HEIMDAL: move code from source4/heimdal* to third_party/heimdal*

[samba.git] / third_party / heimdal / doc / standardisation / draft-ietf-krb-wg-preauth-framework-00.txt

Kerberos Working Group                                        S. Hartman
Internet-Draft                                                       MIT
Expires: August 9, 2004                                 February 9, 2004


         A Generalized Framework for Kerberos Preauthentication
                 draft-ietf-krb-wg-preauth-framework-00

Status of this Memo

   This document is an Internet-Draft and is in full conformance with
   all provisions of Section 10 of RFC2026.

   Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
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   This Internet-Draft will expire on August 9, 2004.

Copyright Notice

   Copyright (C) The Internet Society (2004). All Rights Reserved.

Abstract

   Kerberos is a protocol for verifying the identity of principals
   (e.g., a workstation user or a network server) on an open network.
   The Kerberos protocol provides a mechanism called preauthentication
   for proving the identity  of a principal and for better protecting
   the long-term secret of the principal.

   This document describes a model for Kerberos preauthentication
   mechanisms.  The model describes what state in the Kerberos request a
   preauthentication mechanism is likely to change. It also describes
   how multiple preauthentication mechanisms used in the same request
   will interact.

   This document also provides common tools needed by multiple



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   preauthentication mechanisms.

   The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
   "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this
   document are to be interpreted as described in [1].

Table of Contents

   1.  Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  3
   2.  Model for Preauthentication  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  4
   2.1 Information Managed by Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  5
   2.2 The Preauth_Required Error . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  6
   2.3 Client to KDC  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  7
   2.4 KDC to Client  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  7
   3.  Preauthentication Facilities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  9
   3.1 Client Authentication  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
   3.2 Strengthen Reply Key . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
   3.3 Replace Reply Key  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
   3.4 Verify Response  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
   4.  Requirements for Preauthentication Mechanisms  . . . . . . . . 12
   5.  Tools for Use in Preauthentication Mechanisms  . . . . . . . . 13
   5.1 Combine Keys . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
   5.2 Signing Requests/Responses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
   5.3 Managing State for the KDC . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
   6.  IANA Considerations  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
   7.  Security Considerations  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
   8.  Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
       Author's Address . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
       Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
       Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
   A.  Todo List  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
       Intellectual Property and Copyright Statements . . . . . . . . 20



















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1. Introduction

   The core Kerberos specification treats preauthentication data as an
   opaque typed hole in the messages to the KDC that may influence the
   reply key used to encrypt the KDC response.  This generality has been
   useful: preauthentication data is used for a variety of extensions to
   the protocol, many outside the expectations of the initial designers.
   However, this generality makes designing the more common types of
   preauthentication mechanisms difficult. Each mechanism needs to
   specify how it interacts with other mechanisms.  Also, problems like
   combining a key with the long-term secret or proving the identity of
   the user are common to multiple mechanisms.  Where there are
   generally well-accepted solutions to these problems, it is desirable
   to standardize one of these solutions so mechanisms  can avoid
   duplication of work.  In other cases, a modular approach to these
   problems is appropriate.  The modular approach will allow new  and
   better solutions to common preauth problems to be used by existing
   mechanisms as they are developed.

   This document specifies a framework for Kerberos preauthentication
   mechanisms.  IT defines the common set of functions preauthentication
   mechanisms perform as well as how these functions affect the state of
   the request and response.  In addition several common tools needed by
   preauthentication mechanisms are provided.  Unlike [3], this
   framework is not complete--it does not describe all the inputs and
   outputs for the preauthentication mechanisms.  Mechanism designers
   should try to be consistent with this framework because doing so will
   make their mechanisms easier to implement.  Kerberos implementations
   are likely to have plugin architectures  for preauthentication; such
   architectures are likely to support mechanisms that follow this
   framework plus commonly used extensions.

   This document should be read only after reading the documents
   describing the Kerberos cryptography framework [3] and the core
   Kerberos protocol [2].  This document freely uses terminology and
   notation from these documents without reference or further
   explanation.














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2. Model for Preauthentication

   when a Kerberos client wishes to obtain a ticket using the
   authentication server, it sends an initial AS request.  If
   preauthentication is being used, then the KDC will respond with a
   KDC_ERR_PREAUTH_REQUIRED error.  Alternatively, if the client knows
   what preauthentication to use, it MAY optimize a round-trip and send
   an initial request with padata included.  If the client includes the
   wrong padata, the server MAY return KDC_ERR_PREAUTH_FAILED with no
   indication of what padata should have been included.  For
   interoperability reasons, clients that include optimistic preauth
   MUST retry with no padata and examine the KDC_ERR_PREAUTH_REQUIRED if
   they receive a KDC_ERR_PREAUTH_FAILED in response to their initial
   optimistic request.

   The KDC maintains no state between two requests; subsequent requests
   may even be processed by a different KDC. On the other hand, the
   client treats a series of exchanges with KDCs as a single
   authentication session.  Each exchange accumulates state and
   hopefully brings the client closer to a successful authentication.

   These models for state management are in apparent conflict. For many
   of the simpler preauthentication scenarios,  the client uses one
   round trip to find out what mechanisms the KDC supports.  Then the
   next request contains sufficient preauthentication for the KDC to be
   able to return a successful response.  For these simple scenarios,
   the client only sends one request with preauthentication data and so
   the authentication session is trivial.  For more complex
   authentication sessions, the KDC needs to provide the client with a
   cookie to include in future requests to capture the current state of
   the authentication session.  Handling of multiple round-trip
   mechanisms is discussed in Section 5.3.

   This framework specifies the behavior of Kerberos preauthentication
   mechanisms used to identify users or to modify the reply key used to
   encrypt the KDC response.  The padata typed hole may be used to carry
   extensions to Kerberos that have nothing to do with proving the
   identity of the user or establishing a reply key.  These extensions
   are outside the scope of this framework.  However mechanisms that do
   accomplish these goals should follow this framework.

   This framework specifies the minimum state that a Kerberos
   implementation needs to maintain while handling a request in order to
   process preauthentication.  It also specifies how Kerberos
   implementations process the preauthentication data at each step of
   the AS request process.





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2.1 Information Managed by Model

   The following information is maintained by the client and KDC as each
   request is being processed:

   o  The reply key used to encrypt the KDC response

   o  How strongly the identity of the client has been authenticated

   o  Whether the reply key has been used in this authentication session

   o  Whether the contents of the KDC response can be  verified by the
      client principal

   o  Whether the contents of the KDC response can be  verified by the
      client machine

   Conceptually, the reply key is initially the long-term key of the
   principal.  However, principals can have multiple long-term keys
   because of support for multiple encryption types, salts and
   string2key parameters.  As described in section 5.2.7.5 of the
   Kerberos protocol [2], the KDC sends PA-ETYPe-INFO2 to notify the
   client  what types of keys are available.  Thus in full generality,
   the reply key in the preauth model is actually a set of keys.  At the
   beginning of a request, it is initialized to the set of long-term
   keys advertised in the PA-ETYPE-INFO2 element on the KDC.  If
   multiple reply keys are available, the client chooses which one to
   use.  Thus the client does not need to treat the reply key as a set.
   At the beginning of a handling a request, the client picks a reply
   key to use.

   KDC implementations MAY choose to offer only one key in the
   PA-ETYPE-INFO2 element.  Since the KDC already knows the client's
   list of supported enctypes from the  request, no interoperability
   problems are created by choosing a single possible reply key.  This
   way, the KDC implementation avoids the complexity of treating the
   reply key as a set.

   At the beginning of handling a message on both the client and KDC,
   the client's identity is not authenticated.  A mechanism may indicate
   that it has successfully authenticated the client's identity.  This
   information is useful to keep track of on the client  in order to
   know what preauthentication mechanisms should be used.  The KDC needs
   to keep track of whether the client is authenticated because the
   primary purpose of preauthentication is to authenticate the client
   identity before issuing a ticket.  Implementations that have
   preauthentication mechanisms offering significantly different
   strengths of client authentication MAY choose to keep track of the



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   strength of the authentication used as an input into policy
   decisions.  For example, some principals might require strong
   preauthentication, while less sensitive principals can use relatively
   weak forms of preauthentication like encrypted timestamp.

   Initially the reply key has not been used.  A preauthentication
   mechanism that uses the reply key either directly to encrypt or
   cheksum some data or indirectly in the generation of new keys MUST
   indicate that the reply key is used.  This state is maintained by the
   client and KDC to enforce the security requirement stated in Section
   3.3 that the reply key cannot be replaced after it is used.

   Without preauthentication, the client knows that the KDC request is
   authentic and has not been modified because it is encrypted in the
   long-term key of the client.  Only the KDC and client know that key.
   So at the start of handling any message the KDC request is presumed
   to be verified to the client principal.  Any preauthentication
   mechanism that sets a new reply key not based on the principal's
   long-term secret MUST either verify the KDC response some other way
   or indicate that the response is not verified.  If a mechanism
   indicates that the response is not verified then the client
   implementation MUST return an error unless a subsequent mechanism
   verifies the response.  The KDC needs to track this state so it can
   avoid generating a response that is not verified.

   The typical Kerberos request does not provide a way for the client
   machine to know that it is talking to the correct KDC. Someone who
   can inject packets into the network between the client machine and
   the KDC and who knows the password that the user will give to the
   client machine can generate a KDC response that will decrypt
   properly.  So, if the client machine needs to authenticate that the
   user is in fact the named principal, then the client machine needs to
   do a TGS request for itself as a service.  Some preauthentication
   mechanisms may provide  a way for the client to authenticate the KDC.
   Examples of this include signing the response with a well-known
   public key or providing a ticket for the client machine as a service
   in addition to the requested ticket.

2.2 The Preauth_Required Error

   Typically a client starts an authentication session by sending  an
   initial request with no preauthentication.  If the KDC requires
   preauthentication, then it returns a KDC_ERR_PREAUTH_REQUIRED
   message.  This message MAY also be returned for preauthentication
   configurations that use multi-round-trip mechanisms.  This error
   contains a sequence of padata.  Typically the padata contains the
   preauth type IDs of all the available preauthentication mechanisms.
   IN the initial error response, most mechanisms do not contain data.



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   If a mechanism requires multiple round trips or starts with a
   challenge from the KDC to the client, then it will likely contain
   data in the initial error response.

   The KDC SHOULD NOT send data that is encrypted in the long-term
   password-based key of the principal.  Doing so has the same security
   exposures as the Kerberos protocol without preauthentication.  There
   are few situations where preauthentication is desirable and where the
   KDC needs to expose ciphertext encrypted in a weak key before the
   client has proven knowledge of that key.

   In order to generate the error response, the KDC first starts by
   initializing the preauthentication state.  Then it processes any
   padata in the client's request in the order provided by the client.
   Mechanisms that are not understood by the KDC are ignored.
   Mechanisms that are inappropriate for the client principal or request
   SHOULD also be ignored.  Next, it generates padata for the error
   response, modifying the preauthentication state appropriately as each
   mechanism is processed.  The KDC chooses the order in which it will
   generated padata (and thus the order of padata in the response), but
   it needs to modify the preauthentication state consistently with the
   choice of order.  For example, if some mechanism establishes an
   authenticated client identity, then the mechanisms subsequent in the
   generated response receive this state as input.  After the padata is
   generated, the error response is sent.

2.3 Client to KDC

   This description assumes a client has already received a
   KDC_ERR_PREAUTH_REQUIRED from the KDC.  If the client performs
   optimistic preauthentication then the client needs to optimisticly
   choose the information it would normally receive from that error
   response.

   The client starts by initializing the preauthentication state as
   specified.  It then processes the pdata in the
   KDC_ERR_PREAUTH_REQUIRED.

   After processing the pdata in the KDC error, the client generates a
   new request.  It processes the preauthentication mechanisms in the
   order in which they will appear in the next request, updating the
   state as appropriate. When the request is complete it is sent.

2.4 KDC to Client

   When a KDC receives an AS request from a client, it needs to
   determine whether it will respond with an error or  a AS reply.
   There are many causes for an error to be generated that have nothing



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   to do with preauthentication; they are discussed in the Kerberos
   specification.

   From the standpoint of evaluating the preauthentication, the KDC
   first starts by initializing the preauthentication state.  IT then
   processes the padata in the request.  AS mentioned in Section 2.2,
   the KDC MAY ignore padata that is inappropriate for the configuration
   and MUST ignore padata of an unknown type.

   At this point the KDC decides whether it will issue a
   preauthentication required error or a reply.  Typically a KDC will
   issue a reply if the client's identity has been authenticated to a
   sufficient degree.  The processing of the preauthentication required
   error is described in Section 2.2.

   The KDC generates the pdata modifying the preauthentication state as
   necessary.  Then it generates the final response, encrypting it in
   the current preauthentication reply key.

































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3. Preauthentication Facilities

   Preauthentication mechanisms can be thought of as conceptually
   providing various facilities.  This serves two useful purposes.
   First, mechanism authors can choose only to solve one specific small
   problem.  It is often useful for a mechanism designed to offer key
   management not to directly provide client authentication but instead
   to allow one or more other mechanisms to handle this need.  Secondly,
   thinking about the  abstract services that a mechanism provides
   yields a minimum set of security requirements that all mechanisms
   providing that facility must meet. These security requirements are
   not complete; mechanisms will have additional security requirements
   based on the specific protocol they employ.

   A mechanism is not constrained to only offering one of these
   facilities.  While such mechanisms can be designed and are sometimes
   useful, many preauthentication mechanisms implement several
   facilities.  By combining multiple facilities in a single mechanism,
   it is often easier to construct a secure, simple solution than  by
   solving the problem in full generality.  Even when mechanisms provide
   multiple facilities, they need to meet the security requirements for
   all the facilities they provide.

   According to Kerberos extensibility rules (section 1.4.2 of the
   Kerberos specification [2]), an extension MUST NOT change the
   semantics of a message unless a recipient is known to understand that
   extension.  Because a client does not know that the KDC supports a
   particular preauth mechanism when it sends an initial request, a
   preauth mechanism MUST NOT change the semantics of the request in a
   way that will break a KDC that does not understand that mechanism.
   Similarly, KDCs MUST not send messages to clients that affect the
   core semantics unless the clients have indicated support for the
   message.

   The only state in this model that would break the interpretation of a
   message is changing the expected reply key.  If one mechanism changed
   the reply key and a later mechanism used that reply key, then a KDC
   that interpreted the second mechanism but not the first would fail to
   interpret the request correctly.  In order to avoid this problem,
   extensions that change core semantics are typically divided into two
   parts.  The first part proposes a change to the core semantic--for
   example proposes a new reply key.  The second part acknowledges that
   the extension is understood and that the change takes effect. Section
   3.2 discusses how to design mechanisms that modify the reply key to
   be split into a proposal and acceptance without requiring additional
   round trips to use the new reply key in subsiquent preauthentication.
   Other changes in the state described in Section 2.1 can safely be
   ignored by a KDC that does not understand a mechanism.  Mechanisms



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   that modify the behavior of the request outside the scope of this
   framework need to carefully consider the Kerberos extensibility rules
   to avoid similar problems.

3.1 Client Authentication

      Binding to reply key

      Consider Secure ID case where you don't have anything to bind to


3.2 Strengthen Reply Key

   Particularly, when dealing with keys based on passwords it is
   desirable to increase the strength of the key by adding additional
   secrets to it.  Examples of sources of additional secrets include the
   results of a Diffie-Hellman key exchange or key bits from the output
   of a smart card [5].  Typically these additional secrets are
   converted into a Kerberos protocol key.  Then they are combined with
   the existing reply key as discussed in Section 5.1.

   If a mechanism implementing this facility wishes to modify the reply
   key before knowing that the other party in the exchange supports the
   mechanism, it proposes modifying the reply key.  The other party then
   includes a message indicating that the proposal is accepted if it is
   understood and meets policy.  In many cases it is desirable to use
   the new reply key for client authentication and for other facilities.
   Waiting for the other party to accept the proposal and actually
   modify the reply key state would add an additional round trip to the
   exchange.  Instead, mechanism designers  are encouraged to include a
   typed hole for additional padata in the message that proposes the
   reply key change.  The padata included in the typed hole are
   generated assuming the new reply key. If the other party accepts the
   proposal, then these padata are interpreted as if they were included
   immediately following the proposal.  The party generating the
   proposal can determine whether the padata were processed based on
   whether the proposal for the reply key is accepted.

   The specific formats of the proposal message, including where padata
   are  are included is a matter for the mechanism specification.
   Similarly, the format of the message accepting the proposal is
   mechanism-specific.

   Mechanisms implementing this facility and including a typed hole for
   additional padata MUST checksum that padata using a keyed checksum or
   encrypt the padata.  Typically the reply key is used to protect the
   padata.  XXX If you are only minimally increasing the strength of the
   reply key, this may give the attacker access to something too close



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   to the original reply key.  However, binding the padata to the new
   reply key  seems potentially important from a security standpoint.
   There may also be objections to this from a double encryption
   standpoint because we also recommend client authentication facilities
   be tied to the reply key.

3.3 Replace Reply Key

      Containers to handle reply key when not sure whether other side
      supports mech

      Make sure reply key is not used previously

      Interactions with client authentication

      Reference to container argument


3.4 Verify Response
































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4. Requirements for Preauthentication Mechanisms

      State management for multi-round-trip mechs

      Security interactions with other mechs














































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5. Tools for Use in Preauthentication Mechanisms

5.1 Combine Keys

5.2 Signing Requests/Responses

5.3 Managing State for the KDC












































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6. IANA Considerations


















































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7. Security Considerations

      Very little of the AS request is authenticated.  Same for padata
      in the reply or error.  Discuss implications

      Table of security requirements stated elsewhere in the document













































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8. Acknowledgements


















































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Normative References

   [1]  Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate Requirement
        Levels", RFC 2119, BCP 14, March 1997.

   [2]  Neuman, C., Yu, T., Hartman, S. and K. Raeburn, "The Kerberos
        Network Authentication Service (V5)",
        draft-ietf-krb-wg-kerberos-clarifications-04.txt (work in
        progress), June 2003.

   [3]  Raeburn, K., "Encryption and Checksum Specifications for
        Kerberos 5", draft-ietf-krb-wg-crypto-03.txt (work in progress).

   [4]  Yergeau, F., "UTF-8, a transformation format of ISO 10646", RFC
        2279, January 1998.




































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Informative References

   [5]  Hornstein, K., Renard, K., Neuman, C. and G. Zorn, "Integrating
        Single-use Authentication Mechanisms with Kerberos",
        draft-ietf-krb-wg-kerberos-sam-02.txt (work in progress),
        October 2003.


Author's Address

   Sam hartman
   MIT

   EMail: hartmans@mit.edu





































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Appendix A. Todo List

      Flesh out sections that are still outlines

      Discuss cookies and multiple-round-trip mechanisms.

      Talk about checksum contributions from each mechanism












































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Intellectual Property Statement

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   HEREIN WILL NOT INFRINGE ANY RIGHTS OR ANY IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF
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Acknowledgment

   Funding for the RFC Editor function is currently provided by the
   Internet Society.











































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