?a=blobdiff_plain;f=source%2Fpassdb%2Fsecrets.c;h=771adb96e3dbf9c63751de8bf29d1bee86ed1448;hb=5c6c8e1fe93f340005110a7833946191659d88ab;hp=db08d0271455f475b8d7b2c19240bb5e47fce39f;hpb=a50dc3f836a898d1aef08afbd12e7221db24440a;p=jpeach%2Fsamba.git diff --git a/source/passdb/secrets.c b/source/passdb/secrets.c index db08d027145..771adb96e3d 100644 --- a/source/passdb/secrets.c +++ b/source/passdb/secrets.c @@ -1,22 +1,22 @@ -/* +/* Unix SMB/CIFS implementation. Copyright (C) Andrew Tridgell 1992-2001 Copyright (C) Andrew Bartlett 2002 Copyright (C) Rafal Szczesniak 2002 - + Copyright (C) Tim Potter 2001 + This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by - the Free Software Foundation; either version 2 of the License, or + the Free Software Foundation; either version 3 of the License, or (at your option) any later version. - + This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the GNU General Public License for more details. - + You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License - along with this program; if not, write to the Free Software - Foundation, Inc., 675 Mass Ave, Cambridge, MA 02139, USA. + along with this program. If not, see . */ /* the Samba secrets database stores any generated, private information @@ -29,10 +29,30 @@ static TDB_CONTEXT *tdb; +/* Urrrg. global.... */ +BOOL global_machine_password_needs_changing; + +/** + * Use a TDB to store an incrementing random seed. + * + * Initialised to the current pid, the very first time Samba starts, + * and incremented by one each time it is needed. + * + * @note Not called by systems with a working /dev/urandom. + */ +static void get_rand_seed(int *new_seed) +{ + *new_seed = sys_getpid(); + if (tdb) { + tdb_change_int32_atomic(tdb, "INFO/random_seed", new_seed, 1); + } +} + /* open up the secrets database */ BOOL secrets_init(void) { pstring fname; + unsigned char dummy; if (tdb) return True; @@ -46,6 +66,18 @@ BOOL secrets_init(void) DEBUG(0,("Failed to open %s\n", fname)); return False; } + + /** + * Set a reseed function for the crypto random generator + * + * This avoids a problem where systems without /dev/urandom + * could send the same challenge to multiple clients + */ + set_rand_reseed_callback(get_rand_seed); + + /* Ensure that the reseed is done now, while we are root, etc */ + generate_random_buffer(&dummy, sizeof(dummy)); + return True; } @@ -54,31 +86,26 @@ BOOL secrets_init(void) */ void *secrets_fetch(const char *key, size_t *size) { - TDB_DATA kbuf, dbuf; + TDB_DATA dbuf; secrets_init(); if (!tdb) return NULL; - kbuf.dptr = key; - kbuf.dsize = strlen(key); - dbuf = tdb_fetch(tdb, kbuf); + dbuf = tdb_fetch(tdb, string_tdb_data(key)); if (size) *size = dbuf.dsize; return dbuf.dptr; } -/* store a secrets entry +/* store a secrets entry */ BOOL secrets_store(const char *key, const void *data, size_t size) { - TDB_DATA kbuf, dbuf; secrets_init(); if (!tdb) return False; - kbuf.dptr = key; - kbuf.dsize = strlen(key); - dbuf.dptr = data; - dbuf.dsize = size; - return tdb_store(tdb, kbuf, dbuf, TDB_REPLACE) == 0; + return tdb_trans_store(tdb, string_tdb_data(key), + make_tdb_data((const uint8 *)data, size), + TDB_REPLACE) == 0; } @@ -86,39 +113,41 @@ BOOL secrets_store(const char *key, const void *data, size_t size) */ BOOL secrets_delete(const char *key) { - TDB_DATA kbuf; secrets_init(); if (!tdb) return False; - kbuf.dptr = key; - kbuf.dsize = strlen(key); - return tdb_delete(tdb, kbuf) == 0; + return tdb_trans_delete(tdb, string_tdb_data(key)) == 0; } BOOL secrets_store_domain_sid(const char *domain, const DOM_SID *sid) { fstring key; + BOOL ret; slprintf(key, sizeof(key)-1, "%s/%s", SECRETS_DOMAIN_SID, domain); - strupper(key); - return secrets_store(key, sid, sizeof(DOM_SID)); + strupper_m(key); + ret = secrets_store(key, sid, sizeof(DOM_SID)); + + /* Force a re-query, in case we modified our domain */ + if (ret) + reset_global_sam_sid(); + return ret; } BOOL secrets_fetch_domain_sid(const char *domain, DOM_SID *sid) { DOM_SID *dyn_sid; fstring key; - size_t size; + size_t size = 0; slprintf(key, sizeof(key)-1, "%s/%s", SECRETS_DOMAIN_SID, domain); - strupper(key); + strupper_m(key); dyn_sid = (DOM_SID *)secrets_fetch(key, &size); if (dyn_sid == NULL) return False; - if (size != sizeof(DOM_SID)) - { + if (size != sizeof(DOM_SID)) { SAFE_FREE(dyn_sid); return False; } @@ -128,39 +157,40 @@ BOOL secrets_fetch_domain_sid(const char *domain, DOM_SID *sid) return True; } -BOOL secrets_store_domain_guid(const char *domain, GUID *guid) +BOOL secrets_store_domain_guid(const char *domain, struct GUID *guid) { fstring key; slprintf(key, sizeof(key)-1, "%s/%s", SECRETS_DOMAIN_GUID, domain); - strupper(key); - return secrets_store(key, guid, sizeof(GUID)); + strupper_m(key); + return secrets_store(key, guid, sizeof(struct GUID)); } -BOOL secrets_fetch_domain_guid(const char *domain, GUID *guid) +BOOL secrets_fetch_domain_guid(const char *domain, struct GUID *guid) { - GUID *dyn_guid; + struct GUID *dyn_guid; fstring key; - size_t size; - GUID new_guid; + size_t size = 0; + struct GUID new_guid; slprintf(key, sizeof(key)-1, "%s/%s", SECRETS_DOMAIN_GUID, domain); - strupper(key); - dyn_guid = (GUID *)secrets_fetch(key, &size); - - DEBUG(6,("key is %s, size is %d\n", key, (int)size)); - - if ((NULL == dyn_guid) && (ROLE_DOMAIN_PDC == lp_server_role())) { - uuid_generate_random(&new_guid); - if (!secrets_store_domain_guid(domain, &new_guid)) - return False; - dyn_guid = (GUID *)secrets_fetch(key, &size); - if (dyn_guid == NULL) + strupper_m(key); + dyn_guid = (struct GUID *)secrets_fetch(key, &size); + + if (!dyn_guid) { + if (lp_server_role() == ROLE_DOMAIN_PDC) { + smb_uuid_generate_random(&new_guid); + if (!secrets_store_domain_guid(domain, &new_guid)) + return False; + dyn_guid = (struct GUID *)secrets_fetch(key, &size); + } + if (dyn_guid == NULL) { return False; + } } - if (size != sizeof(GUID)) - { + if (size != sizeof(struct GUID)) { + DEBUG(1,("UUID size %d is wrong!\n", (int)size)); SAFE_FREE(dyn_guid); return False; } @@ -177,13 +207,13 @@ BOOL secrets_fetch_domain_guid(const char *domain, GUID *guid) * * @return stored password's key **/ -const char *trust_keystr(const char *domain) +static const char *trust_keystr(const char *domain) { static fstring keystr; - slprintf(keystr,sizeof(keystr)-1,"%s/%s", + slprintf(keystr,sizeof(keystr)-1,"%s/%s", SECRETS_MACHINE_ACCT_PASS, domain); - strupper(keystr); + strupper_m(keystr); return keystr; } @@ -195,13 +225,13 @@ const char *trust_keystr(const char *domain) * * @return stored password's key **/ -char *trustdom_keystr(const char *domain) +static char *trustdom_keystr(const char *domain) { - static char* keystr; + static pstring keystr; + + pstr_sprintf(keystr, "%s/%s", SECRETS_DOMTRUST_ACCT_PASS, domain); + strupper_m(keystr); - asprintf(&keystr, "%s/%s", SECRETS_DOMTRUST_ACCT_PASS, domain); - strupper(keystr); - return keystr; } @@ -215,88 +245,257 @@ BOOL secrets_lock_trust_account_password(const char *domain, BOOL dolock) return False; if (dolock) - return (tdb_lock_bystring(tdb, trust_keystr(domain),0) == 0); + return (tdb_lock_bystring(tdb, trust_keystr(domain)) == 0); else tdb_unlock_bystring(tdb, trust_keystr(domain)); return True; } +/************************************************************************ + Routine to get the default secure channel type for trust accounts +************************************************************************/ + +uint32 get_default_sec_channel(void) +{ + if (lp_server_role() == ROLE_DOMAIN_BDC || + lp_server_role() == ROLE_DOMAIN_PDC) { + return SEC_CHAN_BDC; + } else { + return SEC_CHAN_WKSTA; + } +} + /************************************************************************ Routine to get the trust account password for a domain. The user of this function must have locked the trust password file using - the above call. + the above secrets_lock_trust_account_password(). ************************************************************************/ BOOL secrets_fetch_trust_account_password(const char *domain, uint8 ret_pwd[16], - time_t *pass_last_set_time) + time_t *pass_last_set_time, + uint32 *channel) { struct machine_acct_pass *pass; char *plaintext; - size_t size; + size_t size = 0; - plaintext = secrets_fetch_machine_password(); + plaintext = secrets_fetch_machine_password(domain, pass_last_set_time, + channel); if (plaintext) { - /* we have an ADS password - use that */ - DEBUG(4,("Using ADS machine password\n")); + DEBUG(4,("Using cleartext machine password\n")); E_md4hash(plaintext, ret_pwd); SAFE_FREE(plaintext); - pass_last_set_time = 0; return True; } - if (!(pass = secrets_fetch(trust_keystr(domain), &size))) { + if (!(pass = (struct machine_acct_pass *)secrets_fetch( + trust_keystr(domain), &size))) { DEBUG(5, ("secrets_fetch failed!\n")); return False; } - + if (size != sizeof(*pass)) { DEBUG(0, ("secrets were of incorrect size!\n")); return False; } - if (pass_last_set_time) *pass_last_set_time = pass->mod_time; + if (pass_last_set_time) { + *pass_last_set_time = pass->mod_time; + } memcpy(ret_pwd, pass->hash, 16); + + if (channel) { + *channel = get_default_sec_channel(); + } + + /* Test if machine password has expired and needs to be changed */ + if (lp_machine_password_timeout()) { + if (pass->mod_time > 0 && time(NULL) > (pass->mod_time + + (time_t)lp_machine_password_timeout())) { + global_machine_password_needs_changing = True; + } + } + SAFE_FREE(pass); return True; } +/** + * Pack SID passed by pointer + * + * @param pack_buf pointer to buffer which is to be filled with packed data + * @param bufsize size of packing buffer + * @param sid pointer to sid to be packed + * + * @return length of the packed representation of the whole structure + **/ +static size_t tdb_sid_pack(uint8 *pack_buf, int bufsize, DOM_SID* sid) +{ + int idx; + size_t len = 0; + + if (!sid || !pack_buf) return -1; + + len += tdb_pack(pack_buf + len, bufsize - len, "bb", sid->sid_rev_num, + sid->num_auths); + + for (idx = 0; idx < 6; idx++) { + len += tdb_pack(pack_buf + len, bufsize - len, "b", + sid->id_auth[idx]); + } + + for (idx = 0; idx < MAXSUBAUTHS; idx++) { + len += tdb_pack(pack_buf + len, bufsize - len, "d", + sid->sub_auths[idx]); + } + + return len; +} + +/** + * Unpack SID into a pointer + * + * @param pack_buf pointer to buffer with packed representation + * @param bufsize size of the buffer + * @param sid pointer to sid structure to be filled with unpacked data + * + * @return size of structure unpacked from buffer + **/ +static size_t tdb_sid_unpack(uint8 *pack_buf, int bufsize, DOM_SID* sid) +{ + int idx, len = 0; + + if (!sid || !pack_buf) return -1; + + len += tdb_unpack(pack_buf + len, bufsize - len, "bb", + &sid->sid_rev_num, &sid->num_auths); + + for (idx = 0; idx < 6; idx++) { + len += tdb_unpack(pack_buf + len, bufsize - len, "b", + &sid->id_auth[idx]); + } + + for (idx = 0; idx < MAXSUBAUTHS; idx++) { + len += tdb_unpack(pack_buf + len, bufsize - len, "d", + &sid->sub_auths[idx]); + } + + return len; +} + +/** + * Pack TRUSTED_DOM_PASS passed by pointer + * + * @param pack_buf pointer to buffer which is to be filled with packed data + * @param bufsize size of the buffer + * @param pass pointer to trusted domain password to be packed + * + * @return length of the packed representation of the whole structure + **/ +static size_t tdb_trusted_dom_pass_pack(uint8 *pack_buf, int bufsize, + TRUSTED_DOM_PASS* pass) +{ + int idx, len = 0; + + if (!pack_buf || !pass) return -1; + + /* packing unicode domain name and password */ + len += tdb_pack(pack_buf + len, bufsize - len, "d", + pass->uni_name_len); + + for (idx = 0; idx < 32; idx++) + len += tdb_pack(pack_buf + len, bufsize - len, "w", + pass->uni_name[idx]); + + len += tdb_pack(pack_buf + len, bufsize - len, "dPd", pass->pass_len, + pass->pass, pass->mod_time); + + /* packing SID structure */ + len += tdb_sid_pack(pack_buf + len, bufsize - len, &pass->domain_sid); + + return len; +} + + +/** + * Unpack TRUSTED_DOM_PASS passed by pointer + * + * @param pack_buf pointer to buffer with packed representation + * @param bufsize size of the buffer + * @param pass pointer to trusted domain password to be filled with unpacked data + * + * @return size of structure unpacked from buffer + **/ +static size_t tdb_trusted_dom_pass_unpack(uint8 *pack_buf, int bufsize, + TRUSTED_DOM_PASS* pass) +{ + int idx, len = 0; + + if (!pack_buf || !pass) return -1; + + /* unpack unicode domain name and plaintext password */ + len += tdb_unpack(pack_buf, bufsize - len, "d", &pass->uni_name_len); + + for (idx = 0; idx < 32; idx++) + len += tdb_unpack(pack_buf + len, bufsize - len, "w", + &pass->uni_name[idx]); + + len += tdb_unpack(pack_buf + len, bufsize - len, "dPd", + &pass->pass_len, &pass->pass, &pass->mod_time); + + /* unpack domain sid */ + len += tdb_sid_unpack(pack_buf + len, bufsize - len, + &pass->domain_sid); + + return len; +} + /************************************************************************ Routine to get account password to trusted domain ************************************************************************/ BOOL secrets_fetch_trusted_domain_password(const char *domain, char** pwd, - DOM_SID *sid, time_t *pass_last_set_time) + DOM_SID *sid, time_t *pass_last_set_time) { - struct trusted_dom_pass *pass; - size_t size; + struct trusted_dom_pass pass; + size_t size = 0; + + /* unpacking structures */ + uint8 *pass_buf; + int pass_len = 0; + + ZERO_STRUCT(pass); /* fetching trusted domain password structure */ - if (!(pass = secrets_fetch(trustdom_keystr(domain), &size))) { + if (!(pass_buf = (uint8 *)secrets_fetch(trustdom_keystr(domain), + &size))) { DEBUG(5, ("secrets_fetch failed!\n")); return False; } - if (size != sizeof(*pass)) { - DEBUG(0, ("secrets were of incorrect size!\n")); + /* unpack trusted domain password */ + pass_len = tdb_trusted_dom_pass_unpack(pass_buf, size, &pass); + SAFE_FREE(pass_buf); + + if (pass_len != size) { + DEBUG(5, ("Invalid secrets size. Unpacked data doesn't match trusted_dom_pass structure.\n")); return False; } - /* the trust's password */ + /* the trust's password */ if (pwd) { - *pwd = strdup(pass->pass); + *pwd = SMB_STRDUP(pass.pass); if (!*pwd) { return False; } } /* last change time */ - if (pass_last_set_time) *pass_last_set_time = pass->mod_time; + if (pass_last_set_time) *pass_last_set_time = pass.mod_time; /* domain sid */ - memcpy(&sid, &(pass->domain_sid), sizeof(sid)); - - SAFE_FREE(pass); - + if (sid != NULL) sid_copy(sid, &pass.domain_sid); + return True; } @@ -315,7 +514,7 @@ BOOL secrets_store_trust_account_password(const char *domain, uint8 new_pwd[16]) } /** - * Routine to set the password for trusted domain + * Routine to store the password for trusted domain * * @param domain remote domain name * @param pwd plain text password of trust relationship @@ -324,19 +523,28 @@ BOOL secrets_store_trust_account_password(const char *domain, uint8 new_pwd[16]) * @return true if succeeded **/ -BOOL secrets_store_trusted_domain_password(const char* domain, smb_ucs2_t *uni_dom_name, - size_t uni_name_len, const char* pwd, - DOM_SID sid) +BOOL secrets_store_trusted_domain_password(const char* domain, const char* pwd, + const DOM_SID *sid) { + smb_ucs2_t *uni_dom_name; + + /* packing structures */ + pstring pass_buf; + int pass_len = 0; + int pass_buf_len = sizeof(pass_buf); + struct trusted_dom_pass pass; ZERO_STRUCT(pass); - /* unicode domain name and its length */ - if (!uni_dom_name) + if (push_ucs2_allocate(&uni_dom_name, domain) == (size_t)-1) { + DEBUG(0, ("Could not convert domain name %s to unicode\n", + domain)); return False; - + } + strncpy_w(pass.uni_name, uni_dom_name, sizeof(pass.uni_name) - 1); - pass.uni_name_len = uni_name_len; + pass.uni_name_len = strlen_w(uni_dom_name)+1; + SAFE_FREE(uni_dom_name); /* last change time */ pass.mod_time = time(NULL); @@ -346,9 +554,11 @@ BOOL secrets_store_trusted_domain_password(const char* domain, smb_ucs2_t *uni_d fstrcpy(pass.pass, pwd); /* domain sid */ - memcpy(&(pass.domain_sid), &sid, sizeof(sid)); + sid_copy(&pass.domain_sid, sid); - return secrets_store(trustdom_keystr(domain), (void *)&pass, sizeof(pass)); + pass_len = tdb_trusted_dom_pass_pack((uint8 *)pass_buf, pass_buf_len, &pass); + + return secrets_store(trustdom_keystr(domain), (void *)&pass_buf, pass_len); } /************************************************************************ @@ -356,34 +566,93 @@ BOOL secrets_store_trusted_domain_password(const char* domain, smb_ucs2_t *uni_d the password is assumed to be a null terminated ascii string ************************************************************************/ -BOOL secrets_store_machine_password(const char *pass) +BOOL secrets_store_machine_password(const char *pass, const char *domain, uint32 sec_channel) { - char *key; + char *key = NULL; BOOL ret; - asprintf(&key, "%s/%s", SECRETS_MACHINE_PASSWORD, lp_workgroup()); - strupper(key); + uint32 last_change_time; + uint32 sec_channel_type; + + asprintf(&key, "%s/%s", SECRETS_MACHINE_PASSWORD, domain); + if (!key) + return False; + strupper_m(key); + ret = secrets_store(key, pass, strlen(pass)+1); - free(key); + SAFE_FREE(key); + + if (!ret) + return ret; + + asprintf(&key, "%s/%s", SECRETS_MACHINE_LAST_CHANGE_TIME, domain); + if (!key) + return False; + strupper_m(key); + + SIVAL(&last_change_time, 0, time(NULL)); + ret = secrets_store(key, &last_change_time, sizeof(last_change_time)); + SAFE_FREE(key); + + asprintf(&key, "%s/%s", SECRETS_MACHINE_SEC_CHANNEL_TYPE, domain); + if (!key) + return False; + strupper_m(key); + + SIVAL(&sec_channel_type, 0, sec_channel); + ret = secrets_store(key, &sec_channel_type, sizeof(sec_channel_type)); + SAFE_FREE(key); + return ret; } - /************************************************************************ Routine to fetch the plaintext machine account password for a realm -the password is assumed to be a null terminated ascii string + the password is assumed to be a null terminated ascii string. ************************************************************************/ -char *secrets_fetch_machine_password(void) + +char *secrets_fetch_machine_password(const char *domain, + time_t *pass_last_set_time, + uint32 *channel) { - char *key; + char *key = NULL; char *ret; - asprintf(&key, "%s/%s", SECRETS_MACHINE_PASSWORD, lp_workgroup()); - strupper(key); + asprintf(&key, "%s/%s", SECRETS_MACHINE_PASSWORD, domain); + strupper_m(key); ret = (char *)secrets_fetch(key, NULL); - free(key); - return ret; -} + SAFE_FREE(key); + if (pass_last_set_time) { + size_t size; + uint32 *last_set_time; + asprintf(&key, "%s/%s", SECRETS_MACHINE_LAST_CHANGE_TIME, domain); + strupper_m(key); + last_set_time = (unsigned int *)secrets_fetch(key, &size); + if (last_set_time) { + *pass_last_set_time = IVAL(last_set_time,0); + SAFE_FREE(last_set_time); + } else { + *pass_last_set_time = 0; + } + SAFE_FREE(key); + } + if (channel) { + size_t size; + uint32 *channel_type; + asprintf(&key, "%s/%s", SECRETS_MACHINE_SEC_CHANNEL_TYPE, domain); + strupper_m(key); + channel_type = (unsigned int *)secrets_fetch(key, &size); + if (channel_type) { + *channel = IVAL(channel_type,0); + SAFE_FREE(channel_type); + } else { + *channel = get_default_sec_channel(); + } + SAFE_FREE(key); + } + + return ret; +} /************************************************************************ Routine to delete the machine trust account password file for a domain. @@ -403,184 +672,203 @@ BOOL trusted_domain_password_delete(const char *domain) return secrets_delete(trustdom_keystr(domain)); } - -/******************************************************************* - Reset the 'done' variables so after a client process is created - from a fork call these calls will be re-done. This should be - expanded if more variables need reseting. - ******************************************************************/ - -void reset_globals_after_fork(void) -{ - unsigned char dummy; - - secrets_init(); - - /* - * Increment the global seed value to ensure every smbd starts - * with a new random seed. - */ - - if (tdb) { - uint32 initial_val = sys_getpid(); - tdb_change_int32_atomic(tdb, "INFO/random_seed", (int *)&initial_val, 1); - set_rand_reseed_data((unsigned char *)&initial_val, sizeof(initial_val)); - } - - /* - * Re-seed the random crypto generator, so all smbd's - * started from the same parent won't generate the same - * sequence. - */ - generate_random_buffer( &dummy, 1, True); -} - BOOL secrets_store_ldap_pw(const char* dn, char* pw) { char *key = NULL; BOOL ret; - + if (asprintf(&key, "%s/%s", SECRETS_LDAP_BIND_PW, dn) < 0) { DEBUG(0, ("secrets_store_ldap_pw: asprintf failed!\n")); return False; } - + ret = secrets_store(key, pw, strlen(pw)+1); - + SAFE_FREE(key); return ret; } +/******************************************************************* + Find the ldap password. +******************************************************************/ + +BOOL fetch_ldap_pw(char **dn, char** pw) +{ + char *key = NULL; + size_t size = 0; + + *dn = smb_xstrdup(lp_ldap_admin_dn()); + + if (asprintf(&key, "%s/%s", SECRETS_LDAP_BIND_PW, *dn) < 0) { + SAFE_FREE(*dn); + DEBUG(0, ("fetch_ldap_pw: asprintf failed!\n")); + } + + *pw=(char *)secrets_fetch(key, &size); + SAFE_FREE(key); + + if (!size) { + /* Upgrade 2.2 style entry */ + char *p; + char* old_style_key = SMB_STRDUP(*dn); + char *data; + fstring old_style_pw; + + if (!old_style_key) { + DEBUG(0, ("fetch_ldap_pw: strdup failed!\n")); + return False; + } + + for (p=old_style_key; *p; p++) + if (*p == ',') *p = '/'; + + data=(char *)secrets_fetch(old_style_key, &size); + if (!size && size < sizeof(old_style_pw)) { + DEBUG(0,("fetch_ldap_pw: neither ldap secret retrieved!\n")); + SAFE_FREE(old_style_key); + SAFE_FREE(*dn); + return False; + } + + size = MIN(size, sizeof(fstring)-1); + strncpy(old_style_pw, data, size); + old_style_pw[size] = 0; + + SAFE_FREE(data); + + if (!secrets_store_ldap_pw(*dn, old_style_pw)) { + DEBUG(0,("fetch_ldap_pw: ldap secret could not be upgraded!\n")); + SAFE_FREE(old_style_key); + SAFE_FREE(*dn); + return False; + } + if (!secrets_delete(old_style_key)) { + DEBUG(0,("fetch_ldap_pw: old ldap secret could not be deleted!\n")); + } + + SAFE_FREE(old_style_key); + + *pw = smb_xstrdup(old_style_pw); + } + + return True; +} /** * Get trusted domains info from secrets.tdb. - * - * The linked list is allocated on the supplied talloc context, caller gets to destroy - * when done. - * - * @param ctx Allocation context - * @param enum_ctx Starting index, eg. we can start fetching at third - * or sixth trusted domain entry. Zero is the first index. - * Value it is set to is the enum context for the next enumeration. - * @param num_domains Number of domain entries to fetch at one call - * @param domains Pointer to array of trusted domain structs to be filled up - * - * @return nt status code of rpc response - **/ + **/ -NTSTATUS secrets_get_trusted_domains(TALLOC_CTX* ctx, int* enum_ctx, unsigned int max_num_domains, int *num_domains, TRUSTDOM ***domains) +NTSTATUS secrets_trusted_domains(TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx, uint32 *num_domains, + struct trustdom_info ***domains) { TDB_LIST_NODE *keys, *k; - TRUSTDOM *dom = NULL; char *pattern; - unsigned int start_idx; - uint32 idx = 0; - size_t size; - fstring dom_name; - struct trusted_dom_pass *pass; - NTSTATUS status; + TALLOC_CTX *tmp_ctx; - if (!secrets_init()) return NT_STATUS_ACCESS_DENIED; + if (!(tmp_ctx = talloc_new(mem_ctx))) { + return NT_STATUS_NO_MEMORY; + } - *num_domains = 0; - start_idx = *enum_ctx; + if (!secrets_init()) return NT_STATUS_ACCESS_DENIED; /* generate searching pattern */ - if (!(pattern = talloc_asprintf(ctx, "%s/*", SECRETS_DOMTRUST_ACCT_PASS))) { - DEBUG(0, ("secrets_get_trusted_domains: talloc_asprintf() failed!\n")); + pattern = talloc_asprintf(tmp_ctx, "%s/*", SECRETS_DOMTRUST_ACCT_PASS); + if (pattern == NULL) { + DEBUG(0, ("secrets_trusted_domains: talloc_asprintf() " + "failed!\n")); + TALLOC_FREE(tmp_ctx); return NT_STATUS_NO_MEMORY; } - DEBUG(5, ("secrets_get_trusted_domains: looking for %d domains, starting at index %d\n", - max_num_domains, *enum_ctx)); + *num_domains = 0; - *domains = talloc_zero(ctx, sizeof(**domains)*max_num_domains); + /* + * Make sure that a talloc context for the trustdom_info structs + * exists + */ + + if (!(*domains = TALLOC_ARRAY(mem_ctx, struct trustdom_info *, 1))) { + TALLOC_FREE(tmp_ctx); + return NT_STATUS_NO_MEMORY; + } /* fetching trusted domains' data and collecting them in a list */ keys = tdb_search_keys(tdb, pattern); - /* - * if there's no keys returned ie. no trusted domain, - * return "no more entries" code - */ - status = NT_STATUS_NO_MORE_ENTRIES; - - /* searching for keys in sectrets db -- way to go ... */ + /* searching for keys in secrets db -- way to go ... */ for (k = keys; k; k = k->next) { + uint8 *packed_pass; + size_t size = 0, packed_size = 0; + struct trusted_dom_pass pass; char *secrets_key; - + struct trustdom_info *dom_info; + /* important: ensure null-termination of the key string */ - secrets_key = strndup(k->node_key.dptr, k->node_key.dsize); + secrets_key = talloc_strndup(tmp_ctx, + (const char *)k->node_key.dptr, + k->node_key.dsize); if (!secrets_key) { DEBUG(0, ("strndup failed!\n")); + tdb_search_list_free(keys); + TALLOC_FREE(tmp_ctx); return NT_STATUS_NO_MEMORY; } - - pass = secrets_fetch(secrets_key, &size); - - if (size != sizeof(*pass)) { - DEBUG(2, ("Secrets record %s is invalid!\n", secrets_key)); - SAFE_FREE(pass); + + packed_pass = (uint8 *)secrets_fetch(secrets_key, &size); + packed_size = tdb_trusted_dom_pass_unpack(packed_pass, size, + &pass); + /* packed representation isn't needed anymore */ + SAFE_FREE(packed_pass); + + if (size != packed_size) { + DEBUG(2, ("Secrets record %s is invalid!\n", + secrets_key)); continue; } - - pull_ucs2_fstring(dom_name, pass->uni_name); - DEBUG(18, ("Fetched secret record num %d.\nDomain name: %s, SID: %s\n", - idx, dom_name, sid_string_static(&pass->domain_sid))); - - SAFE_FREE(secrets_key); - - if (idx >= start_idx && idx < start_idx + max_num_domains) { - dom = talloc_zero(ctx, sizeof(*dom)); - if (!dom) { - /* free returned tdb record */ - SAFE_FREE(pass); - - return NT_STATUS_NO_MEMORY; - } - - /* copy domain sid */ - SMB_ASSERT(sizeof(dom->sid) == sizeof(pass->domain_sid)); - memcpy(&(dom->sid), &(pass->domain_sid), sizeof(dom->sid)); - - /* copy unicode domain name */ - dom->name = talloc_strdup_w(ctx, pass->uni_name); - - (*domains)[idx - start_idx] = dom; - - DEBUG(18, ("Secret record is in required range.\n \ - start_idx = %d, max_num_domains = %d. Added to returned array.\n", - start_idx, max_num_domains)); - - *enum_ctx = idx + 1; - (*num_domains)++; - - /* set proper status code to return */ - if (k->next) { - /* there are yet some entries to enumerate */ - status = STATUS_MORE_ENTRIES; - } else { - /* this is the last entry in the whole enumeration */ - status = NT_STATUS_OK; - } - } else { - DEBUG(18, ("Secret is outside the required range.\n \ - start_idx = %d, max_num_domains = %d. Not added to returned array\n", - start_idx, max_num_domains)); + + if (pass.domain_sid.num_auths != 4) { + DEBUG(0, ("SID %s is not a domain sid, has %d " + "auths instead of 4\n", + sid_string_static(&pass.domain_sid), + pass.domain_sid.num_auths)); + continue; + } + + if (!(dom_info = TALLOC_P(*domains, struct trustdom_info))) { + DEBUG(0, ("talloc failed\n")); + tdb_search_list_free(keys); + TALLOC_FREE(tmp_ctx); + return NT_STATUS_NO_MEMORY; + } + + if (pull_ucs2_talloc(dom_info, &dom_info->name, + pass.uni_name) == (size_t)-1) { + DEBUG(2, ("pull_ucs2_talloc failed\n")); + tdb_search_list_free(keys); + TALLOC_FREE(tmp_ctx); + return NT_STATUS_NO_MEMORY; + } + + sid_copy(&dom_info->sid, &pass.domain_sid); + + ADD_TO_ARRAY(*domains, struct trustdom_info *, dom_info, + domains, num_domains); + + if (*domains == NULL) { + tdb_search_list_free(keys); + TALLOC_FREE(tmp_ctx); + return NT_STATUS_NO_MEMORY; } - - idx++; - - /* free returned tdb record */ - SAFE_FREE(pass); } - - DEBUG(5, ("secrets_get_trusted_domains: got %d domains\n", *num_domains)); + + DEBUG(5, ("secrets_get_trusted_domains: got %d domains\n", + *num_domains)); /* free the results of searching the keys */ tdb_search_list_free(keys); + TALLOC_FREE(tmp_ctx); - return status; + return NT_STATUS_OK; } /******************************************************************************* @@ -592,12 +880,12 @@ BOOL secrets_named_mutex(const char *name, unsigned int timeout) { int ret = 0; - if (!message_init()) + if (!secrets_init()) return False; - ret = tdb_lock_bystring(tdb, name, timeout); - if (ret == 0) - DEBUG(10,("secrets_named_mutex: got mutex for %s\n", name )); + ret = tdb_lock_bystring_with_timeout(tdb, name, timeout); + if (ret == 0) + DEBUG(10,("secrets_named_mutex: got mutex for %s\n", name )); return (ret == 0); } @@ -608,36 +896,359 @@ BOOL secrets_named_mutex(const char *name, unsigned int timeout) void secrets_named_mutex_release(const char *name) { - tdb_unlock_bystring(tdb, name); - DEBUG(10,("secrets_named_mutex: released mutex for %s\n", name )); + tdb_unlock_bystring(tdb, name); + DEBUG(10,("secrets_named_mutex: released mutex for %s\n", name )); } -/********************************************************* - Check to see if we must talk to the PDC to avoid sam - sync delays - ********************************************************/ - -BOOL must_use_pdc( const char *domain ) +/******************************************************************************* + Store a complete AFS keyfile into secrets.tdb. +*******************************************************************************/ + +BOOL secrets_store_afs_keyfile(const char *cell, const struct afs_keyfile *keyfile) { - time_t now = time(NULL); - time_t last_change_time; - unsigned char passwd[16]; - - if ( !secrets_fetch_trust_account_password(domain, passwd, &last_change_time) ) + fstring key; + + if ((cell == NULL) || (keyfile == NULL)) return False; - - /* - * If the time the machine password has changed - * was less than about 15 minutes then we need to contact - * the PDC only, as we cannot be sure domain replication - * has yet taken place. Bug found by Gerald (way to go - * Gerald !). JRA. - */ - - if ( now - last_change_time < SAM_SYNC_WINDOW ) - return True; - - return False; + if (ntohl(keyfile->nkeys) > SECRETS_AFS_MAXKEYS) + return False; + + slprintf(key, sizeof(key)-1, "%s/%s", SECRETS_AFS_KEYFILE, cell); + return secrets_store(key, keyfile, sizeof(struct afs_keyfile)); +} + +/******************************************************************************* + Fetch the current (highest) AFS key from secrets.tdb +*******************************************************************************/ +BOOL secrets_fetch_afs_key(const char *cell, struct afs_key *result) +{ + fstring key; + struct afs_keyfile *keyfile; + size_t size = 0; + uint32 i; + + slprintf(key, sizeof(key)-1, "%s/%s", SECRETS_AFS_KEYFILE, cell); + + keyfile = (struct afs_keyfile *)secrets_fetch(key, &size); + + if (keyfile == NULL) + return False; + + if (size != sizeof(struct afs_keyfile)) { + SAFE_FREE(keyfile); + return False; + } + + i = ntohl(keyfile->nkeys); + + if (i > SECRETS_AFS_MAXKEYS) { + SAFE_FREE(keyfile); + return False; + } + + *result = keyfile->entry[i-1]; + + result->kvno = ntohl(result->kvno); + + return True; +} + +/****************************************************************************** + When kerberos is not available, choose between anonymous or + authenticated connections. + + We need to use an authenticated connection if DCs have the + RestrictAnonymous registry entry set > 0, or the "Additional + restrictions for anonymous connections" set in the win2k Local + Security Policy. + + Caller to free() result in domain, username, password +*******************************************************************************/ +void secrets_fetch_ipc_userpass(char **username, char **domain, char **password) +{ + *username = (char *)secrets_fetch(SECRETS_AUTH_USER, NULL); + *domain = (char *)secrets_fetch(SECRETS_AUTH_DOMAIN, NULL); + *password = (char *)secrets_fetch(SECRETS_AUTH_PASSWORD, NULL); + + if (*username && **username) { + + if (!*domain || !**domain) + *domain = smb_xstrdup(lp_workgroup()); + + if (!*password || !**password) + *password = smb_xstrdup(""); + + DEBUG(3, ("IPC$ connections done by user %s\\%s\n", + *domain, *username)); + + } else { + DEBUG(3, ("IPC$ connections done anonymously\n")); + *username = smb_xstrdup(""); + *domain = smb_xstrdup(""); + *password = smb_xstrdup(""); + } +} + +/****************************************************************************** + Open or create the schannel session store tdb. +*******************************************************************************/ + +static TDB_CONTEXT *open_schannel_session_store(TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx) +{ + TDB_DATA vers; + uint32 ver; + TDB_CONTEXT *tdb_sc = NULL; + char *fname = talloc_asprintf(mem_ctx, "%s/schannel_store.tdb", lp_private_dir()); + + if (!fname) { + return NULL; + } + + tdb_sc = tdb_open_log(fname, 0, TDB_DEFAULT, O_RDWR|O_CREAT, 0600); + + if (!tdb_sc) { + DEBUG(0,("open_schannel_session_store: Failed to open %s\n", fname)); + TALLOC_FREE(fname); + return NULL; + } + + vers = tdb_fetch_bystring(tdb_sc, "SCHANNEL_STORE_VERSION"); + if (vers.dptr == NULL) { + /* First opener, no version. */ + SIVAL(&ver,0,1); + vers.dptr = (uint8 *)&ver; + vers.dsize = 4; + tdb_store_bystring(tdb_sc, "SCHANNEL_STORE_VERSION", vers, TDB_REPLACE); + vers.dptr = NULL; + } else if (vers.dsize == 4) { + ver = IVAL(vers.dptr,0); + if (ver != 1) { + tdb_close(tdb_sc); + tdb_sc = NULL; + DEBUG(0,("open_schannel_session_store: wrong version number %d in %s\n", + (int)ver, fname )); + } + } else { + tdb_close(tdb_sc); + tdb_sc = NULL; + DEBUG(0,("open_schannel_session_store: wrong version number size %d in %s\n", + (int)vers.dsize, fname )); + } + + SAFE_FREE(vers.dptr); + TALLOC_FREE(fname); + + return tdb_sc; +} + +/****************************************************************************** + Store the schannel state after an AUTH2 call. + Note we must be root here. +*******************************************************************************/ + +BOOL secrets_store_schannel_session_info(TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx, + const char *remote_machine, + const struct dcinfo *pdc) +{ + TDB_CONTEXT *tdb_sc = NULL; + TDB_DATA value; + BOOL ret; + char *keystr = talloc_asprintf(mem_ctx, "%s/%s", SECRETS_SCHANNEL_STATE, + remote_machine); + if (!keystr) { + return False; + } + + strupper_m(keystr); + + /* Work out how large the record is. */ + value.dsize = tdb_pack(NULL, 0, "dBBBBBfff", + pdc->sequence, + 8, pdc->seed_chal.data, + 8, pdc->clnt_chal.data, + 8, pdc->srv_chal.data, + 16, pdc->sess_key, + 16, pdc->mach_pw, + pdc->mach_acct, + pdc->remote_machine, + pdc->domain); + + value.dptr = TALLOC_ARRAY(mem_ctx, uint8, value.dsize); + if (!value.dptr) { + TALLOC_FREE(keystr); + return False; + } + + value.dsize = tdb_pack(value.dptr, value.dsize, "dBBBBBfff", + pdc->sequence, + 8, pdc->seed_chal.data, + 8, pdc->clnt_chal.data, + 8, pdc->srv_chal.data, + 16, pdc->sess_key, + 16, pdc->mach_pw, + pdc->mach_acct, + pdc->remote_machine, + pdc->domain); + + tdb_sc = open_schannel_session_store(mem_ctx); + if (!tdb_sc) { + TALLOC_FREE(keystr); + TALLOC_FREE(value.dptr); + return False; + } + + ret = (tdb_store_bystring(tdb_sc, keystr, value, TDB_REPLACE) == 0 ? True : False); + + DEBUG(3,("secrets_store_schannel_session_info: stored schannel info with key %s\n", + keystr )); + + tdb_close(tdb_sc); + TALLOC_FREE(keystr); + TALLOC_FREE(value.dptr); + return ret; +} + +/****************************************************************************** + Restore the schannel state on a client reconnect. + Note we must be root here. +*******************************************************************************/ + +BOOL secrets_restore_schannel_session_info(TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx, + const char *remote_machine, + struct dcinfo **ppdc) +{ + TDB_CONTEXT *tdb_sc = NULL; + TDB_DATA value; + unsigned char *pseed_chal = NULL; + unsigned char *pclnt_chal = NULL; + unsigned char *psrv_chal = NULL; + unsigned char *psess_key = NULL; + unsigned char *pmach_pw = NULL; + uint32 l1, l2, l3, l4, l5; + int ret; + struct dcinfo *pdc = NULL; + char *keystr = talloc_asprintf(mem_ctx, "%s/%s", SECRETS_SCHANNEL_STATE, + remote_machine); + + *ppdc = NULL; + + if (!keystr) { + return False; + } + + strupper_m(keystr); + + tdb_sc = open_schannel_session_store(mem_ctx); + if (!tdb_sc) { + TALLOC_FREE(keystr); + return False; + } + + value = tdb_fetch_bystring(tdb_sc, keystr); + if (!value.dptr) { + DEBUG(0,("secrets_restore_schannel_session_info: Failed to find entry with key %s\n", + keystr )); + tdb_close(tdb_sc); + return False; + } + + pdc = TALLOC_ZERO_P(mem_ctx, struct dcinfo); + + /* Retrieve the record. */ + ret = tdb_unpack(value.dptr, value.dsize, "dBBBBBfff", + &pdc->sequence, + &l1, &pseed_chal, + &l2, &pclnt_chal, + &l3, &psrv_chal, + &l4, &psess_key, + &l5, &pmach_pw, + &pdc->mach_acct, + &pdc->remote_machine, + &pdc->domain); + + if (ret == -1 || l1 != 8 || l2 != 8 || l3 != 8 || l4 != 16 || l5 != 16) { + /* Bad record - delete it. */ + tdb_delete_bystring(tdb_sc, keystr); + tdb_close(tdb_sc); + TALLOC_FREE(keystr); + TALLOC_FREE(pdc); + SAFE_FREE(pseed_chal); + SAFE_FREE(pclnt_chal); + SAFE_FREE(psrv_chal); + SAFE_FREE(psess_key); + SAFE_FREE(pmach_pw); + SAFE_FREE(value.dptr); + return False; + } + + tdb_close(tdb_sc); + + memcpy(pdc->seed_chal.data, pseed_chal, 8); + memcpy(pdc->clnt_chal.data, pclnt_chal, 8); + memcpy(pdc->srv_chal.data, psrv_chal, 8); + memcpy(pdc->sess_key, psess_key, 16); + memcpy(pdc->mach_pw, pmach_pw, 16); + + /* We know these are true so didn't bother to store them. */ + pdc->challenge_sent = True; + pdc->authenticated = True; + + DEBUG(3,("secrets_restore_schannel_session_info: restored schannel info key %s\n", + keystr )); + + SAFE_FREE(pseed_chal); + SAFE_FREE(pclnt_chal); + SAFE_FREE(psrv_chal); + SAFE_FREE(psess_key); + SAFE_FREE(pmach_pw); + + TALLOC_FREE(keystr); + SAFE_FREE(value.dptr); + + *ppdc = pdc; + + return True; +} + +BOOL secrets_store_generic(const char *owner, const char *key, const char *secret) +{ + char *tdbkey = NULL; + BOOL ret; + + if (asprintf(&tdbkey, "SECRETS/GENERIC/%s/%s", owner, key) < 0) { + DEBUG(0, ("asprintf failed!\n")); + return False; + } + + ret = secrets_store(tdbkey, secret, strlen(secret)+1); + + SAFE_FREE(tdbkey); + return ret; +} + +/******************************************************************* + Find the ldap password. +******************************************************************/ + +char *secrets_fetch_generic(const char *owner, const char *key) +{ + char *secret = NULL; + char *tdbkey = NULL; + + if (( ! owner) || ( ! key)) { + DEBUG(1, ("Invalid Paramters")); + return NULL; + } + + if (asprintf(&tdbkey, "SECRETS/GENERIC/%s/%s", owner, key) < 0) { + DEBUG(0, ("Out of memory!\n")); + return NULL; + } + + secret = (char *)secrets_fetch(tdbkey, NULL); + SAFE_FREE(tdbkey); + + return secret; }